A Society Transformed: Hungary in Time-Space Perspective

title: ASocietyTransformed:HungaryinTime-spacePerspective

author: Andorka,Rudolf.publisher: CentralEuropeanUniversityPress

isbn10|asin: 9639116491printisbn13: 9789639116498ebookisbn13: 9780585132167

language: English

subject

Hungary--Socialconditions--1989-,Hungary--Economicconditions--1989-,Post-communism--Hungary,Economicstabilization--Hungary.

publicationdate: 1999lcc: HN420.5.A8S631999ebddc: 306/.09439

Hungary--Socialconditions--1989-,

subject: Hungary--Economicconditions--1989-,Post-communism--Hungary,Economicstabilization--Hungary.

Pageiii

ASocietyTransformedHungaryinTime-SpacePerspective

Editedby

RudolfAndorkaTamásKolosiRichardRose

andGyörgyVukovich

CentralEuropeanUniversityPress,Budapest

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CentralEuropeanUniversityPressOktóber6.utca12H-1051BudapestHungary

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PrintedinHungarybyAkaprint

ContentsListoftables vii

Listoffigures xi

Listofcontributors xii

Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction:ScalingchangeinHungaryTamásKolosiandRichardRose

1Long-termmodernizationofHungariansocietyRudolfAndorkaandIstvánHarcsa

2Population:birth,marriage,anddeathGyörgyVukovich

3DenominationandreligiouspracticeMiklósTomkaandIstvánHarcsa

4ThescopeofthestateandprivatesectorsTamásKolosiandEndreSik

5Thepost-CommunisteconomiceliteGyörgyLengyel

6ThemiddlestrataintransformationZoltánFábián

7ConsciousnessofinequalityPéterRóbert

8WelfareprogrammesandthealleviationofpovertyIstvánGyörgyTóth

9DissatisfactionandalienationRudolfAndorka

10Partiesandsocialdivisions:acommonEast-CentralEuropeanpattern?GáborTóka

11ThelongandtheshortoftransformationinCentralEuropeRichardRose

Index 205

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ListofTables

Table1.1Socialstructure,194993 26

Table1.2Populationandfamily,194893 28

Table1.3Educationalachievement,195593 30

Table1.4Increasedgenderequalityineducation,192090 31

Table1.5Employment,bygender,194990 33

Table1.6Income,195094 35

Table1.7Timebudgets,197793 42

Table1.8Culturalactivities,195093 44

Table1.9Deviance,192093 45

Table1.10Householdsize,194990 45

Table1.11Incomedistribution,196294 46

Table2.1Totalfertilityrateofmarriedwomen 52

Table2.2Agecompositionofpopulation 56

Table2.3Numberandrateofmarriages 57

Table2.4Lifeexpectancyatbirthformenandwomen,196093

Table2.5Mortalityratesofmen 59

Table3.1Hungary'sdenominations,18691949 62

Table3.2DenominationalstructureinHungary,195788 63

Table3.3Religiousaffiliationbyage,1992 63

Table3.4Extentofreligiousendogamy 65

Table3.5Religiousaffiliationofgrandparents,parentsandmarriedcouples

Table3.6Religiousaffiliationbyeducation,average197891

Table3.7Religiousaffiliationandstrengthofcommitment 68

Table3.8Religiousaffiliationandreligiouspractice 70

Table3.9Religiousaffiliationaccordingtobaptismandpractice

Table4.1Worktimeinpublic,mixedandprivatesectors 76

Table4.2Worktimeinthepublicandprivatesectors,annualactivity,1993

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Table5.1Socio-economiccharacteristicsoftheelite 87

Table5.2Oldandnewleadersintheeconomicelite 89

Table5.3Continuity:previousjobinthesamesector 90

Table5.4Dissatisfactionwithintheeconomicelite 92

Table5.5Eliteattitudestowardsfinancialprospects 92

Table5.6Entrepreneurs,populationandeconomicelitefeelings

Table5.7Incomeestimatedanddeemedjust 94

Table6.1Structuralrelationsandtheschemaofclasses 97

Table6.2Thedistributionofearnersbythetypeofworkplace

Table6.3Meanhouseholdpercapitaincome,1992and1994

Table7.1Classidentification,1991-3 115

Table7.2Changingclassidentificationin1992-3,panelsurvey

Table7.3Meansubjectivestatusbysocial-demographiccharacteristics

Table7.4Internalstructureofsocialinequalityconsciousness

Table7.5Factorsinfluencingsocialstatus 121

Table7.6Dimensionsofsocialstatusfordifferentsocio-demographicgroups

Table8.1Povertyratebyhouseholdcharacteristics 131

Table8.2Decilesharesoftypesofincome 135

Table8.3Incidenceofsocialtransfers 137

Table8.4Incomecompositionofsocialpolicytargetgroups

Table8.5Marketincomequintilesbytheirhouseholdincomequintile

Table8.6Ratiobottomquintilemarketincomes(pre-transferpovertyrates)andtotalhouseholdincomes(post-transferpovertyrates)

Table8.7Household-specificpovertyrates 142

Table9.1Satisfactionwithdimensionsofrespondent'slife,1992-4

Table9.2ValuesintheInglehartscale,1994 149

Table9.3Psychologicalproblems,1993 150

Table9.4Manifestationsofanomieandalienation,1993 151

Table9.5Self-confidenceandlifegoals,1978,1990and1994

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Table10.1Arealistvotes,parliamentaryelections25March1990and8May1994

Table10.2Correlationsbetweensocialvariablesandpartypreference

Table10.3Correlationbetweeneconomicstatusandpartypreference

Table10.4Recalledlistvotesbyeconomicpolicyattitudes,1990and1994

Table10.5MSZPvotersbyageandoccupation 176

Table11.1InfantmortalityinCentralEurope 183

Table11.2Life-expectancytrendsinCentralEurope 185

Table11.3Widespreadrejectionofundemocraticalternatives

Table11.4Increasesinfreedominpost-Communistsocieties

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ListofFigures

Figure0.1aChangingmapofHungary,191441 4

Figure0.1bHungarytoday 5

Figure0.2GrowthrateoftheofficialHungarianeconomy 10

Figure0.3ElectionresultsinHungary,1990-8 13

Figure1.1Stockofeducation,192090 29

Figure1.2Riseinconsumption,195092 36

Figure1.3Improvementinthequalityofhousing,194993 38

Figure1.4Steadyimprovementininfantmortality,190093

Figure1.5Trendsinlifeexpectancy;doctorssince1900 40

Figure2.1Totalfertilityrate 51

Figure4.1PrivatesectorinofficialandtotalGDP 74

Figure4.2Publicandprivatesectorsbyeconomicbranch 79

Figure4.3Individualincomeinpublicandprivatesectors 80

Figure4.4Strategiestoearnextraincome 81

Figure4.5Socialservicesprovidedbyemployers 85

Figure6.1Proportionofentrepreneursintheeconomicallyactivepopulation,198293

Figure7.1Attitudestowardwealth 124

Figure11.1MathematicalachievementofCentralEuropeanyouths

Figure11.2Carownership:makingprogressandfallingbehind

Figure11.3PurchasingpowerofCentralEuropeans 190

Figure11.4Importanceofmultipleeconomiesingettingby

Figure11.5TrendsinGDP,198996 194

Figure11.6Ratingeconomicsystems:past,presentandfuture

Figure11.7Ratingpoliticalsystems:past,presentandfuture

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ListofContributorsRudolfAndorka,thelateRector,BudapestUniversityofEconomics

ZoltánFábián,HeadofDepartmentofDataArchivesandInformatics,TÁRKI(SocialResearchInformaticsCentre),Budapest

IstvánHarcsa,HeadofDepartment,CentralStatisticalOffice,Budapest

TamásKolosi,President,TÁRKIandProfessorofSociology,ELTE(EötvösLorándUniversity),Budapest

GyörgyLengyel,ProfessorofSociology,BudapestUniversityofEconomics

PéterRóbert,ProfessorofSociology,ELTEandTÁRKI,Budapest

RichardRose,Director,CentrefortheStudyofPublicPolicy,UniversityofStrathclyde,Glasgow

EndreSik,ProfessorofEconomicSociology,BudapestUniversityofEconomics

GáborTóka,AssistantProfessor,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,CentralEuropeanUniversity,Budapest

MiklósTomka,Director,ResearchCentreforPhilosophyofReligion,InstituteofPhilosophyoftheHungarianAcademyofSciences,Budapest

IstvánGyörgyTóth,GeneralDirector,TÁRKI,Budapest

GyörgyVukovich,formerDirector,CentralStatisticalOffice,Budapest

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AcknowledgementsOURfirstobligationistoacknowledgethankstotheinstitutionsessentialincreatingavolumethatlooksatHungarybroadlyacrossbothtimeandspace.Sinceasocialsciencebookrequiresthetrainingofsocialscientists,thestartingpointistheBudapestUniversityofEconomics,whereRudolfAndorkawasbothProfessorofSociologyandRector.Sincetheanalysisoflong-termsocialtrendsrequiresdata,theCentralStatisticalOffice,ofwhichGyörgyVukovichistheformerDirector,hasmadeanindispensablecontributiontothematerialscontainedherein.Yetthecensusandofficialstatisticsarenottheonlysourceofdata:sincePaulLazarsfeld'spioneeringstudyofunemploymentinAustriaintheearly1930s,samplesurveyshavefrequentlybeenusedtocollectsocialdata.TÁRKI(TársadalomkutatásiInformatikaiEgyesülés;inEnglish,theSocialResearchInformaticsCentre),isthearchiveforsurveydataaboutHungary.TamásKolosiisafounderandnowPresidentofTÁRKI.Inaddition,theGeneralDirector,IstvánGyörgyTóth,hasefficientlyco-ordinatedthecollectionofmaterialsfrommanyauthorsandthemovementofpaperandmachine-readablefilesbetweenBudapestandGlasgow.

OntheScottishside,theCentrefortheStudyofPublicPolicyattheUniversityofStrathclydehasprovidedthecomparativeperspectiveusefulinseeingHungaryinabroaderEuropeanperspective.TheDirector,ProfessorRichardRose,hasbeencomparingmassresponsetotransformationinCentralandEasternEuropeandtheformerSovietUnion,utilizingbothcensusdataandsurveydata.Moreover,HungaryisoneofthetencountriesintheNewDemocraciesBarometerofthePaulLazarsfeldSociety,Vienna,forwhichRoseactsasinternationalscientificadvisor.

ThisbookhasbeenmadepossiblebyagrantfromtheEuropeanCommission,DirectorateGeneralXII,ScienceResearchandDevelopmentunderthePECO/Copernicusprogramme(ERBCIPAACT930091).ResultsfromresearchinprogresshavebeenpresentedinseminarsatawidevarietyofconferencesandacademicinstitutionsoutsideHungaryaswellaswithinit,includingtheSchoolofSlavonic

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andEastEuropeanStudies,London;theOECD,Paris;theMaxPlanckArbeitsgruppeonTransformationsprozesse,Berlin;theDiplomaticAcademy,Vienna;andtheWorldBank,WashingtonDC.

Ouronlyregretaboutthisbookisthatthesenioreditor,RudolfAndorka,didnotlivetoseeitpublished.Itshouldbeclearfromthecontributionsherebyavarietyofcolleaguesandformerstudentsthathisspiritliveson.

RUDOLFANDORKA,TAMÁSKOLOSI,RICHARDROSEANDGYÖRGYVUKOVICH

IntroductionScalingChangeinHungaryTamásKolosiandRichardRose

CHANGEandpersistenceareperennialthemesinthesocialsciences.Inpolitics,achangeofregimewhetherfromauthoritarianismtodemocracyorintheotherdirectionshouldmakeabigchangeinsociety.Butforahistorian,itisthelongueduréethatcounts.SinceHungary'sorigininthetenthcentury,changehasbeenaninevitablefeatureofadaptingtoamillenniumoftransformationinCentralEurope.YetthemaintenanceofadistinctiveFinno-Ungarnlanguageandadistinctivenationalculture,notwithstandingcenturiesofrulebyOttomanandAustrianemperors,isformidableevidenceofpersistence.Sociologically,thecriticalquestionis:howcanwedeterminewhatdoesanddoesnotchangeinacountryoverlongandshortperiodsoftime?

Theobjectofthisbookistoexaminethescaleofchangethatis,boththepresenceandabsenceofchangeinHungariansocietyasaconsequenceofthegreattransformationfromaCommunistintoademocraticregime.Todothisrequirescarefulattentiontothecharacterandtempoofdifferenttypesofchangeinsociety.Inademocraticpolity,agovernmentcanchangeovernightwiththeresultofageneralelection,andtheficklenessofpublicandparliamentaryopinionledBritishPrimeMinisterHaroldWilsontoclaim,Aweekisalongtimeinpolitics.However,ademographerseeschangetakingplaceoverdecadesorgenerations.Whilebirthanddeathareinevitable,anincreaseinlifeexpectancyorafallinbirthratestakestwentyyearsorlongertomakeamajorimpactonthepopulationstructureofasociety.GradualchangesnoticeableinHungarian

societyafterthefallofCommunismactuallystartedundertheoldregime.Thisistruenotonlyoffamilylifeanddemographybutinmanyotherfeaturesofsocietyaswell.Infact,itisinthenatureofanon-

totalitariansocietythatthepoliticalregimedoesnotattempttoplanorcommandwhathappensineveryaspectofsociallifebutacceptswhathappensasaconsequenceofprocessesofchangeincivilsociety.

Withanationalidentitystrongenoughtosurvivemanycenturiesofrulebyforeignpowers,theHungariannationhasshownthecapacitytosurvive.YettheintroductionaftertheSecondWorldWarofaCommunistregimeunderpressurefromSovietoccupationforceswasanabruptdiscontinuityfromthepast.Italsosetintrainprocessesofmodernizationsuchasurbanization,masseducationatthesecondaryanduniversitylevelandwomenenteringpaidemployment.HungarywastheleaderamongCommunistcountriesindistancingitselffromthepoliticalandeconomicorthodoxiesofMarxist-Leninism,eventhoughitwasimpossibletobreakwithMoscow,asthefailed1956Hungarianrevolutiondemonstrated.TheHungarianregimedevelopedgoulashsocialisminanattempttocreateaformofmarketsocialism.PoliticalliberalizationmeantthatHungariansocialscientistscouldundertakeempiricalstudiesoftheconditionsofHungariansociety.EvenbeforetheBerlinWallfell,therulingCommunistPartyhadbeguntonegotiatetheconversionofaPeople'sDemocracyintoademocraticrepublic.

ThecollapseoftheCommunistregimein1989waslessofashockinHungarythanelsewhereintheSovietworldforHungaryhadbeguntomoveinapost-CommunistdirectiondecadesbeforeglasnostandperestroikabecameKremlinslogans.Nonetheless,thefull-scalemovementfromasocialisteconomytoamarketeconomyinthe1990shasinvolvedstructuralchangesthathavegreatlyalteredconditionsformanypeople,someforthebetterandsomefortheworseeconomically.

ALongRoadtoIndependenceandaLongerRoadtoDemocracy

HungariansocietyisasoldorolderthanEnglandorFrance.MagyarstravellingfromeastoftheUralmountainsarrivedinwhatisnowHungaryintheninthcentury.ThefirstHungarianking,Stephen,wascrownedin1001andsecuredtheChristianizationofthecountry.Inmedievaltimesthecrownpassedthroughthehandsofdifferentfamilies,nativeandforeign,androyalterritoryexpandedandcontractedwiththefortunesofwar.ThisperiodclosedwiththedefeatofHungaryatthehandsoftheOttomansunderSuleimantheMagnificentattheBattleofMohácsin1526.Acenturyandahalflater,aftertheTurksfailedintheir

siegeofVienna,theOttomanforceswithdrew.Thisdidnotmeanindependence,forin1699theHabsburgmonarchygaineddominionoverHungaryandTranslyvania.UnderHabsburgadministration,theGermanlanguageandGerman-speakingpopulationspreadthroughoutmuchofHungary'sterritory.

ThewaveofnationalismthatspreadacrossEuropefollowingtheNapoleonicWarsinvolvedHungary:itsnationalleadersdemandedbothnationalself-determinationandconstitutionalliberalizationintheEnglishfashion.InMarch1848,theHungariandietenactedlawsauthorizingaliberalconstitutionalmonarchyundertheHabsburgcrown;nationalminoritiesinwhatwasthentheterritoryofHungaryprotested.AfterFranzJosefbecametheHabsburgemperorlaterinthatyear,hesoughttorepressconstitutionalchange.InApril,1849,LajosKossuthproclaimedHungaryanindependentrepublic,butitwasshort-lived,surrenderingtoAustrianforcesinAugust1849.

TheAusgleichof1867createdadualmonarchywithFranzJosefcrownedkingofHungaryaswellasbeingemperoroftheAustro-HungarianEmpire.TheterritoryofHungaryatthattimeincludedTranslyvania,Slovakia,Croatia,SloveniaandRutheniaandtheBánát(Figure0.1a).Thus,likeotherpartsoftheHabsburgEmpire,Hungarywasamulti-nationalstate.IndustrializationcommencedandBudapest,thecapitaloftheHungarianEmpire,boomed;itspopulationquadrupledbetween1850and1900.From1869to1910,thepopulationofthewholeoftheterritoryincreasedbyalmosthalf,reachingeighteenmillionjustbeforetheFirstWorldWar.Thesizeofethnicminoritiescreatedadditionalpoliticalcomplications.AttheoutbreakoftheFirstWorldWar,theethniccompositionoftheHungarianEmpirewasbarelyhalfHungarian.ItalsoincludedSlovaks,Romanians,Croats,Germans,Jews,gypsiesandothers.TherewereeconomicdivisionsinHungarybetweenthewell-offminorityandthepoorurbanandruralworkersandalsobetweenan

urbanbourgeoisieandthenobilitythatcontrolledmuchofthecountryside.Therewaslittlescopefortherepresentationofcompetinginterests;inkeepingwiththepracticeelsewhereinEurope,themajorityofmalesandallwomenwerenotallowedtovote.

Independence

TheendoftheFirstWorldWar,inwhichtheAustro-HungarianEmpirewasalliedwithGermany,sawthefalloftheHabsburgmonarchyandtheproclamationofanindependentrepublicbyCountMihályKárolyi,

Figure0.1aChangingmapofHungary191441

Figure0.1bHungarytoday

minister-president.However,thefirstgovernmentofthenewstatepromptlycollapsedasaconsequenceofthelossofterritorytoforeignarmies,theinfluxofrefugeestoBudapestandinflation.ACommunistregimeunderBélaKunseizedpowerinearly1919,seekingtoestablishasovietregimeorientatedtowardMoscow.Itnationalizedlandbelongingtothearistocratsandaggressivelyintimidateditsclassenemies.However,theBélaKunregimewasunabletoresisttheadvanceofRomaniantroopsonitseasternfrontandalliedpressures.InAugust1919,shortlybeforeRomaniantroopsenteredBudapest,KunfledtoMoscow.

Acounter-revolutionwaslaunchedunderAdmiralMiklósHorthy,whorepresentedthemilitaryleadershipinacoalitionofsoldiers,conservativearistocrats,theCatholichierarchyandveryright-wingnationalistsandpeasantsthatdominatedHungarianpoliticsfrom1919untilneartheendoftheSecondWorldWar.In1920AdmiralHorthywasproclaimedregent.WhentheHabsburgemperorsoughttotakepowerthefollowingyeartheattemptfailed.

Thealliedpolicyofnationalself-determinationrecognizedHungary'sstatusasanindependentstatebutalsoappliedthesameprincipletoethnicgroupsseekingindependencefromBudapest.Whendifferentnationalitiesdisputedclaimstoterritory,Hungarytendedtolose,becauseitwasamongthedefeatedpowersintheFirstWorldWar.TheresultwasasubstantialcontractionofHungarianborders.TheTreatyofTrianon,signedoutsideParisin1920,reducedthepopulationofHungaryfromeighteenmillionin1910toeightmillionin1920,andtwo-thirdsoftheterritoryofthepre-1914kingdomwascededtoothercountries.Virtuallyallthenon-Magyarterritoriesweretransferredtonewstates,suchasCzechoslovakiaandYugoslavia,ortoanenlargedRomania,whichhadfoughtonthealliedsideintheFirstWorldWar.ThesettlementleftsubstantialHungarianminoritiesinRomania,theSlovakianpartofCzechoslovakiaandintheVojvodinaintheSerbian

partofYugoslavia.Thereducedterritorywasnow90percentHungarianinitspopulation,butone-thirdofHungarianswereminoritiesinneighbouringcountriesthatgainedterritoryintheTrianontreaty(Figure0.1b).

InterwarHungarywasformallyakingdomwithoutaking,asAdmiralHorthywasthroughoutthisperioditsheadasregent.In1920anelectionwasheldwithafranchiseallowingallmalestovoteandasecretballot;theresultwasnegatedbypoliticalupheavals.Beforethe1922election,alawwasenactedabolishingthesecretballotinruralareas.Giventhelargeholdingsofafewlandownersandthenumericaldominanceofthe

countryside,thiseffectivelymadeelectionsneitherfreenorfair,eventhoughtheycontinuedtobeheldthrough1935(cf.Bachmann,1969).TheregimecontinuedinatraditioncharacterizedbyJanos(1982)asThePoliticsofBackwardness.

From1921to1931theprimeministerwasIstvánBethlen,wholedaChristiannationalmovementthatgovernedinanauthoritarianmanner;itspowerwasbasedonrurallandowners.ThegovernmentsupportedandwassupportedbytheCatholicChurch,whosemembersconstitutedtwo-thirdsofthepost-TrianonpopulationofHungary.Anti-Semiticlawswereenactedtoappeasetheradicalrightbutwerelittleenforced.Theliberalandsocialdemocraticoppositionwasmoreorlesstoleratedbutineffective.TheworlddepressionhittheagriculturalbaseoftheBethlengovernmenthard,andtheprimeministerresignedinAugust1931,succeededforayearbyasupporter,GyulaKárolyi.

In1932GyulaGömbösbecameprimeministerinaradicalright-winggovernment,thefirstinHungarianhistorynottohaveacountinthecabinet.Hisattacksontheoldconservativeordermadehimapopulist.Hewasananti-SemiteandalsoanadmirerofMussolini'scorporatiststyleofFascism;hisenemiesnicknamedhimGömbölini.Torevivetheeconomy,GömbösnegotiatedatradeagreementwithGermany.PoliticaltieswiththeThirdReichwerealsostrengthened.HediedwhileonatriptoGermanyinOctober1936.Aseriesofconservativearistocratsthenservedasprimeminister;theradicalright'sinfluenceremainedstrong.Asemi-militaryFascistgroup,theArrowCross,claimed200,000members.Thereturnofthesecretballotbeforethe1938electionincreasedtheelectoralweightofpeasantsasagainstlargelandowners,andinthe1939election,eventhoughthepartyofgovernmentclaimedasubstantialmajorityofvotesandseats,theArrowCrosswasabletobecomethesecondlargestpartyinthe260-seatParliamentwithforty-nineseats.

TheSecondWorldWarledtheHungariangovernmenttosidewiththeAxistoregainterritorieslostundertheTreatyofTrianon.Thispolicywasagreeabletobothtraditionalconservativesandradicalrightpopulists.However,thedivisionsbetweenthesegroupsmeantthatconservativestendedtoresisttheaggressiveanti-Semiticandpro-NazipressuresoftheHungarianradicalright.TheAnschlussintegratingAustriawithGermanyin1938gaveHungaryacommonborderwiththeThirdReich.FollowingtheGermanadvanceintoCzechoslovakia,HungaryregainedterritoriesinsouthernSlovakiaandRuthenia.

WhentheSecondWorldWarbrokeout,theHungariangovernmentproclaimeditwasanon-belligerent.InDecember1940,thegovernment

signedafriendshiptreatywithYugoslavia.However,GermanyinsistedonpassingthroughHungarywhenitinvadedYugoslaviainMarch,1941.Theprimeminister,CountPálTeleki,committedsuicideandHungaryjoinedthewaronGermany'sside.Bysummer1941,HungaryhadregainedhalftheterritorylostintheTreatyofTrianon,andwasapartnerwiththeAxisinthewaragainsttheSovietUnion;inDecember1941itdeclaredwarontheUnitedStates.Whenthetideofwarturned,theHungariangovernmentsoughttowithdrawfromtheAxis.Inresponse,GermantroopsofficiallyoccupiedthecountryinMarch,1944.

TheRedArmyarrives

TheSovietArmyenteredHungaryinautumn1944andbyApril1945hadoccupiedBudapest.Ageneralelection,thefirstfreeelectioneverheldinHungary,occurredon4November1945(Heinrich,1986:27).Thelargestparty,theSmallholders,alinealdescendantofpre-warright-winggroups,won57percentofthevoteandamajorityofseatsinParliament;theSocialDemocratsweresecondwith17.4percentofthevote.TheCommunistswononly17.0percentofthevote,and76ofthe415seatsinParliament.Anewconstitutionwasadoptedin1946andthe1947PeaceTreatyrestoredtheTrianonboundariesofHungarythatremaininplacetoday.

WithSoviettroopsomnipresent,theCommunistPartywasabletoputpressureonpartiesthatwerecoalitionpartnersingovernment,revisetheelectorallawandpurgethevotingregisterofalmostatenthoftheelectorate.Inthe31August1947election,thevotewasevenlydividedamongmanyparties,andtenwonseatsinParliament.TheCommunistsbecamethelargestpartywith22.0percentofthevoteandonehundredseats.ThroughtheircontroloftheMinistryoftheInterior,inearly1948theCommunistsarrestedpoliticalopponents,deposedPrimeMinisterFerencNagyandtookcontrolofthestate.In

1949HungarywasproclaimedtobeaPeople'sRepublic,anewSoviet-styleconstitutionwasadoptedandtheCommunist-dominatedIndependenceFrontwastheonlypartyallowedtocontestanelection.Subsequentelectionswerecontrolledbytheparty.In1947itslistofcandidateswonasmuchas99.7percentofthevoteonaturnoutofnearly99percent(seeBárány,1990;DessewffyandHammer,1995:Tables1and2).

DuringfourdecadesofCommunistruleofHungary,thereweresignificantchangesinpoliticaldirection.TheStalinistperiodcommencedin1949undertheleadershipofPartyGeneralSecretaryMátyásRákosi

withtheshowtrialontreasonchargesofLászlóRajk,formerministeroftheinterior.CardinalJózsefMindszenty,PrimateofHungary,wasarrestedandchargedwithtreason.Atapublictrialheconfessed,butthereweregroundstosuspecthehadbeenpsychologicallybrainwashedanddrugged;thecourtsentencedhimtolifeimprisonment.Ontheeconomicfront,thefirstfive-yearplancommencedinJanuary1950,promotingindustrializationunderstateownership.

AfterStalin'sdeathin1953thebalanceofpowerwithintheCommunistleadershipalternatedbetweenmoderatesandradicals.ImreNagybecameprimeministerin1953,butreductionofrepressioncosthimthejobandledtoexpulsionfromtheParty.RákosiregainedcontrolasPartysecretary.Khruschchev'sde-StalinizationcampaignledtoRákosibeingdeposedinJuly1956.DemonstrationsinBudapestagainstSovietdominationbeganon23October;Nagywasnamedprimeministerasaconcession.NagysoughttoassertHungary'sindependencebywithdrawingfromtheSoviet-sponsoredWarsawPact.However,MinisteroftheInteriorJánosKádárappealedtotheSovietUniontocrushtheinsurrection,andMoscowrespondedbysendingintanks.TheNagygovernmentappealedtotheUnitedNationsforaid,butitwasnotforth-coming.SoviettroopsbrutallyrepressedHungarianprotestersandtherewassubstantialstreet-fightinginBudapest.ImreNagyandotherleadingministerswereexecuted,andKádárformedanewgovernmentunderSovietprotection.

The1956HungarianrevolutionhadachasteningeffectonbothSovietforcesandHungarianopponents.HardlineCommunistsrealizedthattherewassuchathingastoomuchrepression,leadingtopopularoutbursts.OpponentsofCommunistrulerealizedthattheSovietUnionwouldnotallowtheregimetobeoverthrown,butthatitmightbepossibletoreduce,avoidorgetaroundthemostdislikedfeatures

ofCommunistrule.ThePartymadefewerdemandsonHungarians.Kádárstatedthetermsofthecompromiseintheformula,Thosewhoarenotagainstusarewithus.ElemérHankiss(1990,7;italicsinoriginal)describedtheopponentsoftheregimeashavingironicalfreedom,thatis,thefreedomoflivingoutsidethesysteminwhichtheylived,thefreedomofnotidentifyingthemselveswiththesystem.

Anearlysignofliberalizationwastheamnestyofprisonersfromthe1956revolutionin1963.Theregimesoughttopromoteeconomicgrowthbyintroducingpricesorquasi-pricesintotransactions,thuscreatingwhatwasheraldedasasocialistmarketeconomy.Inhopesofmollifyingthemassofthepeople,theeconomyalsoexpandedthe

Figure0.2GrowthrateoftheofficialHungarianeconomySources:Compiled

fromCMEAStatisticalYearbookandEconomicCommissionforEurope

productionofconsumergoods;wasdescribedasgoulashsocialism.However,therewerelimitstoliberalization.In1968theHungarianregimereaffirmeditsoppositiontoradicalreformbysendingtroopstosupporttheSovietarmy'sinvasionofCzechoslovakia.

Theinitialburstofinvestmentinthe1950shadbroughtrapidgrowthinanindustrializingeconomy,butmuchofthiswasanartefactofstartingfromaverylowbaseandaneconomybadlyrackedbywar.ThiswasacommonexperienceofcountriesinWesternaswellasCentralandEasternEurope.Inthe1960sgrowthwassustainedatarateofalmost6percentayear,andbenefitsbegantotaketheformofrisingmassconsumption(Figure0.2).Theeconomycontinuedtogrowatarateof6percentinthefirsthalfofthe1970s.

Theeconomybegantoshowvisiblesignsofslowingdowninthelatterhalfofthe1970s,adecadethatsawtwooilpriceshocks.Thegrowthratefrom1976to1980wasonly2.8percentannually,less

thanhalfthatinthetwopreviousfiveyears.Growthslowedevenmoreinthe1980s.From1986to1990theofficialeconomyactuallywentintoreverse.contractingatarateof0.5percentannually.Assubsequent

chaptersemphasize,officialstatisticsleftoutasubstantialportionofeconomicactivity.Yetsinceofficialstatisticstendtoerronthesideofover-estimatingthesuccessofthecommandeconomy,thereisnodoubtthatgoulashsocialismhadlostitssavourbytheendofthe1980s.

Beforethe1980stheHungarianregimewasliberalwithinaSoviet,butnotaWestern,frameofreference.TraveltoWesterncountrieswaspermittedfrom1961booksandideascouldcirculaterelativelyfreelyinBudapestthereafter.Theelectionlawof1983mademandatorythenominationofmorethanonecandidateforeachelectoraldistrict.ThecandidatesnominatedhadtoworkwithinthelimitationsoftheHungariansystem,butthesystemallowedarangeofopinionstobeexpressedandforvoterstocastmeaningfulvotesagainstcandidatesthattheydisliked(Bárány,1990:78ff).BeforeGorbachev'sproclamationoftheSovietUnion'sneedforopennessandrestructuring,Hungarianswerealreadypractisingwhathewastopreachthere.

TheopeningofdivisionsintheSovietUnionencouragedHungariandissenterstogopublicwithcriticismsoftheirregime,andmadeJánosKádárrespondinarelativelytolerantratherthanrepressivefashion.InSeptember1987,theHungarianDemocraticForumwasfoundedtomobilizesupportforchange.InMarch1988,theAllianceofYoungDemocratswasfoundedwitharulethatmemberscouldnotbelongtoanyotheryouthorganization,thatis,theCommunistleague.Laterintheyear,theIndependentSmallholderspartywasfounded,anamelinkingitwithinterwarpolitics.

DivisionsinthegoverningHungarianSocialistWorkersPartyemergedbetweenreformers,ledbyImrePozsgay,andhardlinerswhoopposedanychange.InMay1988JánosKádárwasdeposedfromtheleadership.Thebalanceofpowerwithinthegovernmenttipped

towardreform.InFebruary1989theCentralCommitteeacceptedtheintroductionofmulti-partydemocracy.Roundtabletalkscommencedonthedraftingofanewelectorallaw.ReformCommunistsarguedforapopularlyelectedpresidencywithexecutivepowers,believingthattheirleader,Pozsgay,wouldwin.Inareferendumon26November1989theproposalwasrejectedbyabaremajority.Bythistime,thegoverningpartyhadalreadydissolveditselfandreformedastheHungarianSocialistParty(foraccountsofthechange,seeforexampleSzoboszlai,1991;forthelongerperiod,seeTokes

*,1996).

HungarywasintheleadinformallyrejectingtheCommunistregime;amonthbeforetheBerlinWallfell,theParliamentoverwhelminglyendorsedanewconstitutionthatdeclaredinitspreamble:

TheHungarianRepublicisanindependent,democratic,law-basedstateinwhichthevaluesofbourgeoisdemocracyanddemocraticsocialismholdgoodinequalmeasure.Allpowerbelongstothepeoplewhichtheyexercisedirectlyandthroughtheelectedrepresentativesofpopularsovereignty.

InanexplicitslapatCommunistdomination,thepreambleadded,Nopartymaydirectanyorgansofstate.

Areturntodemocracy

Thefirstfreeelectionsinthenewpost-CommunistHungarywereheldon25March1990.TheresultwasaresoundingdefeatfortheSocialistParty,thereformistsuccessorofthepartyoftheoldregime,whichdissolveditselfinOctober1989.Itspartylistsecuredlessthan11percentofthevote,andunderHungary'scomplicatedelectorallawtookonlythirty-threeofthe386seatsinthenewParliament.ThewinnerwastheDemocraticForum,aconservativeparty(Figure0.3).Thecomplexelectoralsystemcombinedelementsoffirst-past-the-postandproportionalrepresentation.TheresultwasaverydisproportionaldistributionofseatsinParliamentincomparisonwithactualvotes.TheDemocraticForumwon42percentoftheseatswith25percentofthevote,whilesmallpartiessecuringintotal16percentofthevotewonlessthan3percentoftheseats.AreferendumwasheldinJuly1990todecidewhetherthepresidentshouldbedirectlyelected.Becauseonly14percentturnedouttovote,theproposalfailed.AformerdissidentÁrpádGöncz,waselectedpresident.

TheleaderoftheDemocraticForum,JózsefAntall,becameprimeministerofacoalitiongovernmentwithtwoconservativepartiesaspartners,theIndependentSmallholdersandtheChristianDemocrats.Together,thethreepartiesheld59percentoftheseatswith43percentofthevote.Theparliamentaryoppositionconsistedofamixture

ofoldCommunistsandpro-marketliberalparties.

Thenewgovernmentsoonfoundthattheslowingdownoftheeconomythathadbeguninthemid-1970s,andhadturnedintoafullfledgedrecessionbythe1980s(Figure0.2),couldnotbereversedbyelectionresults.TheliberalizationofpricesinacommandeconomywasinadequatetoprepareHungaryforamarketeconomy(cf.Kornai,1992).Theofficialeconomycontractedby12percentin1991.Bytheendof1993,theofficialeconomyhadcontractedby15percent(seeChapter11,Figure11.5).Whilethisslumpwasfarlessthanthatof

Figure0.3ElectionresultsinHungary,1990-8,voteswonbyeachparty(%)Source:Table10inChapter10,supplementedbyfirst-round

ballotofMay1998

somepost-Communistcountries,itwasenoughtocreatewidespreadpopulardissatisfaction.

By1993thenewgovernmentwasinpoliticalcrisis.Theprimeministerwaschallengedbytheparty'sultra-nationalistright,ledbyIstvánCsurka,whowasexpelledwithafewparliamentarycolleagues.Theprimeministerwasasickman,anddiedinDecember.SándorLezsáktookoveraspartyleaderandprimeminister.ButthechangesinthepartycouldnotsaveitfromdisasterintheMay1994election.TheDemocraticForum'sshareofthepopularvotedroppedto12percentanditsshareofseatsinParliamentdroppedtolessthan10percent.TheelectionwinnerwastheHungarianSocialistParty,whichhadsufficientlypurgeditselfofitsCommunistpasttosecureadmissiontothesocialdemocraticSocialistInternational.TheSocialistPartytookathirdofthevoteand,thankstothemechanicsoftheelectoralsystemanddivisionsamongitsopponents,itwonanabsolutemajorityofseatsinParliamentandGyulaHornbecameprimeminister.TheextremerightJusticeandLifePartyofCsurkawononly1.6percentofthepopularvoteandfailedtowinanyseats.

Facedwithcontinuingeconomicdifficulties,thenewSocialistgovernmentacceleratedmarketreforms,cutpublicspendinganddevaluedthecurrency.HungarygainedinternationalrecognitionforitsmovetothemarketwithitsadmissiontotheOrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),theParis-basedclubofadvancedindustrialnations.However,economicmeasurescausedsubstantialdifficultieswithinthegoverningparty,leadingtoresignationsofcabinetministers.

ThegovernmentemphasizeditsWesternorientationbyseekingmembershipinNato;inaNovember1997referendumthiswasendorsedbymorethanfive-sixthsofthosevotinginaturnoutofjustunder50percent.Theeconomystartedtogrowslowly;bytheendof1997theofficialnationalproductwaswithinfivepointsofitsstandingin1990andtheunderlyingeconomywasfarhealthier,thankstothesqueezingoutofinefficienciesintheplannedeconomy,thedevelopmentofnewmarket-orientedenterprisesandforeigninvestmentinproducingnewfactories.AndHungariansstillhadtheresourcesofunofficialeconomiestocushionthemselvesfromdifficulties.

Theessentialofdemocracyiscompetition,andthe1998parliamentaryelectionestablishedHungary'scredentialsasaworkingdemocracyforthegovernmentofthedaywasonceagainturnedoutofoffice.Thechangeinvoteswasfarlessthanthechangeinseats:theSocialistshareofthevotefellbylessthan1percentbutitlostseventy-fiveseatsanditsparliamentarymajority.TheCsurkaPartywonjustenoughvotestogainrepresentationinParliament,butmorethannine-tenthsoftheHungarianelectorateonceagainrejectedextremistparties.ThebigwinnerwasFIDESZ,initiallyapartyofyoungdemocratsrestrictingmembershiptothoseundertheageof35,butsubsequentlybroadeningitsappealafteradisastrous1994electionshowing.FIDESZwon148seatsandformedacoalitiongovernmentwiththemoreright-winginclinedIndependentPartyofSmallholdersandtheDemocraticForum.TheFIDESZleader,ViktorOrbán,becameprimeminister.AmajorpriorityofthenewgovernmentistonegotiateHungarianentryintotheEuropeanUnion.

PathDependenceandChangingPaths

Thelogicofpathdependenceissimple:whathappenstodayislargelydeterminedbywhatwasdoneyesterday.Byextension,whathappened

lastyear,adecadeago,orevenacenturyago,candeterminewhatisdonetoday,asinthetechnicallyobsoletebutstillpersistinglayoutofatypewriterkeyboard(seeDavid,1985).Takenliterally,dependenceonwhathappensyesterdaycanbetrueyetbanal:acountry'sgrossnationalproductislikelytochangebyabout0.01percentfromonedaytothenext,thedemographiccompositionofthepopulationvarieslittlefromoneyeartothenextandthegreatbulkofthelawsonthestatutebookatthebeginningofayearwereplacedthereyears,decadesorevengenerationsbefore.InasocietysuchasGreatBritain's,whichhasnotunder-

gonethetraumaoftransformationfromaCommunisttoademocraticregime,politicalinertiamaintainsmuchinplacefromonedecadetothenext,reflectingthepreferencesoftheelectorateandofcompetingparties(seeRoseandDavies,1994).

Yetitissophisticaltoassumethatbecauseeachchangeisverysmall,thesumofsmallchangesisalsosmall.Changesinthedemographiccompositionofsocietyarepredictable:foreverymemberofsocietywilldie,andoldpeoplewilldiemuchsoonerthanyounger.Therefore,demographerscandescribewithsomeprecisiontheincreaseintheratioofpensionerstotheworkingpopulationintheyear2020or2030,ortheriseintheeducationallevelofthepopulation,asyoungercohortstendtohavemoreeducationthantheoldestcohorts.Eventhoughsuchchangeshappenslowly,theircumulativeeffectcanbebig.Insomecases,thecompoundingofchangescancauseafundamentalalterationinthecompositionofsociety.

AnyreviewofHungarianpoliticalhistoryshowsthatcontinuityisthewrongwordtodescribeapaththatincludeswar,conquest,defeatandindependence.Changescannotevenbedescribedasreversalsforthatwouldimplyastableframeworkofcyclicalchange.IndependencedisappearedthroughOttomanconquest,andsubsequentlywiththeexpulsionoftheTurksandthearrivalofHabsburgrule.TheindependenceachievedaftertheFirstWorldWarwasatthepriceoflosingterritoryinwhichmillionsofHungarianslived.DefeatintheSecondWorldWarwasfollowedbytheintroductionofaCommunistregimewiththerevolutionaryintentoftransformingHungariansociety,polityandeconomy.Thecollapseofthatregimeandthecreationofanewdemocraticpoliticalsystemin198990waspartofapoliticalrevolutionthatcoveredhalfofEuropeandtheformerSovietUnion.

Ifweviewhistoryasalearningprocess,thepastremains

influentialbutitsinfluenceisambiguous,dependingonthelessonspeoplelearnfromtheirpast.TheconsequencesofflirtingwithpopulistFascismandalignmentwithHitler'sReichtaughtHungariansalessonaboutthecostsofright-wingradicalparties.The1956uprisingtaughtHungariansthattheylackedthemilitarypoweroralliestodefendthemselvesagainstSovietdemandsiftheSovietUnionwishedtocoerceHungary.TheresistanceoftheHungarianstaughtMoscowtheproblemsofusingforcetorepresssubjectstates.

Theextentofcontinuityalongapreviouslysetpathvariesfromfieldtofield.Thehighpointsoftwentieth-centuryHungarianpoliticsshowradicalpoliticalchanges,suchastheswitchfromsubjugationtoa

foreignrulertonationalindependenceortheshiftfromanauthoritarianregimetoCommunismandthentoademocraticconstitution.Whilesuchshiftsoccurinamatterofmonthsorayearortwo,everydayconditionsinHungariansociety,suchasgenderratios,birthratesordeathrates,changebylessthan1percentfromoneyear,orevenonedecade,tothenext,andwecanmonitorthemthroughcensusstatistics.Changesinvaluesandbeliefsoftenlackregularityandpredictability.Tomonitorsuchchangeswemusthavedatafromsamplesurveysofpublicopinion;theyhavebeenundertakenlongerinHungarythaninmostformerlyCommunistsocieties.SincetheeditorsofthisbookincludethreefoundersofTÁRKI,themajorsocialsciencesurveyinstituteinthecountry,useisfrequentlymadeofsurveydatatomonitorchangesinwhatpeoplethinkandwhatpeopledo.

Theideaofwhatconstitutesabigorasmallchangeisrelative,andourideasareshapedbycomparison.Thisisimplicitincomparingpastandpresent;thelongerthetimeperiod,thebiggerthechangewewouldexpecttosee.ComparisonbetweenCommunistandpost-Communistcountriesisusefultodeterminewhatmayconstituteahighorlowstandardoflivingwithinthecontextofanon-marketeconomy.Comparisonbetweennon-marketandmarketeconomiesismuchmorerisky,becauseoftheabsenceofsuchcomparatorsasprices.However,manysocialtrendscanbemonitoredacrossgreatspansoftimeandspacesincecensusstatisticstendedtobestandardizedacrossEuropewellbeforetheimpositionoftheIronCurtain.Forlong-termcomparisons,thisvolumemakesuseofcomparativedatafromcensusesofmanyEuropeancountries,andtocompareresponseinthepost-Communistera,useismadeoftheNewDemocraciesBarometer,atrendsurveyofmassresponsetotransformationbythePaulLazarsfeldSociety,Vienna.

Thechaptersthatfollowprovideconcreteexamplesofbothcontinuity

andchangewithinaregimeaswellasacrosslandmarkpoliticalupheavals.InChapter1,RudolfAndorkalooksatthemodernizationofHungariansocietysincetheendoftheSecondWorldWar.Atthattime,Hungaryhadanunderdevelopedeconomyandsociety;morethanhalfthewageearnerswereinagricultureandeducationwasverylimited.Bythebeginningofthe1970sHungarywasapproachingthestandardsofanadvancedindustrialsocietyintermsofurbanization,educationandoccupationalstructurewithagrowingmiddleclass.ThescaleofchangesencouragedsomeWesternanalyststotreatsuchchangesasevidenceoftheconvergenceofCommunistandnon-Communistsystems,exceptforproblemspeculiartothepoliticalandeconomicstructureofanon-

marketparty-state.However,Hungarianscouldnotignorethesepeculiarities,whichremainedcentraltotheirsocietyuntilthecollapseoftheregime.

Thesecondchapter,byGyörgyVukovich,takesasimilarlylong-termviewofpopulationandidentifiessocialchangesinHungarycommontomostadvancedindustrialsocieties.Thebirthratehasbeenfallingsubstantiallyfromthe1920stothe1940s,andhascontinuedtofallsince.Today,thenumberofchildrenbornislessthanthereplacementrateforthetotalpopulation.Inconsequence,theproportionofthepopulationofretirementageisincreasing,andbecauseofthedecliningbirthratesandlongerlifeexpectancy,thistrendissuretocontinueintothenextcentury.However,increasedlongevityhaswidenedinequalitiesbetweenmenandwomen.In1960thelifeexpectancyofwomenwas4.2yearsgreaterthanformen.By1996thegapinlifeexpectancyhadbecome8.1yearsbetweenHungarianwomenandmen.Moreover,thelifeexpectancyofmalesfellafterreachingapeakin1966,whilethelifeexpectancyofwomencontinuedtoriseuntil1987,andhasremainedvirtuallyconstantsince.

Religion,abasisoftraditionalloyalties,hashistoricallybeenasourceofdivisioninHungariansociety,whichhashadlargeCalvinist,LutheranandJewishminoritiesaswellasaCatholicmajority.Inpre-TrianonHungarytherewasevengreaterreligiousdiversity,withafifthofthethenpopulationOrthodox,Jewish,Moslemorotherreligions.Theanalysisoflong-termtrendsinreligiousdenominationandreligiouscommitmentbyMiklósTomkaandIstvánHarcsainChapter3showsthattheproportionofnominalCatholicshasremainedatabouttwo-thirdsoftheHungarianpopulationsincethe1940s,andtheLutheranminorityhasbeenmorestableinsizethantheCalvinists.However,thestrengthofreligionvarieswiththemethodofmeasurement:bymanycriteria,halforlessoftheHungarianpopulationtodayisreligiousorregularchurchgoers.Thisistrueof

manydenominationsandthistrendisalsofoundinnon-CommunistcountriesinCentralEurope.

ThetransformationofHungaryfromaCommunisttoapost-Communistsocietywasofmajorpoliticalsignificance,butitwasnot,andwasnotintendedtobe,asocialrevolutionorcounter-revolution.Thechangehasbeenmostdramaticintheeconomy,forthecollapseoftheMarxisteconomicsystemhasmeanttherapidexpansionofemploymentintheprivatesector,withallthatmayportendforeconomicgrowth,changesinsocialstatusandinpoliticalattitudes.Nonetheless,KolosiandSikdemonstrateinChapter4thatthechangeislessabreak

withthepastthanmightbeexpected,giventheimportanceofhiddenorshadoweconomiesinthedaysofthenominallystate-controlledeconomy.Theseeconomieswereaccountingforafifthormoreofthenationalproductbeforetheoldsystemcollapsed.

Aclassicsociologicalmethodfortracingchangeandcontinuityistoexaminethecareersofthenewelite.InChapter5GyörgyLengyelexaminestheHungarianeconomicelitetoday.TherehasbeensubstantialchangeinthepersonnelandsocialbackgroundsofindividualsinleadingpositionsoftheHungarianeconomy.Yetin1993,withananti-Communistconservativegovernmentinpower,thechangeswerefarfromcomplete.Ofthoseholdingtopjobsinstateenterprises,68percenthadbeentherepriortotheregimechange,andinbankingandtheministriesmorethanhalfweretherebefore1989.

Thetransformationhasbroughtcostsaswellasbenefits,affectingthesocialpsychologyofthemiddlestrata,asZoltánFábiánpointsoutinChapter6.TheevolutionofHungariansocietyhasfollowedapatternfamiliartoWesternsociologists.Eventhoughcapitalistsintheconventionalmarketeconomysensedidnotexistunderthecommandeconomy,managerialpowerandpartypowerdid.Moreover,thehiddeneconomyofferedscopeforindividualstobetterthemselves.Withamultiplicityofmiddlingclasses,Hungariansocietywasthereforewellplacedtorespondtoashifttoamoremarket-orientedeconomy.

Thecomplexityofamodernsociety,whethernominallysocialistornominallycapitalist,inevitablybringswithitdifferentiation,andthisleadstoinequalitiestoo.ThiswastrueofHungaryunderCommunistrule,andalsosince1989,asPéterRóbertshowsinChapter7.Insociologicalterms,inequalitiesarenotsomuchamatterofincomeasofoccupationalclassandsocialstatus.Róbertshowsthatthecorrelationsbetweendifferentobjectiveandsubjectivemeasuresof

socialstatusarelimited,thusmakinganindividual'srelativepositiononmeasuresofinequalityvaryfrommeasuretomeasure.ThisisconfirmedbyevidencefromtheHungarianHouseholdPanelwhichshowsthatasubstantialminorityofthepopulationdoesnotmaintainaconsistentclassidentificationfromyeartoyear.

Theoldcommandeconomyhadnotabolishedpoverty;uptoapoint,ithadmademoneylessimportantasasourceofprivilegethanotherthings,suchaspositionintheCommunistnómenklatúra.Italsocollectivizedtheprovisionofwelfare,providingasafetynetforeveryoneandguaranteeingajob,butalsorunningtheeconomyinsuchawaythattheaveragecitizenwaspoorcomparedtotheaveragecitizeninamarket

economysuchasAustriaorItaly.Yetwhatevertheaveragestandardofliving,therewillalwaysbeagroupclusteredatthebottomthatcanbedescribedaslivinginpoverty.InChapter8IstvánGyörgyTóthanalysestheproblematicnatureofdefiningpovertyinHungary,andthenpresentsevidenceofwhathasbeenhappeningsincetheeconomictransformation.Thisshowsthatthoseinpovertytodayformaboutone-sixthtoone-fifthoftheHungarianpopulation.However,somegroupshaveamuchhigherincidenceofpoverty:forexample,loneparents,theunemployedand,aboveall,gypsies;povertyisleastinBudapest.Theincidenceofpovertyandincomeinequalityisoffsettosomeextentbycash-transferprogrammes,fortheendoftheCommunistsystemdidnotmeantheabolitionofpensions,children'sallowancesandotherformsofstateassistance.

TheemphasisonmaterialismiscommoninbothMarxistandmarketeconomies.Yettheextenttowhichanindividualissatisfiedordissatisfiedwithlifeisapsychologicalstateofmind,andthisisevenmoretrueoftheextentofsocialexclusionintegrationoralienation.InChapter9RudolfAndorkamarshallspublicopiniondatatoshowtheextenttowhichHungariansdoordonotfeelsatisfiedwithlife.Attheinterpersonallevel,thereisahighdegreeofsatisfactionwithfamilyandworkandhealth,butthissatisfactionco-existswithahighlevelofmaterialisticdissatisfactionwithincome.

FreeandfairelectionsgiveHungarians,liketheirWestEuropeancounterparts,achancetoregistertheirapprovalordisapprovalofgovernment.In1990Hungariansvotedthepartycreatedbyex-Communistsoutofoffice;in1994theyvotedex-Communistsbackintoofficeandoutagainin1998,apatterncommoninCentralandEasternEurope.Yetademocraticelectionnecessarilyrevealsdivisionsamongtheelectorate.InChapter10GáborTókaexamineswhataccountsfordifferencesinthepartypreferencesofHungarianssocialstructureinfluencessuchasage,classandeducation

orpoliticalattitudesandhowelectoraldivisionsinHungarycomparewithelectoralbehaviourintheCzechRepublic,SlovakiaandPoland.

Todeterminetheextentofchangeinthepasthalf-centuryinsuchfundamentalsofsocialconditionsashealth,education,employmentandlifeexpectancy,theconcludingchapterbyRichardRosecomparescensusdataaboutHungaryandneighbouringnationsinCentralEurope,includingAustriaandGermany,withwhichHungaryhashadfarclosertiesoverthecenturiesthanwithRussia.ItassessestheextenttowhichcurrentconditionsofHungariansocietyarenormalwhenjudgedbytwo

verydifferentstandards:comparisonwithneighbouringsocialmarketdemocraciesasagainstneighbouringex-Communistsocieties.ItalsousessurveydatafromtheNewDemocraciesBarometer,across-nationalsurveyofpublicopinioninpost-Communistcountries,toassesstheextenttowhichHungariansarenostalgicforthepastinviewofeconomicdifficulties,ordeterminednottogobacktoanundemocraticformofgovernmentbecausetheyarepositiveaboutgainsinfreedom(Roseetal.,1998).

References

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Bachmann,Gerhard,1969.Ungarn.InDolfSternbergerandBernhardVogel,eds,DieWahlderParlamente.Berlin:WalterdeGruyter,vol.2.,1365-405.

Bárány,ZoltánD.,1990.ElectionsinHungary.InRobertK.Furtak,ed.,ElectionsinSocialistStates.HemelHempstead:Wheatsheaf,7197.

David,PaulA.,1985.ClioandtheEconomicsofQWERTY,AmericanEconomicReview,75,1,332-7.

Dessewffy,TiborandHammer,Ferenc,1995.TheTransitioninHungary.InG.Tóka,ed.,The1990ElectiontotheHungarianNationalAssembly.Berlin:Sigma,1131.

Hankiss,Elemér,1990.EastEuropeanAlternatives.Oxford:ClarendonPress.

Heinrich,Hans-George,1986.Hungary:Politics,EconomicsandSociety.London:FrancesPinter.

Janos,AndrewC.,1982.ThePoliticsofBackwardnessinHungary,18251945.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Kornai,János,1992.TheSocialistSystem:thePoliticalEconomyofCommunism.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Rose,Richard,Mishler,WilliamandHaerpfer,Christian,1998.DemocracyandItsAlternatives:UnderstandingPost-CommunistSocieties.Cambridge:PolityPressandBaltimore:JohnsHopkinsPress.

Rose,RichardandDavies,PhillipL.,1994.InheritanceinPublicPolicy:ChangewithoutChoiceinBritain.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Szoboszlai,György,ed.,1991.DemocracyandPoliticalTransformation.Budapest:HungarianPoliticalScienceAssociation.

Tóka,Gábor,ed.,1995.The1990ElectiontotheHungarianNationalAssembly.Berlin:Sigma.

*,RudolfL.,1996.Hungary'sNegotiatedRevolution:EconomicReforms,SocialChangeandPoliticalSuccession:19571990.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Chapter1Long-TermModernizationofHungarianSocietyRudolfAndorkaandIstvánHarcsa

THEhistoryofHungaryoverthelasttwocenturiescanbeinterpretedasaseriesofattemptsatmodernizationandcatchingupwithmoreadvancedWesternsocietiesinordertobreakoutfromasemi-peripheralposition(Janos,1982).Theseattemptsweremoreorlessfailuresandsometimesendedincatastrophe.Thereformperiodof182549endedinthedefeatoftheHungarianwarofindependence,thedualmonarchyendedintheFirstWorldWarandtheinterwarperiodendedinthedevastationoftheSecondWorldWar.

TheCommunistor,accordingtotheself-definitionoftherulingelite,socialistperiodmightalsobeinterpretedasanattemptatmodernization.TherulingpartyelitebaseditslegitimationincreasinglyontheclaimthatitcouldachieveahigherrateofeconomicgrowthandthatHungarywouldsoonerorlatercatchupwiththemoreadvancedcapitalistsocietiesoftheWest.Ineconomictermsthisclaimwasfalsified,sinceby1990HungarywasfartherbehindthecountriesofWesternEuropethanbeforetheSecondWorldWar(Ehrlich,1991;Bekker,1994).

The1989changeswererevolutionaryinthesenseofcreatingmajorandrapidchangesinbotheconomicandpoliticalstructuresandinstitutions(Dahrendorf,1990).Changeintheeconomicsphereconsistedofamovefromamoreorlesscentrallyplannedeconomybasedonthepredominanceofstateownershipofproductiveassetstoamarketeconomywiththeprivatesectorcontrollingmorethan50percentofproductiveassets.Changeinthepoliticalsystemresultedinamovefromaone-partydictatorshipthatwasinitiallytotalitarian

whichlatersoftenedintoanauthoritariansystemandthentoamulti-partyparliamentarydemocracy,wheretheoppositionin1990andin1994wasabletowinan

electionandformanewgovernment,inaccordwiththerotationofleadersinademocracy.Thesystemtransformationisprovingtobemoredifficultandlongerthanexpected.Hungaryisgoingthroughaseriouseconomicdepression.Thisdepressionmightbeinterpretedasaconsequenceofthenecessarycreativedestructionofoldstructures(Kornai,1993).MorepessimisticevaluationspredictthepossibilityofHungaryfallingbackintoaperipheralsituationintheworldeconomyandspeakaboutBalkanizationorLatinamericanizationofHungary.

ThesocialindicatorspresentedinthischapterprovidethebasistoanalyseinwhatsenseandhowmuchHungariansocietyhasbeenmodernizedsince1945.Theresearchhasbeencarriedoutsincethemid-1970sinHungaryandthefirsttime-seriescompendiumofsocialindicatorswaspublishedinHungarianin1986andinEnglishin1988(AndorkaandHarcsa,1990).Since1990socialreportsinHungarianarepublishedattwo-yearintervalsandtheSocialReport1990wastranslatedintoEnglish(Andorkaetal.,1992).ThepresentanalysisisbasedontheSocialReportpublishedinHungarianin1994.Thesocialindicatorsencompassingthefirstfourpost-transitionyearsevaluatechangeandpersistenceinordertojudgewhetherHungaryhasstartedasuccessfulmodernizationorismovingtowardperipheralizationandlong-lastingbackwardness.

ModernizationTheoryandPeriodsofDevelopment

Modernizationtheoryisconsideredthemostappropriatetheoreticalframeworkfortheanalysisoftime-seriesofsocialindicators.Modernityisheredefinedasconsistingoffourinterrelatedaspectsofsociety:themarket,awelfaresystem,ademocraticpartysystemandamodernmentality(Zapf,1994).Thesocialindicatorsusedtomeasuretheseaspectsarethenumericalstrengthofthemiddlestrata,populationandfertilitymeasures,formaleducationalattainmentindicators,incomeandincomeinequalitymeasures,mass

consumption,healthstatusandlifeexpectancyofthepopulationandleisuretime.

Thesystemchangein1989wasabreakpoint,separatingtwoentirelydifferentperiods.Themulti-partyparliamentaryelectioninspring1990introducedpoliticaldemocracyandmovementtowardthemarketeconomy.Themajorcauseofthesystemchangewasthatthepublic,professionalsinfluencingpublicopinion,thegovernmentandtheopposi-

tionincreasinglyrecognizedthatthesocialistmarketeconomycouldnotfunctionefficientlyandthatmanagersofthestate-ownedenterpriseswouldneverbehavelikeprivateentrepreneursinamarketeconomy.Theydevelopedtheviewthatthestate-ownedenterpriseshadtobeprivatized,butthatitwasimpossibletoimplementmassprivatizationundertheruleofoneparty,interestedinmaintainingitsdominanceintheeconomyviaownershipofthemajorproductiveenterprises(Kornai,1992).Itwasalsorecognizedthatmarket-orientedreformsandprivatizationofstate-ownedenterpriseswasnotsufficient.Inadditionthepoliticalsystemalsohadtobechanged.Thestructuralandinstitutionalchangessince1989arebasedonawidespreadconsensusconcerningthegoalofamarketeconomybasedonprivateownershipandpoliticaldemocracy.

However,theCommunistperiodfrom1945tospring1990shouldnotbetreatedasuniform.NorwastherealineardevelopmentfromthedeathofStalinin1953tothecollapseofthesystemin1989.SubperiodscanbedistinguishedthatdiffernotonlyinthecharacteristicsofthemacroeconomicandpoliticalsystemsbutalsointheeverydaylivesofordinarycitizensduringCommunisttimes.

Thefirstperiod,1945to1947,representedtheliberationofthecountryfromGermanoccupationandtheonsetofSovietoccupation.ForsomewhatmorethantwoyearssomeformaldemocracywastoleratedbytheSovietUnion.Theparliamentaryelectionof1945wasfreeandresultedinanabsolutemajorityfortheSmallholder(Peasant)Party,whichformedacoalitionwithotherparties,includingtheCommunistParty.TheparliamentaryelectionofAugust1947wasstillamulti-partyelection,buttheCommunistPartycommittedseriousfrauds.Nevertheless,theCommunistswereonlyabletoobtain22percentofthevote.Soonafter,theCommunistseliminatedsomeoppositionpartiesfromParliamentandabsorbedothersinaCommunistfronttobetheunchallengedrulersofthecountry.

Thesecondperiod,1947tothemid-1960s,wasthetotalitarianperiod.AsmallpowerelitebelongingtotheCommunistPartycompletelydominatedthepoliticalandeconomicsystem.Notonlywaspublicoppositionsuppressed,buttheprivateexpressionofcriticalviewswasseverelypunished.Falsecriminalchargesandtrialswereconductedagainstpoliticiansandordinarycitizenswhowereconsideredbythepowerelitetobepotentialopponents.Themostimportantenterprisesweretakenoverbythestateandthecollectivizationofagriculturebegan.Bymeansofacommandeconomyarapidindustrializationprocesswasinitiatedbysettingverydetailedplansforeveryproductiveunit.This

processwasorientatedtowardheavyindustry,eventhoughthecountrydidnotpossessthenecessaryrawmaterials,coalandironore.Thislatercausedsevereeconomicproblems,asHungarianheavyindustrywasandstillisnotcompetitiveontheworldmarket.Thetrendtowardgrowingtotalitarianismwasbrokentwice.AfterthedeathofStalintheSovietleadershiporderedImreNagytobeprimeministerandunderhisleadershipoftwenty-twomonthstheworstfeaturesoftotalitarianruleweresomewhatrelaxed.FromJuly1955theformerCommunistpowerelitetriedtoreinstatetotalitarianruleandthisledtotheuprisingof1956.Duringitstwelvedaysthefirststepstowardamulti-partydemocracyweretaken.ThesecondinvasionofBudapestbytheSovietarmy,however,reinstatedthetotalitariansystem,althoughwithachangedCommunistleadership.Severeoppressioncontinuedtill1963.

Thethirdperiod,fromthemid-1960stothesecondhalfofthe1970s,wasatimeoftentativeliberalization.Thestartofthisperiodmightbesetin1963,theyearofthepoliticalamnesty,whenthemajorityofpoliticalprisonerswereliberated;in1966,whentheCentralCommitteeofthePartydecidedtointroducemarket-orientedreforms;orin1968,whenthereformswereimplemented.Thesepoliticaldecisionsresultedfromarecognitionbythepowerelitethatthetotalitariansystemandthecommandeconomyfailedtoworkefficientlyandanewuprising,similarto1956,mightoccur.Therefore,thepowereliteintroducedanumberofliberalizingmeasures.Fewerpersonswereimprisonedforpoliticalopposition,falsechargeswererarelymade,politicalconformitywasdemandedonlyinpublicandcitizenswerepermittedtotraveltoWesterncountries.SomeWesternculturalgoodswereimported,andinartandliteraturethefamouscategorizationofsupported,toleratedandprohibitedworkswasmodifiedsothatstrictlyMarxistandsocialistworksweresometimesclassifiedastolerated.Theso-calledeconomic

mechanismreformstriedtoimplementasocialistmarketeconomyinwhichthestate-ownedenterpriseswouldoperateinamannersimilartoprivateenterprisesinacapitalistsystem.Animportantandsomewhatunintendedby-productofthesereformswasthedevelopmentofasmall-scaleprivateeconomy,mostlyintheformofsecondjobs,thatis,income-supplementingactivitiesafterregularworkinthefirsteconomy.

Thefourthandfinalperiodfromthesecondhalfofthe1970sto1989wasaperiodofstagnation,ultimatelyendinginthecollapseof1989.Duringthisperiodthepowereliteattemptedtostopthepoliticalliberalizationandmarket-orientedreformsthathadbeenintroduced.Theeconomyalmoststagnatedandonthesurfaceone-partyrulewas

strengthened,whilebeneaththesurfaceoppositiontotheregimewasincreasingandbeginningtobeorganized.AnincreasingnumberoftheSocialistPartyleadersseemtohaverecognizedthatthisstagnationmightleadtoaviolentbreakdownofthesystem.Thestartingdatemightbesetattheoilcrisisof1973andthechangesthatfollowedintheworldeconomy,towhichthestate-ownedHungarianenterpriseswereunabletoadapt.Oritcouldbeseenas1974,whentherewasSovietpressuretostopthemarket-orientedreformsandtwoproponentsofthereforms.R.NyersandL.Fehér,wereremoved.Oritcouldbeseenasdatingfrom1978,whenrealwageswereindexedtoalevelneverachievedsince.Althoughthedecisivechangeshappenedbefore1975,theleadershipwasabletoaverttheirconsequencesbyforeignborrowing.Thispolicy,however,wasstoppedin1978,whentheHungarianeconomyhadseveredifficultiesinservicingitsforeigndebt.From1978thepowerelitemuddledthrough,oscillatingbetweenthereintroductionofoppressivemeasuresandreinforcingelementsofthecommandeconomyontheonehand,andgivingliberalizingpalliativestothepopulationandtoleratingthespreadofthesecondeconomyontheother.

SocialStructure

Intheimmediatepost-waryearsHungaryhadanunderdevelopedeconomyandsociety:54percentoftheemployedpopulationwereinagricultureandlessthan10percenthadnon-manualjobsandjustoverafifthwereinindustryorconstruction(Table1.1).Theenforcedsocialistindustrializationofthe1950sgreatlyincreasedthenumberemployedinindustry,butbytheendofthedecadealmosttwo-fifthsstillremainedinagriculture.Industrializationalsoresultedinthegrowthofnon-skilledworkers,whocamefromagricultureandfromthevillages.Thepoliticallyinspiredrepressionofself-employmentreducedtheproportionofartisansandmerchantsinthesociety.In

agriculturethecollectivizationprocesswasbegunbutnotyetfullyaccomplished.

Inthe1960sandthefirsthalfofthe1970sHungaryslowlyapproachedsomefeaturesofindustrialeconomies:increasingnumbersofprofessionalandskilledworkersandadiminishingnumberofagriculturalworkers.Therewere,however,trendswhichclearlydifferedfrommoderneconomies.Themoststrikingwasthealmostcompletedisappearanceoftheself-employed,especiallyinagriculture.Independentpeasantsmallholderswerevirtuallyeliminatedfromtheeconomyandthe

Table1.1:Socialstructure,194993(%)Occupationalstatus 1949 19601970 1980 1990 1993 ChangeManagersandprofessionals 1.8 3.0 5.1 7.8 11.0 16.1 14.3Clericals 8.0 13.7 20.7 22.5 22.4 22.9 14.9Artisians,merchants 8.1 2.4 1.6 1.5 4.2 7.2 -0.9Skilledworkers 11.2 15.5 19.5 23.2 25.7 27.1 15.9Semi-andunskilledworkers 17.3 27.1 29.6 28.5 24.017.8 0.5Self-employedpeasants 46.7 19.9 1.6 0.6 1.1 3.3 -43.4Agriculturalworkers 6.9 18.4 21.9 15.8 11.6 5.6 -1.3(Total) (100) 100)(100)(100)(100)(100)Non-manual 9.5 17.2 24.5 30.5 33.4 39.0 29.5Employed,industryandconstruction 21.6 34 43.7 42.1 38.1 31.0 9.4Employedinagriculture 53.8 38.4 24.7 18.6 12.7 8.9 -44.9Self-employed 55 22.3 3.4 2.8 5.3 10.5 -44.5

numberofagriculturalworkersemployedonstatefarmsgreatlyincreased.Self-employedartisansandmerchantswerealsoalmostcompletelyeliminated.

Inthe1980s,andparticularlyinthesecondhalfofthe1980s,theHungariansocialstructurebegantomovetowardthatoftheadvancedWesternsocieties.Theshareofself-employedartisans,merchantsandpeasantsbegantoincrease,employmentinindustryandconstructionbegantodiminishandemploymentinnon-manualjobsincreasedtoathirdofthelabourforce.By1990thenumberofskilledmanualworkersoutnumberedsemi-skilledandnon-skilledworkers.

Since1990changesseemtohavegatheredmomentumwiththeradicalchangeinthestructureoftheeconomy.Theproportionofmanagersandprofessionalsincreasedbyalmosthalfinthreeyears,anddoubledinlittlemorethanadecade.Theproportionofself-employedhasdoubledinthreeyears,andthenumberofskilledworkersisrisingwhilethatofnon-skilledworkersisfalling.Thus,the

occupationalorsocialstructureofHungariansocietyisheadingtowardamoderncapitalistsociety.

Changesatthetopofthesocialhierarchycannotbegaugedfromtheseindicators,buttheyarealsoveryimportant.Insteadofasmallbutpowerfulpoliticalelitebeingatthetop,in1994theeliteseemstobe

muchmorenumerousandratherheterogeneous.Thiseliteconsistsofapolitical,aneconomicandaculturalelitethatmoreorlesscounterbalanceeachother.AconsequenceofthepluralistelitestructureisthatnoneisnearlyaspowerfulastheeliteoftheCommunistperiod(KonrádandSzelényi,1991).

ItmightbequestionedwhethersocialstrataorclassesareappropriateindicatorsofthesocialstructuresincetheCommuniststatedefineditselfasaclasslesssociety.Thedataonthepercapitaincomelevelsindicatethattherewereimportantandconsistentdifferencesbetweenthesestrata,andtheyweresimilartotheincomedifferencesincapitalistsocieties,includingScandinaviancountries.AnalysisofsocialmobilityhasshownthattherelativemobilityopportunitiestheopennessoftheHungariansocietyintermsofmobilityweremoreorlesssimilartotheopennessofWesternsocieties(EriksonandGoldthorpe,1992).Thisopennessseemstohaveincreasedfromtheinter-warperiodtothe1960s,butdeclinedslightlyfromthe1960stothe1990s(Andorka,1990).

PopulationandFamily

ThemostremarkablefeatureofthepopulationprocessesinHungaryistheearlydeclineinfertilitytobelowthereplacementlevelbytheendofthe1950s;by1958thenetreproductionratefellbelow1.00.AsimilardeclinedidnotoccurinWesternEuropetillaround1970to1975.Sincethefirsthalfofthe1960s,theleveloffertilitycalculatedfromyearlydatashowssomeoscillations,butoverlongerperiodsthecohortfertilityratesdemonstrateremarkablestabilityat1.851.90childrenperwoman.Thisnetcohortreproductionrateofabout0.9is10percentlowerthantherateneededforsimplereplacement(Table1.2).Afterthesystemtransformation,theleveloffertilityhasnotnoticeablydeclinedalthoughtherehavebeensignificantdeclinesinfertilityduringthesameperiodinsomeotherformerCommunist

countries,forexampleEastGermany.

Themostvisibleconsequenceofthelowfertilityrateisthedeclineofthetotalpopulationsizesince1981.Thehighrateofmortalityiscertainlyacontributingfactor,butevenasignificantreductioninmortalitycouldnotpreventafallinpopulation.Asecondaryfactorinpopulationdeclinewasanetoutflowofemigrants,rangingbetween19,000and33,000intheCommunistperiod.

Marriagehasbeentraditionallyyoungandalmostuniversalin

Table1.2:Populationandfamily,194893

YearPopulation(1,000)

Naturalgrowthrate(%)

Netcohortreproductionrate

Illegitimacyrate(%)

Divorce(per1,000marriages)

1948 9.119 9.4 __ 8.2 5.31953 9.545 9.9 1.202 __ __1958 9.850 6.1 0.973 __ __1963 10.074 3.2 0.819 __ 7.11968 10.244 3.9 0.952 __ 7.91973 10.410 3.2 0.906 5.9 9.21978 10.464 2.7 0.979 5.5 9.81983 10.671 -2.0 0.837 8.3 10.71988 10.464 -1.5 0.852 11.5 9.11993 10.310 -3.2 0.804 17.6 9.2Change 1.191 -12.6 -0.398 9.4 3.9

Hungary,withwomenmarryingaround21-3yearsofage.TheageofmarriagedeclinedslightlyduringtheCommunistperiod;itwas22.8yearsin1948,21.5yearsin1988andthen21.7yearsin1993.Thepercentofnever-marryingwomenincreasedduringandjustaftertheSecondWorldWarbutfromthispointongenerallydeclineduntilthesystemchange.Fromthesecondhalfofthe1980sthemarriageratebegantodeclineandtheageofmarriagehasbeguntorisetowardtheWestEuropeanaverage.ThedivorceraterosesignificantlyinthefirstdecadesaftertheSecondWorldWarbuthasfallenslightlysincetheearly1980s,astherateofmarriagehasalsofallen,suggestinganincreaseincohabitationwithoutmarriageordivorce.

Traditionally,mostadultHungarianshavelivedinfamiliesandwhilemosthouseholdsconsistedofanuclearfamily,asignificantminoritycontainedpersonsnotbelongingtothefamilynucleus(forexample,awidowedparentaswell)andinsomecasestwonuclearfamilieslivedtemporarilyinthesamehousehold(mostlymarriedparentsandoneof

theirmarriedchildren)beforeeachcouldobtainadwellingoftheirown.However,bythe1970stheproportionofmulti-generationalfamilieshadbecomesmall.Whilethenuclearfamilyhouseholdremainsthenorm,thesizeoffamilieshasshownasubstantialdecline;in1949theaveragefamilyhad3.39members;by1984ithadfallento2.92members,whereitappearstohavestabilized.Thelowfertilityratemeansfamilieswithfourormorechildrenhavefallenfromnearlyatenthin1949tojustabove1percenttoday.Theproportionofhouseholdswithonlyasingle

memberhasrisenfromoneinsevenin1960toalmostoneinfourtoday(AppendixTable1.1).

Theproportionoffamilieswithchildrenandasingleparentwashighimmediatelyafterthewarbecauseofdeathsofmeninmilitaryservice,butthenfellto10percentin1970.Sincethenithasrisento15percent,duetoatreblingintherateofillegitimatebirthssince1978andtherateofremarriageofdivorcedwomenfallingbymorethanhalfinthesameperiod.

Education

Thestockofeducationinasocietyrepresentsthecumulativeeffectsofinstitutionalchangesintroducedovermorethanhalfacentury:today,elderlyHungarianshavebeeneducatedinthesystemasitprevailedbeforetheCommunisttakeover,andatthetimeoftheCommunisttakeover,olderHungarianshadbeeneducatedintheHabsburgsystem.In1920,barelyoneintenHungarianadultshadhadasmanyaseightyearsofelementaryeducation,andlessthanoneintwentyhadhadeitherasecondaryortertiarydiploma.Educationallevelsrosealittleinthe1920sand1930s,butthedisruptionoftheSecondWorldWarresultedintheoveralllevelofeducationintheadultpopulationremainingmuchthesamein1949.TheHungarianpopulationasawholehasonlybecomeeducated(asdistinctfromhavingbasicliteracy)inthepost-warera(Figure1.1).

Figure1.1Stockofeducation,192090

Modernizationofeducationinthepopulationasawholeisachievedbyincreasingthepercentageofchildrenandyoungpeoplewhoentersuccessivehigherlevelsofeducation,thusproducingaflowofmoreeducatedyoungpeopleintotheadultlabourforce.JustbeforetheFirstWorldWaronlyoneinsixofyoungHungarianshadeightyearsofelementaryeducation,andbythestartoftheSecondWorldWar,theproportionwasaboutoneinfour.Inthepost-warera,eightyearsofelementaryeducationhaseffectivelybeendeliveredtoalmostallchildren,andtheproportioninkindergartensrosefrom23percentin1950to96percentin1989,fallingslightlyto87percentin1993.

EnrolmentinsecondaryschoolswasveryselectivebeforetheCommunistperiod,andcoverageofsecondaryeducationwasincompleteintheCommunistera.In1960,75percentofyoungpeoplewentontosecondaryschoolafterfinishingprimaryschool,andone-quarterdidnot.By1980theproportiongoingtosecondaryschoolreached93percent,andhasremainedatthatlevelsince.Abouthalfinsecondaryeducationattendthree-yearvocationallyorientedschoolsforskilledworkers.Whiletheseschoolsgivetrainingfortheworldofwork,theydonotguaranteeajobandrestrictthepossibilityforfurtherstudy.About35to40percentofyoungpersonsstudyinfour-yearsecondaryschools,eithergymnasiaorspecialsecondaryschools.Successfullycompletionthereisanecessaryqualificationtocontinuestudyingatuniversityorafurthereducationcollege(Table1.3).

Table1.3:195593Thosecompletingeducation,(%)ofpopulationofrelevantage

secondaryYear primary

schoolskilledworker

gymnasium specialteritary

1955 66.5 __ __ __ __1960 79.8 23.0 11.2 5.9 3.2

1965 90.4 29.2 19.7 9.5 5.81970 90.4 38.5 14.4 11.5 7.41975 90.8 36.6 13.1 12.8 8.01980 92.2 37.7 15.1 17.5 9.61985 __ __ __ __ __1989 95.6 34.8 16.6 17.3 11.91990 91.0 34.0 36.5 11.21991 91.2 33.0 36.2 11.41992 93.5 37.4 47.0 11.31993 94.5 34.8 44.1 11.3

Table1.4:Increasedgenderequalityineducation,192090Male/femaleinequality

Year atsecondarydiplomalevel attertiarydiplomalevel1920 4.27 13.001930 3.68 12.501941 4.64 7.671949 2.15 6.001960 1.80 3.601970 1.31 2.361980 1.08 1.881984 1.00 1.491990 0.96 1.36Change -3.31 -11.64

IntheCommunistera,thePlanningBureauimposedstrictquotasonthenumberenteringtertiaryinstitutions.Yettertiaryenrolmentsincreasedinthepost-waryearsunderthesloganofdemocratizationofhighereducation.By1960,30percentwithasecondaryschoolqualificationwereenteringhighereducation,andtheproportionroseto39percentby1980.However,sincemanygraduateswereunabletofindwork,stricterquotaswereimplementedinordertodecreaseenrolmentintertiaryeducation;itfellto36percentby1985.SinceonlyaminorityofyoungHungarianshaveattendedacademicsecondaryschoolsandonlyaminorityoftheseentertertiaryeducation,theresultisthattheproportionofgraduatestendstobelowerinHungarythaninmostWesternsocieties.

Increasededucationhasalsobroughtaboutagreatreductioningenderinequalities.In1920youngmalesweremorethanfourtimesaslikelyasyoungwomentoachieveasecondaryschooldiploma,andthirteentimesmorelikelytogainatertiaryqualification.Theinequalityintertiaryeducationfellsubstantiallyinthenexttwodecades,butnotatthesecondarylevel.AtthestartoftheCommunisteramen

outnumberedwomenwithsecondarydiplomasbymorethantwotoone,andbymorethansixtooneatthetertiarylevel.By1990womenwereslightlymorelikelytohaveasecondarydiploma,andtheratioofmentowomenamongcollegegraduateswasoftheorderoffourtothree(Table1.4)ofyoungmales.Therehasbeenagenderrevolutionineducation.

Employment

Thepotentiallabourforcehasgrowngreatlyinthepost-warera,asthenumberofchildreninthepopulationhasdeclined,fewadultsdiebeforeretirementage,educationhasmademorepeopleemployableandwomenhaveincreasedtheirparticipationinthelabourforce.Inthepost-warera,themostdramaticchangehasbeeninthegenderratioofparticipantsinthelabourforce.In1949,menoutnumberedwomeninthelabourforcebymorethantwoandonetoone;by1990thegenderratiowas1.15mentoeachemployedwoman(Table1.5).

Asecondmajorstructuralchangehasbeenthedecreaseinthenumberofolderpeopleinthelabourforceaspensionshavemaderetirementeconomicallyfeasible.In1949morethantwoinfiveofthepopulationover60wereemployed;fourdecadeslaterbarelytwoinonehundredwereworking,astheageofdrawingapensionwaslowered,especiallyforwomen.

ZerounemploymentwasanimportantlegitimatingclaimoftheCommunistsystem.Duringthewholeperiodnoopenunemploymentexisted,albeitcontrolledwagesandmismanagementofworkersgeneratedunderemploymentanddissatisfaction,asinthesaying:Theypretendtopayusandwepretendtowork.Theconsequenceofthesocalledsoftbudgetaryconstraint(Kornai,1980)wasthatenterprisesandgovernmentinstitutionsemployedmorepersonsthannecessary.Althoughsecondaryeducationprovidedamoreskilledlabourforce,italsodelayedentryintoemployment,asfeweryouthsstartedworkat15.Throughouttheperiodtherewasacontinuousshortageoflabourandallpotentiallabourreserveswereabsorbedbytheeconomy;thisalsoencouragedmobilizingwomeninpaidemployment.

Afterthesystemchange,unemploymentsuddenlyappeared,reaching

13.2percentin1993,butdecliningto10.9percentattheendof1994.Thedeclineinthenumberofemployedpersonswas,however,muchhigherthanthenumberofunemployed.From1990to1994thenumberofemployedpersonsdeclinedby1.4million,25percent,whilethenumberoftheunemployedaccountedforlessthanhalfofthisdecline.Theremainingpartofthedeclineinemploymentcanbeaccountedforbythegrowthinthenumberofpensioners,partlythroughearlyretirement,andbysomegrowthinthenumberofdependenthousewives.

Table1.5:Employmentbygender,194990Malepopulationaged1559 Femalepopulationaged1554

YearActiveearner

Unemployed Ineducation

Otherdependent

Activeearner

Unemployed Ineducation

Otherdependent

194989.7 1.6 4.9 3.8 34.5 1.3 2.9 61.3196091.4 1.1 6.1 1.4 53.3 0.7 4.4 41.6197085.6 2.6 1.06 1.2 64.3 5.6 8.7 21.4198085.9 5.1 7.9 1.1 73.2 12.2 7.8 6.8198486.2 5.8 7.1 0.9 73.8 10.9 8.3 7.0199080.4 7.4 8.4 1.1 69.6 13.6 8.5 6.8

IncomeofthePopulation

SincetheSecondWorldWarnationalincomehasincreasedsignificantly,butitwasslowerthaninmostWesternEuropeancapitalistcountries.Until1989nationalincomewascalculatedaccordingtothesocialistconceptofNetMaterialProduct,excludingservices,butGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)hasalsobeencalculatedsincethe1960saccordingtotheSystemofNationalAccountsproposedbytheUnitedNations,thuspermittingapproximatecomparisonofthemacro-economybeforeandaftertheintroductionofthemarketeconomy.

ThediverseelementsconstitutingthenationalincomegrewatverydifferentratesintheCommunistera.PercapitanationalincomegrewatafasterratethanpercapitaGDP,reflectingtheCommuniststressonmanufacturingmaterialgoods.TheCommunistmacro-economyalsogrewatafasterratethanpercapitarealincome,andverymuchfasterthanrealwages.Infact,officialstatisticsshowedrealwages,afterrapidincreaseinthe1950sand1960s,actuallydecliningfrom1980to1989.Socialbenefitssupplementedrealwages,andtheygrewextremelysharplyinthepost-warera;however,thedramaticpercentageincreaseisduetotheirinitiallowbase.Yetfrom1980to1989socialbenefitsgrewby38percentwhilerealwagesfellby5percent.Sincethetotalcostofsocialbenefitswassmallerthanthatofwages,theformerdidnot,ipsofacto,compensateforthedeclineinwages.

AverageincomeindicatorsprovidesignalsoftheeconomiccrisisofHungarianCommunism.Thegrowthrateinthenationalincome,GDPandtherealincomeofthepopulationwasclearlyhigherinthedecadefrom1965to1975thaninthetenyearsbeforeandafterthisdecade.Fromthepointofviewofeconomicdevelopmentthesubperiodoftentativeliberalizationandmarket-orientedreformsfromthemid-

1960stothesecondhalfofthe1970swerethemostsuccessfulyears.

Afterthesystemchangein1989,theofficiallycalculatedGDPdeclinedbyaboutone-fifthupto1993,andthenstartedtoriseagain.However,theofficialfiguresinTable1.6areonlyapproximatebecauseproductionfromthegreyorinformaleconomyisnotknownandonlypartiallytakenintoconsiderationincalculatingGDP.Accordingtoarecentestimation22to25percentoftheGDPwasproducedbytheinformaleconomyin1992(ÁrvayandVértes,1993).OverthisperiodthedeclineinrealincomesofthepopulationwaslessthanthedeclineintheGDP,asinvestmentdeclinedmuchmorethantheincomeofthepopula-

Table1.6:Income,195094

Percapitanationalincome(1950=100)

PercapitaGDP(1960=100)

Percapitarealincome(1950=100)

Realwage(1950=100)

Realvaluepercapitasocialbenefits(1950=100)

1950 100 __ 100 100 1001955 126 __ 115 105 __1960 165 100 154 154 2861965 198 122 181 168 4151970 270 162 245 199 6881975 360 213 307 234 1,1861980 405 249 334 238 1,5781985 433 275 360 226 1,7921989 450 297 378 222 2,1771990 __ 279 377 214 2,1661991 __ 247 370 197 2,1881992 __ 234 357 195 __1993 __ 229 339 187 __1994 __ 235 351 __ __

tion.Realwagesalsodeclinedby16percentbetween1989and1993.However,bothrealincomesandrealwageshaveincreasedsince.

ThehouseholdincomesurveysoftheCentralStatisticalOfficefrom1962to1987andtheHungarianHouseholdPanelSurveysof1992-4providedataonincomeinequalities(AppendixTableA.2).Measuredbytheshareofthehighestandlowestincomedecileinthetotalincomeofhouseholds,incomeinequalitiesexistedintheCommunistperiodatlevelsmoreorlesssimilartotheincomeinequalitiesobservedinScandinaviancountries.In1962,thetopdecileinthepopulationhad20percentoftheincomeandthebottomdecilelessthan4percent.Itisalsonoteworthythat,whilefrom1962to1982theinequalitiestendedtodeclineslightly,from1982to1987they

increasedagain,withthetoptenthofearnersgaining21percentoftotalincome.

Duringthisperiodthereweretwoimportantgradualshiftsininequalities.Thefirstwasthedeclineintherelativeadvantageofmanagersandprofessionals,althoughimportantfringebenefitsarenottakenintoconsiderationinregisteredincome.Secondwastherelativeimprovementoftheincomepositionofpeasantsintheperiod196777,followedbyafallinthe1980s.

Thetransformationoftheeconomymeansthatincomefiguresafter

1990arenotstrictlycomparablewiththeearlierperiod.Insofarasthisdoesnotdistortoverallpatterns,thenwecansaythatincomeinequalitieshaveincreased;thetopdecilenowearns24percentofincomeandthebottomdecile3.4percent:resultssimilartoincomeinequalitiesinWestGermany.Disregardingproblemsintroducedbymeasurement,thedataalsosuggestthattheincomedifferencesbetweendifferentsocialoroccupationalgroupshaveincreased.Onaveragemanagers,professionalsandtheself-employedhavebeenthewinnerssincethesystemchange,whilesemi-andunskilledworkersandpeasantshaveseentheirrelativeincomefall.

Consumption

Consumptiondatamightbemorereliablethanincomeasameasureofthematerialwell-beingofthepopulation,giventheseriousomissionsinofficialeconomicstatisticsduetoaflourishinginformaleconomy.Moreover,theobjectsofconsumptionhaveshifteddramaticallyinrelativeemphasisinthepost-warperiod.

Foodisastaple,andasignificantamountcanbegrownbyhouseholdsforthemselvesoracquiredoutsideofficialmarketsespeciallyinarichagriculturalcountrysuchasHungary.Intheperiodsince1950totalfood

Figure1.2Riseinconsumption,195092

consumptiondoubledbythemid-1980s,andhasfallenslightlysincethetransformation.Theconsumptionindicatormakesallowancesforhowfoodisproduced,itspriceandquality.Calorieintake,adirectmeasureoffoodconsumption,showsverylimitedchange:itroseby20percentbetween1950and1975,andhasremainedvirtuallyconstantataround3,300caloriesadaysince(Figure1.2).

Modernizationismostdramaticallyevidentinthegreatriseofconsumerdurables.Inasense,thisisanartefactofthetraditionalHungarianhousehold,especiallyinruralareas,havingveryfewmassproducedgoods.Theimpactofwaractuallyresultedinafallinthelevelofconsumergoodsbetween1938and1950.Duringthepost-warera,Hungarianhouseholdshaveenteredintotheeraofmassconsumption,withtelevisionsets,refrigerators,telephonesandotherconsumergoods.ThelevelofmassaffluencehasnotreachedWestEuropeanstandards,asindicatedbythefactthatlessthanhalfHungarianhouseholdshaveanautomobile.Nonetheless,theriseinmateriallivingstandardshasbeenveryreal.Furthermore,theownershipofconsumerdurableshascontinuedsincetheopeningoftheborderstogoodsfromtheWest;thedurableindexroseby26percentbetween1988and1992.

Thecontinuedriseinconsumerdurables,combinedwitha5percentfallintheoverallconsumerindexandinthenotionalpercapitaGDP,illustratesatendencytounreliabilityineconomicstatisticssincetheypointtowardoppositeconclusions.ThedivergenceisdueinpartatleasttothefailureofofficialstatisticstocapturealltheresourcesofinformaleconomiesonwhichHungarianshavereliedtoasignificantextentforfoodandforcashincomeusedtopurchaseconsumerdurables.

Housing

Intheinter-warerathehousingstockofHungarywasgenerallyoflowquality.In1930onlyonehouseineighthaditsownpipedwatersupplyandoneinfourhadelectricity,andtherewasovercrowding,withanaverageof2.6personsperroom.HousingconditionsfurtherdeterioratedduetothedevastationoftheSecondWorldWar.Asof1949,thelevelofovercrowdingwasthesameastwodecadesearlier,lessthanhalfofhouseshadelectricityandonlyoneinsixhadpipedwaterandoneineighthadaflushtoilet.Housingconditionsimprovedonlyslowlyinthefirstfifteenyearsafterthewar,becausecentrallyplannedinvestmentswereconcentratedonmanufacturingandparticularlyinheavyindustry.

Figure1.3Improvementinthequalityofhousing,194993(%)

Inadditionthegreatmajorityofthepopulationwassopoorthatitcouldnotaffordtobuilditsownhouse.

Moreorlessinparallelwiththeintroductionofmarket-orientedreformsinthe1960s,thegovernmentendorsedafifteen-yearhousingconstructionprogramme.However,themajorityofhousingwasbuiltbyprivateresources,notbythestate,withfamilies,friendsandneighboursdoingmuchoftheworkthemselvesandhiringpeopleworkingintheinformaleconomy.Theresultwasamajorgrowthinthenumberofhousesandintheirquality.Attheendofthe1970s,restrictivemonetaryandfiscalpoliciesledtostateinvestmentinhousingconstructionbeingveryheavilyreduced.Asthegrowthofpersonalincomesalsoslowedinthe1980s,privatehousingconstructionalsobegantodecline.Since1989statehousingconstructionhasalmostcompletelystoppedandprivatebuildingalsodeclinedsharply.

Becausehouseshavealifeofhalfacenturyormore,thecumulativeeffectofdecadesofnewconstructionhasbeenabigincreaseinthe

qualityofhousing.Today,fromthree-quarterstovirtuallyallHungarianhouseshaveaflushtoilet,pipedwaterandelectricity(Figure1.3).Thenumberofdwellingswiththreeormoreroomshasrisenfrom5percentin1949,11percentin1970to40percenttoday.Thecontractioninpopulationsizeandinthesizeofhouseholdsandfamilieshascausedthe

numberofpersonsperroom,259in1949,tobehalvedbytheearly1980s,andfallfurtherto121in1988and110in1993.

Health

HealthhasimprovedthroughoutEuropeinthetwentiethcentury,andHungaryisnoexception.Onecommonlycitedcauseisadvancementsinmedicalscience,asecondtheriseinthematerialstandardoflivingandathirdtheincreaseinhealthcareprovidedthroughthewelfarestate.TrendsinHungaryemphasizetheimportanceofthefirsttwoinfluences,andraisequestionsabouttheextenttowhichmoreinputsofdoctorsandhospitalbedsaresufficienttoimprovehealthstandards.

Themostconsistentimprovementisininfantmortality.BeforetheFirstWorldWaraboutoneinfivebabiesdiedininfancy.Whiletheratewashalvedby1949,infantmortalitywasstillninety-onedeathsperthousandbirths.Inthepost-waryearsinfantmortalityhasbeengreatlyreduced.In1989itwas15.7deathsperthousand,andithascontinuedtofallsincethebigchanges,standingat12.5deathsperthousandin1993(Figure1.4)

LifeexpectancyhasrisensubstantiallyinHungarysince1900,butithasnotdonesoconsistently,orequallyformenandwomen(Figure1.5).

Figure1.4Steadyimprovementininfantmortality,190093

Figure1.5Trendsinlifeexpectancy;doctorssince1900

In1900,lifeexpectancyformenwas36.6years,andforwomen,38.1years.Itroseslowlyinthefirsttwodecadesofthecentury,andmoresharplybetweenthewars.By1949,lifeexpectancyhadincreasedbythree-fifthsormore;itwas59.3yearsformen,and63.4yearsforwomen,aslightwideningofthegendergap.

LifeexpectancyroseslowlyformeninthefirsttwodecadesoftheCommunistregime,reaching67.5yearsformenin1966.Asfemalelifeexpectancyhadrisento72.2years,thegendergapremained.Thereafter,lifeexpectancyformenbeganfalling.By1989,lifeexpectancyformenhaddroppedto65.4years,andby1993itstoodat64.5years.ThelifeexpectancyofwomenroseveryslowlythroughoutthefinaltwodecadesoftheCommunistregime,reaching74.0yearsin1988.Sincethemaleratewasfalling,thegendergapincreasedtoeightyears.Sincethen,femalelifeexpectancyhasbeenvirtuallyconstant,andthegendergaphaswidenedtomorethannineyears.

Thedeclineinlifeexpectancyisverystriking,giventhatthebigdropininfantmortalitygivesasubstantialboosttothesefigures.Itisduetomenintheagebracket40to60tendingtodieprematurelyfromavarietyofpathologicalcauses,suchasroadaccidents,whichrosesubstantiallyascarownershiproseunderCommunism,andthen

abruptlyincreasedbetween1989and1991asHungarianmotoristsshowedlessandlessrespectfortrafficrulesinthemidstofregimechange,beforecalmingdownandreturningtothenormalaccidentrateby1993.Accidental

deathsfromothercauseshaveshownasteadyriseinthepost-warera,andthishascontinuedsinceregimechange.

TheexpansionofhealthcareservicesintheCommunisterawasgreat(Figure1.5):thenumberofdoctorsper10,0000peoplemorethantrebledbetween1949and1989,andthenumberofhospitalbedsalmostdoubled.However,thecorrelationwithlifeexpectancyappearsperverse,forthelatterfellwhiletheformercontinuedtorise.Between1966,thehighpointformalelifeexpectancy,and1989,thenumberofdoctorsper10,000peopleincreasedby81percentandhospitalbedsincreased27percent;inthesameperiod,malelifeexpectancyfell3percent.Invaliditypensions,introducedin1971,havealsorisengreatlyfrom207,000intheinitialyear.By1980,invaliditypensionswerepaidto408,000peopleandby1989,502,000,andtheyroseto664,000by1993.Thesefigures,whicharecommonlyfoundinWesternEuropetoo,areasmuchareflectionoftheconsequencesofrisingunemploymentleadingsomepeopletobeclassifiedastooilltoworkratherthanasunabletofindajobinatightlabourmarket.

TheHungarianpatternofhealthrising,thenfalling,duringtheCommunistera,iscommonthroughoutCentralandEasternEuropeandtheformerSovietUniontoo.Itcanbeattributednottothelackofhealthcarebuttoitsinefficienciesandlowstandards,andalsotothesocialstressesgeneratedbythepoliticalsystemandacommandeconomy;jobswereguaranteed,buttheywereunhealthyjobs.P.Józan(1988,1989,1994)describesthecomplexofinfluencesonhealthintheCommunisteraasasocialmaladaptationsyndrome.

TimeBudgets

NationaltimebudgetsurveyswereperformedinHungarybytheCentralStatisticalOfficein1963,1976-7,1986-7andin1993onafullycomparablebasis(AndorkaandFalussy,1982;Falussyand

Zoltánka,1994).Thesedataallowustoanalysethechangesinthemaincharacteristicsofeverydaylifeintermsofcontinuitiesandchange.TheamountoftimethatHungarianshavespentinmeetingtheirbasicphysiologicalneeds,suchassleeping,eatingandwashing,hasremainedvirtuallyconstantregardlessofthepoliticalregime:almosthalfofeachday.

Inthe1970sadultHungariansdevotedverymanyhourstocontractedandcommittedactivities(thatis,workingactivitiesandlearning).Longworkinghourswereexplainedbythehighrateofemploymentofboth

menandwomen,andbythewidespreadsupplementaryuseoftimespentproducingfood,averaginganhouradayformenandthree-quartersofanhourforwomen.Whilewomenspentlesstimeinpaidemploymentthanmen,becausetheyspentmuchmoretimeonhouseholdchores,theirtotalcommittedtimewasgreater(Table1.7).

Fromthemid-1970stothemid-1980sthelengthofcontractedandcommittedtimedeclinedonlyslightlyaspartofthereductionintheworkinghoursinthemainjobwascompensatedbythegrowthoftimespentinthesecondeconomyand,formen,increasedtimespentingrowingfoodfortheirownconsumptionorsaleininformalmarkets.Fromthemid-1980sto1993thehoursspentinthemainjobstronglydeclinedbecauseofthereductioninemployment.Thisdeclinewas,however,notcompensatedbyagrowthofactivitiesinthesecondeconomy.Inpartthiswasduetosomesecondeconomyactivitieschangingintomainjobs(forexample,peasantswhoearliercultivated

Table1.7:Timebudgets,197793(averageminutesperday)Men Women

Typeofactivity 197719861993197719861993Mainjob 284 255 209 176 161 139Supplementarynon-agriculturalwork

3 16 5 1 9 2

Supplementaryagriculturalwork 60 75 73 47 41 34Learning 10 7 7 6 6 5Householdchores 83 73 82 242 221 225Shopping 13 16 19 24 26 28Careforchildren 13 14 17 28 41 49Transport 69 67 62 51 51 49Totalcontractedandcommitedtime 536 522 474 574 555 532Socializing 61 62 63 44 47 46Cultureininstitutions 5 5 3 3 2 2Newspapersandjournals 22 29 19 9 17 13Readingbooks 16 11 9 9 11 14Television,video 95 117 161 83 107 135

Activesports,outdoorexercise 13 11 15 9 6 7Otherleisure 14 14 14 27 29 16Totalleisure 227 250 286 186 219 235Physiologicalneeds 677 668 681 680 666 673

theirhouseholdplotsaftertheirworkinghoursbecameself-employedpeasants),andpartlybecauseeconomicchangesledtoafallintheeffectivedemandforsecondeconomywork,thatis,theabilityofpeopletopaycash-in-hand.

Thetotalamountoftimespentinleisureactivitiesincreasedfrom14to18percentofatwenty-four-hourdayinthedecadesunderreview,anditincreasedevenmorebycomparisonwiththetimespentincontractedandcommittedactivities.Mengainedanextrafifty-nineminutesadayforleisure,andwomenanextraforty-nineminutes.Virtuallyallthisincreaseinleisuretimewasdevotedtowatchingtelevisionand,inthecaseofmen,thisresultedinsomeotheractivities,suchasreadingbooksornewspapers,actuallycontracting.

IntheCommunisteraandafterwards,menandwomenshowsignificantlydifferentprofilesoftimeuse.Becauseofdomesticactivities,womenhavealwayshadmorecontractedandcommittedtimeandithasconsistentlybeeninnon-wagedwork.Thereislittledifferencebetweenmenandwomenintimespentinmeetingphysiologicalneeds.Asforleisure,menhavealwayshadmoreleisuretimethanwomen,andthegendergaphaswidenedovertheyears(Table1.7).

Culture

Tasteinculturalactivitieshaschangeddramaticallyinthepost-warera.In1950,peoplehadlittletimeforleisure,andlittlemoneytospendinculturalpursuits.Thechiefactivity,oftenviewedasatreat,wasgoingtothecinema.Cinemaattendance,whichrequiredmoneyformakingfilms,payingadmissionandtimetowatch,peakedin1960.Itthenfelldramaticallywiththeadventoftelevision.By1989,cinemaattendancewasbelowthelevelof1950.AsimilarriseandfallincinemaattendancehasbeenrecordedinWesternEurope.

Attendanceatthetheatrehasalteredmuchless.Itpeakedin1955,andhassincedeclinedbyaboutone-quarter.Attendanceatmuseumsincreasedmoreslowly,reachingapeakin1987,andthenfallingsharplyby1989andmorethanhalvingby1993(Table1.8).

BookproductionincreasedsubstantiallyintheCommunistera,duetostatesubsidiestopublishinghousesmakingbookscheap,andanincreaseineducationpromotingreadership.Thenumberofdifferentbooktitlesreachedapeakin1984,andthenfellsharplypriortothebigchangeof1989.Ithassubsequentlyrisenaspublishinghouseshavehadgreater

Table1.8:Culturalactivities,195093Bookspub.(per100,000pop) Copies(percapita)

Attendance(per100population)

Year titlesthousandvolumes magazines

dailynewspaperstheatrecinemamuseum

195020 216 20 31 32 504 14195528 233 20 40 69 1,179 22196030 348 23 47 64 1,401 37196539 442 27 59 59 1,045 55197046 454 36 71 54 772 69197573 702 41 79 59 706 113198077 884 47 82 53 567 151198575 825 46 86 57 659 182198972 1,024 44 73 49 440 154199072 1,091 47 76 48 349 135199170 884 49 75 49 210 115199274 786 __ __ 46 148 98199382 700 __ __ 43 __ 90

freedomtoselecttitlestopublish.Thetotalnumberofvolumesprintedhasshownadifferenttrajectory;itwasatapeakin1990,andhasfallensharplysince,ascostsofproductionandpriceshaverisenandincomehasdeclined.Similarly,thenumberofdailynewspapersincirculationhasdeclinedfromninety-onepercapitain1988toseventy-fivepercapitain1993.Thenumberofcopiesofweekly,monthlyandquarterlyjournalshasremainedrelativelyconstantsincetheearly1980s.Today,themainculturalactivityofmostHungariansisthefreeactivityofviewingtelevision.

Deviance

ThewritingsofEmileDurkheimestablishedthesuiciderateasamajorindicatorofsocialpathology.Historically,HungarianshavehadahighrateofreportedsuicidebyEuropeanstandards,buttheratehas

fluctuateddownaswellasup.Attheturnofthecentury,itwasabouteighteensuicidesper100,000population,andthenrosebymorethanhalfintheinter-waryears,peakingintheearly1930s'depression.SuicideratesfellduringtheSecondWorldWar,andcontinuedtofallthereafter,reachingalowof20.5in1955.Asteadyandsharprisemorethandoubledtherate

Table1.9:Deviance,192093Death:liver Percapita

Suiciderate cirrhosis consumptionof

Personssentenced

Year (per100,000pop.)

(per100,000pop.)

alcohol(litre) (per10.000pop.)

1920-4

27.0 __ __ 52

1925-9

29.7 __ __ 47

1930-4

32.9 __ __ 41

1935-9

29.2 7.4 5.5 49

1940-2

24.2 __ __ 62

1950 22.2 5.0 4.9 1101955 20.5 5.5 4.5 991960 26.6 8.9 6.1 561965 29.8 9.8 6.8 681970 34.6 12.9 9.1 491975 38.1 18.2 10.1 611980 44.9 27.7 11.7 561985 44.4 43.1 11.5 561989 41.6 51.8 11.3 621990 39.9 52.6 11.1 461991 38.6 56.9 10.7 591992 38.7 70.5 10.5 701993 35.9 81.7 __ 68

by1980,whenithititspost-warpeak.Since1989,thesuicideratehasfallenby14percent,andby1993wasatitslowestintwodecades(Table1.9).

Statisticsonalcoholconsumptionreflectbothactualdrinkingandthe

capacityofofficialstatisticstoreflecttheamountofalcoholproducedandconsumed.ThepatterninTable1.9showsthatalcoholconsumption

Table1.10:Householdsize,194990Average One-

memberAverage One-

parentFamilieswith

household households family families 4+childrenYear (No.) (%) (No.) (%) (%)

1949 __ __ 3.39 12.9 9.51960 3.10 14.5 3.12 13.4 5.11970 2.95 17.5 3.01 10.2 2.91980 2.79 19.6 2.94 11.3 1.61984 2.70 19.8 2.92 12.6 1.31990 2.66 24.3 2.93 15.5 1.4Change -0.44 9.8 -0.46 2.6 -8.1

Table1.11:Incomedistribution,196294(%)%shareof Percapitaincomeofsocialstratain%ofnationalaveragea

Lowestdecileofpop.

Highestdecileofpop. ManagerProfessionalSupervisorbClerical

Self-employed

Skilledworker

Semi-skilledworker

19623.9 20.2 154 128 119 109 9519674.1 18.0 140 122 111 103 9219724.0 19.9 150 115 108 100 8919774.5 18.6 142 108 97 99 9319824.9 18.6 127 107 99 99 9219874.5 20.9 125 117 93 __ 8819923.5 23.1 __ __ __ 102 __19933.7 23.6 162 140 114 120 122 100 9019943.4 23.8 184 156 138 118 121 96 88a196287bysocialpositionoftheheadofhousehold,199394bysocialpositionofthepersonb196287semi-professional;199394supervisor,foreman

morethandoubledinthefirstthreedecadesoftheCommunistregime,reachingapeakin1980,andthenlevelledoffinthatdecade.Thesefiguresareconsistentwiththedeathratefromcirrhosisoftheliver,amajordiseasecausedbyexcessdrinking.Ithasrisensteadilyandverysubstantiallythroughtheyears.Sincecirrhosisoftheliverisadegenerativediseaseresultingfrommanyyearsofexcessdrinking,theratessince1989reflectpatternsofbehaviourfromtheCommunistera.Bycontrast,since1989consumptionofalcoholappearstohavedroppedbyatenthfromitspost-warpeak.

Statisticaldataoncrimereflectthefunctioningofthepolice,thecriminalcourtsandtheseverityofcriminallaw.Betweenthewarsthenumberofpersonssentencedwasrelativelylow,andactuallyfellduringtheearly1930s'depression.ItmorethandoubledatthestartoftheCommunistera,astheregimeinventednewcrimesandwasharshonanyonedeemedtobeoutofline.ThepeakofsentencingwasreachedduringthemostseveretimeofStalinistoppression:in1952,152personsper10,000weresentencedtoprison.Sincethe1960stherateseemstohavebeenmoreorlessstable.In1993,thenumbersentencedforanti-socialcrimeswasatenthhigherthanin1989,butlessthanhalftheproportionsentencedonpolitical,economicandsocialgroundsduringtheheightoftheStalinistrepression.

Noreliablestatisticaltime-seriesareavailableontheprevalenceofmentalproblemsinthepopulation.Thenumberofpersonscaredforinpsychiatricinstitutionsandthenumberofpatientsdischargedfrommentalhospitalsindicatemorethelevelofpsychiatriccarethanthefrequencyofmentalillness.Bothshowacontinuousincrease.Datafromsociologicalsurveysofmentalhealthinthe1980s(KoppandSkrabski,1992),however,showthatmentalproblemsarewidespread.Theauthorsconcludedthat25percentoftheadultpopulationexhibiteddepressivesymptomsofwhich17percentweremild,5percentweremoresevereand3percenthadserioussymptoms.

Conclusion

DuringtheCommunistperiodtheHungarianeconomyandsocietywasmodernizedinsofarassocialstructurebecamemoresimilartoindustrialsocieties,thelevelofeducationincreasedandthelevelofincomeimproved.Intermsofimprovementinincomeandthestandardofliving,thesubperiodoftentativeliberalizationfromthemid-1960stothesecond

halfofthe1970swasthemostsuccessful,asthestandardoflivingofthemajorityoftheHungariansocietybeganapproachingWestEuropeanstandards.

However,thetotalitariancharacterofthepoliticalsystemandcommandeconomywentcountertotrendsinmodernsocietiesinWesternEurope.Theslowdown,orevenreversalofmodernizationcouldbeobservedinthe1960swhenmortalitybegantodeteriorateandtheriseineducationalmoststopped.Beginninginthelate1970s,stagnationproducedsignsofcrisis,andthefailureofmodernizationbecamemoreandmorevisible.Someunderlyingtrendsthedeteriorationofhealthandthegrowthofcertainformsofdeviancedemonstratethatthebasicprocessofmodernizationisnotcomplete.TherootsofthefailureofmodernizationareinthetotalitarianandlaterallyauthoritariancharacteroftheCommunistpoliticalsystemwhichimpededthedevelopmentofrationalityandmodernvalues.

References

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Transformation.Berlin:Sigma.

Chapter2Population:Birth,MarriageandDeathGyörgyVukovich

THEsizeofthepopulationanditsagecompositionaretheresultsofdemographicprocessesfixedindifferentmomentsoftime.Inthischaptersomecharacteristicfeaturesoftheseprocessesareexamined.Wewillfocusspecificallyonfertilityrates,mortalityandthechangingdemographiccompositionofthepopulation.ThesefeatureswillshowthatHungaryhasexperiencedsometrendsthatdifferfrombothitsEasternEuropeancounterpartsandWesternEuropewhileothersfollowsimilarpatterns.

Fertility

ThenumberofbirthsinHungaryhasshownadecliningtendencyduringthelastfortyyearswithsomefluctuations.Thistendencyofcontinuousdeclineisidenticaltotheprocessesalsooccurringinthemajorityofdevelopedcountries.Thefluctuationsinbirthscan,however,beconsideredtobeaspecificdomesticfeature.Therewasanextremelyhighupswinginthebirthrateinthemiddleofthe1950suntilthebeginningofthe1960swhichwasfollowedbyadownswingtoadegreeneverseenbefore.Thenthebirthrate,increasingwithmoderateshort-termfluctuations,hadanotherupswinginthemiddleofthe1970s,followedbyanotherperiodofdecline.Thisdeclinewasinitiallyslowatthebeginningbutincreasedrapidly.Thenewbottomwasmuchlowerthanthatoftheearly1960s.Thenumberofchildrenbornin1989was123,000,thelowestinthehistoryofHungariandemography.In1990therewasamoderateincrease,with125,600childrenborn.

Asregardsnumberofbirths,HungaryhasafavourableplaceintheEuropeangradation.Forinstance,in1985thegrossbirthrateinHungarywas12.3perthousand:in1990itwas12.1perthousand.In1990therewerelowerratesinAustria(11.6perthousand),Belgium(11.6perthousand),Greece(10.1perthousand),theGermanFederalRepublic(11.4perthousand)andItaly(9.8perthousand).OnecannotfindmuchhigherratesintheotherdevelopedcountriesoftheEuropeanregion.InalltheformersocialistcountriesexceptforBulgaria(11.7perthousand)birthrateshavebeenhigherandinsomemuchhigherthaninHungary.InPolandithasbeenover14.0perthousand,whileinRomaniaithascomeclosetothisnumber.ThebirthrateintheformerSovietUnionin1990was16.8perthousand.Inthenon-Europeancountriesbirthratesareusuallyconsiderablyhigher.ForinstanceinEgyptitis41.1perthousand,inMexicoitis31.5perthousand.Inthedevelopednon-EuropeancountriesbirthratesarelowerbuthigherthaninEurope.Forinstance,inAustraliathebirthrateis14.9perthousand,intheUSA16.7perthousand,inCanada14.9perthousand.

Sincethenumberofbirthsdependsessentiallyonfertilityitisimportanttotraceitsdevelopment.Thetotalfertilityrate(TFR)isthemostsuitableindicator;itistheaveragenumberofchildrenbornebyawomanduringthewholefertileperiodofherlife,calculatedonthebasisofthebirthrateofagivenyearorperiod.Theratehasdeclinedduringthelasttwoorthreedecadesinthecountrieswithhighlydevelopedeconomiesanditisaprocessthathasbeenacceleratinginthelasttenyears.Duringthelastfourdecadesthisindicatorhasdeclinedbymorethanaquarter,andmostsharplybetweenthe1950sand1960s(Figure2.1).

Figure2.1Totalfertilityrate

Insomedevelopedcountrieswecanfindamuchmoreintensivedeclineinfertility.InHungary,theaveragevalueofTFRinthe1950sandearly1960swasbetween2.7and2.8;nowitisabout1.9.Comparedtothirtyyearsago,womennowgivebirthtoonelesschild.Forthelastthirtyyears,thefertilitylevelinHungaryhasnotbeenhighenoughtomaintainthesimplereproductionofthepopulationinthelongerterm.Thisinevitabledeclineinthepopulationsizewaskeptatbayforaperiodbytheagecompositionofthepopulationandsometimesbybringingforwardthetimingofbirth.Whencomparedtotwenty-threeEuropeancountries,thevalueofcompletedfertilityofthefemalecohortbornin1930isthelowestat2.03,whileincountrieswithsimilarorlowervaluesofTFRpercalendaryear,theTFRforwomenbornin1930ishigherormuchhigher.Thecompletedfertilityofthelastmarriedfemalecohortbornin1940is1.86andthecompletedfertilityofthefemalecohortbornin1920wasalsonothigherthan2.19.

DuringthelastthreeyearstheTFRhasshownaverymoderateincreasefrom1.78to1.84.Thismightbeattributedtotheintroductionofachildcareallowance.Thefemalefertilitydatafromthepopulationcensuses(thetotalnumberofrecordedchildreneverbornebywomen)alsoshowaconsiderabledeclineduringthelastcoupleofdecades.Table2.1showsthenumberofchildreneverbornpermarriedwomanin1920was3.60.Thisvaluedeclinedby1970to2.01andthenby1980to1.89.Thistendencyofdeclinehasstoppedduringthelastdecade.By1990thenumberofchildreneverbornpermarriedwomanhadincreasedslightlyto1.90.

In1920morethan40percentofmarriedwomenborefourormorechildren.By1980thisratehaddeclinedto9percent,then,by1990toabout6percent.Inthelasttwodecadesawomanwithtwochildrenhas

Table2.1:TotalfertilityrateofmarriedwomenNumberofchildreneverbornper100marriedwomen

Childrenper

0 1 2 3 4 (total) marriedwoman

192017.9 16.6 12.5 10.9 42.2 (100) 3.62193017.1 16.9 16.5 12.8 36.7 (100) 3.27194918.4 22.3 20.7 13.1 25.6 (100) 2.57196015.1 25.3 25.8 13.8 19.8 (100) 2.32197013.8 29.2 31.0 12.7 13.2 (100) 2.01198011.9 27.9 39.1 12.3 8.8 (100) 1.8919908.7 25.6 46.1 13.2 6.4 (100) 1.90Source:TheannualdemographicreportsbytheCentralStatisticalOffice

becomethenorm.In1980itwas39percentandby1990itsvalueattained46percent.Duringtheperiodsince1920,thegreatestincreasehasoccurredinwomenwithtwochildren.

Newformsoffertilitybehaviourarealsoconfirmedbytheresultsofrepresentativesurveysoffamilyplanning.Accordingtotheresultsofafamily-planningsurveycarriedoutin1989,thenumberofchildrenplannedbyyoungcouplesdeclinedfrom2.07to2.00overthecourseofthefirstsixyearsoftheirmarriage.Familieswhoplanatthebeginningoftheirmarriageonhavingthreechildrenwanttohaveonlytwoofthemaftersixyearsofmarriage,whileasmallergroupwhoinitiallyplanontwochildrenwanttohaveonlyoneaftersixyears.

AmajorreasonadvancedforthedeclineinfertilityinsocietieswithaEuropeancultureistheradicalchangeinthefamilymodelbroughtaboutbyindustrializationandcapitalistdevelopment.Historicalprocesseshavetransformedthefamilyfromaproductiveeconomicunitintoaconsumerone;achildisbecomingacommodity.Inlinewiththisprocesstherehasbeenadeclineinmortality(includinginfantmortality)andanincreaseinthenumberofchildrensurvivingtoadulthood.Asaresultfamilieshavelimitedthenumberofchildren.

Asidefromlarge-scalesocio-economicchangeswethinkoneimportantfactoristhedeclineoftraditionalmoralvalues,asecondistheinabilityoffamiliestoprovideforchildrenunderprevailingeconomicconditionsandathirdisthegreateravailabilityofthemeansofcontraception.

Mortality

Fromtheviewpointofmorbidity,thelastforty-fiveyears

canbecharacterizedbytheprevalenceofchronicdegenerative

diseases,dividedintotwoparts,theperiodbetween1945and1964andbetween1965to1990.Bytheearly1960smortalitydeclinedtoalowerlevelthaneverbefore.Between1949and1964lifeexpectancyatbirthincreasedfrom61.4to69.4years,anoutstandingrisecomparedbothtothepreviousperiodandtoothercountriesintheperiodofreconstructionaftertheSecondWorldWar.

However,duringthelasttwenty-fiveyears,mortalityrateshaveincreasedagain.

1Aboutthree-fourthsoftheincreaseinthemortalityrateisduetotheageingofthepopulation,whileone-fourthistheresultofthegrowingmortalitybyage.Theworseningofmortalityconditionswas

reflectedwithaslightdelayinlifeexpectanciesatbirth.Thiscanbeexplainedpartlybythedeclineinthelifeexpectanciesofmen,theslightincreaseinwomen'slifeexpectancyuntil1989,withadeclinefrom1990onwards.In1990theaveragelifeexpectancyatbirthinHungarywas69.3years(men:65.1years;women:73.7years).Thedeclineinmortalityconditionsoftheadultpopulationisshownbythedeclineinlifeexpectancyofmenaged30by4.3yearsbetween1964and1990,nearthevalueitwasinthe1930s.Thelifeexpectancyofwomendidnotchangeduringthesameperiod.Lifeexpectanciesin1990attheageof30were:men,37.5years;women,45.4years.Ontheotherhand,themortalityofinfants,childrenandadultsunder30hasimprovedagreatdealduringthelasttwodecades.Therelativelyhighinfantmortalityislargelyaresultofinfantsbornwithverylowbirthweight.

Intheperiodbetween1964and1990themortalityofthemalepopulationover30yearsincreasedinallagegroups.Themortalityratesofmenintheagegroups40-4and4559morethandoubled.Themortalityratesofmenbetween4074yearsin1990werehigherthanthosein1947.Intheperiodbetween1964and1990themortalityofwomenbyageincreasedinthegroupsbetween30and64years,whileitdiminishedintheothers.Thedeclineinmortalityconditionsofthemiddle-agedfemalepopulationismuchmoremoderatethanthatofthemalepopulationofthesameage.Thegreatestincreaseinmortalityrates,betweenaquarterandathird,canbefoundinthestratumofwomenagedbetween30-4and40-4years.

Theunfavourablyhighmortalitylevelisduetoseveralconnectedfactors.Thefirstgroupconsistsofunfavourablehabitsoflife,theterritorialmobilityofthepopulation,decliningeconomicconditionsandtraditions.Thesecontributetotheearlyandmassoccurrenceofdegenerativediseases,themostsignificantbeingheartandvascularsystemdiseasesandtumours.Thesecondgroupconsistsofthatbroad

stratumofthesocietythatdonotrecognizethevalueofhealth,havehigh-riskhealthbehaviours,suchasexcessivealcoholconsumptionandtobaccosmoking,andpoorpublichealtheducation.Thethirdgroupreflectsdeficiencyintheinfrastructureofpublichealth,anditsincreasingfailuretofulfilgrowingdemandsorreachinternationalstandards.

Undoubtedly,thesefactorshavealwaysinfluencedmorbidityandmortalityinothercountries,too.Inthehighlydevelopedcountries,however,theseeffectshavepartlydiminishedorceased.NegativeattitudeshavebeenreplacedbypositiveonesandtheamountsinvestedinpublichealthhavebeenmuchgreaterthanthoseinHungary.

Theabovementionedfactorsandtheagedistributionofthepopulationdeterminethenumberofdeathsperyear.Examiningthegrossmortalityrateforthe1980s,thedatashowthegreatestnumberofdeaths(148,000)wasrecordedin1983decliningbyaboutthreethousandby1990.Thesevaluesmayindicatethebeginningofaslowimprovementinmortality,oratleastahaltintheformerdeterioration.

Thehighmortalityrateisthemajorfactorresponsibleforthedeclineinthepopulationsizethatstartedintheearly1980s.Evenafertilitytrendforseveraldecadeswouldnotassurethesimplereproductionofpopulationinthelongrun,butthedeclineinmortalityduringthelasttwodecades,withaconsiderableimprovementofthesameindicatorinthehighlydevelopedcountries,resultedinnegativepopulationgrowth.

DemographicSituation

Thenumberandcompositionofthepopulation

ThechangeintheHungariandemographicsituationin1993,comparedtothepreviousyears,wasadeclineinbirthsfrom121,724(averylowvalue)in1992to116,500,resultinginthelowestratesofbirthandanaturaldecreaseinthepopulation.Inearly1994therewasamorefavourablepictureofdemographicprocesseswithamoderateincreaseinbirthratesalongwithamoderatedeclineindeathrates.ThebirthrateinHungary,incomparisonwiththeotherEuropeancountries,isnotverylow.AnessentialdifferencefromotherEuropeanpopulations,however,isthattherehasbeenacontinuousdeclineforseveraldecades.InmostEuropeancountries,fertilitycharacterizedbytotalfertilityrateshasbeendecliningforashortertimeandinamoreabruptway.

Thecompositionofthepopulationshowedthreemajortrendsinpopulationmovementrates.Firstinearly1994thepopulationnumber

was10,276,968,down33,211fromthepreviousyear.Thatwasthehighestactualdecreaseintimesofpeace.Thegenderratiointhepopulationbecauseoftheextremelyhighmortalityofmenhascontinuedtochangetotheadvantageofwomen.In1994thenumberofwomenforeverythousandofmenwas1,088,whileinthepreviousyearitwas1,086andin1970itwas1,063.

Thesecondimportanttrendhasbeenthecontinuingincreaseinthenumberaswellastheproportionofdivorcedandwidowedinthetotalpopulation.Amongwidowedpeople,maleswereabout154,000,whilefemaleswereabout795,000andwidowsinceasedby5,000innumber

Table2.2:Agecompositionofpopulation(%)1980 1990 1994

0 1.5 1.2 1.114 6.6 4.8 4.859 7.2 6.3 6.01014 6.5 8.3 6.7(014) (21.8) (20.5) (18.6)1519 6.1 7.4 8.62024 7.6 6.5 7.12529 8.3 6.0 6.33034 7.1 7.5 6.13539 6.7 8.2 8.0(1539) (35.8) (35.5) (36.1)4044 6.1 6.9 7.74549 6.4 6.5 6.75054 6.5 5.8 6.15559 6.3 5.9 5.5(4059) (25.3) (25.0) (26.0)6064 3.5 5.6 5.46569 5.1 5.1 4.97074 3.9 2.6 4.27579 2.6 3.1 1.98084 1.4 1.7 1.985+ 0.6 0.8 1.0(60+) (17.1) (18.9) (19.3)

intheyear;thenumberofdivorcedwas271.7and391.7respectively.

Thefinalmajortrendhasbeenadefiniteageingofthepopulation.Theproportionofthoseunder14yearsdeclinedfrom20.5percent(1990)to18.6in1994.Therewasamoderateincreaseintheproportionofthoseagedbetween1539and4059years,andofthoseagedover60.In1994theproportionofthelatterwas19.3percent(Table2.2).

Marriage

Therehasbeenacontinuousdeclineinthenumberandrateofmarriages.Thegrossratehasbecauseofthediminishingpopulationsizedeclinedtoalesserextent,whilethenetratehasinthecaseofbothsexesdeclinedconsiderably.Therehasbeenadeclineinmarriageinallagegroupsregardlessofgender.Intheagegroupsunder24yearsitisparticularly

Table2.3:NumberandrateofmarriagesNo.ofmarriages

per1,000non-marriedaged15

Averageageinyearsatmarriage

Year Totalper1,000persons men women men women

197096,612 9.3 81.7 62.1 27.1 23.6198080,331 7.5 68.7 51.1 27.2 24.2199066,405 6.4 47.4 35.9 27.4 24.4199161,198 5.9 42.3 32.3 27.4 24.4199257,005 5.5 38.3 29.3 27.4 24.4199354,009 5.3 35.4 27.2 __ __

strikingintheperiodbetween1980and1993.Theserates(calculatedforthemarriedpopulationoftheappropriateageandsex)declinedinthecaseofmenfrom140.5to85.7andinthecaseofwomenfrom250.5to123.9(Table2.3).

Asregardsfamilystatusbeforemarriage,thereisalsoadeclineinallcasesoffamilystatus.Besidesthesemarriagemovements,thereisanincreasingnumberoftemporaryandlong-termextra-maritalcohabitations,thoughtherehasbeennocontinuousdatacollectionbytheofficialstatisticsonthismatter.Thisincreaseisshownbytheincreasingnumberofchildrenbornoutofwedlock.Inspiteofthedeclineinthetotalnumberofchildrenborn,thoseoutofwedlockincreasedfrom16,511in1990to20,647in1993.

Fertility

Fertilityhascontinuedtodecline.In1993thebirthratewas11.37perthousand,thelowestvalueevermeasured.Birthsperwomenaged1549declinedfrom49.4(1990)to45.3perthousand(1993)andtherewasasimilardeclineinthebirthratecalculatedpermarriedwomen.

Iftheagedistributionofthepopulationtodaywasthesameasitwasin1910,thenthegrossbirthratewouldbe13.80insteadof11.37.Asaresultofthelong-termdeclineinfertilityandincreaseinmortality,therateofthefemalepopulationofchild-bearingageinthepresentagedistributionismuchlowerthanitwasintheyears1919and1949.

Whenexaminingthenumberofbirthsbytheageofmothers,wecanfindastrikingdeclineintheagegroup20-4,whilethereisadefiniteincreaseinthegroupsaged25-9andover40years.Thefertilityofwomenafterashortperiodofincreaseafter1990hadadistinct

declinein1992and1993,mainlybecauseofthedecreasingratesinthe20-4yearagegroup.Sinceforfertilitythisagegroupisofprimaryimportance,thesignificantdeclineinrecentyearsdeservesattention.Thisdeclinecannotbecounterbalancedbythestagnantorslightlydecliningfertilityratesoftheotheragegroups.

Thedevelopmentoffertilityindicatorsfor1993andbeforeindicatesthattheexpectedincreaseinbirthnumbersofthemorepopulouscohortsastheycometochild-bearingagemightbeconsiderablylessthanestimatedpreviously.In1993thevalueofthenetreproductioncoefficientwas0.804,or20percentlessthanneededforthesimplereplacementofthepopulation.Inthepreviousyearthetotalfertilityratewas1.69.

Thenumberofabortions,afteramaximum(nearly200,000)intheearly1970s,fluctuatedbetweeneightytoninetythousandinthe1980s,then,in1993,itdeclinedto75,300from87,000in1992.Thisdecline,however,wasnotfollowedbyanincreaseinthenumberofbirths,indicatingthatcouplesarepractisingmoreeffectivebirthcontrol.

Mortality

In1993therewere150,244deathsandtheannualgrossmortalityratewas14.6perthousand.Becauseofthedifferentmortalityandagecompositionofthetwosexes,thenumberofmenandwomenwhodiedwas80,498and69,746respectively.Consequently,themortalityrateswere16.32and13.01formalesandfemalesrespectively.Thesedatareflectunfavourablemortalityconditions.In1993thelifeexpectanciesatbirthwere64.53yearsformenand73.81yearsforwomen,asyntheticindicatorbestreflectingtheoveralllevelofmortality(Table2.4).

Thesedataclearlyindicateadramaticdeclineinmalemortalitysince

1966,theyearwiththemostfavourablelifeexpectancyvalues.Femalemortalityhas,withminorfluctuations,stagnatedbutithasneverregainedits1988topvalue.Thedifferentmortalityprocessesofthetwosexeshaveconsiderablyincreasedthedifferencesbetweentheirlifeexpectancies.In1993thelifeexpectancyofwomenatbirthwasmorethannineyearslongerthanthatofmen.Suchagreatdifferencecannotbefoundinanyothercountry.Comparedtothehighlydevelopedcountries,femalemortalityinHungaryisalsoveryhigh.Intheearly1990sthelifeexpectancyofwomenatbirthwasabout7882years,whileinJapanitwasnearly83years.OnlyintheformersocialistcountriesofCentralandEasternEurope(exceptforRomania)couldwe

Table2.4:Lifeexpectancyatbirthformenandwomen,196093Men Women (Difference)

1949 59.28 63.40 (4.12)1955 64.77 68.67 (3.90)1960 65.89 70.10 (4.21)1966 67.53a 72.23 (4.70)1970 66.31 72.08 (5.77)1980 65.45 72.70 (7.25)1981 65.46 72.86 (7.40)1982 65.63 73.18 (7.55)1983 65.08 72.99 (7.91)1984 65.05 73.16 (8.11)1985 65.09 73.07 (7.98)1986 65.30 73.21 (7.91)1987 65.67 73.74 (8.07)1988 66.16 74.03a (7.87)1989 65.44 73.79 (8.35)1990 65.13 73.71 (8.58)1991 65.02 73.83 (8.81)a1992 64.55 73.73 (9.18)1993 64.53 73.81 (9.28)aThehighestlifeexpectanciesandthelargestdifference

findvaluesmuchlessthanintheleadingcountriesbutneverthelessmorefavourablethaninHungary.

Suchadeclineinthemortalityconditionsofmenisduetoanextremeworseningofmortalityofthemiddle-agedpopulation.Sincethemid-1960s,mortalityratesofthepopulationaged3554havemorethandoubled.Table2.5showstheaveragemalemortalityrateperthousandfor1993,forthefavourable19591960yearsandforAustria.

Table2.5:Mortalityratesofmen(perthousand)Hungary

195960 1993 Austria,1992

30-4 1.99 3.20 1.3635-9 2.54 5.95 1.8840-4 3.48 9.13 2.9445-9 5.50 12.97 4.8550-4 9.14 19.58 7.1355-9 16.08 25.67 11.2660-4 25.30 36.36 18.6065-9 40.02 49.43 28.39

Thereis,however,adefinitedeteriorationinallgroups.Amongthehighlydevelopedcountries,themortalitylevelofAustriaisbetterthanaverage.ThecomparisonoftheAustrianandHungariandataneedsnocomment,especiallywhentakingintoconsiderationthattheserateswereverycloseintheyears195960.Althoughitisdifficulttoexaminethecausesofthedramaticdecline,thestructureofthecausesofdeathisverysimilarinthehighlydevelopedcountriesandinHungary,withsomespecialexceptionssuchasaccidentsandsuicide.ThecharacteristicfeatureofthedomesticsituationisthatthemajordiseasesresultingindeathoccurinmuchyoungeragegroupsthaninWesterncountries,duetoanunconcernedattitudetowardthewayoflifeandhealth,and,inawidersense,totherelativelypoorlevelofpublichealthinfrastructure.

1ForadetailedanalysisofmortalityseeTheDevelopmentofMortalityinHungarybetween1945and1985(MortalityStudies,5)issuedbytheCentralStatisticalOffice.TheauthorisPéterJózan.

Chapter3DenominationAndReligiousPracticeMiklósTomkaandIstvánHarcsa

THISchapterisconcernedwiththechangeindenominationalcompositioninHungaryandthesocialdeterminantsofreligiousaffiliationandreligiosity.Itsummarizesthemostimportantconclusionsofsociologicalstudiesbasedonlargesurveysconductedbetween1971and1991andresultsfromthe1992-3annualsurveybytheHungarianCentralStatisticalOfficeonsocialstructureandmobility(Bukodietal.1994;VKSH1993).

OverthepastcenturyitisgenerallythoughtthattheproportionoftheCatholicpopulationhasincreased,whiletheLutheranpopulationhasdecreased.ThetotalsizeofthedifferentdenominationswereobviouslydifferentbeforeandaftertheFirstWorldWar.Beforethatwar,theHungarianempireincludelargepartsofCentralEuropewhichlaterbecamenewstates.Thuspre-FirstWorldWarHungaryhadaboutthreetimesthepopulationandaboutfourtimestheterritoryof1918Hungary.Thenewcountrieswere,however,notonlyethnicallybutdenominationallymixedwithastrongrepresentationofOrthodoxbelieversandUniates(GreekCatholics).Ontheotherhand,HungarybecameethnicallyhomogenouswithlargegroupsofHungarianminoritiesremainingintheneighbouringnewcountries.Withthecountry'sterritorialchangeafterthePeaceTreatyofTrianon(1920),thesignificantproportionofHungariansadheringtotheOrthodoxreligionallbutdisappeared.TheCalvinistproportionincreasedbyoneandahalfinrelationtothepreviousperiod(Karner,1931;Kovacsis,1963;Nyárády,1981;KSH,1992).Inspiteofallthesechanges,inbothperiodstheCatholicproportionofthe

populationcontinuedtoincreasewhiletheCalvinistproportioncontinuedtodecline(Table3.1).

Thereisacorrelationbetweenreligiousaffiliationandsocio-economic

Table3.1:Hungary'sdenominations,18691949CatholicaCalvinistLutheranOther

Pre-VersaillesTreaty(Trianon)territoryb1869 57.4 14.9 8.1 19.61880 58.1 14.7 8.1 19.11890 58.9 14.6 7.8 18.71900 59.6 14.4 7.5 18.51910 60.3 14.3 7.2 18.2

Present-dayterritory1910 65.0 21.4 6.4 7.21920 66.1 20.9 6.2 6.81930 67.2 20.9 6.1 5.81941 68.2 20.8 6.0 5.01949 70.5 21.9 5.2 2.4

aRoman,Greek,andAmericanCatholicbExcludesCroatiaandSlavoniaSource:Censusdata,asreprintedbyKovascics(1963:306)

characteristics.TheCatholicreligionhashadanaboveaverageratioofbelieversinthecountry'scentralandwesternregionsandamongthelandlesspeasantry.TheCalvinistsweredisproportionatelypresentintheeasternregionsandamongthesmallandmiddle-sizelandowners.LutheranswereconcentratedintheurbanareasandamongtheethnicSlovaks,whiletheJewishpopulationwasconcentratedinthelargercities.Thereweredifferencesineducation,income,lifestyleandcultureamongthedifferentreligiousgroupings.

Theeffectsoftherecentpastonreligiousstatisticsarepartlyevidentbutnumericallyunclarified.Forexample,theHolocaustandtheensuingemigrationreducedtheJewishdenominationtoone-tenthorevenlessofitsoriginalnumber,whileasignificantnumberofSlovaksandGermansleftHungaryeitherviapopulationexchange,

deportationsorvoluntaryemigration,thusreducingthesizeoftheLutheranChurch.Thedeportationsoftheearly1950s,thecontinuousinfluxintourbanareas,atrendtowardverticalmobilityandthediscriminationagainstthosepractisingtheirreligionallcontributedtowardbreakingdownthepreviouslyexistingreligioussub-culturesandhinderedtheirregeneration.

ExtensivedenominationalstatisticswerelastpreparedinHungaryin1949.Althoughdatafromrepresentativesamplesexistonlysince1972(Tomka,1991),severalauthoritativeforeignsourcespublisheddetailedestimateddataonHungary'sdenominationalstructuresoverthelastdecades(Table3.2).Barrett's(1982)WorldChristianEncyclopedia

Table3.2:DenominationalstructureinHungary,1957881957a 1980a 1980b 1980c 1988b 1988d 1991d

Catholic 67 61.4 58.6 53.9 66.2 70.6 72.2Calvinist 20 16.8 23.9 21.6 17.9 20.6 20.3Lutheran 6 3.3 4 4.4 3.5Jewish ? 0.7 0.9 0.9 2.4 0.4 0.2Other ? 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4Noreligion ? 17 16 23.1 9.5 3.7 3.4aEstimatesdonotmentioncriteriausedforclassifyingintodenominationsbEstimatesgivecriteriausedasbaptismsandinscriptionscEstimatesbasedonself-identificationdSurveydataSources:1957(Bilan,1964);1980(András);1980(Barrett,1982);1988;(Tomka,1991).1988,1991surveys(Tomda,1994,334f.).

becameasourcewhosedatawithreferencetoitornotnumerousforeignandnativewritershaveadopted(Clévenot,1987;Gergely,1986;Voss,1984).Theseestimateswerenotbasedonsystematicsurveysbutoninternalecclesiasticalreports(MorelandAndrás,1984),someappearingininternationalpublications(AnnuariumStatisticumEcclesiae,1989;WorldAllianceofReformedChurches,1986;BaptistWorldAlliance1984).However,statisticalaccuracyisnotguaranteedinecclesiasticalreports.Systematicerrorscanslipin,suchastheinsufficienttrackingofgeographicalmobility.Norcanonedismissthedistortionsdictatedbyvariousinterests(Tomka,1988a).

Thefourteenstudieswithlargesamplesurveysbetween1972and1991(Table3.3)supporttheearlierwork.TherehasbeenaslightincreaseintheproportionofCatholicsovertime,whiletheproportionofCalvinistsandLutheranshasdeclined.AsisconsistentwithtrendsinotherWesterncountriestherehasbeenanincreaseintheproportionofthepopulationwhoindicatethattheyhavenoreligiousaffiliation.

populationwhoindicatethattheyhavenoreligiousaffiliation.Amalgamatingsurveysbetween1978and1991makesitpossibletoundertakeadetailedexaminationofthedenominationalstructureofthepopulation.The

Table3.3:Religiousaffiliationbyage,1992CatholicCalvinistLutheranOther

religionNoreligion

Unknown

1829 61.3 18.0 3.0 1.8 14.1 1.83039 67.3 20.3 3.3 2.7 4.4 1.94049 67.0 22.3 4.2 2.8 1.8 1.95059 69.1 22.3 5.0 2.5 0.5 0.760+ 68.8 22.5 5.5 2.9 0.4 0.7Difference:Old-Young

7.5 4.5 2.5 1.1 -13.7 -1.1

sampleschosenwererestrictedbythequestionwording,sowehaveusedintegratedsamplesproducedfromstudiesdonepartlybetween1972and1981andin1985,andpartlyfromannualsamplesbetween1984and1991.

AgeandDenominationalReproduction

Thecomparisonoftheyoungestandoldestagegroupsisparticularlysuitablefortheillustrationofstructuralchange.Whenweexaminereligiousaffiliationwithindifferentagegroups,(Table3.3),thespreadofthosewithnoreligiousaffiliationismuchstrongeramongtheyoungthantheold.Thus,14.1percentofthoseaged18to29reportednoaffiliationin1992comparedto0.4percentofthoseaged60andolder.TheproportionofLutheransunder25islessthantwo-thirdsthatofthose60orolder,andtheCalvinistratioisalsosignificantlylowerintheyoungeragegroups.Bycontrast,theproportionofCatholicsandotherdenominationsintheyoungergroupisonlyslightlylowerthanintheoldergroup.ThedecreasewithintheJewishdenominationissolargethatseveralProtestantsectsbypassitintheyoungeragegroups.Attheinstitutionallevel,onecancomparetheshiftintheoverallmembershipofthechurches.AmongCatholics,theratiooftheyoungeragegroupdeclinedslightlyincomparisontotheoldergroup,butitgrewsignificantlyinrelativesizeincomparisontootherdenominationsinthe1978to1991period.ThisraisesthepossibilitythattheCatholicprevalenceinthenon-adultgroupisevengreaterthanisshownhere.

ReligiousEndogamy

Earlierstudiesprovideonlyfragmentedinformationonthereligiousaffiliationsofhusbandsandwives(Tomka,1980;Utasi,1992),yetinter-marriageacrossreligiousgroupsaffectsthepreservationofvaluesandtraditions.Giventhelimitationsofthesamplesize,the

analysisisrestrictedtotheCatholicandCalvinistdenominations,althoughcertainbroadtendenciescanbeshownfortheLutheransandforthosewithnoreligiousaffiliation.

EndogamyishighestamongCatholics(Table3.4).Morethanfour-fifthsofCatholicschoosepartnerswithintheirdenomination.TheproportionatevalueforCalvinistsis54percent,and36percentforLutherans.Thisrelativelylargediscrepancycouldpossiblybeexplainedbythedifferenceindenominationalsize.Beinginthemajority,

Table3.4:Extentofreligiousendogamy(Wife)

CatholicCalvinist Lutheran OtherNoreligion Unknown(Husband) (Rowpercentages)Catholic 81.3 12.6 3.0 1.5 0.9 0.7Calvinist 39.2 53.7 3.1 1.9 1.3 0.8Lutheran 47.5 12.9 35.6 4.0 __ __Other 36.7 23.3 __ 36.7 3.3 __Noaffiliation 46.4 14.3 1.8 1.8 32.1 3.6

Catholicshaveamuchhigherchanceofchoosingapartnerwithinthesamedenominationthandotheotherdenominations.Toalesserdegree,thedifferencepresumablycanbeexplainedinthatthecapabilityfordenominationalmaintenanceisgreaterforCatholicsthanforCalvinists.Thislatterassumptionisstrengthenedbydifferencesobservedintheday-to-daypracticesofdifferentreligiousgroups,suchasbaptismandchurchattendance.However,endogamyisstillrelativelyhighamongthesmallerreligiousgroupsthatmakeuptheothercategorywithone-thirdchoosingapartnerwiththesamereligiouscategory.Theprobableexplanationforthisisagreaterinnercohesivenessofthesmallerchurchesandtheirdistanceandtheirantipathytowardthebig,institutionalizedchurchesandtheiradherents.Aroundone-thirdofthosewithnoreligiousaffiliationarealsomarriedtopartnerswhoalsoreportnoreligiousaffiliation.

Ifwelookatreligiousendogamywithindifferentlevelsofeducationalattainment,thehigherthehusband'seducationalattainment(andpresumablythewife's),thelowertheprobabilitythatmembersofthesamedenominationmarry.ThisassociationissignificantlystrongeramongCalviniststhanamongCatholicswith40percentofCalvinistswithpost-secondaryeducationreportinganendogamousmarriage,14percentbelowtheCalvinistaverage,ascomparedto75percentof

Catholicswithpost-secondaryeducation,6percentbelowtheCatholicaverage.Severalfactorscombinetoexplainthisphenomenon.Aspirationforahighereducationcharacterizesthelesstraditionalgroups,wheredenominationalopennessisprobablygreater.Conversely,ahighereducationalattainmentusuallymakespeoplemoreopenorreceptivetonewideasandvalues.Thisfavoursthespreadofinter-denominationalorexogamousmarriages.Finally,theattainmentofahighereducationgenerallygoeshand-in-handwithanalienationfromthetradition-preservingsocialgroupoforienta-

Table3.5:Religiousaffiliationofgrandparents,parentsandmarriedcouples

(Husbands)aPaternalandmaternalgrandfather

parentsmarriedcouples

change

BothCatholic 63.6 64.3 55.9 -7.7BothProtestant 22.0 21.9 16.3 -5.7HusbandCatholic-wifeProtestant

3.4 3.8 10.1 +6.7

HusbandProtestant-wifeCatholic

8.4 5.5 10.2 +1.8

Othermixedcombination

2.6 4.5 7.5 +4.9

aMissingcasesexcluded

tionachangeinsocialconnectionsandencounteringanenvironmentinwhichthereislessemphasisplacedonreligiousaffiliation.

Afurtherimportantquestioniswhetheramongthosesurveyedparentalreligiousaffiliationinfluencesthepropensityofchildrentowardsendogamousmarriages.Dothereligiousvaluesandattitudesreceivedathomeplayaroleinthechoiceofapartner?Beforethe1940sthereevolvedfairlystrictcustomsthemajorityofthosegettingmarriedchoseapartnerwithinthesamedenomination.Wheretherewasinter-marriageacrossdifferentdominations,onecouldexpectseriousfamilyconflicts.Consequently,suchmarriageswererare.

Table3.5examinesthereligiousaffiliationsofthehusband'spaternalandmaternalgrandfatherandthehusband'sparentsandcomparesthemwithcurrentmarriages.ThepercentofendogamousCatholicmarriagesamonggrandparents(paternalandmaternalgrandfather)andparents(fatherandmother)wasapproximately64percent,22percentwereendogamousCalvinistmarriagesandtheremainingportionconsistsofdifferentmixedfamilies.Twoconclusionscanbedrawn.

Thefirstisthatthedenominationalcompositionofthefamilieswasrelativelystableinpreviousgenerations;thesecondisthatpercentagedistributionresemblesthedenominationalproportionthatwascharacteristicofthetotalpopulation.

Whenwecomparepresentmarriageswiththoseoftheparents,therateofmixedmarriageshasnoticeablyincreasedinthelastthreetofourdecades.Theincreaseinmixedmarriagesvariesacrossdifferentreligiousgroups.WherebothparentsareCatholic,82percentofmarriagesarealsoCatholic.IninstanceswherebothparentsareCalvinist,only63percentofthemarriagesareCalvinist.Among

Calvinists,theextentofendogamousmarriagedeclinesmorerapidlythanamongCatholics.

EducationandDenomination

Theeducationalattainmentofthedifferentdenominationalgroupsandthosewithnoreligiousaffiliationshowsquiteasignificantstructuraldifference.Closetotwo-thirdsoftheadultswithnoaffiliation,morethanhalfoftheJewishreligion,andclosetohalfoftheothercategoryhavesecondaryorpost-secondaryeducation.Therearealsoconsiderabledeviationswithinthethreehistoricalchurches,thebigchurcheswithdeeprootsinHungarianhistory.TheeducationleveloftheLutheransishigherthanthatofeithertheCatholicsortheCalvinists.Thepatternisaffectedbythehistoricalpatternsofbehaviourwhichcontinuetobepresent.Inaddition,religionwasabasisforexclusionfromhighereducationduringtheCommunistperiod,andthosewithaspirationsforupwardmobilitywereexpectedtobeatheistswithnoreligiousaffiliation.

TheratioofthehighesttothelowestlevelofeducationalattainmentshowninthelastcolumnofTable3.6indicatesthateducationalattainmentishigherforthosewithnodenominationalaffiliation,Jews,Lutheransandtheothercategory,andtheprobabilityofobtainingasecondaryorpost-secondaryeducationisbelowaverageforCatholicsorCalvinists.Accordingtothe1992data,ofthosebelongingtothethreebigchurches(Catholic,CalvinistandLutheran)one-third(32.8

Table3.6:Religiousaffiliationbyeducation,average197891(%)Educationlevelslessthangrade8 grade8 secondary

college/universityratioofhightolowedu.

Catholic 72.1 71.8 70.3 69.2Calvinist 22.7 21.6 19.1 19.4Lutheran 4.3 3.7 4.8 5.4Jewish 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.0Other 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4

Other 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4Noaffiliation

0.2 1.8 4.3 4.4

Missingdata 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.2(N) (23,629)(43,103) (20,630) (8,657)

Source:Tomka(1994:337)

percent)completedgrade8orless,one-third(35percent)obtainedaskilledworker'scertificateandone-third(32.1percent)asecondaryoruniversitydiploma.Amongthenon-affiliated,theratioofthosewithgrade8orlessisonly23percent.Incontrast,thenumberwithsecondarycertificatesordiplomasistwiceaslarge,44.3percent(Bukodietal.1994).

ReligiousReproduction

Changesthatwereoccurringinreligiousaffiliationshavebeenattributedtosixfactors.ThesewerethehigherbirthratioforCatholics;lowerbirthratesamongCalvinists;themovementofpeoplefromthelargeProtestantchurchestothesects;politicalfactors;mixedmarriages;andtherigidCatholicstandwhichinsistedonalloffspringbeingbaptizedasCatholic.Inthelastfiftyyearstherehasalsobeenamovetowardde-ChristianizationwhichhasbeenapparentinWesternsocieties.Althoughreligiosityandreligiousaffiliationarenotidentical,andonedoesnotassumetheother,itcanbepresumedthatthosewithlowerlevelsofreligiositywillbelesslikelytomaintaintheirreligiousaffiliations.

Inthepasttwodecadesopinionsurveysandsociologicalresearchposedthequestionaboutreligiosityintwoways.Between1972and

Table3.7:Religiousaffiliationandstrengthofcommitmenta(%)Baptismsorinscription

Religiousinownwayb ReligiouscReligiousd

Catholic 71.3 75.1 77.0 78.6Calvinist 21.1 19.2 18.1 15.5Lutheran 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.6Jewish 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2Other 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.9Noaffiliation 2.2 0.5 0.1 0.2Missingdata 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1

(n) (96,019) (35,628) (19,323) (8,100)

Percentoftotalpopulation

100 60 40 13

aAverageofdatabetween1978-91bRespondentswhoindicatedIamreligiousaccordingtotheteachingsoftheChurchorIamreligiousinmyownwaycRespondentswhosaidyestothequestion:Areyoureligious?dRespondentswhoindicatedtheyarereligiousaccordingtotheteachingsofthechurchSource:Tomka(1994)

1981theygenerallyusedasimpleyes-noquestion:Areyouareligiousperson?YesorNo.From1984afive-itemscalehasbecomewidespread(Table3.7).Whenthetwohighestpointsonthescalearegrouped,ahigherratioofreligiosityisprovidedthanfromthesimpledichotomousquestionaskedpriorto1984.

Regardlessofwhichquestionisused,thereisasignificantdifferenceinthepercentagewhoconsiderthemselvesreligiousamongthedifferentdenominations.AccordingtoCentralStatisticalOffice,fortheadultpopulation(KSH,1993)48percentbaptizedasCatholicspractisetheirreligion;0.6percentarepractisingmembersofanotherdenomination;31.5percentarebelievers,butnon-practising;and19.9percentarenon-believersoratheists.Bycomparison,thepercentagepractisinginthedenominationoftheirbaptismis42.7percentamongLutheransandamongCalvinists39.8percent.Approachedfromtheotheraspect,thecombinednon-believersandatheistsamongbaptizedLutheransis21.4percentandbaptizedCalvinists,25.5percent.

Thestudiesrepresentfourdifferentapproachesinthewayinwhichreligiosityisdefined(seeTable3.7).Thefirstshowsthedenominationaldistributionofthetotalpopulationusingbaptismalrecordsasastartingpoint.Thesecondmeasureshowsapproximately60percentarereligiousinthebroadcastsenseonaveragefrom1978to91(thepercentageincreasesto74percentin1993).Thethirdmeasureistheyes-noquestionregardingreligiosity:40percentoftheadultpopulationconsidersitselfreligious.Finally,thefourthlooksatthosewhoarereligiousaccordingtotheteachingsoftheChurch.Inpractice,thisisthegroupthatgoestochurchonSundays;theaverageintheperiod197891was13.5percentand16.6percentin1994.Comparingthefourapproaches,weseethatthestrongerthereligiositycriteria,thehighertheproportionofCatholic,Lutheran,andothernumbers;andconverselythelowertheproportionof

Calvinists.

Ifwecomparedenominationalidentificationaccordingtoreligionregisteredatbirthandtheactualpracticeofreligion,therearedifferencesamongthevariousdenominations(Table3.8).Thirty-eightpercentofCatholics,32percentofLutheransand28percentofCalvinistspractiseinChurch:theyparticipateatreligiousservicesmoreorlessregularly,sendtheirchildrentoreligiousinstructionandparticipateinthereligiouscommunityondifferentoccasions.OneoutoffivemembersofCatholic,CalvinistorLutheranchurchesclaimtofollowreligiouspracticesnotininstitutionalformsbutasprivateprayersanddevotions.Agroupofthesamesizepreservesadenominationaladherenceandidentitywithout

Table3.8:ReligiousaffiliationandreligiouspracticeFormofreligiouspractice

inchurch doesnotpractice

regularlyseldom

inownway

butisabeliever

non-believer/atheist

unknownCatholic 15.1 22.6 9.9 30.4 19.2 2.8Calvinist 8.2 19.7 12.8 30.9 24.2 4.3Lutheran 10.3 21.5 11.4 32.5 20.5 3.7Otherreligion

29.8 9.8 9.8 30.1 18.4 2.1

Noaffiliation

0.4 0.4 0.7 5.9 84.9 7.8

Unknown 1.1 2.6 0.8 8.4 35.0 52.1Total 12.7 20.6 10.0 29.0 23.6 4.0Source:Bukodi,etal.(1994:125)

believing.Thepercentageofnon-believersandatheistsisfrom19to24percentforCatholics,LutheransandCalvinists.

Therearerelativelyfewcaseswherepeopleleavetheirdenominationofbaptismandjoinanotherdenomination.Forthosejoiningthelargestdenomination(Catholic),thisproportiondoesnotexceed2percent.Anysignificantdifferenceobservedisamongthosewhobecomenon-believers,atheistsorwhoaresimplybelieversbutdonotpractisetheirfaith.Thechangetonon-believeroratheistishighestforthosebelongingtotheCalvinistdenomination.Thusthemaintainingcapacityofthechurchistheweakesthere(Table3.9).

Thereasonforthereductioninthenumberofpeoplewhopracticeareligionisnotinter-denominationalmigrationbutde-Christianization.ThesizeofthiseffectvariesamongthethreedominatingreligiousculturesinHungary.Themajorityofthosewhonolongerpractisea

Table3.9:Religiousaffiliationaccordingtobaptismandpractice

(Religionpractised) (Non-practising)Baptised CatholicCalvinistLutheranotherbelievernon-believer,

atheistCatholic 47.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 31.7 20.0Calvinist 1.8 39.8 0.1 0.3 32.5 25.5Lutheran 1.5 0.2 42.7 0.6 33.7 21.4Other 2.0 0.6 __ 47.5 31.2 18.8Noaffiliation

0.5 0.6 0.1 0.3 6.4 92.2

Total 32.7 8.7 1.9 1.7 30.6 24.5Source:Bukodi,etal.(1994:127)

religionarestillbelievers;howeverthisissmallestamongsttheCalvinists.ThusthemaintainingcapacityoftheCalvinistChurchisweakest.

Surveysofthelasttwenty-fouryearsprovideclearproofofaslowbutcontinuousshiftinthedenominationalstructureofHungariansociety.Themostimportantnewphenomenonistheemergenceandgrowthinthepopulationofthosenotaffiliatedtoanychurch.Thechangeintherelativesizeofdenominationsfollowshistoricalpatterns.CatholicismisgrowingbiggerbycomparisonwiththeCalvinistsandLutherans.ThebiggestchallengefortheLutheranpopulationisthelackofyouth.Therearemarkeddifferencesineducationalattainmentamongthedifferentdenominations.JewsandLutheranshavethehighestlevelsofeducationalattainment,andCalvinistshaveparticularlylowlevels.Religiousendogamyisweakening.Before,itwaslessexplicitamongProtestantsthanCatholics,butthedissolutionofdenominationalendogamycharacterizestheProtestantpopulationparticularly.Denominationaldistributiondependsonthecriteriaused.Distributionaccordingtodenominationatbirthiscontestedbysomeasbeingirrelevantforthepresentsituation.Ifreligiouspeoplearetakenasabasisofdenominationalbelonging,religiosityhastobedefined.Thestrongerthecriteriaforreligiouscommitmentused,thehighertheproportionoftheCatholicandLutherangroups,thelowertheproportionofCalvinistsandthelowertheproportionofreligiouspeopleinthepopulation.

References

András,Imre,1984.LÉglisedeHongrie'.ProMundiVita:Dossiers,2,132.SecretariaStatusRationariumGeneraleEcclesiae,1989.

AnnuariumStatisticumEcclesiae,1989.VaticanCity:SecretariaStatusRationariumGeneraleEcclesiae.

BaptistWorldAlliance,1984.TheWorldFamilyofBaptists.WashingtonDC:BaptistWorldAlliance.

Barrett,D.B.,ed.,1982.WorldChristianEncyclopedia.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

EncyclopédieCatholiquedeMondeChrétienIII.BilandeMonde,1964.Tournai:Casterman.

Bukodi,Erzsébet,Harcsa,IstvánandReisz,László,1994.Társadalmitagozódás,mobilitás.Az1992.mobilitásvizsgálatalapján[SocialStructureandMobilityAccordingtoDataofMobility-surveyof1992].Budapest:KözpontiStatisztikaiHivatal.

Clévenot,M.,ed.,1987.L'étatdesreligionsdanslamonde.Paris:Ed.DécouverteEd.Cerf.

Gergely,Jeno

*,1986.II.JánosPál.(JohnPaulII)Budapest:Kossuth.

Karner,Károly,1931.AfelekezetekMagyarországonastatisztikaimegvilágításhan[DenominationsinHungaryinStatisticalView].Debrecen:DebreceniNyomda.

Kovacsics,József,1963.Magyarországtörtélmidemográfiája[HistoricalDemographyofHungary].Budapest:KözgazdaságiésJogiKönyvhiasló.

KSH(CentralStatisticalOffice)KözpontiStatisztikaiHivatal,1992.Történetistatisztikaiidosorok*18671992[TrendsinHistoricalStatistics.18671992].Budapest:KözpontiStatisztikaiHivatal.

KSH(CentralStatisticalOffice)KözpontiStatisztikaiHivatal,1993.VallásiéletMagyarországon1992-ben[ReligiousLifeinHungaryin1992].Budapest:KözpontiStatisztikaiHivatal.

Morel,J.andAndrás,E.,1984.HandbuchdesungarischenKatholizismus.Wien:UngarischesKirchensoziologischesInstitut.

Nyárády,R.Károly,1981.Erdélynépességéneketnikaiésvallásitagolódásaamagyarállamalapítástóladualizmuskoráig[EthnicandDenominationalstructureofTransylvaniafromtheFoundationoftheHungarianStateuntilthePeriodoftheAustro-HungarianMonarchy].Budapest:KSHNépesedéstudományiKutatóintézet.

Tomka,Miklós,1980.Avallásosönjellemzésnéhánytendenciája[TendenciesofReligiousIdentification].Világosság,6,360-6.

Tomka,Miklós,1988a.Amagyarországikatolicizmusstatisztikájaés

szociológiája[StatisticsandSociologyofHungarianCatholicism].InL.Turányied.,MagyarKatolikusAlmanachII[HungarianCatholicAlmanacII].Budapest:SzentIstvánTársulat,510-77.

Tomka,Miklós,1988b.Elveszettkatolikusok?avagy,mennyiakatolikusoklétszámamaMagyarországon?[LostCatholics?or:HowManyCatholicsLiveinContemporaryHungary?].Teológia,2,11318.

Tomka,Miklós,1991.Magyarkatolicizmus1991[HungarianCatholicism:1991].Budapest:OrszágosLelkipásztoriIntézet.

Tomka,Miklós,1994.Felekezetiszerkezetfelekezetireprodukeió[DenominationalStructure,ReproductionofDenominations].StatisztikaiSzemle,45,32943.

Utasi,Ágnes,1992.Vallásiházasságihomogámiaéskulturálisreprodukció[ReligiousHomogamyofMarriagesandCulturalReproduction].SzociológiaiSzemle,2,4559.

Voss,E.,ed.,1984.DieReligionsfreiheitinOsteuropa.Zollikon:GZW.

WorldAllianceofReformedChurches,1986.HandbookofMemberChurches.Genf:WorldAllianceofReformedChurches.

Chapter4TheScopeoftheStateandPrivateSectorsTamásKolosiandEndreSik

OFCENTRALimportanceinthechangingstructureoftheHungarianeconomyisthechangeinthescopeofthepublicandprivatesectors.Theproportionofprivatepropertywasestimatedontheprincipleofdominance.IftherewasevidencethatthemajorityofownershipofthepropertywasprivateaccordingtotherecordsoftheTaxOffice,thepropertywasconsideredprivate.Bytheearly1980sthestatisticsforpropertywerealteredbytransferringtheproductionofsmallcompanies,smallco-operatives,householdfarmingandcomplementaryfarmplotsintotheprivatesector.

Theproportionofprivate-sectorinvolvementintheproductionofgrossdomesticproductionwasalreadysignificant(10percent)asearlyastheearly1980s,andifproductioninthehiddeneconomyisincluded,itwas17percent.Rapidexpansionstartedinthe1990s(ÁrvayandVértes,1994).In1993thepublicsectorlostitsdominanceintheproductionofGDP(Figure4.1).Theprivatesectorislargerstillwhenonetakesintoconsiderationproductionfromthehiddeneconomyaswell.Accordingtointernationallyaccepteddefinitions,itincludesthoseformsofactivitythatcreate(orincreasethevalueof)productsorservicesthatsatisfyrealsocialdemands.TheseactivitiesareconsideredhiddenbecauseincomesderivedfromthemarenotreturnedtotheTaxOfficeortheStatisticalOffice.Wedonotincludeinthecategoryofhiddeneconomytheincomesobtainedbymeansofcorruptionandotherindictableoffensesinvolvingimprisonment(ÁrvayandVértes,1994a).TherehasbeenanincreaseinboththeabsolutevalueandtherelativeproportionofGDPproducedinthe

hiddeneconomy(cf.Sik,1992).Withtheinclusionofthehiddeneconomy,theshareofGDPheldbytheprivatesectorwillbehigherthanthatofthepublicsector.

Figure4.1PrivatepropertyinofficialandtotalGDP

Source:ÁrvayandVértes,1994

PublicandPrivateSectorsinTermsofEmploymentandAmountofWorktime

Inthischapterwewillusedatafromthe1993HungarianHouseholdPanel,asurveyconductedinApril-May,1993.ThebaseperiodforestimationwaseitherMarch1993orthetotalperiodfromApril1992,dependingonthetopic.Inthecaseofagriculture,theestimatesarebasedononetypicalweekoftheyear.TheHungarianHouseholdPaneldataincludes2,218employedpersons,ofwhomsixty-sixwereofficiallyunemployedbutinfacthadfull-timejobs.Theywereaskedwhetherthecompanytheyworkedforwastotallypublic,totallyprivate,orpartlyprivateandpartlypubliclyowned.

Twoestimatesoftheamountoftimespentatworkwerecalculated:theactivityoftherespondentinMarch1993andactivityduringthepasttwelvemonths.WhenreferringtotheformerestimateweusethetermMarchestimateandwhenreferringtothelatterweusethetermannualestimate.InthecaseoftheMarchestimate,althoughstarting

fromindividualdata,wemadeourcalculationsbyinterpolatingaggregates,inthecaseoftheannualestimatewecarriedoutallcalculationsonthe

basisofindividualdata.WhencarryingouttheMarchestimate,inthecaseofemployedpersonsnotknowingthesectorialstatusoftheirworkplaces,weassumedthattheirworktimehadbeendividedthesamewayastheworktimeofthosewithknownsectoralstatus;inthecaseoftheannualestimate,personswhodidnotknowthesectorialstatusoftheirworkplaceswereleftoutfromtheanalysis.IntheMarchestimate,thosewithoutjobsaredividedbetweenthetwosectors,whiletheannualestimateincludesallofthemintheprivatesector.FortheMarchestimate,besidesthepublicandprivatesectors,wedistinguishedthecategoryofmixedownershipaswell.Inthecaseoftheannualestimatewehaveincludedthelatterintheprivatesector.

EstimatingtheMonthlyMarchData

Westartedourcalculationswiththeestimationofthenumberofpersonsemployedineachsectoralongwiththeestimationoftheprincipalandextraworktimeinthesesectors.Wecompleteditwithanestimationoftheworktimeofpeoplewithoutjobsbutworkingregularlyforsalary(furtheronwewillcallthemworkerswithoutformaljobs.Thenextstepwastheestimationoftheextrahoursworked.Detailedquestionswereaskedaboutthenumberandaverageworktimeofpersonsoccupiedinagriculturalsmall-scaleproduction,ofthosehavingsecondaryemploymentorpart-timejobsandofthoseundertakingoddjobs.Theaveragenumberofworkinghoursinaweekwasestimatedonthebasisoffrequencyandhoursofworkoneachoccasion.Unfortunately,thedatacannotbebrokendownbysector.Thus,fortheestimationofthetotalamountofworktimeweassumedthatsecondaryemploymentandpart-timejobsweredividedamongthesectorsinthesameproportionsasthemainjobswere;inthecaseofoddjobsweassigned20percentoftheworktimetothepublicsector,10percenttothemixedsectorand70percenttotheprivatesector,whilethetotalworktimespentforagriculturalsmall-

scaleproductionwasassignedtotheprivatesector.

Onthebasisoftheseassumptions,whilenearlyhalf(49.6percent)oftheemployedworkinthepublicsector,theshareofthissectorinthemainworktimeisonly45.5percent.Theseproportionschangelittlewhenovertimeandworkerswithoutformalemploymentareincludedaswell.Theinclusionofworkyieldingextraincome,however,changestheoverallpicture:theshareofthepublicsectorinthetotalworktimedropsto35.5percent(Table4.1).

Table4.1.Worktimeinpublic,mixedandprivatesectors(%oftotal)

Public Mixed PrivateShareofemployment 50 15 35Totalprincipalworktime 46 15 39Totalworktime 35 11 53Source:1993HungarianHouseholdPanelSurvey;numberofemployedrespondents,2,218

EstimatingAnnualActivity

Thefirststepoftheestimatewascarriedoutonthebasisofthenumberofthoseemployed,andofthequantityofannualworktimeintheprincipaljob.Thiswasfollowedbytheestimationoftheamountofovertimeworkedbyfull-timeemployeesandoftheprincipalworktime(oddjobsorauxiliaryworkexecutedasfamilymember)oftheworkerswithoutajob(i.e.theunemployedon31March1993).Thenextstepoftheprocedurewastheestimationofthequantityofextraworkbytherespondents:thenumberofmonthsoftheperiodinvestigatedyieldingincomefromthegivenkindofwork,multipliedbythefrequencyofdoingthisworkinthegivenmonth,multipliedbythenumberofhoursworkedoneachoccasion.Thefinalresultisthenumberofhoursworked.Thisvalue,ifmultipliedbytheweightedvalueofthesample,gives,inthecaseofagivenactivity,theworktimeofthepopulationoverfifteenyears.Thesecondstepwastoestimatethequantityofextraincomeearnedbyoccupationalsector.Thiswedidbydividingtheemployedpopulationintoninedifferentemploymentcategories.Ofthese,theonlycategoriesinwhichextraincomewasprimarilyinthepublicsectorweresecondaryemployment,part-timejobsandcasualintellectualwork.Themajorityofextraincomewasinthenon-publicsector,includingagriculture.Althoughinthepresentnationalaccountsystemandcalculationof

GDPitisunusual,calculationswerealsomadefortheannualtotalworktimeinvolvedintheexchangeoflabourbetweenhouseholdsandofdomesticworkaswell.

Intheannualestimate,wehavenotbeenabletoidentifythoseinmixedenterprisesseparately;theestimateofworktimeisdividedsolelybetweenpublicandprivatesectors.Onthisbasis,thenumberofemployedweredivided50:50intheperiod,butprivate-sectoremployeesaccountedfor54percentofworktime,andwhenthehiddensectoris

Table4.2:Worktimeinthepublicandprivatesectors,annualactivity,1993

Public PrivateNumberemployed 49.8 50.2Annualamountofworktime 46.0 54.0Totalprincipalworktime 45.7 54.3Above+annualamountofextrawork 43.344.156.7-55.9Above+agriculturalsmall-scaleproduction 32.433.167.6-66.9Above+labour-exchangebetweenhouseholds 31.732.368.3-67.7Above+non-wageddomesticwork 16.917.283.1-82.8

added,for64percentoftotalworktime.Theannualestimateindicatesthatpublic-sectoroutputwas2to3percentlessthanthevalueoftheMarchestimate.Theinclusionoftheexchangeoflabourbetweenhouseholdsinthemodelhardlyincreasestheweightoftheprivatesector.Buttakingnon-wageddomesticworkintoconsideration,theshareofthepublicsectorbyworktime,accordingtoourcalculations,wouldbejustasixthoftheoutputofthewholeeconomy(Table4.2).Itisevidentthattheproportionofthepublicsectorestimatedonthebasisofboththenumberemployedandtheamountofworktimehasconsiderablydiminishedsincethebeginningof1991.

WeightofthePublicandPrivateSectorsinIncomes

Inestimatingthedistributionofhouseholdannualincome,wehavedistinguishedtwomaintypesofincome:non-redistributiveincomefromemploymentandredistributiveincomeindependentofemploymentandprovidedbythestatesectorsuchaschildcareallowance,pensions,incomesupport,etc.(Fábián,1994).Thus,thestatenotonlyprovidesdirectincometoemployeesbutalsoprovidesincomethroughredistributivepolicies.

Incomefromthepublicandtheprivatesectorwasdefinedineach

casebythesourceofemployment.Thus,whenanentrepreneursellshisproducttothestate,theincomewillbeprivate,notpublic.Wehaveconsideredcompanieswithmixedownershippartoftheprivatesector.Theratioofpublictoprivateworkplacesin1992was46:54andin1993itwas48:52.Inthecaseofoccasionalincome(bonuses,travellingallowances,etc.)wehaveassumedthattheprincipalworkplaceisthesource.Inourcalculationswehaveproceededinthesamewayasfor

incomefromtheprincipalworkplace.Foroddjobs,weassumemostcomesfromtheprivatesectorandhavedivideditbetweenthepublicandprivatesectorsintheratioof20to80.Theonlyexceptionwasincomefromtips,whichwehavefullyincludedintheprivateeconomy.

Thedifferencebetween1992and1993calculationsisthatinthelattercasewedidnotconsidertheso-calledotherformsofoccasionalincome.Thisdifference,however,doesnothavemuchinfluenceonthecalculatedsectorialproportions.

ComparingthedataoftheHouseholdPanelof1993andthemacro-statisticalreportoftheCentralStatisticalOffice,wefoundthattherewereabout400thousandmillionforintsmissingintheHouseholdPaneldata(Bedekovicsetal.,1994).Thisisduetoincomefromentrepreneurialprofit,small-scaleagriculturalproductionandextraworkwhichcomesmainlyfromtheprivatesector.Inordertobringthedeficientincomecategoriesclosertothemacro-statisticaldatatheyweremultipliedbyacoefficientcalculatedasthedifferencebetweenthemeasuredandtheunexpectedsizeofincome.

Duringtheperiodunderinvestigationtherehavebeenchangesinthesectorialdistributionofhouseholdincome.Incomefromtheprivatesectorhasincreased7percentinlinewiththereductionintheweightofthepublicsectorbythatamount.Atthesametimetheshareofredistributiveincome,32percent,hasnotchanged.Leavingasideredistributiveincome,thereisaboutan11percentdifferenceinannualhouseholdincomeinfavouroftheprivatesector.

FeaturesofthePrivateSector

Thegreatestexpansionoftheprivatesectortookplaceintheindustrialsectorsoftrade,building,andtheninservices.Thesearesectorsthathavebeengrowinginmarketeconomiestoo(Figure4.2).

Employmentintheprivatesectorisaboveaverageinindustryandagriculture.Itiswellbelowtheoverallnationalaverageintransport,educationandhealth,fieldswherepublicemploymentishighinmarketeconomiestoo.

TheHungarianHouseholdsurveycanprovideasocio-economicprofileofthepublic/privatesectordivisionoftheworkforceinthreebranches:industryandbuilding,agricultureandtrade(cf.Rose,1985).Womenarefounddisproportionatelyinthepublicsectorinallthreebranches,andespeciallyintrade,wherewomenareinamajorityinboth

Figure4.2Publicandprivatesectorsbyeconomicbranch

Source:1993HungarianHouseholdPanelSurvey;numberofresondents:2,218

thepublicandprivatesectors.The3percentofgypsyrespondentsinthesamplewerealsomorelikelytobeworkinginthepublicthantheprivatesector.

Asforeducation,workersinthepublicsectorineachofthethreebranchesaremorelikelytohavehadonlyanelementaryeducationandlesslikelytohaveachievedahighereducation.Itisspeciallynoteworthythatinprivatetradethereisanunusuallyhighproportionofwell-educastedpeople.Thissuggeststhatforyoungerpeoplewithahighlevelofeducationalattainmenttradeisarefugefromunemploymentand/orasuitablestartingpointforanindependentexistenceinthelabourmarket.Thelatterassumptionisconfirmedbyabreakdownbyage.One-fourthofworkersemployedinprivatetradeareunder25,andmorethanhalfofthemareunder35.Inthebuildingindustryalso,theproportionofyoungworkersemployedintheprivatesectorishigherthanthatinthepublicsector.

Theaverageannualincomeofworkersvariesintwodimensionsbythebranchoftheeconomyandbywhetherapersonisinthepublicor

privatesector.Tradeshowsthebiggestdifferencebetweenpublicandprivatesector:thoseinprivatetradehaveanannualincomehalfagainasgreatasthoseinthepublicsector(Figure4.3).Thoseinprivateindustryonaverageearnmorethanthoseinpublicindustries,butthedifferenceisonlyafewpercent.Agricultureisthelowestpaidbranchofthe

Figure4.3Individualincomeinpublicandprivatesectors

Source:1993HungarianHouseholdPanelSurvey;numberofrespondentsincludedhere,1,065

economy;withinthisbranch,thoseinthepublicsectorearnmorethanagriculturalistsworkingintheprivatesector.

Therearealsosubstantialdifferencesinincomewithineachbranchandwithinthepublicandprivatesector.Incomedifferencesareleastinindustry,andthisistrueofbothpublicandprivatesectors.Whilethemeanlevelofincomeislow,thereisarelativelywidebutevenspreadofincomesamongthoseworkinginboththepublicandprivatesectorsofagriculture.Intrade,theincomeofthoseinthepublicsectortendstobefairlywidelydistributedwithatendencytoover-representthosewithwagesjustbelowaverage.Intheprivatesectoroftrade,thereissomeevidenceofpolarization,asathirdareinthetopquintileofincome,butthoseinthebottomquintilearehalfagainasnumerousasthoseinthebottomquintileinothercategories.

Inaneconomyintransformation,beingintheupperhalfoftheincomedistributiondoesnotnecessarilyprovideasufficiencyofincome,andtherearemanypotentialstrategiesthatworkerscan

exploretoaugmenttheirincomes(Figure4.4).Themostfavouredwayofsecuringextraincomeisbyworkingovertime,whichisdoneby28percent.Ofcourse,thisisonlypossiblewhereworkershavestrictlydefinedlimitsfornormalworkingtime;hence,workingovertimeistwiceasfrequentinindustryandbuilding(36percent)thaninagriculture,wherethereare

Figure4.4Strategiestoearnextraincome

Source:1993HungarianHouseholdPanelSurvey.Percentagesrefertototalinindustry,

building,agricultureandtrade;totalnumber,1,072

dailyroutinesbutnohourlylimitonthetimeintheworkingweek.Tradersinboththepublicandprivatesectorsarealsobelowaverageinworkingovertime,becausetheirjobsoftenhavenohourlylimit.Gettingasecondjobisthesecondcommonestalternativeforsupplementingincome,especiallyamongthoseinprivatetrade,andalsodisproportionatelyfoundamongthoseinpublicindustryandpublicagriculture.

Entrepreneurialactivityismostoftenfoundamongprivatetraders,andleastoftenfoundamongfarmers.Giventheconditionsofentrepreneur-shipinasocialistorpost-socialisteconomy,suchactivitiesaremorelikelytoresemblewildcapitalismthanlong-terminvestment.Thoseinindustryandbuildingareunlikelytobemakingmoneybymakingdeals,whetherinthepublicorprivatesector.Inshort,tradersintheprivatesectorarelikelytobeextroverts,lookingoutsidetheirnormalroutinestomakemoremoney,whereasthosein

industryandagriculturearemorelikelytoseekmoremoneybyworkingmorehoursattheirprincipalplaceofemployment.

Insocialisteconomieswageswereoftensupplementedbythedifferentialrewardofbenefitsinkind.Somebenefitscouldbesuppliedbythefirmtoallworkers;thisstrategywasusefultoavoidthelossoflabourtootherenterprises.Asecondalternativewastoawardbenefitsselectivelytothemostproductiveworkers.Neithercriterionisthatusedbysocial

Figure4.5Socialservicesprovidedbyemployers

Source:1993HungarianHouseholdPanelSurvey.Percentagesrefertototalinindustry,building,

agricultureandtrade;totalnumber,953

ministries,theprovisionofbenefitsaccordingtoneed.Thecommonestbenefitismealsatwork,andamajorityofemployeesinallbranches,privateandpublic,receivesubsidizedorfreemeals(Figure4.5).Industryismostlikelytoprovidemedicalcare,buteventhenonly30percentinthisbranchoftheeconomysobenefit;thedifferencebetweenpublicandprivatesectorsisonly4percent.Intradeaneighthreceivemedicalcareandinagriculture,lessthananeighth.Inacommandeconomy,industrialenterprisescouldoffershortagegoodsasanincentivetoproduction.Inamarketeconomy,higherwagesisthenormalmethodofincreasingconsumption;thosemostlikelytobenefitbybuyinggoodsatareducedpricearetraders.

ComparisionswithOtherTransitionEconomies

ThesizeoftheprivatesectorinHungarycanbeevaluatedbycomparisonsacrossspaceaswellastime.Comparisonscanonlybeapproximate,because,whileahiddenprivatesectorhasexistedinall

formersocialistcountries,itwasoftenofficiallydeniedandrarelythesubjectofsystematicinvestigationthatcouldbegeneralizedtothenationallevel.Hungarianresearchershavebeenverymuchinthevanguardinthisfield.

PriortothecollapseoftheSoviet-drivencommandeconomy,theprivatesectornormallyaccountedforlessthan10percentoftheofficialGDP.InCzechoslovakiain1989itwasestimatedtoaccountforonly4percent.Hungarywasthereforeexceptionalinitsprivatesectoraccountingforone-fifthoftheeconomy.InPolandtheproportionwasevenhigher,29percent,duetoagricultureremaininginprivatehandsthere.IntheformerYugoslavia,thedoctrineofworkersself-management'recognizedandoftenencouragedprivatesectoremployment(Árvay,1994).

Afterthechangeofregime,eachcountryhasputthedevelopmentoftheprivatesectorasacentralplankofeconomicpolicy,andthishasbeenapriorityorconditionofWesterneconomicaid.By1993,HungaryhadcaughtupwithPolandinhavingatleasthalfthelabourforceintheprivatesector;thetwocountrieswerealsointhevanguardinprivateemployment.IntheCzechRepubliconlyathirdofthelabourforcewasintheprivatesectorandinBulgariaone-tenth.Thelogicofmarketizationisthatprivatesectoremploymentwillexpandinalloftheformercommandeconomies,andthehiddeneconomywillincreasinglybecomerecognizedandintegratedinofficialstatistics.Butbecausethetempoofchangeisvariable,itisfairtodescribeHungaryasaleaderratherthanalaggardinadvancingfromasocialisttoamarketeconomy.

References

Árvay,János,1994.TheDimensionofPrivateandHiddenEconomies.InTheNationalEconomicWeightofPrivateandHiddenEconomies.ASurveyfortheStatePropertyAgency(ÁVÜ).Budapest:InformaticsCentreforSocialResearch(TÁRKI),May.

Árvay,JánosandVértes,András,1994.TheWeightofPrivateEconomyinGDP.InTheNationalEconomicWeightofPrivateand

HiddenEconomies.ASurveyfortheStatePropertyAgency(ÁVÜ),Budapest:InformaticsCentreforSocialResearch(TÁRKI),May.

Árvay,JánosandVértes,András,1994a.Amagángazdaság[PrivateEconomy].InR.Andorka,K.TamásandV.György,eds,Társadalmiriport1994[SocialReport1994].Budapest:InformaticsCentreforSocialResearch(TÁRKI).

Bedekovics,István,Kolosi,TamásandSzivós,Péter,1994.Jövedelmihelyzeta90-esévekelso

*felaében[IncomeSituationintheFirstHalfoftheNineties].InR.Andorka,K.TamásandV.György,eds,Társadalmiriport1994[SocialReport1994].Budapest:InformaticsCentreforSocialResearch(TÁRKI).

Fábián,Zoltán(1994).TheWeightofthePublicandPrivateSectorsinthePopulation'sIncomes.InTheNationalEconomicWeightofPrivateandHiddenEconomies.ASurveyfortheStatePropertyAgency(ÁVÜ).Budapest:InformaticsCentreforSocialResearch(TÁRKI),May.

Rose,Richard,1995.PublicEmploymentinWesternNations.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Sik,Endre,1992.FromtheSecondtotheInformalEconomy.JournalofPublicPolicy,12,2,153-76.

Chapter5ThePost-CommunistEconomicEliteGyörgyLengyel

ELITEtheorysuggeststwothesesaccountingfortherelationbetweenthetransformationoftheeliteandchangeinthepoliticalsystem.Thefirst,aweakthesis,isthatifthereplacementoftheeliteprecedestheprocessesofpoliticalchange,thiswillreducethesocialcostsofthetransformation.Thesecond,astrongthesis,assertsthatchangeoftheeliteisastructuralprerequisiteforthetransformationofthepoliticalsystem.Theprocessesofpoliticalchangebecomeirreversiblewhenafundamentalchangehastakenplaceinthemannerofrecruitment,thecompositionandtheinstitutionalconditionsoftheelite.

UsingtwoempiricalsurveysthischapterexaminestherecruitmentoftheHungarianeconomiceliteandthechangesinitscompositionbetween1990and1993.

1Thefirstsurveywasundertakeninthefirstquarterof1990,priortoparliamentaryelections.Itisarepresentativesampleof371topleaders,coveringtheeliteinthebankingsector,industrialenterprisesandtheeconomicministries.Thesecondsurvey,carriedoutinthelastquarterof1993,containsarepresentativesampleof342personsfromtheformerthreesegments,withtheadditionofseniormanagerialstaffofprivatecompaniesandmembersoftheparliamentaryeconomiccommittees.Duetothelimitedscopeofthedata,ourresearchresultsprovideinformationmainlyonthecompositionandprocessesofrecruitment;howeverthedataalsoallowustoilluminatetheimplicationsthatflowfromtheseprocesses.

ChangesintheSocio-EconomicProfileoftheEconomicElite

Asregardstheweakthesiselitechangeasthehistoricalpreconditionforthechangeofthepoliticalsystemonecancorrectlyassumethatitwasinpartduetothestartoftheelitechangebackinthe1980sthattheHungariantransitionwasaccompaniedbysmallersocialtensionsthantheRomanian,BulgarianorYugoslaviantransformations.Thisappliesbothtotheappearanceofthealternativepoliticaleliteandtochangesintheeconomicelite.ThechangeintheHungarianeconomicelitebeganinthesecondhalfofthe1980s,beforepoliticalchange(Szalai,1989).Therateofannualcirculationrosetomorethanoneandahalftimesasmuchasithadbeenatthebeginningofthedecade.TheavailableinformationrevealsnosuchchangeoccurredintheBulgarianandtheYugoslavianelite(Kostova,1992;Lazic,1992;Bartha-Martin,1995).

OneofthedistinguishingcharacteristicsoftherecruitmentoftheHungarianelitewashighstandardsofeducationalattainmentinthe1980s(SzelényiandSzelényi,1992),anditremainedsointhe1990s.Morethannineoutoftenoftheeconomicelitehavecompletedtertiaryeducation.However,theprocesseswherebythesediplomaswereobtainedhavechangedsignificantlybetween1990and1993.In1990two-fifthsoftheeconomiceliteobtainedtheirdiplomasthrougheveningandcorrespondencecourses;by1993thisratedroppedtoaroundone-fourth.

Anothercharacteristicimportantinthelastphaseofstatesocialismpartymembershiphadlostitssignificanceby1990.Asagainstfour-fifthsoftheeconomicelitein1987,amere13percentweremembersoftheSocialistPartyin1990.However,formerSocialistPartymembersamountedtothree-fourthsoftheeconomicelitein1990.Sincethen,thepercentageofex-SocialistPartymembershasdecreased,buttheystillmakeupoverhalfofthe

economicelite.

Therearesomevariationsamongthedifferentelitegroups(Table5.1).In1990formerSocialistPartymembersweremorelikelytobefoundintheministries(81percent)andleastlikelytobefoundinbanking(64percent).By1993thishadchangedquitedramatically,withonly43percentofthoseintheministriesand44percentinbankinghavingformerlybeenSocialistPartymembers.FormerSocialistPartymembersareover-representedintheleadershipofstateandprivatizedcompaniescomparedtoothersegmentsoftheeconomicelite(BöröczandRóna-Tas,1994).Table5.1showsthatin199074percentoftheeliteinstate

Table5.1:Socio-economiccharacteristicsoftheelite(%)1990 1993 Change

FormerSocialistPartymemberMinistry 81 43 38Parliament na 26 naBanking 64 44 20Enterprise(state) 74 70 4Enterprise(private) na 66 na(Total) (74) (56) (18)Under45yearsoldMinistry 30 48 18Parliament na 49 naBanking 59 55 4Enterprise(state) 29 29 0Enterprise(private) na 33 na(Total) (35) (39) (4)FatheraworkerMinistry 45 31 14Parliament 38 33 5Banking 33 25 8Enterprise(state) 55 38 17Enterprise(private) 42 50 8(Total) (50) (35) (15)MotheronlycompletedprimaryeducationMinistry 60 22 38Banking 48 23 25Enterprise(state) 78 43 35(Total) (68) (37) (31)FemaleMinistry 20 30 10Parliament na 5 naBanking 19 26 7Enterprise(state) 14 12 2Enterprise(private) na 9 na(Total) (17) (16) (1)

enterpriseswereformerSocialistPartymembers;thishaddeclinedbyonly4percentin1993.Therateofthosebeingformallyaffiliatedwithapoliticalpartyisonly16percent,andthemajorityofthesearemembersoftheParliament'seconomiccommitteeswhoareusuallyaffiliatedwithoneoranotherparty.

Since1989theelitehasbecomesomewhatyoungerwithleadersunder

45increasingby4percent.Chieflyaccountingforthiswastherejuvenationoftheeconomicpoliticalstaff.Justunderone-thirdofseniorministrypersonnelwereunder45in1990.By1993thishadincreasedby18percent;asimilarproportionoftheeliteinParliamentarealsounder45.Forenterprises,therehasbeennochangeintheageprofilealthoughtheproportionoftheeliteunder45isslightlyhigherintheprivatethanthestatesector.Inotherrespects,nosignificantdifferencehasbeenfoundbetweenleadersofprivateandstatecompanies(Matonite,1994).Asforrecruitment,thedividinglineisbetweenHungarianandforeignfirms(Barthaetal.,1992).Amongbankers,whohavealwaysconstitutedtheyoungestsegmentoftheeconomicelite,thepercentageofyoungleadersdroppedfrom59to55inthethree-yearperiod.

Aconsiderablechangeoccurredintheinter-generationalmobilityoftheeconomicelite.Acontentanalysisofeconomicleaders'biographiespublishedinapopulareconomicweeklyrevealsthatsocialoriginhasincreasedinimportanceinthepublicimagination.Inthemid-1980sonlyaquarterreferredtosocialorigin;intheearly1990stwo-thirdsdid(Révai-Molnár,1995).UnliketheirYugoslavandBulgariancounterparts,priorto1989theHungarianeconomicelitewascharacterizedbyhighstatusfamilybackgrounds(Kostova,1994;Lazic,1994).Thisappearstobeconnectedtothefactthatworking-classoriginnolongerplayedasignificantformalroleincadrepoliciesorasevidenceofpartyloyalty.ArelativelysmallproportionoftheHungarianelitehavehadworkerparentsandparentswhoonlycompletedprimaryeducation,andtheirnumberscontinuetodecline.In1990halftheeconomicelitehadworking-classfathers;by1993thatpercentagewasdownto35percent.

Thequestionisrightlyraisedwhethersignificantdifferencesinsocialstatuswerenotcausedbytheinstitutionaltransformationsthathavetakenplaceinthemeantime.Donewfractionsoftheelitethe

parliamentaryandprivatespherehaveradicallynewanddifferentsocialbackgrounds?Theresearchresultsdefinitelyrefutethisassumption.AmongtheMPsinvolvedintheeconomiccommittees,thereisahigherproportionofthosewithlower-statusparentsthanamongbankandministryleaders,whiletheleadersofprivatefirmsaremorelikelytobefromparentsoflowerstatusthanleadersofstateenterprises.

Whileearliersome60percentofseniorministryofficialsandoverthree-quartersofcompanydirectorshadmotherswhoseeducationdidnotexceedprimarylevel,theirnumbershavebeenreducedtoaround20percentand40percentrespectively.Thisfactismorecloselyconnectedtoacohorteffect,inasmuchasamongyoungerleadersparentalqualifi-

Table5.2:Oldandnewleadersintheeconomicelite(%)1990 1993

Risentoposition RisentopositionBefore1988

198890Before1990

1990-3

EconomicsectorsMinistries 31 69 11 89Parliament 5 95Banks 31 69 13 87Enterprises 57 43 na naEnterprises(state) na na 30 70Enterprises(private) na na 30 70(Total) (45) (55) (21) (79)Socio-economiccharacteristicsLeadersageunder45 22 46 24 43Eveningorcorrespondenceschool

39 40 27 27

Havingsecondaryeducation 3 6 6 4Workingclassorigin 55 45 45 30Mothersworkingashousewives

60 42 47 44

FormerSocialistPartymembers

73 76 76 50

cationsarenecessarilydifferentbecauseofthechangedhistoricalpatternsofeducation.Itcontinuedtoholdtrue,however,thattheHungarianeconomiceliteweremorelikelytocomefromthestrataofhigherstatusfamiliesthanleadersoftheBulgarianandYugoslavianeconomy.TherecruitmentoftheHungarianeconomicelitethusdivergedrelativelyearlyfromthecoursedeterminedbyEastEuropeancadrepolicyandbegantoapproachtheinternationalinter-generationalmobilitypatterninwhichthemajorityoftheelitecomefromupperandupper-middlestratafamilies.

Intermsofgender,overallthereappearstohavebeennochangeintheproportionofwomenamongtheeconomicelite.Table5.2showsthatinboth1990and1993theyaccountedforaroundone-sixthoftheeconomicelite.However,theunchangedaverageconcealseffectsdictatedbytheinstitutionalstructure(Nagy,1993).Therehasbeenanincreaseintherepresentationofwomenincertainsegmentsoftheelite,risingfrom20to30percentamongheadsofministrydepartmentsandfrom19to26percentamongbankers.Inthenewlyemergingsegments,suchastheeconomiccommitteesofParliamentandprivateenterprise,thenumberofwomenisconspicuouslylow,at5and9percentrespectively.Therehasalsobeenadropinthenumberofwomendirectingstateenterprises.Thetendencythatistakingshapesuggeststhatinlargeadministrative

organizations,inwhichtherateoffemalelabourishighanyway,womengetanincreasingshareinmanagement,whileintheseniormanageriallevelsofeconomicorganizationsandinpoliticaldecision-makingthereisnoticeablesocialdiscriminationagainstwomen.

ReplacementoftheEconomicElite

Didthereplacementoftheeconomicelitecontinueintheperiodoftransition?Yes;Table5.3showsthatfour-fifthsoftheeconomicelitehaverisentotheirpostssince.1990andthenumbersareevenhigherintheministries,banksandtheeconomiccommitteesofParliament.Thecorrespondingnumberamongcompanyleadersis70percent.Thishighrateofturnoverdatesfromtheendofthe1980s.Thesurveyofearly1990showedthatjustoverhalfoftheeconomicelitehadbeeninofficefornolongerthanthreeyearsatthattime,andthereweredifferencesbetweensectors.Newholdersoftoppositionsnumberedbelowtheaverageamongcompanyleadersandwayabovetheaverageinministriesandbanks.Thesehighfluctuationrateswerepossiblyattributabletothegovernment'sresponsetorecessioninthecaseofeconomicpositionsandtotheemergenceofatwo-tierbankingsystemwithrespecttobankers.

Studyingtheannualfluctuationrateor,moreprecisely,theproportionofleadersappointedinthepastyear,onefindsthattheirratesare38and36percentrespectively,oneandahalftimeshigherthanwasthecaseinthefirsthalfofthe1980s.Thefluctuationrateofministryandbankmanagersfarexceededtherateofcompanyleadersinboth1990and1993.In1993therewasaslightdropof9percentinnewlyappointedleadersinministriesandaslightriseinstatecompaniesfrom27to34percent.Newcomerstotheechelonofprivatefirmshadahigherrateat39percent,relatedtotheexpansionoftheprivatesphere.

Table5.3:Continuity:previousjobinthesamesector(%)

1990 1993 ChangeMinistry 79 58 21Parliament na 9 naBank 46 59 13Enterprise(state) 80 68 12Enterprise(private) na 42 na(Total) (73) (54) (19)

Intheeconomicelite,ifonecomparesthesocio-economicbackgroundsofthesub-groupappointedbefore1990withthatappointedsince1990,onecandetectafewspecificfeatures.Amongnewcomers,thenumbersofyoungerleadersandthosecomingfromwhite-collarparentsareconsiderablyhigher.Also,thereisasignificantdropfromthree-fourthstoaround50percentamongformerSocialistPartymembers.Moredetailedbreakdownsrevealthatthemajorityoftheold-timersinthetopechelonwerealsoappointedtotheirpostsinthelate1980s.

Furthermore,themajorityoftheeconomicelitehavehadcontinuousadministrativecareers:73percentoftheelitehadhadtheirpreviousjobinthesamesectorin1990(Table5.3).Seventy-ninepercentoftheministerialleadersand46percentofbankmanagersrosewithintheirownsectors,whilemostcompanyleadersascendedinsidetheirownfirms(80percent).Thedeclineinintra-sectormobilitybetween1990and1993wasmainlyduetothecontinuouscareerpatternsbeingbelowaverageintheeconomiccommitteesofmembersofParliamentandamongprivatefirmleaders.Thoughtherepresentationofsuchcareerpatternshasdecreasedamongtheseniorministerialstaffandcompanyleaders,itstillremainedpredominantandshowedariseinthestabilizingbankingsphere;newlyappointedleadersinthesesectorsdisplayednomarkedlydifferenttraits.

ElitePerspectivesonSocialandEconomicConditions

Asfarasonecaninferfromtheavailabledata,noimportantchangeoccurredintheelite'sopinionaboutthesocial-economicconditionsandtheirpersonalprospects.Earlyworkshowedthattheopinionsoftheleaderssharplydifferedfromthatoftheemployees,andithadnotchangedby1993.Thereisadifferencebetweentheeconomiceliteandtheadultpopulationingeneralconcerningself-evaluationandsocialcontent.Themembersoftheeconomicelitearefarmore

satisfiedwiththeircareers,livingstandardandfutureprospectsthantheaverage.Comparingtheopinionsoftheelitein1990to1993,itisstrikingthatmembersofthenewelitearemoresatisfiedthantheirpredecessorsinnearlyeveryaspectoflife.Table5.4showsthatdissatisfactiondeclinedby4percentforfamilyrelationsand37percentforfutureprospects.Themajorityweresatisfiedwiththeirwork,housing,socialstatusandfamilyrelationsin1990andby1993hadbecomeevenmoresatisfied.

Table5.4:Dissatisfactionwithintheeconomicelite(%)1990 1993 Change

Country'ssocio-economiplight 91 75 16Children'soutlook 59 25 34Futureprospects 51 14 37Levelofeducation 46 16 30Standardofliving 39 11 28Socialstatus 27 5 22Health 25 11 14Life-coursesofar 21 3 18Housing 19 15 4Work 16 6 10Interpersonalrelations 16 5 11Familyrelations 10 6 4

Theiruncertaintydecreased,buttheystillremaineddissatisfiedwiththecountry'seconomicperspectives.

Membersoftheelitejudgetheirownmaterialprospectsmorefavourably,buttheyaremorepessimisticregardingthegeneralpopulation.Table5.5indicatesthatbetween1990and1993theproportionoftheelitewhothinkthattheirfamilies'financialstandingwilldeterioratedropsby26percent,whereastheproportionwhothinkthatthepopulation'sfinancialstandingwilldeteriorateincreasesby10percent.

Afeelingofhelplessness,ill-luck,theconvictionthatonecanhardlylessenone'sburdens,whichcharacterizedabouthalfthepopulation,weretypicaloflessthanone-fifthoftheeconomicelite.Some30percentofthepopulationwereworriedabouttheirhealth,haveheadaches,constantnervousness,whilethecorrespondingrateamongtheeconomicleadersisone-fifth.ExhaustionanddepressionarementionedmoreoftenbytheeconomicelitethantheHungarianaverage,whichitselfishighin

Table5.5:Eliteattitudestowardsfinancialprospects(%)Inthenextyearsthefinaincialstandingof:

Family Population1990 1993 1990 1993

Deterioratesharply 4 2 10 13Deteriorate 44 20 47 54Notchange 28 57 20 23Improve 22 21 23 10Improvemassively 2 __ __ __

Table5.6:Entrepreneurs,populationandeconomicandeconomicelitefeelings(%answeringyes)

EntrepeneursaAdultpopulationb

Ioftenfeelexhausted,depressed 62 57 61ImostlyfeelIhavenoluck 38 53 19Iamalwaysrestless,nervous 33 31 20Thosewhowanttogetonmustbreaksomerules

64 78 49

aSource:VenturersandEntreprenurs,BKE-KSH,1993(N=1,473)bSource:HouseholdPanelSurvey,BKE-TÁRKI,1993(N=3,898)

comparisontointernationallevels.Around60percentofentrepreneurs,theeliteandtheadultpopulationreportthattheyoftenfeelexhaustedanddepressed(Table5.6).

Specialmentionmustbemadeoftheviolationofnorms,whichwithreservationcanbeusedasanindicatorofananomaloussocialstate.Overthree-quartersoftheadultpopulationregardeditasatruismthatanyonewhowishestogetonisforcedtobreachcertainrules.Thiscompareswithabouthalfoftheeconomicelitewhofoundthisstatementtrue.InHungariansocietyagreatmajorityofthepopulationandhalftheeconomicleadersregardthebreakingofnormsasprevalentandaconditionofsuccess.Whentheviolationofnormsisacceptedasgenerallyprevalentandentailingnosanctions,peoplemaysometimesadjusttheirbehaviouraccordingly.

Beneaththisphenomenon,onecanalsodetectstrategiesofsuccesswhichevadedlegalandmoralrules,sincetheeconomiceliteareabletoadaptthemselvestotherequirementsofinstitutionalbargainingandmarketnetworksalike.Theroleoftheformerseemstobereinforced,amongothers,bytheparadoxicalfeatureofcontractualdisciplineconditioningmarketrelationsamongcompanies.Onlyaninsignificant

fraction,7percent,notedthattheywereunabletopaytheirtradingpartners,whereas40percentcomplainedthattheirpartnerswereinarrearswithpayment.Thedifferenceinmagnitudeischieflyduetothefactthatindebtedcompaniesareconcentratedinthesectoroflargeenterpriseswhichareinfavourablepositionstobargain.

Therewasonepointaboutwhichtheopinionoftheeconomicelitehaschangedthedifferencebetweenestimatedandjustincome(Tóth,1992).Comparedtothemajorityofthepublic,whattheHungarianeconomicelite(Czirjáketal.,1994)regardedasacceptablewasnotthecutbackofleaders'incomeinabsolutetermsbutthemoderationoftherelative

Table5.7:Incomeestimatedanddeemedjust(forints)(1990) (1993)

estimated just estimated justTypist 100 100 100 100Skilledworker 142 160 124 150Entrepreneur 618 538 611 494Generaldirector 807 692 732 620Minister 683 760 627 725

incomeadvantagesofentrepreneursandcompanyleaders.Thismightatthesametimehaveredressedthefactthattheincomeofgeneraldirectorswasputbeforethatofministers.Thistendencyhelditsgroundintheearly1990s.Whatdidchangeafterthedevelopmentofatransitionaleconomywasthattheeconomiceliteconsideredthedifferencebetweentheirownincomeandtheearningsoftheemployeessmallerthaninthelatephaseoftheplannedeconomy.Inconnectionwiththisandincreasingsocialtensions,theeliteseemsinclinedtomoderateevenjustifiableincomedifferences(seeTable5.7).Sociologicalsurveysonincomes,however,donotsupportthisassumption(Andorkaetal.,1994),nordoesthepublicseedevelopmentsinthisway(Csepelietal.,1992).

Conclusion

Whatconclusioncanthenbedrawnconcerningthestrongthesisoftheinterrelationofelitechangeandregimechange?Researchsuggeststhatthepersonnelcompositionoftheelitehadchangedfullybytheearly1990s,withchangesalreadybeguninthelate1980s.Thelogicofeliteselectionwasalsomodified.Themostnoteworthychangebroughtaboutthedemotionoftheformalandcontextualaspectsofpartyaffiliation,andpossiblystrengthenedpersonalandcorporateloyalty.NewinstitutionalconditionsemergedastheeconomiccommitteesofParliamentnowseemtohaverealeconomic

politicalcompetenciesandprivatecompaniesemergeasanindependentsector.

Itmustbekeptinmindatthesametimethatthesuperiorityofstateenterprisesandredistributiveinstitutionsdidnotceaseinthetransitionaleconomyandvariousformsofstateinfluencesurvived,entailingthepreservationofconcomitantmanagerialbehaviour.Ithasalsotoberealizedthatalthoughthecompositionoftheeconomicelitechanged

fundamentally,thesocialbasisofrecruitmentremainedrelativelyunchangedandnarrowinregardtocareerpatterns,whileitnarrowedinrespectofinter-generationalmobility,socialcomposition,attitudesandinstitutionalcircumstancesoftheeconomicelite,containingoldfeaturesaswell.Thecautiousconclusionisthatthemodificationoftheeconomiceliteforeshadowsthepossibilitythatthereplacementoftheelitemightbethestructuralpreconditionforachangeoftheoverallsystem,butintheearly1990sitdidnotreachalevelthatwouldensuretheirreversibilityofthetransformationprocess.

1ThefirstsurveywasconductedbyTamásRozgonyiandtheauthorwithfundingsupportfromtheOTKA.Thesecondone,conductedbytheauthorwassupportedbytheOTKAandtheCentralEuropeanUniversityResearchSupportScheme.PálJuhász,DobrinkaKostova,MladenLazicandErzsébetSzalaiassistedinthepreparatoryaspectsofthisresearch.

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Chapter6TheMiddleStrataInTransformation

ZoltánFábián

MiddleClassesandMiddleStrata:PossibleDefinitions

ASOCIOLOGICALdefinitionofthemiddleclass(es)raisesanumberoftheoreticalandempiricalproblems.Forexample,classandstratificationtheoriesapproachtheirobjectfromdifferentperspectives.Classtheoriestrytodescribethemaingroupsofsocietyonthebasisoftheirfunctionalprocesses.AccordingtoErikOlinWright,formulatoroftheneo-Marxistclassparadigm,theoperationofmodernbourgeoissocietiesisbasedoncomplexmechanismsofexploitation.WrightandMartin(1987)mentionthreemechanismsbasedonownershiprelations,controloforganizationsandownershipofskills.Thefirstrelationdistinguishesbetweengroupswithandwithoutpossessions,i.e.thebourgeoisieandtheworkers.Thesecondallowstheidentificationofthegroupthatcontrolsorganizations,i.e.managers,asopposedtothoseundercontrol,namelyemployees.Skillassetsarepossessedbyexperts,asagainstthosewholackthem.Table6.1summarizestheschemaofclassesdefinedbyproductionrelations.

Table6.1:StructuralrelationsandtheschemaofclassesTypeofexploitation Apppropriationof

surplusProductionrelations

Capitalassets:ownershipofmeansofproduction

Profit Capital-labour

Controloforganizationassets

Loyaltydividend(wagetrajectories)

Manager-worker

Skillassets Rentcomponentofthewage

Expert-nonexpert

Thisgivesrisetothequestion:wheredoweplacethemiddleclasses?TheanswergivenbyWrightandMartinisasfollows:Withinthiscomplexmatrixofrelations,certainpositionsaresimultaneouslyexploitingalongonedimensionofproductionrelationsandexploitedalonganotherThesesimultaneousexploiting/exploitedpositionscorrespondtowhatincommonlanguageisgenerallycalledthemiddleclass(1987:7).Inotherwords,Wrightdefinesthemiddleclassesbytheircontradictoryclassposition.Whoeverappearsasexploiteralongonedimensionofthestructuralrelationsofsocietywhileappearingasexploitedalonganotherbelongstothemiddleclass(es).Insociologicaljargonitiscustomarytocallthebourgeoisieold,andtheclassesexploitingalongthetwootherdimensionsnewmiddleclass(forexample,Kriesi,1989).Thedistinctionisbasedonmonopolycapitalismappearingduringthetwentiethcenturytocreatetheconditionsforthedominanceofthenewmiddleclass,while,simultaneously,theoldmiddleclassrecedesintothebackground.

InhisclassicessayonsocialpsychologypublishedduringtheSecondWorldWar,ErichFromm(1941)explainedtherisetopowerofNazismbytheimpairmentoftheeconomicposition,andtheresultantsocio-psychologicalsituationoftheGermanoldmiddleclass.Hisreasoningalsobringsthereader'sattentiontotherelationshipbetweenthesocialpositionofthemiddlestrataandpoliticalstability(Fábián,1994a).InHungaryandanumberofotherformerstatesocialistcountriesthecompleteeliminationoftheoldmiddleclasswasaccomplishedbyFascism,andthenbytheCommunistgovernmentsthatcameintopoweraftertheSecondWorldWar.Withthecollapseofthestatesocialistsystems,astrangesituationarose.ThereorganizationandrecreationofthemiddleclasscalledoldinWesternsociologywasincorporatedintopoliticalagendas.Duringtheinitialstagesofthesystemtransformation,thecombinationofprivatizationwithcompensationforthatformerproperty-owningmiddleclasswas

oneofthemostimportantobjectivesoftheHungarianconservativecoalitiongovernments.Atthesametime,thetransformationdidnotleavetheold-newemployeemiddleclassuntouchedsincethetraumaticappearanceofmassunemploymentaffectednotonlyunskilledworkersbutalsoskilledworkersandwhite-collaremployeestoanaboveaveragedegree.

Othersclaimthatthecharacteristicgroupsofconsumersocietiesaretobeidentifiednotintermsofproductionrelationsbutintermsofstylesofconsumption.Afterall,consumptiononthelevelofthewholeofsocietynotonlyhomogenizesbutalsodifferentiatessociety.Inconsumer

societies,classaffiliationisdeterminednotbythevolumebutbythecultureofconsumption.Howevermuchmoneysomeonehas,spendingitwithoutacertaindegreeoftastebetraysaffiliationtoalowerclass.Asaresult,classboundariescanonlybeestablishedonthebasisofaninvestigationofthegivensociety'spatternsofconsumptionandtheirculturalsignificance.Intermsoftheirstylesofconsumption,themembersofthemiddleclasstrytoalignthemselveswiththoseabovethemonthesocialladder,whileendeavouringtoseparatethemselvesfromtheclassesbelow.Itisnotonlythesociologicaltrendsofinterpretativeorqualitativesociology(forexample,Fussele,1987)thatutilizesuchanapproach.Itsadherentscanalsobefoundwithinempiricalquantitativesociology,usuallyundertheheadingoflifestyle(forexample,Soebel,1981).

Researchonsocialstratificationstudiesthehierarchicalarticulationofsociallyrelevantdifferencesamongindividualsthatiscalledthesystemofinequalities.Agroupofindividualsisconsideredtoconstituteasocialstratumiftheyoccupytypicallysimilarpositionsalongthedifferentdimensionsofthesystemofinequalities.Naturally,decidingwhichdifferencestoconsiderimportantindetermininginequalitypresentscertainproblems,assystemsofsocialinequalityaredeterminedhistoricallyanddifferbetweensocietiesandepochs.However,sociologicalresearchhasidentifiedsomeregularitiesthataregenerallyapplicabletoindustrializedsocieties.Amongthemistheclosesimilarityoftheprestige-distributionofoccupations(Treiman,1977),orthespontaneousco-varianceofsocialadvantagesanddisadvantages(Lenski,1954).Mostoften,threerelativelyeasilymeasurablevariablesareusedforthemeasurementofsocialstatusincome,levelofeducationandprestigeofoccupation.However,manyarguethatitistheoreticallymoreappropriatetobringalargersectionofthesystemofsocialinequalitiesintotheperspectiveofscientificresearch(Kolosi,1984,1987a).

Twopointsareveryimportanthere.First,fromtheperspectiveofsocialstratificationresearch,thenumberofwaysthemiddlestratamaybedefinedisthesameasthenumberofimportantdimensionsofinequalityweexamine.Wemaydiscussthemiddlestrataaccordingtoincome,assets,levelofeducation,consumption,culturalactivity,power,etc.OursecondimportantpointisconnectedwithwhatLenski(1954)calledstatuscrystallization,orstatusconsistency.Theco-occurrenceofadvantagesanddisadvantagesisvariablenotonlyfromtheperspectiveofsocialhistorybutalsoacrossindividualsandsocialgroups,withtheresultthatthedegreeofstatuscrystallizationdiffersbythelevelofstrati-

fication.Differencesalongvariousdimensionsofstatus,suchasincome,levelofeducation,etc.aretermedstatusinconsistency.Lenskidefinedtheconceptasthehorizontaldimensionofstratification.WernerLandecker's(1987)hypothesisconcerningtherelationbetweenstatusinconsistencyandsocialhierarchywassummedupbyKolosi(1987b)asfollows:theextensivehorizontalandverticaldifferentiationofasocietyandrapidsocialchangebothdecreasethedegreeofstatuscrystallisation,andtheextremesofstratificationnecessarilyexperienceagreaterdegreeofcrystallisationthanthemiddlestrata(italicsadded).Thisisequivalenttotheclaimthatthelevelofstatusinconsistencyishigherinthemiddlestrata.

2ForthesakeofdrawingaparallelwemayreferbacktoWright'sobservationconcerningthecontradictorypositionofthemiddleclass.

Researchersstudyingthemiddlegroupsofsocietymayavailthemselvesofanumberofpossibleterminologies.Thereforewefinditexpedientforthereductionofterminologicalconfusiontobreakawayfromthelogicofeverydaylanguage,andtousethetermmiddleclass,alongwithclassingeneral,intheneo-Marxistandneo-Weberiansense.Thewidelyusedeverydayconceptofthemiddleclassismuchmorelikelytobebasedonanimplicitstratificationtheory.Itisourimpressionthatineverydaycommunication,amiddle-classpositionistakentorefertopeopleoccupyingamiddlepositioninsomedimensionofhierarchicalinequalities.However,whensociologistsspeakinthatsense,theyusuallyusetheexpressionmiddlestrata.

EmbourgeoisementandMiddleStrata

Fromtheperspectiveofthestabilityofmodernbourgeoissocietyand

itsmulti-partyparliamentarydemocraticpoliticalstructure,thedestinyofeconomicallyrelativelyindependentautonomousmiddlestrataisofdecisiveimportance.Historically,thedevelopmentoftheorganizationalsystemofbourgeoisdemocraciesandtheunfoldingofthecapitalistsystemofproductionhasbeenhandinhandwiththeeconomicandpoliticalemancipationofthemiddlestrata.Theconceptsofembourgeoisementandmiddle-classformationarenotsociologicallyidentical.Theconceptofbourgeoisieinvolvesarelativeeconomicautonomyandindependenceandaparticularformoflifeandmentality.3

TheempiricalseparationofthemiddleclassandthebourgeoisieiswelldemonstratedbythestructureofHungariansocietybetweenthetwo

WorldWars,whichFerencErdei(1980)calledadoublesocialstructure.Itisespeciallyapparentintheseparationofthegentrysectionofthemiddleclass,thatistheso-calledChristian-nationalisticmiddleclass,fromthebourgeoismiddleclass,whichwasrecruitedfromtheethnicallynon-Hungarianpopulation,forexampleGermansandJews.Theformergroupischaracterizedbyitseconomicandpoliticaldependenceonthestateandadministrativesectorandcorrespondingpoliticalinfluence,basedonfeudaloriginandstatusintheWeberiansense.Thecharacteristicfeatureofthebourgeoissectionwasitsownershipofmarketableassets,propertyandskills.Approachingthepresent,themiddle-classformationoftheKádárera,whichwasmadepossiblelargelybythedevelopmentofthesocalledsecondeconomyconnectedtomarketreform,alsopromotedtheprocessofembourgeoisement.Allofthat,withthewidespreaddevelopmentofenterpriseskillsandthegradualstrengtheningofcivilsociety,waspartofthesocialfoundationofthesystemtransformation.

TheproblemofembourgeoisementisoneofthemostcontentiousandsensitivetopicsinHungariansociology,andoftenmakesanappearanceonpartyagendasandinpoliticalslogans.Manyrefrainfromevenusingthetermbecausetheyfeelitisanoverused,elasticconcept,orbecausetheyfinditacceptableonlyinconnectionwithadeterminateperiodofsocialhistory,theendoftheeighteenthandthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcentury.However,embourgeoisementisatermthatsociologycannotsurrendertohistorians,asitaffordsagoodgraspofthemodernizationofthestructureofsociety,thetransformationofthesocietybasedonprivilegeslinkedtostatuscharacteristics,suchasethnicityandpartymembership,toacapitalistclasssociety.

InHungary,theeconomicallyindependentmiddlestratathatmayprovidethebasisfortheformationofautonomousmiddleclassesare

nowbeingcreated.Thereareanumberofpossiblescenariosforthecompositionandsociologicalprofileofthemiddleclass.Oneofthemainaimsoftheprivatizationstrategyformulatedbythefirstdemocraticallyelectedpost-CommunistgovernmentsinHungarywasthecreationofanationalproperty-owningbourgeoisiebythereorganizationandcompensationoftheformerproperty-owningmiddleclass.Anotherpolicyaimedatthemiddlestratashowsapreferencefortheinterestsoftheemployeemiddlestratumduringthedeconstructionofstateownershipbybringinginforeigncapital.Thiscreateslargeprivatizedcompaniesthatmodernizethedeficit-producingpublicsectorbyimprovingproductivityandwhichactascreatorsofemployment.Thepoliticalrisksofthelatterstrategy

atemporaryincreaseinunemployment,xenophobia,etc.areobvious.InHungarytheabovetwoscenariosarebeingrealizedtogether.

TheExpansionofthePrivateSector

Ownersandentrepreneurs:rebirthoftheoldmiddleclass

ThedistinguishingfeatureofKádár'ssoftdictatorship(theso-calledgoulashCommunism)wasthatitallowedawidestrataofsocietytomaintainorimprovetheirstandardoflivingbyactivitiesintheso-calledsecondeconomy.Thesocio-structuralroleofthesecondeconomywasrecognizedbyHungariansociologistsrelativelyearly.Alongwiththestructuredefinedbythestate-redistributiveeconomy,theirmodelsalsotookaccountoftheroleofthesecondeconomy,theactualmarketconditions(SzelényiandManchin,1986;Kolosi,1987a).Kolosi(1987:151)foundthatduringthefirsthalfofthe1980s,three-quartersoftheactivepopulationparticipatedinthesecondeconomybyundertakingsomesortofincome-generatingactivityoutsidethestatesector.Followingthesystemtransformation,thevariousformsofsecondeconomyactivities,especiallysmall-scaleagriculturalproductionforthemarketandcasualwork,havedeclinedinimportance.Examininghouseholdsengagedinsmall-scaleagriculturalproduction,Spéder(1994:80)reportedthatthepercentageofthoseproducingforthemarketaswellwas27.5percentin1987.Thatfiguredecreasedto14.5percentby1992,whiletheproportionofhouseholdsproducingonlyfortheirownconsumptionincreased.Thetendencyprobablyreflectsnotonlytheappearanceofmassunemploymentandthecrisisofagricultureintransformation,butalsoaproportionofthoseonceengagedinthesecondeconomyhavenowenteredtheprivatesectorastheirprimaryoccupation.Thathypothesisissupportedbyanumberofindicatorsthatshowtheexpansionoftheprivatesectorattheexpenseofthepublicsector.ThesubjectisgivenadetailedtreatmentbyTamásKolosiandEndreSik

inChapter4inthisvolume,andinthestudyofthedevelopmentoftheprivatesectorbyTÁRKIandEconomicResearchLtd.(TÁRKIandGKI,1994).Thevariousapproachesinthisvolumethoughpreparedusingverydifferentmethodologiesandresearchhypotheseshaveallledtosimilarconclusions.TheproportionoftheprivatesectorwithintheHungarianeconomywasaround60percentin1993.TheproportionoftheHungarianandforeignprivatesectorwithintheproductionoftheGDP

Figure6.1Proportionofentrepreneursintheeconomicallyactivepopulation,198293

Sources:aKolosiandRóbert,1991:6;bKolosietal.,1993:13

wasestimatedbyJánosÁrvayandAndrásVértesat56to63percent.TamásKolosiandEndreSikestimatedthattwo-thirdsofthetotalworkinghourswerespentintheprivatesector.Iestimatedtheproportionofprivate-sectorincomeinthetotalincomeofhouseholdsat45percent.Ifweexcludefromconsiderationincomeofaredistributivetype,towhichthedistinctionofprivateandpublicsectorsisnotapplicable,thatproportionrisesto66percent.

Fromtheperspectiveofthischapter,indicatorsattestingtotherebirthoftheoldmiddleclassareparticularlyimportant.Thedominanttendencyisthestrengtheningofentrepreneurialinclination.In1988,25percentofsubjectssaidtheywouldliketobeentrepreneurs;twoyearslaterthefigurehadincreasedto44percent.Thegapbetweenaspirationsandactualbehaviourislarge,but,significantly,thenumberofpeopleactuallystartingabusiness

4alsodoubledbetween1989and1993asisshownbyFigure6.1.

ThepercentageofHungarianentrepreneurshadbecomeverysimilartothecorrespondingfigureinWesternEuropeandotherdevelopedcountriesby1993.Thatistrueevenifwetakeintoaccountthatwehavelumpedtogetherthetwolargegroupsofproprietorybourgeoisie:

employersandtheself-employedpettybourgeoisie.Theproportionoftheformergroupisaround1to3percentindevelopedcountries.Forexample,inFinlandtheproportionofentrepreneursemployingmorethantenpeoplewas1percent(BlomandKivinen,1989:20).KolosiandSik(1991)providesomeinformationconcerningtheinternaldivisionsofentrepreneurs.In1992,74percentofentrepreneurswereself-employed,19percentwereactiveownersofcompanies(managingalimitedcompanytheypartiallyowned)and7percentwerehelpingfamilymembersorwerepensioner-entrepreneurs.

SinceFigure6.1onlycontainspeoplewhoreportthemselvesasindependententrepreneursintheirprimaryoccupation,thenumberinvolvedinsomesortofentrepreneurialactivityisprobablylarger.In1991,forinstance,TÁRKIputthefollowingquestiontosubjects:Moreandmorepeoplethesedaysworkforcompaniesnotownedbythestate.Haveyou,orsomeoneinyourfamily,triedanyofthefollowing?Thequestionwasfollowedbyalistofvariousformsofenterprise.Ofthesubjectsandtheirhousehold,16.9percenthadtriedsomeformofenterprise.Inmostcasesthatmeantindependentproductionorserviceenterprise,orparticipationinalimitedcompany.

In1992,thelargestproportionofentrepreneurs,35percent,wereworkinginserviceindustries,24percentwereinretail,22inindustryand10percentinagriculture.Theremaining9percentwerefreelancenon-manuals(KolosiandSik,1992:10).Theproportionofindependententrepreneursisgreatestinthosesectorsoftheeconomywhichwereearliersurrenderedtothesecondeconomybytheredistributivesystem.

Employeesandthedevelopmentoftheprivateeconomy

Theexpansionoftheprivatesectorisconsiderableintermsofjobsaswell.In1992,nationally35.8percentofemployeeswereworkingintheprivatesector(seeTable6.2),andinBudapest46percent.

Examiningtheprivatesectorin1992thegreatestdifferencebetweennationalandBudapestfiguresisinthecaseofprivatelyownedcompanies.Theproportionofpeopleemployedinthatcategorywasover25percentinBudapest.Itisgenerallythecasethattheexpansionoftheprivatesectorisfastestinthecapital.There,theproportionofthoseemployedbycompaniesinforeignownershipisalsogreaterthanthenationalaverage.

Whenevaluatingtherateofincrease,however,itmustbetakenintoaccountthattheexpansionoftheprivatesectorhassofarbeendynamiconlyamongsmallandmediumcompanies,whileitremainedveryslow

Table6.2:Thedistributionofearnersbythetypeofworkplace

1992 1993PublicsectorPubliclyfinancedinstitutions 22.1 16.1Publiccorporations 23.2 19.8Localgovernmentcompanies 5.2 5.9Traditionalcooperative 8.0 5.8State-ownedcompanies 5.7 8.9PrivatesectorPartlyprivatelyownedcompanies 9.3 12.5Privatelyownedcompanies 14.1 16.5Individualentrepreneursandenterpriseswithnolegalentity

12.4 13.8

(Total) (100)(100)Sources:1992:KolosiandSik,1992:21;1993:Kolosiet.al.,1993:18

amonglargeones(KolosiandSik,1992:10).Thatfurthersubstantiatestheclaimthatupuntil1993therateofdevelopmentoftheprivatesectorwasdeterminedlargelybynewenterprisesratherthanprivatization.

Intermsofthenationalityofownershipin1992,90percentofemployeesworkedforcompaniesentirelyinHungarianownership,8.7percentwerelocatedinpartHungarian,partforeign-ownedcompanies,whileonly1.4percentworkedforfirmsentirelyinforeignhands.Despitethehighlevelofworkingcapitalinflux,unparalleledintheregion,theproportionofforeignownershipisrelativelylowinthewholeoftheeconomy;insomesmallWesternEuropeancountriestheproportionofplacesofemploymentpartiallyorwhollyinforeignownershipreaches50percent.Therefore,theviewconcerningthedominationofforeigncapitalisunfounded(KolosiandSik,1992:10).In1993,theratioofthoseworkingfor

companiespartiallyorwhollyinforeignownershipdidnotreach20percenteveninthemoreprivatizedandcosmopolitanBudapest.

ChangeoftheIncomeDistributionandtheMiddleStrata

TheinequalityofincomeinsocietyismonitoredbytheHungarianHouseholdPanelStudy.Researchersaskedaboutallformsofincome,andtheirchanges,indetail(seeKolosietal.,1993).Despitetherelativereliabilityofthedata,itmustbeemphasizedthatdeclaredincomeisestimatedtobe3050percentbelowactuallevels.

Table6.3:Meanhouseholdpercapitaincome,1992and1994(1992) (1994)

Populationdeciles

Meanincome

(1991=100)Meanincome

(1993=100)

Bottom 4,617 128 4,600 1012 6,593 128 7,264 1053 7,677 125 8,873 1104 8,564 124 10,031 1125 9,394 124 11,073 1146 10,378 124 12,234 1147 11,721 125 13,694 1148 13,629 126 15,933 1169 16,858 127 19,806 117Top 28,649 127 33,920 118Top/bottomratio

6.21 __ 7.37 __

Sources:1992:KolosiandSik,1992:24.1994:Kolosietal.,1994:19

Ifwedividethepopulationintotengroupsofequalsizebylevelofincome,itbecomespossibletosketchthemaintendenciesoftheeffectsofthesystemtransformationonthedistributionofincomebetween1991and1994(Table6.3).Thedetailedstudyoftemporalseriesofincomedecilesrevealsthattheincomedifferentiationaccompanyingthesystemtransformationoccurrednotattheexpenseofmembersofthetwobottomdeciles,butatthecostofadeteriorationinthepositionsofthemembersofdeciles3to7.Thewidelyheldopinionthatduringthesystemtransformationthepoorbecamepooreristrueonlytoaverylimitedextent.Whiletherichbecamericher,itwasmainlythelowermiddlestratawhosecircumstancesdeclined,whilethemostdisadvantagedbottomtenthofthepopulationmanagedtomaintainitslevelofincome.Itwouldappearthattheeconomicburdenofthefirstperiodofthetransition

waslargelybornbythemiddlestratum,which,evenduringthelateKádárera,couldonlymaintainitsstandardoflivingbyenteringthesecondeconomyinaself-exploitativemanner.Itmaybearesultofthedisillusionmentofthosestratathatin1992,theHungarianDemocraticParty,thelargestpartyinthecoalitiongovernment,wasthemostunpopularamongthoseidentifyingthemselvesaslowermiddleclass(Róbert,1994:15).

Theprocesswherebythedifferentiationofincomewasbeingrealizedbytherichbecomingricherandthemiddlestratalosingground,whichhasbeenalong-termtrend,seemstobecomingtoahalt.Betweenthebottomandtopinequalitiesofincomeincreasedtoaconsiderableextentintheperiodbetween1992and1994,andthemiddle-incomegroupscouldattaingreatergrowthinincomethanlower-incomegroups.

IdentificationwiththeMiddleClassandSocialAttitudes

Theexplanationofbehaviourmusttakepsychologicalelementsintoaccountaswell.Oneoftheseimportantsubjectivefactorsisthesenseofidentity,whichisoftenrootedinthedeeplayersofhumanpersonality.

AccordingtotheresultsofWesternEuropeananalyses,indemocraticcircumstances,(AlmondandVerba,1963)citizensareconfidentthattheycanaffectthedemocraticinstitutionsbyrationalaction(participatinginelections)andbecausetheyholdthoseinstitutionspredictable(confidenceinthelaw).Theyarealsofreetopursueactivitiesincivilsociety(Berlin,1979).Thisrequireseconomicautonomyorindependence.Thepost-industrialcapitalistmiddleclassesmaintaintheirautonomybycontrollingassets(seeTable6.1).

Historically,thatimageofcitizenry(citoyen)connectedwithapoliticalcultureoriginatedatthetimeoftheFrenchRevolution.Thatageistheperiodofpoliticalstrugglebetween,ontheonehand,thenobilityandtheclergy,andontheothertheiropponent,thethirdestate(Bibó,1990).Justastheconceptofthethirdestateiswiderthanthatofthebourgeoisie,thepoliticalsenseoftheconceptofcitizendiffersfromtheconceptofthemiddleclassdefinedbypositionwithinthedivisionoflabourand/orsocialstratification.ThemiddleclassesofWesternsocietiescanbeconsideredratherhomogenousinthatsensethattheycanbecharacterizedbyacivicpoliticalculture.Insocietiesundergoingdelayedmodernization,suchasinCentralandEasternEurope,thesociologicalcompositionofthemiddleclassesismoreheterogeneous.Thedual,gentryandbourgeois,natureofthemiddleclassofHungariansocietybetweenthetwoWorldWarsisacaseinpoint.Thereasonoftencitedforheterogeneityintheirpoliticalcultureisthattheeconomicautonomyrequiredforcivillibertiesislackinginsomeformoranotherinthemiddlestrata

ofthesesocieties.

Totalitariansystemsstrivetocontrolthemembersofsocietytosuchanextentthattheyevendemandtherighttodeterminetheirpersonalidentities(Eros

*,1993).Inthestatesocialistsystem,foralongtimetheonlyelementsofsocialidentitythatcouldbepubliclyprofessedwerethoserecognizedbyCommunistideology.Bourgeoisbecameaforbiddencategoryandthewholeofthebourgeoisiewaspronouncedclass-alien.Theeffectofthestatemanipulationofidentitywascushionedtosomeextentbytheremainingsmallcirclesofliberty,the

familyandtheremnantsofcivicsociety,soinreality,traditionalelementsofidentityremainedinheritable(Bibó,1990;Szummer,1992).Themosteffectivemeansusedbystatesocialismtopreventthesurvivalofcitizens'politicalculturewastheabolitionofprivatepropertyandthemarketeconomy.Astheprocessesofreforminitiatedinthe1960sbegantotakeshape,theconditionsforapluralismofidentitieswerecreatedinparallelwiththerebirthofcivilsociety(Fábián,1992).

ThevalidityoftheabovelineofreasoningissupportedbytheempiricalanalysesofRóbertandSági(1994)whichshowtheroleofthesecondeconomyintheidentificationwithmiddleclassandbourgeoisie.Theirtime-seriesofdataalsoshowthatthenormativecontextoftheaboveelementsofidentitychangedafterthesystemtransformation.Afterthesystemtransformation,thecategoryofmiddleclassandofthebourgeoisiewasre-evaluatedinpoliticaldiscourse.Itsearlierpejorativeconnotationwaslost,notleastbecausethepartiesstartedanintensiveraceforthevotesofthosegroups.

Inhisanalysisoftheconnectionbetweenclassidentitiesandpoliticalattitudestowardsthesystemtransformation,PéterRóbert(1994)hasshownthatthesocialimpactofthesystemtransformationisevaluatedinamoredifferentiatedmannerbythoseidentifyingwiththemiddleclassthanwiththelowerclass,workingclassorlower-middleclass.Thelastrespondtotheincreasingsocialdifferencesresultingfromthesystemtransformationwithafrustratedpaternalisticattitude.Ascendingthesocialladder,refusalofaguardianstatebecomesthemorecharacteristicpoliticalattitudefromthelower-middleclassupwards.

OurportraitoftheHungarianmiddlestrataandtheeconomicandsocialprocessesaffectingthesesocialgroupsisnecessarilyfragmentaryincomparisonwiththetheoreticframeworksintroduced.

Summarizingourmainobservations,theeconomicburdenoftheinitialstageofthesystemtransformationwasbornebythelowerbandofthemiddlestrata.Thistendencyappearstobechanginginthe1993-4period,inasmuchasthebottom30percentinincomewasabletomaintainitslevelofincomeofthepreviousyearlesswellthanthemiddlestrata.AccordingtothesubsistenceminimumcalculationsoftheKSH(CentralInstituteofStatistics),theproportionofthepopulationlivingbelowthesubsistencelevelhastripledsince1989.Theprivatesectorhasexpandeddynamically,especiallyindependententrepreneursandprivate-sectoremployees,andinthecaseoftheformer,theynowapproachtheproportioninWesternEuropeansocieties.By1993,asignificantlowerandmiddleproperty-owningclass(petitebourgeoisie)haddevelopedinHungary.However,

theprivatizationoflargecompaniesprogressedatamuchlowerrate.Despitetheexceptionalinfluxofforeigncapital,onlyasmallfractionofjobsareprovidedbycompaniesinforeignhands.Intermsoftheinternaldifferentiationofthemiddleclass,this,alongwiththeunderdevelopedcharacterofthehomecapitalmarket,hindersthedevelopmentofanemployeeormanagerialnewmiddleclass.

1CommisionedbytheMinistryofWefare,TÁRKIexaminedthecircumstancesofmiddlestratafromSeptember1993toMarch1994.Thisessayformsapartofthesummaryreportonthatresearch(seeKolosi,Róbert,SágiandFábián,1994).

2Inhiscorrespondinganalyses(1987a,1987b),KolosifoundthatincomparisonwithDutch,WestGermanandCzechoslovakiansocieties,Hungariansocietyislesswellcharacterizedbyconsistentmiddlestrata.Inthe1980s,thedistinguishingfeatureofHungarianmiddlestratawaspreciselythathighlevelofinconsistency.Sincethesystemtransformation,thelevelofstatuscrystallizationhasincreasedinHungariansociety(Fábián,1994b).However,wedonotknowwhateffectthatgeneraltrendishavingonthesociologicalprofileofthemiddlestrata.

3Itisworthnotingherethatcivilandbourgeois'aredenotedbythesamewordinHungarian,andconsequentlypolitical-culturalconnotations(e.g.civicculture)areoftenneglectedorconfusedwiththesocio-economicmeaningoftheword.

4Weshouldmentionthattheabovefigurescontainso-calledforcedenterpreneurs,whoareactuallyemployeesandonlyfigureasindependentstosecurebetternationalinsuranceandtaxterms.Wedonothavereliabledataaboutthesizeofthatgroup.

5Wemayalsonotethatquestionnairestudiesarenotsuitableforinvestigatingtheverytopandverybottomlayersofsociety,thehomelessandthehighestgroupsoftheelite,astheyaretechnicallyimpossibletoreach,andthechancesofmembersofthosegroupsoccurringinasampleareminimal.About400billionForints(approximately$4.3billion)aremissingincomparisonwiththemacro-statisticaldata,mostofwhichcomesfromtheprivatesector(Kolosietal.,1993).

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Chapter7ConsciousnessofInequalityPéterRóbert

THEinvestigationofsocialinequalitieshasbeenoneofthecentralsubjectsofsociologicalresearchforalongtime.HowhasthesystemofrelationspertainingtosocialinequalitybeenreshapedbytheeconomicandpoliticaltransitioninHungary?Sociologistsmayattemptananswerbymeansofmeasuringthesocialstatusofpeople,thatisvariouscharacteristicsrelatedtotheiroccupation,qualifications,incomes,consumptionorlivingcircumstancesanddrawtheirconclusionsasregardsthedistancebetweenvarioussocialgroups.Itisalsopossibletoaskpeoplehowtheythemselvesperceivetheirpositionandwhethertheircircumstancesandopportunitieshaveimprovedordeteriorated.Manyconsidersocialfacts,thatisdataoninequalitiesanddistancesbetweensocialgroups,tobeascientificallymorevaluableandreliablesourcethanwhatcanbeinferredfrompeople'sownfeelingsandimpressions.Yetsincesocialinequalitiesmanifestthemselvesaspoliticalproblems,thelatterapproachisequallyrelevant,sincepeople'spoliticalpreferencesandvotingbehaviourarefarmoredeterminedbytheirfeelingsthanbythewaysocialscientistschoosetodescribethem.Moreover,people'sopinionsandattitudesmayalsobeconsideredsocialfacts.Consequently,thereflectionofsocialinequalitiesonthesubjective,individuallevelisanobjectivephenomenonwhichrequiresanalysis.

ThisstudyattemptstopresentsomeaspectsofinequalityconsciousnessinHungariansocietyintheearly1990s.Theavailabledataprovideanoverviewofpeople'ssubjectiveclassidentification,wheretheyplacethemselvesintheHungariansocialhierarchy,which

factorstheyconsidersignificantfordeterminingchangesofsocialstatusandwhattheirfeelingsareaboutthesocialinequalitieswhichhaveresultedfrom

thetransition.Whenpossible,tablespresentdatafrombeforeandafterthetransition.Thesourceisthe1992mobilitysurveyconductedbyTÁRKI(SocialResearchInformaticsCentre)andtheISSP(InternationalSocialScienceProgram).

ClassIdentification

Themostgeneralreflectionofinequalityconsciousnessisclass-consciousness:withwhichsocialclassdopeopleidentifythemselves?Analysesofsocialstructureandtherelatedtheoreticaldebateshavebeencharacterizedbyaconstantfluctuationbetweenclass-basedandstrata-basedapproaches.2Classself-identificationhasbeensuccessfullyusedinpublicopinionpollsandattitudesurveysaimedattheanalysisofpoliticalopinionsinnearlyallsocieties.Sometimesthecategoriesusedinthesesurveysonlymakeadistinctionwithinthedichotomyofworkingclassandmiddleclass,butasaruletheydistinguishbetweenlowerclass,workingclass,middleclassandupperclass.Whileitisanobviousfactthattheseclasspositionsarequiteheterogeneousempirically,theyneverthelessmakesenseaswordsstimulatingageneralconsciousnessofidentifyinthemajorityofpeople.Identificationwithclassesmaybeconsideredthewayinwhichclassformationprocessesofthetransitionperiodarereflectedinpeople'sconsciousness.TheHungarianpraxishasshowntheneedtocompletetheclassificationwiththelower-middleandupper-middleclasseswhichprovidesforamoresophisticatedrangeofchoicesandthusregisterssubtlerdifferencesinasocietyundergoingarealeconomicandsocialtransition.

Withrespecttoclass-consciousnessforthreeconsecutiveyears(1991,1992,1993)3therearefluctuationsinthedata,somewithintherange

ofsamplingerrorandsomestatisticallysignificant.Alineartrendcanonlybeseenwithregardtothelowerclasswhichisgrowingmoderately,butstilllowerthanthemeasurebasedonanswerstoquestionsaboutwhethertherespondentlivesbelowtheminimumsubsistencelevel(Table7.1).

Thedatarevealamajordecreasefollowedbyaminorincreaseintheidentificationwiththeworkingclass.Inanycasethisisthemoststablesocialgroup.AsTable7.2shows,two-thirdsofthesamerespondentsaskedin1992and1993identifiedthemselveswiththeworkingclassinbothyears.Asamatteroffact,thereseemstobeamarkedfluctuationbetweentheworkingclassandthelowerclass.Forty-sixpercentofthosewhoidentifiedthemselveswiththelowerclassin1992cameto

Table7.1:Classidentification,1991-3(%)1991 1992 1993 (%change)

Lowerclass 7.2 9.4 10.0 (+2.8)Wokingclass 48.8 39.8 42.6 (-6.2)Lower-middleclass 17.6 16.1 185 (+0.9)Middleclass 23.8 31.9 27.6 (+3.8)Upper-middleclass 2.4 2.4 1.3 (-1.1)Upperclass 0.2 0.4 __ (-0.2)(N) (971) (2,953) (1,140)

identifythemselveswiththeworkingclassin1993;conversely,49percentofthoseidentifyingthemselveswiththelowerclassin1993hadclassifiedthemselvesasworkingclassin1992.

Inthecaseofthemiddleclassthetrendistheopposite:thereisamajorincreasebetween1991and1992,followedbyaminordeclinein1993.Thestabilityofthemiddleclassissmallerthanthatoftheworkingclass:50to60percentbetween1992and1993.Thesmallerstabilityofthemiddleclassisdueprimarilytothefactthatoneineveryfour(26percent)whoidentifiedthemselvesasmiddleclassin1992cametoclassifythemselvesaslower-middleclassin1993.Seenfromtheotheraspect,44

Table7.2:Changingclassidentificationin1992-3,panelsurveya(%)

(1993)LowerWorkingLower-

middleMiddleUpper-

middle1992Outflow

Lower 42 46 5 7 __Working 12 66 10 12 __Lower-middle

9 38 32 21 __

Middle 2 18 26 51 3Upper-middle

__ (8) (8) (76) (8)

InflowLower 29 8 2 2 __Working 49 64 23 19 (8)Lower-middle

15 15 30 14 __

Middle 7 13 44 59 (64)Upper-middle

__ __ 1 6 (14)

Upper __ __ __ __ (14)aN=1,140.Boldfiguresexpressstableclassidentification.Bracketednumbersarevaluesbasedonsuchasmallnumberofcasesthattheyareunreliable

percentofthelower-middleclassof1993hadconsidereditselfmiddleclassin1992.InHungary,thelower-middleclassisinfacttypicallythebufferzonewhich,accordingtoGiddens(1973),delimitsthemiddleclassfromthelower-statusworkingclass.Itsstabilityissubstantiallysmaller(30percent)thanthatofeithertheworkingclassorthemiddleclass.Thisisthespherewherethetwo-waymobilityofclassesactuallyoccurs.

Elsewhere,wehaveanalysedstatisticallythesocial-demographicaldeterminantsofclassformation,identificationwiththemiddleclassinparticular(RóbertandSági,1994).Thatanalysisrevealedthesignificantandunchangingeffectofoccupation,qualificationsandevensocialbackgroundonbelongingtothemiddleclass.Fluctuation,however,waslargelyaresultofthegrowingroleofmaterialfactors(income,wealth)indeterminingidentificationwithacertainclass.Financialstatushadsomeimpactpreviously,butmereparticipationinthesecondeconomyembodiedanalternativechanceforrelativeindependenceandmaterialaffluencewhichgavepeoplethesenseofhavingmadeamajorsteptowardsthemiddleclass.Asaresultofthetransition,however,thesecondeconomyiscontracting.TheprivatizationofstateindustrybringsabouttheendofworkinginEnterpriseBusinessCommunities,inwhichpeopleemployedbyorretiredfromastate-ownedcompanydoseparateworkforthecompanyoncommission.Oneofthemainareasofthesecondeconomywasthesmall-scaleproductionofagriculturalgoodsathome,butbasedonresourcesoftheco-operative.Theliquidationofagriculturalco-operatives,turningagricultureintoacrisisbranchoftheeconomy,meansthathouseholdfarmingcannotbecontinued.Thesechangesexplainwhyearlierrelativeaffluencehasdepreciatedandagreatnumberofthosewhosemiddle-classexistencewasbasedonthisrelativesecurityandconsumeraffluencefeelthattheyaresuddenlygoingdownhill.Asthepossibilityofparticipationbecomes

availabletoanevernarrowingcircle,thelessinfluencethisfactorhasonclass-consciousnessandthemorefactorssuchaswealthandmaterialconsumptionhavecometodetermineclass-consciousness.

PlaceontheSocialLadder

TherearepeopleinHungaryinhigherandlowersocialpositions,respectively.Youcanseealadderinthispicture.Ifthetopstepoftheladdermeansthoseinthehighestpositionandthebottomstepmeans

thoseinthelowest,wherewouldyouplaceyourselfonit?Weaskedthisquestioninasurveyconductedonanation-widerepresentativesamplefirstin1987,in1992andagainintheautumnof1993(RóbertandSági,1992).

TheHungariandatacouldalsobeevaluatedinaninternationalcomparison,asthesurveywasconductedwithintheframeworkofISSPresearch.Weconcludedthat,incomparisonwiththedataofdevelopedmarketeconomies.Hungariansfeelthattheirsocialstatushasimprovedmorecomparedtotheirparents',yetonaveragetheyevaluatetheirownstatusonthesocialladderashavingdeteriorated.Themorerecentdataenableustoshowhowtheevaluationofthesituationhaschangedinaperiodwhichincludesthepoliticaltransitionwithallitseconomicandsocialconsequences.

Peopleevaluatedtheirsocialstatusmoreunfavourablyintheearly1990sthantheydidbeforethetransition.Ona10-pointscalewith1thetopand10thebottom,in1987themeanratingforsubjectivestatuswas6.30.In1992,themeanratinghadfallento7.08.Itrecoveredto6.96inthefollowingyear,butwasstillmorethanhalfastepdownfromsixyearsearlier.Whiletherewasabroadstratum(30percent)onthefifthstepin1987,the1992and1993percentageofthoseatthislevelwaslessthan10percent.In1987,52percentoftherespondentswerelocatedonsteps5and6.Thesameproportionofpeoplearefoundonsteps6and7in1993.Whileafourthoftherespondentsplacedthemselvesonthelowestthreestepsin1987,theproportionwas40percentin1992and35percentin1993.However,thedeclineinsocialstatuswasalsomatchedbyadeclineininequality,asmeasuredbythestandarddeviation:itwas1.7in1987,fallingto1.6in1992and1.4thefollowingyear.

Wealsoexaminedfindingsinrelationtooccupation,qualifications,placeofresidenceandincome.Table7.3showsthatsocialstatusas

measuredbyobjectiveindicatorsisrelatedtosubjectiveevaluation:thehighertheoccupationalgrouponebelongsto,themoreeducatedoneis,themoreurbanthesettlementonelivesinandthehigherone'sincome,thehigheronewillplaceoneselfonthesocialladder.Ontheotherhand,thereisnotasingleoccupationalgroup,educationallevel,categoryofsettlementorincomegroupthatdoesnotfeeladeteriorationofsocialstatuscomparedtotheperiodprecedingthetransition.

Inthecaseofoccupation,managersfeltastrongerdeteriorationofsocialstatusthanintellectuals.Skilledworkersaretheothergroup,bothonthebasisofoccupationandqualifications,whichhasexperiencedamarkeddecline.Asonemovesdowntheslopeofurbanization,the

Table7.3:Meansubjectivestatusbysocial-demographiccharacteristics

198719921993Change(Mean:ahigherscoremeansworsesocialstatus,since1wasthetopstepoftheladder)Occupation

Agriculturemanual 6.72 7.94 7.34 -0.62Unskilledandsemi-skilledworker 6.63 7.46 7.26 -0.63Skilledworker 6.22 6.16 6.83 -0.61Self-employed 5.88 6.59 6.24 -0.36White-collarworker 6.08 6.71 6.55 -0.47Professional 5.49 6.09 6.13 -0.64Manager 5.49 6.46 5.97 -0.48

EducationBelow8years 7.12 7.68 7.77 -0.658years 6.33 7.62 7.41 -1.08Vocationalschool 6.16 7.13 6.97 -0.81Secondary 6.05 6.57 6.49 -0.44College 5.55 6.42 6.12 -0.57University 5.18 5.76 5.92 -0.74

PlaceofLivingVillage 6.52 7.41 7.34 -0.82Town 6.26 7.06 6.94 -0.68Countyseat 6.12 6.89 5.56 -0.44Budapest 6.03 6.56 6.55 -0.52

IncomeBottomquintile 6.65 7.41 na (-0.76)

¦ 6.74 7.65 na (-0.91)¦ 6.22 7.14 na (-0.92)¦ 6.14 7.02 na (-0.88)

Topquintile 5.81 6.23 na (-0.42)na:thequestionaboutincomewasnotincludedinthe1993questionnaire

inhabitants'perceptionoftheirsocialstatusdeteriorates.Thestructuralchangesintheindustry,andunfavourableprocessesinforeignmarketsarealldevelopmentswhichadverselyaffecttheskilledworkers'earlieropportunitiesforincomestrategiesbasedonparticipationinthesecondeconomy.Itisprimarilypeoplelivinginthecountrywhosesocialstatusisunfavourablyaffectedbythebankruptcyofagriculture.Themanagers'feelingofafallinstatusabovetheaveragemaybeexplainedbythefactthattheirreferencecategoryhasbecome,morethaneverbefore,theWestanditsmanagerialincomes,lifestylesandconsumptionlevels.

Theonlyfavourableresultisthatthedatashownofurtherdeteriorationofthesubjectivesocialstatusbetween1992and1993.Withrespecttooccupationitisonlytheintellectualswhoplacedthemselveseven

Table7.4:Internalstructureofsocialinequalityconsciousness(N=2,418,correlationcoefficients)a

(Subjectiveindicators)

IncomeCulture Occupation StatusSubjectiveindicators

Subjectiveincome 1.00Subjectiveculture .47 1.00Subjectiveoccupationalprestige

.42 .62 1.00

Subjectivesocialstatus .64 .59 .60 1.00Objectiveindicators

Occupation .23 .43 .42 .33Education .27 .50 .45 .37Income .24 .21 .23 .24Placeofliving .08 .17 .15 .10Age -.12 -.14 -.09 -.11Subjectiveclass .39 .45 .42 .46

aAllcorrelationsaresignificantatp<.001

loweronthesocialladderin1993thanayearbefore,whilewithrespecttoqualificationsitisthoseholdinguniversitydegreesandthosewithoutanyeducationwhodidso.Elsewherethedataaresimilarorsomewhatbetterthanpreviouslybutoftenwithinthemarginofsamplingerror.

Sincestatusisamulti-dimensionalphenomenon,wehaveattemptedtodistinguishthemostsignificantdimensions.Consequently,intheTÁRKImobilitysurveyofspring1992peoplewereaskedtoplacethemselvesona10-stepladderaccordingtotheirfinancialstatus,theireducationandculture,theiroccupationalprestigeandfinallyaccordingtotheirsocialstatus.Themeanratingforfinancialstatuswas4.1;forsocialstatus4.5;occupationalprestige,4.7;andfor

educationandculture,5.1.Thereisadifferenceofonewholestepinthemeansforfinancialstatus,whichishighest,andculture,whichislowest.Generalsocialstatusisthemostcloselyrelatedtofinancialstatus:thetermsocialstatusmakespeoplethinkmostlyoftheirfinancialstatus.Thereisonlyarelativelysmallcorrelationbetweensubjectivefinancialstatusandsubjectivestatusinthehierarchyofculturalandoccupationalinequalities(Table7.4).Thelattertwovariables,however,haveamoremarkedcorrelation.Onedimensionofinequalityconsciousnessisfinancialstatus,whiletheotherdimensioniscultural,educationalandoccupationalstatus.

Theevaluationofone'ssituationwithrespecttofinancialinequalitiesistheleastconnectedtosocial-demographicvariablesandclass-consciousness.ThecorrelationcoefficientsinthelowerpartofTable7.2

show,accordingtotheobjectiveandsubjectiveindicatorsofsocialstatus,thatinequalityconsciousness(exceptingthedistinctiveexperienceoffinancialstatus)isconsistentlyhighlycorrelatedwithoccupation,educationandclass-consciousness,moderatelycorrelatedwithincomeandweaklycorrelatedwiththeplaceofresidenceandage.Thedirectionofthecorrelationsisalwayspositive,exceptforage,withahighersocialstatusassociatedwithamorefavourableexperienceinconsciousness.Thenegativecorrelationwithageindicatesthattheyoungevaluatetheirstatusmorefavourablythantheelderly.

FactorsInfluencingSocialStatus

Whichsocialfactorsareconsideredbypeopletoinfluencetheirsocialstatusandtowhatdegreearetheseanimportantelementofinequalityconsciousness?Thefactorswhichtheyconsidertohaveagreaterroleindeterminingtheircircumstancesandopportunitieswillbethosedimensionsofinequalityinwhichperceivedsuccessorfailurehasbeenachieved.Thesefactorswillmakeaprimaryimpactontheirgeneralmood,behaviourandevaluationoftheirstatus.

RespondentstotheTÁRKImobilitysurveyofspring1992hadtoranktwentyfactorsonascaleof1to5onthebasisofthedegreetowhichtheyinfluencesocialstatus.ThesefactorsarepresentedinTable7.5intheorderofthemeansoftheresponses.Lookingatthetopoftheranking(anaveragevalueof4orhigheronthescaleof5),wecanseethatsocialstatusisprimarilyinfluencedbyfactorssuchastheamountofincomefromafull-timejob,theexistenceorlackofnetworkconnectionsandstatusasamanagerorsubordinateemployee.Thisresultonceagainsuggeststhatpeople,whenconsideringtheirsocialstatus,thinkoffinancialstatusfirst;besidesincomefromafull-timejob,theamountofadditionalincomecomesfifthintherankings.Beyondfinancialstatustheyalsothinkofan

informalstatuswhichgivesoneaccesstothatwhichcannotbemeasuredinmoney;andthisisfollowedbyaformalstatusofpower,amanagerialposition.Allthesethreefactorsinfluencingsocialstatusareofaremarkablymaterialcharacterandimplythatdemandsarenotsatisfiedtoasufficientdegree,butthisinsufficientsatisfactioncanbemaximizedbyoptimisingcontrol(money,connectionsworthmoneyandpower).Postmaterialfeaturesofstatussuchasone'swayofthinking,prestigeorthevaluesbywhichonelivesareatthebottomoftherankorder.

Table7.5:FactorsinfluencingsocialstatusMeanDeviation%sayingagreat

deal(Greatdeal=5;Notatall=1)

Full-timeincome 4.2 .9 45.5Connections 4.2 .9 45.1Managerorsubordinateemployee

4.0 1.0 40.5

Typeofjob 3.9 .9 32.6Additionalincome 3.9 1.0 31.6Talent 3.8 .9 27.5Familybackground 3.8 1.0 31.8Education 3.8 1.0 27.1Lifestyle 3.8 .9 22.8Self-employedoremployee 3.8 1.0 26.3Luck 3.8 1.0 29.2Wayofthinking 3.7 1.0 22.8Prestige 3.6 1.0 19.3Valuesfollowed 3.5 1.0 14.7Typeofsettlement 3.3 1.1 16.6Region 3.3 1.2 17.3Ethnicity 2.9 1.2 9.2Gender 2.8 1.2 8.9Politicalviews 2.6 1.2 6.2Religion 1.8 1.9 1.8(N=2,499)

Lookingatthebottomoftherankorder,anaveragevalueof3orlower,weseeethnicity,politicalviewsandreligioninfluencingsocialstatustheleast.Whatthesefactorsshareisanoppositiontotheprincipleofachievement,insofarastheyareallascriptivefactorsderivingsocialstatusfromwhetherthepersoninquestionismaleorfemale,belongstoacertainethnicgrouporreligiousdenomination.Peopleperceivethesediscriminatoryfactorstohavenomorethana

minoreffectonsocialstatus.

Itisonlynaturalthatcertainconnectionsappearbetweensocialstatusitselfandopinionsconcerningthefactorswhichhaveaninfluenceonit.Characteristically,thosewhorankedlifestyle,wayofthinkingandvaluesasmorestronglyinfluencingstatuswerepeoplewithhighereducationandinmoresenioremploymentroles.Inaddition,asweproceedupwardsinthehierarchyofoccupationsandqualifications,thementionoffactorssuchasplaceofresidence,regionorevenethnicityandgender

Table7.6:Dimensionsofsocialstatusfordifferentsocio-demographicgroupsJobstatusversusqualifications

Jobstatusversussalary

Qualificationsversussalary

job qualificationsboth job salaryboth qualificationssalarybothOccupationManager 51.6 18.1 30.2 32.8 38.7 28.5 22.5 54.0 23.5Professional 56.3 15.8 27.9 28.0 45.3 26.7 24.8 51.6 23.6White-collar 52.7 17.5 29.8 20.6 50.3 29.1 14.9 57.9 27.2Lowermanager

58.3 9.2 32.5 18.5 54.1 27.4 12.9 65.1 22.0

Self-employed

54.7 15.1 30.2 17.6 55.6 26.8 10.2 62.0 27.8

Skilledlabourer

55.6 14.8 29.6 15.9 58.2 25.9 12.0 63.4 24.6

Unskilledlabourer

48.5 19.6 31.9 15.4 57.4 27.2 12.0 60.9 27.1

Agricult.manual

44.6 17.4 38.0 19.6 50.0 30.4 14.6 51.6 33.8

(Total) (51.7) (16.7) (31.6)(19.1)(53.3)(27.6) (14.2) (59.3)(26.5)N 1,348 435 822 502 1,407729 376 1,567702

EducationBelow8classesofprimaryschool

43.1 21.1 35.8 17.6 51.0 31.4 13.7 53.7 32.6

8classesofprimaryschool

48.5 18.2 33.3 16.7 55.9 27.4 13.3 59.3 27.4

Vocationalschool

53.0 15.4 31.6 14.8 58.2 27.0 11.9 61.1 27.0

Vocationalsecondaryschool

59.6 14.1 26.3 23.8 52.9 23.3 15.7 62.3 22.0

Secondary 55.0 16.3 28.7 21.4 49.3 29.3 14.9 58.6 26.5

gymnasiumCollege 50.2 17.4 32.4 32.4 38.6 29.0 24.3 52.4 23.3University 55.5 16.0 28.5 23.8 49.2 27.0 19.5 58.5 22.0(Total) (51.4) (17.0) (31.6)(19.2)(53.2)(27.6) (14.5) (58.7)(26.8)N 1,461 483 897 552 1,529795 419 1,692771

PlaceoflivingVillage 47.4 16.3 36.3 16.5 51.8 31.7 13.8 54.9 31.3Town 52.4 17.1 30.5 19.8 54.8 26.1 13.4 61.0 25.6Countyseat 52.0 20.6 27.4 24.6 52.9 22.5 17.9 60.5 21.6Budapest 57.0 16.0 27.0 19.8 54.5 25.7 15.3 61.3 23.4(Total) (51.4) (17.1) (31.5)(19.2)(27.6 (27.6) (14.6) (58.7)(26.7)N 1,461 485 897 553 1,530795 420 1,693771

increasesaswell.Thismayimplythatthoseinhigherpositionsandwithhigherqualificationsconsidertheinfluenceofdiscriminatoryfactorsindeterminingsocialstatustobegreater.Religionandpoliticalviewsonlyshowastatisticallysignificantconnectionwiththeolderagegroup.Interestingly,itispossibletoascertaintheimpactofsocialstrataonthefactorswhichrankinthemiddleoratbottom,whilethesameislessfrequentinthecaseofthehigh-rankingfactors.Differencesofoccupationalstatus,educationandplaceofresidenceseemtohavelessimpactonwhetherfull-timeincomeornetworkconnectionsareconsideredtobefactorscrucialindeterminingsocialstatus.

Weapproachedthesamequestioninadifferentwaybyaskingpeoplewhatthoughtstheexpressionsshe/hehasdonewellinlifeandhis/hersocialstatushasimprovedevokeintheirminds.Dotheythinkofsomeonewhohasachievedhighstatusintheirjob,attainedhigheducationalqualifications,orsecuredajobwithagoodsalary?Theaimwastomeasurewhatinfluencethethreeconventionaldimensionsofstratificationandinequalityresearchoccupation,culturalandmaterialresourceshadinanevaluationofdoingwellinsociety.Thethreedimensionswerearrangedincontrastingpairs.Respondentsalwayshadtochoosebetweentwodimensionsatatime:firstbetweenasenioremploymentroleorhighqualifications,thenbetweenaseniorjobpositionoragoodsalary,andfinallybetweenhighqualificationsoragoodsalary.Ifrespondentscouldnotdecide,theiranswerswereinterpretedasboth.

Peoplemeasureprogressandtheimprovementofsocialstatuspredominantlyintermsofmoney(Table7.6).Whenasenioremploymentrolewascontrastedwithagoodsalary,59percentchosesalaryasopposedto14percentchoosingthesenioremploymentstatus.Whenhighqualificationswerecontrastedwithagoodsalary,53percentchosesalary,while19percentchosetheformer.High

qualificationslostinthecompetitionwithasenioremploymentroleaswell:51percentconsideredthelatter,while17percentconsideredtheformerasignofhavingdonewell.

Thedatashowdifferencesacrosssocialstrata.Thoseinlowermanagerialpositionsandprofessionalsareonaveragemorelikelytochooseasenioremploymentroleoverhighqualifications.Withrespecttoqualifications,thosewhohavecompletedvocationalsecondaryschoolsandthoselivinginBudapestareonaveragemorelikelytochooseasenioremploymentroleratherthanhigheducationalqualifications.Agoodsalarywasmoreoftenpreferredtoasenioremploymentrolebysemi-skilledorunskilledworkers,whileitwasmoreoften

preferredtohighqualificationsbythoseinlowermanagerialpositionsandskilledworkers.

Conclusion

ThesystemtransitionwhichhastakenplaceinHungariansocietyinthepastfewyearshasresultedinincreasingsocialinequalities.Itisaprocessthepopulationapparentlyfindshardtotolerate.WhenaskedwhetherInequalitiesofincomearetoogreat,76percentoftherepresentativesampleagreedin1987,84percentagreedin1992and88percentagreedin1993.Thisattitudeissounanimousthatanalysisofvariancebysocial-demographicvariablesscarcelyyieldsanysignificantdifferences.WhenaskedabouttheirlevelofagreementwiththestatementGreatdifferencesofincomearenecessaryforthedevelopmentofHungary,26percentagreedin1987,21percentagreedin1992and17percentin1993.Aslongasthemajorityperceivetheirownsocialstatustobedeteriorating,onlyaminoritywillaccepttheexistinginequalitiesofincomewhichtheymayconsidertobeincreasing.

Figure7.1

Attitudestowardwealth

Theincreasingwealthofaminorityappearsillegitimate,evensuspectandillegal.TheaboveisapparentfromthedistributionofanswerstothequestionsoftheTÁRKIMobilitysurveyofspring1992(Figure7.1).Three-fourthsconsideritadutyofthestatetodecreaseinequalitiesofincome;moreover,theywouldevensupportthestateinvestigatinghowindividualshaveaccumulatedtheirwealth.Thereasonisthatwealthandbecomingwealthyarelinkedwithdishonestyandcrime(fraudandtheft)ininequalityconsciousness.

Inconnectionwithquestionsrelatedtothemagnitudeofdifferencesinincomeandthedutyofthestatetointerferewithit,Kolosi(1990)demonstratedthatevenbeforethepoliticaltransitioninHungary(1987ISSPdata)therelevantHungarianattitudesweresignificantlydifferentfromthosemeasuredintheAnglo-Saxoncountries,Germany,SwitzerlandandtheNetherlands.Theywereratherclose,however,totheopinionsofthoseaskedinAustriaandItaly.

Itisalsoworthnotingthatresearchonsocialinequalitieshasalwaysdemonstratedthedeterminingroleofculturalandeducationaldifferences.Yettheexperienceoftheseinequalitiesandpeople'srelatedattitudesandemotionsareapparentlydominatedbymaterialfactors.Itisamootpointwhetherthiscontrastisrealorvirtual.Ifitisarealcontrast,ourearlierknowledgeofobjectivesocialprocessesmayhavetobereconsidered.Wemightsuspectthatculturalandeducationaldifferencesmayhaveappearedsoimportantwithregardtosocialinequalitiesbecausewehavecontinuouslyunderestimatedtheroleofmaterialdifferencesintheprocessofmeasurement.Wemightalsoventureanotherexplanation:whileunderstatesocialismculturalcapitaldeterminedopportunitiestoagreaterextent,inamarketeconomymaterialcapitaldoesso.

Onthebasisofearliersociologicalresearch,wecouldarguethatculturalcapitalhasneverthelessbeenthesocialfactorplayingthe

essentialrolebothindetermininginequalitiesandtheconsciousnessthereof.Inthiscasewemustassumeasomewhatmorecomplexchainofcausalrelations.Eventhoughinequalityconsciousnessfollowsfromthematerialconditionsoflifetoagreaterdegree,thelatterareonlyintermediatevariablesinachainofcauseandeffectinwhichsuccessorfailureinamaterialsensearedeterminedbyculturalandeducationaldifferences,accesstoculturalcapitalandthecapitalofconnections.

1ThisstudyisbasedontheresultsofresearchprojectNo.2617supportedbytheNationalScientificResearchFund(OTKA),TheCulturalandMaterialDeterminationoftheContentsofSocialConsciousness.TheresearchprojectisdirectedbyPéterRóbert.

2TherewasaperiodinAmericanempiricalsociologysubsequenttoresearchconductedbyWarnerandassociates(1941,1942)whenstratificationresearchcompletelyreplacedclass-basedanalyses.Later,however,ErikO.Wright'sneo-Marxistclass-basedapproach(1979,1985)broughtthelatterbackintosociologicalthought.Class-basedapproacheshavealwaysbeenpresentalongwithempiricalstratificationresearchinWesternEuropeinFrench(e.g.Bourdieu,1966)andEnglish(e.g.GoldthorpeandLockwood,1969orGiddens,1973)sociology.Intheformersocialistcountriesthefunctionofresearchofthiskind(Ferge,1973;Kolosi,1987)wastobalancetheideologicallybasedclassmodel.

3Thesourceofthe1991distributionisthecomparablequestioningoftheearlier(1989)sample.The1992dataarefromtheTÁRKImobilitysurvey,andthe1993distributionisbasedontherepeatedquestioningofasubsampleofthe1992survey.The1992andthe1993datathuscomefromidenticalpeople.

4Wehaveexaminedthisstatementbyprincipalcomponentanalysis,aswell.Eventhoughthevariablesexpressingthesubjectiveperceptionofstatusformedasingledimension,boththeloadingsandthecommunalityofthevariablereferringtotheevaluationofincomeweresmallerthanthoseoftheothervariables.

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Warner,W.L.andLunt,P.S.,1942.TheStatusSystemofaModernCommunity.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Wright,E.O.,1979.ClassStructureandIncomeDetermination.NewYork:AcademicPress.

Wright,E.O.,1985.Classes.London:NewLeftBooks.

Chapter8WelfareProgrammesAndTheAlleviationOfPoverty

IstvánGyörgyTóth

PovertyhasbothincreasedandbecomemorevisibleinHungaryasaninevitableconsequenceofthetransformationalrecession(Kornai,1993)accompanyingthechangeoftheeconomicsystem.AccordingtotheHungarianCentralStatisticalOfficetheabsolutenumberofpeoplelivingunderthepovertylinein1992rosebyapproximatelyhalffromitsrelativelystablelevelof10percentpovertyrateinthe1980s(KSH,1993).TheHungarianHouseholdPanelshowedthatpovertyhadgrownto2225percentby1993(Kolosi,etal.,1993).Socialpolicyprogrammeshaveplayedanimportantroleinkeepingpovertyfromgrowingtoanevengreaterdegree,andhavetherebycontributedtothereductionofthesocialcostsofeconomictransformation.However,analysesofthesocialpolicysystemgivegroundsforconcernaboutefficiencyandequityinthesocialpolicysystem.

Thefirstpartofthechaptersummarizesthetypesandextentofpoverty.Nextthereisaninvestigationintotherolewelfareprogrammes(socialinsurance,familyaid,financialsupport)actuallyplayinthereductionofpoverty:thepatternsofincidenceofsocialprogrammesareexaminedfollowedbyanattempttoseeiftherearegroupsneglectedbythewelfaresystem.

TheHungarianHouseholdPanelData

Theanalysesrelyonthe1993waveoftheHungarianHouseholdPanel(HHP),alongitudinalstudyofincomes,wealthandlabourmarketpositionsofHungarianhouseholds.TheHHPisajointexcerciseof

TÁRKI,theDepartmentofSociologyattheBudapestUniversityofEconomicSciencesandtheCentralStatisticalOfficewithTÁRKIresponsibleforfieldwork,documentationandreleaseofthedata.Thefirstwaveoccuredinthespringof1992andthesecondwaveofdata,usedhere,wascollectedinAprilMay1993.Theinitialsamplewasafour-stagestratifiedsamplefromthe1990census.Inthefirstwave2,059householdswerequestioned,whilesome1,931werequestionedinthesecondwaveaverylowdrop-outrateincomparisontootherpanels.However,sincethedrop-outwasnotentirelyrandom,itwasnecessarytoweightdatafromthesecondwave,resultingin2,157weightedcases.

Thepoverty-relatedvariablesarecomposedofanswerstoblocksofquestionsaboutincomesofpersonsandhouseholds.Povertycanalsobemeasuredwithvariablesotherthanincome.InthisperiodoftransitioninHungaryanapproachtopovertyanalysingconsumptionandbelongingsmightbejustifiedtosiftoutuncertaintiesarisinginasimplemeasurementofpoorfamilies'incomes.However,consumptiondatawouldbeoflimiteduse:whileincomereflectsthepossibilityforconsumption,actualconsumptionstyleisdeterminedbypersonalspendingpreferences.

Theincomesofhouseholdscanbecomparedinseveralways.Atoneextremehouseholdsarenotdistinguishedbysize.Thismethodignoresthefactthatfamilysizedeterminesboththeearningcapacityandconsumptionneedsofthehousehold.Theunderlyingassumptionisthathouseholdexpensesdonotchangewithfamilysize.Attheotherextreme,whenpercapitaincomesarecompared,theassumptionisthatcostsoflivingriseinadirectproportiontofamilysize.Bothmethodsareusedintheliteratureonincomeinequalities.Amethodbetweenthesetwoextremesreflectsrealitybest.

Theunderlyingassumptionbehindequivalentincomesisthata

growthinfamilysizemeansanon-lineargrowthincostsofliving.Equivalencescalesassignaweighttoindividualhouseholdmemberswhichtakeseconomiesofscaleintoaccount.Toputitmoreformallyafamily'sincomeisequivalenttothatofasingle-personhouseholdifJ=h/N,whereJrepresentstheincomeofasingle-personhousehold,hrepresentsthetotalincomeofthehouseholdinquestion,andNisaco-efficientindicatingdifferingneedsdependingonfamilysize.Ithasbeenshownintheliteraturethattheco-efficientexpressingfamilyneedscanbeexpressedbytheformulaN=Se,whereSequalsthefamily(household)size,whileerepresentstheelasticityofneedstounitsize(Buchmanetal.:1988,Förster,1993).Inthisstudyweightedhouseholdincomesare

used.Consumptionweightsareassignedtotherespectivehouseholdmemberswiththefirstpersoninthehouseholdbeingassignedaweightof1,thesecondpersonaweightof0.7andthethirdandsubsequentpersonsaweightof0.5.Theseweightswereestimatedwiththevaluee=0.73.

WhoisPoor?

ThechartingofthecompositionofabsolutepovertybasedondatafromtheHungarianHouseholdPanelwascarriedoutbyKolosiandSik(1992),whilethechartingofrelativepovertywasinitiallycarriedoutbyRudolfAndorka(Andorka,1992;AndorkaandSpéder,1993a,1993b).Amorerecentanalysistookadetailedlookatthecompositionofpovertyusingthreedifferentequivalencescalesandfourdefinitionsofpoverty(Tóth,etal.,1994).

Table8.1displaystherisksoffallingintopovertybyhouseholdsandtheirmembersinthedatagivenbytheethnicaffiliationoftheheadofhousehold,hisoccupationalstatus,levelofeducation,age,sizeofhousehold,homelocationandnumberofchildrenundertheageof18.Thetablecontainsthecellfrequenciesofninecross-tablesindecreasingorder.Thiscompactpresentationallowsforadirectcomparisonofpovertyriskssharedbypeopleinthevarioushouseholdcategories.

Fivegeneralpointscanbedrawnfromthistable.First,gypsyfamiliesareseriouslyaffectedbypoverty.Sixty-ninepercentofallgypsyhouseholdsarepoorandsome72percentofthoselivinginfamiliesinwhichtheheadoffamilyisagypsyarepoor.Amoredetailedanalysisshowsthatthemorerestrictivethedefinitionofpovertyused,thehigherthepercentageofgypsyhouseholdswhofallintothepoorcategory.Longitudinalanalysishasalsoshownthatgypsieshavelittlechanceofescapingfrompoverty.

Second,demographicaldeterminantsofpovertyareimportant.Povertyratesarehigheramonghouseholdswithatleastthreechildreniftheheadofhouseholdisunder40yearsofage,orwithinasingle-parenthousehold.Differencesbetweenvarioushouseholdtypesaresmallerforagecategoriesbetween40and60years.Finally,householdsheadedbyapersonover60aregreatlyatriskofbeingimpoverishediftheolderpersonlivesalone.Thelowerwegointheincomehierarchy,thegreaterthenumberoffamilieswithfourormorechildrenandofsingle-childfamilies,and,atleastpartiallyinconsequence,thegreaterthenumberofpeoplefromthree-personorfive-ormorepersonhouseholds.

Table8.1:PovertyratebyhouseholdcharacteristicsPersonsinpoverty

% N(thousands)Gypsy 72.4 389Notgypsy 15.0 1,470Unemployed 47.0 354Notunemployed 16.2 1,520Education:

Lessthanprimary 41.6 486Primary 31.5 710Vocatinal 16.0 550Secondary 8.4 179Tertiary 3.0 40

HouseholdheadPensioner 41.1Male 16.1 1,311Female 27.0 374Lonemale 17.1 35Lonefemale 40.6 239Loneparent 37.0 198

Age<30 24.3 2063039 19.3 5284049 19.0 4835059 15.4 27260+ 19.3 472

NumberofchildrenNone 16.6 719One 18.2 421Two 16.3 426Three 24.8 189Four+ 67.2 208

HouseholdsizeNuclearfamily 15.6 277

One 34.4 277Two 15.5 325Three 14.0 309Four 16.9 505Five+ 24.4 542

Placeofresidencevillage 23.7 958City 18.7 558Cheiftownincounty 18.7 271Detachedhouse 22.9 28Budapest 8.3 142

Source:HungarianHouseholdPanel,19923

Youngerheadsofhouseholdsarealsooverrepresentedinthelowerpovertystrata.

Third,peoplewithalower-leveleducation,andthoselivinginruralareas,areespeciallyvulnerabletotherisksofpoverty.Thoselivinginisolatedfarmhouses,orinhomeswheretheheadoffamilyispoorlyeducated(withfewerthaneightprimaryschoolyears),aretwiceaslikelyastheaveragetobepoor.Inaddition,thelowerthelevelofincomeusedasthepovertythreshold,themoreatriskthesegroupsbecome.

Fourth,thelabourmarketplaysanimportantroleinthedeterminationofpoverty.Thoselivinginhouseholdswithanunemployedheadruntwicetheriskofbeingpoorastheaverage.However,itisnotprimarilythegroupofthetemporarilyunemployedwhichisthreatenedbypermanentorlong-termimpoverishment;theyhaveonlytemporarydifficultiesinmakingendsmeet.Rather,thosewhohavebeenpermanentlydrivenoutofthelabourmarketandwhoarenotyeteligibleforpensionsorothersocialsecuritybenefitsaretrulyintrouble.

Finally,themagnitudeofpovertyrisksrunbyvarioussocialgroupsisonlyoneaspectofthepovertyprofile.Fromasocialpolicypointofview,theactualsizeofthegroupsconcerneddeterminesthepotentialclienteleandtheelectoralbaseforwelfareprogrammes.Thenumberofpoorpersonslivinginhouseholdswheretheheadisemployed,notagypsy,andisnotawomanisgreaterthanthenumberofpersonslivinginhouseholdswithanunemployedhead,agypsypersonorafemale.Thosewithalowerpercentageinpovertymayrepresentagreaternumberofthepoor.Forinstance,agreatnumberofgypsiesarepoor,butthemajorityofthepoorarenotgypsies.Similarly,althoughagreatnumberoftheunemployedarepoor,themajorityofthepoorareinhouseholdswithanemployedheadofhousehold.

SocialPolicySupportProgrammes

ThecashredistributionprogrammesofHungary'ssocialsystemhavethreecategories.Thefirstgroupismadeupofprovisionsreplacingearningswithbenefitsrelatedtoearnings.Eligibilitycriteriaaretiedtoemploymentstatus;aconditionofthepaymentofearnings-relatedbenefitsisthattherecipientshouldhaveaprioremploymentrecordandhavemadesocialsecuritycontributions.Contributionsandbenefitsaretiedtopreviouswagesthroughaformula.Pensions,sickpay,unemploymentbenefitsandmaternityfeesarethemajorbenefitsinthiscategory.

Thesecondcategoryofbenefitsguaranteesabasicincome.Eligibilitycriteriaarenotattachedtoemploymentstatusandtheamountofthebenefitisnotlinkedtoincomeorpriorearnings.Thebenefitapplicantneedonlymeetdemographiccriteriatobeeligibleforthebenefit.Thebestexamplesarefamilyallowanceandmaternityallowance.Thethirdgroupcomprisesbenefitsgrantedsolelytothosewithlowincomes.Assistancepaymentsaredesignedspecificallytoalleviatepoverty,andgrantedonthebasisofameanstest.

Howdomacrosocialexpenditurestrickledowntoindividualhouseholds?Inparticular,howdomacrodatalookfromaworm's-eyeviewofindividualfamilies'incomestructure?Whatsortofsocialdifferencescanbefoundbehindthediversityofincomestructures?Howwelltargetedarecashbenefitprogrammes?

Therearefivemajorsourcesofincome.Thefirstgroupiscalledmarketincome.Earningsandcashpropertyincomebelongtothisgroup.Personalincomefrommainjobs(wages,overtimepayments,benefitsinkind,costallowances),personalincomefromallothersecondaryjobsandhouseholdincomearisingfromsmall-scaleagriculturalproductionalsofitintothiscategory.Profitsanddividendincomemakeupcashpropertyincome.Inthiscasethereturnsgainedfromaninvestmentofcapitalcontributetothetotalincomeofahousehold.

2Earnings-relatedsocialsecuritybenefits(pensions,sick-leavebenefits,unemploymentbenefits,andmaternityallowanceswiththeexceptionofthechildcareallowance)belongtothesecondgroup.Non-insurance-typepublicsocialtransfersmakeupthethirdgroup.Someofthese,thefamilyallowanceforexample,areindependentoftheirrecipient'sincomes,whileothersaremeanstested(suchasregularandoccasionalsocialassistancebenefits).Thefourthgroupcomprisesinter-householdtransferssuchasalimony,cashhelp

betweenfamiliesandothers.3Thefifthtypeofincomeincludesmiscellaneousotherearnings.

TheDistributionalPatternsofWelfarePayments

Thegrowthinsocialexpenditurewasprofoundinthelastdecade.Inthebeginningofthe1980sHungary'ssocialexpenditureshareinGDPrankedamongthelessdevelopedOECDcountries.Duetopoliticaldecisionsandalsotoagreatextenttothetransformationalrecessionwhichthecountryexperiencedinthelastfiveyears,thesocialexpendi-

tureshareofthenationalproducthasgrowntoalevelequaltothehighestspendersintheOECD,and(Andorkaetal.,1994;Tóth,1994)cashsocialtransfersdisproportionatelyincreasedtheirshare.TheIncidenceStudycommissionedbytheWorldBankprovidedaincisiveanalysisintotheincidenceofsocialtransfersattheendofthe1980s(KSH,1990a).

Theincidenceofcashsocialtransfers

Ajudgementofthedistributionaleffectsofvarioustypesofincomeandsocialbenefitsstronglydependsonhowhouseholdincomesaremeasured.Variationsinpovertyratesareverysensitivetotheincomemeasurementconceptused(FörsterandTóth,1993,1994;Tóthetal.,1994).Weuseanequivalencescalewitha0.73elasticitytoexaminethecompositionofincome.

Ingeneral,therehasbeenasignificantgrowthintheshareofsocialincomeasaresultofthetransitionprocess.Theproportionofhouseholdswithnomarketincomeatallisfairlyhigh,alittlemorethan20percentofthetotalsample.Three-quartersofthesehouseholdsareheadedbysomeoneover60yearsofage,andmorethanhalfcontainmorethantwopeople.About94percentofhouseholdswithnomarketincomereceivesomesortofsocialinsurance,some20percentreceivesomeformofpublicsocialtransfers,andwithinthisfifthonly9.4percentreceivesocialassistance.

Theproportionofhouseholdsenjoyingearnings-relatedsocialinsurancebenefitsisalmostashighastheratioofmarketincomerecipients(74.8percent).Morethanhalfofsuchhouseholdsreceivesomesortofpension(old-agepension,disabilitypension,widow'spension).About13percentofallhouseholdsreceivedunemploymentbenefitsin1992-3.Thisrepresentedanincreaseoverpastyearsastheunemploymentratehasriseninthemeantime;10percentof

householdsreceivedunemploymentbenefitsin1991-2.Another10percentreceivedmaternityallowances.Approximatelyone-thirdofhouseholdsreceivefamilyallowancesforatleastonechild,whereasonlyatenthisreceivingsocialassistance.

Overall,thewideinequalitiesinprimaryearnings(thereisatwenty-folddifferencebetweentheearningsinthetopdecileandearningsinthebottomdecile)aresignificantlyreducedbysocialincomes(theratiobetweenthetotalhouseholdincomesoftheupperandlowerdecilesis6.3).Nonetheless,thedistributionofvarioussocialincomesbetweendecilesshowsdifferentpatterns(Table8.2).Ingeneral,alargerproportion

Table8.2:Declinesharesoftypesofincome1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

(rowpercentage)a

Marketincometotal 1.5 2.5 3.1 4.8 6.1 8.1 11.0 13.7 18.3 30.9earnings 1.5 2.5 3.2 4.9 6.2 8.2 11.1 13.8 18.5 30.0cashpropertyincomes 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.2 4.3 5.2 6.7 6.3 74.1

Socialinsurancebenefits 6.9 9.0 10.3 11.4 12.3 11.5 10.6 10.9 8.8 8.3pensions 5.6 8.7 10.4 11.7 13.1 11.9 10.2 11.1 8.5 8.9unemploymentbenefits

18.5 13.2 10.1 10.3 8.9 10.4 11.4 9.3 4.7 3.1

maternitysupport 9.5 7.9 13.2 11.8 9.8 11.4 11.9 11.3 10.4 2.8Publicsocialtransfers 10.5 9.2 10.2 8.9 9.1 12.2 10.4 11.2 9.4 9.0socialassistance 16.8 13.5 7.4 8.4 6.9 12.7 15.3 7.5 8.1 3.5familyallowance 9.3 7.7 9.6 9.6 9.5 12.9 11.1 12.3 9.8 8.1

Inter-householdtransfers

7.6 13.3 9.0 9.9 7.6 7.4 14.6 8.4 10.7 11.5

Otherhouseholdincome 1.6 1.7 2.2 2.7 2.4 5.0 5.7 3.7 15.0 59.8(Totalhouseholdincome)

(3.7) (4.9) (5.7)(7.0)(8.0)(9.3)(10.7)(12.3)(14.80(23.6)

aBasedontotalequivalenthouseholdincomes.Cellsshowreceivedincome/benefitofthegiventypeinthegivendecileasapercentageofthetotalbenefit/incomeofthattypeinthesampleSource:HungarianHouseholdPanel,1992-3

ofsocialinsurancebenefitpaymentsreachesthemiddledecilesthanthelowerdeciles.Thelowestdecileenjoys5.6percentofpensions,whilethefifthdecilereceives13percentofpensions.Similarly,butlessstrikingly,maternitybenefitstendtobenefitthemiddledeciles.

Thedistributionofsocialincomewouldbetargetedifthelowestdecilesweretoreceivethelargestproportionofthebenefit.Ascanbeseenfromthedata,thisisnotthecase.Familyallowanceisgrantedtothesixthandeighthdeciletoahigherdegreethantoanyotherdecile.Thedistributionofsocialassistanceisalsothoughtprovoking.Thelowestdecileenjoys17percentofallsocialassistance,butaratherhighproportionofaidisgrantedtothesixthandseventhdeciles.Unemploymentbenefits,however,seemtobesomewhatbettertargeted.

Theprecedingtablesshowdeciledistributionswheretherankingofhouseholdsisbasedonallhouseholdincome(includingcashsocialbenefits).However,sometimesthisrankingmightnotbeappropriate.Inwhatfollowsitisassumedthatoriginal,orprimary,incomeinequalitiesaredeterminedbyincomedifferencesgeneratedbymarketforces.Socialredistributionprogrammesessentiallymodifythisoriginalinequalityinonewayoranother.

InTable8.3,block1representsthedistributionofvarioustypesofpensionsamongthehouseholdquintilesthatweredefinedonthebasisof(adjusted)marketincomes.Thelowerahousehold'smarketincomeis,thehighertheproportionofthosehouseholdsreceivingsomesortofpension.Sixty-eightpercentofhouseholdsfromthelowestmarketincomequintile,and16percentofhouseholdsfromthehighestquintile,receivesomesortofpension.Withinthisdistribution,theincidenceofretirement,disabilityandotherpensions(e.g.widow'spension)differs.Theproportionofthosepeoplereceivinganold-agepensionishigherinthesecondquintilethaninallothers.Thirty-four

percentofhouseholdsreceivinganoldagepension,20percentofthosereceivingdisabilitypensions,andsome36percentofthosereceivingsomeotherformofpension,belongtothelowestquintile.Thedistributionalpatternofpensionstakesthisformbecausethefunctionofpensionsistoreplaceearliermarketincomes,and,consequently,theresultoforderinghouseholdsbymarketincomesisthatrelativelymoreoftheretiredfallintothelowestquintile,despitethefactthatbasedontheirtotalincome(whichalsoincludepensions)theydonotrankamongthepoor.

Familyallowancesaredesignedtofulfiladifferentfunction.Theaimoftheseallowancesistosupporthouseholdsofworkingagewithchildren.Peopleofworkingagegenerallyhavemarketincomesandalso

Table8.3:IncidenceofsocialtransfersQuintiles

1 2 3 4 5 (Total)PensionsOldage

percentinthequintileac 68.156.336.622.715.9 (40.0)percentreceivingpensions 34.128.218.311.4 8.0(100.0)

Disabilitypercentinthequintileac 11.917.413.5 9.9 5.6 (11.6)percentreceivingdisabilitypensions 20.429.823.217.0 9.6(100.0)

Otherpercentinthequintileac 13.4 8.8 7.2 4.6 3.3 (7.5)otherpensions 35.923.619.312.3 8.8(100.0)

FamilyallowancesUnemploymentbenefits

percentinthequintilebc 35.223.719.612.8 6.0 (19.5)percentreceivingunemploymentbenefits

36.224.420.113.2 6.2(100.0)

Maternityfeepercentinthequintilebc 13.615.6 9.6 5.3 0.0 (8.8)percentreceivingmaternityfee 30.835.421.812.0 0.0(100.0)

Meternityallowancepercentinthequintilebc 10.021.210.8 3.6 0.8 (9.3)percentreceivingmaternityallowance

21.645.723.3 7.8 1.7(100.0)

Familyallowancepercentinthequintilebc 46.561.464.648.327.7 (49.7)percentreceivingfamilyallowance 18.724.7 2619.411.1(100.0)

SocialAssistancepercentinthequintilead 24.510.2 6.5 4.6 5.4 (10.2)percentreceivingsocialassistance 47.919.912.7 9.010.5(100.0)

atotalhouseholds;bactivehouseholds;cequivalentmarketincome;dtotalequivalenthouseholdincomesupportSource:HungarianHouseholdPanel,1992-3

receivesocialsupportwhichsupplementtheirincome.Therefore,inthesecondblockofTable8.3.,thedistributionalpatternsoffamilyallowancesaredisplayedwithq1uintilesofhouseholdsofactiveageheadrankedonthebasisoftheirequivalentmarketincomes.Almosthalfofalltheactiveagedhouseholdsenjoyafamilyallowance.Mosthouseholdswhichreceiveafamilyallowancecanbefoundinthemiddlequintile.Thedistributionalpatternoffamilyallowanceshasabell-shapedpattern,thoughitisabitskewedtowardsthelowerincomes.The

maternityfeeandthematernityallowanceseemsbetterdirectedatthosewithlowerincomes.

Withunemploymentbenefits,likefamilyallowances,therankingofactiveagehouseholdsbasedonmarketincomeseemstobeappropriate.Hereitappearsthattheunemploymentbenefitisrelativelystronglytargetedtowardsthepoorsincetheproportionofhouseholdsreceivingthistypeofbenefitstronglydecreaseswiththeriseof(adjusted)marketincomes.Approximately60percentofallhouseholdsreceivingunemploymentbenefitsbelongtothelowesttwoquintiles.

Thefunctionofsocialassistanceistosupplementthetotalhouseholdincomeifitisnotsufficienttoprovidesubsistence,irrespectiveofage,numberofpeoplelivinginthehouseholdorthehouseholder'sjobstatus.Therefore,therankingofallhouseholdsaccordingtopre-assistance(adjusted)householdincomeisappropriate(Table8.3,block3).Allinall,some10percentofhouseholdsreceivemeans-testedassistance.However,thisassistancedoesnotprimarilyreachthosewiththelowestincomes.About24percentofthelowestquintilereceivesomesortofaid,andapproximately10percentofthesecondquintilereceivesuchhelp.Morethanhalfofallhouseholdsreceivingsuchassistancepaymentscannotbeclassifiedaspoorifthepovertythresholdisdefinedwithanincomeequallingtheupperbreakpointofthelowestquintile.

Theincomecompositionofvarioussocialpolicytargetgroups

Benefitsarisingfromsocialredistributionsocialinsuranceprogrammesandothersocialaidaccountfornearly40percentofannualtotalhouseholdincomeinHungary.Marketincomes,however,barelyexceedhalfofallhouseholdincome(56percent).However,theincomecompositionofsocialpolicytargetgroupsmightbequitedifferentfromtheoverallaverage.

Thesetofsocialgroupstobetargetedbysocialpoliciesisamatterforpoliticaldebate.InTable8.4,theincomecompositionoffourvulnerablesocialgroupsisexamined.Oldhouseholdswerethoseinwhichtheheadofhouseholdisabovetheretirementage.Thispopulationdoesnotexactlymatchthepensionerpopulationsincethereareanumberofoldpeoplewhoreceivenoretirementbenefits,andlargenumbersofpensionersundertheagelimit.UnemployedhouseholdsweredefinedasthoseinwhichtheheadofhouseholdmettheILOdefinitionofunemployment.Largefamiliesweredefinedasfamilieswiththreeor

Table8.4:IncomecompositionofsocialpolicytargetgroupsHouseholdtypes

ElderlycUnemployedbLargecPoord(Columnpercentages)

Marketincome 20.1 45.5 53.6 22.9Earnings 19.2 45.4 49.9 22.8Cashpropertyincome 0.9 0.1 3.7 0.1

Socialinsurancebenefits 73.1 33.7 14.8 61.6Pensions 71.8 12.3 3.8 51.2Unemploymentbenefits 0.6 16.4 4.4 6.5Maternitysupport 0.2 2.7 5.2 2.5

Publicsocialtransfers 1.2 15.8 26.7 13.1Familyallowance 0.5 8.3 23.7 2.4Socialassistance 0.5 1.4 2.0 7.8

Privatetransfers 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.9Otherhouseholdincome 5.2 4.0 4.0 1.5

(N) (728) (145) (97) (432)ahouseholdheadisabovetheretirementage(women55;men60)bheadofhouseholdisunemployed(accordingtoILO'sdefinition)cthreeormorechildrenundertheageof18dbyitstotal(equivalent)income,householdinthebottomquintileSource:FörsterandTóth,1993

morechildrenundertheageof18.Finally,poorhouseholdsweredefinedasallthosebelongingtothelowestquintile.

Adeterminantoftheincomesoftheaverageoldhouseholdprovedtobethepension,approximately73percentofincome.Withunemployedhouseholdstheproportionofearningsisrelativelyhigh,45percent.Onaveragethisproportionissignificantlyhigherthaninpoorandoldfamilies,butlowerthaninlargefamilieswhereitreaches

53.6percent.Theincomestructureofpoorhouseholdsissurprising.Welfare,namelyallowanceswhicharespecificallysupposedtohelpthepoor,thosewhomostneedthehelp,onlyaccountsfor8percentoftheirtotalincome.

Therolesocialsupportplaysinthereductionofpoverty

Table8.5showsthedistributionofhouseholdsamongquintilesbasedon(adjusted)marketincome.Iftherewerenonon-marketredistribution,thehouseholdswouldallbeinthediagonalofthematrix;non-marketincomeshiftsthecellfrequenciesfromthediagonal.Thefirstrowofthe

Table8.5:Marketincomequintilesbytheirhouseholdincomequintile

Quintilesbasedontotal(adjusted)householdincomes

Marketincome92-3

1 2 3 4 5

Adjusted1Quantile

43.1 27.9 16.8 8.9 3.3

2 37.6 31.9 21.1 6.3 3.23 14.6 28.4 32.4 20.1 4.44 3.0 9.1 24.2 44.9 18.85 1.9 2.6 5.8 19.4 70.2

tableisthemostsignificant.About43percentofthosewhobelongtothelowestquintileaccordingtotheirmarketincomebelongtothecategoryofthepoor(thelowestquintile,basedonalltypesofhouseholdincome).Withnon-marketincomethemajorityareaidedtosuchadegreeastobelongtoquintiles25.Pensionsunambiguouslyarethegreatestcauseofthis.

Letusnowmovetothesocialcompositionofthelowestincomegroups.Post-transferaredefinedastheproportionfromagivenpopulationgroupwhobelongtothelowestquintilebasedontotal(adjusted)householdincome,whilepre-transferbelongtothelowestquintileof(adjusted)marketincome.Thedifferencesbetweentheseratesreflectthechangesinrankingofhouseholdsasaresultofintroducingnon-marketincome.Ifonlymarketincomeexisted,thentherelativeriskoffallingintopovertythreateningthefollowingsocialgroupswouldsignificantlyincrease(cf.Table8.6):homeswheretheheadofhouseholdisabove60yearsofage;childlesshouseholds;homesinwhichtheheadofhouseholdisnotunemployed;singlehouseholds;thosewithhighereducationlevels;andhouseholdsinBudapestandothercities.Non-marketredistributiondecreasesthe

riskoffallingintopovertyforthesegroupstothehighestdegree.

Letusnowmakeacounterfactualexperiment.Letusfixthepovertythresholdattheleveloftheupperbreakpointofthelowestquintileofall(equivalent)householdincomesandthenletusexaminehowthepovertyratesofvariousgroupstargetedbysocialpolicieswouldbeaffectedifsocialpolicybenefitsdesignedforthemwereremoved.Table8.7showsthatwithoutpensionstheriskoffallingintopovertyrunbyfamilieswheretheheadofhouseholdisabovetheretirementagewouldincreaseto88percent,comparedwiththepresent24percent.Moreover,81percentofthesepeoplewouldalsofallunderhalfofthemedianincome.Simultaneously,removingpensionswouldalsosignificantlyincreasethe

Table8.6:Ratiobottomquintilemarketincomes(pre-transferpovertyrates)andtotalhouseholdincomes(post-transferpovertyrates)a

Householdsize1 2 3 4 5+

Pre-transferb

47.1 25.9 10.0 2.8 6.1

Post-transferc

34.4 15.5 14.0 16.9 24.4

Ageofheadofhousehold>30 3040 4050 5060 60+

Pre-transfer

7.0 7.4 5.5 12.6 42.3

Post-transferc

24.3 19.3 19.0 15.4 19.3

Numberofchildren0 1 2 3 4+

Pre-transfer

30.0 5.8 2.8 10.0 27.0

Post-transferc

16.6 18.2 16.3 24.8 67.2

Occupationalstatusofheademployedhead unemployedhead

Pre-transfer

19.7 24.1

Post-transferc

16.2 47.0

Householdstypes

singlemalesinglefemale

male-headed

female-headed

singlepensioner

Pre-transfer

37.1 50.8 12.1 19.1 59.1

Post-transferc

17.1 40.6 16.1 27.0 41.1

Educationoftheheadlessthan

primary primary vocationalhighschool universityPre-transfer

39.4 25.5 12.7 14.8 13.1

Post-transferc

41.6 31.5 16.0 8.4 3.0

Typeofsettlementdetachedhouse village city

countycapital Budapest

Pre-transfer

23.7 14.9 20.4 23.3 27.2

Post-transfer

22.9 23.7 18.7 18.7 8.3

aThehouseholdincomeisweightedbynumberofhouseholdmembers,e=0.73bPre-transfer:thepercentageinthelowestquintileasdefinedbymarketincomecPost-transfer:thepercentageinthelowestquintileasdefinedbythehousehold'stotalequivalentincomesSource:HungarianHouseholdPanel,1992-3

Table8.7:Household-specificpovertyratesPovertyratesatotalincome

totalincomesminusbenefits

HeadofhouseholdAboveretirementage 24.2 87.9Belowretirementage 17.6 26.9

No.ofchildrenunder18inhousehold1 19.3 27.52 16.4 29.53 25.6 51.64 65.2 86.9

OccupationalstatusofhouseholdheadNotunemployed 18.2 19.9Unemployed 41.0 50.7

IncomepositionofthehouseholdBottomquintile 20.0 20.6

athousehouseholdsaredefinedtobepoor.wherethehouseholdhasanincomelessthentheuppenbreakpointofthelowestquintile,basedontotal(equivalent)householdincomesSource:HuyngarianHouseholdPanel,19923

povertyriskrunbyhouseholdswheretheheadoffamilyisundertheolderagelimitfrom18percentto27percent.Theshareofpensionsintotalhouseholdincomesaswehaveseenitearlierisabove70percentinelderlyhouseholds,andevenhigherinthecaseofsinglepensionersandretiredcouples.Therefore,thereduction,(adabsurdum:thecessation)ofpensionswouldimmediatelypushthesepeopleintoabsolutepoverty,asitwouldleadtoatotallackofincomeinthemajorityofcases.Theriskthattheminorityofpensionerswhoearnmarketincomes,orliveinhouseholdswithatleastoneactive

wageearner,wouldfallintopovertyissmaller.

Thepovertyriskrunbyfamilieswithanumberofchildrenwouldalsosignificantlyincreaseiftherewere(adabsurdum)absolutelynoformoffamilyallowance,butthisriskwouldbeaffectedbythenumberofchildren.Thepovertyrateofhouseholdswithonechildwouldincreasefrom19percentto27percent,whilethepovertyratesofhouseholdswithtwochildrenwouldgrowfrom16percentto26percent.Thepovertyrateoffamilieswiththreechildrenwoulddoublefrom26percentto52percent,andthealreadyhighpovertyrateoffamilieswithfourormorechildrenwouldincreasetoanevengreaterdegree.These

datashowthatalthoughthefamilyallowancetendstobenefitthemiddleincomegroups,anerosionofthefamilyallowancewouldhaveagreatereffectonthosewhoseincomestatusislower.Consequently,theeffectivenessofthefamilyallowanceasanincomesupportprogrammecouldbeincreasedbymakingitmoredependentonthenumberofchildren,andbymakingthenetfamilyallowancedependonincomebytaxingit.

Therepealoftheunemploymentbenefitandsocialsupportwouldleadtolessdramaticeffects.Thesearethetypesofincomethatcontributeleasttothealleviationofpovertyoftherespectivesocialgroups.Thepovertyriskrunbyhouseholdswherethehouseholdheadisunemployedwouldincreasebyapproximately25percent,from40percentto51percent.Thus,halfofthehouseholdsheadedbyanunemployedindividualwouldnotsinkintodestitutioneveniftheunemploymentbenefitwerecompletelyeliminated.Therepealofsocialassistancebenefitwerewouldhavelittleimpactonthepovertyriskofthepopulationasawhole,whilecausingagraveproblemforthepoorestofthepoor.Cessationwouldsignificantlyharmthosewhoarealreadyimpoverished,aswellasdecreasingtheincomeofpoorhouseholdslivingabovetherecentlyfixedabsolutepovertylevel.

PovertyinHungaryisdeterminedbyanumberofsocialfactors.Ethnicaffiliation,stageinthedemographiclifecycle,lostlabourmarketattachments,lowereducation,loweroccupationalstatusandgeographiclocationallplayanessentialpartinimpoverishment.Socialtransfersplayanimportantroleindecreasingtheorderofpovertyandareconsequentlyneeded.Atthesametime,however,asignificantpartofsocialpolicybenefitsdonotfavourpoorpeople,butinsteadfavourthenon-poorandbetteroff.

1Thisstudyisarevised,shortenedversionoftheresearchreportsubmittedtotheActiveSocietyFoundation(AktívTársadalomAlapítvány),sponsoredbytheSOCOProgramofIWM,Vienna.AnearlierversioninKovács,ed.(1996).

2Intheoryincomefromthesaleofpropertyorpossessionsshouldfitintothisgroup,but,sincesellinganassetinoneyearmaybefollowedbybuyinganotheroneinanotheryear,hugeuncertaintiesarisefortheamountofnetincome.Sothesetypesofincomeareexcludedfromthepresentanalysis.

3TheHungarianHouseholdPanelquestionnaireasksaboutnetincomes,thewageactuallytakenhomebyaheadofhousehold.Exceptionshereareincomesbroughtinbythewholeofthefamily(forexample,incomefromthesaleofagriculturalproductsraisedonasmallscalebythehousehold).Thisformofincomedoesnotcauseagreatdistortionindata:incomefromsmall-scaleagriculturalproduction,forexample,enjoyssuchgreattaxallowancesthattheoverwhelmingmajoritycanberegardedasnetincome.

References

Andorka,Rudolf,1992.Szegénység[Poverty].InSikandTóth(1992).

Andorka,RudolfandSpéder,Zsolt,1993a.Szegénység[Poverty].InSikandTóth,(1993).

Andorka,RudolfandSpéder,Zsolt,1993b.PovertyinHungary.SomeResultsoftheFirstTwoWavesoftheHungarianHouseholdPanelSurveyin1992and1993,Berlin:October.

Andorka,RudolfandTóth,IstvánGyörgy,1992.Aszociáliskiadások

ésaszociálpolitikaMagyarországon[SocialExpendituresandSocialPolicyinHungary].InR.Andorka,T.KolosiandGy.Vukovich,eds.,TársadalmiRiport1992[SocialReport1992]Budapest:TÁRKI.

Andorka,Rudolf,Kondratas,AnnaandTóth,IstvánGyörgy,1994.TheHungarianWelfareStateinTransition:Structure,DevelopmentsandFirstStepstowardsReform.TheJointHungarianInternationalBlueRibbonCommissionPolicyStudyNo3.Washington,DC:HudsonInstitute.

Buchman,B.,Rainwater,L.,Schmaus,G.andSmeeding,T.,1988.EquivalenceScales,WellandBeing,InequalityandPoverty:SensitivityEstimatesAcrossTenCountriesUsingtheLISDatabase.ReviewofIncomeandWealth,34,115-42.

Förster,MichaelandTóth,IstvánGyörgy,1993.Aháztartásokjövedelmiszerkezeteésaszociálisújraelosztás[Theincomestructureofhouseholdsandthesocialredistribution]InSikandTóth(1993).

Förster,MichaelandTóth,IstvánGyörgy,1994.IncomePovertyandHouseholds'IncomeCompositioninHungary.PaperpreparedfortheThird

PragueInternationalWorkshoponSocialResponsestoTransfromationsinEastandCentralEurope,6and8May1994,Prague.

Förster,MichaelF.,1993.ComparingPovertyin13OECDCountries:TraditionalandSyntheticApproaches,LuxemburgIncomeStudyWorkingPaperNo100.

Kessides,C.,Davey,K.,Micklewright,J.,Smith,A.andHinayon,C.,1991.Hungary:ReformoftheSocialPolicyandDistributionSystem.TheWorldBank,draft,February.

Kolosi,TamásandSik,Endre.,1992.Munkaeropiac

*ésjövedelmek[LabourMarketandIncomes].InSik,andTóth(1992).

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Chapter9DissatisfactionandAlienationRudolfAndorka

UNDERtheCommunistsystemfewsurveysincludedquestionsonsatisfaction,psychologicalwell-beingormanifestationsofanomieandalienation.Theofficialideologyclaimedthatevery,oralmostevery,memberofthesocietywassatisfied,enjoyingpsychologicalwell-being.Bydefinitionanomieandalienationwerenon-existentinaCommunistor,accordingtotheself-definitionoftherulingelite,Socialistsystem.Theincreasingrateofsuicideandalcoholisminthe1970sand1980sindicatedthattherewere,andare,seriousproblemsinthesedomains.

Ofthefewstudiespriorto1989thataddressedtheseissues,themostnotablewerethesurveybyHankissandco-authors(1978)concerninglifestyle,qualityoflifeandvalues,twosurveysonmentalhealthbyKoppandSkrabaski(1992)in1983and1988andsurveysoftheeconomicandpoliticalsystembytheDepartmentofSociologyoftheBudapestUniversityofEconomicSciences(Andorka,1990).Allthesestudiespointedtoahighlevelofdissatisfaction,seriousmentalhealthproblemsandwidespreadsymptomsofanomie,alienationandageneralcrisisofvaluesandnorms.

MorerecentlytherehavebeenattemptstoexaminesystematicallytheseaspectsofHungariansociety.TheHungarianHouseholdPanelsurveysin1992,1993and1994included,inadditiontothequestionsonhouseholdincomeandonemploymentofthehouseholdmembers,questionsonsatisfactionwithseveraldimensionsoftherespondent'spersonallife,onsymptomsofpsychologicalproblems,onthedeepermanifestationofanomieandalienationandin1994forthefirsttime

questionsonvalues.ThevaluequestionsweretheIngelhart(1977)post-materialist/materialist

scale,whilealloftheothersweretakenfromthehouseholdpanelsurveysundertakeninEasternGermanysince1990(Habichetal.,1991;Noll,1994).Eachofthesedimensionswillbeconsideredinturn.

Satisfaction

TodayitisalmostatruismthatHungariansareverydissatisfiedwiththeirpresentlivingconditions.Manysurveyshavefoundsimilarlyhighlevelsofdissatisfaction.Table9.1showsthatthehighestaveragelevelsofdissatisfactionarewiththelevelofincomeandthecurrentstandardoflivingandfutureprospects.Thedissatisfiedaremorenumerousthanthosewhoaresatisfied.

Therearedifferencesinlevelsofsatisfactionbetweenmalesandfemales,youngandoldandthosewithlowandhighincomes.Intermsofgender,dissatisfactionishigheramongmenthanamongwomenforallofthedomainsexcepthealth.Middle-agedadultsaregenerallymoredissatisfiedwiththevariousdimensionsoftheirlifethantheyoungortheold.However,aswithgender,therelationshipbetweensatisfactionwithhealthandageissomewhatdifferent.Aspeopleagetheyreporthigherlevelsofdissatisfactionwiththeirpersonalhealth.Finally,dissatisfactionishigheramongthosebelongingtothelowestincomequintileandmuchloweramongthosebelongingtothehighestquintile,indicatingthatdissatisfactionis,indeed,correlatedwiththeobjectivematerialsituationofpersonsandhouseholds.

Insixdomainsthesatisfiedoutnumberedthedissatisfied.Familyisthe

Table9.1:Satisfactionwithdimensionsofrespondent'slife,1992-4(Meanlevelofsatisfaction)a

(%,1994)

1992 1993 1994 DisatisfiedMediumSatisfied

Family 8.65 8.52 8.49 3.4 11.9 84.7Work 7.43 7.37 7.27 6.6 26.9 66.5Housingenvironment

7.32 6.91 7.01 12.3 23.8 63.9

Housing 7.14 7.01 7.13 9.7 25.4 64.9Personalhealth 6.39 6.20 6.34 21.2 24.7 54.1Personallifetillnow

5.75 5.53 5.83 15.0 45.4 39.6

Presentlevelofliving

4.58 4.49 4.88 27.6 47.4 25.0

Futureperspectives

4.20 4.20 4.85 29.6 43.6 26.8

Income 3.62 3.69 3.99 44.6 38.3 17.1a0(lowsatisfaction)to10(highsatisfaction)

domainwheresatisfactionisdeclaredtobethehighest;84percentreporttheyaresatisfied.Itisalsonoteworthythatdissatisfactionwithincomeandwithfutureperspectivessomewhatdiminishedfrom1992to1994,althoughtheobjectiveincomedatafromthesamesurveysseemtoindicatethattheaveragerealincomelevelofthepopulationcontinuedtodeclineuptothetimethe1994surveywascarriedout.However,theotherdimensionsindicatearelativestabilityintheaveragepositivelevelofsatisfaction.

Materialist/Post-MaterialistValues

Thehighlevelofdissatisfactionwithpresentincomeleveloughttobeconsideredahighlyimportantsocialfactas,accordingtotherankordergiventothefourbasicvaluesoftheshortestversionoftheInglehartvaluequestions,Hungariansareverymaterialist.Theyattributemuchhigherimportancetothematerialistvaluesoforderandpricestabilitythantothepost-materialistvaluesofparticipationinpoliticaldecisionsandfreedomofspeech(Table9.2).AccordingtotheclassificationproposedbyInglehart59percentoftherespondentsbelongedtothematerialisttype,puttingthetwomaterialistvaluesfirstandsecond.Only2percentarepost-materialist,puttingthetwopost-materialistvaluesinthefirsttwoplaces;theremaining39percentareofthemixedtype.

Onlyminorandinconsistentdifferencescanbeseenbetweenthevalueorientationsofmenandwomen.Asmightbeexpected,thebreakdownofvaluesbyageindicatesthatyoungeradultstendtobesomewhatlessmaterialistic,butpersonshavinghighereducationareasmaterialisticasthosehavinglowereducation.

Table9.2:ValuesintheInglehartscale,1994(%)Importance

MostSecondThirdLeastDon'tknow

Maintainpublicorderinthecountry 49.1 28.8 12.5 5.9 3.9Fightagainstinflaction 35.4 38.7 16.1 5.1 3.7Morevoicecitizensingovernmentdecisions

9.9 18.1 39.6 27.7 4.7

Protectfreedomofspeech 3.4 10.0 27.2 54.7 4.6

PsychologicalWell-Being

Ninequestionswereincludedonmentalhealthandpsychologicalwell-being;theanswersdemonstratethehighprevalenceofthesesymptomsofdisturbance(Table9.3).Sixty-onepercentcomplainedoffrequentexhaustionanddepression,57percentdeclaredthattheyusuallyhavethefeelingofbeingunlucky,41percentareveryworriedabouttheirhealth,34percentcomplainedoffrequentpalpitations,31percentsaidtheywerecontinuouslyirritatedandnervous,30percentcomplainedoffrequentheadaches,29percentstatedthattheybecomeconfusediftheyhavetoperformseveraltasksinashorttime,21percentcomplainedoffrequenttremorsand20percentstatedthattheywerenotabletobeforgettheirfearsandanxieties.

Therearesignificantdifferencesbetweensocio-economicgroupsinpsychologicalwell-being.Consistently,womenaremorelikelythanmentoreportlowerlevelsofwell-beingthanmen,asdotheold,thosewithlowerlevelsofformaleducationandthepoor.Insomecasesthesedifferencesarelarge.Forexample,18percentmorewomenreportfeelingcontinuouslyirritatedandnervous,14percentmorewomenreportfeelingfrequentexhaustionanddepressionand13percentreportfrequentpalpitations.Notunexpectedly,theoldare47percentmorelikelytoreporttheyareworriedabouttheirhealththantheyoungand33percentmore

Table9.3:Psychologicalproblems,1993(%)Percentagedifference

(Total/Yes)Female-male

Old-young

Low-higheducation

Ioftenfeelexhausted,depressed (61) 14 19 -14InmostcasesIfeelIhavenoluck (57) 4 18 -36Iworryalotaboutmyhealth (41) 12 47 -15Ioftenhaveastrongheartbeat (34) 13 33 -11

Iamconstantlyupsetandnervous (31) 8 17 -17Ioftenhaveabadheadache (30) 18 16 -13IgetveryconfusedwhenIhavetocarryoutdifferentthingsinashorttime

(29) 11 16 -20

Ioftenfindmyselftremblingallover

(21) 10 22 -12

Icannotgetridofmyfearsandanxieties

(20) 11 12 -15

likelytoreportfrequentheartpalpitations.Althoughthosewithlowlevelsofcompletedformaleducation,areconsistentlymorelikelytoreportlowerlevelsofwell-beingthanthosewithhigherlevelsofformaleducationthelargestdifferencesareobservedonthetwoitemsreferringtoluckandconfusion.Intheformer,thosewithlowerlevelsofeducationare36percentmorelikelytoreportthattheyfeelunluckythanthosewithhigherlevelsofeducationandthedifferenceonfeelingconfusedis20percent.

Thosewhoaremoredissatisfiedwiththevariousdomainsoftheirlifealsoreportlowerlevelsofpsychologicalwell-being.Itisdifficulttodeterminethecausativelinksbetweenthehighworkload(longworkinghoursinthefirstandsecondjobandinthehousehold),thestressofeverydaylife,thehighlevelofdissatisfactionandthesesymptomsofpsychologicalproblems.Itis,however,clearthattheyarelinked.

AnomieandAlienation

Itmightbehypothesizedthatbothsymptomsofpsychologicalproblemsandofgeneraldissatisfactionareatleastpartlyduetowidespreadanomieandalienation.HereIinterpretanomieandalienationasreflectingthesamephenomenon,acrisisofvaluesandthefeelingofpowerlessness.

Table9.4:Manifestationsofanomieandalienation,1993(%)Completelyagrees

Partlyagrees

Somewhatdisagrees

Completelydisagrees

AnomieIfonewishestoachievesomething,itisnecessarytobreaksomerules

38.9 39.0 12.4 9.8

NowadaysIambarelyabletofindmywayineverydaymatters

24.7 37.2 20.2 17.9

AlienationIamconfidentinmyownfuture

36.0 36.7 15.1 12.2

IcarryoutwhatIdecide 33.8 52.8 10.2 3.7Myfuturedependsfirstofallonmyself

25.3 41.1 21.0 12.6

Iambarelyabletoinfluencemyownfortune

16.7 40.3 25.3 17.7

Iambarelyabletoalleviatethemajorityofmyworries

15.6 35.5 27.1 21.8

Ioftenfeelhelplessinimportantmatters

13.7 33.4 26.6 26.3

Ioftenfeellonely 11.8 14.3 17.3 56.6Iamunabletosolvemyproblems

9.7 42.0 24.4 23.8

Iusuallydonotfindpleasureinmywork

5.7 17.3 22.6 54.4

TheanswersinTable9.4ofrespondentstoquestionsandstatementsexploringdifferentpossiblemanifestationsofanomieandalienationindicatethatafewarewidespreadinHungary.Amajoritythinkthattoachievesomething,itisnecessarytobreakrules,andamajorityalsofinditdifficulttocopewitheverydaymattersorinfluencetheirownfortune.Ontheotherhand,averylargemajorityalsothinktheycancarryoutwhatevertheydecide,areconfidentoftheirfutureandbelievethatitdependsonwhattheythemselvesdo.

Whenweexaminethemanifestationsofanomieandalienationamongdifferentsocio-economicgroups,morewomenreporthighlevelsofanomieandalienationthanmen.Aswiththesatisfactionandwell-beingmeasures,olderpeoplereporthigherlevelsofanomieandalienationthantheyoungandsimilarlythosewithlowlevelsofformaleducationreporthigherlevelsthanthosewhohavecompletedmoreyearsofformaleducation.Therearealsodifferencesinincome,withthosefrompoorbackgroundsreportinghigherlevelsofanomieandalienationthanthemoreaffluent.However,menandtheyoungweremuchmorelikelytoindicateagreementwiththestatement:Ifonewishestoachievesomething,itisnecessarytobreaksomerules.Interestinglytherewasnosignificantdifferencebetweenthoseonlowandhighincomesinagreementwiththisstatement.

Therearesignificantinter-relationshipsbetweenanomieandalienationandgeneraldissatisfactionwiththevariousaspectsoflifeandpsychologicalwell-being.Respondentswhoweremoredissatisfiedwiththeirgenerallifesituationwerealsomorelikelytoreporthigherlevelsofanomieandalienation.Thiswasalsothecasewiththosewhoreportedlowerlevelsofpsychologicalwell-being.

Whenfourstatementsandquestionsonotheraspectsofanomieandalienation,referredtoasself-confidenceandlifegoals(Table9.5),askedbyHankissandco-authors(1978),wereincludedinasurveyin

spring1990andagaininspring1994,itwasfoundthatmanifestationsofanomieandalienationincreasedstronglyfrom1978to1990.ItmightbehypothesizedthatthisanomieandalienationcrisiswasanimportantfactorleadingtothecollapseoftheCommunistsystem(Andorka,1994).From1990to1994thesesymptomsofanomieandalienationdonotseemtohaveincreasedandsomeanswersshowadecline.Ataboutthesametimethegrowthinthesuicideratedeclined.Iftherootofanomieandalienationisthefeelingofpowerlessness,thanitmightbeconcludedthattheregimechangeclearlylessenedtheexposureofordinarycitizenstoarbitrarymeasuresofthegovernmentanditsrepressiveorgans.Asaconsequence

Table9.5:Self-confidenceandlifegoals,1978,1990and1994(%)197819901994

Howoftendoyouhavethefeelingthatyourlifehasnosense,nopurpose?

Never 72 55 47Sometimes 19 33 36Often 4 6 9Veryoften 3 4 5Continuously 2 2 3

Howoftendoyouloseyourfaithinyourself,doyouhavethefeelingthatyouareuselessforeverypurpose?

Never 71 53 60Sometimes 22 38 28Often 4 4 6Veryoften 2 3 4Continuously 1 1 2

Ideals,purposes,principleschangesorapidlythatonedoesnotknowinwhattobelieveandhowtolive

Doesnotagree 46 13 13Partlyagrees 33 28 38Completelyagrees 21 59 49

Itisnotworthwhiletomakeplansandtoformulateperspectivelifegoals?

Doesnotagree 69 17 20Partlyagrees 17 35 34Completelyagrees 14 48 46

therewasadiminutionofthefeelingofbeinghelplesslyexposedtoexternalforces,ofbeingunabletoplanandinfluenceone'sownfortunes.

Therearedifferencesbetweenmaterialistsandpost-materialistsandthefourmeasuresofself-confidenceandlifegoals.Materialistsreport

higherlevelsoffeelinguselessandthattheirlifeissenseless.However,theyarelesslikelytoreportthatitisnotworthwhiletomakeplansandtoformulatelifegoalsandthattheydonotknowinwhattobelieveorhowtolive.

Conclusion

Thesedatashowevidenceofdissatisfactionwithincome,livingconditionsandfutureperspectives,psychologicalproblemsandmanifestationsofanomieandalienation,andinterestingdifferencesbetweendifferentsocio-economicgroups.Whereasmenreporthigherlevelsofdissatisfactionwiththeirlives,itiswomenwhoreportlowerlevelsofpsychologicalwell-beingandhigherlevelsofanomieandalienation.Thepoorandthosewithlowerlevelsofformaleducationreporthigherlevelsofgeneraldissatisfaction,anomieandalienation,andlowerlevelsofwell-being.Theyoungtendtobemoresatisfied,havehigherlevelsofwell-beingandlowerlevelsofanomieandalienation.ItoughttobeemphasisedthatalltheseproblemsexistedandwereincreasingduringtheCommunistsystem.Therearenotyetenoughdataandalsothetimeistooshorttoascertainwhetherthiscrisisisdeepening,lesseningorremainingstablesincethesystemchange.

References

Andorka,R.,1990.1988utózöngéimitkellmeghallani1990-ben[Reverberantsof1988whatshouldbefearedin1990].KözgazdaságiSzemle,37,10,11921.

Andorka,R.,1994.SocialchangesandsocialproblemsinHungarysincethe1930s.Economic,socialandpoliticalcausesofthedemiseofstatesocialism.ComparativeSocialResearch,14,4996.

Habich,R.,Krause,P.andPriller,E.,1991.DieEntwicklungdessubjektivenWohlbefindensvomJanuarbisHerbst1990inderDDRandOstdeutschland.InProjektgruppeDasSozio-ökonomischePanel,eds,LebenslagenimWandel.Frankfurt:Campus,33256.

Hankiss,E.,Manchin,R.andFüstös,L.,1978.Életmód,életminoség,

értékrendszer.AlapadatokIIII[Lifestyle,QualityofLifeandSystemofValues.BasicDataIIII].Budapest:MTANépmuvelésiIntézet.

Inglehart,R.,1977.TheSilentRevolution.ChangingValuesandPoliticalStylesamongWesternPublics.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Kopp,M.andSkrabski,Á.,1992.Magyarlelkiállapot[Hungarianmood].Budapest:Végeken.

Noll,H.H.,1994.SteigendeZufriedenheitinOstdeutschland,sinkendeZufriedenheitinWestdeutschland.InformationsdienstSozialeIndikatoren,11,17.

Chapter10PartiesandSocialDivisionsinHungary:ACommonEastCentralEuropeanPattern?

GáborTóka

Itisstillanoft-mentionedcommonplacethatinnewdemocraciesthepartyloyaltiesofvotersareweak.Buthowweak?Thestandardmeansofcomparingpartisanshipinternationallyisthevolatility-index,firstdevelopedbyPedersen.Theindexiscalculatedasfollows:iftwosubsequentelectionsareenteredbythesameparties,andiftheyallgetthesameresultsonbothoccasions,thevalueoftheindexiszero;ontheotherhand,ifatthesecondelectionallthevotesaretakenbyentirelynewparties,thevalueoftheindexisonehundred.Inpractice,wealwaysrecordvaluesbetweenthesetwoextremes.Theindexcansimplybecalculatedbysummingthechangeinthepercentageofvotescastforthepartieswithdecreasingsupport(oritsmirrorimage,theincreaseofvotesofthepartiesthathavegainedsupport).

Forvotescastfortheregionalpartylistsatthe1990and1994Hungarianelectionsthevolatilityindexis28.3(seeTable10.1).ThisismorethanthreetimestheWesternEuropeanaverageforthehundredyearsbetween1885and1985(seeBartoliniandMair,1990).Inaddition,theHungarianindexisrelativelylowincomparisonwiththefigureof34forthe1991and1993electionsinPoland.Rose(1995)hasdemonstratedtheextraordinaryvolatilityofEastEuropeanelectoralalignmentswithdatafrommanyofthenewdemocracies.

Howcanweexplainthisphenomenon?Itispossiblethatthemere

noveltyofmulti-partysystemsprovidesasufficientexplanationfor

Table10.1:Arealistvotes,Hungarianelections25March1990and8May1994(%)

1990 1994 (Change)Pro-businessparties:RepublicParty(KP) __ 2.6PartyofEntrepreneurs(VP) 1.9 0.6(Sub-total) (1.9) (3.2) (+1.3)Liberalparties:FederationofYoungDemocrats(FIDESZ)

9.0 7.0

AllianceofFreeDemocrats(SZDSZ) 21.4 19.7(Sub-total) (30.4) (2.1) (-3.7)Straightagrarianparties:AgrarianAlliance(ASZ) 3.1 2.1Co-operativeandAgrarianParty(MSZAP)

0.1 __

(Sub-total) (3.2) (2.1) (-1.1)IndependentSmallHoldersParty,splintes,andrelated:IndependentHungarianJusticeandLife(MIEP)

0.06 __

PartyofHungarianJusticeandLife(MNP)

__ 1.6

HungarianPeople'sParty(MNP) 0.8 __NationalDemocraticAlliance(NDSZ) __ 0.5MarketParty(PP) __ 0.01(Subtotal) (25.6)(13.8) (-11.8)Greenparties:GreenPartyofHungary(MZP) 0.4 0.2GreenAlternative(ZA) __ 0.02(Subtotal) (0.4) (0.2) (-0.2)Socialdemocrats:SocialDemocraticPartyofHungary(MSZDP)

3.6 1.0 (-2.6)

Post-CommunistFormations:PatroiticElectoralCoalition(HVK) 1.9

HangarianSocialistParty(MSZP) 10.9 33.0Worker'sParty(MP,ex-MSZMP) 3.7 3.2(subtotal) (16.5)(36.2) (+19.7)Source:OrszágosVálasztásiBizottság,1990.AzOrszágosVálasztásiBizottságJelentése,[ReportoftheNationalElectionCommittee].MagyarKözlöny,13May1990;OrszágosVálasztásiBizottság,1990.AzOrszágosVálasztásiBizottságJelentése,[ReportoftheNationalElectionCommittee].MagyarKözlöny,24June1994

volatility.Thatexplanationmaybereassuringafterall,infantiledisordersdocometoanendwithtimebutforpreciselythatreason,fewfinditintellectuallyexciting.Asaconsequence,manyanalystshaveattemptedtofindamoresophisticatedexplanation.IntheHungarianpopularpress,IvánSzelényi,MihályBihariandothershavearguedthattheweaknessofpartyloyaltiesisduetothefactthatthenewpartiesfollowcatch-allstrategies,withtheresultthatvotersareunabletoidentifythemclearlyastherepresentativesofopposedsocialgroups.Iarguethatthisexplanationishardlyappropriate.

ThefirsttwopartsofthischaptercomparetheelectoralbasesofthePolish,Czech,SlovakianandHungarianpartygroupingsandexaminewhichsocio-demographicgroupsrecognizetheirrepresentativesinthespiritualfamiliesofparties.The1991figuresindicatethatthereisusuallyastrongcorrespondencebetweenvoters'socio-culturalcharacteristicsandtheirpartypreferencesinEastCentralEurope.ItisonlyinSlovakiaandHungarythatthevolatilityofpreferencescanbeexplainedbytheweaknessofsuchconnections,ifweattributeparticularimportancetoclassvotingamonglinkagesofthiskind.Thethirdandfourthsectionsdiscussthechanges,amongthemtheappearanceofthephenomenonofclassvoting,intheelectoralbasesofHungarianpartiesbetweenthefirsttwofreeelections.Iarguethattheloyaltiesoftheelectoratearestillverymuchinquestion.

Thecurrentanalysishaslimits.InthefirstpartIrelyondatafromaquestionnairesurveyinitiatedandsponsoredbytheInstituteforEastWestStudiesandconductedinOctober1991(Dohnaliketal.,1991).Inthecourseofthatsurveyweaskedthesamequestionsofrandomlyselectedgroupsof800peopleinSlovakia,1,500eachinPolandandHungaryand1,200inCzechlands.WhileIamtryingtoanalysethesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweentheprofilesofrelatedfamiliesofpartiesinparticularcountries(Christian,liberal,agrarian,secularright-wing,formerrulingparties,etc.),thedataonlyreferto

thepartywithinthemasselectorate,andnotthepartyingovernmentorParliament.Anadditionallimitationistechnical,arisingfromtherelativelackofconsolidationofthepartysystemsunderexamination.Numeroussmallpartiestogetherenjoytheconfidenceofanotinconsiderablesectionoftheelectorate,but,becauseoftheirinsufficientfrequencyinthedata,thesevotersandthus,theirpartieshadtobeexcludedfromtheanalysis.Excludedpartieshadsupportbelow1or2percentofthevoters;theyareirrelevanttothesocio-politicalcleavagesrepresentedbythepartysystem.Thisproblemcanbealleviatedbycombiningsomeof

thesmallerpartiesintheanalysis.ThiscoursewaschosenforthreesmallChristian-democraticpartiesandmovementsintheCzechRepublicdespiteitssimilarity,thePeople'sParty(CSL)remainedinacategoryofitsownandinthecaseofPolandwiththevariouspeasants'parties;withpartiesofaChristianorientation;withthesmallerliberalpartiesandtheLiberalDemocraticCongress(KLD);andwithelectoralalliancesbearingthenameoftheSolidarityUnioninsomeformoranother.

PartyPreferencesinPost-CommunistSocieties

Theliteratureconcerningpost-Communistcountriescontainstwo,seeminglydiametricallyopposed,expectationsregardingthedeterminationofpartypreferencesbysocio-demographicfactors.Themajorityviewisthatintheearlystagesofdevelopmentofpost-CommunistPartysystemsfollowingthefallofauthoritarianregimes,threecharacteristicswereapparent.First,individualpartiesincomparisonwiththeircounterpartsinestablishedpartysystemsreliedonextraordinarilyheterogeneouselectoralbases.Second,newlyestablishedparties,oftenunitedbynomorethantheiroppositiontotheoldregimeorthedemandfordemocratization,wereunabletofulfiltheirinterest-articulatingandrepresentativefunctions.Third,theresultingpartysystemswereimmature.

ThemostsuccinctstatementofthenormativethrustofthisapproachhasbeengivenbyAlainTouraine(1991:263):

Representativedemocraciesnotonlyimplyinstitutionsguaranteeingfreedomofpoliticalchoice;theyalsorequirethepre-existenceofsocialinterestswhichcanberepresented,whichensuresameasureofprioritytopeopleinsocietyovertheirpoliticalrepresentation.IfWesternEuropehavehadstrongdemocracies,itisbecausetheirpartiesfaithfullyreflectedthecategoriesorevensocialclassesbornofindustrialisation.Wherethelinkwasstrong,asinBritainandtheScandinaviancountries,theprimacy

ofcivilsocietywasensured;where,onthecontrary,theconceptofthestateremainedpredominant,asinFrance,democracyhasalwaysbeenweaker,threatenedordestroyedbyBonapartist-stylemovementsorbypartiesmoreconcernedwithtakingpowerthanwithdefendingtheinterestsofaparticularsocialcategoryandthereforerecognizingpoliticalpluralism.

ThethesisthatconnectionsbetweenpartypreferencesandsocialpositionareextraordinarilyweakinEasternEuropeisnotsomuchbasedonfactualobservationbutstemsfromthesupposedimmaturityof

thenewdemocracies.Itisalsoimportanttonotetheoriginsoftheidea.StartingfromthehistoricalanalysisofLipsetandRokkan(1967),BartoliniandMair(1990:212-49)arguethatthepoliticalconflictswhichdeterminethelong-termcleavagesofpartysystemsarethosethatbringintooppositiongroupsthatcanbedemarcatedbycertainsocialcharacteristics(e.g.ethnicity,class,religiousaffiliationthedemandfordemocratizationdoesnotitselfusuallybringsuchgroupsintoopposition).Inaddition,whengroupsarebroughtintoopposition,theyoftenpossessastrongsenseofcollectiveidentity,arereadytoactonthisbasisandrepresentasocialcleavagethathassomeformoforganizationalexpression.Yet,afterfortyyearsofstatesocialism,itisunlikelythatthepotentiallyimportantcleavagesofthenearfutureshouldpossesssuchcognitive,affectiveandorganizationalexpression.Intheseatomizedsocietiesthereisinitiallylittlechancethatimportantsocialcleavageswilltranslateintopartyideologiesandintotheorganizationallinkagesbetweenpartiesandvoluntaryorganizations(seeMair,1991).

Thealternativeapproacharguesthatinarelativelynewpartysystemoverandabovethefactthatthepoliticalprioritiesofthepartiesthemselvesarenotyetfullyformedtheelectorate'simageoftheparties,theirfunctionalrolesandtheirpossiblegovernmentactivitiesareunderdeveloped.However,thatispreciselythereasonwhysuperficialsignsofthesocio-demographicandculturalpositionofthepartiesandtheirleadersmayaffectthevoters'choiceofpartytoanextraordinarydegree.IntheWestGermancase,accordingtoKlingemannandWattenberg(1992),theperiodfollowingthefirstdemocraticchangeofgovernmentbetween1969and1987wasoneinwhichtheimageformedbytheGermanelectorateofthetwomajorpartiesbecameincreasinglyvariegatedanddetailed.Atthesametime,boththestrengthofidentificationwiththepartiesandthesocio-demographicbaseofthevoteweakened.Thesignificanceofclass

voting,forexample,decreaseddespitethefactthattheaveragevoterwasformingastrongerimageoftheclassrootsoftheCDU.Totheextentthatthistrendcanbeunderstoodasindicativeofamorerational,politicallyconsciouspatternofelectoralbehaviour,theincreasedsocio-demographicdeterminationofthevotecouldalsobeseenasasignoftheimmaturityofthepartysystem.Inotherwords,theweakandthestrongcharacterofthesocialembeddednessofthevotecouldequallybeinterpretedasalogicalconsequenceoftheweakmotivationalbasesofpartyattachments.

Table10.2showsthestrengthoftheconnectionsbetweenpartypreferencesandcertainsocio-demographicbackgroundvariablesinnine

Table10.l2:Correlationsbetweensocialvariablesandpartypreference

EducaINCOMEbCHURCATcURBRURdAGE4ePartyPreferencef

(Symmetricuncertaintycoefficient)

Australia .004 .005 .017 .029 .005USA .001 .005* .014 .003 .004*GreatBritain

.022 .020 .009 .008 .008

Germany .017 .011 .035 na .002*Austria .010 .011 .100 .024 .004*CzechRepublic

.039 .020 .072 .030 .035

Slovakia .026 .030 .148 .014 .045Hungary .035 .018 .078 .023 .080Poland .083 .022 .032 .101 .013**chi-squarestatisticnotsignificantatthe.05levelnanodataavailableaEDUC:educationwascodedas1maximumprimary,2vocationalschool,incompletedsecondaryschool,3finishedsecondaryschool,4highereducationbINCOME:totalfamilyincome:1one-thirdwithlowestincome,2one-thirdinbetweenorlackofdata,3one-thirdwithhighestincomecCHURCAT:frequencyofchurch-going:1onceamonthatleast,2severaltimesayear,3lessfrequentlyorneverdURBRUR:placeofresidence:1bigcity(100,000inhabitantsormore),2smallsettlement(lessthan2,0002,500inhabitants),3othereAGE4:age:11829,23044,34559,460yearsoldorolderfPartiesconsideredinthegivencountries:Australia:LiberalParty,Labour,Country(National)Party,DemocraticPartyUnitedStates:Reagan,Mondale

GreatBritain:Conservative,Labour,Alliance(orLiberalorSDP)Germany:CDU/CSU,SPD,FDP,TheGreensAustria:OVP,SPÖ,FPÖCzechRepublicandMoravia:CzechPeople'sParty(CSL),SocialDemocraticParty(CSSD),CommunistParty(KSCM),CivilDemocraticParty(ODS),CivicMovement(OH),CivicDemocraticAlliance(ODA),AGrarianParty(memberoftheSocialistUnion),GreenParty(memberoftheSocialLiberalUnion),SocialistParty(memberoftheSocialLiberalUnion),smallerChristiandemocraticpartiesandmovements),MoravianParties(HSD-SMS),RepublicanParty(SPR-RSC)Slovakia:ChristianDemocraticMovement(KDH),SlovakNationalParty(SNS),MovementforDemocraticSlovakia(HZDS),PartyofDemocraticLeft(SDL),CivicDemocraticUnion(VPN-ODU)Hungary:MDF,SZDSZ,FKGP,MSZP,FIDESZ,KDNPPoland:peasantparties(PLandPSL),Solidarnosc(aggregatesupportersofelectorallistsandpartiesusingthenameoftheunion),Christianparties(includeCentreAgreement(POC),andCatholicElectoralAction(WAK),DemocraticUnion(UD),liberalparties(includingLiberalDemocraticCongress(KLD),andUnionofRealpolitics(UPR),ConfederationforIndependentPoland(KPN),DemocraticLeftAlliance(SLD))Sources:Zentralarchiv,1987.TheRoleofGovernment,ISSP1985,Machine-ReadableDataFile.Köln:Zentralarchiv;Dohnalik,Jacek,Hartl,Jan,Krazysztof,Jasiewicz,Markowski,Radoslaw,Mateju,Peter,Rezler,Lubos,Tóka,Gábor,Tucek,Milan,1991.DismantlingoftheSocialSafetyNetanditsPoliticalConsequencesinEastCentralEurope.AnInternationalComparativeStudyInitiatedandSponsoredbytheInstituteofEast-WestStudies,NewYork-Prague.Machine-ReadableDataFile.Distributors:IEWS,NewYorkandTÁRKI,Budapest

countries.Thestrengthoftheconnectionsisindicatedbythesymmetricuncertaintycoefficient,whosevaluewouldbezeroif,inagivencountry,therewerenoconnectionsbetweensocio-demographiccharacteristicsandpartypreferences,andonewhenpartypreferencescouldbewhollyexplainedbysocio-demographiccharacteristics.ThedataforthefiveWesterndemocraciesisthe1985-6ISSPRoleofGovernmentsurvey(Zentralarchiv,1987),whiletheEasternEuropeandataaretheOctober1991surveymentionedabove.IntheUSA,Austria,GermanyandAustraliacurrentpartypreferenceswereusedinsteadofvotescastattheirmostrecentnationalelections.Non-voters,respondentsgivingnopartypreferenceandsupportersofsmallpartieswereexcludedfromtheanalysis.ThenumberofpartiestakenintoconsiderationintheWesterncountriesrangesfromtwointheUSAtofourinWestGermanyandAustralia,whileintheEasternEuropeancountriesitvariesfromfiveinSlovakiatotwelveinCzechland-Moravia.

Twosimpleindicatorsofsocialstatus,educationandincome,haveastrongercorrelationwithchoiceofpartyineachofthefournewdemocraciesthaninthefiveestablishedones.Theeffectofageissimilar:withtheexceptionofPoland,theimpactofageonpartypreferenceiscomparableorasinHungarylargerthanthatofsocialstatus.AlthoughslightdifferencesinthepartypreferencesofvariousagegroupsdooccurinWesterndemocraciesaswell,theirsignificancetendstobemarginal.Bycontrast,theeffectofageismuchlargerineachofthefournewdemocracies:inthetwodifferentpartysystemsofCzechoslovakiaandinHungary,ageisamajorfactorshapingthecompetitionoftheparties.

AlongwiththeHungarianSmallholders,wefindtheHungarianandtheSlovakianChristianDemocrats,andthePeople'sParty(CSL)andtheCommunists(KSCM)ofCzechlandamongtheEastCentralEuropeanpartieswiththeoldestsupporters.Althoughitistemptingto

explainthisbythehistoricalcharacteroftheseparties,oursamplecontainsatleastonehistoricalpartytheCzechsocialdemocrats(CSSD)whoseelectoralbaseshowsonlyamarginalover-representationofoldervoters.ThesamepatternholdsforthePolishandCzechagrarianparties.AmongformerCommunistpartiesandChristianpartieswiththeexceptionoftheratherinsignificantCzechChristiandemocratsitisgenerallythecasethattheaverageageoftheirvotersisabovethenationalaverage.AlthoughthePolishChristianpartiesalsodisplaythistendencyonlytoaverylimitedextent,andthoughtheconsistentcharacteristicofformerCommunistpartiesseemstobeextremelysmallnumbersofsupportersamongtheyoungestagegroupsratherthanahighratioamongthe

elderly,certainpartytypeshaveaparticularappealtocertainagegroupsacrossthewholeregion.

Thelistofpartieswithyoungerelectoralbasesalsodemonstratesthesystematicbutcomplexnatureofthephenomenon.Accordingtoourdata,inEastCentralEurope,alongwiththeHungarianFIDESZ,itistheCzechrepublicans(SPR-RSC,theallianceoftwoxenophobicpartieswhoseprofilesaresimilartothatoftheGermanrepublicans),certainCzechcentre-leftoppositionparties

2(notablytheGreens)andtheSlovakNationalPartythatcanlayclaimtotheyoungestvoters.Nevertheless,itisnotsimplytheprotest-votingtendencyoftheyoungthataccountsforthispattern,sincetherelativelylowaverageageoftheelectoralbaseisalsocommonamongliberalpartiesingovernmentandinopposition.Forexample,inOctober1991itwasalsoacharacteristicoftheSlovakianPublicAgainstViolence,theCzechCivicMovementofPetrPithartandJiriDienstbier,thePolishLiberalDemocraticCongressandDemocraticUnionaswellastheHungarianAllianceofFreeDemocrats(SZDSZ).ApeculiarcharacteristicofthepoliticsofageinEastCentralEuropeisprovidedbyVaclavKlaus'ssecular-conservativeCivicDemocraticPartywhichistypicallyanddominantlythepartyofthemiddleaged.

Turningtopartypreference,religionandplaceofresidence,inEastCentralEuropebothareapproximatelyasimportantasifnotmoreimportantthantheyareinthoseWesterncountrieswheretheurban-ruralorthereligious-secularcleavageistraditionallyveryimportant.InHungaryandtheCzechRepublictheext0entofseparationbetweenpartiesrelyingonmoreruralandonmoreurbanelectoralbasesissimilartothatinAustriaorAustralia,whileinPolandthesameseparationtakesonratherextremeproportions.Inthisregard,Slovakiaisexceptional,probablybecauseitistheonlyareainthe

regionwhereformeragrarianpartieshavenotre-emerged.ItisonlyinPolandthatagrarianpartiesinthenarrowsensedominatethevillages.ThelikelyexplanationisthatPolishagriculturalconditionsweretheleasttransformedbystatesocialism.Giventheunusuallyhighratioofagriculturalemployment,thismakestherural-urbancleavageoneofthemostimportantfactorsinPolishelectoralpolitics.

WhilethePolishandCzechagrarianpartiesfindmorethanhalfoftheirsupportersamongthoseactuallyworkinginagriculture,inthecaseoftheHungarianSmallHoldersPartythefigureisbelow20percent.Oncetheageandreligiousdistributionsoftheirelectoralbasesarealsotakenintoaccount,thesocialbaseoftheSmallHoldersPartyissimilartothatoftheCzechPeople'sPartyandtotheHungarianandSlovakian

Christiandemocratsratherthantotheagrarianparties.Inthenewdemocracies,asinAustriaandWestGermany,apartfromagrarianpartiesitisChristianpartiesthatenjoyabove-averagesupportamongcountrydwellersandthoseemployedinagriculture.PolishChristiandemocraticparties,whichfacestrongcompetitionfrompeasants'parties,andthesmallCzechChristiandemocraticpartiesoutsidethePeople'sParty,constituteexceptionstothisrule,as,accordingtoourdata,theyachieveconsiderablylessthantheirnationalaverageamongvotersemployedinagricultureand/orlivinginruralareas.

InthepredominantlyAnglo-Saxoncountriesthereligious-secularcleavagehasnosignificantroletoplayinpartypolitics.Bycontrast,inWestGermanyandespeciallyAustriathereisastrongcorrelationbetweenthefrequencyofchurchgoingandpartypreference.(Rose,1974:11).ThereisnothingunusualinthewayinwhichreligiondifferentiatestheelectoralbasesoftheindividualEastCentralEuropeanparties.Practisingreligiousvoterspledgeabove-averagesupporttothevariousChristianparties,whilethesupportforformerCommunistpartiesissignificantlyloweramongthesevoters.Toalesserdegree,alloftheliberal(UD,KLD,OH,ODA,VPN-ODU,SZDSZ,FIDESZ)andthesecularnationalist(KPN,SlovakNationalParty,HZDS,Czechrepublicans)partiesoftheregion,aswellastheCzechcentre-left,arepartiessupportedbylessreligiousvoters.Inthiscontext,theHungarianDemocraticForumissituatedmoreontheclericalside,whileVaclavKlaus'sconservative-liberalCivicDemocraticPartyisonthesecularside.

AmongthefourEastCentralEuropeancountries,predictingaperson'svoteonthebasisofhisorherreligiousaffiliationisleasteffectiveinPoland.Atthesametime,theaccuracyofsuchapredictionissimilarinWestGermany,whileintheotherthreecountriesitissignificantlymoreaccuratedespitethefactthatinWestGermanytheChristianpartiesareopposedtothreeclearlyand

traditionallyanti-clericalones.ThisisespeciallyinterestingconsideringthatboththeCzechRepublicandHungaryappearmoresecularized(asindicatedbytheratioofregularchurchgoers)thaneitherWestGermanyorAustria.InSlovakia,wheretheratioofregularchurchgoersisclosertothatinthetwoGerman-speakingcountries,thepartypreferencesofindividualsubjectscanbepredictedonthebasisofchurchgoingevenmoreaccuratelythaninAustria.

WecanconcludethatinEastCentralEuropepartypreferencesareinfluencedbythesocio-demographiccharacteristicsoftheelectoratemorethanintheestablishedWesterndemocracies.Wecanalsosaythat

theelectoralbasesofEastCentralEuropeanpartiesareingeneralmoresociallyhomogeneousthanthoseoftheirWesterncounterparts.However,thisisnotnecessarilyasignofmaturityonthepartofEastCentralEuropeandemocracies.NeitherdoesitmeanthatEastCentralEuropehasmoreandpoliticallymorerelevantcleavagesthantheotherdemocraciesofcontinentalEurope.Itmaybeonlyasymptomoftheemergenceofmassdemocracytodayinsocietieswhichareinsomerespectspre-modern.

ClassandPartyPreference

Withsomecaveats,thetheorythatpositsaweakerconnectionbetweenpartypreferenceandsocialpositioninthenewEasternEuropeandemocraciesthanintheWesterndemocraciesisnotconfirmed.Thesituationisthesameforoccupationalclass:iftherespondentsaredividedintothreecategoriessimilartothoseusedinWesterncountries(differentiatingbetweenthemiddleclass,comprisingmostlynon-manualworkersandindependents;theworkingclass;andthelargelyinactiveothercategory),theconnectionbetweenoccupationandpartychoiceisweakerinalloftheWesterncountries(withtheexceptionofBritainand,partially,Austria)thaninanyoftheEastCentralEuropeanones(seeTable10.3,column1).

Thispicturechangessomewhatifweframethequestionlikethis:inindividualcountries,howdothepartypreferencesofnon-manualemployees,farmersandagriculturalworkers,andothermanualworkersdifferfromthenationalpattern?Outofourninecountries,theidentificationofthepartythatseesitselfastheprimaryrepresentativeofagrarianinterestsisaproblemonlyintheUnitedStatesandSlovakia,andthesmallnumberofagriculturalworkersinBritainandtheUnitedStatesmakesquantitativecomparisonmeaningless.Consequently,ifwecompareonlytheremainingthreeWesterncountrieswiththefourEastEuropeanones,thesignificant

differenceswefindarenotbetweenthetwogroupsbutwithinthem.Inotherwords,wecannotclaimthatthebackgroundvariableinquestion(AGRIC,seeTable10.3)hasastrongereffectonchoiceofpartyinthenewdemocraciesthanintheestablishedones.WedofindsuchsignsforNONMAN:inPoland,HungaryandtheCzechRepublicitiseasiertoidentifythetypicalpartypreferencesofnon-manualemployeesthaninanyoftheWesterndemocracieswiththeexceptionofBritain.

Table10.3:Correctionbetweeneconomicstatusandpartypreference

CLASSaAGRICbNONMANc INDWRKdMEMBERePartypreferencef

(Sytmmetricuncertaintycoefficient)

Australia .009 .021 .007 .016 .021USA .006* na .006 .007 .035GreatBritain .039 na .030 .028 .011Germany .013 .036 .003 .016 .029Austria .014 .039 .003 .016 .043CzechRepublic

.027 .035 .017 .020 .025

Slovakia .020 .002 .004 .003* .069Hungary .014 .014 .017 .005* .039Poland .031 .112 .059 .020 .045*Chi-squarestatisticisnotsignificantatthe.05levelnanumbersaretoosmalltoprovidereliableestimatesaCLASS:presentorlastjob:1non-manulemployeeorself-employed,3manualworker,2otherornothingbAGRIC:presentorlastjob:1idenpendentfarmeroragriculturalmanualworker,2otherornothingcNONMAN:presentorlastjob:1non-manualemployee,2otrherornothingeINDWRK:presentorlastjob:1othermanualworker,2otherornothingfMEMBER:tradeunionmembershipinWesterncountries,formerCSKPmembershipinCzechoslovakia,formerLEMPmembershipinPolandandformerMSZMPmembershipinHungary:1member,2notmembergseeTable10.2fordescriptionofpartiesSources:Zentralarchiv,1987.TheRoleGovgernment,ISSP1985,Machine-ReadableDataFile.Köln:Zentralarchiv;Dohnalik,Jacek,Hartl,Jan,Krazysztof,Jasiewicz,Markowski,Radoslaw,Mateju,Peter,Rezler,Lubos,Tóka,Gábor,Tucek,Milan,1991.DismantlingoftheSocialSafetyNetanditsPolitical

ConsequencesinEastCentralEurope.AnInterrnationalComparativeStudyInitiatedandSponsoredbytheInstituteofEase-WestStudies,NewYork-Prague.Machine-ReadableDataFile.Distributors:IEWS,NewYorkandTÁRKI,Budapest

Thereverseisthecasefornon-agriculturalmanualworkers.TheINDWRKvariable(seeTable10.3)showsastatisticallysignificant(thoughnotverystrong)connectionwithpartychoiceinallWesterncountries,butofthefournewdemocraciesthisoccursonlyinPolandandCzechland.However,theclassvotemanifestsitselfinasomewhatpeculiar,rathernegativeformthere:notassupportforcertainpartiesbutratheraslackofsupportforotherparties.InPolandthepartiesbearingthenameoftheSolidarityUnion,andinCzechlandtheCommunistPartyandsomeofthecentre-leftparties,werepreferredbyslightlymoremanualthannon-manualworkers.ThePolishDemocraticUnionandliberalsaswellastheCzechCivicDemocraticPartyappeartoattracthalfasmuchsupportfrommanualworkersasfromallothervoters.Possibleexplanationsforthisincludetheconnectionoftheformerparty

withtheBalcerowiczplan,andthelatterwiththeeconomicprogrammeofVaclavKlaus.

OurquantitativecomparisonconfirmsbeyonddoubtinSlovakiaandHungary,andtentativelyinCzechlandandPoland,thattheEastCentralEuropeanpartiesrelyonextraordinarilyheterogeneouselectoralbases.Animportantelementoftheexplanationforthisphenomenonis,ofcourse,thatinthesecountrieswiththeexceptionofCzechlandtheonlysignificantrepresentativesofthetraditionalleftinthepoliticalarenaarethesuccessorsoftheformerCommunistparties,andthesepartiesrelyonanextremelynarrowelectoralbase.Usingasimile,whileinWesterncountriesunionmembershipisusuallyamoreaccurateindicatorofavotecastforaleft-wingpartythanoccupationitself,inEastCentralEuropeformerPZPR,KSCSandMSZMPmembershipsplaythesamerole(seeTable10.3).TheCommunistsuccessorpartiesattractedbetween50to65percentoftheir1991supportamongformerpartymembersinallfourrepublics,whiletheprobabilityofothervoterssupportingthemisseventotentimesmallerthanthatofformerpartymembers.Inallofthecountriesexamined,formerpartymembersmostlycamefromnon-manualworkers,andsincewiththesingleexceptionoftheCzechRepublicamongformerpartymembersthelikelihoodofsympathizingwiththesuccessorpartyisthesameformanualandnon-manualworkers,itisunderstandablethattheelectoralbasesofEastCentralEuropeanleft-wingpartiesareconsistentlymorenon-manualthanmanual.

3Czechlandmaybeanexceptiontothispattern,partlybecauseofthepresenceoftheSocialLiberalUnion(LSU),andpartlybecauseoftheunusualelectoralbaseoftheCzechCommunists.Formerpartymembersaredifficulttoidentifyasaseparatesocialgroupsuchasthemembershipofareligiousdenominationoranoccupational

grouphenceitisdifficulttoclaimthatwearedealingwithapeculiarlyEasternEuropeancleavageintheLipset-Rokkansense.Despitethis,itstillseemsthatthecharacteristicsofEastCentralEuropeanpartysystemscannotbereducedtothesymptomsofimmaturity(fragmentedness,underdevelopment,instability,etc.),butinsomerespectstheyaredistinctlydifferentfromthepartysystemsoftheWesterndemocracies.

Whileourfindingsarereinforcedbyotherstudies(seeTóka,1995),theabsenceofaclassvoteinHungaryandSlovakia,andthephenomenonofanegativeclassvote,hasprovedtobetemporary.InSlovakia,theexplanationwastheemergenceoftheSlovakWorkersParty,astronglyétatistpartyfoundedin1994byaformerpost-CommunistmemberofParliament,anditssubsequentremarkableelectionperfor-

mance.InHungary,theexplanationwasthesuddenincreaseinthepopularityofthereformistsocialistparty(MSZP)in1993-4.In1991-2,populardissatisfactionwiththecoalitiongovernmentoftheChristian-nationalistpartiesseemedtoenhancetheelectionprospectsofthepro-marketliberalparties.However,amovementfavouringthesocialistsbegantoemergeinearly1993.WhileFIDESZ,havingledthepollssinceearly1991,becomemoreoutspokenaboutitspro-businesseconomicpolicies,theliberalpluralitybegantotransformitselfintoasocialistgrouping.AlthoughHungariancommentatorsmostlyemphasizedtheroleofotherfactorstoexplaintheshiftinpublicopinion,thedatabelowunderlinetheimportanceofeconomicpolicy.Thus,electoralchoicehasbecomemoremeaningfulintermsofclasspolitics;buthavethepartyattachmentsofthevotersbecomestrongerinthecourseofthischange?

ExplainingStrongerPartyAttachments

Inthissectionweshallrelyprimarilyonthreesourcesofdata.First,weusetheMay1990TÁRKIstudyandtheAprilMay1994masssurveybytheDepartmentofPoliticalScienceoftheCentralEuropeanUniversityandMediántodetermineinwhichsocialgroupindividualpartieslostorgainedsupportbetweenthetwoelections.Bothstudiesusednationalclusteredrandomsamplesofadultcitizens,whosememberswerequestionedshortlyafterthe1990andthe1994elections.Sincealltherespondentsinthe1990studywereover19yearsold,respondentsunder20wereexcludedfromtheanalysisofthedataoftheCEUsurveyaswell.Toscreenoutthepossibledistortingeffectofsmalldifferencesbetweenthecompositionsofthetwosamples,weimplementedaweighingprocedurewherebytheratiosof126socio-demographicgroups(differentiatedbygender,age,placeofresidenceandlevelofeducation)withinthesamplesweremadetoagreewiththecorrespondingestimatesforthe1990national

census.Alongwiththesetwostudies,weshallalsouseanelectiondayexitpollconductedon8May1994bytheNépszabadságnewspaperandtheMediánInstituteofMarketandPublicOpinionResearch.

WhatreasondowehavetosupposethatthevolatilityofHungarianvotersmayprovepermanent?BartoliniandMairhavedemonstratedthatextraordinarilyvolatileelectionshaveoccurredintwosorthrees,ratherthaninisolation.Atthesametime,theireffectonthebalanceofpowerbetweenpartieshasbeensuchthatthehistoricalanalogywithother

volatileelectionstendstosupporttheargumentthatthefurthertransformationoftheHungarianpartysystem,especiallyinthedirectionofleft-wingdominance,willbecomepermanent.Thus,iftwoormoreconsecutiveelectionsproducehighlevelsofvolatility,thentheywillstrengthenthesamepartyorpartyfamily.However,wemaybemoreinterestedindiscoveringwhetherthedecisionsofindividualvotersshowedmoreorlesstemporalvariabilityduringthe1994electioncampaignthanduringthecorrespondingperiodofthe1990campaign.

Wecanmakesomeestimatesofinter-electionvolatilitybycomparingaFebruaryMarch1991panelconductedbyGallup-Budapestwiththe1994CEUpaneldata.Theresultsshowthatthewithin-campaignvolatilityoftheChristianDemocrat(KDNP)andSocialist(MSZP)constituencieshadprobablyincreased,andthatofMDFandFIDESZvotershadprobablydecreasedbetweenthetwoelections.TheloyaltyoftheFKGPandSZDSZconstituenciesdidnotshowsignificantchangeovertime.Yetthiscomparisonissomewhatunreliable,astwopanelstudiesexaminedstabilityduringdifferentperiodsofthetwocampaigns.Itismoreworthwhiletocomparedatafromthe1994exitpollandtheMay1990TÁRKIstudytoidentifyhowcongruentthelistvotesofthevoterswerewiththeirvotesinthesingle-memberconstituenciesduringthefirstround

4(seeTóka,1994).Weassumethatthefrequencyofcongruentvotes,thoughlessthanthetemporalconstancyofpartypreferences,isstillanacceptableindicatorofthestrengthofvoters'partyloyalties.

Theincreaseinthecongruencybetweenlistvotesandsingle-membersvotesislikelytohavebeengreaterthanourdatasuggest,asthe1990figurescomefromastudyconductedamonthafterthesecondroundofelections,whileour1994estimateswererecordedattheexitpoll

conductedthedayafterthefirstround.Nevertheless,asignificantincreaseinconsistencyisstillevidentforthreeofthesixmajorparties,whilenoneshowsastatisticallysignificantdecrease.In1994,about90percentofthevotersofagivenmajorparty'slistvotedfortheparty'scandidateinthesingle-memberdistricts.Yetacloserlookfindsnotraceofstrengthenedpartyloyalties.Thereasonfortheincreaseinthecongruencyofthetwovotesisthat,ontheonehand,theproportionofthosevoterswhosupportedanindependentcandidateinthesingle-memberconstituenciesapparentlydecreasedamongthesupportersofeachmajorparty'slistsince,in1994,considerablyfewerseriouscandidatesstoodasindependents.Ontheotherhand,wheretheincreaseincongruencyofvotesissignificant,aswiththeFIDESZ,theexplanationmaybeinthe

increasedstrengthofthatparty'sorganizationratherthaninthestrengtheningpartyloyaltieshypothesis.FIDESZenteredapartylistineveryregionbothin1990and1994,butin1990ithadcandidatesinonlyhalfasmanysingle-memberdistricts.Theothermajorpartiesdidnotforcetheir1990followerstosplittheirvoteinthesamewayastheorganizationallyweakerFIDESZdid.

Onlyoneofthefactorscapableofincreasingthecongruencyofthetwovoteswouldimplythestrengtheningofvoters'partyloyalties:namelyiftheproportionofvoterssplittingtheirvotesbetweentwopartiesinthefirstrounddefinitelydecreasedamongfollowersofthefourmajorparties(MDF,SZDSZ,FKGPandMSZP)whosenumberofcandidateswasequallygoodatbothelections.Yetoverallthereislittlereasontobelievethatsuchadevelopmenttookplace.InthecasesoftheMDFandtheSZDSZtheproportionofsuchvotersshowsaslightincrease,whilefortheMSZPandtheFKGPadecreasewasregistered.

Itseemscertainthatthecongruenceoflistvotesandsingle-membervotesincreased,butaccordingtotheabovereasoningthatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthepsychologicalloyaltiesofvotersincreased.

TheMovetotheLeft

TheotherexplanationofthevolatilityofHungarianvotersisthatthepartiesareuncommittedtodistinguishableeconomicpolicies,withtheresultthattheirelectoralbasesareindistinguishablefromeachotherintermsbothofmassattitudestowardseconomicpolicyandinthesupportofspecificoccupationalgroups.Datafromthe1990-2perioddoshowthatthevotersofthesixmajorHungarianpartiesaremoreheterogeneousinthesetworespectscomparednotonlytoBritishvoters,butalsotoPolish,CzechandSlovakianvotersaswell(seeTóka,1995).Inexplanationsadvancedfortheresultsofthe1994

election,however,itbecamealmostcompulsorytosuggestthatthespectacularincreaseinMSZPvoteswasnotmerelytheresultofdissatisfactionwiththeperformanceoftheAntallgovernment,oroppositiontotheChristian-nationalspiritandstyle,butratherandmaybemostofalltheresultofalatentdemandforaleft-wingshiftineconomicpolicy.Followingthelogicofthesecomments,thepolarizationofelectoralbasesintermsofattitudestowardseconomicpolicyshouldalsoimplythestrengtheningofvoters'partyloyalties.Thelatter,aswearguedabove,didnotoccur.Butdidthepolarizationintermsofeconomicpolicyitselfoccur?

Table10.4:Recalledlistvotesbyeconomicpolicyattutudes,1990and1994(%)(1990)

FIDESZFKGPKDNPMDFMSZPSZDSZOther(WeightedN)

StatecontrolspricesaDoesnotagree 7 9 5 34 6 32 7 (216)Both 15 8 4 34 9 24 6 (135)Agrees 8 14 8 37 8 17 9 (277)

IndustrysubsidizedbDoesnotagree 8 6 3 39 9 28 8 (211)Both 4 9 8 39 7 27 7 (116)Agrees 12 13 8 31 8 20 8 (299)

Inflation/unemploymenticAgainstinflation 9 10 6 35 9 24 8 (469)Againstunemployment 10 15 10 33 5 21 6 (150)

TradeunioninfluencedToolittle 10 10 5 36 9 25 6 (361)Asmuchasneeded 10 9 12 37 7 16 10 (105)Toomuch 8 10 4 35 6 29 9 (97)

PrivatizationeAgainstprivatization 6 14 9 34 10 17 10 (134)Preferablyslower 10 9 6 36 7 26 7 (443)Thefasterthebetter 10 9 16 37 8 18 3 (47)

ForeignownshipfNotallowedtobuy 10 14 8 40 6 15 7 (99)Buyonlycompanieswithdeficit

7 12 9 28 7 28 10 (215)

Anything,ifhighestprice

8 8 5 41 9 23 6 (278)

PrivatizedowncompanygNo 13 10 6 35 8 20 9 (136)Yes 8 8 4 37 8 30 5 (162)

(tablecontinuedonnextpage)

(tablecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

aIamgoingtogiveyousomeexamplesofhowthestatecaninfluencetheeconomystate]controlspricesbydecrees?banddoyouagreewiththefactthatindustrialbranchesincrisisshouldbesubsidizedtsothatpeopleworkingtherewon'tbecomeunemployed?cIfthegovernmentweretochoosebetweendecreasinginflationorunemployment,whichdoyouthinktheyshouldchoose:whichdoyouthinkismoreimportant,tocurbinflationortodecreaseunemployment?dDoyouthinkthattheinfluencetradeunionsexertinHungaryismore,lessoraboutasmuchastheyshould?ePrivatizingstate-ownedcompaniesisanissuefrequentlymentionednowadays.Itisalsosaidthatalotofabuseshaveoccurredinthisrespectinthepastfewyears.Whatdoyouthinkofthisquestion?State-ownedcompaniesshouldnotbeprivatized,ortheyshouldbeprivatizedbutabusesshouldbestoppedevenifitmeansslowingdownchanges,ortheprocessofprivatizationshouldbeacceleratedevenifitinvolvesabuses?fNowadaystheyoftentalkaboutforeigncompaneisandprivateindividualsbuyingHungariancompanies.Whatdoyouthinkwouldberight:foreignersshouldnotbeallowedtobuyHungariancomapneisatall,orforeignersshouldbeallowedtobuycomapaneisoperatingwithdeficit,orforeignersshouldbeallowedtobuyanyHungariancompanyiftheyofferthehighestprice?Source:TÁRKI-CISSP(May1990);CEU-Medián:MayPanel(April-May1994)

Table10.4showstheproportionsofvotescastforindividualpartiesin1990and1994byopiniongroups.Subjectswhodidnotanswer,orgaveadon'tknowanswer,aswellasnon-votersandthosewhorefusedtodivulgehowtheyvoted,areexcludedfromtheseestimates.Inbothyears,morepeoplerecalledvotingforthewinningparty,andfewerforthelistofoneofthepartiesthatdidnotwinelectiontoParliament,thanwouldbeexpectedfromarepresentativesample.Asaresult,thesefiguresmakethegainoftheMSZP,aswellasthelossoftheMDF,appeargreaterthantheyreallywere.However,astheprobabilityofafalsevoterecallispresumedtoberandomanduncorrelatedwithopinionsoneconomicpolicy,thisshouldnotdistorttheresultsofouranalysis.

Thecompositionandsizeofindividualopiniongroupsdidnotremainconstantwithtime.Accordingtoourdata,44percentofthe1990electorateand65percentin1994agreedthatthestateshouldcontrolpricesbymeansoflawsandstatutes.In199048percentagreedthatsectorsincrisisshouldbesupportedinordertosavejobs,comparedto69percentin1994.In1990,24percentagreedthatthefightagainstunemploymentwasmoreimportantthanthefightagainstinflation,comparedto60percentin1994.Inbothyears,justoversixoutoftenfeltthattheinfluenceoftheunionswastooweak,whilein1990only17percentandin1994only7percentfeltthatitwastoostrong.Betweenthetwosurveys,theproportionofthoseopposedtothesaleofHungariancompaniestoforeignersmorethandoubled,whiletheproportionofthosesupportingtheprivatizationoftheirownplacesofemploymentdecreasedfrom54to22percent.

Changesofopinionareconnectedwiththeprogressofprivatization,changesintherangeofcompaniesstillinpublicownershipandthe

decreaseininflation.Inthiscase,however,causesarelessimportantthantheeffect:theeconomicattitudesoftheHungarianelectoratetookasignificantandconsistentturntotheleft.Forallofthequestionsconsidered,theincreaseintheMSZPvotewasmuchgreaterinleft-wingopiniongroupsthaninright-wingones.SZDSZvotersareconsistentlyover-representedintheright-winggroupsinbothyears,butthereisnoindicationthatthecorrelationbetweeneconomicpolicyattitudesandSZDSZvotingbecameanystronger.ThesituationisdifferentwiththeMDF.Among1990MDFvoters,forasmallproportionofquestions,theleft-winggroupandfortheotherstheright-winggroup,appearstobeover-representedtoastatisticallyinsignificantdegree;bycontrast,in1994theright-winggroupisover-representedforalmostallofthesevenquestionsamongMDFvoters.Whiletheelectoralbasesofthe

FKGPandtheKDNPwerealittlemoreleft-thanright-wing,especiallyin1990,inthecaseofthethreesmallerparliamentarypartiesthereappearstobenoconsistentcorrelationbetweenvotescastandeconomicattitudeseitherin1990orin1994.

Inastatisticalsense(expressedbytheetacoefficient),in1994respondents'choiceofpartywasmorestronglyrelatedtotheirageorchurch-goinghabitsthantotheirresponsestoanyoftheeconomicpolicyquestions.However,whilethestrengthofthefirsttwocorrelationsdidnotincreasefrom1990to1994,themajorityofthelastsevenand,mostsignificantly,theiraveragedid.Thus,contrarytotheobservationsofthefirstyearortwooftheAntallgovernment(seeTóka,1993),consideringthe1990-4periodasawhole,thepolarizationoftheelectoralbasesoftheHungarianpartiesdidnotincreasewithrespecttogenerationalandreligiousdivisionswhichwerealreadyimportantin1990butpolarizationdidincreasewithrespecttoeconomicpolicyattitudes.

Whateffectdidthishaveonthecompositionoftheparties'electoralbases?Howevertemptingitistoassumethatthepartiesingovernmentlostsupportamongthoseharmedbythetransformationoftheeconomy,andthatMSZPgainscamemostlyfromthisgroup,thehypothesisisdifficulttotest.First,variousanalystsdisagreeoverwhothemainloserswere:pensioners,thoseunabletocompensateforlossesbytakingonextrawork;youngpeopleandunskilledmanualworkers,mostatriskfromunemployment;themiddleclasses;workersinagricultureandothersectorsincrisis.Thelistissoall-embracingthatitishardtosaywhichgroupsarelikelytoshowaswingbelowthenationalaverage.Iftheproportionofsuchgroupsintheelectorateisassmallasitisforentrepreneurs,itishardlypossiblethatanysignificantgroupshouldshowMSZPgainsorMDFlossesconsiderablyabovethenationalaverage.

Second,thesubculturalembeddednessofHungarianelectoralbehaviourreflectedmostofallintermsofgenerationalandreligiousdifferences,aswellasformerMSZMPmembershipremainedthefundamentaldeterminantofpartypreferencesin1994aswellasin1990.Thisisparticularlyimportantastheageandreligiouscompositionofthevariousconstituenciesalsohaveaneffectontheirsocio-economiccomposition.Anyunderstandingofthesocio-economicchangesbetween1990and1994mustbeginwithananalysisofsubculturalfactors.Here,wecanonlygiveabriefoverviewofthefigures.ComparingthedatafromtheexitpollandtheCEUstudywiththeresultsofthe1990TÁRKIstudy,onlytheelectoralbaseoftheKDNPremainedthesameintermsofreligion.SupportfortheFKGPdecreasedbyabout10percentamong

weeklychurchgoers,whilehardlyatallintheothergroups.Atthesametime,theelectoralbasesoftheFIDESZandtheSZDSZshiftedslightlytowardsmorereligiousvoters.Nevertheless,thestrengthoftheconnectionbetweenchurchgoingandpartychoicedidnotdecrease,becausetheMSZP'sgainsandtheMDF'slossesbothshowanegativecorrelationwithreligiosity:eachwasroughlytwiceasstrongamongnon-church-goersasamongweeklychurchgoers.

ItisalsotruethatingeneralthelossesoftheMDF,theSZDSZandtheFIDESZ,aswellasthegainsoftheMSZP,werebelowthenationalaveragemostlyamongthemoretraditionalsubculturesofsociety,whilethelossesoftheFKGP,whichshiftedfromthemoretraditionalChristianright-winglinetowardsamoreradicalanti-establishmentstance,werethegreatestinthesesamegroups.ThegainsoftheMSZPandthelossesoftheMDF,theSZDSZandtheFIDESZwerebelowaverageinruralareas,whereasthelossesoftheFKGPwereabovethenationaltrend.WhiletheurbanbiasoftheMSZPbasegrewmarginallyincomparisonwithits1990level,thatoftheSZDSZdecreased,thatoftheFIDESZbecamepracticallynon-existentandthatoftheMDFreversed.

Comparisonsintermsofagearesimilar,showingabove-averagelossesfortheFKGPandbelow-averagelossesfortheMDFinthemoretraditional(i.e.ruralandolder)socialgroups.Intheelectoralbasesoftheotherpartiesthereislittlechangeinagegroupcompositioncomparedto1990:inbothelections,theMSZPwasmostattractivetothemiddleagedandleastattractivetotheyoung.Theconnectionsbetweentheliberalvoteandtheyoung,andbetweentheolderagegroupsandtheworkers'party,socialdemocraticandKDNPvotesshownochangeindirectionorstrength.

Occupation,EducationandPartyChoice

Comparingthedatafromtheexitpollwiththeopinionpollsof1990,wedonotfindasingleeducationaloroccupationalgroupwithinwhichtheproportionsofvotesforanyofthesixmajorpartiesdifferedfromthenationaltrendinexcessoftherelativelylargestatisticalerrormarginsofthe1990samplebetweenthetwoelections.Ontheotherhand,duetothenegligible1994statisticalerrorforthelargesampleoftheexitpoll,andtheagreementbetweenthecorrespondingresultsofallavailableopinionpollsfrom1990,itislikelythattheMDFelectoralbaseshiftedslightlytowardsgroupsoflowereducationalandoccupationalstatusbetween

1990and1994,whilethatoftheMSZPmovedtowardsnon-agriculturalmanualworkers.Whileaccordingtothe1990opinionpolls,thoseofhigherstatusweregenerallyover-representedamongvotersofbothparties(inparticular,non-manualemployeesinthecaseoftheMDF,managementfortheMSZP),by1994thesituationhadchanged.ItisprobablethatMSZP'sgaininvotes,whichaveraged22percentnationally,wasafewpercentagepointsmoreamongmanualworkers,whiletheMDF'slosswasasmuchas10percentsmalleramonglesseducatedgroupsthannationally.

Yetthefactthattheireffectmanifesteditselfdifferentlyinindividualagegroupsalreadyindicatesthatdifferencesinstatuswerestillonlysecondarydeterminantsofpartypreferencein1994.Withtheexceptionofafewsmallerparties,aconsistentcorrespondencebetweenlevelofeducationandvoteoverallagegroupscanonlybeestablishedinthecaseoftheFKGP,generallysupportedbythoseofthelowesteducationallevel,andtheSZDSZ,generallysupportedbymoreeducatedpeople.Buteventhisobservationneedstobequalified.Whatseemstobethemostinterestingphenomenonisthatthestrengthofthecorrelationbetweeneducationallevelandvotecastfortheliberalpartiesdecreaseswithincreasingage,whilethedirectionofthecorrelationbetweenworkers'partyandMSZPvotesontheonehand,andeducationallevelontheother,isreversed.

Themoredetailedfigures(whicharenotshownforreasonsofspace)showthatwhileamong1829,30-9and40-9year-oldgraduatestheorthodox(Communist)Workers'Partyonlyattracted0.4,0.9and1.6percentofthevoterespectively,inthesameagegroups,amongthosewithfewerthaneightyearsofprimaryeducationitsshareofthevotewas13.8,11.0and9.2percent,respectively.Incontrast,inthestrongestagegroupoftheWorkers'Party,thosebornbetween1924and1934,theyattracted8.1percentofthegraduatevote,butonly5.1percentofthosewithfewerthaneightyearsofschooling.Thesame

trendisobservablewiththeMSZP,thoughinalessextremeform.Whileamongthoseunder40thepartyreceivedtheleastsupportfromgraduatesandthemostsupportfrompeoplewithonlyprimaryeducation,amongpeopleover40educationallevelandtheproportionofMSZPvotesrosetogether.Theextremecaseisagainthegenerationwhoreachedadulthoodinthe1940sandearly1950s(whoareagedintheirsixtiestoday):47percentofgraduates,31percentofpeoplewitheightyearsofschoolingand24percentofthelesseducatedvotedfortheMSZP.TheKDNPonlybecomesthepartyofthelessratherthanthemoreeducatedamongpeopleaged

Table10.5:MSZPvotersbyageandoccupation(1860years)a(%)(Agegroupings)

1820 3039 4049 5059Unemployedonbenefit 20 29 36 36Agriculturalmanualworkersb 21 27 33 30Professionals 23 26 38 36Top/middlemanagers 20 30 42 41Othernon-manualworkers 22 29 37 36Foremenandskilledworkers 26 32 38 38Unskilledworkers 26 33 37 34Inactivec 20 29 35 35aRespondentswereaskedtochooseoneof13groupsofeconomicactivitiesandoccupationsthatbestdescribedtheircircumstancesbIncludesself-employedfarmerscIncludespensioners,mothersonchildcareandchildbenefitandthedependentSource:Népszabadság-Mediánexit-poll(8May1994)

over50.Amongyoungerpeople,itenjoysmarginallymoresupportfromgraduatesthanfromothersinthesameagegroup.

ThedistributionofMSZPvotesisonlymarginallycorrelatedwithoccupationalgroup(Table10.5).Amongpeopleover40itisthoseinmanagerialpositions,followedbyskilledworkersandintellectuals,whovotedforthemmostfrequently.Amongthoseunder40theproportionofMSZPvotersshowsasharpdecline,especiallyamongmanagers,andothernon-manualworkers.Intheseagegroupswewitnessapositiveclassvote:heretheMSZPissupportedmostlybynon-agriculturalmanualworkers.TodayitisdifficulttosaywhetherthatrepresentssomeformofpotentialadvantageorratheranunusualweaknessoftheMSZPamongtheyoungerpartoftheelite.However,itiscertainlytruetosaythattheoccupationalgroupcompositionoftheMSZP'selectoralbasehaschangedsomewhatcomparedto1990;

amongtheinactive,agriculturalworkersandtheunemployedthatsupportfortheMSZPdidnotevenreachtheagegroupaveragewithinanyagegroup.

Conclusion

The1994Hungarianelectionarenawasdividedintotwodifferentworlds.Inthefirstgrouppeopleover40or50chosebetweentheleft,supportedmainlybywhite-collarworkers,andtheChristian-nationalpartiesmainlyrepresentingpeopleoflowstatus.Inthesecondworld

peopleunder40werepolarizedonaclassicalclassbasisbetweenthesecularleft-wingpartiesoftheindustrialworkersandtheliberalpartiesofthoseofhigherstatus.FollowingPoland,SlovakiaandtheCzechRepublic,theeconomicpolicyissuewasinstitutionalizedasasignificantelectoraldivideinHungaryaswell.Nevertheless,noteventhisdevelopmentwasabletotransformthevolatilecharacterofpartyloyalties.

Ourresultschallengesomecommonwisdomaboutnewpartysystems.First,wehaveshownthathighlevelsofvolatility(thatistheweaknessofpartyloyalties)can,andinEastCentralEuropedo,gotogetherwithrelativelystrongstatisticalassociationbetweenpartychoiceandvarioussocio-culturalcharacteristicsofthevoters.Thedirectionofthesecorrelationsseemstobemaintainedovertime:inthatrespectweseenosignsofhighvolatility.However,thestrengthofsomecorrelationsprobablystemsmorefromthesuperficialityofthecluesthatthevotersutilizeinmakingtheirchoicesthanfromastrongsocialembeddednessofthenewparties.Second,theempiricalevidenceofHungarysuggeststhatpartyloyaltiesarenotgettinganystrongereitherbythemereageingofthepartysystem,orbytheriseofclassvotingorbytheincreaseinissuevotingsuchassuggestedbyTable10.4.Indeed,commercialpolls(seeSzonda-IpsosReport,Népszabadság,10July1995,page8)alreadysuggestthattheswingfromgovernmenttooppositionpartieswasevenbiggerinthefirstyearoftheHorngovernment(1994-5)thanitwasduringthefirstyearoftheAntallgovernment(1990-1).ArelativelystrongstructurationofthevoteisfoundinEastCentralEurope,yetthisisnotinconsistentwithhighlevelsofvolatility.

1Thisessaywaswrittenaspartofaresearchproject(codeF006900)supportedbytheHungarianNationalScientificResearchFund

(OTKA).

2TheexpressioncoverstheSocialDemocrats(CSSD),thetwoMoravianpartiestreatedhereunderoneheading(HSD-SMS)andtheGreen,socialistandagrarianpartiesformingtheSocial-LiberalUnion,allofwhommaybeclassifiedasbeingtotheleftofthecentristCivicDemocraticPartyofKlaus(ODS),theCivicMovement(OH)andtheCivicDemocraticAlliance,whichwereingovernmentatthetimethedatawerecollected.

3ItisespeciallystrikingthatthistendencyisapparenteveninPoland,despitethefactthatourpartypreferencevariablewasnotsimplymeasuringvotestobecastfortheSDRPbutfortheDemocraticLeft(acommonelectionlistwhichincludedthepost-Communistparty,theunionallianceOPZZandother,smallerleft-winggroups).

4Hungarianelectionsareconductedintworounds.Inthefirst,votersmaycasttwoseparatevotes.

5Forthepurposeofanalysingthelastquestion,onlyanswersgivenbysubjectsactivelyemployedatthetimeofquestioningbutnotemployedbysomenationalorlocalauthorityorintheprivatesectorwereconsidered.

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Chapter11TheLongandTheShortofTransformationinCentralEuropeRichardRose

HUNGARYhasalwaysbeenpartofCentralEurope,butastheboundariesofCentralEuropehaveshiftedithassometimesfounditselftoofarEast.ThiswastrueduringthecenturyofOttomanoccupation,anditwasagainthecaseafterSoviettroopsarrivedinBudapestin1945.FormostofmodernEuropeanhistory,theHabsburgempirewasthecentralkingdomofCentralEurope,andHungarywaspartofthisempire.BetweenthewarsHungarywasaCentralEuropeanstatethatsharedwithAustria,Germany,Polandandothercountriesintheregiontheexperienceofabriefattemptatdemocratization,thenauthoritarianruleandsevereeconomicdepression.

TheIronCurtainthatseparatedCommunistcountriesfromWesternEuropedeniedtheveryideaofMitteleuropaandHungarywasindubitablyontheeasternsideoftheCurtain.MoscowmadeitselfthefocalpointforgovernmentthroughouttheSovietbloc.ThecollapseoftheIronCurtainin1989,withHungarythefirstcountrytoopenitsboundariestotheWest,hasmadeCentralEuropeonceagainameaningfulpoliticalfact.TheDanubeoriginatesinsouth-westGermany,andflowsthroughAustriabeforeitbecomesaborderbetweenSlovakiaandHungary.AndBudapestandViennaareinmanysensesclosertoeachotherthantosmallercitiesandtownsintheirowncountries.

WithneighbouringcountriesinCentralEuropeinthepost-warera,Hungarianshavesharedtheexperienceofafundamentaltransformationinsocialconditions.Health,educationandmaterial

standardsoflivinghavechangedfundamentallysincethebeginningofthetwentieth

century,andtheyhavechangeddramaticallybetweentheendoftheSecondWorldWarandthepresent(seee.g.Rose,1994).Butbecauseoffortyyearsofdivision,theCentralEuropetowhichHungarynowbelongsisnotthesameasbefore.ThereisnowafaultlinewithinCentralEurope,forfourdecadesoflivinginaCommunistsystemmeantthatHungary,CzechoslovakiaandPolandprogressedataslowertempo,aswellasinadifferentmanner,fromcountriesoutsidetheSovietbloc.ThiscanbedemonstratedmostdramaticallybydifferencesbetweenthetwopartsofGermany(RoseandHaerpfer,1997).

ThefirstobjectofthischapteristomeasuretheimpactofCommunismonHungarybycomparingtrendstherewithneighbouringandhistoricallylinkedcountriesAustria,Czechoslovakia,GermanyandPoland.BecausetheIronCurtaindividedCentralEurope,countriesthatsharedmuchincommonupto1945havedivergedsince.ComparingHungarywithPoland,CzechoslovakiaandtheGermanDemocraticRepublicprovidesevidenceofhowHungariansprogressedcomparedtootherSoviet-dominatedsocieties.ComparingHungarywithAustriaandtheFederalRepublicofGermanyyieldsinsightsintodifferencescreatedbyamarketasagainstanonmarketeconomy,andademocraticasagainstanundemocraticpoliticalsystem.

Withhindsight,countriesthatwerefreetosidewiththeWestduringthecoldwarerawereobviouslybetteroff.ButthepointwasnotsoobviouswhentheIronCurtainwasputinplace.GermancitieshadbeenbombedflatasaconsequenceofHitler'sdeterminationtofightthewartothebitterend,andGermanfoodrationswereatsubsistencelevels.AustriahadbeenincorporatedintheThirdGermanReichin1938and,whileseparatedafter1945,itsufferedfour-powermilitaryoccupationforadecade.AustriaonlyescapedGerman-stylepartitionbythe1955PeaceTreatythatledtothewithdrawalofSoviettroops

fromAustriaandanAustriancommitmenttoformalneutralitybetweenEastandWest.

Second,thechapterassessestransformationinthe1990s.Thedescriptionofeconomictransformationasaninterruptionineconometrictime-seriesanalysisisanEnglishunderstatement.Moreover,transformationcancauseabruptshort-termreversals.Thisismostevidentintheeconomy,whereinflationrateshavesoaredandthenfallen,andwhereunemploymenthasreplacedtheCommunistpracticesofover-employmentandunder-utilizationoftheproductivecapacitiesofemployees.Itisalsoregisteredbytheswingoftheelectoralpendulumincompetitionbetweendemocraticparties.

MakingProgressandFallingBehindinSocialConditions

Absoluteprogressisthetwentieth-centurynormoveranyperiodaslongasadecadeorgeneration.BycomparisonwithneighbouringcountriesintheCommunistbloc,Hungariansoftenappearedahead.Forexample,inpoliticalandcivilrights,Hungaryinthemid-1980swastheleastilliberaloftheSovietblocregimes(Gastil,1987),toleratingdiverseformsofexpressionthatdidnotthreatentheregime.TheeconomywasrelativelyopenandtheprivatesectormoretoleratedthanintheapparentlyprosperousbuthighlyregimentedEastGermanregime.

ButwhencomparedwithAustriaandtheFederalRepublicofGermany,therecordofCommunistHungaryappearsdifferent.ThisshowstheextenttowhichprogressinHungarywasslowcomparedtosocietiesalsodevastatedbywarandinterwardepressionbutwithoutaCommunistregime.WhilelivingconditionsinHungaryprogressedintheabsolutesense,therateofchangewassoslowthatHungarywassimultaneouslyfallingbehindAustriaandWestGermany.ComparisonacrosstheIronCurtainemphasizesthattheshockoftransformationmayalsobeviewedasliberationfromthedeadweightofasystemholdingpeopleback.

ThecollapseoftheSovietblochascreatednewopportunitiesforHungarians.Butitcannotremoveovernightthelegacyofthepreviousfourdecadesandthefirstlawofeconomicsisthattherearenobenefitswithoutcosts.Inastablesociety,focusingontheshorttermcanemphasizestability,forpopulationstendtochangeverygraduallyandmajorchangescanrequirethecompoundingofsmallannualratesofchangefordecadesbeforethemomentumofinertiatriggersvisiblemajorchanges.Inpost-Communistsocieties,thislogicdoesnotapply,forthebiggestchangesarequalitative;theyaffectwhatwemeasure.Thisismostobviousinpolitics,whereoldandnewareincomparable:

forexample,votinginafreeasagainstanunfreeelection.Itisalsoevidentinseeminglysmalldetails.Forexample,whilethenumberofyouthsinsecondaryeducationmayremainconstant,transformationhastriggeredanabruptshiftfrompupilsstudyingRussiantothefreechoiceofstudyingEnglishorGerman.

Theyear1989isthebaselineformeasuringshort-termchanges.Insofarasdeclineinsocialconditionshasstoppedandimprovementsbeguninthemid-1990s,thecostoftransformationisonlythelossofafewyearsofprogressratherthandecadesofopportunities.Combiningthe

analysisoflong-termandshort-termchangeenablesustounderstandtheextenttowhichHungaryhasmadeprogressinthepasthalf-centuryandyethowmuchitisnowunderpressuretocatchupwithCentralEuropeanneighboursthatwerenotsubjecttoCommunistrule.

Mattersoflifeanddeath

TurmoilandlosshavebeenassignificantasprogressintwentiethcenturyCentralEurope.Thisisespeciallyvisibleinpopulationstatistics.HungaryexperiencedadrasticlossofpopulationasaconsequenceofboundarychangesaftertheFirstWorldWar.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,Hungarians,andevenmore,minoritieslivinginHungarysuchasJewsandgypsies,sufferedlossoflife.Sincethen,theaggregatepopulationofHungaryhasalteredverylittle,increasingbyonly12percentsince1948.However,thepopulationcanhardlybedescribedasstagnant,giventhatthemedianHungarianadultwasbornaboutthetimeofthe1956HungarianRevolution,whereasthemedianadultin1948wasbornundertheHabsburgcrown.

Regardlessoftheflagthatfliesoveracityandwhateverthenationalcurrency,lifeanddeatharesignificanttoeveryone.InCentralEuropetherearegoodlong-termstatisticsforinfantmortality,thelikelihoodthatachildwillsurviveforatleastayearafterbirth(Table11.1)WithinHungarygreatprogresshasbeenachievedinreducinginfantmortality.In1949,theratewas91deathsperthousand;bytheendoftheCommunisterain1989itstoodat16deathsperthousand,afallof82percent.AdramaticdecreaseininfantmortalitywasnotuniquetoHungary;itwascommonthroughoutEurope.

WhileinabsolutetermsHungaryhasmadegreatprogressinreducinginfantmortality,incomparativetermsithasbeenfallingbehind.In1949therateofinfantmortalityinHungarywaslowerthaninAustria.FollowingthewithdrawalofSoviettroopsandthenormalizationoflifeinthewholeofAustriain1955,infantmortality

showedadramaticdropthere,parallelingtheachievementintheFederalRepublicofGermany,andcontinuingtofallthereafter.By1989,eventhoughHungaryhadbeenmakinggreatprogress,infantmortalityinAustriawashalfthatofHungary.

Similarly,Czechoslovakiashowssubstantialprogressyetisfallingbehind.In1949itsinfantmortalityratewaswellbelowAustriaandalmostthesameasinbothhalvesofGermany.By1989,thefinalyearoftheCommunistera,infantmortalityinCzechoslovakiawashalfagain

Table11.1:InfantmortalityinCentralEuropeA.LongTerm1949 1960 1970 1980 1989 Change

Infantmortality(deathsper1000)Germany:East 72 39 19 12 8 -64Germany:Fed.Republic 75 34 24 13 8 -67Austria 92 38 26 14 8 -84Czechoslovakia 78 24 22 18 12 -66HUNGARY 91 48 36 23 16 -75Poland 108 57 33 21 19 -89

B.ShortTerm1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Change

(Deathsper1000livebirths)Germany 8 7 7 6 6 6 5 5 -3Austria 8 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 -3CzechR 10 11 10 10 9 8 8 6 -4Slovakia 14 12 13 13 11 11 11 11 -3HUNGARY 16 15 16 14 13 12 11 11 -5Poland 19 19 18 17 16 15 14 14 -5Sources:UN,thenOECDHealthStatistics.Communistcountries:UnitedNationsandWorldBankstatistics,plusInternationalChildDevelopmentCentre,ChildrenatRiskinCentralandEasternEurope.Florence:ICDC/INICEFRegionalMonitoringReportNo.4,1997,p.155;OECDfor1996

thatintheFederalRepublic,theGermanDemocraticRepublicandAustria.Polandshowedthegreatestabsoluteimprovementbetween1949and1989,butonlybecauseitsinfantmortalitywasrelativelyhighatthebeginning.ItsinfantmortalityratehasnowcaughtupwithHungary,buthasfallenbehindrelativetoAustriaandGermany.

Infantmortalityhasbeenlittleaffectedbytheshort-termshocksofpoliticalandeconomictransformation.In1989Hungaryhadsixteen

infantdeathsperthousand;ithasnowfallentoeleven(Table11.1).InPoland,thenumberofdeathshasfallenbythesameamount.ThedecreasewaslessintheCzechRepublic,AustriaandGermanybecausethestartingpointwaslower;however,theproportionatechangewassimilar.Slovakiashowedaslowerrateofimprovementthanitsneighbours.Consistentwiththelogicoftransformationasashock,infantmortalityactuallyrosebyoneperthousandbetween1990and1991,apatternalsofoundintheCzechRepublicandSlovakia.However,thereversalwastemporaryandimprovementsininfantmortalityhaveaccel-

eratedsince.InHungary,infantmortalityfellbyacompoundannualrateof6.6percentannuallysince1989,comparedtoanannualrateofimprovementof4.4percentbetween1980to1989,thefinaldecadeoftheCommunistregime.

WhilethelevelofinfantmortalityremainshigherinHungarythaninAustriaorGermany,thesizeofthegapisdecreasing.In1989deathsfrominfantmortalitywereeightperthousandgreaterinHungarythaninAustriaortheFederalRepublicofGermany;by1996,thegaphadbeenreducedtosix.Moreover,becauseinfantmortalityisimprovingatafasterannualrateinHungarythaninAustriaorGermany,therearenowprospectsforHungarycatchingupintheforeseeablefutureonthisimportantmeasureofhealth.

WhilelifeexpectancyhasbeenrisingacrossEurope,therearesubstantialcumulativedifferencesintherateofimprovement.Hungaryisdistinctivebecauseithasalsobeenfallingbehinditsneighbours,evenwhilelifeexpectancyisrising.In1949thelifeexpectancyofHungarianwomenwasayearhigherthaninPoland,butby1989Polandhadattainedahigherlifeexpectancy.HungarywasatthebottomforlifeexpectancyamongCentralEuropeanwomen(Table11.2A).ThelifeexpectancyofHungarianmaleshasfollowedasimilartrajectory,exceptthatthegapbetweenHungaryandneighbouringcountrieshaswidenedevenmore.In1949Hungarianmencouldexpecttoliveanaverageoffifty-eightyears,threeyearsmorethaninPolandandoneyearlongerthaninGermany.By1989lifeexpectancyforHungarianmenhadrisenbysevenyears,butbecauseithadrisenbyelevenyearsinPolandandfifteenyearsinpostwarFederalGermany,HungarywasatthebottominlifeexpectancyinCentralEurope.

Thenormalpatternoflifeexpectancyinanadvancedindustrialsocietyisthatitincreasesbyaseeminglysmallratefromoneyearto

thenext,resultinginasubstantialincreaseinlongevityfromonedecadetothenext.However,inHungaryimprovementinwomen'slifeexpectancybegantoslowdowninthelate1960sandthenshowedsignsofstagnating.Between1966and1980femalelifeexpectancyimprovedbyonlythree-fifthsofayear.Inthe1980s,theratewasvirtuallystatic.Bycontrast,inthesametwodecadesthelifeexpectancyofwomenrosebymorethanfiveyearsinAustriaandtheFederalRepublicofGermany.ThelifeexpectancyofHungarianmenhasshownanevenworsetrajectory:insteadofstagnatingithasactuallydeclinedsince1966,whenlifeexpectancywas67.5years.By1989,malelifeexpectancywaslowerthanin1960(seeTable2.4above).

Table11.2:Life-expectancytrendsinCentralEuropeALong-termChanges

1949 1960 1970 1980 1989 ChangeFemaleLifeexpectancy(years)

Austria 67 72 73 76 79 12Germany:FedRepublic 68 72 74 77 79 11GDR 69 72 72 75 76 7Czechoslavakia 65 73 73 74 75 10Poland 62 70 73 75 75 13HUNGARY 63 70 72 73 74 11

B.Short-termChangesB.Short-termChanges1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Change

Women(years)Austria 78.8 79.0 79.2 79.3 79.4 79.7 80.1 80.2 1.4Germany 79.0 79.2 78.8 79.8 79.3 79.3 79.5 79.9 0.9CzechR 75.4 76.0 75.7 76.1 76.6 76.6 76.9 77.6 2.2Poland 75.5 75.5 75.3 75.7 76.0 76.1 76.4 76.4 0.9Slovakia 75.4 75.4 75.2 75.3 76.7 76.5 76.3 76.7 1.3HUNGARY 73.8 73.7 73.8 73.7 73.8 74.2 74.5 74.7 0.9

MenAustria 72.1 72.5 72.6 72.9 72.9 73.3 73.5 73.9 1.8Germany 72.6 72.0 72.2 72.6 72.8 72.8 73.0 73.6 1.0CzechR 68.1 67.5 68.2 68.5 68.9 69.5 70.0 70.5 2.4Slovakia 66.9 66.6 66.8 66.8 68.4 68.3 68.4 68.8 1.9Poland 66.8 66.5 66.1 66.7 67.4 67.5 67.6 67.6 0.8HUNGARY 65.4 65.1 65.0 64.6 64.5 64.5 65.3 66.6 1.2Sources:GermanyandAustria:UN,thenOECDHealthStatistics.UNDemographicYearbook,1979,specialhistoricalsupplement.WorldHealthOrganization.InternationalChildDevelopmentCentre,ChildrenatRiskinCentralandEasternEurope.RegionalMonitoringReportNo.4,1997,p.123,OECDfiguresfor1996

TheimpactofdecadesofpoorhealthhascontinuedinHungarysince

transformation.HungarianwomenhavethelowestlifeexpectancyinCentralEurope.ThepositionofHungarianmenhasworsenedrelatively.ThelifeexpectancyofmenissevenyearslessthanofAustrians,andayearlessthanforPoles.TheabnormaltrenddownwardhascreatedthebiggestgendergapinEurope.By1996Hungarianmencouldexpecttolive8.1yearslessthanwomen,whereasinGermanyandAustriathegendergapis6.3years.ThewideninggendergapreflectsgrowingcausesofprematuredeathinHungary,includingacutealcoholism,automobileandindustrialaccidents.Thesewereincreasingsignificantly

inHungarybeforepoliticaltransformation.Forexample,deathsfromcirrhosisoftheliverincreasedfromtwenty-eightperhundredthousandtofifty-twobetween1980and1989,andreachedeighty-twoby1993(Table1.9above;seealso,Table2.5).

IneveryEuropeancountryeducationhasimprovedsomuchinthiscenturythattheverymeasuresusedtoevaluateachievementshavebeentransformed.Initially,literacywasthegoal;thespreadofmasseducationmeantthatbythe1930smorethannine-tenthsofHungarianadultswereliterate,aproportiongreaterthaninMediterraneancountriesfromGreeceandItalytoSpainandPortugal,andalsomorethaninPoland(Rose,1994:Table19),andcompleteliteracyfollowedaftertheSecondWorldWar.

ThepostwardevelopmentofeducationinHungaryinitiallyinvolvedtheprovisionoffreesecondaryeducationforall,withseparatecoursesandschoolsforacademic,vocationalandtechnicaleducation.Thisraisedtheskillleveloftheadultlabourforce,andincreasedtheminorityqualifiedtoentertertiaryeducation.TheproportionofHungarianyouthscompletingtertiaryeducationhasmorethantrebledsince1960,andincreasedbyalmosthalfbetween1970and1989(Table1.3above).Trendsineducationsince1989cannoteasilybemonitored,becausethecompulsoryelementmakesparticipationineducationhigh,andstructuralchangesatsecondaryandtertiarylevelshaveintroduceddiscontinuitiesinstatistics.Theevidenceindicatesthatparticipationinfurthereducationhasnotfallen,andinsomecasesmayhaverisensince1989(cf.ICDC,1997:159ff).

Figure11.1MathematicalachievementofCentralEuropeanyouthsSource:InternationalAssociationfortheEvaluationofEducationalAchievement,asreportedin

Cross-nationalcomparisonsineducationalachievementaremoredifficultthancomparisonsofhealth,fortheorganizationofeducationdiffersfromcountrytocountry.Inanattempttocompareachievementsdirectly,internationaltestsincoreschoolsubjectsareadministeredinmanyadvancedindustrialsocieties.Mathematicsisparticularlysuitableforinternationalcomparison,sincequestionscanliterallybethesameineverycountry,whichisnotthecasewithreadingandlanguagetests.Ontheinternationalmathematicalachievementtestforsecondaryschoolpupils,Hungaryranksfourteenthamongforty-onecountries.ItisbehindtheCzechRepublic,aEuropeanleader,andAustria,butclearlyaheadofGermany,BritainandtheUnitedStates(Figure11.1).Inaparalleltestofachievementinscience,Hungaryranksninthamongforty-onecountries,justbehindAustriaandtheCzechRepublic,theEuropeanleader.

MaterialConditions

Anonmarketeconomyisdifferentinkindfromamarketeconomy,forpricesaresetbybureaucraticcommandsratherthanthemarket,individualslackthefreedomtochangejobsorbargainforwagesandthestateallocatesbenefitsonthebasisofpartyloyaltyaswellasneed,substitutingpoliticalcapitalforeconomiccapital.Insuchcircumstances,anyattempttocompareeconomictrendsinCentralEuropebycitingeconomicstatisticsfortworadicallydifferenttypesofeconomycompoundstheconfusion,asGermanslearnedoncetheEastGermaneconomywasopeneduptothemarketeconomyoftheFederalRepublic(seee.g.Mareretal.,1992;Lavigne,1995).

Carownershipoffersasimplematerialindicatorofmasslivingstandards,forastheaverageincomeinasocietyrises,sotoodoesautomobileownership.ImmediatelyaftertheSecondWorldWar,carownershipwasaluxurythroughoutEurope.Forexample,inthe

FederalRepublicofGermanyin1950,therewereonlythirteencarsperthousandpeopleandinAustriaonlyseven,comparedto266intheUnitedStates.Withincreasedaffluence,carownershiphassteadilyrisenthroughoutEurope,andinWesternEuropemuchofthegapwiththeUnitedStateshasbeenclosed(Fig.11.2).

Withincommandeconomies,theriseincarownershiphasbeendramatictoo.Between1960and1989carownershipincreasedmorethanfortytimesinHungary,thirtytimesinPolandandeleventimesin

Figure11.2Carownership:makingprogressandfallingbehindSource:United

NationsDemographicYearbook(variousyears).FinalyearforEastandWest

Germanyis1993,andforCzechoslovakia,1991

CzechoslovakiaandinEastGermany.Butgreatincreaseswereduetoaverylowstartingpoint.In1960,theearliestyearwithcomparativedata,carownershipinHungaryandPolandwaslessthaninAustriaorGermanyin1950,andonlyone-twentieththeWestGermanratein1960.Theconsumerboomincommandeconomiesbeganinthe1960s;withinadecadecarownershiphadincreasedbyalmostsixtimesinHungary.However,allthecommandeconomiesinabsolutetermsfellfurtherbehindAustriaandWestGermany,whichhadbeenmakingprogressatamuchfasterrate.AtthetimetheBerlinWallfell,carownershipinHungaryhadrisento164perthousand,athirdhigherthanPolandbutbehindCzechoslovakiaandEastGermany.However,theabsolutegapbetweenWestGermanyandAustriaandHungarywasstillthesame.

Carownershiphighlightsthefactthatcomparingnumbersofcarsisnotacomparisonoflikewithlike,becauseofgreatdifferencesinqualitybetweencarsinthetwosystems.TheEastGermanTrabantorWartburgwasfarinferiorineveryrespect,includingtheavoidanceofpollution,tocarsproducedintheWesterneconomiesofCentralEurope,suchasthe

VolkswagenorVauxhall.After1989,whenconsumersweregivenfreedomtochoose,thedemandforcarswasdoublyintense,assomeHungarians,Poles,CzechsandSlovaksbecamefirsttimebuyersofcars,andotherstradedupfromanonmarketcartoacarthatcouldmeetthestandardsofbuyersinacompetitiveEuropeanmarket.Thus,thebigincreaseincarownershipinHungary,up29percentbetween1989and1994,comparedto16percentinAustria,understatesanevenbiggerimprovementinquality.

Sincepricesandwagesdifferradicallyfromonemarketeconomytoanother,convertingthesesumsintoUnitedStatesdollarsdoesnotgivethemostaccuratepictureofcurrentlivingstandards.Forexample,aSwedishincomethatsoundsbigindollarsisrapidlycutdowntosizewhenrelatedtoSwedishprices.Evenwheninflationdollarizesaneconomy,becausetheinflationassociatedwithtransformationtemporarilymakesanationalcurrencyworthlessforpurposesofforeignexchange,thedollardoesnotfullyassessincomebecausepeopletendtoreactbygettingoutofmoney,thatis,relyingonfoodandotherthingstheycanproduceforthemselves,particularlyinasocietysuchasHungary,whereunofficialeconomiesflourishedunderCommunism.

Todealwithdisparitiesbetweennationallivingcostsandforeignexchangerates,theOECDhasdevelopedameasureofpercapitaincomeadjustedtoachievepurchasingpowerparity(PPP)withtheAmericandollar.Thisraisestherealvalueofmoneyinlow-incomecountries,wherepricesofbasicgoodstendtobelow,anddepressestheapparentrichesofhigh-incomeandhigh-costScandinaviancountries.ThegapbetweenthecommandeconomiesandthemarketeconomiesofCentralEuroperemainslargeevenafterthisisdone(Figure11.3).TheleadingcountryinPPPadjustedGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)percapitaistheCzechRepublic,butincomethereitbarelyhalfthatintheFederalRepublicevenaftertheburdensofthe

fivenewEastGermanlandsareincluded.CzechGDPisalsolessthanthatofthepoorestcountryintheEuropeanUnion,Greece($12,730).TheestimatedGDPforHungaryistwo-thirdslessthanAustriaorGermany,morethanathirdlessthantheCzechRepublic,andonlyaheadofPoland.

Peoplesocializedintoanonmarketeconomyhavelotsofexperienceinmanaginghouseholdaffairswithalowcashincome.Thecharacteristicfeatureofacommandeconomywasthatitexistedinparallelwithunofficialeconomies.Unofficialuncivileconomiesinvolvedearningmoneythroughtransactionsthatwerenotdeclaredtotaxauthoritiesandwent

Figure11.3PurchasingpowerofCentralEuropeans

Source:1998WorldBankAtlas,WashingtonDC:WorldBank,1998,pp.42-3

unrecordedinofficialstatistics,forexample:drivingataxiordoinghouseholdrepairsonacash-in-handbasis.Inaddition,householdscouldproducegoodsandservicesfortheirownconsumption,forexample,growingvegetablesonado-it-yourselfbasiswithoutanymoneychanginghands.TheHungarianeconomywasoutstandinginacceptingunofficialeconomicactivityoutsidethestate'sofficialcognizance.Moreover,thedeficienciesofthecommandeconomyalsoencouragedpeopletorely,insofarastheycould,onhouseholdresourcesforsomefoodstuffsandforminor(andsometimesmajor)householdrepairsandconstruction.

Whereasinaconventionalmarketeconomy,anindividual'swagesoughttopayenoughforapersontomakeendsmeet,inanon-marketeconomythiswasnotexpected.Inordertogetby,thatis,meetregularmaterialneedswithoutborrowingmoneyorspendingsavings,

peoplehadtorelyonamultiplicityofeconomies,officialandunofficial.Thecommonestpracticewastocombinenon-monetizedhouseholdproductionwiththeincomesofhouseholdmembersintheofficialeconomy.Secondinimportancewastocombineawageintheofficialeconomyand

moneyearnedintheunofficialshadoweconomy.Bothstrategieshavebeenmaintainedtodealwiththedisturbancesofeconomictransformation(cf.Rose,1993).

ThenationwiderepresentativesamplesurveysoftheNewDemocraciesBarometerofthePaulLazarsfeldSocietymonitorinvolvementinunofficialaswellasofficialeconomies.Thefirstquestionaskediswhetherpeopleearnenoughfromtheirregularjobtobuywhattheyreallyneed;thisisthenorminamarketeconomybutwasnotalwaysthecaseinacommandeconomyorinpost-Communistcountriestoday.Peoplearethenaskedwhethertheyearnenoughtogetby,thatis,inthepastyearhavetheymanagedtocopewithoutborrowingmoneyorspendingsavings.Thiscanbedonebycombiningnon-moneydo-it-yourselfresources,unofficialearningsandincomefromaregularjobinagreatvarietyofways.Insofarasthiscanbedone,livingstandardscanbemaintainedindefinitely.

InWestGermany,91percentreportthattheyearnenoughfromtheirregularjobtobuywhattheyreallyneedandinEastGermany,re-unificationhasmadeitpossiblefor86percenttoliveontheirregularearnings.Peoplewhocannotdoso,forexample,studentsorthetemporarilyunemployed,maydrawonsavingsoronfamilyforhelp,borrowmoney

Figure11.4ImportanceofmultipleeconomiesingettingbySource:Hungary,Czech

Republic,Slovakia,Poland:PaulLazarsfeldSociety,Vienna,NewDemocracies

BarometerVsurvey,1998;NewDemocraciesBarometerI,1991.

Germany:CSPP/WZBOkopolsurvey,1993:questionreferencetopension

fromfriendsorturntounemploymentbenefitorotherpublicfundstotidethemoverdifficulties.InAustria,72percentsaythattheyearnenoughfromtheirregularjobtomeettheirneeds;thosedrawingonsecondaryresourcestoaugmenttheirneedsareonly14percentofthesociety(Figure11.4).IntheformercommandeconomiesofCentralEurope,asomewhatdifferentpatternisfound.WhenthequestionwasfirstaskedinHungaryin1991,only25percentofthoseinworksaidtheyearnedenoughfromtheirregularjobtobuynecessities.Theproportionwhosaidtheycouldgetbywas68percent;the43percentagepointgapbetweenthetwofiguresemphasizestheimportanceofunofficialeconomiesinenablingHungarianstogetby.Sincethen,therehasbeenagradualincreaseintheproportionofHungariansearningenoughfromtheirregularjobtobuywhattheyneed;bythe1998NDBsurvey49percentofthoseinemploymentweredoingso,almostdoubletheproportionin1991.Concurrently,therehasbeenalesserincreaseintheproportionabletogetbythroughacombinationofunofficialandofficialactivities.TheproportionofHungariansabletogetbywithoutborrowingorspendingsavingsisapproachingthatofAustrians,albeitHungarianscopeatalowerstandardofliving(fordetails,seeRoseandHaerpfer,1996;1998).

Thenormalizationofpost-CommunistcountriesofCentralEuropeisindicatedbythegradualclosingofthegapbetweenwagespaidintheofficialeconomyandwhatapersonneedstoliveon.Inthefourtransitioneconomiesin1991,anaverageof37percentofthoseinworkreportedtotheNewDemocraciesBarometerthattheyearnedenoughtoliveonfromtheirregularjob;by1998theproportionhadrisento53percent.Whilethisfigureiswellbelowthatofnormalmarketeconomies,itissubstantialevidenceofcatchingup.Moreover,theproportionofhouseholdsinthefourcountriesabletogetbywithoutborrowingmoneyorspendingsavingshasrisenfroman

averageof31percentin1991to77percentin1998,andconsumptionhasriseninallfourcountriestoo.

ThepressureforthetotalmobilizationoflabourincommandeconomiesaftertheSecondWorldWarpreparedhouseholdstocopewiththeshocksoftransition.Incommandeconomiesthetotalresourcesofahousehold,notjustthewagesofindividuals,wereofcriticalimportance.Multipleincomesfromtheofficialeconomywereeasytoobtain,forCommunistregimesemphasizedtheMarxistprimacyoflabour,andsoughttomobilizebothmenandwomenintofulltimeemployment.Moreover,housingshortagessustainedmulti-generationhouseholds.Awidowedgrandmothernotonlyhadasmallpensionbutalsocouldlookaftergrandchildrenwhileherdaughterworked.Ateen-agedstudentcould

earnmoneyinanunofficialeconomybysellinggoodsinaweeklymarket.

WhilefewwomenormenwereunemployedinHungaryin1949,only34percentofwomenofworkingagewereinthelabourforcecomparedto90percentofmen(Table1.5above).IntheCommunistera,theproportionofwomenmobilizedintopaidemploymentmorethandoubled,reachingapeakof74percentby1984.Changesreflectedagreaterdemandforworkersinindustryandtheservicesector,andadecliningdemandforworkinagriculture,historicallyamajoruserofnonwagedfemalelabour.Italsoreflectedtheincreasededucationallevel,andthusemployabilityofwomen,andtheurbanizationthatwascreatingeasieraccesstothelabourmarket.Asyoungermalestendedtostaylongeratschoolandmenoftenretiredwellbelowtheageof65,theratioofwomentomeninthelabourforcerosetoo.

TherapidmobilizationofwomenintopaidlabourwascommonthroughouttheCommunistbloc.WhilethereasonsfordoingsoappliedinlargemeasureinAustriaandtheFederalRepublicofGermanytoo,thetempoofchangewasmuchslower.WhereasinCommunistcountriesitwasnormaltohavethreeorfourwomeninworkforeveryfivemen,inAustriaandGermanythegenderratiointhelabourforcedidnotreachtwowomentothreemenuntilthelate1980s.Eventhen,therewasusuallyagapbetweenmarketandnonmarketcountries.Forexample,inEastGermanytherewereeighty-ninewomeninworkforeveryhundredmenin1980,whereasintheFederalRepublictheratiowassixtytoahundred(Rose,1994:Tables10,11).InHungary,themobilizationofwomenintopaidemploymentwasnotsointenseasintheGermanDemocraticRepublic,butthelevelandtempoofchangewasconsistentlyaheadofneighbouringAustria.

Thetransformationofcommandeconomieshasincreasedunemploymentamongbothmenandwomen.InHungary,theproportionofwomeninemploymenthasdroppedsixpercentagepointsbetween1989and1996.Sincetheproportionofmeninthelabourforcehasdroppedsevenpercentagepoints,theratioofwomentomeninthelabourforcehashardlybeenaffectedandasimilarpatternhasemergedinneighbouringex-commandeconomies.ButinthemarketeconomiesofCentralEurope,AustriaandGermany,therehasbeenanincreaseintheproportionofwomeninemploymentwhilethepercentageofmalesinworkhastendedtoremainconstant,thuscontinuingthelong-termsecularincreaseinequalemploymentofmenandwomen,apatterninitiatedinHungary,CzechoslovakiaandPoland.

Figure11.5TrendsinGDP,198996Sources:Austria:OECDEconomicOutlookNo.62

(December1997),A4.Formercommandeconomies:TransitionReport1997(London:

EuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopment),appendixwithcountrystatistics.

*From198990,regionalaccountsofCzechoslovakia

TransformingacommandeconomyintoamarketeconomyisintendedtodrawthecountriesofCentralEuropeclosertogetherthroughtrade,membershipintheEuropeanUnionand,ifformercommandeconomiescatchup,inlivingstandardstoo.Buttheimmediateresultemphasizeddifferences,asthefirstconsequenceofrestructuringcommandeconomieswastosqueezeoutinefficientandvaluesubtractingenterprises.Inthefirstpartofthe1990s,acrosstheregiontheofficiallyrecordedGrossDomesticProductcontracted,theintroductionofmarketpriceswasaccompaniedbydouble-andtreble-digitinflationandoveremployment(thatis,concealedunemploymentduetomisuseoflabour)becameopenunemployment.

Growthisthenormformarketeconomies,albeittherateofgrowthislikelytovaryfrom1to3or4percentayear.Thecontractionofthe

economyistheexception.Forexample,inAustria,themostappropriatecomparatorinCentralEuropebecauseoftheshocktotheFederalRepublicofGermanycausedbyreunification,theeconomygreweveryyearbetween1989and1997.Aftercontrollingfortheeffectsofinflation,thecountry'sGrossDomesticProductwas16percentgreaterin1997thanintheyeartheBerlinWallfell(Figure11.5)

Thedynamicsofeconomiesintransformationhavebeenverydifferent.Paradoxically,thefirstsignofprogressisacontractionintheofficialeconomy,astheintroductionofmarketsrevealstheinadequaciesofmuchthatwentbeforeandmuchneweconomicactivityoccursoutsidetheofficialeconomy.Theex-commandeconomiesofCentralEuropehaveonlydifferedinthedepthanddurationofeconomiccontraction.Between1989and1991everyeconomycontractedmorethan12percent.By1993theofficialHungarianeconomyhadlevelledoff,andrecoverystarted.Asoftheendof1997,thePolishrecoveryhadcreatedanofficialGDPgreaterthanin1989;andsignsofrecoveryfromthedepthsoftransformationwereevidentinHungaryaswellasintheCzechRepublicandSlovakia.

Whatevercredenceisgiventoofficialeconomicstatisticsintransitioncountries,threeconclusionsareclear.TheimpositionofacommandeconomyimposedgreatcostsonthepeoplesofCentralEurope,becausefordecadesitcausedlivingstandards,whethermeasuredinhealthorwealth,tolagbehindtheboomingsocialmarketeconomiesofAustriaandtheFederalRepublic.Atthestartofthe1990s,theintroductionofamarketeconomyimposedcostsonnonmarketeconomies.Buttheturnaroundinthemid-1990sgiveshopesofaboomatthestartofthenewmillennium,asthelaggardeconomiesofEastCentralEuropeseektocatchupwithsocialmarketeconomies.

Howpeopleevaluatethenationaleconomydependsonwhethertheylookbackwardorforwardintime.Peoplemaymakeeconomicjudgmentsbasedsolelyonthepresent;theymayretrospectivelycomparecurrentconditionswiththosebeforetransformation;ortheymayputthefuturefirst.Sincewordssuchascapitalismandsocialismarevague,emotionallyloadedsymbolsthatdonotdescribeactualeconomies,theNewDemocraciesBarometeraskspeopletoevaluatethenationaleconomywithoutreferencetoideologicallabels.People

aresimplyaskedtoratetheeconomybeforetherevolutionof1989;ourpresenteconomicsystem;andoureconomicsysteminfiveyearstime.CentralEuropeansshowtwoverydifferentpatternsofresponse(Figure11.6).Hungariansareoutstandingintheextenttowhichtheyarepositiveabouttheoldeconomicsystem,foreventhoughitwasnotsoprosperousofficiallyitnonethelessallowedsubstantialscopeforunofficialearnings,andlaxcurrencycontrolsenabledmanytoacquireforeigncurrenciestospendonshoppingexpeditionsinVienna.Slovaksaresecondintheirpositiveorientationtowardthepast,whileCzechsandPolestendtobenegativeabouttheoldcommandeconomy.

Figure11.6Ratingeconomicsystems:past,presentandfuture

Source:Hungary,CzechRepublic,Slovakia,Poland:PaulLazarsfeldSocietyVienna,NewDemocraciesBarometerVsurvey,1998

DissatisfactionwiththeeconomicsystematpresentisnotconfinedtoHungarians:amajorityofCzechsandSlovaksarealsodissatisfied.ThedistinctivefeatureofHungariansisthattheyratetheneweconomicsystem,asof1998,muchlessfavorablythantheoldsystem,whereasamajorityofCzechsarenegativeaboutboththeoldandnew.AmongtheCentralEuropeanex-commandeconomies,onlythePolisheconomyhassucceededinachievingsufficientgrowthtogaintheendorsementofamajorityofitscitizens.AsubstantialgapremainswithAustria,where87percentarepositiveaboutthewayitseconomyworks.

Theconventionaltextbookmaximthatcostscomebeforebenefitsimpliesthatpeopleoughtnottoviewthecostsoftransformationasalossbutasaninvestmentthatwillyieldfuturebenefits.ThisisthecasethroughoutCentralEurope.TheproportionofHungarianspositiveaboutthefutureeconomyisjustashighasthatofPoles,even

thoughtheupswinginHungaryhasyettoreachtheheightsofPoland.NopopulationisaspositiveabouttheeconomicfutureasareAustrians,butthereisoptimismthroughouttheDanuberegion.Paradoxically,amajorityofHungariansarepositiveaboutboththeoldeconomicsystemandthe

economicsystemastheyseeitevolvinginfuture.InsofarastheyuseAustriaorGermanyasamodeloftheHungarianfuture,thenewsystemalsopromisesamuchhigherstandardoflivingthantheold.

ChangingPoliticalEvaluations

Since1945Hungaryhashadthreefundamentalpoliticaltransformations.ThefirstcameinNovember1945whenafreecompetitiveelectionwasheld.TheSmallholdersPartywonanabsolutemajorityofvotes,57percent.Thesecondbreakcameshortlythereafter:theCommunistPartyusedtheSovietpresencetobecomeapartnerinacoalitiongovernmentandintimidateopponents.By1948theCommunistseliminatedtheiropponentsfromgovernmentandintroducedaone-partystate.IntheMay1949election,theCommunist-ledbloc,theonlypartynominatingcandidates,won95.6percentofthevote.Afundamentalshifttoone-partyrulebegan;itlastedfortyyears(DessewffyandHammer,1995:14ff).

HungarywasinthevanguardofabandoningCommunism.AmongCommunistregimes,Hungaryrankedhighonliberalization,thatis,limitedrepressionratherthantotalitariansuppression.OntheFreedomHousescale,inthe1980sHungaryrankedasjustasliberalizedasYugoslaviaalbeitthiswasstillintheunfreecategory.Bycontrast,EastGermanyand,formuchofthetimeCzechoslovakia,wereatthebottomoftheunfreecategory,alongwiththeSovietUnionandRomania(cf.Gastil,1987:Table6).Thelowlevelofunfreedomgavedissidentsachancetocriticizethegovernmentfromananti-Communistvieworfromapost-Marxistperspective(cf.Fehér,etal.,1983).Italsoopeneddebatewiththegoverningparty.Hence,inOctober1989themajorityinthepartyvotedtodissolveitanddenouncedcrimesandmistakesofthepast.

Whilefundamentalconstitutionalchangeoccurred,publicopinionisproblematic.Theoriesofpoliticalsocializationpostulatethatthepoliticalvaluesthatpeopleformearlyintheirlivestendtoendurethroughoutadulthood.ButgiventhenatureofHungariansocialism,theordinaryHungarianwasunlikelytoacquirethevaluesofanorthodoxMarxistLeninistkind.YetsincethesystemwasliberalbycomparisonwithotherCommunistregimes,thismayhavesofteneditsrejection.TheconsciouslyambiguousroleofCommunistleadersalsotaughtmanyHungarianstobecomepoliticalcynics,scepticalofallpoliticianswhatevertheirprofessedideologyorinterests.

Figure11.7Ratingpoliticalsystems:past,presentandfuture

Source:Hungary,CzechRepublic,Slovakia,Poland:PaulLazarsfeldSociety,Vienna,NewDemocraciesBarometerVsurvey,1998

Inconsequenceofadistinctivepoliticalhistory,Hungarianshavereacteddifferentlythanneighbourstothechangeinregimein1989.WhentheNewDemocraciesBarometeraskspeopletoratetheformerCommunistregime;ourpresentsystemofgoverningwithfreeelectionsandmanyparties;andoursystemofgoverninginfiveyearstime,HungariansconsistentlygiveahighratingtotheoldCommunistregime(Figure11.7).Inthe1998NDBsurvey,58percentwerepositive,comparedtolessthanathirdofCzechsandPoles.Hungariansalsodifferinbeinglessfavourableaboutthenewregime.WhereasCzechsandPolesaremuchmorelikelytohaveapositiveviewofthenewcomparedtotheoldregime,thereisafivepercentagepointfallintheproportionofHungariansfavouringthenewregimecomparedtotheold.Nonetheless,amajorityremainspositive.OnlythePolesshowaspositivearatingasthatofAustrians.

ThereadinessofHungarianstovotethegovernmentofthedayoutof

officeisevidencethattheyunderstandwhatdemocracyisabout:itisaboutthemassofthepopulationhavingachoiceaboutwhogoverns,ratherthantrustingtheparty(orMoscow)toknowbest.Thisattitudeis

sharedwidelyamongcitizensinpost-CommunistcountriesofCentralEurope.Three-quartersofHungariansarethereforepositiveabouttheregimeastheyexpectittobeinfiveyears,andthesameistrueofalmostasmanyCzechs,SlovaksandPoles.Ironically,thepeoplesofthenewdemocraciesaremorepositiveaboutthefuturethanAustrians,sinceAustriansevaluategovernmentbyadifferentstandard.

Positiveattitudestowardtheoldregimearenotevidenceofadesiretoreturntopoliticsasitwasbefore1989.WhentheNewDemocraciesBarometeraskspeoplewhethertheythinkthecountrywouldbebetteroffifCommunistrulewererestored,lessthanaquarterofHungarianssaytheywouldlikethistohappen.Hungariansdivideintothreegroups.Thelargestbloc,39percent,areunreservedlynegativeaboutCommunistrule,dislikingtheoldregimeandrejectingtheideaofreturningtothepast.ThemedianHungarians,morethanathirdofthetotal,arenostalgicbutrealistic,havingapositiveviewoftheoldpoliticalsystembutrejectingtheideaofreturningtoit.Onlyoneinfiveisreactionary,approvingtheoldregimeandalsowantingitback.ThepatternissimilarinotherCentralEuropeancountries.OnlytheSlovaksappearmorepositiveaboutareturntothepast,butthatisbecausethepresenceofaCommunistregimeisconfoundedwiththeexistenceofCzechoslovakia(Table11.3).

TheHungarianSocialistPartyhasmadeexplicitthat,eventhoughitwasfoundedbypoliticiansintheoldregime,ittoodoesnotwanttoreturntothepast.HungarianCommunistswerenotbelieversinMarxismbutbelieversinpowerandtheadvantagesofapartycardinordertogetahead.TheHungarianSocialistParty'scredentialsasasocial-democraticratherthananti-democraticpartyhavebeenconfirmedbyitsadmissiontotheInternationalofthesocialdemocrats.Theleadership'scredentialsasopportunistsratherthanideologueshavebeenconfirmedbythesuccessfulnegotiationof

Hungary'sentrytoOECDandtoNATO,both

Table11.3:Widespreadrejectionofundemocraticalternatives(%)Army Communistregime Strongleader-noParliament

(%strongly,somewhatinfavour)HUNGARY 1 23 18CzechRepublic 3 16 13Slovakia 6 29 23Poland 6 15 27Source:PaulLazarsfeldSociety,Vienna,NewDemocraciesBarometerVsurvey,1998

foundedinoppositiontotheCommunisttakeoverofhalfofEurope.Inthedescriptionofapartyledbyex-Communists,thecriticaltermisex;surveyevidenceshowsthatthebasicpoliticalattitudesofHungarianex-CommunistsarevirtuallythesameasthoseofHungariannon-Communists,andthisistrueinotherCentralEuropeancountriestoo(Rose,1996).

IncommonwithotherCentralEuropeans,Hungariansdonotwanttoberuledbyanundemocraticregime,whetherCommunist,militaryorapopulistdictator,eachofwhichwasafamiliaralternativeinthepast.Eventhoughhalfhavenotbeenpositiveaboutthecurrentregime,whenNDBsurveysaskedwhethertheywouldprefergovernmentbyastrongleaderwithoutaParliamentorelections,82percentofHungariansrejecteddictatorship,morethaninPoland,orSlovakia,and99percentrejectmilitaryrule.Altogether,two-thirdsofHungariansrejectallthreeundemocraticalternativesofferedintheNDBsurvey(cf.Roseetal.,1998).

ThevotesoftheHungarianelectorateconfirmtherejectionofundemocraticalternatives.Theunpopularityoftheconservativegovernmentinthe1990ParliamentencouragedIstvanCsurkatoformtheJusticeandLifeParty,withslogansechoingneo-Fascistpartiesofthe1930sbutinthe1994Hungarianelection,thepartysecuredlessthan2percentofthepopularvote,anditbarelyclaimedafewseatsinParliamentinthe1998election.IntheCzechRepublicandPolandright-wingpartieshavewonmorevotesandinAustriatheso-calledFreedomPartyofJörgHaiderwinsmorethanafifthofthevote.InSlovakia,thebehaviourofPrimeMinisterVladimirMeciarinofficeraiseddoubtsabouthisdemocraticcommitment,andledtoSlovakianotbeinggroupedwithHungaryanditsneighboursinnegotiationsformembershipintheEuropeanUnionandNATO.

EventhoughthegoulashSocialismofHungarydidnotdeliverasrich

adietastheplannershadhoped,theconcurrentpoliticalliberalizationgaveHungariansafreerlifebefore1989thanwasfoundelsewhereinCentralEurope.Bycontrast,CzechsandSlovakswerekeptbehindbordersbyheavilyarmedguardsandEastBerlinersseparatedfromWestBerlinbyahighwall,andsecuritypolicepreparedtoshootanyonewhomadeadashforfreedom.PolesweresubjecttomartiallawimposedbythedictatesofMoscow.

Tomeasuregainsinfreedomfromthestate(cf.Berlin,1969),theNewDemocraciesBarometeraskspeopletosaywhethertheythink,bycomparisonwiththeCommunistsystem,theyfeelfreer,muchthesame

Table11.4:Increasesinfreedominpost-Communistsocieties(%)Hungary CzechR Slovakia Poland Mean

(%feelingfreernowthaninoldregime)Joinanyorganization 85 89 86 89 87Travelanywhere 88 92 92 92 91Decideonreligion 80 88 93 77 84Saywhatthink 82 81 74 83 80Source:PaulLazarsfeldSociety,Vienna,NewDemocraciesBarometerV,1998

orlessfreeasregardssucheverydayactivitiesassayingwhatyouthinkormakingupyourownmindaboutreligiousbeliefs.IneveryCentralEuropeancountryanaverageofmorethanfour-fifthsofthepopulationfeelsfreertodaythanbefore1990,andthedifferencesbetweennationalpopulationsislimited.Anaverageof87percentofCzechs,86percentofSlovaks,85percentofPolesand84percentofHungarianssaytheyfeelfreernowthanintheoldregime(Table11.4).ThedifferenceisgreatestbetweenHungaryandtheCzechRepublic,moreprosperousthanHungaryandwithmorecommonborderswithfreesocieties(thatis,WestGermanyandAustria)butmorerepressedaftertheSoviet-ledinvasionof1968.BecauseHungarianswerelessrepressed,theminoritysayingthattheynoticenochangeintheirfreedombetweenthe1980sand1990sislarger.Allinall,Hungariansofallclassesandlevelsofeducationvaluefreedom.

InHungary,asinestablishedEuropeandemocracies,expressionofdissatisfactionwithhowacountryisgovernedisnotademandfortheintroductionofanundemocraticregime.Itisasymptomofdemocraticdissatisfaction,astateofmindthatcanexistinestablisheddemocraciesaswellasinpost-Communistcountries(cf.Tóka,1995;Norris,1999).DissatisfactionsthatHungariansshowtodayarenotsomuchahankeringforareturntotheredtotalitarianismoftheearly1950sortheblackauthoritarianismofthe1930s,butanexampleof

Schumpeter's(1952)modelofdemocracyascompetitionbetweencompetingteamsofpoliticalleaders,onegroupseekingendorsementforitsachievementsinofficeandanotherseekingtocreatedissatisfactiontojustifyitsdemandtobevotedintooffice.Democracyisnotamechanismforproducingafinalsolutiontopoliticalproblems,aphrasewithuniquelydistastefulsignificanceinCentralEurope.Itisaninstitutionforgivingventtopopulardissatisfaction,thusgivinganincentivetogovernorstodobetterorrisklossofoffice.

InthefinaldecadeoftheCommunistregimetheproblemsofHungarywerestructuralproblems;Hungarianscouldonlyregistertheirdissatisfactionbymovingoffthebooksintotheunofficialeconomyorbycoffeehousedissent.Today,therearestillsocial,economicandpoliticalproblems.Butthereisafundamentalchange:Hungarianscannowexpresstheirdissatisfactionthroughtheclassicdemocraticmethodofvotingoutofofficeagovernmentthattheydislikeandvotingintoofficethosewhomtheybelieveorhopewilldobetter.

References

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Dessewffy,TiborandHammer,Ferenc,1995.TheTransitioninHungary.InGáborTóka,ed.,The1990ElectiontotheHungarianNationalAssembly.Berlin:Sigma,1131.

Fehér,Ferenc,Heller,ÁgnesandMárkus,György,1983.DictatorshipoverNeeds.Oxford:BasicBlackwell.

Gastil,RaymondD.,1987.FreedomintheWorld:PoliticalRightsandCivilLiberties.NewYork:GreenwoodPress.

InternationalChildDevelopmentCentre(ICDC),1997.ChildrenatRiskinCentralandEasternEurope.Florence:ICDC/UNICEFRegionalMonitoringReportNo.4.

Lavigne,Marie,1995.TheEconomicsofTransition:FromSocialistEconomytoMarketEconomy.London:Macmillan.

Marer,Paul,Árvay,János,O'Connor,John,Schrenk,MartinandSwanson,Daniel,1992.HistoricallyPlannedEconomies:aGuidetotheData.WashingtonDC:WorldBank.

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DemocraticGovernance.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

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Rose,RichardandHaerpfer,Christian,1996.ChangeandStabilityintheNewDemocraciesBarometer:ATrendAnalysis.Glasgow:UniversityofStrathclydeStudiesinPublicPolicyNo.270.

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State:EastGermansinComparativePerspective.GermanPolitics,6,1,100-21.

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Rose,Richard,Mishler,WilliamandHaerpfer,Christian,1998.DemocracyandItsAlternatives:UnderstandingPost-CommunistSocieties.Cambridge:PolityPressandBaltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.

Schumpeter,JosephA.,1952.Capitalism,SocialismandDemocracy.London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,4thed.

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Age,32f,53ff,64,7987f,119,130,134,138f,148ff,161f,173ff

Agriculture,25f,78ff,102

Alcoholism,45f

Alienation,147ff

Anomie,93,147ff

Antall,József,12f

ArrowCross,7

Atheist,63ff

Austria,59,179203

Axis,8

Bánát,3f

Benefitsinkind,81f

Birthrate,50ff,68

Bourgeoisie,100ff,108

Bulgaria,83,86ff

Calvinism,6172

Carownership187ff

Catholics,6172

CentralEurope,179203

Class,25f,97112,114-26,164ff,174ff

Consumption,36ff,98

Comparison,cross-national,120,51ff,82ff,179203

Crime,96

Croatia,3f

Csurka,István,13,

CzechRepublic,includedinCzechoslovakia

Czechoslovakia,157-67,188203

Democracy,22ff

Deviance,44ff

Diseases,54

Divorce,28f

Economicconditions,9ff,34ff,7384,187-97,

Economy,privatesector,7384,87ff

Economy,publicsector,23,7384,89ff

Economy,unofficial,7384,102,116

Education,29ff,65ff,86ff,99,117ff,131,150ff,161,174ff,186ff

Elections,11ff,155-78,181

Elites,27,8596

Emigrants,27

Employment,32ff,74ff,97ff,192

Entrepreneurs,103ff

Ethnicity,3f

Family,27ff,66,87,121,131,134ff,138

Fertilityrates,51ff

Food,36f

Freedom,9,200f

Fromm,Erich,98

Gender,3,31f,39f,43,54ff,78,87ff,121,148ff,184ff,192f

Germany,159,179203

Gömbös,Gyula,7

Goulashsocialism,10,102,200

Gypsies,79,130

Habsburgmonarchy,3ff

Hankiss,Elemér,9,152

Health,39ff,148

Horthy,AdmiralMiklós,6

Housing,37ff,148

Income,34ff,73,77ff,92ff,99,103ff,117ff,129ff,138ff,148,152,161,191f

Inequality,35f,99,105ff,113-27,133ff

Infantmortality,39f,53,182ff

Inglehart,Ronald,149

IronCurtain,180,

Jews,62ff

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