Post on 14-Aug-2020
Improving acquisition efficiency with a situational awareness (SA) based SIMOPS management
solution Gary Pemberton, Stuart Darling*, and Emma McDonald, ION
Summary
Situational awareness (SA) describes the accuracy of a
person’s knowledge and understanding of a situation. It
directly impacts the quality of decisions made by
personnel. SA can be severely compromised when
personnel are overloaded with complex and dynamic
information, as experienced during simultaneous operations
(SIMOPS) management in many offshore fields. When
conducting seismic acquisition, poor SA can result in an
increase in risk exposure, inefficiency and expense.
This paper presents a SIMOPS management system which
works to improve the SA of all users (including, but not
limited to seismic operations personnel), therefore
improving the efficiency and reducing the risk exposure of
acquisition. This is primarily achieved through a linked
Gantt chart and map, and the ability to model forward in
time, showing the users where vessels and other infield
equipment (such as streamers, dive crews, drilling rigs etc.)
plan to be in the future. A knowledge-based system
automatically provides alarms when rules are breached,
reducing the chance of user error and increasing visibility.
Several case histories from commercial field operations
have demonstrated that downtime and risk exposure can be
reduced through effective SA.
The cost of simultaneous operations
Oilfields are complex environments, with multiple
operations occurring simultaneously. The variety and
intricacy of SIMOPS considerations have increased
markedly as oilfields and infrastructure have developed.
Managing SIMOPS has become a major task, and errors
due to poor management can have a massive cost in QHSE
and monetary terms.
Seismic acquisition is a challenge for both the operator and
contractor, as it introduces a substantial moving obstruction
into an environment already crowded with Exploration and
Production activity. This occurs alongside industries such
as fishing and shipping which operate across oilfields.
When a seismic crew is added, the SIMOPS complexity
increases and careful planning is required. Communication
is crucial to minimizing standby - operational plans are
exchanged infield daily, often verbally or via email (as text
or spreadsheet). The problems associated with this timing
and distribution are well recognized – by the time an email
is sent the information may be out of date, and spreadsheets
cannot clearly represent the spatial nature of the operations.
A SIMOPS management system is needed which provides
all relevant parties with timely, accurate, real-time updates
during rapidly changing conditions.
The significance of situational awareness (SA)
SA describes the accuracy of a person’s current knowledge
and understanding of a task, compared to actual conditions
at the time (Lochmann et al., 2015). Endsley (1995)
describes three levels of SA: (1) perceiving/being aware of
critical information; (2) comprehending the meaning of
information in an integrated manner and (3) projecting
relevant elements into the near future, resulting in
appropriate action. The three levels build on each other -
dynamic updates of the present environment are required,
which contribute to accurate understanding of the situation,
and the projection into the future. In turn, this informs
appropriate decisions and actions for the current objectives
(Figure 1). SA is about more than information processing;
it focuses on human behavior in complex environments.
It is widely accepted that SA is a safety critical factor, and
the consequences of reduced SA in the marine environment
have been assessed - the USCG accident database indicates
that 60% of accidents can be attributed to a failure of SA
(Safahani and Tutttle, 2013). SA and risk perception were
identified as root causes by the Deepwater Horizon
investigation (Roberts et al, 2013). Statistics vary, but the
majority of incidents occur at SA level 1 (Table 1 and
Figure 1), indicating a strong requirement to improve the
users perception of elements in the current situation.
Level 1 Level 2 Level3
Aviation
(Jones & Endsley, 1996) 78% 17% 5%
Offshore Drilling
(Sneddon et al, 2006) 67% 20% 13%
Shipping
(Hetherington et al, 2006) 59% 33% 9%
Table 1: Percentage of incidents occurring at each level of SA
A phenomenon known as inattentional blindness can
further decrease SA. It defines the failure to notice a fully
visible, but unexpected, object or event when attention is
devoted to something else (Simons, 2000). As the volume
of information grows, it becomes impossible for any
individual to understand the relationships between all
variables. Consequently, companies suffer a loss of
performance and can increase the risk of QHSE incidents,
due to SIMOPS complexities.
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Improving SIMOPS management
SA and systems design
‘In light of the potential consequences, it is no longer
acceptable to rely on a system that requires the right person
to be looking at the right data at the right time, and then to
understand its significance in spite of simultaneous
activities and other monitoring responsibilities’ (p.121,
Graham et al, 2011). Endsley (1995) argues that systems
should be designed to support and enhance SA. As
processes are controlled by people, human error and
operational risk can never be entirely eliminated, but
effective systems can minimize any loss of awareness.
Literature surrounding systems design, systems engineering
and cognitive engineering is extensive, but the requirement
to collect, filter, analyze, structure, and transmit data is key
(Harrald & Jefferson, 2007). Historically there has been a
failure of systems to provide information in a usable format
(Bonaceto and Burns, 2005). Safety-critical systems
became complex to the point where they were unable to be
operated effectively by skilled users (Gersh et al, 2005).
While operator error is often cited as a causal factor, the
conditions and systems with which the operator works can
have a significant effect on the outcome (Leveson, 2011).
As data volume has increased, we require more from
systems design (Endsley, 2000). The necessary capabilities
and information must be provided in a way that is usable
cognitively as well as physically. Glandrup (2013) debates
the difficulty of gathering maritime information and
combining it in a way that is useful to the user, without
overloading them. It specifically looks at the challenge of
analyzing significant volumes of data to identify safety
critical situations. The work discusses maritime security,
but similar principles can be applied to the offshore energy
sector. The following requirements were identified:
Warn operators when needed
Provide a historic overview
Allow operators to loop back over time to check vessels
This could be achieved with a Common Operating Picture
(COP), a direct method to improve SA.
A Common Operating Picture
A COP is ‘a single display of relevant information shared
by more than one Command. A common operational
picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all
echelons to achieve situational awareness’ (Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, 2005). It initially referred
to military and security situations, but is increasingly
applied to emergency response, and has thus been utilized
by the energy sector.
In SIMOPS situations, a COP would aid SA amongst all
users across the field. Sneddon et al (2006) describe the
importance of team SA, where the drill crew works
together effectively, with a mutual understanding of the
situation. This can be expanded to encompass workers
across the field, with the added complexity of trying to gain
a good awareness of unfamiliar operations. In this situation,
a COP can be very valuable.
Automated Processes
It is recognized that manual processes are better than no
processes, and well implemented automated processes are
more effective than manual ones. Automated systems
provide a speed, consistency and reliability of search and
analysis algorithms which cannot be matched manually
(Galloway et al, 2002). Digital oilfield automation is
credited with significantly improving production rates,
while allowing engineers to focus on more skilled work
(Lochmann and Brown, 2014). This has been integrated in
the concept of ‘Intelligent Energy’, an initiative which
promotes automated solutions to improve asset
performance (Davidson & Lochmann, 2012).
Figure 1: Levels of situational awareness and feedback loop (based on Endsley 1995)
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Improving SIMOPS management
Automated system controls improve the users SA, and
reduce the likelihood of inattentional blindness by drawing
attention to relevant information. People can only store
between 5 and 9 items in their working memory (Miller
1956). By organizing and managing data, software systems
reduce the non-essential information and allow operators to
concentrate on critical items.
A rules-based monitoring system
A SIMOPS management system has been developed
specifically to aid SA. It aims to improve the safety and
efficiency of all infield operations, including seismic
acquisition, using automated processes to provide a COP.
The SIMOPS management system uses a knowledge-based,
rules-based monitoring system to integrate and display
critical information, and to help the user predict the effect
on operations in the near future. The knowledge base is
comprised of user-defined facts, including:
positions for installations and static or dynamic vessels;
exclusion zones (based on attributes such as speed
limits and permit requirements);
acquisition plans and other operational schedules;
supplementary data including meteorological data,
marine mammal observations, debris, and fishing gear.
General rules address vessel proximity, operational plan
progress, and zone encroachment (Pemberton et al, 2015).
Facts are continuously updated by the system and
monitored against the rules. When a rule is breached, an
alarm is generated, reducing the likelihood of inattentional
blindness. All warnings are logged, and data can be played
back to aid post-incident analysis and audit. Additional
facts, such as marine mammal observations, can be
documented and aggregated over multiple surveys, to build
a solid scientific basis to address regulatory concerns.
A key requirement of a SIMOPS system is the ability to
visualize SIMOPS events. The system described here
provides complete temporal and spatial representation of
operations, enabling visualization and sharing of real-time
operational data, within the field, onshore, and (via a web
map) on third party operations. By ensuring that individuals
involved in the operations have access to the same real-
time information, they may collaborate more effectively to
make critical real-time decisions.
Facts are updated automatically and manually. Authorized
users add and adjust tasks and exclusion zones, enabling
multiple accurate SIMOPS plans to be shared automatically
via an interactive Gantt chart (Figure 2). Live positional
data (such as AIS and radar feeds) are displayed
automatically, enabling real-time operational data to be
shared across the field and onshore. This data feeds
constantly into the rules system. For example, if a new AIS
target introduces a potential conflict with another operation,
an alarm will activate, alerting the operator to the predicted
collision and allowing mitigating action to be taken.
The system was first utilized on a 4D survey over multiple
fields. SIMOPS activities included saturation diving, pipe-
laying, rig moves and tanker offloading, and over 100 close
passes were performed during the acquisition. In this
environment, the ability to share SIMOPS data across all
users was invaluable, as was the link between the map and
Gantt chart, allowing the crew to optimize acquisition in
priority areas (Figure 3).
A case study
Recent energy reform opened access to the southern Gulf
of Mexico (GoM), and by mid-2015 many seismic vessels
were operating in Mexican waters. The potential for
Figure 2: Interactive Gantt chart showing overlapping task schedules. These are some of the facts which rules are monitored against.
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Improving SIMOPS management
inefficiencies resulting from this influx of crews was
significant. Vessels operating in close proximity produce
acoustic interference, reducing data quality and increasing
costs. In a 2D multiclient survey, sail-lines extended the
width of the GoM, requiring interaction with numerous
distinct operations, each with its own SIMOPS schedule.
While the majority of acquisition occurred in open water,
the survey proved how congested an area can become when
several contractors prioritize the same blocks, particularly
when adhering to a regulatory requirement to maintain
30km separation between seismic operations. Over a 3-day
period, 4 incidents occurred where the rules and time-
sliding capabilities provided by the system warned of
potential conflicts. These were identified sufficiently early
that efficient schedule changes were made, and minimal
delays occurred.
Data acquisition in a single continuous traverse
The benefits of a SA/SIMOPS management system are
clear on surveys where multiple vessels and obstructions
increase the day rate and the QHSE exposure, but effects
can also be notable on conventional surveys. A new
regional 3D survey was acquired in the North Sea,
comprising approximately 20 producing fields. As with the
2D case study, a principal priority was to acquire lines in a
single continuous pass, preventing the downtime and data
discontinuities associated with multiple attempts. The
survey included 4 shipping lanes and 26 offshore facilities,
often requiring 4 or 5 close passes of surface obstructions
per day. This is typical of the ‘hidden’ operating cost which
has been accepted in the past, but should be reduced in the
current low oil price environment (Pemberton et al, 2015).
Conclusion
Seismic surveys are frequently conducted over congested
fields where other operations influence survey efficiency.
Existing SIMOPS management systems do not provide all
parties with a full temporal and spatial overview. This
means that the SA of all personnel is compromised. A new
automated SA/SIMOPS technology has been introduced,
based on 20 years of academic SA research and extensive
field experience. It addresses the current operating
conditions of today’s low oil price environment, where
complex assets, rising production costs and low headcounts
make efficiency a practical necessity. Producers are no
longer forced to accept inefficiencies that are commonplace
in offshore operations managed by manual processes.
This management system addresses all three levels of SA.
At level 1, the system shares all critical infield and
operations data through real time data hosting. At level 2,
combining spatial and temporal elements provides a clear
visualization of the situation for all users. Continuous rules
monitoring triggers automated alarms, warning users of
potential conflicts. At level 3, the ability to slide forward in
time allows the effects of operations on each other to
become apparent, and multiple scenarios can be evaluated
in terms of operational efficiency and risk exposure. By
improving SA at all three levels, the ability to successfully
address SIMOPS is greatly increased for seismic and other
E&P operations.
Figure 3: Linked Gantt chart and map showing multiple activities. Note seismic streamer vessel in yellow at the bottom of the map.
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EDITED REFERENCES Note: This reference list is a copyedited version of the reference list submitted by the author. Reference lists for the 2016
SEG Technical Program Expanded Abstracts have been copyedited so that references provided with the online metadata for each paper will achieve a high degree of linking to cited sources that appear on the Web.
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