Post on 24-Feb-2021
id: 40280
date: 9/9/2005 18:16
refid: 05BOGOTA8495
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is
not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 008495
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2005
TAGS: KJUS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, CO, AUC
SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT APPROVES DON BERNA'S EXTRADITION;
URIBE HAS FINAL SAY
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On September 7, Colombia's Supreme Court approved the
U.S. extradition request for paramilitary commander Diego
Murillo, AKA "Don Berna," and transmitted the case to the
President for his decision. The approval occurred in much
less than normal time for such a decision (less than a third
of the time the Simon Trinidad extradition took for example).
The USG seeks his extradition for narcotrafficking crimes
committed after 1998. Berna has been a key negotiator for
the United Self-Defenses of Colombia (AUC), and is currently
involved in the U.S.-supported paramilitary demobilization
process. In private, President Uribe has expressed his
reluctance to extradite leaders who are actively advancing
the peace process.
2. (U) Following a highly-publicized GOC hunt for Don Berna
in May, the GOC placed him under house arrest on a farm in
the municipality of Piedras de Valencia, Cordoba Department.
In July 2004, the GOC suspended arrest warrants for
negotiating paramilitaries to encourage their full
participation in the peace process. The suspended arrest
warrant for other AUC leaders effectively postponed
extradition proceedings for them, but Don Berna's house
arrest status allowed his extradition process to proceed.
3. (C) President Uribe suspended a decision on AUC leader
Salvatore Mancuso's extradition, saying that his cooperation
in the peace and demobilization processes made immediate
extradition inappropriate.
-------
COMMENT
-------
4. (C) The Supreme Court may have set a political trap for
Uribe whether by design or not. Don Berna is a key player in
the paramilitaries now and maintains much influence over
others in the paramilitary groups. If Uribe extradites him,
the GOC risks a severe backlash. The slow pace of
reintegration of paramilitaries due to resource constraints
could mean the peace process is at least partially
reversible. If Uribe does not extradite Don Berna, he may be
seen as cooperating with paramilitaries and he may risk
charges from NGOs and the Colombian left (normally not/not
friends of extradition) that his government is not
prosecuting the paramilitaries. End Comment.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 22359
date: 11/2/2004 18:31
refid: 04BOGOTA11752
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is
not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 011752
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2014
TAGS: PREL, CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT URIBE IN COLOMBIA
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)
------------
Introduction
------------
1. (C) President Uribe welcomes the visit of President and
Mrs. Bush with enthusiasm. Current hot topics include:
--Floods in Northern Colombia, more than 150,000 persons
affected
--Demobilization and reinsertion of up to 3,000 paramilitary
terrorists in the next two months
--U.S. support in out years
--Free Trade Agreement negotiations; next round in Tuscon at
the end of November could be crucial
--Record-breaking drug eradication and seizures
--Major judicial reform starting in January
--Extradition
--U.S. travel advisory and security in Cartagena
--Continued shortage of helicopters for counter-drug and
counter-terror missions
--Status of U.S. hostages
--Human rights
--Alternative development and humanitarian assistance
---------------------------
Floods in Northern Colombia
---------------------------
2. (C) Heavy rainfall has caused flooding in the north coast
region, including the Cartagena area. Some 200,000 persons
have been affected and more than 300 homes destroyed.
Through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, we are
providing $150,000 in assistance to the Red Cross to help
some 10,000 persons in the hardest-hit areas south of
Cartagena.
------------------------------
Demobilization and Reinsertion
------------------------------
3. (C) Colombia plans to demobilize 3,000 or so members of
the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the
country's largest paramilitary terrorist organization, in the
next six weeks, adding to the over 1,000 paramilitaries who
demobilized in 2003. The program is underfunded and the OAS
verification chief has issued an international call for help;
several European nations have responded with low levels of
aid. Uncertainty regarding Patriot Act restrictions has
prevented direct U.S. assistance or involvement in design of
the program. President Uribe may seek U.S. assistance to
help reinsert voluntarily demobilized ex-terrorists who are
cooperating against their former organizations and otherwise
adhering to the government's program. This
demobilization/reinsertion is expected to be the template for
eventual demobilization of up to 15,000 paramilitaries by the
end of 2005, and the leftist terrorists of the ELN, with whom
preliminary talks are underway but going slowly.
------------
U.S. Support
------------
4. (C) As in past meetings, Uribe will be looking for private
and public reaffirmations of U.S. support and continued
financial resources for the next few years. Requested U.S.
assistance tops $660 million in FY05, plus a number of DOD
operating accounts. Special DOD assistance to Plan Patriota
operations runs out after 2005.
----------------------------
Free Trade Agreement/Economy
----------------------------
5. (C) Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement, with Peru and
Ecuador, begin their fifth round on November 29 in Tuscon.
President Uribe remains a strong proponent, but agricultural
and other concerns, principally regarding pharmaceuticals,
have prevented Colombia from moving as rapidly as it should.
As a result, our goal of conclusion by early 2005 is
uncertain. Colombia hopes for special consideration for its
close cooperation on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism
efforts. Overall growth continues to be strong (about 4
percent), and investment is returning. But the country faces
fiscal pressure, and President Uribe political pressure, from
the competition for resources between defense and social
needs, especially unemployment (currently 12.5 percent).
-----------------------------
Drug Eradication/Interdiction
-----------------------------
6. (C) FY04 drug eradication and interdiction are at record
levels. We should meet our 130,000-hectare goal for coca
spraying and exceed last year's level for opium poppy.
President Uribe is working to expand manual eradication
efforts. We continue to press for spraying in national parks
in the face of Colombian and U.S. congressional resistance.
Drug seizures are also at record levels. In 2004 the
Colombian National Police has seized approximately 56 metric
tons; the Colombian military, primarily the navy and coast
guard, approximately 68 metric tons; and a multi-national
force approximately 192 metric tons. Between eradication and
seizures, more than 475 metric tons of drugs have been
blocked in 2004, in comparison to about 300 tons in 2003.
---------------
Judicial Reform
---------------
7. (C) Colombia will switch to an oral adversarial trial
system, like that of the U.S., in January. We have provided
extensive training and advice to this major reform; it is
also a high priority among many in the U.S. Congress.
President Uribe may request additional resources. The
Minister of Justice has requested that the justice sector
rapidly/rapidly receive 50 percent of all Colombia-related
drug assets that we seize; in the past, Colombia has received
a smaller share, sometimes after years of delay.
-----------
Extradition
-----------
8. (C) President Uribe has approved since taking office more
than 150 extraditions to the U.S. He will likely ask for
more political sensitivity in our extradition requests, as he
and his ministers have done several times in the last year.
Although Uribe is solid in his support, extradition faces
political pressure from well-connected drug traffickers
awaiting extradition and from paramilitary leaders involved
in peace negotiations. We are taking steps to avoid killing
the golden goose. Uribe may raise paramilitary leaders'
efforts to negotiate extradition at the peace table. We have
said that extradition should not be a topic in the
negotiations, and not be addressed in any way before all/all
demobilization steps are fulfilled by the paramilitary
leaders, including peaceful demobilization of their troops.
Uribe has agreed.
------------------
Cartagena/Consular
------------------
9. (C) The U.S. travel advisory warns against all travel to
Colombia. President Uribe may ask for a cut-out for
Cartagena, so cruise ships, a potential major source of
tourist revenue, can enter. Cartagena has not seen a
terrorist incident for two years, has special safeguards for
cruise ship tourists (no incidents have been reported for
European cruise ship tourists), and has a better security
record than many Latin American capitals. Although we resist
a cut-out for Cartagena, we are working to revise the travel
advisory for Colombia as a whole, and the State Department
head of security will visit Cartagena at the end of November.
----------------------
Plan Patriota/Military
----------------------
10. (C) The Colombian Armed Forces has made steady progress
against illegal armed groups since the late 1990s, thanks in
large part to U.S. assistance. Plan Patriota is currently
focused in FARC-dominated, heavily forested southeastern
Colombia; it is going well, but slowly. The logistical
strain of keeping 17,000 troops in the dense, hostile jungle,
hundreds of miles from their supply bases, has been a huge
challenge. Poor inter-service cooperation, corruption, and
tolerance of paramilitarism continue, but they are improving,
most recently with good changes in senior military
leadership. There continues to be competition for scarce
helicopters between counter-drug and counter-terrorism
missions. President Uribe may ask for additional Blackhawk
helicopters.
----------
Reelection
----------
11. (C) Constitutional reform to permit Presidential
re-election is near completion; we believe it is probable.
The reform will face review by the Constitutional Court early
next year, a wild card. The press may seek a U.S. view on
re-election. Although we can praise President Uribe, we
should avoid comment on re-election, which could be played as
"interference in domestic affairs." Uribe is above 65
percent approval in polls.
------------
Human Rights
------------
12. (C) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress
in human rights, but has not been completely successful in
ensuring accountability, strengthening the military justice
system, in breaking military ties to paramilitary groups, or
in ending corruption. The government has an active dialogue
with NGOs, the United Nations, and foreign governments.
Human rights training is mandatory for all members of the
military and police. The Embassy vets all units that receive
U.S. assistance, in accordance with the Leahy Amendment.
Homicides fell by 20 percent, kidnappings by 30 percent, and
forced displacements by 49 percent in 2003; that trend has
continued in 2004. Less than 2 percent of human rights
violations are attributable to government security forces.
But recent violations by members of the armed forces, such as
the suspicious murders in August of three trade unionists in
the highly conflictive department of Arauca, demonstrate the
need for further improvement.
-------------
U.S. Hostages
-------------
13. (C) The three U.S.-contractor hostages captured by the
FARC in February 2003 are now the longest U.S. terror
captives in the world. (Another U.S. contractor and a
Colombian were killed by the FARC in the same incident, when
their helicopter safely crash-landed due to mechanical
failure near a FARC camp.) Plan Patriota operations have
increased the likelihood that we will receive more
information about the hostages, but also that an unintended
encounter between Colombian forces and the hostage holders
will result in their execution. The Colombians are providing
full assistance, both to keep us informed and to avoid
unplanned encounters that might endanger the hostages. The
U.S. publicly has counseled against negotiations with the
FARC for any of its dozens of hostages, to avoid providing an
incentive for further hostage-taking. We have supported
Uribe's proposals for an exchange of hostages for FARC
prisoners not accused of violent crimes provided that the
FARC prisoners are prevented from returning to terrorist
activities; so far the FARC has refused. Uribe has assured
us that the U.S. hostages will be included in any possible
exchange.
-------------------------------------------
Development, Humanitarian, Judicial Reform
-------------------------------------------
14. (C) Alternative development, humanitarian aid, and
democracy programs are going well. We have leveraged
substantial private sector assistance to establish 270 square
miles of legal agriculture benefiting 40,000 families. U.S.
aid has helped nearly 2 million internally displaced persons.
Colombia has the largest displaced population outside Africa.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 13060
date: 1/6/2004 18:34
refid: 04BOGOTA85
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is
not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 000085
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PHUM, PINR, PINS, MOPS, CO, FARC
SUBJECT: SENIOR FARC LEADER SIMON TRINIDAD IN CUSTODY: GOC
INTEREST IN EXTRADITION TO THE U.S.
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d)
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) On January 2, Ecuadorian authorities arrested Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commander Ricardo Ovidio Palmera Pineda
alias "Simon Trinidad." He is now in Colombia, where he faces over 50
counts of terrorism and other serious crimes. Palmera, who played a ke
role in managing FARC finances and is implicated in several high-profil
terrorist incidents, is the highest-ranking FARC commander ever to be
captured. His capture is a major political victory for President Uribe
and demonstrates the importance of effective security cooperation
between Colombia and its neighbors. The GOC would like to extradite
Palmera to the U.S. End Summary.
-----------------------------
Ecuador-Colombian Cooperation
-----------------------------
2. (C) On January 2, Ecuadorian authorities arrested Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commander Ricardo Ovidio Palmera Pineda
alias "Simon Trinidad," in a popular tourist district of Quito. Palmer
was allegedly in Quito to receive treatment for prostate cancer. The
Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) had been tracking his movements for
several weeks. After appearing before an Ecuadorian judge, Palmera was
turned over to Colombian authorities and transported to Bogota, where
he faces a total of 59 charges of terrorism, kidnapping, and drug
trafficking. The GOC was fully aware of the Ecuadorian operation and,
prior to the arrest, provided Ecuadorian officials with a positive
identification of Palmera. Contrary to press reports, an informant did
not provide Colombian military authorities with information on
Palmera's whereabouts; the ENP planned most of the operation
independently of Colombian authorities.
------------------------
Who is "Simon Trinidad"?
------------------------
3. (C) Palmera, more commonly known as "Simon Trinidad," is the most
senior FARC commander ever captured. Although not a member of the
seven-member FARC Secretariat, Palmera was an influential member of the
FARC's General Staff ("Estado Mayor"), a decision-making body ranking
directly below the Secretariat that administers most of the FARC's
political, strategic, and operational activities. Palmera -- who holds
a university degree in economics and hails from a wealthy
cattle-ranching family in the department of Cesar -- helped manage FARC
finances and drug trafficking operations.
4. (C) Palmera is believed to have been directly involved in several
high profile terrorist incidents, including the kidnapping and murder o
former Minister of Culture Consuelo Araujo in September 2001 and the
deaths in May 2002 of over 100 civilians who took refuge in a church
during a clash between the FARC and paramilitary forces in the town of
Boyaja, Choco department. The 53-year-old Palmera has been an active
member of the FARC for nearly 20 years and gained public prominence fro
his role as a hard-nosed FARC negotiator during peace negotiations with
the government of President Andres Pastrana from 1998-2002. Palmera di
not play a major role in planning FARC combat operations; his absence i
unlikely to hurt the group's military capacity.
---------------------
Public Relations Coup
---------------------
5. (C) Palmera's capture is a political victory for Uribe, who has
publicly pledged to kill or capture leaders of Colombia's illegal armed
groups before the end of his term. Colombian media have touted the
arrest as the most important blow to the FARC in recent memory, and it
should temporarily satisfy the public's growing impatience to see the
GOC achieve a major victory against the insurgent group. Palmera's
arrest also demonstrates the importance of close security cooperation
between the GOC and officials in neighboring countries, where FARC
leaders often go for relaxation.
-----------
Extradition
-----------
6. (C) Senior GOC officials, including President Uribe, have asked that
the U.S. consider requesting the extradition of Palmera. They
obviously would prefer to see him secure in a U.S. jail than processed
in the sometimes unreliable Colombian judicial system. Their requests
have had a note of urgency to them. At this time, however, Palmera doe
not face criminal charges in the U.S. The Embassy is unaware of any
pending investigations against this well-known narco-terrorist by U.S.
law enforcement agencies.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 13754
date: 2/5/2004 17:15
refid: 04BOGOTA1198
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 04BOGOTA993
header:
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not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001198
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2014
TAGS: PREL, KJUS, PTER, SNAR, PHUM, CO, Demobilization
SUBJECT: URIBE ON PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION
REF: BOGOTA 993
Classified By: DCM Milton Drucker, Reasons: 1.5 B & D.
1. (C) In a February 4 meeting with Ambassador Wood and
visiting U.S. inter-agency delegation, President Uribe stated
that he was instructing his Administration to offer
paramilitary leaders two options: relocation to so-called
"concentration zones" for those who agree to demobilize or
prosecution (e.g., jail or death on the battlefield).
Ambassador and DAS Peter DeShazo urged Uribe to neither lift
the arrest orders on top paramilitary leaders, including
Carlos Castano and Salvatore Mancuso of the AUC, nor attempt
to change extradition laws (see para 3 reftel). Uribe
stressed he would not modify extradition. Uribe added that
if demobilized paramilitaries were to be given a temporary
safe conduct in concentration zones they would need to be
engaged in social service type activities. Uribe noted that
since he took office (August 2002), 3908 paramilitaries had
been captured and an additional 435 had been killed.
2. (C) In a January 27 meeting with Ambassador and members
of the Core Group (reftel), Peace Commissioner Restrepo had
indicated that the GOC would not formally lift arrest
warrants for paramilitary leaders, but intended to allow them
freedom of movement in designated zones in order to
facilitate demobilization (and OAS observation efforts).
3. (C) Comment: Uribe is firm on his commitment not to
touch extradition in the event of a collective paramilitary
demobilization. We will continue to work with the Uribe
Administration to find a satisfactory way to deal with the
issue of AUC members who already have arrest warrants.
Additional items discussed in the February 4 meeting with
Uribe will be reported septel.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 37166
date: 7/22/2005 20:33
refid: 05BOGOTA6889
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: UNCLASSIFIED
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is
not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 006889
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KMDR, KPAO, OPRC, PREL, SNAR, PGOV, CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: JULY 2005 GALLUP POLL RESULTS
Security Policies
-----------------
1. (U) The survey found that 71% of respondents feel
safer today than they did a year ago, up seven percent
(64%) from April 2005. Those disagreeing with the
statement decreased from 31% in April to 26% in July.
As such, a little over a third of Colombians (36%)
feel that public order/security is the country's top
problem. As security conditions improve, the public's
willingness to forego some liberties to improve
security decreased, from 63% in December 2004 to 55%
in July. The large majority (73%) believes that the
Government is respectful of human rights; 19%
Peace Process
-------------
2. (U) Public support for the Government's
negotiations with paramilitary groups remains strong -
73% in favor, and 23% against. Support for
reinsertion programs for former members of guerrilla/
paramilitary groups has declined from 65% in April to
56% in July. Public support for humanitarian
exchanges between guerrillas and hostages also
continues to decline, from 47% in favor in December
2004, to 36% in July 2005.
Economic Management
--------------------
3. (U) With security conditions improving in the cities
where the poll was taken, respondents identified the economy
as the main problem facing Colombia (46%). Sixty-percent
disapproved of the president's handling of cost of
living issues (36% approved), and 59% disapproved of
his unemployment policies (36% approved). On an FTA
with the United States, support decreased from 60% in
June 2004 to 52% in July 2005.
Extradition
-----------
4. (U) Support for extradition, at 44% in July, is
down three points from March.
Aerial Spraying
---------------
5. (U) For the first time, opposition to aerial
spraying surpassed approval, 50% to 47%. Support for
aerial spraying has lost 6% points since December
2004.
Elections/Candidates
--------------------
6. (U) Support for President Uribe's reelection
remained strong at 66%. Favorable ratings for other
potential presidential candidates were as follows:
- Colombia's ambassador to Spain, Noemi Sanin: 54%
- Bogota Mayor Luis E. Garzon: 54%
- Former Bogota Mayor Antanas Mockus 51%
- Former Bogota Mayor Enrique Penalosa: 46%
- Polo Democratico candidate Senator Antonio
Navarro Wolf: 37%
- Vice-President Santos: 38%
- Former President Cesar Gaviria: 35%
- Minister of Interior Sabas Pretelt: 32%.
- Liberal Party hopeful Horacio Serpa: 30%
Seventy percent of respondents considered themselves
political independents, 19% Liberals, and 6%
Conservatives.
Institutions
------------
7. (U) Among institutions, the Armed Forces enjoyed
the highest favorable image, at 80%. Plan Colombia
and the Police, at 70% and 69% respectively, were in
the top five. The United Nations has a 67% favorable
rating, and Human Rights NGOs come in next at 66%.
With regards to Venezuela, 37% have a favorable
opinion, while 50% have a negative opinion. When
asked if the relationship with Venezuela could be
described as respectful and prosperous, those agreeing
with that statement have been decreasing steadily from
65% in March, 61% in April, to a low of 47% in July.
Hugo Chavez received 16% favorable ratings and 49%
unfavorable.
8. (U) The opinion poll was conducted by telephone in
the four largest metropolitan areas July 5-6. It overweighted
poorer respondents and represents a good profile of the more
politically relevant or influential populat
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 16082
date: 4/16/2004 23:24
refid: 04BOGOTA3894
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: SECRET
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is
not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
S E C R E T BOGOTA 003894
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KJUS, SNAR, CO
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON COLOMBIAN DRAFT LEGISLATION TOUCHING ON
EXTRADITION
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 B & D.
1. (S) Summary: The Colombian House of Representatives is
close to a final vote on criminal procedure code reforms.
The GOC, supported strongly by the Embassy, is pushing for
status quo on the article that addresses extradition. A
sizable number of congressmen, however, continues to advocate
new language that would add an oral evidentiary hearing to
the extradition process. Senior House players have assured
us that the GOC will prevail in the House. In addition,
ranking senators have assured us the GOC would ultimately
prevail in the Senate, which would be the final step in
passage of legislation. Nevertheless, we continue to monitor
the situation as drug traffickers and paramilitaries are
trying to influence both houses. In a related development,
38 members of Congress co-signed a legislative proposal to
modify the Constitution to prohibit extradition of any
individual who participates in an eventual peace process with
the government. As a Constitutional reform, this measure
would face a higher vote hurdle for passage. End Summary.
2. (C) The week of April 12 saw two sessions of debate in
the House regarding reforms to the Criminal Procedure Code
(Codigo de Procedimiento Penal). Debate is set to resume on
April 20. A crucial item in the legislation is Article 518,
which established procedures for the Supreme Court's role in
the extradition process (Spanish texts faxed to WHA/AND).
The House Constitutional Affairs Committee passed a reform
proposal that would modify Article 518 to mandate an oral
evidentiary hearing between the Court and the defense
attorney of the potential extraditee. The GOC, supported
strongly by the Embassy, has pushed for maintaining Article
518 intact. Article 518 at present calls for Supreme Court
written administrative review of the extradition request.
The oral hearing element, according to Embassy and Colombian
legal experts, would potentially subject the extradition
process to questions, delays, and legal challenges. Sabas
Pretelt and Mario Iguaran, GOC Interior and Justice Minister
and Vice Minister, respectively, maintained a near constant
presence in the House during debate the week of April 13, in
an effort to keep out damaging extradition language. The
Embassy also expressed U.S. opposition to legislators.
3. (C) In a related development, on April 14,
Representative Maria del Rocio Arias Hoyos, along with 38
House and Senate co-sponsors (Senate membership is 102, House
166), introduced into the House a proposal to prohibit
extradition of any individual who "reincorporates into
society by way of a peace process with the government." (Text
faxed to WHA/AND). The proposal is not currently on the
formal congressional calendar. As a Constitutional reform,
the Arias proposal would require four rounds of approval, two
in each house, and in back-to-back congressional periods
(periods are March-June and July-December). The second round
in both houses would require qualified majority, i.e.,
majority vote of total members (vice quorum). President
Uribe appears to have enough members in both houses to
prevent its passage.
4. (C) Comment: The criminal procedure code legislation,
once passed by the House, would need to be passed by the
Senate prior to becoming law. Speaker Alonso Acosta and Vice
President Edgar Torres have assured us privately that the GOC
will carry the day in the House. Senate Constitutional
Affairs Committee Chair Luis Gomez Gallo and member Andres
Gonzalez (former GOC Justice Minister) tell us that any
attempt to modify extradition will not make it out of their
committee. Nevertheless, the congressional scene is a
complicated one, and ongoing tensions between the Executive
and Legislative branches may complicate the GOC's ability to
hold the line on extradition. Fortunately, the Arias
proposal (para 3), as a Constitutional reform, faces a higher
vote threshold in the second round.
5. (S) Comment (continued): Embassy has information
indicating that both drug traffickers and paramilitaries may
be attempting to influence senators and congressman. Embassy
will continue to monitor the situation and lobby against any
and all modifications to extradition rules and procedures.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 16448
date: 4/28/2004 15:53
refid: 04BOGOTA4297
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 04BOGOTA4278
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is
not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004297
SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR POLITICAL COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SUBJECT LINE CHANGED)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014
TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, SNAR, ASEC, CO, ELN Peace Process
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MOD AND PEACE
COMMISSIONER
REF: BOGOTA 04278
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On April 27, Ambassador spoke to Minister of Defense
Uribe and Peace Commissioner Restrepo about that day's
presidential declaration on the peace process (reftel).
2. (C) Minister Uribe said that the declaration had been
composed the day before and had been reviewed before issuance
by himself, Minister of Interior and Justice Pretelt,
Restrepo, and the military High Command. Although the
President wrote most of the declaration himself, the message
was a product of many hands. Ambassador told Restrepo that
the Embassy strongly supported the declaration.
3. (C) Regarding the opening line on paramilitary threats
against the President, Minister Uribe said they had good
information that drug trafficker/paramilitary "Don Berna" and
others were trying to organize an attempt on the President's
life. Paramilitary attacks on the President are a new
phenomenon and run counter to their rhetoric of "patriotism."
4. (C) Regarding the line that "those who wished to avoid
extradition must demonstrate to the international community
good faith and a purpose of amending their ways," Minister
Uribe said it was not meant to open the door to evasion of
extradition. Rather, the declaration was clear that
extradition was not on the negotiating table and equally
clear that it was the "international community" who must be
convinced in any case where extradition was not granted.
Extradition would remain an open possibility in all cases
and, at least for the time being, the subject was closed.
5. (C) Minster Uribe commented that the declaration should
serve to separate any paramilitaries interested in a genuine
peace process from those, increasingly dominant, who are
merely narco-terrorists trying to masquerade as political
actors to get in on the benefits. He shared the view that
Carlos Castano was dead and that the paramilitary movement
was falling increasingly into purely narco-terrorist hands.
6. (C) Restrepo said that the declaration was not an
ultimatum, in spite of the language saying "(if the
paramilitaries) do not comply, the government will continue
fighting them until they are done with." Restrepo said it
was a "clarification," which would help him at the
negotiating table, remove any doubts that his tough line was
not also that of the President, and present the
paramilitaries with a clear choice. He stressed the criteria
of a real cease-fire, concentration of forces, and movement
toward demobilization were key to progress.
7. (C) The declaration coincided, by chance, with a rally in
Cali in favor of a "humanitarian exchange" of prisoners of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for kidnap
victims. The evening news in Colombia focused on the
declaration's statement that the FARC would not be permitted
to impose a humanitarian exchange by threat that would weaken
the Government's policy of democratic security. A parade of
family members of kidnap victims criticized the declaration.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 41267
date: 9/23/2005 22:03
refid: 05BOGOTA9089
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is
not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 009089
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015
TAGS: KJUS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, CO, ELN Peace Process, Demobilization
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER OPPOSES DON BERNA'S EXTRADITION
AND IS SURPRISED BY SUPPORT FOR ELN TALKS
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo on September
22 told the Ambassador that the GOC is inclined not to
extradite Diego Murillo AKA "Don Berna" at the moment because
it would endanger future demobilizations and Don Berna
remains an important player in ensuring these demobilizations
happen. The Ambassador responded that not extraditing Don
Berna would feed domestic and international critics of the
peace process. Restrepo agreed to delay any public
announcement on Don Berna until the Ambassador has had the
opportunity to consult with Washington and speak again to
President Uribe. Restrepo also updated the Ambassador on the
public and private support the GOC has received for its
preliminary peace talks with the National Liberation Army of
Colombia (ELN). He contrasted this with the unenthusiastic
response to the GOC's decision to allow 38 jailed
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) members to
benefit from Justice and Peace (J&P) law sentence reductions.
End summary.
--------------------------------------------- --------
GOC LEANING IN FAVOR OF KEEPING DON BERNA IN COLOMBIA
--------------------------------------------- --------
2. (C) Restrepo expressed ambivalence about Don Berna's
extradition. On the one hand, he is aware of the political
implications, in particular with the USG and NGOs, of
refusing to extradite him given ongoing criticism the GOC's
negotiations with the AUC. Nevertheless, his primary goal is
to demobilize the remaining paramilitary structures during
the next three months and Don Berna remains an important
player in ensuring this happens.
3. (C) Restrepo explained that if the GOC were to announce
Don Berna's extradition now it could generate "panic," freeze
future demobilizations, and lead those leaders imprisoned in
Santa Fe de Ralito to try to escape. There is already fear
and resistance after meetings last week with AUC leaders when
he made clear that demobilized paramilitary leaders would
serve time in prison. He was told that his announcement had
angered many AUC members, especially those in the middle
ranks, and that his statement threatened the current peace
talks with the remaining paramilitary blocks.
4. (C) Restrepo insisted that his hesitation to extradite Don
Berna did not extend to the other 10 to 12 key AUC leaders.
If Don Berna is extradited, however, Restrepo foresees a
significant change in the atmosphere, which could affect
ongoing peace talks and spark paramilitary violence. He
emphasized that the GOC would need significant USG security
assistance if this occurred. He drew on his experience as a
psychologist to express particular concern for the state of
mind of the paramilitaries, whom he described as "bandits
willing and able to do harm." His preference was not to
scare them, but instead to encourage them to continue to
"enter the corral" and participate in the process. Meanwhile,
he said that AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso wanted to speak to
the USG because he is willing to consider serving some time
in the United States and could convince others to do the
same. Other AUC leaders have suggested that after being
convicted in Colombia, they would like to serve their time in
another country. The rational for this is that they have no
opportunities here and their lives would be in danger from
fellow AUC and FARC members.
--------------------------------------------- ----
AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED USG POSITION ON EXTRADITION
--------------------------------------------- ----
5. (C) The Ambassador said the USG wants Don Berna's
extradition for judicial and political reasons. Judicially,
the USG has been able to support the Justice and Peace (J&P)
law because the GOC promised it would not negotiate
extradition. The J&P law denies benefits for illegal
activities conducted for personal gain before membership. The
law permits the serving of sentences abroad. Therefore,
there should be no obstacle for Don Berna or others to be
extradited to the United States. Don Berna personally
benefited from illicit activities before and during his
membership in the AUC. Don Berna has also been accused of
complicity in the killing of a government official while
negotiating, thus violating the ceasefire, and his subsequent
denial of responsibility for this crime makes him eligible
for trial in the regular criminal justice system.
6. (C) From the political perspective, the Ambassador said he
understood Uribe's concern about the political cost of
extradition while trying to demobilize paramilitaries.
Nevertheless, showing a firm hand with respect to the rule of
law would help to further legitimize the process. The
Ambassador said that in his meetings on September 23 with
Governor Gaviria of Antioquia, Mayor of Medellin Fajardo and
General Carillo, both Gaviria and Carillo favored Don Berna's
extradition, and the Mayor did not oppose the idea. (Berna
had an extensive network in Medellin.)
7. (C) The Ambassador stressed the intense focus in the U.S.
and elsewhere on Colombia's demobilization and reinsertion
efforts. An announcement like that for Salvatore Mancuso,
that the GOC was suspending Don Berna's extradition "while he
assisted the peace process" would undercut support for the
demobilization process and the J&P law. It would also
undermine Uribe's credibility shortly after his conversations
with members of the U.S. Congress. The Ambassador asked that
there be no public statement until he again discussed it with
President Uribe.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
POTENTIAL TALKS WITH ELN RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT...
--------------------------------------------- ----------
8. (C) Restrepo said that in the past days he has received
more local and international support on potential peace talks
with the ELN than he has had during his three years trying to
promote peace with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC). Politicians, former Presidents, the Catholic Church,
and the Swedish and Norwegian governments have expressed
their willingness to help in the process. With the AUC, he
struggled to "fill a van of supporters," while with the ELN
he has already had to "hire three large buses and turn people
back." He was appreciative of the reiteration of USG support
for the process and emphasized his hope that the ELN would
take advantage of it.
9. (C) Restrepo speculated that the talks might succeed
because of tensions between the ELN and the FARC. In recent
weeks, the FARC has intensified its threats against the ELN
leadership and warned them to withdraw from negotiations or
expect a war. Restrepo said the FARC's tactic of
discouraging the ELN from negotiating may benefit the
government. Specifically, he thought the threats could
backfire by convincing the ELN to negotiate now before
fighting with the FARC weakens them further.
--------------------------------------------- ----
...BUT SUPPORT FOR FARC'S 38 J&P PETITION IS WEAK
--------------------------------------------- ----
10. (C) Restrepo understood the political cost of allowing
the petition of the 38 jailed FARC members to participate
under the Justice and Peace (J&P) law, but underscored the
overall value of this and similar future requests. He
explained that accepting these requests weakens FARC morale
and helps the GOC collect intelligence against the
guerrillas. He hoped to put the FARC members interested in
participating in the J&P law through a rigorous interrogation
process, which could confirm their identification and extract
relevant intelligence. He added that he has a list of an
additional 150 FARC members waiting for a response from the
GOC regarding their petitions to participate under the J&P
law.
-------
COMMENT
-------
11. (C) We believe that we can persuade the Uribe
Administration not to suspend Don Berna's extradition on an
open-ended basis like they did for Mancuso. But we doubt we
can get a decision for immediate extradition by the September
29 deadline.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 44203
date: 11/1/2005 13:28
refid: 05BOGOTA10230
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is
not available.
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 010230
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, VE, CO, 2006 Elections, Venezuela, ELN, FARC
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT GAVIRIA HIGHLIGHTS PARAMILITARY
INFLUENCE; SUGGESTS U.S. ESTABLISH CHANNEL TO CHAVEZ
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)
-------
Summary
-------
1. (C) Former President Cesar Gaviria told Polcouns October
28 that paramilitaries are threatening and intimidating
Liberal Party candidates and office holders, and claimed
President Uribe's efforts to combat such activities are
conspicuous by their absence. The Liberal Party would
continue to campaign throughout the country despite
paramilitary threats. (Almost as if on cue, Uribe said the
same day that paramilitaries who interfered in the electoral
process would lose benefits under the Justice and Peace law.)
Gaviria said extradition is at the core of the current
GOC-paramilitary impasse and expressed surprise at the manner
in which Uribe was handling the issue. Gaviria predicted the
Liberals would increase their legislative representation in
March 2006 elections. He discounted the importance of an
upcoming Constitutional Court ruling on the Electoral
Guarantees law, and predicted that Uribe could win the
presidency in May on the first ballot. Gaviria suggested the
U.S. establish a private, confidential channel to Venezuelan
President Chavez, preferably a U.S. citizen close to
President Bush. In the alternative, Gaviria said OAS
Secretary General Insulza "would not be a bad choice," nor
SIPDIS
would a non-U.S. citizen who had the confidence of President
Bush. End summary.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
Paramilitaries Exerting Dangerous Influence in Campaigns
--------------------------------------------- -----------
2. (C) Gaviria said paramilitaries are threatening and
intimidating Liberal Party candidates and office holders,
especially in the Departments of Antioquia, Risaralda, and
Bolivar, as well as on the coast. In one case, Gaviria said
narcotics trafficker "Macaco" (who heads up the Central
Bolivar Bloc of paramilitaries, the most powerful yet to
demobilize) visited a town in Risaralda to ensure that
Macaco's brother became the next mayor. In similar ways, he
said, paramilitaries are telling Liberal Party candidates
that they are not welcome in certain areas and that the
paramilitaries have already selected the winning candidates.
The party has received information from confidential
informants about paramilitary intentions against party
candidates and from security detail observation of vehicles
following party officials. The party has filed complaints
with the police. Gaviria said Liberals would continue to
campaign throughout the country despite the risks because
there was no other option. (One of Gaviria's DAS security
detail said after the meeting that an AUC informant had told
of a specific AUC plan to attack Gaviria. Gaviria's security
detail has one armored vehicle for Gaviria's use.)
3. (C) Gaviria is worried about a violent election campaign
(though not as violent as the 1990s) in the wake of the
recent attack on Senator German Vargas Lleras, which Gaviria
believes is more likely to be the work of a
paramilitary/narcotics trafficker nexus than the work of the
FARC. The possibility of a violent campaign is increased
when the influence of regional mafias is taken into account,
he said. They also have interests to protect.
-----------------------------------
Uribe Silent on Paras, Gaviria Says
-----------------------------------
4. (C) Gaviria said he did not understand why Uribe stayed
silent in the face of clear evidence of paramilitary
intimidation. "We don't know where he stands," he said. In
Gaviria's view, Uribe should at least state that
paramilitaries are not welcome in any political grouping that
purports to support the president, and make clear that he
rejects paramilitary support. His silence is troubling, in
Gaviria's view. Uribe's efforts with the paramilitaries have
focused too much on reconciliation and not enough on justice
and truth, he said. More generally, the Uribe
administration's effort to permit sentenced prisoners (from
the AUC and FARC) to benefit from the Justice and Peace law
was "absurd," Gaviria said.
----------------------------------
Extradition is Point of Contention
----------------------------------
5. (C) Gaviria believes that extradition is the crux of the
current difficulty that Uribe is facing with the
paramilitaries and expressed surprise that Uribe has failed
to manage the matter more effectively. Gaviria asserted the
GOC, through Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, had
made private commitments on extradition to certain
paramilitary leaders and is now facing their fear and
distrust. The paramilitaries worry about extradition above
all else. In Gaviria's view, Uribe's lack of transparency on
extradition has caused the current tensions. He said if
Uribe was going to promise not to extradite certain leaders,
he should have obtained a much better deal from the
paramilitaries than that embodied in the Justice and Peace
law.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Uribe Could Win on First Ballot; Law No Impediment
--------------------------------------------- -----
6. (C) Gaviria predicted Uribe could win the presidency on
the first ballot in May 2006 but noted that his likely voter
poll numbers are falling. The Liberals would not win but
would make it a contest. Horacio Serpa was the most likely
Liberal standard bearer against Uribe, but Rafael Pardo and
Rodrigo Rivera should not be discounted. The Constitutional
Court's ruling on the Electoral Guarantees law (expected
November 11) would be no impediment to Uribe running again,
in Gaviria's opinion. The Court has made its basic
constitutional ruling and the Court's view of the guarantees
law cannot change that. It would be helpful to have a
clearer sense of the limitations on public officials getting
involved in political campaigns, and of the allocation of
media time, but such issues pale when considered next to the
dangers of campaigning in the face of paramilitary threats,
he said.
---------------------------------------------
Liberals Expect to Increase Legislative Seats
---------------------------------------------
7. (C) The Liberal Party should be able to increase its
Senate representation from 20 to between 25 and 30 seats in
March elections (out of 102), according to Gaviria. (Note:
Liberal Party identification is somewhat murky, as
allegiances are prone to shift. Gaviria's figure of 20
Liberal Senators seems high. End note.) Liberal Party
workers are motivated and energetic, more so than the
backbone of other parties. A combined Liberal/Polo
Democratico legislative bloc would have a good chance of
exceeding a combined Uribista/Conservative party grouping, he
suggested.
---------------------------------------
U.S. Should Establish Channel to Chavez
---------------------------------------
8. (C) In response to a question about Venezuela, Gaviria
suggested that the U.S. open a private, confidential channel
to Chavez. The best candidate to serve in this position
would be a U.S. citizen close to President Bush. Other
possibilities included OAS Secretary General Insulza ("he
would not be bad") or other non-U.S. citizens, as long as
such a person had reasonably strong access to the White
House. From Gaviria's perspective, Chavez is more measured
in his actions than many give him credit for and has a strong
sense of how far he can go; he will not cross certain lines.
His rhetoric is more important to him than concrete
achievements. Chavez has to know that he is essentially
talking directly to the White House when he deals with a U.S.
emissary.
9. (C) Gaviria said Chavez might try to influence Colombian
politics but he would not be successful. "No-one would dare
take his money," he suggested. He said it was more likely
that Chavez was already trying to influence elections in
countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador.
------------
FARC and ELN
------------
10. (C) Gaviria said the FARC was likely to commit terrorist
attacks during the electoral campaign "because that is what
they do." However, the FARC has never been a factor in
Colombian electoral campaigns and this time would be no
different. The ELN peace process is worth the effort,
Gaviria said, but it appears to lack the necessary political
will to be successful, especially on the part of Uribe, who
(like Samper and Pastrana) started the process late in his
term.
Comment
-------
11. (C) Gaviria remains one of the most adroit partisan
political leaders in Colombia. Uribe and Gaviria exchanged
views on paramilitary influence in recent days. Uribe said
October 28 that paramilitaries should respect democracy, and
warned that those who interfered in the political process
would lose benefits under the Justice and Peace law.
Gaviria, in an interview published October 29, repeated his
criticisms of Uribe on this subject and called for action,
not words, to ensure a fair campaign environment.
WOOD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 123557
date: 9/25/2007 17:02
refid: 07BOGOTA6967
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 006967
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, VZ, CO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD'S SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING WITH
GOC PEACE COMMISSIONER LUIS CARLOS RESTREPO
Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) GOC Peace Commissioner Restrepo said that the GOC
finds it hard to control Senator Cordoba's and President
Chavez' efforts to facilitate a humanitarian exchange. The
FARC has little interested in an exchange, but wants to use
Chavez' role to gain international recognition, create
tensions between the GOC and USG, and gain space to help it
outlast Uribe's presidency. The GOC and USG must work closely
together to prevent the FARC from blaming them should the
initiative eventually collapse. Restrepo described the ELN
peace process as "exhausted," but said Chavez' role brings
new energy to the talks. He also commented that he would
consult with President Uribe on the usefulness of USG funding
of civil society in the process. Restrepo said Uribe needs
"judicial" proof of Don Berna's ongoing involvement in crime
to extradite him. End Summary
------------------------------------
THE FARC AND A HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE
------------------------------------
2. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador and PolCouns on September
21, Restrepo said the GOC accepted Senator Cordoba's initial
proposal of direct GOC-FARC talks outside of Colombia with no
demilitarized zone (despeje), because it coincides with
President Uribe's position. The GOC hoped that by setting
the rules of the game--no despeje and no return of FARC
prisoners to FARC ranks--it could keep Cordoba and President
Chavez under control. This has proved difficult. Cordoba
has respected the GOC position of no despeje, but has ignored
GOC instructions not to involve other countries or
international actors in the process. She did not consult
with the GOC before launching her trip to the United States
to meet with "Simon Trinidad" and "Sonia," U.S. legislators,
and family members of the U.S. hostages. Similarly, Chavez
has supported the FARC's call for a despeje and continues to
push for a meeting with FARC leader Marulanda despite the GOC
position.
3. (C) Restrepo said the GOC needs to react each time Cordoba
or Chavez exceeds the limits set by the GOC. After Cordoba
met with Congressman McGovern, he called Ambassador Barco and
asked that President Uribe publicly support a meeting of U.S.
Congressmen with President Chavez. At the same time, Cordoba
called Uribe and urged him to publicly endorse a meeting of
the family members of the U.S. hostages with Chavez. Uribe
reacted sharply, telling Barco to inform McGovern he would
not insert himself into "U.S. domestic politics." Restrepo
said he told Cordoba and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas
Maduro they should not involve other international actors
without prior GOC approval. Maduro said Chavez understood,
but unilateral Chavez statements remain a problem.
4. (C) Restrepo judged that the FARC has no interested in a
humanitarian accord or broader peace process. It wants to
exploit Chavez' involvement to gain international
recognition, create tensions between the GOC and the USG, and
gain political space that will help it outlast Uribe's
presidency. The GOC and USG must manage the process in a way
that does not permit this or for the FARC to escape blame for
the process' eventual collapse. The USG statements
supporting the humanitarian initiative were positive, and
caught Chavez, Cordoba, and the FARC by surprise. Restrepo
continued that the USG should explain to Congressman McGovern
and other U.S. legislators that the FARC will try to
manipulate them and the hostages' families for political
advantage.
5. (C) He said the GOC plans to demand an immediate meeting
with the FARC if a FARC emissary meets with Chavez in
Caracas. Such a request would highlight that the GOC and
FARC do not need a despeje to hold talks on a humanitarian
accord, and would be resisted by the group. If the FARC
refuses to meet, the GOC will consider ending the process.
Restrepo said he had explained the GOC's stance to Cordoba
and Chavez. Cordoba assured him that the FARC will meet with
him in Caracas, but Restrepo remains skeptical.
---
ELN
---
6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query. Restrepo said
the ELN has no political agenda and manipulates the peace
process, particularly civil society groups' participation, to
play for time. The GOC tries to pressure by cutting off its
funding from the Swedes, Norwegians, and Swiss, and by
limiting its contacts with civil society. Chavez'
involvement injects some new energy into an "exhausted"
process, but it does not compensate for the ELN's lack of
political vision. Restrepo agreed that U.S. funding of a
civil society group--if focused on a specific purpose and for
a limited time period--might help move the process forward.
He would consult with President Uribe and get back to the
Ambassador on this issue.
-------------------------
DON BERNA AND EXTRADITION
-------------------------
7. (C) Restrepo said various officials inside and outside the
GOC believe that the DEA letter outlining the evidence of
Diego Fernando Murillo AKA Don Berna's on-going criminal
activity does not justify his extradition. Medellin Mayor
Sergio Fajardo told President Uribe that Don Berna continues
to meet his obligations under the paramilitary peace process,
Colombian National Police Director Oscar Naranjo said he has
no proof of his involvement in criminal activity after his
demobilization. Restrepo told the Ambassador that he,
himself, had recommended extradition based on current
evidence. Nevertheless, Uribe believes he needs "judicial"
proof, such as an identified witness, to extradite Berna.
Brownfield
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 120131
date: 8/27/2007 19:23
refid: 07BOGOTA6278
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
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----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 006278
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2010
TAGS: MARR, PRGOV, PREL, PTER, CO
SUBJECT: EXTRADITION PROCESS ON TRACK FOR FORMER PARAS
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer. Reason: 1.4(b,d)
1. (C) Minister of Interior and Justice Carlos Holguin
announced August 24 the transfer of Carlos Mario Jimenez
(alias "Macaco") from Itagui prison in Medellin to the
maximum security Combita prison near Bogota for conducting
drug trafficking activities from prison. The Fiscalia has
approved his provisional arrest warrant for extradition,
which will be served August 27. He would be the first
paramilitary to lose eligibility under the Justice and Peace
Law (JPL).
2. (C) Holguin also announced the transfer of Diego
Fernando Murillo Bejarano (aka "Don Berna") to Combita as a
"security precaution." Outgoing Department of Administrative
Security (GOC intelligence agency) director Andres Penate
told us August 24 Don Berna will likely be extradited to the
U.S. within the next two weeks due to his continuing
involvement in criminal activity. President Uribe
subordinated our July 2004 extradition request for Berna on
drug and money laundering charges in September 2005 because
of Berna's key role in the paramilitary peace process. The
U.S. has extradited 87 individuals from Colombia this year,
bringing the total to 583.
3. (C) Penate said the GOC needed to satisfy specific
Colombian legal requirements before extraditing Berna.
Complying with these steps would strengthen Uribe's political
and legal position. Penate said the GOC must provide five
days notice to citizens subject to an extradition order
before it can extradite them. It will take the GOC several
days to prepare the paperwork; notification to Berna is
unlikely to occur before August 31. He said the GOC also
would open a criminal case against Berna at the Fiscalia to
bolster its claim Berna had continued to engage in criminal
activity. Berna would be the first paramilitary leader whose
extradition request was subordinated by Uribe to be
extradited.
4. (C) Penate said Uribe is committed to extraditing Don
Berna as soon as these legal steps are completed. The only
risk is that Berna's lawyers will exploit the five days to
find a friendly judge who would issue an order blocking
extradition. Penate said the DAS had passed intelligence
reports implicating Don Berna in several murders in Medellin
and Cartagena, but lacked legal proof. Uribe's decision to
move against Berna was provoked by an anonymous letter that
was passed to him by a trusted source. The letter was
addressed to Castano's wife and claimed Berna and Macaco were
involved in Vicente Castano's murder earlier this year. It
also warned Castano's wife to leave the country. DAS records
showed she left Colombia three weeks ago.
Nichols
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
id: 153741
date: 5/13/2008 22:37
refid: 08BOGOTA1764
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBO #1764/01 1342237
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 132237Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2758
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8192
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0416
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 6203
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 1685
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 6853
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001764
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018
TAGS: KJUS, PREL, PREF, PTER, PHUM, CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA EXTRADITES 14 EX-PARA LEADERS TO THE U.S.
Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer
Reasons 1.4 (b and d)
SUMMARY
-------
1. (U) The GOC extradited 14 ex-paramilitary leaders,
including Salvatore Mancuso, Diego Murillo, and Rodrigo Tovar
Pupo, on May 13 to the United States to face narcotrafficking
and money laundering charges. President Uribe said he
extradited the fourteen due to due to their continued
involvement in crime or their failure to meet their Justice &
Peace Law (J&P) obligations. He added that victims could
have access to the extradited paras through judicial
cooperation agreements and that any seized assets would
benefit victims. The Ambassador held a news conference to
reiterate the USG's commitment to truth and reparations.
Opposition Senator Petro called the extraditions "the death
of the Justice and Peace process." End summary.
EX-PARA LEADERS EXTRADITED
--------------------------
2. (U) On May 13, the GOC extradited fourteen former United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) leaders to the United
States to face narcotrafficking and money laundering charges.
The ex-paras had all begun testimony under the J&P Law.
Some had provided limited information on mass graves, but
none had provided comprehensive information on past crimes or
turned over significant assets in accordance with their J&P
law obligations.
3. (U) President Uribe said he extradited the fourteen
because of their continuing involvement in crime or their
failure to meet their J&P obligations. He said he had
reached agreement with the USG that Colombians would have
access to the trials of the ex-paras, and that any assets
seized from the paras would benefit victims. Uribe added
that the extraditions were necessary to show the GOC's
determination to enforce the J&P Law, and called on
guerrillas who demobilized under previous peace processes to
confess their crimes and make moral reparations. Post worked
closely with the GOC in the days leading up to the
extraditions to ensure that all procedures and paperwork in
the cases were completed in line with normal extradition
protocols. Those extradited were:
--Salvatore Mancuso-Gmez
--Diego Fernando Murillo-Bejarano, aka "Don Berna"
--Rodrigo Tovar-Pupo, aka "Jorge 40"
--Eduardo Enrique Vengoechea-Mola
--Juan Carlos Sierra-Ramirez
--Francisco Javier Zuluaga-Lindo, aka "Gordo Lindo"
--Ramiro Vanoy-Murillo, aka "Cuco Vanoy"
--Guillermo Prez-Alzate
--Nodier Giraldo-Giraldo
--Hernan Giraldo-Serna
--Diego Alberto Ruiz-Arroyave
--Edwin Mauricio Gomez-Luna
--Martin Penaranda-Osorio
--Manuel Enrique Torregrosa-Castro
GOC WORRIED ABOUT FREEZE OF PARA EXTRADITIONS
---------------------------------------------
4. (C) Presidential legal Advisor Edmundo del Castillo told
us President Uribe decided to extradite the fourteen because
he feared additional tutelas (injunctions) or court rulings
would limit his extradition authority. Such restrictions
would undercut presidential power and undermine the J&P
process. Judicial Council Magistrate Angelino Lizcano told
us the Council's May 5 ruling reversing a lower court
injunction prohibiting Macaco's extradition was written as
broadly as possible to allow the GOC to extradite other
paras. Still, Constitutional Court Magistrate Maurico
Gonzalez told us on May 9 that a victims' group was appealing
the Council's ruling to the Constitutional Court. Given the
current political support for victims' rights, he predicted
that the Constitutional Court would rule in the victims'
favor.
PUBLIC REACTION: MIXED
----------------------
5. (U) The extraditions generated immediate, mixed public
reaction. Opposition Polo Party Senator Gustavo Petro called
the move "the death of the Justice and Peace process." He
said the extraditions signaled the GOC's lack of confidence
in the judicial system's ability to manage the ex-para
leaders. Popular radio commentator Vicky Davila said many
suspected the extraditions represented an effort to prevent
para leaders from implicating more politicians, military, and
businessmen. Castillo said it would be important that the
USG show its commitment to address victims' rights after the
extradition to preserve popular support in Colombia for the
extradition process.
6. (U) The Ambassador held a press conference May 13 to
reiterate U.S. support for the extraditions and to thank
those involved in the successful operation. He also assured
the public that the USG wanted to see the paras confess the
full truth about their crimes and provide reparations to
victims. He said there were legal instruments available to
facilitate Colombian access to U.S. evidence/testimony
provided by the ex-paras.
7. (U) Former Vice Minister of Justice and radio commentator
Rafael Nieto said the extraditions would benefit both
Colombia and the United States. He said the ex-paras had not
cooperated previously in the J&P process, and had continued
criminal activities from jail. Those activities needed to be
stopped. He added, "The United States has every reason to
cooperate fully with Colombia to find the truth and achieve
reparations for para victims, and there are many mechanisms
available to do so."
BROWNFIELD
=======================CABLE ENDS============================