Access Control - Research | Education | InnovationWindows of vulnerability Arbaugh, William A.,...

Forum Securitatis

Lars Westerdahl

5 December 2016

Access Control

Access control

Identification

Authentication

Authorization

Access decision

(Karp, Haury & Davis 2009)

Access Control

• Policy

• Model

• Mechanism

(Hu, Ferraiolo & Kuhn 2006)

Discretionary Access Control

Mandatory Access Control

DAC MAC

Bell-LaPadula model

DAC MAC

Role-Based Access Control

DAC MAC

Attribute-Based Access Control

DAC MAC

Attribute-Based Access Control

DAC MAC

Attribute-Based Encryption

KP-ABECP-ABE

Attribute-Based Encryption

References

• Karp, A.H., Haury, H. & Davis, M.H. (2009).

From ABAC to ZBAC: The Evolution of Access

Control Models.

http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2009/HPL-

2009-30.pdf

• Hu, V.C., Ferraiolo, D.F. & Kuhn, D.R. (2006).

Assessment of Access Control Systems.

Gaithersburg: National Institute of Standards

and Technology.

ICS– History and Security

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

In the simplest terms: Computer systems that control

physical processes, usually on an industrial (large) scale.

We use ICS as a generic term. (ICS, DCS, SCADA)

What are they?

History

• Punch cards 1725

• Automated control of a machine

• Humans reduced to support units

• Mass production 1850

• Electrification 1900

• Chain production 1900-

• RW-300 1959

• The first DCS

– Distributed control system

– Removed humans from production

Specifics of early ICS:s

• Control logic implemented in physical relay

ladders

• Reprogramming involved physical rebuilding of the ”computer”

level.

• Direct control on the machine level is physical:

• Relays, cam timers, drum sequencers

• Cool, but impractical.

Examples

• Nuclear and hydroelectrical powerplants and power distribution

• Drinking water plants and water supply network

• HVAC systems

• Paper mills

• Steel mills

• Rail and road traffic control systems

The summer of love

• MODICON 084

• MOdular DIgital CONtroller

• The first PLC

• Programmable logic controller

• A programmable logic

controller, PLC or

programmable

controller is a digital

computer used for

automation of typically

industrial

electromechanical

processes (Wikipedia)

Ladder logic

Ladder logic continued

• These days PLC:s may or may not have ladder

• Proprietary or non proprietary programming

languages

• Open or undisclosed internal representation of

Specifics

• Controls a PHYSICAL PROCESS, important!

• Large areas, may need MW-links or SatCom

• LOTS of devices, often in redundance

• Low latency, low bandwidth (1200 Baud)

• Real time data

Specifics

• Historically:

• Custom designed hardware, software and systems

• Single vendor

• Proprietary protocols,

• Now

• Mixed systems, some custom parts some COTS

• Usually single major vendor

• Mixed protocols, often older ones run on IP

PLC never die….

• Almost.

• Operating life of ICS-technology routinely

exceed twenty years.

• State of the art 2014 next to state of the art

• Quite a bit of difference

Then and now:

Trends

• Virtualization

• Relays -> Software

• Generalization

• Custom built hardware -> COTS

• Geographic distribution

• Plant wide networks -> Internet connected systems

• ICS to ECS (Embedded Control Systems)

• Turbine hall -> Suburban house

• Legacy remains

• Modbus -> Still Modbus but over IP over WiFi

• Integration

• Separate networks -> Connected networks

ICS Security

Safety and security

• Safety protects people from the system

• Security protects the system from people

• Traditional priority is as follows

• Safety

• Uptime

• Cost

• Safety again

Example

This is Sheikh Abdolsamad

Mosque

Square Kufic?

But I digress..

It’s here:

What lies below..

• 100,000 square meters

• Built 8 meters underground

• Steel reinforced concrete roof 2.5 meters thick

• Covered by an additional 22 meters of packed

earth.

Uranium enrichement plant

• Extracts U235 from UF6

• Uses Centrifugal extraction

• EU and the US were against

this activity

Timeline

• 2002 <200 centrifuges

• 2003 Underground complex construction

begins

• 2006 UN resolution 1696 demand that Iran

cease all enriching activity

• 2006 By end of year approx 3000 centrifuges

• 2007 IAEA reports only 2/3 centrifuges running

• 2009 Project plagued by delays due to quality control, At least 1000

centrifuges scrapped

• Irans head of Nuclear program resign

• 2010 IAEA: 3772 working, 5084 still inactive

• Prof Massoud Ali Mohammadi murdered

• Dr Majid Shahriari Murdered

• Chemistry engineer Fereydoon Abbasi Davani Survived murder

attempt

• 2011 Darioush Rezaeinejad murdered

• 2012 Dr Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan murdered

• 2015 Treaty signed

Stuxnet

• Jun 2010 VirusBlokAda discover a new

malware.

• 15 Jun they post their findings.

• 15 Jun, DDOS of unknown origin strikes mailing

lists for SCADA-security causing many to miss

the post.

• The malware is later named Stuxnet, and it is

MAGNIFICENT! very dangerous

Stuxnet timeline

• 0.500 November 3, 2005 C&C server registration

• 0.500 July 4, 2009 Infection stop date

• 1.001 June 22, 2009 Main binary compile timestamp

• 1.100 March 1, 2010 Main binary compile timestamp

• 1.101 April 14, 2010 Main binary compile timestamp

• 1.x June 24, 2012 Infection stop date

What does it do?

• It attacks SCADA-systems in a very sneaky

Infection

• USB-drive

• Primary infection is through a USB drive in a windows system.

• The malware uses a vulnerability in windows shortcuts to install

itself without user interaction

• RPC-exploit for windows

• Used to spread throughout the windows network

• Rootkits, user-mode and kernel-mode is used to hide itself in the

targets.

• The worm updates from C&C servers (DE&MY) and P2P

Infection continued

• Four zero-day exploits were used, as well as

CPLINK and Conficker exploits to accomplish

the attack.

• That is a pretty impressive attack.

Target

• All this was just preliminary

• The target was the server running WinCC

• It is used to update the actual PLC:s in the ICS

• StuxNet carried two genuine certificates from

Jmicron and Realtek

• Using another Zeroday and the certificates,

Stuxnet uploaded malware to the ICS

UNLESS!

• Stuxnet had an encoded failsafe:

• Siemens S7-300 PLC:s..

• ..controlling Variable-frequency drives..

• ..from either Fararo Paya, or Vacon..

• ...that runs at 807-1210Hz

• Curioser and curioser!

Payload

• Rootkit that hides the software, but also hides

its activities

• It sometimes changes the control frequency as

follows: Up to 1402Hz, down to 2Hz, up to

1064Hz

• If this happed to a centrifuge, it would most

likely cause vibrations that would eventually

destroy the ballbearings, or the structural

integrity of the main body. (The tube)

Notable differences

• Four Zerodays

• Two known exploits

• Two root kits

• C&C network

• P2P network

• Two stolen

Certificates

Office Network Scada Network

• Root kit

Most ICS networks lack security

• Focus is on safety

• Security is often non existing once you get

network access.

• Some work has been done regarding white

listing or IDS:s

• Most traditional IT-security measures have

been unsuitable for ICS:s

• Security depends securing access points

Security through NW-separation

• Eroded by need for

patching modern OS:s

• Eroded by use of public

datacommunication lines

• Eroded by use of IP and

other COTS methods

• Eroded by lack of training

and awareness of the

personnel

Then and now:

Air gap?

An overview of attacks and defenses

Hannes Holm, Ph.D.

hannes.holm@foi.se

2016621987

2374925482

2739628261

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Disclosed high severity vulnerabilities

Background

DefenseIncident

Vulnerability

Attack

IT system

Impact on

system

Impact on

service realized

by the system

Overview of cyber intrusions

There is no “silver bullet”

• 99% of all alarms are false…

Hannes Holm, Signature Based Intrusion Detection for Zero-Day Attacks: (Not)

a Closed Chapter?, Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences,

Unauthenticated scan Authenticated scan

Scanner SamplesRemediation

%Remediation

% (Linux)Remediation

% (Win)Remediation

%Remediation %

(Linux)Remediation

% (Win)

AVDS 50 40 65 19 70 65 75

McAfee VM 50 22 22 22 53 22 83

Nessus 50 22 9 33 72 70 75NeXpose 50 34 43 26 53 43 63

Patchlinkscan

50 2 4 0 45 13 75

QualysGuard 50 38 48 30 87 83 92

SAINT 50 54 83 30 66 100 33

Hannes Holm, Performance of automated network vulnerability scanning at remediating

security issues, Computers and Security, 2012

Hannes Holm, Performance of automated network vulnerability scanning at remediating

security issues, Computers and Security, 2012

AttackAbuseJonsson, Erland, and Tomas Olovsson. "A quantitative model of the security intrusion process based on attacker behavior." Software Engineering, IEEE

Transactions on 23.4 (1997): 235-245.

Holm, Hannes, Matus Korman, and Mathias Ekstedt. "A bayesian network model for likelihood estimations of acquirement of critical software vulnerabilities and

exploits." Information and Software Technology 58 (2015): 304-318.

McQueen, Miles A., et al. "Time-to-compromise model for cyber risk reduction estimation." Quality of Protection. Springer US, 2006. 49-64.

Overview of IT intrusions

Vulnerability

Vulnerability timeline

Vulnerability discovered

Vulnerability disclosed

Detection signatures

Exploit publishedPatch

Software release

Arbaugh, William A., William L. Fithen, and John McHugh. "Windows of vulnerability:

A case study analysis." Computer 33.12 (2000): 52-59.

Vulnerability timeline

Vulnerability discovered

Vulnerability disclosed

Detection signatures

Exploit publishedPatch

Software release

Known0-day

Windows of vulnerability

A 0-day attack on average requires 312 days to detect

Bilge, Leyla, and Tudor Dumitras. "Before we knew it: an empirical study

of zero-day attacks in the real world." Proceedings of the 2012 ACM

conference on Computer and communications security. ACM, 2012.

A patch is released on average 7 days after a vulnerability is disclosed

Holm, Hannes, Matus Korman,

and Mathias Ekstedt. "A bayesian

network model for likelihood

estimations of acquirement of

critical software vulnerabilities and

exploits." Information and Software

Technology 58 (2015): 304-318.

312 days 7 dagar

Network traffic (PCAP) given 0.5 Gb bandwidth during 1 year: 1684.8 TB

AttackAbuseJonsson, Erland, and Tomas Olovsson. "A quantitative model of the security intrusion process based on attacker behavior." Software Engineering, IEEE

Transactions on 23.4 (1997): 235-245.

Holm, Hannes, Matus Korman, and Mathias Ekstedt. "A bayesian network model for likelihood estimations of acquirement of critical software vulnerabilities and

exploits." Information and Software Technology 58 (2015): 304-318.

McQueen, Miles A., et al. "Time-to-compromise model for cyber risk reduction estimation." Quality of Protection. Springer US, 2006. 49-64.

Overview of IT intrusions

Vulnerability

Common vulnerabilities and exploits

• Social engineering

• Denial of service

• Spoofing

• Code injection

• Buffer overflow

• Bypass access control

• Spoofing

• Code injection

• Buffer overflow

• Deceive an individual to comply with a malicious request– E-mail (phishing)

– Telephone

– Rarely physically

• The threat actor exploits feelings (e.g., fear or excitement) and established trust relationships

• Common exploit vectors:– Link to web server

• Drive-by-download

– Theft of credentials

– Malicious appendix

Holm, Hannes, Waldo Rocha Flores, and Göran Ericsson. "Cyber security for a Smart Grid-What

about phishing?." Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT EUROPE), 2013 4th

IEEE/PES. IEEE, 2013.

Social engineering

Phishing experiment #1

Holm, Hannes, Waldo Rocha Flores, and Göran Ericsson. "Cyber security for a Smart Grid-What about phishing?."

Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT EUROPE), 2013 4th IEEE/PES. IEEE, 2013.

Click link 8%

Run application 2%

Phishing experiment #2

Holm, Hannes, Waldo Rocha Flores, and Göran Ericsson. "Cyber security for a Smart Grid-What about phishing?."

Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe (ISGT EUROPE), 2013 4th IEEE/PES. IEEE, 2013.

Click link 30%

Run application 11%

• Spoofing

• Code injection

• Buffer overflow

• Send data that an application or system cannot

properly manage

• Methods:

– Send large amounts of data

– Send invalid data

Denial of Service

• Spoofing

• Code injection

• Buffer overflow

Spoofing

• Att lura en entitet att man är någon annan

• Man-in-the-middle

• SMTP spoofing

• DNS spoofing

• ARP spoofing

DNS Spoofing

UserUserwww.foi.sewww.foi.se

’ ’ DNS server

Designated DNS server

se DNS server

foi.seDNS server

Domain IPwww.aftonbladet.se 193.14.90.203

www.stackoverflow.com 198.252.206.16

www.foi.se 150.227.7.71

DNS Spoofing

UserUserwww.foi.sewww.foi.se

’ ’ DNS server

se DNS server

foi.se DNS server

Domain IPwww.aftonbladet.se 193.14.90.203

www.foi.se 150.227.7.71

UserUserwww.evilhamster.comwww.evilhamster.com

DNS SpoofingDomain IPwww.aftonbladet.se 120.237.19.52

www.foi.se 120.237.19.52

ARP Spoofing

UserUser

IP MAC192.168.10.1 00:19:5B:4C:2C:5A

192.168.10.2 00:40:8C:55:70:9C

192.168.10.3 00:14:22:52:6B:03

192.168.10.4 00:B0:55:86:BB:F7

192.168.10.5 00:22:6B:86:BB:E4

192.168.10.6 00:55:D0:86:03:40

ARP Spoofing

UserUser

Threat agentThreat agent

IP MAC192.168.10.1 08:19:55:6B:14:70

192.168.10.2 08:19:55:6B:14:70

192.168.10.3 08:19:55:6B:14:70

192.168.10.4 08:19:55:6B:14:70

192.168.10.5 08:19:55:6B:14:70

192.168.10.6 08:19:55:6B:14:70

192.168.10.7 08:19:55:6B:14:70

192.168.10.7

Defenses against spoofing

• SMTP spoofing

– Sign e-mails

• DNS spoofing

– DNSSEC

• ARP spoofing

– ARP-defense modules such as dynamic

ARP inspect or IP-MAC connection

in DHCP server

– Static ARP-tables

AnvändareAnvändarewww.foi.sewww.foi.se

’ ’ DNS server

Föredragen DNS server

com DNS server

foi.com DNS server

Domän IPwww.aftonbladet.se 193.14.90.203

www.foi.se 150.227.7.71

• Spoofing

• Code injection

• Buffer overflow

Code injection

• SQL injection

• File inclusion

• Command Injection

• Cross site scripting (XSS)

#include <stdio.h>

#include <unistd.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv) {

char cat[] = "cat ";

char *command;

size_t commandLength;

commandLength = strlen(cat) + strlen(argv[1]) + 1;

command = (char *) malloc(commandLength);

strncpy(command, cat, commandLength);

strncat(command, argv[1], (commandLength - strlen(cat)) );

system(command);return (0);

exec('ping -c1 ' . $_ GET['PING'], $result);

foreach($output as $line)

echo $line .’<br>’;

Code injection concerns more than

web applications!

Defenses against code injection

• Development– Use libraries that have undergone security tests

– Code analysis

• Operation– System tests

– Hardening

– Access control

include( $_GET['COLOR'] . '.php' );

if ($_GET['COLOR'] == ”red”) {

include('red.php');

elseif($_GET['COLOR'] == ”blue”) {

include('blue.php');

• Spoofing

• Code injection

• Buffer overflow

Memory virtualization

MS Word

Outlook

Address Value0x000ff7ac ”HELO"

0x000ff7a8 ”GREY"

0x000ff7a4 ”KITTY”

0x000ff7a0 0x4a3c5c9e

0x7FFFFFFF

0x00000000

0xFFFFFFFF

--Kernel memory--

1 2 3 44 Byte

32 Bit 8 16 24 32

Buffer overflowexample.c

#include <string.h>

void do_something(char *Buffer)

char MyVar[8];

strcpy(MyVar,Buffer);

int main (int argc, char **argv)

do_something(argv[1]);

user@system:~$./example test

example.c

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

Buffer overflow

0x00000000

Pointer to argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top address =

Top of

0x000ff7ac

Address Value0x003e3cb2 ”test"

”test”

MS Word

Outlook

”test”

example.c

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

Buffer overflow

0x00000000

Pointer to argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top of stack

Top address

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

0x00000000

Saved instruction pointer

Pointer to argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top of stack

Top address

”test”

Top+4 byte

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

0x00000000

Saved frame address

Pointer to argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

”test”

Top of stack

Top+8 byte

Top address

Top+4 byte

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

0x00000000

Saved frame address

Pointer to argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top of stack

Top address

Top+8 byte

Top+12 byte

”test”

Top+16 byte

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

0x00000000

Saved frame address

Pointer to argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top of stack

test\n

”test”

Top address

Top+8 byte

Top+12 byte

Top+16 byte

strcpy()

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

0x00000000

Saved frame address

Pointer to argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top of stack

”test”

Top+8 byte

Top address

Top+4 byte

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

0x00000000

Pointer to argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top of stack

”test”

Top address

Top+4 byte

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

0x00000000

Saved frame address

Pointer to argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top of stack

user@system:~$./example AAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDD

”AAAAAAAABBBBCCCCDDDD”

Top address

Top+8 byte

Top+12 byte

Top+16 byte

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

0x00000000

Saved frameadress

Pointertill argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top of stack

Top address

Top+8 byte

Top+12 byte

Top+16 byte

strcpy()

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

0x00000000

Pointertill argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

Top of stack

Toppadress

Top+4 byte

Top+16 byte

0x00000000

<Spaceför MyVar>

Saved frame address

Pointertill argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

Topaddress

user@system:~$./example AAAAAAAABBBB$TopaddressDDDD

Top address

Top+8 byte

Top+12 byte

”AAAAAAAABBBB$TopaddressDDDD”

strcpy()

Top address

Top+8 byte

Top+12 byte

Top+16 byte

0x00000000

Sparad frameadress

Sparad instruktionspekare

Pekare till argv[1]

0xFFFFFFFF

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

Topaddress

user@system:~$./example AAAAAAAABBBB$Topaddress$code

code= "\xdb\xc0\x31\xc9\xbf\x7c\x16\x70\xcc\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\xb1" . "\x1e\x58\x31\x78\x18\x83\xe8\xfc\x03\x78\x68\xf4\x85\x30" . "\x78\xbc\x65\xc9\x78\xb6\x23\xf5\xf3\xb4\xae\x7d\x02\xaa" . "\x3a\x32\x1c\xbf\x62\xed\x1d\x54\xd5\x66\x29\x21\xe7\x96" . "\x60\xf5\x71\xca\x06\x35\xf5\x14\xc7\x7c\xfb\x1b\x05\x6b" . "\xf0\x27\xdd\x48\xfd\x22\x38\x1b\xa2\xe8\xc3\xf7\x3b\x7a" . "\xcf\x4c\x4f\x23\xd3\x53\xa4\x57\xf7\xd8\x3b\x83\x8e\x83" . "\x1f\x57\x53\x64\x51\xa1\x33\xcd\xf5\xc6\xf5\xc1\x7e\x98" . "\xf5\xaa\xf1\x05\xa8\x26\x99\x3d\x3b\xc0\xd9\xfe\x51\x61" . "\xb6\x0e\x2f\x85\x19\x87\xb7\x78\x2f\x59\x90\x7b\xd7\x05" . "\x7f\xe8\x7b\xca"

strcpy()

Defenses against buffer overflow

• Development– Use languages with garbage collectors

– Use modern IDEs

– Use tested libraries

– Perform code analysis

• Operation– System tests

– Hardening

– Operating system defenses• Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Adress Space Layout

Randomization (ASLR), stack cookies, safeSEH

– Access control

example.c

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

example.c

#include <string.h>

char MyVar[8];

strncpy(MyVar,Buffer,sizeof(MyVar));

• Spoofing

• Code injection

• Buffer overflow

Bypass access control

• Credentials that are saved in a vulnerable

application, are sent/stored in clear text or with

weak encryption/low entropy

• Can be accomplished by most previously

discussed attacks

SELECT Users.Username

FROM Users

WHERE Users.Username = ’Anders’

AND Users.Password = ’gottmos’ OR 1=1

databas

• Administration and technology

• Access control

• Proactive vs reactive

• Detection vs prevention

• Network vs agents

• 0-day vs known attacks

General defenses

Questions?

Embedded systemsThe old days was better, or at least more robust

Mikael Wedlin, mwe@foi.se

Summary

• More and more of our surroundings is controlled by

software

• Tools can get new unexpected features

• Software around us becomes only more advanced =

more complicated and komplex

• Development is not the same as more robust

• Internet of Things

• Often Wireless

• Difficult to think outside the normal use

What is security?

Confidentiality

Availability Integrity

CIA vs AIC

Confidentiality

Availability Integrity

http://www.anniesinternetcafe.com

Healthcare

Another example of embedded systems

Are we without hope?

State that "attacking" SCADA systems

- a known example!

1982: Siberian Gas Pipeline Explosion.

”While the following cannot be fully confirmed, it has been reported that during the Cold War the CIA inserted malicious code into control system software leaked to the Soviet Union. The software, which controlled pumps, turbines, and valves on a Soviet gas pipeline, was programmed to malfunction after a set interval. The malfunction caused the control system to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures beyond the failure ratings of pipeline joints and welds, eventually causing an enormous explosion.”

This has more or less been verified by V. G. & Cherkashin Feifer, Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB officer: The true story of the man who recruited Robert That Hanssen and Aldrich Ames, Basic Books, 2005.

Fides est bona,

sed custodia

est melior

2007 Pew Global Attitudes

Social trust

• QOG gives good societies

• Lack of trust provides:

• Increased transaction costs

• Increased feeling of insecurity

• Reduced use

• IT Security do not add any functionality

• IT security must be built from the beginning

Trivial example

Tailored Access Operations

Glenn Greenwald: No place to hide,

Last Home-PC offer

Nytt HemPC-erbjudande

Frånowner-alla-lin@foi.se för Tommy Lodehed

Datum den 19 april 2006 13:16:00Tillalla@foi.seKopia:

ÄmneNytt HemPC-erbjudandeHej,

nytt HemPC-erbjudande enligt nedan.

För PC:

www.dellhempc.nu/view/foi

Klicka på länken ovan så kommer du till beställningssidan.

OBS! När du beställt, skriv ut beställningsbekräftelsen samt låneavtalet (som skall skrivas under) och skicka till Tommy Lodehed på Inköp.

För Mac:

http://intranet.foi.se/upload/organisation/forskningsstod/enheter/ekonomi/inkop/HemMac-2006-FOI.pdf

Klicka på länken ovan så öppnas ett PDF-dokument.

Skriv ut och fyll i beställningen som skall skickas tillsammans med ett underskrivet låneavtal till Tommy Lodehed på Inköp.

Har du några frågor kontakta mig.

Hälsningar

Tommy Lodehed

FOI Inköp/FOI Purchasing Office

Phone: 46 13 378117 / Fax: 46 13 378067

Email: tommy.lodehed@foi.se

www.dellhempc.nu/view/foi

More of the same contract

www.dellhempc.nu/view/forsvaret

Login at Dell

Personnummer

UTAN bindestreck

So what?

• Could there be something on a home PC that

does not should not be there?

• Do we take work home?

A new quote

"So Snowden returned to the NSA, the This time as

an employee of Dell Corporation, which

collaborated with the Agency. "

Glenn Greenwald: No place to hide,

Risks with increased security?

Access Control - Research | Education | InnovationWindows of vulnerability Arbaugh, William A.,...

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