Improving acquisition efficiency with a situational awareness (SA) based SIMOPS management

solution Gary Pemberton, Stuart Darling*, and Emma McDonald, ION

Summary

Situational awareness (SA) describes the accuracy of a

person’s knowledge and understanding of a situation. It

directly impacts the quality of decisions made by

personnel. SA can be severely compromised when

personnel are overloaded with complex and dynamic

information, as experienced during simultaneous operations

(SIMOPS) management in many offshore fields. When

conducting seismic acquisition, poor SA can result in an

increase in risk exposure, inefficiency and expense.

This paper presents a SIMOPS management system which

works to improve the SA of all users (including, but not

limited to seismic operations personnel), therefore

improving the efficiency and reducing the risk exposure of

acquisition. This is primarily achieved through a linked

Gantt chart and map, and the ability to model forward in

time, showing the users where vessels and other infield

equipment (such as streamers, dive crews, drilling rigs etc.)

plan to be in the future. A knowledge-based system

automatically provides alarms when rules are breached,

reducing the chance of user error and increasing visibility.

Several case histories from commercial field operations

have demonstrated that downtime and risk exposure can be

reduced through effective SA.

The cost of simultaneous operations

Oilfields are complex environments, with multiple

operations occurring simultaneously. The variety and

intricacy of SIMOPS considerations have increased

markedly as oilfields and infrastructure have developed.

Managing SIMOPS has become a major task, and errors

due to poor management can have a massive cost in QHSE

and monetary terms.

Seismic acquisition is a challenge for both the operator and

contractor, as it introduces a substantial moving obstruction

into an environment already crowded with Exploration and

Production activity. This occurs alongside industries such

as fishing and shipping which operate across oilfields.

When a seismic crew is added, the SIMOPS complexity

increases and careful planning is required. Communication

is crucial to minimizing standby - operational plans are

exchanged infield daily, often verbally or via email (as text

or spreadsheet). The problems associated with this timing

and distribution are well recognized – by the time an email

is sent the information may be out of date, and spreadsheets

cannot clearly represent the spatial nature of the operations.

A SIMOPS management system is needed which provides

all relevant parties with timely, accurate, real-time updates

during rapidly changing conditions.

The significance of situational awareness (SA)

SA describes the accuracy of a person’s current knowledge

and understanding of a task, compared to actual conditions

at the time (Lochmann et al., 2015). Endsley (1995)

describes three levels of SA: (1) perceiving/being aware of

critical information; (2) comprehending the meaning of

information in an integrated manner and (3) projecting

relevant elements into the near future, resulting in

appropriate action. The three levels build on each other -

dynamic updates of the present environment are required,

which contribute to accurate understanding of the situation,

and the projection into the future. In turn, this informs

appropriate decisions and actions for the current objectives

(Figure 1). SA is about more than information processing;

it focuses on human behavior in complex environments.

It is widely accepted that SA is a safety critical factor, and

the consequences of reduced SA in the marine environment

have been assessed - the USCG accident database indicates

that 60% of accidents can be attributed to a failure of SA

(Safahani and Tutttle, 2013). SA and risk perception were

identified as root causes by the Deepwater Horizon

investigation (Roberts et al, 2013). Statistics vary, but the

majority of incidents occur at SA level 1 (Table 1 and

Figure 1), indicating a strong requirement to improve the

users perception of elements in the current situation.

Level 1 Level 2 Level3

Aviation

(Jones & Endsley, 1996) 78% 17% 5%

Offshore Drilling

(Sneddon et al, 2006) 67% 20% 13%

Shipping

(Hetherington et al, 2006) 59% 33% 9%

Table 1: Percentage of incidents occurring at each level of SA

A phenomenon known as inattentional blindness can

further decrease SA. It defines the failure to notice a fully

visible, but unexpected, object or event when attention is

devoted to something else (Simons, 2000). As the volume

of information grows, it becomes impossible for any

individual to understand the relationships between all

variables. Consequently, companies suffer a loss of

performance and can increase the risk of QHSE incidents,

due to SIMOPS complexities.

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Improving SIMOPS management

SA and systems design

‘In light of the potential consequences, it is no longer

acceptable to rely on a system that requires the right person

to be looking at the right data at the right time, and then to

understand its significance in spite of simultaneous

activities and other monitoring responsibilities’ (p.121,

Graham et al, 2011). Endsley (1995) argues that systems

should be designed to support and enhance SA. As

processes are controlled by people, human error and

operational risk can never be entirely eliminated, but

effective systems can minimize any loss of awareness.

Literature surrounding systems design, systems engineering

and cognitive engineering is extensive, but the requirement

to collect, filter, analyze, structure, and transmit data is key

(Harrald & Jefferson, 2007). Historically there has been a

failure of systems to provide information in a usable format

(Bonaceto and Burns, 2005). Safety-critical systems

became complex to the point where they were unable to be

operated effectively by skilled users (Gersh et al, 2005).

While operator error is often cited as a causal factor, the

conditions and systems with which the operator works can

have a significant effect on the outcome (Leveson, 2011).

As data volume has increased, we require more from

systems design (Endsley, 2000). The necessary capabilities

and information must be provided in a way that is usable

cognitively as well as physically. Glandrup (2013) debates

the difficulty of gathering maritime information and

combining it in a way that is useful to the user, without

overloading them. It specifically looks at the challenge of

analyzing significant volumes of data to identify safety

critical situations. The work discusses maritime security,

but similar principles can be applied to the offshore energy

sector. The following requirements were identified:

Warn operators when needed

Provide a historic overview

Allow operators to loop back over time to check vessels

This could be achieved with a Common Operating Picture

(COP), a direct method to improve SA.

A Common Operating Picture

A COP is ‘a single display of relevant information shared

by more than one Command. A common operational

picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all

echelons to achieve situational awareness’ (Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms, 2005). It initially referred

to military and security situations, but is increasingly

applied to emergency response, and has thus been utilized

by the energy sector.

In SIMOPS situations, a COP would aid SA amongst all

users across the field. Sneddon et al (2006) describe the

importance of team SA, where the drill crew works

together effectively, with a mutual understanding of the

situation. This can be expanded to encompass workers

across the field, with the added complexity of trying to gain

a good awareness of unfamiliar operations. In this situation,

a COP can be very valuable.

Automated Processes

It is recognized that manual processes are better than no

processes, and well implemented automated processes are

more effective than manual ones. Automated systems

provide a speed, consistency and reliability of search and

analysis algorithms which cannot be matched manually

(Galloway et al, 2002). Digital oilfield automation is

credited with significantly improving production rates,

while allowing engineers to focus on more skilled work

(Lochmann and Brown, 2014). This has been integrated in

the concept of ‘Intelligent Energy’, an initiative which

promotes automated solutions to improve asset

performance (Davidson & Lochmann, 2012).

Figure 1: Levels of situational awareness and feedback loop (based on Endsley 1995)

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Improving SIMOPS management

Automated system controls improve the users SA, and

reduce the likelihood of inattentional blindness by drawing

attention to relevant information. People can only store

between 5 and 9 items in their working memory (Miller

1956). By organizing and managing data, software systems

reduce the non-essential information and allow operators to

concentrate on critical items.

A rules-based monitoring system

A SIMOPS management system has been developed

specifically to aid SA. It aims to improve the safety and

efficiency of all infield operations, including seismic

acquisition, using automated processes to provide a COP.

The SIMOPS management system uses a knowledge-based,

rules-based monitoring system to integrate and display

critical information, and to help the user predict the effect

on operations in the near future. The knowledge base is

comprised of user-defined facts, including:

positions for installations and static or dynamic vessels;

exclusion zones (based on attributes such as speed

limits and permit requirements);

acquisition plans and other operational schedules;

supplementary data including meteorological data,

marine mammal observations, debris, and fishing gear.

General rules address vessel proximity, operational plan

progress, and zone encroachment (Pemberton et al, 2015).

Facts are continuously updated by the system and

monitored against the rules. When a rule is breached, an

alarm is generated, reducing the likelihood of inattentional

blindness. All warnings are logged, and data can be played

back to aid post-incident analysis and audit. Additional

facts, such as marine mammal observations, can be

documented and aggregated over multiple surveys, to build

a solid scientific basis to address regulatory concerns.

A key requirement of a SIMOPS system is the ability to

visualize SIMOPS events. The system described here

provides complete temporal and spatial representation of

operations, enabling visualization and sharing of real-time

operational data, within the field, onshore, and (via a web

map) on third party operations. By ensuring that individuals

involved in the operations have access to the same real-

time information, they may collaborate more effectively to

make critical real-time decisions.

Facts are updated automatically and manually. Authorized

users add and adjust tasks and exclusion zones, enabling

multiple accurate SIMOPS plans to be shared automatically

via an interactive Gantt chart (Figure 2). Live positional

data (such as AIS and radar feeds) are displayed

automatically, enabling real-time operational data to be

shared across the field and onshore. This data feeds

constantly into the rules system. For example, if a new AIS

target introduces a potential conflict with another operation,

an alarm will activate, alerting the operator to the predicted

collision and allowing mitigating action to be taken.

The system was first utilized on a 4D survey over multiple

fields. SIMOPS activities included saturation diving, pipe-

laying, rig moves and tanker offloading, and over 100 close

passes were performed during the acquisition. In this

environment, the ability to share SIMOPS data across all

users was invaluable, as was the link between the map and

Gantt chart, allowing the crew to optimize acquisition in

priority areas (Figure 3).

A case study

Recent energy reform opened access to the southern Gulf

of Mexico (GoM), and by mid-2015 many seismic vessels

were operating in Mexican waters. The potential for

Figure 2: Interactive Gantt chart showing overlapping task schedules. These are some of the facts which rules are monitored against.

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Improving SIMOPS management

inefficiencies resulting from this influx of crews was

significant. Vessels operating in close proximity produce

acoustic interference, reducing data quality and increasing

costs. In a 2D multiclient survey, sail-lines extended the

width of the GoM, requiring interaction with numerous

distinct operations, each with its own SIMOPS schedule.

While the majority of acquisition occurred in open water,

the survey proved how congested an area can become when

several contractors prioritize the same blocks, particularly

when adhering to a regulatory requirement to maintain

30km separation between seismic operations. Over a 3-day

period, 4 incidents occurred where the rules and time-

sliding capabilities provided by the system warned of

potential conflicts. These were identified sufficiently early

that efficient schedule changes were made, and minimal

delays occurred.

Data acquisition in a single continuous traverse

The benefits of a SA/SIMOPS management system are

clear on surveys where multiple vessels and obstructions

increase the day rate and the QHSE exposure, but effects

can also be notable on conventional surveys. A new

regional 3D survey was acquired in the North Sea,

comprising approximately 20 producing fields. As with the

2D case study, a principal priority was to acquire lines in a

single continuous pass, preventing the downtime and data

discontinuities associated with multiple attempts. The

survey included 4 shipping lanes and 26 offshore facilities,

often requiring 4 or 5 close passes of surface obstructions

per day. This is typical of the ‘hidden’ operating cost which

has been accepted in the past, but should be reduced in the

current low oil price environment (Pemberton et al, 2015).

Conclusion

Seismic surveys are frequently conducted over congested

fields where other operations influence survey efficiency.

Existing SIMOPS management systems do not provide all

parties with a full temporal and spatial overview. This

means that the SA of all personnel is compromised. A new

automated SA/SIMOPS technology has been introduced,

based on 20 years of academic SA research and extensive

field experience. It addresses the current operating

conditions of today’s low oil price environment, where

complex assets, rising production costs and low headcounts

make efficiency a practical necessity. Producers are no

longer forced to accept inefficiencies that are commonplace

in offshore operations managed by manual processes.

This management system addresses all three levels of SA.

At level 1, the system shares all critical infield and

operations data through real time data hosting. At level 2,

combining spatial and temporal elements provides a clear

visualization of the situation for all users. Continuous rules

monitoring triggers automated alarms, warning users of

potential conflicts. At level 3, the ability to slide forward in

time allows the effects of operations on each other to

become apparent, and multiple scenarios can be evaluated

in terms of operational efficiency and risk exposure. By

improving SA at all three levels, the ability to successfully

address SIMOPS is greatly increased for seismic and other

E&P operations.

Figure 3: Linked Gantt chart and map showing multiple activities. Note seismic streamer vessel in yellow at the bottom of the map.

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EDITED REFERENCES Note: This reference list is a copyedited version of the reference list submitted by the author. Reference lists for the 2016

SEG Technical Program Expanded Abstracts have been copyedited so that references provided with the online metadata for each paper will achieve a high degree of linking to cited sources that appear on the Web.

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