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1/17
Nihilism, Science, and Emptiness in NishitaniAuthor(s): Hase Shoto
Source: Buddhist-Christian Studies, Vol. 19 (1999), pp. 139-154Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1390532.
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2/17
NISHITANI
Nihilism, Science,
and
Emptiness
in
Nishitani
Hase Shoto
EMPTINESS AND NIHILISM
It
may
be
sufficiently
known
by
now
that
the
trunk ine of Nishitani's
philosophy
s
the 'idea
of
emptiness.'
ndeed,
rom his
Philosophy
fPrimordial
ubjectivity
1940)
through
his God and
Absolute
Nothingness
1948)
and
Nihilism
(1949)
right
into
Religion
and
Nothingness
1961),
Nishitani's
thinking
has
fundamentally
urned
around
he
idea of
emptiness.1
Not that in the
threeworks
precedingReligion
nd
Nothingness
he idea of
emptiness
s treated
overtly
as
such.
Rather,
n
those
works
the
idea
is
continually
growing,
as it
were,
on an invisible
underground
evel,
to
come
finally
o
the surface
n
Religion
nd
Nothingness.
t is
as if the
emptiness
hat
had
grown
strong
by
withstanding
he
pressure
f
the
'rock'
of
nihilism
came into
the
open
by
overthrowing
hat rock.
As it
was
the
key
to the
solution
of
the
problem
of
nihilismthat
had beset
him
in his
youth,
the
idea of
emptiness
was more than a mere
dea
for
Nishitani.It was
something
on which the
possibility
of existence
entirely
depended
or him.
There-
fore,
he
did
not
speak
of the
idea of
emptiness
but of the
'standpoint
f
emptiness.'
For
Nishitani,
nihilism
was not
simply
a
philosophical roblem,
a
problem
acciden-
tally
encountered
n the
courseof his
philosophical
nvestigations.
t
was a
problem
he had beensaddledwithwilly nillyas a resultof his own natureandtemperament
as well as of the conditionsof his
time. He then
decided o
shoulder he
problem
as
his
particular
ask.In
other
words,
nihilism
assumed or him the
natureof a
destiny.
Consequently,
he
'standpoint
f
emptiness,'
at which
he arrived t the
end
of
the
arduous
struggle
or the
solution of the
problem
of
nihilism,
took
on for
him
the
character f a reliable
lab of
granite
discovered t the
bottom
of
his own
existence:
something
with
a
depth
reaching
all the
way
to
the
core of the earth
and a
solidity
sufficient o
carry
he
weight
of
nihilism. Of all
this
Nishitani himself
was
clearly
aware.Let
me
reflect
a few moments
on Nishitani's
dea of
emptiness
n
its
relation-
shipwith nihilism.
How
did Nishitaniview this
nihilism hat
constituted he
basic
problem
or
him?
He
defined
his own
philosophical tandpoint
as,
in
the final
analysis,
the
overcom-
ing
of
nihilism
by
way
of
nihilism. n his
own
estimate,
he nihilismhe
struggled
with was an
extremely
difficult nd hard
o solve
problem
for
philosophy-a
problem
wherein
ntellectual
aporia
and
existential
onundrum
ntertwine;
not the
Buddhist-Christian
tudies
19
(1999).
?
by University
f
Hawai'iPress.All
rights
reserved.
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3/17
HASE SHOTO
kind of
problem
that
finds
a solution
provided
one makesthe
necessary
fforts;
a
problemthat is hardto get hold of: the studyof variousthoughtsystemsappears
only
to circle
around
ts
periphery.
hus,
ata certain
moment
I
decided
o
give up
my
philosophical
ffortsand to
tackle he
problem
by
Zen
[meditation],
way
rom
all intellectual
fforts.At that
point,
for
the
first ime and
little
by
little,
a
way
to its
solutioncame
in
sight. 2
This
kind
of
patientstruggling
with one
particular roblem,
as
we see it
in
Nishi-
tani's
case,
may
not be unheard
of
but
is
certainly
not
commonplace.
f
we
may
call
this attitude
or
way
of
facing
problems
a
'method,'
t
appears
o be described
by
Simone
Weil,
where she writes:
The
method
proper
to
philosophy
consists
in
clearlyseeing insolubleproblemsin their insolubility,and then to contemplate
them,
concentratedly
nd
indefatigably,
or
years,
without
any
hope
in the
waiting.
According
o
this
criterion,
here
arefew
philosophers.
But
'few'
may
be
saying
oo
much.
The
passage
o
the transcendent
s
opened
when
the humanfaculties-intel-
lect,
will,
human
love-run
into a
limit,
and
then the human
being
stays
on this
threshold,
beyond
which
it
cannot
put
a
single
step-and
this without
turning
away,
without
knowing
what it
desires,
and concentrated
n
the
waiting.
It is a
state
of extreme
humiliation.
t is unachievable
or
anybody
who is not
capable
f
accept-
ing
humiliation. 3
We
may
say
that,
just
like SimoneWeil herself,who for
many years
struggled
with the
insoluble
problem
of'unhappiness'
nd
finally
ound
the
way
to
a
solution
on a
supernatural
evel,
Nishitani
too,
who faced
the insoluble
problem
of nihilism
and
kept up
a
solitary
ntellectual
attlewith
it for
long
years,
was
truly
one of those
rare
philosophers
worthy
of the name.
Under
which
guise
did the idea
of
emptinesspresent
tself to
Nishitani
in the
midst
of that
Auseingndersetzung
ith nihilism?
Of
course,
the idea
of
emptiness
forms
the center
of the doctrine
of
Mahayana
Buddhism
and as such
has been end-
lessly
discussed.
A
bibliographical
ist of thesestudies
would contain
a
gigantic
num-
ber of
items.What would
then be
the characteristic
eatureof Nishitani'sdea of
emptiness
n the midst
of that
plethora
of
interpretations?
t
lies
in
the
fact that
Nishitaniconceives
of
it
subjectively
r
existentially,
rom
his own
bodily
existence
in the
present.
n
fact,
such
a
subjective
pproach
s the attitude
originally
equired
in
matters
of
religion;
eligious
ruth
reveals
tself
only
in
such
an
attitude.The fact
that it is
a
question
o be asked
n
the attitude
original
o
religion,
however,
oes not
necessarily
mean that
it is
universal.
In
Buddhist
parlance,
o treata
problem
romone'sown
present
bodily
existence
would
mean to
put
the
question
of sentient
beings
becoming
Buddha
right
n the
middle
of
it;
in other
words,
o askabout
satori,
or
awakening.
At
present,
o askthe
question
rom that
angle
is
the
only
right
way
to come
into contact
with the
Bud-
dhist
tradition.
An
investigation
f the Buddhist
criptures
merely
rom the
angle
of
Buddhism
being
the
doctrine
preached
by
the
Buddha,
without consideration
f
the
integration
of
the Buddha's
nlightenment
n the
self,
was branded
by
Soga
Ryojin
as Buddhist
materialism. 4
t is
viewing
the
sutras
n the
same
way
as sci-
ence views
material
things,
treating
he
scriptures
he
way
science
analyzes
he water
in
a
cup.
Just
as
the
water
n
a
cup evaporates,
o too
the full
reality
of
emptiness
140
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4/17
NIHILISM,
SCIENCE,
AND EMPTINESS
IN NISHITANI
evaporates
n such
treatment.When handledthis
way,
the
question
of
becoming
Buddha
s absent
rom the
beginning.Only
when
thematized
subjectively,
n
rela-
tion to a
problem
mposed
by
the actual
situation,
the idea
of
emptiness
becomes
spirit.
Emptiness
considered
apart
from
such a
relation
degenerates
nto a
mere
'thing.'Soga
says
it
in
the
following
way:
When
viewing
the
prevalent
endencies
in most of
present-day
Buddhist
studies,
that is the conclusion
I
have to come to.
Such a
view of the
history
of
Buddhismamounts
to a Buddhistmaterialist iew of
history
hat
explains
he declineof Buddhismwhile
basing
tselfon a materialisthe-
ory
that is a
negation
of
all
religion. 5
t
may
be
easy
to
'shoot
holes'
n
this
sweep-
ing
statement
by
Soga,
but it cannot be denied
that his
contention
that a
study
of
Buddhismunconnectedwithsubjective-existentialroblemss, in the finalanalysis,
a kind of Buddhistmaterialism ontainsa
good
part
of
truth.
Seen fromthat
point,
Nishitani's ttitude oward
religion,
once described
y
him-
self
as
inquiring
nto
religion
rom
the
point
where t
emerges
rom
man
himself,
as a
subject,
s a self
living
in
the
present, 6
ertainly
goes
in
a
direction
opposed
o
that of materialism.
With
regard,
hen,
to
emptiness,
t is
only
when
putting
t
into
question subjectively,
rom
one'sown existence
n
the
present
ime,
that the
tradi-
tion of
emptiness
will revive
n
the
present
and becomealive and
operative
here.
What made Nishitani
questionemptiness
on the basisof his own
present
exis-
tence waspreciselynihilism.It is through he mediationof nihilismthatemptiness
was removed
rom
a
museumshowcase-that
is,
from
its statusas a
dead
'thing'
o
be viewed
or an
object
of
archaeological
tudy,
to make
its
appearance
n
the real
marketplace
s a
currency
with
actual
power,
restored
o
its statusof
living
and
oper-
ative
spirit.
The real
marketplace,
f which
we
speak
here,
also has the
meaning
of
the
town called
The
Motley
Cow,
where
Nietzsche'sZarathustra
proclaimed
his
idea of the eternalrecurrence.
According
o
Nishitani,
his town
calledThe
Motley
Cow means the
multicoloredworld with its infinite
variety
of
forms ;
n
other
words,
the
contemporary
world.
To let
emptiness
oose into
it is to walk that
town
barefoot,
or to stand n the
very
midstof nihilism.
According
o
Nishitani,
t is
pre-
cisely
when
standing
herethat a
human
being gets
in
touch with
the
point
of ori-
gin
or
zero
point
from where
religion
as
religion
s
born.
Nishitani's laim
that the
overcoming
f nihilism s
only
possible
n
emptiness
s
basedon what
could be calledhis 'faith n
emptiness':
he
conviction
hat
emptiness
is
the
only
path
of
transcendence
open
in
the
presentday.
It
may
sound
strange
o
speak
of'faith'
n
emptiness.
Still,
it
seems o me
that
faith
is
precisely
he
right
word
to
characterize ishitani's ision
of
the
certainty
of
emptiness
as
the
path
of
tran-
scendence.The
selectionor
decision o choose
emptiness,
not
as one of
manypaths,
but
as
the
only
path
of
transcendencen a
present
day
dominated
by
nihilism,
s at
work
in
Nishitani.
We can
find therein a
frame of
mind reminiscent
of
Honen's
Selection f the
Primal
Vow.
Amid the
consciousness
f
living
in
the
Age
of the
Latter
Days
of the
Law
(mappo),
which was
rampant
n the
transition
period
from
the
Heian erato
the
Kamakura
ra,
Honen
madethe
desperate
moveof
selecting
he
way
of
Other-Power
salvation
by
Amida's
Primal
Vow)
as
the
only
path
still
open
to
salvation,
hereby
rejecting
all other
Buddhist
paths
as
not
walkable
any
longer.
A
similar
standpoint
of
selection
and
rejection
hows
up
in
the
earlier-mentioned
141
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5/17
HASE
SHOTO
fact
that Nishitani
speaks
of
the
standpoint
f
emptiness
ather han of
the
idea of
emptiness.
This
'faith'
of
Nishitani
was
supported
by
his
senseof
reality
and
view
of
history.
His
senseof the
age
he was
living
n
had
much in
common
with that of
the
founders
of
the
Japanese
PureLand
schools,
who
defined
heir
age
as
Latter
Days
and looked
for a
path
of
transcendence
truly
effective n
such
an
age.
Up
to a
point,
the
sense
of nihilism n
our
age
and the senseof
Latter
Days
of the Late
Heian
people
are
par-
allel
phenomena.
In
the
Latter
Day
age,
we
encounter
n
Shinran
and others
the
standpoint
of
Other-Power,
hich
opened
up
by
accepting
he
Latter
Day
situation
as
it
was;
n
the
age
of
nihilism,
here
s Nishitani
o whom
the
standpoint
of
empti-
ness
appeared
s the
only
walkable
path.
The
awareness f the Latter
Day
is not
a
matterof
clear
and
objective
knowledge
o
anybody;
t
makes ts
appearance
ithin
a
specific
sense of
history
and sense of the
age.
Similarly,
o
pin
down
nihility
as
nihility,
a
subtle
spirit
esprit efinesse)
s
required.
Nishida
callsthis
the sense f
reality-a
sense one
cannot learn rom
somebody
else.
J.
Van
Bragt
peaks
n
this
connection of
Nishitani's
prophetic
haracter. 7
f
there is in
Nishitani
anything
that can be
called
by
that
name,
it
finds its
origin
n
that senseof
reality,
hat
sense
of
certainty.
What is of
primary mportance
n
Nishitani's
standpoint
of
emptiness
is the senseof the earthor,to use anearlier imile,the senseof theTownof the Mot-
ley
Cow,
wherein
emptiness
must
strike
roots.
It
can also be
called
the
senseof the
present
elf
or,
in
Buddhist
parlance,
he
sense
of ki
(the
capability
f
the
concrete
subject
[to
grasp
the
Buddha's
message]).
In
Nishitani's
case,
nihilism shows
the
character f
such
a senseof
ki;
and
'emptiness'
tands or
one more
certainty,
which,
while
based
on
that sense of
ki,
is
able to
overcome
t.
Let
us
make nihilism
the
starting
point
of
our
reflections
or a
moment.
What
kind
of
nihility
would
the
nihility
n
nihilismbe?
Why
was
the nihilism
Nishitani
encountered
ard
o overcome?
he
reason
ies
in the
essenceof
that nihilism tself:
that it hasto do with a nihility in thesecondpower. t is not simplythe universal
nihility,
which is
an essential rait of all human existence
irrespective
f time and
place,
and which
Sakyamuni
ad
in
mind when he
said that all
s
impermanent.
Nihilismrefers o
a
nihility
originating
within a
historical
ituation,
anchored
n
his-
torical,social,
and culturalconditions.
In
other
words,
the
nihility
of nihilism
s a
nihility
that makes
ts
appearance
new
within the values
hat haveenabledhuman-
ity
to overcome
he
nihility
that
is
natural nd essential o
it.
Through
t the
natural
nihility
is raised o the second
power
by
the
nihility
arising
n
history
and
society.
Nishitani
distinguishes
he
two
aspects
contained
in nihilism
and then
says
that
nihilism s thecompoundof the two. In Nishitani's wn words: On the one hand,
nihilism s a
problem
hat transcendsime
and
space
and
is
rooted
n the essenceof
human
being,
an
existential
problem
n
which the
being
of
the self
is
revealed o the
self itself as
somethinggroundless.
On
the
other
hand,
it is a historical
and social
phenomenon....
The
phenomenon
of nihilism shows that
...
the value
system
which
supports
our
historical
ife
has broken
down,
and
that
the
entirety
of social
and historical
ife has
loosened
tself from
its foundations.
Nihilism is
a
sign
of the
collapse
of
the socialorder
externally
nd of
spiritual
decay nternally. 8
The
problem
of nihilism
lies
in
the
point
that,
when
these
two
combine,
they
142
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6/17
NIHILISM,
SCIENCE,
AND
EMPTINESS IN
NISHITANI
open up
an
abyss
of
nihility
at the bottom
of
people
living
in
history,
whereby
he
very
existence
of the
human
being
is
put
into
question.
There lies
the
reason
why
nihilism s suchaninvolvedandhard-to-solve
problem:
because he
nihility
encoun-
tered
in
the
existenceof
the self is
rendered
opaque by
the fact
that
it
implicates
within
itself
the
historical
and
social
problems
and,
consequently,
he
bringing
o
self-awarenessf
this
nihilism
requires
historical
ense
capable
of
reading,
within
the
existenceof
the
self,
the
historicaland
social
tasks
of
the
age
wherein
he self
is
located.It
demands
an
eye
that can
see the
nihility
of the
age
through
he
nihility
of the
existence
of the
self.All
this
explainswhy
nihilism s
such an
intractable,
ntri-
cate,
and
hard-to-solve
problem.
As
already ointed
out,
one can
speak,
n
connection
with
nihilism,
of
a
nihility
in
the
second
power,
n
the
sense
that
the
nihility
n
question
s
one
that
infiltrated
anew
into
the
sociocultural
alues
that
once
overcame he
natural
human
nihility.
When the
social
values
hat
made
the
overcoming
f
the
natural
nihility
possible
ol-
lapse,
nihility
oses its
place
to
go,
twists
and
turnswithin
the
cultureas a
profound
doubt,
and
coils
up,
as it
were,
in its
bottom.
The
cultural
path
that
had
been
opened
for
a
time
becomes
a
dead
end
and ceases
o be a
path.
It is
for that
reason
that
nihilism s a
historical-cultural
problem.
This
special
character f
the
nihility
of
nihilism
may
become
clearer f
we
compare
t,
for
instance,
with
the
'sorrow'
hat
Nishidasaw asthe startingpoint of philosophy.
At
first
sight,
the
nihility
of
sorrow
and the
nihility
of
nihilism
may
seem
not to
differ,
both
being
nihility.
However,
both
are
separated
y
an
invisible
gulf.
The
sor-
row
that
Nishida
discovers n
the
starting
point
of
philosophy
and
also at
the
origin
of
religion
is the
taste of
nihility
a
human
being experiences
when
meeting
with
unhappiness
n
life.
Sorrow,
however,
s
not
purely
a
negative
eeling;
here
s in
it
a
quality
hat can
turn
the
negative
nto
something
positive.
Nishida
himself
says
hat
somebody
who
falls
into
extreme
unhappiness
annot
keep
religious
eelings
rom
vividly
welling
up
in
himself.
The
characteristic
rait of
sorrow
s
that
it
elicits the
riseof religiosity:ranscendenteelings hat,withintheencounterednegation,make
the
overcoming
of
that
negation
possible.
As
something
that
heals the
wounds
inflicted
by
negation,
religiosity
s
a
healing
power
hat
wells
up
in
the
bottom
of
the
self
from
a
point
transcending
he
self.
Feelings
of
sorrowcan
introducea
person
into
a
transcending
world,
and the
healing
power
at work in
them
is
like
the
heal-
ing power
of the
Moonlight
Bodhisattva
hat
healed
he
wounds of
King
Ajatasatru
in
the
Nirvana
Sutra.
The
reason
why
sorrow
tself
is
sometimes
called
a
religious
feeling
s
that
there s
present
n
it
something
hat
can
heal the
wounds of
the
per-
son
who
met
with
unhappiness.
n
sorrow,
a
person
s not
a
captive
of
despair;
n
the contrary,n sorrowa person s consoledandsaved rom
despair.
Nihilism,
on
the
other
hand,
does
not have
such
a
transcending ower.
Instead
of
being open
to
transcendencet is
closed
to
it. In
it,
the
path
to the
transcendent
is
destroyed,
bliterated.
Consequently,
ifferently
rom
sorrow,
here
s no
healing
of
the bite
of
unhappiness
n
the
nihility
of
nihilism.
For
that
reason
he
nihility
of
nihilism is
said to
be
not
a
direct
and
simple
nihility,
but a
nihility
in the
second
power,
a
nihility
that
has
become
doubt-suspicion.
nsofar
as
it
reintroduces
nihility
where
nihility
had
once
been
overcome,
t is
a
nihility
become
fur
sich-self-aware.
143
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7/17
HASE
SHOTO
Nishitani
ikens his to a
germ
or virus hat
had once been
subdued
by
strong
chem-
icalsbut then reboundswith a new resistance o chemicals. t opensan areligious
and
antireligious
ealmat the
same level as the
place
of
religion
tself.All
roads
o
religion
are
then
closed,
a
deep
breach s
introduced
nto the link
betweenself
and
absolute hat
had been establishedn
sorrow,
nd
absolute
distrust-suspicion
omes
to
reign.
The well from which
religionsprings
s
cut
off,
religiosity
dries
up,
and
in
the
place
from where
religious
eeling
are
supposed
o
originate,
a
profound
doubt
now
lies
curled
up.
When
he
said that
the
point
of
departure
f
his
philosophy
s
nihilism,
Nishitaniwas
clearly
aware hat the
nihility
he
had encounteredwas some-
thing
of
a differentnature romthe sorrowNishida
speaks
of,
something
hat makes
all salvationpowerless. t is a
thing
that harborsn itselfdistrustandrebellion,and
merits he name of
evil.
That Nishitani
had to arrive t the ideaof
emptiness
was
due to the involved har-
acterof the
nihility
of nihilism.A
nihility
that dissolvesand rendersnull and void
all
paths
to the
transcendent emandsa
special
means
of
transcendence.
Emptiness
possesses unique
way
of
transcendencehat makes he
overcoming
f that
nihility
of nihilism
possible.
Furthermore,
t
was
by
facing
hat
nihility
of
nihilism hatNishitaniarrived t
his
distinctive
understanding
f the
relationship
f
religion
and
philosophy.
n
Nishi-
tani,
philosophy
s no
abstract
heory
hat floats
n
thin airabove
ife;
t is a
path
that
runs
rightthrough
he
very
middle
of life: it shows
up
from before echnical
philos-
ophy
and
projects
ts
presence
beyond philosophyproper.
n that
capacity,
t runs
right hrough
ife as a
path
of
absolute
negation,
a
path
of
great
doubt,
a
path
of tran-
scendence.
t is
not, therefore,
discipline
hat would
explain
religion
rom
the side
of
religion.
Nor is it
something
hat would be therebefore
religion
and would
carry
reflection
right
up
to the threshold f
religion
and,
when faced
with
religion,
would
abandonand
reject
tself.
In
Nishitani,
philosophy
s
absolutely
rreverent,
nd noth-
ing
can
stop
its course.Nishitaniconsiders t
to
be the
properworking
of
thought,
and
thereby
onceives f
thinking
as an
activity
able
to
transcend
anything
whatever.
It is
a
standpoint
hat,
when faced
with
religion,
also
goes
beyond
religion.
Consequently,
n
Nishitani's
philosophy
f
religion, eligion
and
philosophy
tand
in
a
relationship
ot of
harmony
but rather f mutual
warfare,
egation,
and accom-
plishment.
And
it
is,
indeed,
the
nihility
of
nihilism
that
made
Nishitani
walk
the
path
of a
philosophy
n
that sense.Since
he
nihility
hat faced
him
presented
prob-
lem without
a
solution,
Nishitani
was
forced
o
go
on
thinking
while
abiding
n
the
problem
tself.
In
fact,
he himself testifies:
Although ecognizing
hat
my
problem
wassupposed o find a solutiononlyon the levelof religion, had to make
a
detour
through
philosophy. 9
he
nihility
of nihilismhad
paralyzed eligion
and
rendered
it
impotent
but could not
similarly
paralyze hilosophy
as the
path
of
thinking.
At
this
point, philosophy
appears
s
something ranscending eligion.
The
idea
of
emptiness,
however,
s
not
something
that
philosophical
hinking
opened
up
and
established
y
its
own
power.
t is a
space
hat
opened
up
by
philos-
ophy
penetrating
nto
religion,going
right through
t,
and
explodingreligion
rom
the inside.
The
space
of
freethinking
nd
wisdom,
opened
up
within
religion
by
passing
through religion,
is
preciselyemptiness.
Since there
is
nothing
that can
144
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8/17
NIHILISM,
SCIENCE,
AND
EMPTINESS
IN NISHITANI
obstruct
t,
this
space
of
thinking
has infinitewidth and
depth.
Nishitanithen
calls
this freethinking,which advanceswhileovercoming verything hat couldobstruct
its
view,
butsukojogoing
beyond
the
Buddha).
On the
other
hand, however,
hink-
ing
is coerced
o exert nfinite
patience
when
passing
hrough
he midst of life-and
specifically hrough
the midst
of
nihilism. And
infinite
patience
breaksone's self-
esteem.
Therefore,
n
the
realmof
thinking,
transcending
he Buddha
s,
in
turn,
true
humility,
hat which
shows
the
non-ego
of the
thinking.
The
tie-up
of nihilismand
emptiness
makesus
pay
attention o
the
unique
char-
acter
of the transcendence
present
n
emptiness.
Nishitanimaintains hat the over-
coming
of nihilismbecomes
possible
only
in a
radicalization
f nihilism
romwithin
itself,andthat this is an essential raitof nihilism.Thatnihilismdemands ucha
spe-
cial
way
of
overcoming
s
due
to
the
higher
ndicated act that
the
nihility
of nihil-
ism becomes a
profound
doubt and
thereby
closes in on
itself. What is closed
in
within itselfcan be
opened
only
from
the inside.And to
open
a
thing
fromthe
inside
becomes
possible
only by
reaching
he
very
own-reality
f the
thing.
Emptiness
s the
path
to that
self-reality
f
things.
There then lies the reason
why
the
overcoming
f
nihilism s said to be effected
n
emptiness.
The
transcendence orked
n
emptiness
does not consist
in
offeringbeing
over
nothingness,
ife over
death,
meaning
over
meaninglessness.
o the
question,
When the three
worlds
are
without
Dharma,
whereto look for the heart-mind?
emptiness
does not answer
by
presenting
he
heart-mind omewhere.
t
answers,
The heart-mind s
unobtainable,
nd
thereby
finds
the
answer
and
peace
of
mind
within the
question
tself.
Precisely
herein
ies
the
standpoint
of
emptiness,
ays
Nishitani.It is
the
path
of
escape
rom
meaning-
lessnessand
nihilityby
a total
acceptance
f
nihility
as
nihility
and
meaninglessness
as
meaninglessness
nd
by
going deeper
and
deeper
nto
nihility
and
meaninglessness.
Faced
with the
question,
Where o
find
a reason o
live?
emptiness
ruly
finds
the
reason o
live
and salvation n the
place
of ohne
warum :
n
order
o heal
oneliness,
it
goes
nto the
desert ;
t
finds
the
point
of
no heat n the
very
midst of heat.
But what
kind
of
transcendence oes this
path
offer? t
would be
wrong
to think
of it as a
path
of mere
negation
and
irony.
Rather,
t is one
more
path,
different rom
both those of
negation
and affirmation.Nishitani calls
it
the
way
of
reality. 10
Emptiness
s
the
place
where all
phenomena
appear
n
their true
reality.
That all
things
appear
here n their true
reality
becomes
possible
by
the
fact
that
emptiness
is
bottomless,
s a bottomless
depth
hat has
broken
through
all bottoms.The
principle
of
reality
s this
bottomlessness.
But how
would
this
path
of
reality
be a
path
of
transcendence?Would
not
for us humans the
way
of
transcendenceie in
transcendencen the soil, transcendence y wayof the PureLand,rather hanin
transcendencen
emptiness
the
sky)?
This
question
does not fit in
our
present
prob-
lematic,
however,
and
I
shall
therefore
not
pursue
t here.
NIHILISM AS A
PREPHILOSOPHICAL
QUESTION
Nihilism
was the
point
of
departure
f Nishitani's
philosophy.
For
Nishitani
t
grew
bigger
and
bigger
also as a
philosophical
problem,
ill
it came to
embracealmostall
problems
of
the life of
contemporary
umans. It then
became the
central ask of
145
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9/17
HASE SHOTO
Nishitani's
philosophy
of
religion
o
unmask
he nihilism
that
pervades
he
core
of
present-day ivilization,n problems uchas the scientificworldviewand scientific
rationality,
echnology
pervading
ll
aspects
of human
ife,
moral
decay
n
contem-
porary
ociety,
and to
look for the
direction
n which to overcome hat nihilism.
But instead
of
investigating
hat broad
spectrum
f
the
problems
onnected
with
nihilism,
I
would
like to
consider
the more
personalquestion
of how
the
young
Nishitaniencountered ihilism.Nishitani
speaks
aboutthis
in
two
short
essays
nti-
tled
My
Youth
or
My
Teenage
Period )
nd
My
philosophical
Point of
Depar-
ture.
Before t built itself nto a
philosophical roblem,
nihilism
cameto obsess
he
young
Nishitanias anihilistic
mood
of a
special
character.
What
would
that
spe-
cial character ave been?
Nishitani ells us about
the
point
of
departure
f his
philosophy
n the
following
way:
With
regard
o
the
motive
for
philosophizing,
o
the
connection
between
he
pre-philosophical
nd
philosophy,
n thatsense
with
regard
o
the
beginning
of
philosophy,
many
things
have been
adduced
rom
olden
times on. There
are,
of
course,
Aristotle's
wonderment,
hristianity's
for
he sakeof
apolo-
getics,
Descartes'
doubt,
nd
so
on; but,
besides
hesethere
s,
for
example,
Nishida
telling
us that
philosophy
wells
up
from the
profound
sorrow of
human
life. All these relate
o
philosophy
as
meta-physics,
ut
in
modern
times there
are caseswherein
philosophy
originates
n connectionwith sci-
ence
(mathematics
nd the natural
ciences,
or social sciences
ike
psycho-
analysis).
My
own
startingpoint
was
different
rom all these.When
I
try
now
to
express
what
it
was,
I
cannot,
in
the final
analysis,
call
it
anything
but
nihilism.Not
that this
concept
was
clear o me at
the
time,
but
when
I
think
back from where
I
am
now,
I cannot but
give
it that name.
Nihilism has
already
acquired
he
meaning
of
a
specific standpoint
n
philosophy
but,
strictlyspeaking,what I am speakingof here has a differentmeaning.This
does
not mean
however
hat it was
merely
a
nihilityistic
mood.
It was
a
kind
of nihilism
that,
while
being
pre-philosophical,
ssentially
contained
the
demand
o
move to the
philosophical
evel.11
In his
My
Youth,
Nishitanifurther
explains
his
last sentence
n a
very
direct
and
apt
way:
To
say
it
in
one
word,
my
own
youth
was a
period
totally
without
hope;
or
rather, livedin an atmospheren which the access o hope had been thor-
oughly
removed.
This
does,
of
course,
not
mean that
the time
of
my
youth
as
such
was such
an
age.
On
the
contrary,
t was the time
immediately
fter
he
FirstWorld
War,
a time
in which
Japan,
at least
to all outward
appearances,
entered
ts
brightest
and most
flourishing
eriod.
One
could
say
that
it
was
a
period
it
to
provokehopeful
dreams
n
young people.
However,
myself
had
fallen
into a state wherein
all the
hopes
the
age
permitted
appeared
nly
as
totallymeaningless.
The state
I am
speaking
of did
not
only
have to do
with
outer
situations,
but ratherwith
a
spiritual
ituation.
To
describe
my
state of
146
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10/17
NIHILISM, SCIENCE,
AND EMPTINESS
IN
NISHITANI
mind
at the time
in a
word,
I
could
say
that
it was as if a thornhad been
dri-
ven into the bottom of my heart.That thorn continuallycausedpain and,
beset
by
that
pain,
I suffered
rom life itself. Since
this thorn was such that
I
could
not remove
t with
my
own
powers,
and I
thought
that the
only
way
to
get
rid
of the
pain
was
by
dying,
my
lifeat thetime
lay totally
within a
nihilis-
tic
sphere,
a realmof
despair.12
The state of
despair
nto which Nishitanifell was caused
by
an
accumulation
f
various
misfortunes hat make
life
hard-to
begin
with,
the loss of his fatherat a
time
when he neededa
support
o
step
into
society
and start
his
own
life.
We must
paydueattention o what he further ells us: that thisdespairhrewhim into a tate
of
melancholy
and
depression,
different
rom such states as heal
by
themselves.
What is a
melancholy
hat knows
no
natural
healing?
Nishitani s
telling
us that
such
melancholy
and loneliness
exist in
human
ife,
and we should take note of
the
way
he describes t: Therecan be in
human
life
something
ike the
melancholy
of
a
tree
n whose
very
core a
poisoned
needlehas been
inserted,
he lonelinessof a
tree
that
fights
within itself
against
he fluid of death that is
streaming
n the
arteries f
its life.
In
such a
tree,
the
activity
of the life
fluids,
which want to
expand
when
spring
comes,
becomes tself
the
working
of
the
poisoned
luids.
Here,
the
direction
of life is at the sametime the directionof death; ife is, as it were,paralyzedn its
very
source. 13
Nishitani
further
points
out that this
melancholic
depression
was
of such a
nature hat a
cure could not be
found
in
any
outer
thing,
a
question
which
hid-
denly
contains
he answer n
itself,
a
problem
or which there s
no other
solution
than
todraw
he
power
o
live,
to
find
the
minimal
but fundamental
power
of
resis-
tance and
hope,
within the
very
despair
nto
which one has been
thrown
in
total
nakedness s
it
were. Nishitani
himselfsomehow
ound
the
way
out of this
despair
back
to
life,
and he
tells
us
that,
when he
later ound the
following
sentence
among
the
sayings
of the
ancients- oppressed
by
rocks,
bambooshoots
creep
out side-
ways;
on the
steep
banksof the
river,
lowers
grow upside
down -and reflected n
his own
youth,
he
keenly
elt that this
described
precisely
ow it
had beenwith him.
Since
the
nihility
Nishitanihad to face
n
his
youth
was of such a
twisted
natureand
had demanded
rom him
infinite
submission,
t
could not but leave
scars
n
his
later
life,
even after t
had been
basically
vercome.
What
Nishitanishowedus in the
above
discussionwas the
specificquality
of
the
nihility
of
nihilism-what
he
himself
calls
nihility
n the
second
power.
Of this
nihility
Nishitani
spoke
already
n
the
Contemporary
onsciousness nd
Religion
chapter
of his
Philosophyf
Primordial
Subjectivity.4
n
that
essay,
Nishitani
speaks
of a
despair
urking
n the
religious
consciousness f
present-day
eople
and calls
this
bashful
aith. 15
It is
the faithof
the
person
who
attained aithout
of
pure
reli-
gious
motives,
such as
consciousness
f
one'sown
finitudeand
sinfulness,
but
then
comes to
harbor
a
despair
while
living
the life of
a
specialist
n
various
ields,
and
accepting
ultural lements n
the
process
of
making
hat faith
concrete.
Here,
n the
person
who
has the
consciousness f I
believe,
faith tself
s
pushed
nto the back-
ground
and becomes hin
like a
ghost,
while the
interest n
the
outer
world
and
the
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11/17
HASE
SHOTO
desire or fameand
profit
lare
up
anew.
Here,
the
prayer
I
believe,
helpmy
unbe-
lief fits the inner
reality
of
the
person.
When such a
person,
with he last bit
of
sincerity
hat rests
n
him,
becameawareof his own
decadence,
he
might
lose
all
interestand fall into a realm
of
total sloth or inertness. 16n
such
a bashful aith
the
nihility
of nihilism dwells.
It
is not the
nihility
before
faith,
the
nihility
that
made
the
person
turn
to
faith,
it is a
nihility
that assails he
person
after he has
attained aith and makes
him
leavehis faith behind.
Concretely
peaking,
n what
circumstances ould
this kind of
nihility
show
up?
Nishitaniclarifies
things
at
the
handof
one
example.
Take he case
of a woman
who,
afterlosingher husbandwhen stillyoungandraisinga son allbyherselfwith much
hardship,
oses also
this son.
In
this
case,
there
s still a
way
of salvationout
of the
nihility
that
may
assail he
mother,because,
although
he has lost her
child,
she can
still
keep
up
the
link
with
him in
a
spiritual
world.
But,
imagine
that an air raid
strikeswhile this mother
s
living
with
her
son. She herself
s
on
the
point
of
death,
but
her son
hastily
runs
away
o save
himself,
eaving
her behind.
Suppose
hen that
she is saved
somehowand she
is
living
again
with her
son. What would
then be her
feelings?
The son is still
there,
but
the
link
with
him
is cut
off more
radically
han
when he would
have
died.
Here,
the
nihility
would be
different
rom the
former
case.This timethe mother'sfeelingscannotturn towardherson, nor to God or the
Buddha
either. It
s
a situation hat
brings
he doubt
whether
anything
ike
God
or
the Buddha
exists. This
nihility
is the
nihility
of
nihilism. Nishitani
says
the fol-
lowing
about it:
This means
hat,
at the bottom of
the son who
estranged
imself
rom
her,
..
a
profound
nihility
appeared;
nihility
that makes
all ethical and
religious
link
impossible.
Moreover,
his
nihility opens up
from below her
own
feet,
from the bottom
of her
own existence.The desire
or
an
ontological
ink,
the
need to findsomething o lean on arisesasbefore,butnow shecannotturn it
either
to
her
son or to God
or Buddha.
Those
feelings
urn
backon her
and
go
on
deepening
he
nihility,
strengthening
er
despair
and desolation.
This
nihility,
which
runs
also
through
he realms
of ethics and
religion
and
is resis-
tant
to
them;
this
nihility,
which
has come
to
awareness
s
something
that
cannot
be
enveloped
even
by
ethics
or
religion,
s a
nihility
that
has become
ffur
ich.
It
could
also be called
a
pessimism
hat has
found a
basis
of its cer-
tainty.
Nihilism arises
n the
form of such
a
becomingfiur
ichof
nihility.
Or
it
can
be
said,
at
the
least,
that such
a form is
the
core
around
which
the
pearl
of
nihilismtakes
shape.17
The
nihility
of
nihilism nsinuates
tself
nto the
place
rom
where
religion
s
sup-
posed
to
ariseand undermines
he
place
of
religion
rom
the inside.
Nishitani
argues
that modern
cience
showssuch a
character:
.
..
the
image
of the natural
world
has
undergone
a
completechange
since
the
Renaissance
s a result
of the
development
of
the
natural
ciences.
The worldhas
come
to
appear
ompletely
unfeeling
and
alto-
gether
indifferent
o human
interests.
The world
has
cut across
he
personal
rela-
tionship
between
God and
man. 18
148
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12/17
NIHILISM,
SCIENCE,
AND
EMPTINESS
IN
NISHITANI
This
view of
a mechanical
and
nonteleological
natureor
world,
which the
nat-
ural
scienceshave
promoted
n
modern
imes,
cannot
recognize,
besides his
world,
the existence
of a
spiritual
world,
a
religious
worldin
which
a
personal
elationship
is
established etween
God
and
the
human
being.
The
worldviewof
the
natural
ci-
ences
ends
up
reducing
everything
o
a
world of
death,
n
which
the
insentient
and
material
reigns.
Thereby,
he view
that
distinguishes
realmof
science
and a
realm
of
religion
andthen
triesto set
the
limitsof
each
and
determine
he
relationship
f
the
two is
undercut. n
other
words,
science
spreads
p
to the
throneof
God,
throws
it
out,
and
destroys
t.
How, then,
would the
overcomingof sucha nihilism,thathas become ir sich
and cannotbe
encompassed
y
religion,
be
possible?
Nishitani
maintains
hat this
is
only
possible
n
emptiness.
Therein
ies
the
necessity
of the
link
between
he
prob-
lem of
nihilism
and
emptiness.
CONTEMPORARY
NIHILISM AND
THE
METAMORPHOSIS
OF
SCIENCE
The
various
problems
hat
Nishitani had
delved
up
at the
roots of
the
modern
age
in his
Philosophyf
Primordial
Subjectivity
ere
then
all
brought
ogether
under he
rubricof nihilismand furtherpursuedassuchin Nihilism,Religion ndNothingness
and the later
writings.
He
himself
has
said
that
the
problem
of
nihilism,
which
had
been the
startingpoint
of his
philosophy,
became
gradually
bigger
and
bigger
as a
problem
and
came
to
embrace lmostall
the
problems
present-day
eople
encounter
in
their
existence:
he
problem
of
scientific
worldview
and
rationality,
he
problem
of
technology
pervading
ll
realms
of
human
life,
the
problem
of
moral
decadence
in
present-day
ociety,
and
so
on.
These
great
problems
f
contemporary
ivilization
all
amount
to forms
of
masked
nihilism or
nihilism n
code.
Nishitani's
basic
philosophical
ask
was
thus to
bring
to
light
the
nihilism
that
pervades
he
civiliza-
tion of the presentage in its verycoreand to look for the direction n which this
nihilism
could
be
overcome.
One of
the
main
symptoms
of
the
nihilism
hat
pervades
resent
ociety
s
the
fact
that
in
various
espects,
uman
relations
ave
become
hin
and
alienated
nd
turned
into
fragmentary
nd
short-term
things,
rejecting
he
commitmentof
the
whole
per-
son.
The
absence
of
goal
and
meaning
n
present
ociety
denotes
the lack
n
society
of
a
place
that
permits
bringing
out
the
existence
of
the
self in
its
totality.
The fact
that
such a
place
cannot
be
found
anywhere
n
social
ife
makes
present
ociety
a
sick
one. A
person
who
cannot
find the
goal,
meaning,
and
destiny
of
his life
in
the rela-
tionshipwith society,andwho cannotthrowhis entire self into it, retires nto an
unnatural
rivate
ealm
and dreams
here
of a
free
and
autonomous
ife.
But in
such
a
private
ealm,
ree
from
all
restrictions,
here
s to
be
found
only
the
void of
inac-
tivity
and
anxiety;
true
joy
is
lacking
in
it.
Nishitani
locates
the
misery
of
people
today
in
that
thinness
of
relations. It
means
that
...
among
people
affinity
and
harmony
are
lost
and,
instead,
strife
and
mutual
oppression
become
rampant
in
the
various
aspects
of
human
relationships;
in
other
words,
that
the
place
of
common-
ality
gradually
ceases to
exist. 19
Nishitani
says
that
the
lack of
a
trustworthy
cer-
149
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13/17
HASE
SHOTO
tainty
that makesa total
commitment
possible
akes
away
he
joy
of
life
and makes
the characterormationof the contemporary umanbeingdifficult.
When the
mutual
relationships
f
people
do not
grow
out
of a
religious
ounda-
tion that
touches
hem in theirtotal
reality
nd
are
placed
under
he
aegis
of
an
imi-
tation
set
of
laws
and
contracts,
human relationsbecome conditionaland
provi-
sional.
When the rational
but exterior
relations,
regulated
by
rights
and contracts
and
basedon the
autonomy
of
the
human
being,
takethe
place
of the irrational ut
religious
elations f sacrifice
nd
self-denial,
he
distance
rom the
modern
auton-
omous
subject
o the
contemporary private
uman
being
s but a
single
step.
What
made
this
single
step
look like
an
infinitely
ar
distance
s
only
the
fact
that
resistancesnd obstacles
against
t
persisted
t variousplaces n society; hesehadto
be
subdued
before he
idea
of the autonomous
subject
could
spread
o
all
nooks and
crannies f
society.
The
growing hinning
of relations esults
n
shutting
he
human
being
up
in a
private
realmand
in
producing
a
private
ome kind
of
person
who
turnshis or
her backon various
relationships.
n
Religion
nd
Nothingness,
ishitani
calls such a
person
a
subject
driven
by
desires
and
impulses, tanding
entirely
out-
side
of
the
natural
aws. At
the
origin
of this
predicament
here ies the modern
dea
of the autonomous
subject.
The autonomous
subject
of
modern
imes,
however,
was
not outsideof all laws.
Rather,
ts
standpoint
originated
n the will to define and realizeoneself
according
to the laws
of reason.But the
problem
hat the idea of the
autonomous
subject
car-
ried
within itself
did
not
come
to the surface
as
long
as
modernity
had
to
fight
all
kinds
of
irrational esistances nd
obstacles
n its
endeavor
o
make this idea
pene-
trate nto all
aspects
of
society
and
to
rebuild
ociety
according
o this idea.
It was
only
after
t had done
away
with
the
obstacles
and
it
looked
as
if
it had
completely
realized
tself
that the
problems
contained
n it came to
the
surface
and it revealed
the
fragility
of its basis.
That is what the
contemporary
ge
is about.
Why
did
this
situation
come about?
Why
did
the modernautonomous
subject,
which was
sup-
posed
to have established
tself
by
following
the rules
of
reason,
come
to
turn
into
the
present-age
ubject
of
desires
tanding
entirely
outside
all
laws?
Nishitani sees modern
nihilism at the
roots of the
contemporary
ickness.
For
him,
modern
nihilism
originated
y
way
of the
modernautonomous
ubject
and sci-
ence,
and
contemporary
ihilism s an offshoot
of modern
nihilism.
Thus,
Nishitani
sees
contemporary
ihilismas an extension
of modern
nihilism.
But
can
contempo-
rary
nihilism
really
be
considered
o be
in
continuity
with modern
nihilism?
s it
not, rather,
hat
there
s a
big
breachbetween
the two and
contemporary
ihilism
showsan
altogether
ifferent
acethan modern
nihilism? he
question
hen
becomes
where
this breach
xactly
ies.
The
metamorphosis
f scienceand
technology
n
our
day
could
have much
to do with
it. The
loss of the
feeling
of
certainty
nd trust
n
science
s what
separates
he two nihilisms.
n
modern
nihilism,
God
was dead but
science
was
still alive.
Contemporary
ihilism
originated
t the
deathbed
f science
and
technology.
At the
origin
of
modern
nihilism there
lay
the
idea
of the autonomous
ubject
and
the
concomitant
irm
belief
n
science
and
technology.
But what
is,
after
all,
this
modern
age
that
gave
rise to the ideas
of the
autonomous
ubject
and
of science?
t
150
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14/17
NIHILISM,
SCIENCE,
AND EMPTINESS
IN NISHITANI
was the
rise of a
new demand
for and
conception
of 'truth'
and
'certainty.'
his
appearsn the fact that the ideaof 'experience'ameto occupythe highestposition
in
modern imes.
Certainty
s
established
y
'verification.'When
applied
o
'things,'
this
gives
rise to the idea of
experience;
when
applied
o the
self,
the
idea of
'good
conscience'arises.
The
demand
for
a
certainty
obtained
by
ascertaining
with one's
own
eyes,
while
doing
away
with
ambiguous hings,
uncertain
things,
and
ideas
rest-
ing
on
authority
or
preconception,
brought
orth,
in
the outer
world,
the modern
mechanisticview of a
nature
otally
regimented
by
natural
aws and the scientific
worldview;
nd,
as to
the inner
world,
t
spawned
he
modern
deasof'autonomous
subject'
and 'conscience.'This becamethe
matrix
of
the
Reformation.The inven-
tion of the machinewas somethingthat guaranteedhe 'conscience' hat built on
this kind of
certainty
nd addeda flourish o it.
UnderGod's
dominion,
all
creatures
sang
the
glory
of
God;
it was
the
machine,
created
by
man,
that
gavepraise
o
the
glory
of
the
modern dea
of
certainty.
An
ambiguous
machine
s
something
unthink-
able,
ndeed.
In recent
years
he
idea
of
'fuzziness' as
been
introduced,
ut this does
not mean
that
the
machinehas
become
ambiguous.
The
machine s what
reflects he
laws that
govern
nature
n
their
purest
orm.
On the
opposite
side of
certainty,
he
modern
scientific
worldview vinces
nsen-
tience,
impersonality,
nd absenceof
value.
I
need
not belabor
he
point
that these
characteristicsedto thedeclineof the traditional
religious
nd cultural
alues,
which
were of a
personal
and
teleological
nature,
and thus
gave
rise to
nihilism. But
we
must
pay
attention o the
fact
that,
while in
modern
nihilism he
traditional
highest
valuesweredone
away
with,
there
was
present
n it
a trust
n
science
and
technology.
The
strength
o
bear
he
nihility
that
accompanies
he loss of
the
highest
valueswas
linked
to
that trust n
science
and
technology.
t
was felt
that the
nihility
that
comes
in
the wake of
science
and
technology
had to be borne
and could be
borne.What
has been
called
perfect
ihilism
howed hat kind of
self-confidence.
Being
able to
bear
the
nihility
was
deemed to
show the
highest
strength.
No
matter that
they
implied
on
their
shadow
side
a
world
of
nihility
and
death,
science
and
technology
were trusted
and
warmly
welcomedas
having
rendered he
distinguished
erviceof
breaking
down
the
supreme
values
hat
had
reignedup
to
then. In
its lack of
values
it
may
have been
an
uncommon
world,
but
there
was
at
least a
worldview
clearly
dominated
by
laws.
Therein
lay
the
specific
natureof
modern
nihilism.
Contemporary
ihilism,
on the other
hand,
ies
precisely
n
the fact
that
this clear
worldviewhas
collapsed.
This
is,
in
turn,
connectedwith the
fact that
suspicion
has
fallenon
scienceand
technology:
doubt has been
carried nto
scientific
knowledge,
this last
bastion
guaranteeing
ruth
and
certainty.Through
his
relativization f sci-
entific
knowledge,
a
clear
worldviewhas
become
impossible.
Since
the
unitary
prin-
ciple
that
ruled
the
world has been thrown
out,
the
world has
become
fragmentary,
an
anarchical
place.
Therein
contemporary
ihilism
originated.
n
the
wake of
the
death
of
God,
also
science-technology
as
died. The
death
of science
and
technol-
ogy
does
not,
of
course,
mean that
science
and
technology
have
disappeared.
his
death does not
lie,
either,
n
the fact
that
science
and
technology
have
led to
envi-
ronmental
pollution
and various
tricky
problems
n
the
realmsof
biotechnology,
organ
ransplantation,
nd so on. It
means
hat
science
and
technology
have ost the
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15/17
HASE
SHOTO
halo of
certainty
nd haveceased o be of 'value.'When
science-technology
ives on
without this light, it turnsinto an opaqueand darkmagicpower.Contemporary
nihilism lies
in the
point
that we are
living
in
a realm
n which
science and tech-
nology
have
turned
nto
magical
powers.
Science-technology
was the locus
of
certainty,
nsofaras
it
enabledthe human
spirit
to
grasp
he world as a whole and to build a clear
picture
of
the universe
by
means
of
the laws hat
govern
he
world.
Through
hat
conviction,
we
humans
could
also
be
sure of
the
power
of
our own
spirit
and were
transported
rom a
magical
world
wherein
uncertainty
nd arbitrariness
reigned
nto a rationalworld
of law and
order-elevated
from
a
world
of darkness
nto
a world
of
light.
It was not
so,
how-
ever, hat
people
ivedin such a rationalworld n actual act; t meantonlythat faith
in science and
technologyguaranteed
he existence
of such a
world,
and,
to that
degree,
modern
people
could
mentally
ive in
that
world.
They
lived
in
such a world
in
their
worldview,
n
their
image
of the
world,
n their
thought.
Therein
ay
for them
the 'value' nd
the
'light'
of
science-technology.
At the
present
ime,
however,
we humanshave sunk
anew
into a
magical
world,
this time
in the midst
of the rule of science
and
technology.
There
ies the
point
of
contemporary
nihilism. Science and
technology
have
collapsed
as
light
and
as
thought.
How would
this stateof
affairs ave
come
about?
Why
did
modern
cience,
this locusof
certainty,
all into the realmof
uncertainty?
Herewe must look for the
metamorphosis
hat took
place
n
the
innerrealms
of
science,
he
change
and
crum-
bling
of the
basic
principles
hat had
undergirded
modern
science.Pluralist
nd rel-
ativist
views,
such
as
the
theory
of
relativity,
he
paradigm
heory,
and
the set
theory
gradually
tepped
nto
the
place
of
the monisticview
that
lay
at
the basisof modern
science.
Theory
of
science and
philosophy
of
sciencehave
pursued
hat metamor-
phosis
of
the
principles
of
science
but have
not,
I
believe,
ncluded
n their
ques-
tioning
the
consequences
hat the
change
n
worldview,
rovoked
by
that
metamor-
phosis,
have
broughtalong
in the human
world. We
stand
in
need
of a more
thorough
and multisided
analysis
of these
consequences.
At
the
moment
we
can
only
remark
hat
the
feeling
of
liberation nd
spiritual
xaltation
present
n modern
nihilism
at the
time that it was declared
hat
God had died-what
Nietzschecalled
the
vision
of an
open
ea nd
a
presentiment
f
a dark
light -is
absent
romcon-
temporary
ihilism.
The lawsof
nature,
which
science
ries
to
grasp,
became
more and
more
compli-
cated
with the
progress
f
science,
ill
they
proved
o
transcend
he
scope
of human
thinking.
At that
moment,
the human
spirit,
which had
grown
in
belief
in
itself,
self-confidence,
nd
pride
with
the
widening
of the
scope
of
its
thinking,
then,
on
the
contrary,
hrank
n the face
of science.
Lawsand
means
may
be there
n the com-
plicated
ools and
machines;
hey
are
already
nonexistent
n the human
spirit.
But
the human
being
can be an
autonomous
ubject
only
insofaras
it has the laws
and
means
within
itselfand
can rediscover
hem
also
n
things.
Once
the
point
is reached
that
aws
and means
are
here
n
the
things
made
by
man but
absent
romthe
human
spirit,
we
humans,
n the
very
midst
of
a worldof
science-technology,
all
back o
the
same
evel
as
primitive
man who
could
only
fearand
tremble
before
he blind
forces
of nature.
Then,
rather
han the
locus of
certainty, cience-technology
ecomes
a
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16/17
NIHILISM, SCIENCE,
AND EMPTINESS IN NISHITANI
place
wherethe
incomprehensible,
he
uncertain,
nd
the
eldritch
reign-what
the
worldof naturewas forprimitiveman. Thus present-day uman