Hase article on Nishitani

8/12/2019 Hase article on Nishitani

1/17

Nihilism, Science, and Emptiness in NishitaniAuthor(s): Hase Shoto

Source: Buddhist-Christian Studies, Vol. 19 (1999), pp. 139-154Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1390532.

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2/17

NISHITANI

Nihilism, Science,

and

Emptiness

in

Nishitani

Hase Shoto

EMPTINESS AND NIHILISM

It

may

be

sufficiently

known

by

now

that

the

trunk ine of Nishitani's

philosophy

s

the 'idea

of

emptiness.'

ndeed,

rom his

Philosophy

fPrimordial

ubjectivity

1940)

through

his God and

Absolute

Nothingness

1948)

and

Nihilism

(1949)

right

into

Religion

and

Nothingness

1961),

Nishitani's

thinking

has

fundamentally

urned

around

he

idea of

emptiness.1

Not that in the

threeworks

precedingReligion

nd

Nothingness

he idea of

emptiness

s treated

overtly

as

such.

Rather,

n

those

works

the

idea

is

continually

growing,

as it

were,

on an invisible

underground

evel,

to

come

finally

o

the surface

n

Religion

nd

Nothingness.

t is

as if the

emptiness

hat

had

grown

strong

by

withstanding

he

pressure

f

the

'rock'

of

nihilism

came into

the

open

by

overthrowing

hat rock.

As it

was

the

key

to the

solution

of

the

problem

of

nihilismthat

had beset

him

in his

youth,

the

idea of

emptiness

was more than a mere

dea

for

Nishitani.It was

something

on which the

possibility

of existence

entirely

depended

or him.

There-

fore,

he

did

not

speak

of the

idea of

emptiness

but of the

'standpoint

f

emptiness.'

For

Nishitani,

nihilism

was not

simply

a

philosophical roblem,

a

problem

acciden-

tally

encountered

n the

courseof his

philosophical

nvestigations.

t

was a

problem

he had beensaddledwithwilly nillyas a resultof his own natureandtemperament

as well as of the conditionsof his

time. He then

decided o

shoulder he

problem

as

his

particular

ask.In

other

words,

nihilism

assumed or him the

natureof a

destiny.

Consequently,

he

'standpoint

f

emptiness,'

at which

he arrived t the

end

of

the

arduous

struggle

or the

solution of the

problem

of

nihilism,

took

on for

him

the

character f a reliable

lab of

granite

discovered t the

bottom

of

his own

existence:

something

with

a

depth

reaching

all the

way

to

the

core of the earth

and a

solidity

sufficient o

carry

he

weight

of

nihilism. Of all

this

Nishitani himself

was

clearly

aware.Let

me

reflect

a few moments

on Nishitani's

dea of

emptiness

n

its

relation-

shipwith nihilism.

How

did Nishitaniview this

nihilism hat

constituted he

basic

problem

or

him?

He

defined

his own

philosophical tandpoint

as,

in

the final

analysis,

the

overcom-

ing

of

nihilism

by

way

of

nihilism. n his

own

estimate,

he nihilismhe

struggled

with was an

extremely

difficult nd hard

o solve

problem

for

philosophy-a

problem

wherein

ntellectual

aporia

and

existential

onundrum

ntertwine;

not the

Buddhist-Christian

tudies

19

(1999).

?

by University

f

Hawai'iPress.All

rights

reserved.

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3/17

HASE SHOTO

kind of

problem

that

finds

a solution

provided

one makesthe

necessary

fforts;

a

problemthat is hardto get hold of: the studyof variousthoughtsystemsappears

only

to circle

around

ts

periphery.

hus,

ata certain

moment

I

decided

o

give up

my

philosophical

ffortsand to

tackle he

problem

by

Zen

[meditation],

way

rom

all intellectual

fforts.At that

point,

for

the

first ime and

little

by

little,

a

way

to its

solutioncame

in

sight. 2

This

kind

of

patientstruggling

with one

particular roblem,

as

we see it

in

Nishi-

tani's

case,

may

not be unheard

of

but

is

certainly

not

commonplace.

f

we

may

call

this attitude

or

way

of

facing

problems

a

'method,'

t

appears

o be described

by

Simone

Weil,

where she writes:

The

method

proper

to

philosophy

consists

in

clearlyseeing insolubleproblemsin their insolubility,and then to contemplate

them,

concentratedly

nd

indefatigably,

or

years,

without

any

hope

in the

waiting.

According

o

this

criterion,

here

arefew

philosophers.

But

'few'

may

be

saying

oo

much.

The

passage

o

the transcendent

s

opened

when

the humanfaculties-intel-

lect,

will,

human

love-run

into a

limit,

and

then the human

being

stays

on this

threshold,

beyond

which

it

cannot

put

a

single

step-and

this without

turning

away,

without

knowing

what it

desires,

and concentrated

n

the

waiting.

It is a

state

of extreme

humiliation.

t is unachievable

or

anybody

who is not

capable

f

accept-

ing

humiliation. 3

We

may

say

that,

just

like SimoneWeil herself,who for

many years

struggled

with the

insoluble

problem

of'unhappiness'

nd

finally

ound

the

way

to

a

solution

on a

supernatural

evel,

Nishitani

too,

who faced

the insoluble

problem

of nihilism

and

kept up

a

solitary

ntellectual

attlewith

it for

long

years,

was

truly

one of those

rare

philosophers

worthy

of the name.

Under

which

guise

did the idea

of

emptinesspresent

tself to

Nishitani

in the

midst

of that

Auseingndersetzung

ith nihilism?

Of

course,

the idea

of

emptiness

forms

the center

of the doctrine

of

Mahayana

Buddhism

and as such

has been end-

lessly

discussed.

A

bibliographical

ist of thesestudies

would contain

a

gigantic

num-

ber of

items.What would

then be

the characteristic

eatureof Nishitani'sdea of

emptiness

n the midst

of that

plethora

of

interpretations?

t

lies

in

the

fact that

Nishitaniconceives

of

it

subjectively

r

existentially,

rom

his own

bodily

existence

in the

present.

n

fact,

such

a

subjective

pproach

s the attitude

originally

equired

in

matters

of

religion;

eligious

ruth

reveals

tself

only

in

such

an

attitude.The fact

that it is

a

question

o be asked

n

the attitude

original

o

religion,

however,

oes not

necessarily

mean that

it is

universal.

In

Buddhist

parlance,

o treata

problem

romone'sown

present

bodily

existence

would

mean to

put

the

question

of sentient

beings

becoming

Buddha

right

n the

middle

of

it;

in other

words,

o askabout

satori,

or

awakening.

At

present,

o askthe

question

rom that

angle

is

the

only

right

way

to come

into contact

with the

Bud-

dhist

tradition.

An

investigation

f the Buddhist

criptures

merely

rom the

angle

of

Buddhism

being

the

doctrine

preached

by

the

Buddha,

without consideration

f

the

integration

of

the Buddha's

nlightenment

n the

self,

was branded

by

Soga

Ryojin

as Buddhist

materialism. 4

t is

viewing

the

sutras

n the

same

way

as sci-

ence views

material

things,

treating

he

scriptures

he

way

science

analyzes

he water

in

a

cup.

Just

as

the

water

n

a

cup evaporates,

o too

the full

reality

of

emptiness

140



4/17

NIHILISM,

SCIENCE,

AND EMPTINESS

IN NISHITANI

evaporates

n such

treatment.When handledthis

way,

the

question

of

becoming

Buddha

s absent

rom the

beginning.Only

when

thematized

subjectively,

n

rela-

tion to a

problem

mposed

by

the actual

situation,

the idea

of

emptiness

becomes

spirit.

Emptiness

considered

apart

from

such a

relation

degenerates

nto a

mere

'thing.'Soga

says

it

in

the

following

way:

When

viewing

the

prevalent

endencies

in most of

present-day

Buddhist

studies,

that is the conclusion

I

have to come to.

Such a

view of the

history

of

Buddhismamounts

to a Buddhistmaterialist iew of

history

hat

explains

he declineof Buddhismwhile

basing

tselfon a materialisthe-

ory

that is a

negation

of

all

religion. 5

t

may

be

easy

to

'shoot

holes'

n

this

sweep-

ing

statement

by

Soga,

but it cannot be denied

that his

contention

that a

study

of

Buddhismunconnectedwithsubjective-existentialroblemss, in the finalanalysis,

a kind of Buddhistmaterialism ontainsa

good

part

of

truth.

Seen fromthat

point,

Nishitani's ttitude oward

religion,

once described

y

him-

self

as

inquiring

nto

religion

rom

the

point

where t

emerges

rom

man

himself,

as a

subject,

s a self

living

in

the

present, 6

ertainly

goes

in

a

direction

opposed

o

that of materialism.

With

regard,

hen,

to

emptiness,

t is

only

when

putting

t

into

question subjectively,

rom

one'sown existence

n

the

present

ime,

that the

tradi-

tion of

emptiness

will revive

n

the

present

and becomealive and

operative

here.

What made Nishitani

questionemptiness

on the basisof his own

present

exis-

tence waspreciselynihilism.It is through he mediationof nihilismthatemptiness

was removed

rom

a

museumshowcase-that

is,

from

its statusas a

dead

'thing'

o

be viewed

or an

object

of

archaeological

tudy,

to make

its

appearance

n

the real

marketplace

s a

currency

with

actual

power,

restored

o

its statusof

living

and

oper-

ative

spirit.

The real

marketplace,

f which

we

speak

here,

also has the

meaning

of

the

town called

The

Motley

Cow,

where

Nietzsche'sZarathustra

proclaimed

his

idea of the eternalrecurrence.

According

o

Nishitani,

his town

calledThe

Motley

Cow means the

multicoloredworld with its infinite

variety

of

forms ;

n

other

words,

the

contemporary

world.

To let

emptiness

oose into

it is to walk that

town

barefoot,

or to stand n the

very

midstof nihilism.

According

o

Nishitani,

t is

pre-

cisely

when

standing

herethat a

human

being gets

in

touch with

the

point

of ori-

gin

or

zero

point

from where

religion

as

religion

s

born.

Nishitani's laim

that the

overcoming

f nihilism s

only

possible

n

emptiness

s

basedon what

could be calledhis 'faith n

emptiness':

he

conviction

hat

emptiness

is

the

only

path

of

transcendence

open

in

the

presentday.

It

may

sound

strange

o

speak

of'faith'

n

emptiness.

Still,

it

seems o me

that

faith

is

precisely

he

right

word

to

characterize ishitani's ision

of

the

certainty

of

emptiness

as

the

path

of

tran-

scendence.The

selectionor

decision o choose

emptiness,

not

as one of

manypaths,

but

as

the

only

path

of

transcendencen a

present

day

dominated

by

nihilism,

s at

work

in

Nishitani.

We can

find therein a

frame of

mind reminiscent

of

Honen's

Selection f the

Primal

Vow.

Amid the

consciousness

f

living

in

the

Age

of the

Latter

Days

of the

Law

(mappo),

which was

rampant

n the

transition

period

from

the

Heian erato

the

Kamakura

ra,

Honen

madethe

desperate

moveof

selecting

he

way

of

Other-Power

salvation

by

Amida's

Primal

Vow)

as

the

only

path

still

open

to

salvation,

hereby

rejecting

all other

Buddhist

paths

as

not

walkable

any

longer.

A

similar

standpoint

of

selection

and

rejection

hows

up

in

the

earlier-mentioned

141



5/17

HASE

SHOTO

fact

that Nishitani

speaks

of

the

standpoint

f

emptiness

ather han of

the

idea of

emptiness.

This

'faith'

of

Nishitani

was

supported

by

his

senseof

reality

and

view

of

history.

His

senseof the

age

he was

living

n

had

much in

common

with that of

the

founders

of

the

Japanese

PureLand

schools,

who

defined

heir

age

as

Latter

Days

and looked

for a

path

of

transcendence

truly

effective n

such

an

age.

Up

to a

point,

the

sense

of nihilism n

our

age

and the senseof

Latter

Days

of the Late

Heian

people

are

par-

allel

phenomena.

In

the

Latter

Day

age,

we

encounter

n

Shinran

and others

the

standpoint

of

Other-Power,

hich

opened

up

by

accepting

he

Latter

Day

situation

as

it

was;

n

the

age

of

nihilism,

here

s Nishitani

o whom

the

standpoint

of

empti-

ness

appeared

s the

only

walkable

path.

The

awareness f the Latter

Day

is not

a

matterof

clear

and

objective

knowledge

o

anybody;

t

makes ts

appearance

ithin

a

specific

sense of

history

and sense of the

age.

Similarly,

o

pin

down

nihility

as

nihility,

a

subtle

spirit

esprit efinesse)

s

required.

Nishida

callsthis

the sense f

reality-a

sense one

cannot learn rom

somebody

else.

J.

Van

Bragt

peaks

n

this

connection of

Nishitani's

prophetic

haracter. 7

f

there is in

Nishitani

anything

that can be

called

by

that

name,

it

finds its

origin

n

that senseof

reality,

hat

sense

of

certainty.

What is of

primary mportance

n

Nishitani's

standpoint

of

emptiness

is the senseof the earthor,to use anearlier imile,the senseof theTownof the Mot-

ley

Cow,

wherein

emptiness

must

strike

roots.

It

can also be

called

the

senseof the

present

elf

or,

in

Buddhist

parlance,

he

sense

of ki

(the

capability

f

the

concrete

subject

[to

grasp

the

Buddha's

message]).

In

Nishitani's

case,

nihilism shows

the

character f

such

a senseof

ki;

and

'emptiness'

tands or

one more

certainty,

which,

while

based

on

that sense of

ki,

is

able to

overcome

t.

Let

us

make nihilism

the

starting

point

of

our

reflections

or a

moment.

What

kind

of

nihility

would

the

nihility

n

nihilismbe?

Why

was

the nihilism

Nishitani

encountered

ard

o overcome?

he

reason

ies

in the

essenceof

that nihilism tself:

that it hasto do with a nihility in thesecondpower. t is not simplythe universal

nihility,

which is

an essential rait of all human existence

irrespective

f time and

place,

and which

Sakyamuni

ad

in

mind when he

said that all

s

impermanent.

Nihilismrefers o

a

nihility

originating

within a

historical

ituation,

anchored

n

his-

torical,social,

and culturalconditions.

In

other

words,

the

nihility

of nihilism

s a

nihility

that makes

ts

appearance

new

within the values

hat haveenabledhuman-

ity

to overcome

he

nihility

that

is

natural nd essential o

it.

Through

t the

natural

nihility

is raised o the second

power

by

the

nihility

arising

n

history

and

society.

Nishitani

distinguishes

he

two

aspects

contained

in nihilism

and then

says

that

nihilism s thecompoundof the two. In Nishitani's wn words: On the one hand,

nihilism s a

problem

hat transcendsime

and

space

and

is

rooted

n the essenceof

human

being,

an

existential

problem

n

which the

being

of

the self

is

revealed o the

self itself as

somethinggroundless.

On

the

other

hand,

it is a historical

and social

phenomenon....

The

phenomenon

of nihilism shows that

...

the value

system

which

supports

our

historical

ife

has broken

down,

and

that

the

entirety

of social

and historical

ife has

loosened

tself from

its foundations.

Nihilism is

a

sign

of the

collapse

of

the socialorder

externally

nd of

spiritual

decay nternally. 8

The

problem

of nihilism

lies

in

the

point

that,

when

these

two

combine,

they

142



6/17

NIHILISM,

SCIENCE,

AND

EMPTINESS IN

NISHITANI

open up

an

abyss

of

nihility

at the bottom

of

people

living

in

history,

whereby

he

very

existence

of the

human

being

is

put

into

question.

There lies

the

reason

why

nihilism s suchaninvolvedandhard-to-solve

problem:

because he

nihility

encoun-

tered

in

the

existenceof

the self is

rendered

opaque by

the fact

that

it

implicates

within

itself

the

historical

and

social

problems

and,

consequently,

he

bringing

o

self-awarenessf

this

nihilism

requires

historical

ense

capable

of

reading,

within

the

existenceof

the

self,

the

historicaland

social

tasks

of

the

age

wherein

he self

is

located.It

demands

an

eye

that can

see the

nihility

of the

age

through

he

nihility

of the

existence

of the

self.All

this

explainswhy

nihilism s

such an

intractable,

ntri-

cate,

and

hard-to-solve

problem.

As

already ointed

out,

one can

speak,

n

connection

with

nihilism,

of

a

nihility

in

the

second

power,

n

the

sense

that

the

nihility

n

question

s

one

that

infiltrated

anew

into

the

sociocultural

alues

that

once

overcame he

natural

human

nihility.

When the

social

values

hat

made

the

overcoming

f

the

natural

nihility

possible

ol-

lapse,

nihility

oses its

place

to

go,

twists

and

turnswithin

the

cultureas a

profound

doubt,

and

coils

up,

as it

were,

in its

bottom.

The

cultural

path

that

had

been

opened

for

a

time

becomes

a

dead

end

and ceases

o be a

path.

It is

for that

reason

that

nihilism s a

historical-cultural

problem.

This

special

character f

the

nihility

of

nihilism

may

become

clearer f

we

compare

t,

for

instance,

with

the

'sorrow'

hat

Nishidasaw asthe startingpoint of philosophy.

At

first

sight,

the

nihility

of

sorrow

and the

nihility

of

nihilism

may

seem

not to

differ,

both

being

nihility.

However,

both

are

separated

y

an

invisible

gulf.

The

sor-

row

that

Nishida

discovers n

the

starting

point

of

philosophy

and

also at

the

origin

of

religion

is the

taste of

nihility

a

human

being experiences

when

meeting

with

unhappiness

n

life.

Sorrow,

however,

s

not

purely

a

negative

eeling;

here

s in

it

a

quality

hat can

turn

the

negative

nto

something

positive.

Nishida

himself

says

hat

somebody

who

falls

into

extreme

unhappiness

annot

keep

religious

eelings

rom

vividly

welling

up

in

himself.

The

characteristic

rait of

sorrow

s

that

it

elicits the

riseof religiosity:ranscendenteelings hat,withintheencounterednegation,make

the

overcoming

of

that

negation

possible.

As

something

that

heals the

wounds

inflicted

by

negation,

religiosity

s

a

healing

power

hat

wells

up

in

the

bottom

of

the

self

from

a

point

transcending

he

self.

Feelings

of

sorrowcan

introducea

person

into

a

transcending

world,

and the

healing

power

at work in

them

is

like

the

heal-

ing power

of the

Moonlight

Bodhisattva

hat

healed

he

wounds of

King

Ajatasatru

in

the

Nirvana

Sutra.

The

reason

why

sorrow

tself

is

sometimes

called

a

religious

feeling

s

that

there s

present

n

it

something

hat

can

heal the

wounds of

the

per-

son

who

met

with

unhappiness.

n

sorrow,

a

person

s not

a

captive

of

despair;

n

the contrary,n sorrowa person s consoledandsaved rom

despair.

Nihilism,

on

the

other

hand,

does

not have

such

a

transcending ower.

Instead

of

being open

to

transcendencet is

closed

to

it. In

it,

the

path

to the

transcendent

is

destroyed,

bliterated.

Consequently,

ifferently

rom

sorrow,

here

s no

healing

of

the bite

of

unhappiness

n

the

nihility

of

nihilism.

For

that

reason

he

nihility

of

nihilism is

said to

be

not

a

direct

and

simple

nihility,

but a

nihility

in the

second

power,

a

nihility

that

has

become

doubt-suspicion.

nsofar

as

it

reintroduces

nihility

where

nihility

had

once

been

overcome,

t is

a

nihility

become

fur

sich-self-aware.

143



7/17

HASE

SHOTO

Nishitani

ikens his to a

germ

or virus hat

had once been

subdued

by

strong

chem-

icalsbut then reboundswith a new resistance o chemicals. t opensan areligious

and

antireligious

ealmat the

same level as the

place

of

religion

tself.All

roads

o

religion

are

then

closed,

a

deep

breach s

introduced

nto the link

betweenself

and

absolute hat

had been establishedn

sorrow,

nd

absolute

distrust-suspicion

omes

to

reign.

The well from which

religionsprings

s

cut

off,

religiosity

dries

up,

and

in

the

place

from where

religious

eeling

are

supposed

o

originate,

a

profound

doubt

now

lies

curled

up.

When

he

said that

the

point

of

departure

f

his

philosophy

s

nihilism,

Nishitaniwas

clearly

aware hat the

nihility

he

had encounteredwas some-

thing

of

a differentnature romthe sorrowNishida

speaks

of,

something

hat makes

all salvationpowerless. t is a

thing

that harborsn itselfdistrustandrebellion,and

merits he name of

evil.

That Nishitani

had to arrive t the ideaof

emptiness

was

due to the involved har-

acterof the

nihility

of nihilism.A

nihility

that dissolvesand rendersnull and void

all

paths

to the

transcendent emandsa

special

means

of

transcendence.

Emptiness

possesses unique

way

of

transcendencehat makes he

overcoming

f that

nihility

of nihilism

possible.

Furthermore,

t

was

by

facing

hat

nihility

of

nihilism hatNishitaniarrived t

his

distinctive

understanding

f the

relationship

f

religion

and

philosophy.

n

Nishi-

tani,

philosophy

s no

abstract

heory

hat floats

n

thin airabove

ife;

t is a

path

that

runs

rightthrough

he

very

middle

of life: it shows

up

from before echnical

philos-

ophy

and

projects

ts

presence

beyond philosophyproper.

n that

capacity,

t runs

right hrough

ife as a

path

of

absolute

negation,

a

path

of

great

doubt,

a

path

of tran-

scendence.

t is

not, therefore,

discipline

hat would

explain

religion

rom

the side

of

religion.

Nor is it

something

hat would be therebefore

religion

and would

carry

reflection

right

up

to the threshold f

religion

and,

when faced

with

religion,

would

abandonand

reject

tself.

In

Nishitani,

philosophy

s

absolutely

rreverent,

nd noth-

ing

can

stop

its course.Nishitaniconsiders t

to

be the

properworking

of

thought,

and

thereby

onceives f

thinking

as an

activity

able

to

transcend

anything

whatever.

It is

a

standpoint

hat,

when faced

with

religion,

also

goes

beyond

religion.

Consequently,

n

Nishitani's

philosophy

f

religion, eligion

and

philosophy

tand

in

a

relationship

ot of

harmony

but rather f mutual

warfare,

egation,

and accom-

plishment.

And

it

is,

indeed,

the

nihility

of

nihilism

that

made

Nishitani

walk

the

path

of a

philosophy

n

that sense.Since

he

nihility

hat faced

him

presented

prob-

lem without

a

solution,

Nishitani

was

forced

o

go

on

thinking

while

abiding

n

the

problem

tself.

In

fact,

he himself testifies:

Although ecognizing

hat

my

problem

wassupposed o find a solutiononlyon the levelof religion, had to make

a

detour

through

philosophy. 9

he

nihility

of nihilismhad

paralyzed eligion

and

rendered

it

impotent

but could not

similarly

paralyze hilosophy

as the

path

of

thinking.

At

this

point, philosophy

appears

s

something ranscending eligion.

The

idea

of

emptiness,

however,

s

not

something

that

philosophical

hinking

opened

up

and

established

y

its

own

power.

t is a

space

hat

opened

up

by

philos-

ophy

penetrating

nto

religion,going

right through

t,

and

explodingreligion

rom

the inside.

The

space

of

freethinking

nd

wisdom,

opened

up

within

religion

by

passing

through religion,

is

preciselyemptiness.

Since there

is

nothing

that can

144



8/17

NIHILISM,

SCIENCE,

AND

EMPTINESS

IN NISHITANI

obstruct

t,

this

space

of

thinking

has infinitewidth and

depth.

Nishitanithen

calls

this freethinking,which advanceswhileovercoming verything hat couldobstruct

its

view,

butsukojogoing

beyond

the

Buddha).

On the

other

hand, however,

hink-

ing

is coerced

o exert nfinite

patience

when

passing

hrough

he midst of life-and

specifically hrough

the midst

of

nihilism. And

infinite

patience

breaksone's self-

esteem.

Therefore,

n

the

realmof

thinking,

transcending

he Buddha

s,

in

turn,

true

humility,

hat which

shows

the

non-ego

of the

thinking.

The

tie-up

of nihilismand

emptiness

makesus

pay

attention o

the

unique

char-

acter

of the transcendence

present

n

emptiness.

Nishitanimaintains hat the over-

coming

of nihilismbecomes

possible

only

in a

radicalization

f nihilism

romwithin

itself,andthat this is an essential raitof nihilism.Thatnihilismdemands ucha

spe-

cial

way

of

overcoming

s

due

to

the

higher

ndicated act that

the

nihility

of nihil-

ism becomes a

profound

doubt and

thereby

closes in on

itself. What is closed

in

within itselfcan be

opened

only

from

the inside.And to

open

a

thing

fromthe

inside

becomes

possible

only by

reaching

he

very

own-reality

f the

thing.

Emptiness

s the

path

to that

self-reality

f

things.

There then lies the reason

why

the

overcoming

f

nihilism s said to be effected

n

emptiness.

The

transcendence orked

n

emptiness

does not consist

in

offeringbeing

over

nothingness,

ife over

death,

meaning

over

meaninglessness.

o the

question,

When the three

worlds

are

without

Dharma,

whereto look for the heart-mind?

emptiness

does not answer

by

presenting

he

heart-mind omewhere.

t

answers,

The heart-mind s

unobtainable,

nd

thereby

finds

the

answer

and

peace

of

mind

within the

question

tself.

Precisely

herein

ies

the

standpoint

of

emptiness,

ays

Nishitani.It is

the

path

of

escape

rom

meaning-

lessnessand

nihilityby

a total

acceptance

f

nihility

as

nihility

and

meaninglessness

as

meaninglessness

nd

by

going deeper

and

deeper

nto

nihility

and

meaninglessness.

Faced

with the

question,

Where o

find

a reason o

live?

emptiness

ruly

finds

the

reason o

live

and salvation n the

place

of ohne

warum :

n

order

o heal

oneliness,

it

goes

nto the

desert ;

t

finds

the

point

of

no heat n the

very

midst of heat.

But what

kind

of

transcendence oes this

path

offer? t

would be

wrong

to think

of it as a

path

of mere

negation

and

irony.

Rather,

t is one

more

path,

different rom

both those of

negation

and affirmation.Nishitani calls

it

the

way

of

reality. 10

Emptiness

s

the

place

where all

phenomena

appear

n

their true

reality.

That all

things

appear

here n their true

reality

becomes

possible

by

the

fact

that

emptiness

is

bottomless,

s a bottomless

depth

hat has

broken

through

all bottoms.The

principle

of

reality

s this

bottomlessness.

But how

would

this

path

of

reality

be a

path

of

transcendence?Would

not

for us humans the

way

of

transcendenceie in

transcendencen the soil, transcendence y wayof the PureLand,rather hanin

transcendencen

emptiness

the

sky)?

This

question

does not fit in

our

present

prob-

lematic,

however,

and

I

shall

therefore

not

pursue

t here.

NIHILISM AS A

PREPHILOSOPHICAL

QUESTION

Nihilism

was the

point

of

departure

f Nishitani's

philosophy.

For

Nishitani

t

grew

bigger

and

bigger

also as a

philosophical

problem,

ill

it came to

embracealmostall

problems

of

the life of

contemporary

umans. It then

became the

central ask of

145



9/17

HASE SHOTO

Nishitani's

philosophy

of

religion

o

unmask

he nihilism

that

pervades

he

core

of

present-day ivilization,n problems uchas the scientificworldviewand scientific

rationality,

echnology

pervading

ll

aspects

of human

ife,

moral

decay

n

contem-

porary

ociety,

and to

look for the

direction

n which to overcome hat nihilism.

But instead

of

investigating

hat broad

spectrum

f

the

problems

onnected

with

nihilism,

I

would

like to

consider

the more

personalquestion

of how

the

young

Nishitaniencountered ihilism.Nishitani

speaks

aboutthis

in

two

short

essays

nti-

tled

My

Youth

or

My

Teenage

Period )

nd

My

philosophical

Point of

Depar-

ture.

Before t built itself nto a

philosophical roblem,

nihilism

cameto obsess

he

young

Nishitanias anihilistic

mood

of a

special

character.

What

would

that

spe-

cial character ave been?

Nishitani ells us about

the

point

of

departure

f his

philosophy

n the

following

way:

With

regard

o

the

motive

for

philosophizing,

o

the

connection

between

he

pre-philosophical

nd

philosophy,

n thatsense

with

regard

o

the

beginning

of

philosophy,

many

things

have been

adduced

rom

olden

times on. There

are,

of

course,

Aristotle's

wonderment,

hristianity's

for

he sakeof

apolo-

getics,

Descartes'

doubt,

nd

so

on; but,

besides

hesethere

s,

for

example,

Nishida

telling

us that

philosophy

wells

up

from the

profound

sorrow of

human

life. All these relate

o

philosophy

as

meta-physics,

ut

in

modern

times there

are caseswherein

philosophy

originates

n connectionwith sci-

ence

(mathematics

nd the natural

ciences,

or social sciences

ike

psycho-

analysis).

My

own

startingpoint

was

different

rom all these.When

I

try

now

to

express

what

it

was,

I

cannot,

in

the final

analysis,

call

it

anything

but

nihilism.Not

that this

concept

was

clear o me at

the

time,

but

when

I

think

back from where

I

am

now,

I cannot but

give

it that name.

Nihilism has

already

acquired

he

meaning

of

a

specific standpoint

n

philosophy

but,

strictlyspeaking,what I am speakingof here has a differentmeaning.This

does

not mean

however

hat it was

merely

a

nihilityistic

mood.

It was

a

kind

of nihilism

that,

while

being

pre-philosophical,

ssentially

contained

the

demand

o

move to the

philosophical

evel.11

In his

My

Youth,

Nishitanifurther

explains

his

last sentence

n a

very

direct

and

apt

way:

To

say

it

in

one

word,

my

own

youth

was a

period

totally

without

hope;

or

rather, livedin an atmospheren which the access o hope had been thor-

oughly

removed.

This

does,

of

course,

not

mean that

the time

of

my

youth

as

such

was such

an

age.

On

the

contrary,

t was the time

immediately

fter

he

FirstWorld

War,

a time

in which

Japan,

at least

to all outward

appearances,

entered

ts

brightest

and most

flourishing

eriod.

One

could

say

that

it

was

a

period

it

to

provokehopeful

dreams

n

young people.

However,

myself

had

fallen

into a state wherein

all the

hopes

the

age

permitted

appeared

nly

as

totallymeaningless.

The state

I am

speaking

of did

not

only

have to do

with

outer

situations,

but ratherwith

a

spiritual

ituation.

To

describe

my

state of

146



10/17

NIHILISM, SCIENCE,

AND EMPTINESS

IN

NISHITANI

mind

at the time

in a

word,

I

could

say

that

it was as if a thornhad been

dri-

ven into the bottom of my heart.That thorn continuallycausedpain and,

beset

by

that

pain,

I suffered

rom life itself. Since

this thorn was such that

I

could

not remove

t with

my

own

powers,

and I

thought

that the

only

way

to

get

rid

of the

pain

was

by

dying,

my

lifeat thetime

lay totally

within a

nihilis-

tic

sphere,

a realmof

despair.12

The state of

despair

nto which Nishitanifell was caused

by

an

accumulation

f

various

misfortunes hat make

life

hard-to

begin

with,

the loss of his fatherat a

time

when he neededa

support

o

step

into

society

and start

his

own

life.

We must

paydueattention o what he further ells us: that thisdespairhrewhim into a tate

of

melancholy

and

depression,

different

rom such states as heal

by

themselves.

What is a

melancholy

hat knows

no

natural

healing?

Nishitani s

telling

us that

such

melancholy

and loneliness

exist in

human

ife,

and we should take note of

the

way

he describes t: Therecan be in

human

life

something

ike the

melancholy

of

a

tree

n whose

very

core a

poisoned

needlehas been

inserted,

he lonelinessof a

tree

that

fights

within itself

against

he fluid of death that is

streaming

n the

arteries f

its life.

In

such a

tree,

the

activity

of the life

fluids,

which want to

expand

when

spring

comes,

becomes tself

the

working

of

the

poisoned

luids.

Here,

the

direction

of life is at the sametime the directionof death; ife is, as it were,paralyzedn its

very

source. 13

Nishitani

further

points

out that this

melancholic

depression

was

of such a

nature hat a

cure could not be

found

in

any

outer

thing,

a

question

which

hid-

denly

contains

he answer n

itself,

a

problem

or which there s

no other

solution

than

todraw

he

power

o

live,

to

find

the

minimal

but fundamental

power

of

resis-

tance and

hope,

within the

very

despair

nto

which one has been

thrown

in

total

nakedness s

it

were. Nishitani

himselfsomehow

ound

the

way

out of this

despair

back

to

life,

and he

tells

us

that,

when he

later ound the

following

sentence

among

the

sayings

of the

ancients- oppressed

by

rocks,

bambooshoots

creep

out side-

ways;

on the

steep

banksof the

river,

lowers

grow upside

down -and reflected n

his own

youth,

he

keenly

elt that this

described

precisely

ow it

had beenwith him.

Since

the

nihility

Nishitanihad to face

n

his

youth

was of such a

twisted

natureand

had demanded

rom him

infinite

submission,

t

could not but leave

scars

n

his

later

life,

even after t

had been

basically

vercome.

What

Nishitanishowedus in the

above

discussionwas the

specificquality

of

the

nihility

of

nihilism-what

he

himself

calls

nihility

n the

second

power.

Of this

nihility

Nishitani

spoke

already

n

the

Contemporary

onsciousness nd

Religion

chapter

of his

Philosophyf

Primordial

Subjectivity.4

n

that

essay,

Nishitani

speaks

of a

despair

urking

n the

religious

consciousness f

present-day

eople

and calls

this

bashful

aith. 15

It is

the faithof

the

person

who

attained aithout

of

pure

reli-

gious

motives,

such as

consciousness

f

one'sown

finitudeand

sinfulness,

but

then

comes to

harbor

a

despair

while

living

the life of

a

specialist

n

various

ields,

and

accepting

ultural lements n

the

process

of

making

hat faith

concrete.

Here,

n the

person

who

has the

consciousness f I

believe,

faith tself

s

pushed

nto the back-

ground

and becomes hin

like a

ghost,

while the

interest n

the

outer

world

and

the



11/17

HASE

SHOTO

desire or fameand

profit

lare

up

anew.

Here,

the

prayer

I

believe,

helpmy

unbe-

lief fits the inner

reality

of

the

person.

When such a

person,

with he last bit

of

sincerity

hat rests

n

him,

becameawareof his own

decadence,

he

might

lose

all

interestand fall into a realm

of

total sloth or inertness. 16n

such

a bashful aith

the

nihility

of nihilism dwells.

It

is not the

nihility

before

faith,

the

nihility

that

made

the

person

turn

to

faith,

it is a

nihility

that assails he

person

after he has

attained aith and makes

him

leavehis faith behind.

Concretely

peaking,

n what

circumstances ould

this kind of

nihility

show

up?

Nishitaniclarifies

things

at

the

handof

one

example.

Take he case

of a woman

who,

afterlosingher husbandwhen stillyoungandraisinga son allbyherselfwith much

hardship,

oses also

this son.

In

this

case,

there

s still a

way

of salvationout

of the

nihility

that

may

assail he

mother,because,

although

he has lost her

child,

she can

still

keep

up

the

link

with

him in

a

spiritual

world.

But,

imagine

that an air raid

strikeswhile this mother

s

living

with

her

son. She herself

s

on

the

point

of

death,

but

her son

hastily

runs

away

o save

himself,

eaving

her behind.

Suppose

hen that

she is saved

somehowand she

is

living

again

with her

son. What would

then be her

feelings?

The son is still

there,

but

the

link

with

him

is cut

off more

radically

han

when he would

have

died.

Here,

the

nihility

would be

different

rom the

former

case.This timethe mother'sfeelingscannotturn towardherson, nor to God or the

Buddha

either. It

s

a situation hat

brings

he doubt

whether

anything

ike

God

or

the Buddha

exists. This

nihility

is the

nihility

of

nihilism. Nishitani

says

the fol-

lowing

about it:

This means

hat,

at the bottom of

the son who

estranged

imself

rom

her,

..

a

profound

nihility

appeared;

nihility

that makes

all ethical and

religious

link

impossible.

Moreover,

his

nihility opens up

from below her

own

feet,

from the bottom

of her

own existence.The desire

or

an

ontological

ink,

the

need to findsomething o lean on arisesasbefore,butnow shecannotturn it

either

to

her

son or to God

or Buddha.

Those

feelings

urn

backon her

and

go

on

deepening

he

nihility,

strengthening

er

despair

and desolation.

This

nihility,

which

runs

also

through

he realms

of ethics and

religion

and

is resis-

tant

to

them;

this

nihility,

which

has come

to

awareness

s

something

that

cannot

be

enveloped

even

by

ethics

or

religion,

s a

nihility

that

has become

ffur

ich.

It

could

also be called

a

pessimism

hat has

found a

basis

of its cer-

tainty.

Nihilism arises

n the

form of such

a

becomingfiur

ichof

nihility.

Or

it

can

be

said,

at

the

least,

that such

a form is

the

core

around

which

the

pearl

of

nihilismtakes

shape.17

The

nihility

of

nihilism nsinuates

tself

nto the

place

rom

where

religion

s

sup-

posed

to

ariseand undermines

he

place

of

religion

rom

the inside.

Nishitani

argues

that modern

cience

showssuch a

character:

.

..

the

image

of the natural

world

has

undergone

a

completechange

since

the

Renaissance

s a result

of the

development

of

the

natural

ciences.

The worldhas

come

to

appear

ompletely

unfeeling

and

alto-

gether

indifferent

o human

interests.

The world

has

cut across

he

personal

rela-

tionship

between

God and

man. 18

148



12/17

NIHILISM,

SCIENCE,

AND

EMPTINESS

IN

NISHITANI

This

view of

a mechanical

and

nonteleological

natureor

world,

which the

nat-

ural

scienceshave

promoted

n

modern

imes,

cannot

recognize,

besides his

world,

the existence

of a

spiritual

world,

a

religious

worldin

which

a

personal

elationship

is

established etween

God

and

the

human

being.

The

worldviewof

the

natural

ci-

ences

ends

up

reducing

everything

o

a

world of

death,

n

which

the

insentient

and

material

reigns.

Thereby,

he view

that

distinguishes

realmof

science

and a

realm

of

religion

andthen

triesto set

the

limitsof

each

and

determine

he

relationship

f

the

two is

undercut. n

other

words,

science

spreads

p

to the

throneof

God,

throws

it

out,

and

destroys

t.

How, then,

would the

overcomingof sucha nihilism,thathas become ir sich

and cannotbe

encompassed

y

religion,

be

possible?

Nishitani

maintains

hat this

is

only

possible

n

emptiness.

Therein

ies

the

necessity

of the

link

between

he

prob-

lem of

nihilism

and

emptiness.

CONTEMPORARY

NIHILISM AND

THE

METAMORPHOSIS

OF

SCIENCE

The

various

problems

hat

Nishitani had

delved

up

at the

roots of

the

modern

age

in his

Philosophyf

Primordial

Subjectivity

ere

then

all

brought

ogether

under he

rubricof nihilismand furtherpursuedassuchin Nihilism,Religion ndNothingness

and the later

writings.

He

himself

has

said

that

the

problem

of

nihilism,

which

had

been the

startingpoint

of his

philosophy,

became

gradually

bigger

and

bigger

as a

problem

and

came

to

embrace lmostall

the

problems

present-day

eople

encounter

in

their

existence:

he

problem

of

scientific

worldview

and

rationality,

he

problem

of

technology

pervading

ll

realms

of

human

life,

the

problem

of

moral

decadence

in

present-day

ociety,

and

so

on.

These

great

problems

f

contemporary

ivilization

all

amount

to forms

of

masked

nihilism or

nihilism n

code.

Nishitani's

basic

philosophical

ask

was

thus to

bring

to

light

the

nihilism

that

pervades

he

civiliza-

tion of the presentage in its verycoreand to look for the direction n which this

nihilism

could

be

overcome.

One of

the

main

symptoms

of

the

nihilism

hat

pervades

resent

ociety

s

the

fact

that

in

various

espects,

uman

relations

ave

become

hin

and

alienated

nd

turned

into

fragmentary

nd

short-term

things,

rejecting

he

commitmentof

the

whole

per-

son.

The

absence

of

goal

and

meaning

n

present

ociety

denotes

the lack

n

society

of

a

place

that

permits

bringing

out

the

existence

of

the

self in

its

totality.

The fact

that

such a

place

cannot

be

found

anywhere

n

social

ife

makes

present

ociety

a

sick

one. A

person

who

cannot

find the

goal,

meaning,

and

destiny

of

his life

in

the rela-

tionshipwith society,andwho cannotthrowhis entire self into it, retires nto an

unnatural

rivate

ealm

and dreams

here

of a

free

and

autonomous

ife.

But in

such

a

private

ealm,

ree

from

all

restrictions,

here

s to

be

found

only

the

void of

inac-

tivity

and

anxiety;

true

joy

is

lacking

in

it.

Nishitani

locates

the

misery

of

people

today

in

that

thinness

of

relations. It

means

that

...

among

people

affinity

and

harmony

are

lost

and,

instead,

strife

and

mutual

oppression

become

rampant

in

the

various

aspects

of

human

relationships;

in

other

words,

that

the

place

of

common-

ality

gradually

ceases to

exist. 19

Nishitani

says

that

the

lack of

a

trustworthy

cer-

149



13/17

HASE

SHOTO

tainty

that makesa total

commitment

possible

akes

away

he

joy

of

life

and makes

the characterormationof the contemporary umanbeingdifficult.

When the

mutual

relationships

f

people

do not

grow

out

of a

religious

ounda-

tion that

touches

hem in theirtotal

reality

nd

are

placed

under

he

aegis

of

an

imi-

tation

set

of

laws

and

contracts,

human relationsbecome conditionaland

provi-

sional.

When the rational

but exterior

relations,

regulated

by

rights

and contracts

and

basedon the

autonomy

of

the

human

being,

takethe

place

of the irrational ut

religious

elations f sacrifice

nd

self-denial,

he

distance

rom the

modern

auton-

omous

subject

o the

contemporary private

uman

being

s but a

single

step.

What

made

this

single

step

look like

an

infinitely

ar

distance

s

only

the

fact

that

resistancesnd obstacles

against

t

persisted

t variousplaces n society; hesehadto

be

subdued

before he

idea

of the autonomous

subject

could

spread

o

all

nooks and

crannies f

society.

The

growing hinning

of relations esults

n

shutting

he

human

being

up

in a

private

realmand

in

producing

a

private

ome kind

of

person

who

turnshis or

her backon various

relationships.

n

Religion

nd

Nothingness,

ishitani

calls such a

person

a

subject

driven

by

desires

and

impulses, tanding

entirely

out-

side

of

the

natural

aws. At

the

origin

of this

predicament

here ies the modern

dea

of the autonomous

subject.

The autonomous

subject

of

modern

imes,

however,

was

not outsideof all laws.

Rather,

ts

standpoint

originated

n the will to define and realizeoneself

according

to the laws

of reason.But the

problem

hat the idea of the

autonomous

subject

car-

ried

within itself

did

not

come

to the surface

as

long

as

modernity

had

to

fight

all

kinds

of

irrational esistances nd

obstacles

n its

endeavor

o

make this idea

pene-

trate nto all

aspects

of

society

and

to

rebuild

ociety

according

o this idea.

It was

only

after

t had done

away

with

the

obstacles

and

it

looked

as

if

it had

completely

realized

tself

that the

problems

contained

n it came to

the

surface

and it revealed

the

fragility

of its basis.

That is what the

contemporary

ge

is about.

Why

did

this

situation

come about?

Why

did

the modernautonomous

subject,

which was

sup-

posed

to have established

tself

by

following

the rules

of

reason,

come

to

turn

into

the

present-age

ubject

of

desires

tanding

entirely

outside

all

laws?

Nishitani sees modern

nihilism at the

roots of the

contemporary

ickness.

For

him,

modern

nihilism

originated

y

way

of the

modernautonomous

ubject

and sci-

ence,

and

contemporary

ihilism s an offshoot

of modern

nihilism.

Thus,

Nishitani

sees

contemporary

ihilismas an extension

of modern

nihilism.

But

can

contempo-

rary

nihilism

really

be

considered

o be

in

continuity

with modern

nihilism?

s it

not, rather,

hat

there

s a

big

breachbetween

the two and

contemporary

ihilism

showsan

altogether

ifferent

acethan modern

nihilism? he

question

hen

becomes

where

this breach

xactly

ies.

The

metamorphosis

f scienceand

technology

n

our

day

could

have much

to do with

it. The

loss of the

feeling

of

certainty

nd trust

n

science

s what

separates

he two nihilisms.

n

modern

nihilism,

God

was dead but

science

was

still alive.

Contemporary

ihilism

originated

t the

deathbed

f science

and

technology.

At the

origin

of

modern

nihilism there

lay

the

idea

of the autonomous

ubject

and

the

concomitant

irm

belief

n

science

and

technology.

But what

is,

after

all,

this

modern

age

that

gave

rise to the ideas

of the

autonomous

ubject

and

of science?

t

150



14/17

NIHILISM,

SCIENCE,

AND EMPTINESS

IN NISHITANI

was the

rise of a

new demand

for and

conception

of 'truth'

and

'certainty.'

his

appearsn the fact that the ideaof 'experience'ameto occupythe highestposition

in

modern imes.

Certainty

s

established

y

'verification.'When

applied

o

'things,'

this

gives

rise to the idea of

experience;

when

applied

o the

self,

the

idea of

'good

conscience'arises.

The

demand

for

a

certainty

obtained

by

ascertaining

with one's

own

eyes,

while

doing

away

with

ambiguous hings,

uncertain

things,

and

ideas

rest-

ing

on

authority

or

preconception,

brought

orth,

in

the outer

world,

the modern

mechanisticview of a

nature

otally

regimented

by

natural

aws and the scientific

worldview;

nd,

as to

the inner

world,

t

spawned

he

modern

deasof'autonomous

subject'

and 'conscience.'This becamethe

matrix

of

the

Reformation.The inven-

tion of the machinewas somethingthat guaranteedhe 'conscience' hat built on

this kind of

certainty

nd addeda flourish o it.

UnderGod's

dominion,

all

creatures

sang

the

glory

of

God;

it was

the

machine,

created

by

man,

that

gavepraise

o

the

glory

of

the

modern dea

of

certainty.

An

ambiguous

machine

s

something

unthink-

able,

ndeed.

In recent

years

he

idea

of

'fuzziness' as

been

introduced,

ut this does

not mean

that

the

machinehas

become

ambiguous.

The

machine s what

reflects he

laws that

govern

nature

n

their

purest

orm.

On the

opposite

side of

certainty,

he

modern

scientific

worldview vinces

nsen-

tience,

impersonality,

nd absenceof

value.

I

need

not belabor

he

point

that these

characteristicsedto thedeclineof the traditional

religious

nd cultural

alues,

which

were of a

personal

and

teleological

nature,

and thus

gave

rise to

nihilism. But

we

must

pay

attention o the

fact

that,

while in

modern

nihilism he

traditional

highest

valuesweredone

away

with,

there

was

present

n it

a trust

n

science

and

technology.

The

strength

o

bear

he

nihility

that

accompanies

he loss of

the

highest

valueswas

linked

to

that trust n

science

and

technology.

t

was felt

that the

nihility

that

comes

in

the wake of

science

and

technology

had to be borne

and could be

borne.What

has been

called

perfect

ihilism

howed hat kind of

self-confidence.

Being

able to

bear

the

nihility

was

deemed to

show the

highest

strength.

No

matter that

they

implied

on

their

shadow

side

a

world

of

nihility

and

death,

science

and

technology

were trusted

and

warmly

welcomedas

having

rendered he

distinguished

erviceof

breaking

down

the

supreme

values

hat

had

reignedup

to

then. In

its lack of

values

it

may

have been

an

uncommon

world,

but

there

was

at

least a

worldview

clearly

dominated

by

laws.

Therein

lay

the

specific

natureof

modern

nihilism.

Contemporary

ihilism,

on the other

hand,

ies

precisely

n

the fact

that

this clear

worldviewhas

collapsed.

This

is,

in

turn,

connectedwith the

fact that

suspicion

has

fallenon

scienceand

technology:

doubt has been

carried nto

scientific

knowledge,

this last

bastion

guaranteeing

ruth

and

certainty.Through

his

relativization f sci-

entific

knowledge,

a

clear

worldviewhas

become

impossible.

Since

the

unitary

prin-

ciple

that

ruled

the

world has been thrown

out,

the

world has

become

fragmentary,

an

anarchical

place.

Therein

contemporary

ihilism

originated.

n

the

wake of

the

death

of

God,

also

science-technology

as

died. The

death

of science

and

technol-

ogy

does

not,

of

course,

mean that

science

and

technology

have

disappeared.

his

death does not

lie,

either,

n

the fact

that

science

and

technology

have

led to

envi-

ronmental

pollution

and various

tricky

problems

n

the

realmsof

biotechnology,

organ

ransplantation,

nd so on. It

means

hat

science

and

technology

have ost the



15/17

HASE

SHOTO

halo of

certainty

nd haveceased o be of 'value.'When

science-technology

ives on

without this light, it turnsinto an opaqueand darkmagicpower.Contemporary

nihilism lies

in the

point

that we are

living

in

a realm

n which

science and tech-

nology

have

turned

nto

magical

powers.

Science-technology

was the locus

of

certainty,

nsofaras

it

enabledthe human

spirit

to

grasp

he world as a whole and to build a clear

picture

of

the universe

by

means

of

the laws hat

govern

he

world.

Through

hat

conviction,

we

humans

could

also

be

sure of

the

power

of

our own

spirit

and were

transported

rom a

magical

world

wherein

uncertainty

nd arbitrariness

reigned

nto a rationalworld

of law and

order-elevated

from

a

world

of darkness

nto

a world

of

light.

It was not

so,

how-

ever, hat

people

ivedin such a rationalworld n actual act; t meantonlythat faith

in science and

technologyguaranteed

he existence

of such a

world,

and,

to that

degree,

modern

people

could

mentally

ive in

that

world.

They

lived

in

such a world

in

their

worldview,

n

their

image

of the

world,

n their

thought.

Therein

ay

for them

the 'value' nd

the

'light'

of

science-technology.

At the

present

ime,

however,

we humanshave sunk

anew

into a

magical

world,

this time

in the midst

of the rule of science

and

technology.

There

ies the

point

of

contemporary

nihilism. Science and

technology

have

collapsed

as

light

and

as

thought.

How would

this stateof

affairs ave

come

about?

Why

did

modern

cience,

this locusof

certainty,

all into the realmof

uncertainty?

Herewe must look for the

metamorphosis

hat took

place

n

the

innerrealms

of

science,

he

change

and

crum-

bling

of the

basic

principles

hat had

undergirded

modern

science.Pluralist

nd rel-

ativist

views,

such

as

the

theory

of

relativity,

he

paradigm

heory,

and

the set

theory

gradually

tepped

nto

the

place

of

the monisticview

that

lay

at

the basisof modern

science.

Theory

of

science and

philosophy

of

sciencehave

pursued

hat metamor-

phosis

of

the

principles

of

science

but have

not,

I

believe,

ncluded

n their

ques-

tioning

the

consequences

hat the

change

n

worldview,

rovoked

by

that

metamor-

phosis,

have

broughtalong

in the human

world. We

stand

in

need

of a more

thorough

and multisided

analysis

of these

consequences.

At

the

moment

we

can

only

remark

hat

the

feeling

of

liberation nd

spiritual

xaltation

present

n modern

nihilism

at the

time that it was declared

hat

God had died-what

Nietzschecalled

the

vision

of an

open

ea nd

a

presentiment

f

a dark

light -is

absent

romcon-

temporary

ihilism.

The lawsof

nature,

which

science

ries

to

grasp,

became

more and

more

compli-

cated

with the

progress

f

science,

ill

they

proved

o

transcend

he

scope

of human

thinking.

At that

moment,

the human

spirit,

which had

grown

in

belief

in

itself,

self-confidence,

nd

pride

with

the

widening

of the

scope

of

its

thinking,

then,

on

the

contrary,

hrank

n the face

of science.

Lawsand

means

may

be there

n the com-

plicated

ools and

machines;

hey

are

already

nonexistent

n the human

spirit.

But

the human

being

can be an

autonomous

ubject

only

insofaras

it has the laws

and

means

within

itselfand

can rediscover

hem

also

n

things.

Once

the

point

is reached

that

aws

and means

are

here

n

the

things

made

by

man but

absent

romthe

human

spirit,

we

humans,

n the

very

midst

of

a worldof

science-technology,

all

back o

the

same

evel

as

primitive

man who

could

only

fearand

tremble

before

he blind

forces

of nature.

Then,

rather

han the

locus of

certainty, cience-technology

ecomes

a



16/17

NIHILISM, SCIENCE,

AND EMPTINESS IN NISHITANI

place

wherethe

incomprehensible,

he

uncertain,

nd

the

eldritch

reign-what

the

worldof naturewas forprimitiveman. Thus present-day uman

Hase article on Nishitani

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