id: 40280 date: 9/9/2005 18:16 -...

id: 40280

date: 9/9/2005 18:16

refid: 05BOGOTA8495

origin: Embassy Bogota

classification: CONFIDENTIAL

destination:

header:

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is

not available.

----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 008495

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2005

TAGS: KJUS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, CO, AUC

SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT APPROVES DON BERNA'S EXTRADITION;

URIBE HAS FINAL SAY

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) On September 7, Colombia's Supreme Court approved the

U.S. extradition request for paramilitary commander Diego

Murillo, AKA "Don Berna," and transmitted the case to the

President for his decision. The approval occurred in much

less than normal time for such a decision (less than a third

of the time the Simon Trinidad extradition took for example).

The USG seeks his extradition for narcotrafficking crimes

committed after 1998. Berna has been a key negotiator for

the United Self-Defenses of Colombia (AUC), and is currently

involved in the U.S.-supported paramilitary demobilization

process. In private, President Uribe has expressed his

reluctance to extradite leaders who are actively advancing

the peace process.

2. (U) Following a highly-publicized GOC hunt for Don Berna

in May, the GOC placed him under house arrest on a farm in

the municipality of Piedras de Valencia, Cordoba Department.

In July 2004, the GOC suspended arrest warrants for

negotiating paramilitaries to encourage their full

participation in the peace process. The suspended arrest

warrant for other AUC leaders effectively postponed

extradition proceedings for them, but Don Berna's house

arrest status allowed his extradition process to proceed.

3. (C) President Uribe suspended a decision on AUC leader

Salvatore Mancuso's extradition, saying that his cooperation

in the peace and demobilization processes made immediate

extradition inappropriate.

-------

COMMENT

-------

4. (C) The Supreme Court may have set a political trap for

Uribe whether by design or not. Don Berna is a key player in

the paramilitaries now and maintains much influence over

others in the paramilitary groups. If Uribe extradites him,

the GOC risks a severe backlash. The slow pace of

reintegration of paramilitaries due to resource constraints

could mean the peace process is at least partially

reversible. If Uribe does not extradite Don Berna, he may be

seen as cooperating with paramilitaries and he may risk

charges from NGOs and the Colombian left (normally not/not

friends of extradition) that his government is not

prosecuting the paramilitaries. End Comment.

WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 22359

date: 11/2/2004 18:31

refid: 04BOGOTA11752



destination:

header:


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----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 011752

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2014

TAGS: PREL, CO

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH

PRESIDENT URIBE IN COLOMBIA

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons

1.4 (b) and (d)

------------

Introduction

------------

1. (C) President Uribe welcomes the visit of President and

Mrs. Bush with enthusiasm. Current hot topics include:

--Floods in Northern Colombia, more than 150,000 persons

affected

--Demobilization and reinsertion of up to 3,000 paramilitary

terrorists in the next two months

--U.S. support in out years

--Free Trade Agreement negotiations; next round in Tuscon at

the end of November could be crucial

--Record-breaking drug eradication and seizures

--Major judicial reform starting in January

--Extradition

--U.S. travel advisory and security in Cartagena

--Continued shortage of helicopters for counter-drug and

counter-terror missions

--Status of U.S. hostages

--Human rights

--Alternative development and humanitarian assistance

---------------------------

Floods in Northern Colombia

---------------------------

2. (C) Heavy rainfall has caused flooding in the north coast

region, including the Cartagena area. Some 200,000 persons

have been affected and more than 300 homes destroyed.

Through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, we are

providing $150,000 in assistance to the Red Cross to help

some 10,000 persons in the hardest-hit areas south of

Cartagena.

------------------------------

Demobilization and Reinsertion

------------------------------

3. (C) Colombia plans to demobilize 3,000 or so members of

the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the

country's largest paramilitary terrorist organization, in the

next six weeks, adding to the over 1,000 paramilitaries who

demobilized in 2003. The program is underfunded and the OAS

verification chief has issued an international call for help;

several European nations have responded with low levels of

aid. Uncertainty regarding Patriot Act restrictions has

prevented direct U.S. assistance or involvement in design of

the program. President Uribe may seek U.S. assistance to

help reinsert voluntarily demobilized ex-terrorists who are

cooperating against their former organizations and otherwise

adhering to the government's program. This

demobilization/reinsertion is expected to be the template for

eventual demobilization of up to 15,000 paramilitaries by the

end of 2005, and the leftist terrorists of the ELN, with whom

preliminary talks are underway but going slowly.

------------

U.S. Support

------------

4. (C) As in past meetings, Uribe will be looking for private

and public reaffirmations of U.S. support and continued

financial resources for the next few years. Requested U.S.

assistance tops $660 million in FY05, plus a number of DOD

operating accounts. Special DOD assistance to Plan Patriota

operations runs out after 2005.

----------------------------

Free Trade Agreement/Economy

----------------------------

5. (C) Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement, with Peru and

Ecuador, begin their fifth round on November 29 in Tuscon.

President Uribe remains a strong proponent, but agricultural

and other concerns, principally regarding pharmaceuticals,

have prevented Colombia from moving as rapidly as it should.

As a result, our goal of conclusion by early 2005 is

uncertain. Colombia hopes for special consideration for its

close cooperation on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism

efforts. Overall growth continues to be strong (about 4

percent), and investment is returning. But the country faces

fiscal pressure, and President Uribe political pressure, from

the competition for resources between defense and social

needs, especially unemployment (currently 12.5 percent).

-----------------------------

Drug Eradication/Interdiction

-----------------------------

6. (C) FY04 drug eradication and interdiction are at record

levels. We should meet our 130,000-hectare goal for coca

spraying and exceed last year's level for opium poppy.

President Uribe is working to expand manual eradication

efforts. We continue to press for spraying in national parks

in the face of Colombian and U.S. congressional resistance.

Drug seizures are also at record levels. In 2004 the

Colombian National Police has seized approximately 56 metric

tons; the Colombian military, primarily the navy and coast

guard, approximately 68 metric tons; and a multi-national

force approximately 192 metric tons. Between eradication and

seizures, more than 475 metric tons of drugs have been

blocked in 2004, in comparison to about 300 tons in 2003.

---------------

Judicial Reform

---------------

7. (C) Colombia will switch to an oral adversarial trial

system, like that of the U.S., in January. We have provided

extensive training and advice to this major reform; it is

also a high priority among many in the U.S. Congress.

President Uribe may request additional resources. The

Minister of Justice has requested that the justice sector

rapidly/rapidly receive 50 percent of all Colombia-related

drug assets that we seize; in the past, Colombia has received

a smaller share, sometimes after years of delay.

-----------

Extradition

-----------

8. (C) President Uribe has approved since taking office more

than 150 extraditions to the U.S. He will likely ask for

more political sensitivity in our extradition requests, as he

and his ministers have done several times in the last year.

Although Uribe is solid in his support, extradition faces

political pressure from well-connected drug traffickers

awaiting extradition and from paramilitary leaders involved

in peace negotiations. We are taking steps to avoid killing

the golden goose. Uribe may raise paramilitary leaders'

efforts to negotiate extradition at the peace table. We have

said that extradition should not be a topic in the

negotiations, and not be addressed in any way before all/all

demobilization steps are fulfilled by the paramilitary

leaders, including peaceful demobilization of their troops.

Uribe has agreed.

------------------

Cartagena/Consular

------------------

9. (C) The U.S. travel advisory warns against all travel to

Colombia. President Uribe may ask for a cut-out for

Cartagena, so cruise ships, a potential major source of

tourist revenue, can enter. Cartagena has not seen a

terrorist incident for two years, has special safeguards for

cruise ship tourists (no incidents have been reported for

European cruise ship tourists), and has a better security

record than many Latin American capitals. Although we resist

a cut-out for Cartagena, we are working to revise the travel

advisory for Colombia as a whole, and the State Department

head of security will visit Cartagena at the end of November.

----------------------

Plan Patriota/Military

----------------------

10. (C) The Colombian Armed Forces has made steady progress

against illegal armed groups since the late 1990s, thanks in

large part to U.S. assistance. Plan Patriota is currently

focused in FARC-dominated, heavily forested southeastern

Colombia; it is going well, but slowly. The logistical

strain of keeping 17,000 troops in the dense, hostile jungle,

hundreds of miles from their supply bases, has been a huge

challenge. Poor inter-service cooperation, corruption, and

tolerance of paramilitarism continue, but they are improving,

most recently with good changes in senior military

leadership. There continues to be competition for scarce

helicopters between counter-drug and counter-terrorism

missions. President Uribe may ask for additional Blackhawk

helicopters.

----------

Reelection

----------

11. (C) Constitutional reform to permit Presidential

re-election is near completion; we believe it is probable.

The reform will face review by the Constitutional Court early

next year, a wild card. The press may seek a U.S. view on

re-election. Although we can praise President Uribe, we

should avoid comment on re-election, which could be played as

"interference in domestic affairs." Uribe is above 65

percent approval in polls.

------------

Human Rights

------------

12. (C) The Uribe Administration continues to make progress

in human rights, but has not been completely successful in

ensuring accountability, strengthening the military justice

system, in breaking military ties to paramilitary groups, or

in ending corruption. The government has an active dialogue

with NGOs, the United Nations, and foreign governments.

Human rights training is mandatory for all members of the

military and police. The Embassy vets all units that receive

U.S. assistance, in accordance with the Leahy Amendment.

Homicides fell by 20 percent, kidnappings by 30 percent, and

forced displacements by 49 percent in 2003; that trend has

continued in 2004. Less than 2 percent of human rights

violations are attributable to government security forces.

But recent violations by members of the armed forces, such as

the suspicious murders in August of three trade unionists in

the highly conflictive department of Arauca, demonstrate the

need for further improvement.

-------------

U.S. Hostages

-------------

13. (C) The three U.S.-contractor hostages captured by the

FARC in February 2003 are now the longest U.S. terror

captives in the world. (Another U.S. contractor and a

Colombian were killed by the FARC in the same incident, when

their helicopter safely crash-landed due to mechanical

failure near a FARC camp.) Plan Patriota operations have

increased the likelihood that we will receive more

information about the hostages, but also that an unintended

encounter between Colombian forces and the hostage holders

will result in their execution. The Colombians are providing

full assistance, both to keep us informed and to avoid

unplanned encounters that might endanger the hostages. The

U.S. publicly has counseled against negotiations with the

FARC for any of its dozens of hostages, to avoid providing an

incentive for further hostage-taking. We have supported

Uribe's proposals for an exchange of hostages for FARC

prisoners not accused of violent crimes provided that the

FARC prisoners are prevented from returning to terrorist

activities; so far the FARC has refused. Uribe has assured

us that the U.S. hostages will be included in any possible

exchange.

-------------------------------------------

Development, Humanitarian, Judicial Reform

-------------------------------------------

14. (C) Alternative development, humanitarian aid, and

democracy programs are going well. We have leveraged

substantial private sector assistance to establish 270 square

miles of legal agriculture benefiting 40,000 families. U.S.

aid has helped nearly 2 million internally displaced persons.

Colombia has the largest displaced population outside Africa.

WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 13060

date: 1/6/2004 18:34

refid: 04BOGOTA85



destination:

header:


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----------------- header ends ----------------


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014

TAGS: PTER, PREL, PHUM, PINR, PINS, MOPS, CO, FARC

SUBJECT: SENIOR FARC LEADER SIMON TRINIDAD IN CUSTODY: GOC

INTEREST IN EXTRADITION TO THE U.S.

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.5 (b)

and (d)

-------

Summary

-------

1. (C) On January 2, Ecuadorian authorities arrested Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commander Ricardo Ovidio Palmera Pineda

alias "Simon Trinidad." He is now in Colombia, where he faces over 50

counts of terrorism and other serious crimes. Palmera, who played a ke

role in managing FARC finances and is implicated in several high-profil

terrorist incidents, is the highest-ranking FARC commander ever to be

captured. His capture is a major political victory for President Uribe

and demonstrates the importance of effective security cooperation

between Colombia and its neighbors. The GOC would like to extradite

Palmera to the U.S. End Summary.

-----------------------------

Ecuador-Colombian Cooperation

-----------------------------

2. (C) On January 2, Ecuadorian authorities arrested Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commander Ricardo Ovidio Palmera Pineda

alias "Simon Trinidad," in a popular tourist district of Quito. Palmer

was allegedly in Quito to receive treatment for prostate cancer. The

Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) had been tracking his movements for

several weeks. After appearing before an Ecuadorian judge, Palmera was

turned over to Colombian authorities and transported to Bogota, where

he faces a total of 59 charges of terrorism, kidnapping, and drug

trafficking. The GOC was fully aware of the Ecuadorian operation and,

prior to the arrest, provided Ecuadorian officials with a positive

identification of Palmera. Contrary to press reports, an informant did

not provide Colombian military authorities with information on

Palmera's whereabouts; the ENP planned most of the operation

independently of Colombian authorities.

------------------------

Who is "Simon Trinidad"?

------------------------

3. (C) Palmera, more commonly known as "Simon Trinidad," is the most

senior FARC commander ever captured. Although not a member of the

seven-member FARC Secretariat, Palmera was an influential member of the

FARC's General Staff ("Estado Mayor"), a decision-making body ranking

directly below the Secretariat that administers most of the FARC's

political, strategic, and operational activities. Palmera -- who holds

a university degree in economics and hails from a wealthy

cattle-ranching family in the department of Cesar -- helped manage FARC

finances and drug trafficking operations.

4. (C) Palmera is believed to have been directly involved in several

high profile terrorist incidents, including the kidnapping and murder o

former Minister of Culture Consuelo Araujo in September 2001 and the

deaths in May 2002 of over 100 civilians who took refuge in a church

during a clash between the FARC and paramilitary forces in the town of

Boyaja, Choco department. The 53-year-old Palmera has been an active

member of the FARC for nearly 20 years and gained public prominence fro

his role as a hard-nosed FARC negotiator during peace negotiations with

the government of President Andres Pastrana from 1998-2002. Palmera di

not play a major role in planning FARC combat operations; his absence i

unlikely to hurt the group's military capacity.

---------------------

Public Relations Coup

---------------------

5. (C) Palmera's capture is a political victory for Uribe, who has

publicly pledged to kill or capture leaders of Colombia's illegal armed

groups before the end of his term. Colombian media have touted the

arrest as the most important blow to the FARC in recent memory, and it

should temporarily satisfy the public's growing impatience to see the

GOC achieve a major victory against the insurgent group. Palmera's

arrest also demonstrates the importance of close security cooperation

between the GOC and officials in neighboring countries, where FARC

leaders often go for relaxation.

-----------

Extradition

-----------

6. (C) Senior GOC officials, including President Uribe, have asked that

the U.S. consider requesting the extradition of Palmera. They

obviously would prefer to see him secure in a U.S. jail than processed

in the sometimes unreliable Colombian judicial system. Their requests

have had a note of urgency to them. At this time, however, Palmera doe

not face criminal charges in the U.S. The Embassy is unaware of any

pending investigations against this well-known narco-terrorist by U.S.

law enforcement agencies.

WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 13754

date: 2/5/2004 17:15

refid: 04BOGOTA1198



destination: 04BOGOTA993

header:


not available.

----------------- header ends ----------------


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2014

TAGS: PREL, KJUS, PTER, SNAR, PHUM, CO, Demobilization

SUBJECT: URIBE ON PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION

REF: BOGOTA 993

Classified By: DCM Milton Drucker, Reasons: 1.5 B & D.

1. (C) In a February 4 meeting with Ambassador Wood and

visiting U.S. inter-agency delegation, President Uribe stated

that he was instructing his Administration to offer

paramilitary leaders two options: relocation to so-called

"concentration zones" for those who agree to demobilize or

prosecution (e.g., jail or death on the battlefield).

Ambassador and DAS Peter DeShazo urged Uribe to neither lift

the arrest orders on top paramilitary leaders, including

Carlos Castano and Salvatore Mancuso of the AUC, nor attempt

to change extradition laws (see para 3 reftel). Uribe

stressed he would not modify extradition. Uribe added that

if demobilized paramilitaries were to be given a temporary

safe conduct in concentration zones they would need to be

engaged in social service type activities. Uribe noted that

since he took office (August 2002), 3908 paramilitaries had

been captured and an additional 435 had been killed.

2. (C) In a January 27 meeting with Ambassador and members

of the Core Group (reftel), Peace Commissioner Restrepo had

indicated that the GOC would not formally lift arrest

warrants for paramilitary leaders, but intended to allow them

freedom of movement in designated zones in order to

facilitate demobilization (and OAS observation efforts).

3. (C) Comment: Uribe is firm on his commitment not to

touch extradition in the event of a collective paramilitary

demobilization. We will continue to work with the Uribe

Administration to find a satisfactory way to deal with the

issue of AUC members who already have arrest warrants.

Additional items discussed in the February 4 meeting with

Uribe will be reported septel.

WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 37166

date: 7/22/2005 20:33

refid: 05BOGOTA6889


classification: UNCLASSIFIED

destination:

header:


not available.

----------------- header ends ----------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 006889

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: KMDR, KPAO, OPRC, PREL, SNAR, PGOV, CO

SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: JULY 2005 GALLUP POLL RESULTS

Security Policies

-----------------

1. (U) The survey found that 71% of respondents feel

safer today than they did a year ago, up seven percent

(64%) from April 2005. Those disagreeing with the

statement decreased from 31% in April to 26% in July.

As such, a little over a third of Colombians (36%)

feel that public order/security is the country's top

problem. As security conditions improve, the public's

willingness to forego some liberties to improve

security decreased, from 63% in December 2004 to 55%

in July. The large majority (73%) believes that the

Government is respectful of human rights; 19%

Peace Process

-------------

2. (U) Public support for the Government's

negotiations with paramilitary groups remains strong -

73% in favor, and 23% against. Support for

reinsertion programs for former members of guerrilla/

paramilitary groups has declined from 65% in April to

56% in July. Public support for humanitarian

exchanges between guerrillas and hostages also

continues to decline, from 47% in favor in December

2004, to 36% in July 2005.

Economic Management

--------------------

3. (U) With security conditions improving in the cities

where the poll was taken, respondents identified the economy

as the main problem facing Colombia (46%). Sixty-percent

disapproved of the president's handling of cost of

living issues (36% approved), and 59% disapproved of

his unemployment policies (36% approved). On an FTA

with the United States, support decreased from 60% in

June 2004 to 52% in July 2005.

Extradition

-----------

4. (U) Support for extradition, at 44% in July, is

down three points from March.

Aerial Spraying

---------------

5. (U) For the first time, opposition to aerial

spraying surpassed approval, 50% to 47%. Support for

aerial spraying has lost 6% points since December

2004.

Elections/Candidates

--------------------

6. (U) Support for President Uribe's reelection

remained strong at 66%. Favorable ratings for other

potential presidential candidates were as follows:

- Colombia's ambassador to Spain, Noemi Sanin: 54%

- Bogota Mayor Luis E. Garzon: 54%

- Former Bogota Mayor Antanas Mockus 51%

- Former Bogota Mayor Enrique Penalosa: 46%

- Polo Democratico candidate Senator Antonio

Navarro Wolf: 37%

- Vice-President Santos: 38%

- Former President Cesar Gaviria: 35%

- Minister of Interior Sabas Pretelt: 32%.

- Liberal Party hopeful Horacio Serpa: 30%

Seventy percent of respondents considered themselves

political independents, 19% Liberals, and 6%

Conservatives.

Institutions

------------

7. (U) Among institutions, the Armed Forces enjoyed

the highest favorable image, at 80%. Plan Colombia

and the Police, at 70% and 69% respectively, were in

the top five. The United Nations has a 67% favorable

rating, and Human Rights NGOs come in next at 66%.

With regards to Venezuela, 37% have a favorable

opinion, while 50% have a negative opinion. When

asked if the relationship with Venezuela could be

described as respectful and prosperous, those agreeing

with that statement have been decreasing steadily from

65% in March, 61% in April, to a low of 47% in July.

Hugo Chavez received 16% favorable ratings and 49%

unfavorable.

8. (U) The opinion poll was conducted by telephone in

the four largest metropolitan areas July 5-6. It overweighted

poorer respondents and represents a good profile of the more

politically relevant or influential populat

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 16082

date: 4/16/2004 23:24

refid: 04BOGOTA3894


classification: SECRET

destination:

header:


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----------------- header ends ----------------

S E C R E T BOGOTA 003894

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2014

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KJUS, SNAR, CO

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON COLOMBIAN DRAFT LEGISLATION TOUCHING ON

EXTRADITION

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 B & D.

1. (S) Summary: The Colombian House of Representatives is

close to a final vote on criminal procedure code reforms.

The GOC, supported strongly by the Embassy, is pushing for

status quo on the article that addresses extradition. A

sizable number of congressmen, however, continues to advocate

new language that would add an oral evidentiary hearing to

the extradition process. Senior House players have assured

us that the GOC will prevail in the House. In addition,

ranking senators have assured us the GOC would ultimately

prevail in the Senate, which would be the final step in

passage of legislation. Nevertheless, we continue to monitor

the situation as drug traffickers and paramilitaries are

trying to influence both houses. In a related development,

38 members of Congress co-signed a legislative proposal to

modify the Constitution to prohibit extradition of any

individual who participates in an eventual peace process with

the government. As a Constitutional reform, this measure

would face a higher vote hurdle for passage. End Summary.

2. (C) The week of April 12 saw two sessions of debate in

the House regarding reforms to the Criminal Procedure Code

(Codigo de Procedimiento Penal). Debate is set to resume on

April 20. A crucial item in the legislation is Article 518,

which established procedures for the Supreme Court's role in

the extradition process (Spanish texts faxed to WHA/AND).

The House Constitutional Affairs Committee passed a reform

proposal that would modify Article 518 to mandate an oral

evidentiary hearing between the Court and the defense

attorney of the potential extraditee. The GOC, supported

strongly by the Embassy, has pushed for maintaining Article

518 intact. Article 518 at present calls for Supreme Court

written administrative review of the extradition request.

The oral hearing element, according to Embassy and Colombian

legal experts, would potentially subject the extradition

process to questions, delays, and legal challenges. Sabas

Pretelt and Mario Iguaran, GOC Interior and Justice Minister

and Vice Minister, respectively, maintained a near constant

presence in the House during debate the week of April 13, in

an effort to keep out damaging extradition language. The

Embassy also expressed U.S. opposition to legislators.

3. (C) In a related development, on April 14,

Representative Maria del Rocio Arias Hoyos, along with 38

House and Senate co-sponsors (Senate membership is 102, House

166), introduced into the House a proposal to prohibit

extradition of any individual who "reincorporates into

society by way of a peace process with the government." (Text

faxed to WHA/AND). The proposal is not currently on the

formal congressional calendar. As a Constitutional reform,

the Arias proposal would require four rounds of approval, two

in each house, and in back-to-back congressional periods

(periods are March-June and July-December). The second round

in both houses would require qualified majority, i.e.,

majority vote of total members (vice quorum). President

Uribe appears to have enough members in both houses to

prevent its passage.

4. (C) Comment: The criminal procedure code legislation,

once passed by the House, would need to be passed by the

Senate prior to becoming law. Speaker Alonso Acosta and Vice

President Edgar Torres have assured us privately that the GOC

will carry the day in the House. Senate Constitutional

Affairs Committee Chair Luis Gomez Gallo and member Andres

Gonzalez (former GOC Justice Minister) tell us that any

attempt to modify extradition will not make it out of their

committee. Nevertheless, the congressional scene is a

complicated one, and ongoing tensions between the Executive

and Legislative branches may complicate the GOC's ability to

hold the line on extradition. Fortunately, the Arias

proposal (para 3), as a Constitutional reform, faces a higher

vote threshold in the second round.

5. (S) Comment (continued): Embassy has information

indicating that both drug traffickers and paramilitaries may

be attempting to influence senators and congressman. Embassy

will continue to monitor the situation and lobby against any

and all modifications to extradition rules and procedures.

WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 16448

date: 4/28/2004 15:53

refid: 04BOGOTA4297



destination: 04BOGOTA4278

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SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR POLITICAL COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SUBJECT LINE CHANGED)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014

TAGS: PTER, PHUM, PGOV, PINR, PINS, SNAR, ASEC, CO, ELN Peace Process

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MOD AND PEACE

COMMISSIONER

REF: BOGOTA 04278

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons

1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) On April 27, Ambassador spoke to Minister of Defense

Uribe and Peace Commissioner Restrepo about that day's

presidential declaration on the peace process (reftel).

2. (C) Minister Uribe said that the declaration had been

composed the day before and had been reviewed before issuance

by himself, Minister of Interior and Justice Pretelt,

Restrepo, and the military High Command. Although the

President wrote most of the declaration himself, the message

was a product of many hands. Ambassador told Restrepo that

the Embassy strongly supported the declaration.

3. (C) Regarding the opening line on paramilitary threats

against the President, Minister Uribe said they had good

information that drug trafficker/paramilitary "Don Berna" and

others were trying to organize an attempt on the President's

life. Paramilitary attacks on the President are a new

phenomenon and run counter to their rhetoric of "patriotism."

4. (C) Regarding the line that "those who wished to avoid

extradition must demonstrate to the international community

good faith and a purpose of amending their ways," Minister

Uribe said it was not meant to open the door to evasion of

extradition. Rather, the declaration was clear that

extradition was not on the negotiating table and equally

clear that it was the "international community" who must be

convinced in any case where extradition was not granted.

Extradition would remain an open possibility in all cases

and, at least for the time being, the subject was closed.

5. (C) Minster Uribe commented that the declaration should

serve to separate any paramilitaries interested in a genuine

peace process from those, increasingly dominant, who are

merely narco-terrorists trying to masquerade as political

actors to get in on the benefits. He shared the view that

Carlos Castano was dead and that the paramilitary movement

was falling increasingly into purely narco-terrorist hands.

6. (C) Restrepo said that the declaration was not an

ultimatum, in spite of the language saying "(if the

paramilitaries) do not comply, the government will continue

fighting them until they are done with." Restrepo said it

was a "clarification," which would help him at the

negotiating table, remove any doubts that his tough line was

not also that of the President, and present the

paramilitaries with a clear choice. He stressed the criteria

of a real cease-fire, concentration of forces, and movement

toward demobilization were key to progress.

7. (C) The declaration coincided, by chance, with a rally in

Cali in favor of a "humanitarian exchange" of prisoners of

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for kidnap

victims. The evening news in Colombia focused on the

declaration's statement that the FARC would not be permitted

to impose a humanitarian exchange by threat that would weaken

the Government's policy of democratic security. A parade of

family members of kidnap victims criticized the declaration.

WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 41267

date: 9/23/2005 22:03

refid: 05BOGOTA9089



destination:

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----------------- header ends ----------------


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015

TAGS: KJUS, PTER, PREL, PGOV, CO, ELN Peace Process, Demobilization

SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER OPPOSES DON BERNA'S EXTRADITION

AND IS SURPRISED BY SUPPORT FOR ELN TALKS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.

Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------

SUMMARY

-------

1. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo on September

22 told the Ambassador that the GOC is inclined not to

extradite Diego Murillo AKA "Don Berna" at the moment because

it would endanger future demobilizations and Don Berna

remains an important player in ensuring these demobilizations

happen. The Ambassador responded that not extraditing Don

Berna would feed domestic and international critics of the

peace process. Restrepo agreed to delay any public

announcement on Don Berna until the Ambassador has had the

opportunity to consult with Washington and speak again to

President Uribe. Restrepo also updated the Ambassador on the

public and private support the GOC has received for its

preliminary peace talks with the National Liberation Army of

Colombia (ELN). He contrasted this with the unenthusiastic

response to the GOC's decision to allow 38 jailed

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) members to

benefit from Justice and Peace (J&P) law sentence reductions.

End summary.

--------------------------------------------- --------

GOC LEANING IN FAVOR OF KEEPING DON BERNA IN COLOMBIA

--------------------------------------------- --------

2. (C) Restrepo expressed ambivalence about Don Berna's

extradition. On the one hand, he is aware of the political

implications, in particular with the USG and NGOs, of

refusing to extradite him given ongoing criticism the GOC's

negotiations with the AUC. Nevertheless, his primary goal is

to demobilize the remaining paramilitary structures during

the next three months and Don Berna remains an important

player in ensuring this happens.

3. (C) Restrepo explained that if the GOC were to announce

Don Berna's extradition now it could generate "panic," freeze

future demobilizations, and lead those leaders imprisoned in

Santa Fe de Ralito to try to escape. There is already fear

and resistance after meetings last week with AUC leaders when

he made clear that demobilized paramilitary leaders would

serve time in prison. He was told that his announcement had

angered many AUC members, especially those in the middle

ranks, and that his statement threatened the current peace

talks with the remaining paramilitary blocks.

4. (C) Restrepo insisted that his hesitation to extradite Don

Berna did not extend to the other 10 to 12 key AUC leaders.

If Don Berna is extradited, however, Restrepo foresees a

significant change in the atmosphere, which could affect

ongoing peace talks and spark paramilitary violence. He

emphasized that the GOC would need significant USG security

assistance if this occurred. He drew on his experience as a

psychologist to express particular concern for the state of

mind of the paramilitaries, whom he described as "bandits

willing and able to do harm." His preference was not to

scare them, but instead to encourage them to continue to

"enter the corral" and participate in the process. Meanwhile,

he said that AUC leader Salvatore Mancuso wanted to speak to

the USG because he is willing to consider serving some time

in the United States and could convince others to do the

same. Other AUC leaders have suggested that after being

convicted in Colombia, they would like to serve their time in

another country. The rational for this is that they have no

opportunities here and their lives would be in danger from

fellow AUC and FARC members.

--------------------------------------------- ----

AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED USG POSITION ON EXTRADITION

--------------------------------------------- ----

5. (C) The Ambassador said the USG wants Don Berna's

extradition for judicial and political reasons. Judicially,

the USG has been able to support the Justice and Peace (J&P)

law because the GOC promised it would not negotiate

extradition. The J&P law denies benefits for illegal

activities conducted for personal gain before membership. The

law permits the serving of sentences abroad. Therefore,

there should be no obstacle for Don Berna or others to be

extradited to the United States. Don Berna personally

benefited from illicit activities before and during his

membership in the AUC. Don Berna has also been accused of

complicity in the killing of a government official while

negotiating, thus violating the ceasefire, and his subsequent

denial of responsibility for this crime makes him eligible

for trial in the regular criminal justice system.

6. (C) From the political perspective, the Ambassador said he

understood Uribe's concern about the political cost of

extradition while trying to demobilize paramilitaries.

Nevertheless, showing a firm hand with respect to the rule of

law would help to further legitimize the process. The

Ambassador said that in his meetings on September 23 with

Governor Gaviria of Antioquia, Mayor of Medellin Fajardo and

General Carillo, both Gaviria and Carillo favored Don Berna's

extradition, and the Mayor did not oppose the idea. (Berna

had an extensive network in Medellin.)

7. (C) The Ambassador stressed the intense focus in the U.S.

and elsewhere on Colombia's demobilization and reinsertion

efforts. An announcement like that for Salvatore Mancuso,

that the GOC was suspending Don Berna's extradition "while he

assisted the peace process" would undercut support for the

demobilization process and the J&P law. It would also

undermine Uribe's credibility shortly after his conversations

with members of the U.S. Congress. The Ambassador asked that

there be no public statement until he again discussed it with

President Uribe.

--------------------------------------------- ----------

POTENTIAL TALKS WITH ELN RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT...

--------------------------------------------- ----------

8. (C) Restrepo said that in the past days he has received

more local and international support on potential peace talks

with the ELN than he has had during his three years trying to

promote peace with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

(AUC). Politicians, former Presidents, the Catholic Church,

and the Swedish and Norwegian governments have expressed

their willingness to help in the process. With the AUC, he

struggled to "fill a van of supporters," while with the ELN

he has already had to "hire three large buses and turn people

back." He was appreciative of the reiteration of USG support

for the process and emphasized his hope that the ELN would

take advantage of it.

9. (C) Restrepo speculated that the talks might succeed

because of tensions between the ELN and the FARC. In recent

weeks, the FARC has intensified its threats against the ELN

leadership and warned them to withdraw from negotiations or

expect a war. Restrepo said the FARC's tactic of

discouraging the ELN from negotiating may benefit the

government. Specifically, he thought the threats could

backfire by convincing the ELN to negotiate now before

fighting with the FARC weakens them further.

--------------------------------------------- ----

...BUT SUPPORT FOR FARC'S 38 J&P PETITION IS WEAK

--------------------------------------------- ----

10. (C) Restrepo understood the political cost of allowing

the petition of the 38 jailed FARC members to participate

under the Justice and Peace (J&P) law, but underscored the

overall value of this and similar future requests. He

explained that accepting these requests weakens FARC morale

and helps the GOC collect intelligence against the

guerrillas. He hoped to put the FARC members interested in

participating in the J&P law through a rigorous interrogation

process, which could confirm their identification and extract

relevant intelligence. He added that he has a list of an

additional 150 FARC members waiting for a response from the

GOC regarding their petitions to participate under the J&P

law.

-------

COMMENT

-------

11. (C) We believe that we can persuade the Uribe

Administration not to suspend Don Berna's extradition on an

open-ended basis like they did for Mancuso. But we doubt we

can get a decision for immediate extradition by the September

29 deadline.

WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

id: 44203

date: 11/1/2005 13:28

refid: 05BOGOTA10230



destination:

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----------------- header ends ----------------


SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, VE, CO, 2006 Elections, Venezuela, ELN, FARC

SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT GAVIRIA HIGHLIGHTS PARAMILITARY

INFLUENCE; SUGGESTS U.S. ESTABLISH CHANNEL TO CHAVEZ

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.

Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

-------

Summary

-------

1. (C) Former President Cesar Gaviria told Polcouns October

28 that paramilitaries are threatening and intimidating

Liberal Party candidates and office holders, and claimed

President Uribe's efforts to combat such activities are

conspicuous by their absence. The Liberal Party would

continue to campaign throughout the country despite

paramilitary threats. (Almost as if on cue, Uribe said the

same day that paramilitaries who interfered in the electoral

process would lose benefits under the Justice and Peace law.)

Gaviria said extradition is at the core of the current

GOC-paramilitary impasse and expressed surprise at the manner

in which Uribe was handling the issue. Gaviria predicted the

Liberals would increase their legislative representation in

March 2006 elections. He discounted the importance of an

upcoming Constitutional Court ruling on the Electoral

Guarantees law, and predicted that Uribe could win the

presidency in May on the first ballot. Gaviria suggested the

U.S. establish a private, confidential channel to Venezuelan

President Chavez, preferably a U.S. citizen close to

President Bush. In the alternative, Gaviria said OAS

Secretary General Insulza "would not be a bad choice," nor

SIPDIS

would a non-U.S. citizen who had the confidence of President

Bush. End summary.

--------------------------------------------- -----------

Paramilitaries Exerting Dangerous Influence in Campaigns

--------------------------------------------- -----------

2. (C) Gaviria said paramilitaries are threatening and

intimidating Liberal Party candidates and office holders,

especially in the Departments of Antioquia, Risaralda, and

Bolivar, as well as on the coast. In one case, Gaviria said

narcotics trafficker "Macaco" (who heads up the Central

Bolivar Bloc of paramilitaries, the most powerful yet to

demobilize) visited a town in Risaralda to ensure that

Macaco's brother became the next mayor. In similar ways, he

said, paramilitaries are telling Liberal Party candidates

that they are not welcome in certain areas and that the

paramilitaries have already selected the winning candidates.

The party has received information from confidential

informants about paramilitary intentions against party

candidates and from security detail observation of vehicles

following party officials. The party has filed complaints

with the police. Gaviria said Liberals would continue to

campaign throughout the country despite the risks because

there was no other option. (One of Gaviria's DAS security

detail said after the meeting that an AUC informant had told

of a specific AUC plan to attack Gaviria. Gaviria's security

detail has one armored vehicle for Gaviria's use.)

3. (C) Gaviria is worried about a violent election campaign

(though not as violent as the 1990s) in the wake of the

recent attack on Senator German Vargas Lleras, which Gaviria

believes is more likely to be the work of a

paramilitary/narcotics trafficker nexus than the work of the

FARC. The possibility of a violent campaign is increased

when the influence of regional mafias is taken into account,

he said. They also have interests to protect.

-----------------------------------

Uribe Silent on Paras, Gaviria Says

-----------------------------------

4. (C) Gaviria said he did not understand why Uribe stayed

silent in the face of clear evidence of paramilitary

intimidation. "We don't know where he stands," he said. In

Gaviria's view, Uribe should at least state that

paramilitaries are not welcome in any political grouping that

purports to support the president, and make clear that he

rejects paramilitary support. His silence is troubling, in

Gaviria's view. Uribe's efforts with the paramilitaries have

focused too much on reconciliation and not enough on justice

and truth, he said. More generally, the Uribe

administration's effort to permit sentenced prisoners (from

the AUC and FARC) to benefit from the Justice and Peace law

was "absurd," Gaviria said.

----------------------------------

Extradition is Point of Contention

----------------------------------

5. (C) Gaviria believes that extradition is the crux of the

current difficulty that Uribe is facing with the

paramilitaries and expressed surprise that Uribe has failed

to manage the matter more effectively. Gaviria asserted the

GOC, through Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, had

made private commitments on extradition to certain

paramilitary leaders and is now facing their fear and

distrust. The paramilitaries worry about extradition above

all else. In Gaviria's view, Uribe's lack of transparency on

extradition has caused the current tensions. He said if

Uribe was going to promise not to extradite certain leaders,

he should have obtained a much better deal from the

paramilitaries than that embodied in the Justice and Peace

law.

--------------------------------------------- -----

Uribe Could Win on First Ballot; Law No Impediment

--------------------------------------------- -----

6. (C) Gaviria predicted Uribe could win the presidency on

the first ballot in May 2006 but noted that his likely voter

poll numbers are falling. The Liberals would not win but

would make it a contest. Horacio Serpa was the most likely

Liberal standard bearer against Uribe, but Rafael Pardo and

Rodrigo Rivera should not be discounted. The Constitutional

Court's ruling on the Electoral Guarantees law (expected

November 11) would be no impediment to Uribe running again,

in Gaviria's opinion. The Court has made its basic

constitutional ruling and the Court's view of the guarantees

law cannot change that. It would be helpful to have a

clearer sense of the limitations on public officials getting

involved in political campaigns, and of the allocation of

media time, but such issues pale when considered next to the

dangers of campaigning in the face of paramilitary threats,

he said.

---------------------------------------------

Liberals Expect to Increase Legislative Seats

---------------------------------------------

7. (C) The Liberal Party should be able to increase its

Senate representation from 20 to between 25 and 30 seats in

March elections (out of 102), according to Gaviria. (Note:

Liberal Party identification is somewhat murky, as

allegiances are prone to shift. Gaviria's figure of 20

Liberal Senators seems high. End note.) Liberal Party

workers are motivated and energetic, more so than the

backbone of other parties. A combined Liberal/Polo

Democratico legislative bloc would have a good chance of

exceeding a combined Uribista/Conservative party grouping, he

suggested.

---------------------------------------

U.S. Should Establish Channel to Chavez

---------------------------------------

8. (C) In response to a question about Venezuela, Gaviria

suggested that the U.S. open a private, confidential channel

to Chavez. The best candidate to serve in this position

would be a U.S. citizen close to President Bush. Other

possibilities included OAS Secretary General Insulza ("he

would not be bad") or other non-U.S. citizens, as long as

such a person had reasonably strong access to the White

House. From Gaviria's perspective, Chavez is more measured

in his actions than many give him credit for and has a strong

sense of how far he can go; he will not cross certain lines.

His rhetoric is more important to him than concrete

achievements. Chavez has to know that he is essentially

talking directly to the White House when he deals with a U.S.

emissary.

9. (C) Gaviria said Chavez might try to influence Colombian

politics but he would not be successful. "No-one would dare

take his money," he suggested. He said it was more likely

that Chavez was already trying to influence elections in

countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador.

------------

FARC and ELN

------------

10. (C) Gaviria said the FARC was likely to commit terrorist

attacks during the electoral campaign "because that is what

they do." However, the FARC has never been a factor in

Colombian electoral campaigns and this time would be no

different. The ELN peace process is worth the effort,

Gaviria said, but it appears to lack the necessary political

will to be successful, especially on the part of Uribe, who

(like Samper and Pastrana) started the process late in his

term.

Comment

-------

11. (C) Gaviria remains one of the most adroit partisan

political leaders in Colombia. Uribe and Gaviria exchanged

views on paramilitary influence in recent days. Uribe said

October 28 that paramilitaries should respect democracy, and

warned that those who interfered in the political process

would lose benefits under the Justice and Peace law.

Gaviria, in an interview published October 29, repeated his

criticisms of Uribe on this subject and called for action,

not words, to ensure a fair campaign environment.

WOOD

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

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----------------- header ends ----------------


SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017

TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, VZ, CO

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD'S SEPTEMBER 21 MEETING WITH

GOC PEACE COMMISSIONER LUIS CARLOS RESTREPO

Classified By: Ambassador William R. Brownfield

Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------

SUMMARY

-------

1. (C) GOC Peace Commissioner Restrepo said that the GOC

finds it hard to control Senator Cordoba's and President

Chavez' efforts to facilitate a humanitarian exchange. The

FARC has little interested in an exchange, but wants to use

Chavez' role to gain international recognition, create

tensions between the GOC and USG, and gain space to help it

outlast Uribe's presidency. The GOC and USG must work closely

together to prevent the FARC from blaming them should the

initiative eventually collapse. Restrepo described the ELN

peace process as "exhausted," but said Chavez' role brings

new energy to the talks. He also commented that he would

consult with President Uribe on the usefulness of USG funding

of civil society in the process. Restrepo said Uribe needs

"judicial" proof of Don Berna's ongoing involvement in crime

to extradite him. End Summary

------------------------------------

THE FARC AND A HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE

------------------------------------

2. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador and PolCouns on September

21, Restrepo said the GOC accepted Senator Cordoba's initial

proposal of direct GOC-FARC talks outside of Colombia with no

demilitarized zone (despeje), because it coincides with

President Uribe's position. The GOC hoped that by setting

the rules of the game--no despeje and no return of FARC

prisoners to FARC ranks--it could keep Cordoba and President

Chavez under control. This has proved difficult. Cordoba

has respected the GOC position of no despeje, but has ignored

GOC instructions not to involve other countries or

international actors in the process. She did not consult

with the GOC before launching her trip to the United States

to meet with "Simon Trinidad" and "Sonia," U.S. legislators,

and family members of the U.S. hostages. Similarly, Chavez

has supported the FARC's call for a despeje and continues to

push for a meeting with FARC leader Marulanda despite the GOC

position.

3. (C) Restrepo said the GOC needs to react each time Cordoba

or Chavez exceeds the limits set by the GOC. After Cordoba

met with Congressman McGovern, he called Ambassador Barco and

asked that President Uribe publicly support a meeting of U.S.

Congressmen with President Chavez. At the same time, Cordoba

called Uribe and urged him to publicly endorse a meeting of

the family members of the U.S. hostages with Chavez. Uribe

reacted sharply, telling Barco to inform McGovern he would

not insert himself into "U.S. domestic politics." Restrepo

said he told Cordoba and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas

Maduro they should not involve other international actors

without prior GOC approval. Maduro said Chavez understood,

but unilateral Chavez statements remain a problem.

4. (C) Restrepo judged that the FARC has no interested in a

humanitarian accord or broader peace process. It wants to

exploit Chavez' involvement to gain international

recognition, create tensions between the GOC and the USG, and

gain political space that will help it outlast Uribe's

presidency. The GOC and USG must manage the process in a way

that does not permit this or for the FARC to escape blame for

the process' eventual collapse. The USG statements

supporting the humanitarian initiative were positive, and

caught Chavez, Cordoba, and the FARC by surprise. Restrepo

continued that the USG should explain to Congressman McGovern

and other U.S. legislators that the FARC will try to

manipulate them and the hostages' families for political

advantage.

5. (C) He said the GOC plans to demand an immediate meeting

with the FARC if a FARC emissary meets with Chavez in

Caracas. Such a request would highlight that the GOC and

FARC do not need a despeje to hold talks on a humanitarian

accord, and would be resisted by the group. If the FARC

refuses to meet, the GOC will consider ending the process.

Restrepo said he had explained the GOC's stance to Cordoba

and Chavez. Cordoba assured him that the FARC will meet with

him in Caracas, but Restrepo remains skeptical.

---

ELN

---

6. (C) In response to the Ambassador's query. Restrepo said

the ELN has no political agenda and manipulates the peace

process, particularly civil society groups' participation, to

play for time. The GOC tries to pressure by cutting off its

funding from the Swedes, Norwegians, and Swiss, and by

limiting its contacts with civil society. Chavez'

involvement injects some new energy into an "exhausted"

process, but it does not compensate for the ELN's lack of

political vision. Restrepo agreed that U.S. funding of a

civil society group--if focused on a specific purpose and for

a limited time period--might help move the process forward.

He would consult with President Uribe and get back to the

Ambassador on this issue.

-------------------------

DON BERNA AND EXTRADITION

-------------------------

7. (C) Restrepo said various officials inside and outside the

GOC believe that the DEA letter outlining the evidence of

Diego Fernando Murillo AKA Don Berna's on-going criminal

activity does not justify his extradition. Medellin Mayor

Sergio Fajardo told President Uribe that Don Berna continues

to meet his obligations under the paramilitary peace process,

Colombian National Police Director Oscar Naranjo said he has

no proof of his involvement in criminal activity after his

demobilization. Restrepo told the Ambassador that he,

himself, had recommended extradition based on current

evidence. Nevertheless, Uribe believes he needs "judicial"

proof, such as an identified witness, to extradite Berna.

Brownfield

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2010

TAGS: MARR, PRGOV, PREL, PTER, CO

SUBJECT: EXTRADITION PROCESS ON TRACK FOR FORMER PARAS

Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer. Reason: 1.4(b,d)

1. (C) Minister of Interior and Justice Carlos Holguin

announced August 24 the transfer of Carlos Mario Jimenez

(alias "Macaco") from Itagui prison in Medellin to the

maximum security Combita prison near Bogota for conducting

drug trafficking activities from prison. The Fiscalia has

approved his provisional arrest warrant for extradition,

which will be served August 27. He would be the first

paramilitary to lose eligibility under the Justice and Peace

Law (JPL).

2. (C) Holguin also announced the transfer of Diego

Fernando Murillo Bejarano (aka "Don Berna") to Combita as a

"security precaution." Outgoing Department of Administrative

Security (GOC intelligence agency) director Andres Penate

told us August 24 Don Berna will likely be extradited to the

U.S. within the next two weeks due to his continuing

involvement in criminal activity. President Uribe

subordinated our July 2004 extradition request for Berna on

drug and money laundering charges in September 2005 because

of Berna's key role in the paramilitary peace process. The

U.S. has extradited 87 individuals from Colombia this year,

bringing the total to 583.

3. (C) Penate said the GOC needed to satisfy specific

Colombian legal requirements before extraditing Berna.

Complying with these steps would strengthen Uribe's political

and legal position. Penate said the GOC must provide five

days notice to citizens subject to an extradition order

before it can extradite them. It will take the GOC several

days to prepare the paperwork; notification to Berna is

unlikely to occur before August 31. He said the GOC also

would open a criminal case against Berna at the Fiscalia to

bolster its claim Berna had continued to engage in criminal

activity. Berna would be the first paramilitary leader whose

extradition request was subordinated by Uribe to be

extradited.

4. (C) Penate said Uribe is committed to extraditing Don

Berna as soon as these legal steps are completed. The only

risk is that Berna's lawyers will exploit the five days to

find a friendly judge who would issue an order blocking

extradition. Penate said the DAS had passed intelligence

reports implicating Don Berna in several murders in Medellin

and Cartagena, but lacked legal proof. Uribe's decision to

move against Berna was provoked by an anonymous letter that

was passed to him by a trusted source. The letter was

addressed to Castano's wife and claimed Berna and Macaco were

involved in Vicente Castano's murder earlier this year. It

also warned Castano's wife to leave the country. DAS records

showed she left Colombia three weeks ago.

Nichols

=======================CABLE ENDS============================

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RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018

TAGS: KJUS, PREL, PREF, PTER, PHUM, CO

SUBJECT: COLOMBIA EXTRADITES 14 EX-PARA LEADERS TO THE U.S.

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer

Reasons 1.4 (b and d)

SUMMARY

-------

1. (U) The GOC extradited 14 ex-paramilitary leaders,

including Salvatore Mancuso, Diego Murillo, and Rodrigo Tovar

Pupo, on May 13 to the United States to face narcotrafficking

and money laundering charges. President Uribe said he

extradited the fourteen due to due to their continued

involvement in crime or their failure to meet their Justice &

Peace Law (J&P) obligations. He added that victims could

have access to the extradited paras through judicial

cooperation agreements and that any seized assets would

benefit victims. The Ambassador held a news conference to

reiterate the USG's commitment to truth and reparations.

Opposition Senator Petro called the extraditions "the death

of the Justice and Peace process." End summary.

EX-PARA LEADERS EXTRADITED

--------------------------

2. (U) On May 13, the GOC extradited fourteen former United

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) leaders to the United

States to face narcotrafficking and money laundering charges.

The ex-paras had all begun testimony under the J&P Law.

Some had provided limited information on mass graves, but

none had provided comprehensive information on past crimes or

turned over significant assets in accordance with their J&P

law obligations.

3. (U) President Uribe said he extradited the fourteen

because of their continuing involvement in crime or their

failure to meet their J&P obligations. He said he had

reached agreement with the USG that Colombians would have

access to the trials of the ex-paras, and that any assets

seized from the paras would benefit victims. Uribe added

that the extraditions were necessary to show the GOC's

determination to enforce the J&P Law, and called on

guerrillas who demobilized under previous peace processes to

confess their crimes and make moral reparations. Post worked

closely with the GOC in the days leading up to the

extraditions to ensure that all procedures and paperwork in

the cases were completed in line with normal extradition

protocols. Those extradited were:

--Salvatore Mancuso-Gmez

--Diego Fernando Murillo-Bejarano, aka "Don Berna"

--Rodrigo Tovar-Pupo, aka "Jorge 40"

--Eduardo Enrique Vengoechea-Mola

--Juan Carlos Sierra-Ramirez

--Francisco Javier Zuluaga-Lindo, aka "Gordo Lindo"

--Ramiro Vanoy-Murillo, aka "Cuco Vanoy"

--Guillermo Prez-Alzate

--Nodier Giraldo-Giraldo

--Hernan Giraldo-Serna

--Diego Alberto Ruiz-Arroyave

--Edwin Mauricio Gomez-Luna

--Martin Penaranda-Osorio

--Manuel Enrique Torregrosa-Castro

GOC WORRIED ABOUT FREEZE OF PARA EXTRADITIONS

---------------------------------------------

4. (C) Presidential legal Advisor Edmundo del Castillo told

us President Uribe decided to extradite the fourteen because

he feared additional tutelas (injunctions) or court rulings

would limit his extradition authority. Such restrictions

would undercut presidential power and undermine the J&P

process. Judicial Council Magistrate Angelino Lizcano told

us the Council's May 5 ruling reversing a lower court

injunction prohibiting Macaco's extradition was written as

broadly as possible to allow the GOC to extradite other

paras. Still, Constitutional Court Magistrate Maurico

Gonzalez told us on May 9 that a victims' group was appealing

the Council's ruling to the Constitutional Court. Given the

current political support for victims' rights, he predicted

that the Constitutional Court would rule in the victims'

favor.

PUBLIC REACTION: MIXED

----------------------

5. (U) The extraditions generated immediate, mixed public

reaction. Opposition Polo Party Senator Gustavo Petro called

the move "the death of the Justice and Peace process." He

said the extraditions signaled the GOC's lack of confidence

in the judicial system's ability to manage the ex-para

leaders. Popular radio commentator Vicky Davila said many

suspected the extraditions represented an effort to prevent

para leaders from implicating more politicians, military, and

businessmen. Castillo said it would be important that the

USG show its commitment to address victims' rights after the

extradition to preserve popular support in Colombia for the

extradition process.

6. (U) The Ambassador held a press conference May 13 to

reiterate U.S. support for the extraditions and to thank

those involved in the successful operation. He also assured

the public that the USG wanted to see the paras confess the

full truth about their crimes and provide reparations to

victims. He said there were legal instruments available to

facilitate Colombian access to U.S. evidence/testimony

provided by the ex-paras.

7. (U) Former Vice Minister of Justice and radio commentator

Rafael Nieto said the extraditions would benefit both

Colombia and the United States. He said the ex-paras had not

cooperated previously in the J&P process, and had continued

criminal activities from jail. Those activities needed to be

stopped. He added, "The United States has every reason to

cooperate fully with Colombia to find the truth and achieve

reparations for para victims, and there are many mechanisms

available to do so."

BROWNFIELD

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