1 Approaches to dialogue Peter KühnleinHannes Rieser

Approaches to dialogue

Peter Kühnlein Hannes Rieser

http://129.70.104.40/TCD/

Intentionalist approaches to dialogue

Part IX:

Characteristic of intentionalist approaches:The chief explanatory notion is that of a certain type of mental state of adiscourse participant – the intention she has.

Intentions have a disputed ontological status: Are they reducible to other (mental)states or are they states in their own rights?

E.g., one could try to do this reduction:1. S intends to A just in case2. S desires that G and3. S believes that Aing leads to G(obvious problems)

Characteristic of intentionalist approaches:The chief explanatory notion is that of a certain type of mental state of adiscourse participant – the intention she has.

Intentions have a disputed ontological status: Are they reducible to other (mental)states or are they states in their own rights?This question (and questions concerning many other properties of intentions) willnot be discussed here.

Approach under consideration:Grosz, B.J. & Sidner, C.L., Computational Linguistics, Vol. 12 (3), 1986:Attention, Intention, and the Structure of Discourse

As we develop it, the theory of discourse structure will be seen to beintimately connected with two nonlinguistic notions: intention and attention.

G&S 175

As we develop it, the theory of discourse structure will be seen to beintimately connected with two nonlinguistic notions: intention and attention.Attention is an essential factor in explicating the processing of utterancesin discourse.

G&S 175

As we develop it, the theory of discourse structure will be seen to beintimately connected with two nonlinguistic notions: intention and attention.Attention is an essential factor in explicating the processing of utterancesin discourse. Intentions play a primary role in explaining discoursestructure, defining discourse coherence, and providing a coherentconceptualization of the term "discourse" itself.

G&S 175

So there are two goals for explication: processing and structure.

Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure?

Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure? There is evidencethat antecedents in discourse are decreasingly well accessible for anaphoric reference depending on diverse factors.

Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure? There is evidencethat antecedents in discourse are decreasingly well accessible for anaphoric reference depending on diverse factors. Current theories of anaphoric resolution (e.g., standard DRT or FCS) are bad in capturing this.

“She truly loves her” would have 20 solutionsaccording to standard DRT.

Ann(v)

Berta(w)

Carol(x)

Dorothy(y)

Eve(z)

v w x yz

Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure? There is evidencethat antecedents in discourse are decreasingly well accessible for anaphoric reference depending on diverse factors. Current theories of anaphoric resolution (e.g., standard DRT or FCS) are bad in capturing this.One suggestion (Muskens, van Benthem and Visser (1997)) could be to strengthenstandard dynamic semantics by complementing them with a theory of discoursestructure.

Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure? There is evidencethat antecedents in discourse are decreasingly well accessible for anaphoric reference depending on diverse factors. Current theories of anaphoric resolution (e.g., standard DRT or FCS) are bad in capturing this.One suggestion (Muskens, van Benthem and Visser (1997)) could be to strengthenstandard dynamic semantics by complementing them with a theory of discoursestructure. Their proposal: Grosz & Sidner (1986).

Discourse structure

Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is a composite of threedistinct but interacting components:

G&S 176

Discourse structure

Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is a composite of threedistinct but interacting components:•the structure of the actual sequence of utterances in the discourse;

G&S 176

Discourse structure

Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is a composite of threedistinct but interacting components:•the structure of the actual sequence of utterances in the discourse;•a structure of intentions;

G&S 176

Discourse structure

Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is a composite of threedistinct but interacting components:•the structure of the actual sequence of utterances in the discourse;•a structure of intentions;•an attentional state.

G&S 176

Discourse structure • the structure of the actual sequence of utterances

Just as the words in a single sentence form constituent phrases, theutterances in a discourse are naturally aggregated into discourse segments.The utterances in a segment, like the words in a phrase, serve particularroles with respect to that segment.

G&S 177

DS1 DS2 DS3

D: Discourse

DS: Discourse Segment

DS1 DS2 DS3

G&S 177

The factoring of discourses into segments has been observed across a widerange of discourse types. Grosz (1978) showed this for task-orienteddialogues.

DS1 DS2 DS3

G&S 177

The factoring of discourses into segments has been observed across a widerange of discourse types. …Chafe (1979,1989) found differences in pauselengths at segment boundaries.

DS1 DS2 DS3

G&S 177

The factoring of discourses into segments has been observed across a widerange of discourse types. …Butterworth (1975) found speech rate differencesthat correlated with segments; speech rate is slower at start of a segmentthan toward the end.

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

U: Utterance

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

U: Utterance

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177

Although two consecutive utterances may be in the same discourse segment,…

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177

Although two consecutive utterances may be in the same discourse segment,it is also common for two consecutive utterances to be in different segments.

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177

The trivial case

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177

The nontrivial case

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177

It is also possible for two utterances that are nonconsecutive to be in the same segment.

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 DS4

Discourse segments can benested

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 DS4

Discourse segments can benested; this is callednon-strict decompositionalitybecause utterances and discourse segmentscan appear on the same level

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 DS4

G&S 178

Reichman (1981) discusses somewords that function [as indicatorsfor segment boundaries] and coinedthe term clue words.

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 DS4

G&S 178

We will use the term cue phrasesto generalize on her observation …because each one of these devices cuethe hearer to some change in thediscourse structure.

G&S 178

We will use the term cue phrasesto generalize on her observation …because each one of these devices cuethe hearer to some change in thediscourse structure.

G&S 198: Cue phrases

now, next, that reminds me, and, but

anyway, but anyway, in any case, now back to

the end, ok, fine

I must interrupt, excuse me

the end, ok, fine

Oops, I forgot

the end, ok, fine

Oops, I forgot

By the way, incidentally, speaking of,Did you hear about..., That reminds me

the end, ok, fine

Oops, I forgot

In the first place, first, second, finally,moreover, furthermore

the end, ok, fine

Oops, I forgot

For example, to wit, first, second, and,moreover, furthermore, therefore

the end, ok, fine

Oops, I forgot

G&S 178

[T]hese linguistic boundarymarkers can be dividedaccording to whether theyexplicitly indicate changesin the intentional structureor in the attentional stateof the discourse.

the end, ok, fine

Oops, I forgot

G&S 178

Just as linguistic devicesaffect structure, so thediscourse segmentationaffects the interpretationof linguistic expressionsin a discourse.

the end, ok, fine

Oops, I forgot

G&S 178

Just as linguistic devicesaffect structure, so thediscourse segmentationaffects the interpretationof linguistic expressionsin a discourse. Referringexpressions provide theprimary example of thiseffect.

the end, ok, fine

Oops, I forgot

G&S 178

Just as linguistic devicesaffect structure, so thediscourse segmentationaffects the interpretationof linguistic expressionsin a discourse. … Thesegmentation of discourseconstrains the use ofreferring expressions bydelineating certain pointsat which there is asignificant change in whatentities … are beingdiscussed.For example, to wit, first, second, and,

moreover, furthermore, therefore

This can be applied to the example dialogue that has been reported on inthe introduction as follows

Dialogue example & situation

"Inst." refers to an instructor"Cnst." refers to a constructor

Common task is to build a toyairplane

Both Ss are separated by a screen.

The current stage of the construction(constructor side)

(A)Inst: So, jetzt nimmst du

Well, now you takeCnst: eine Schraube

a screw.Inst: eine <-> orangene mit einem

Schlitz.an <-> orange one with a slit

Cnst: Ja. Yes

Available Bolts

Inst: Und steckst sie dadurch, also

And you put it through there,

let’s see

Cnst: Von oben.

From the top.

Inst: Von oben, daß also die drei festgeschraubt werden dann.

From the top, so that the three bars get fixed.

Cnst: Ja.

Intended Junction

Intended Result

Dialogue example & situation c'td

(A)Inst: Well, now you takeCnst: a screw.Inst: an <-> orange one with a slitCnst: Yes.

(B)Inst: And you put it through there, let’s seeCnst: From the top.Inst: From the top, so that the three bars get fixed.Cnst: Yes.

The structuring of the discourse that was done on an intuitive basis can nowbe explained in the theoretical framework.

The discourse will be used again with more annotation, so the sample textwill from now on be compressed into the following.

Inst: Well, now you take Cnst: a screw.Inst: an <-> orange one with a slit Cnst: Yes. Inst: And you put it through there, let's see Cnst: From the top.Inst: From the top, so that the three bars get fixed then. Cnst: Yes.

Some cue phrases contained in the discourse.

Discourse structure

G&S 176

Discourse structure

G&S 176

Discourse structure • a structure of intentions

G&S 178

A rather straightforward property of discourses, namely, that they (or, moreaccurately, those who participate in them) have an overall purpose, turns outto play a fundamental role in the theory of discourse structure.

G&S 176:

Because in multi-party conversations more than one participant may speak(or write) different utterances within a segment, the terms speaker and hearerdo not differentiate the unique roles that he participants maintain in asegment of a conversation.

G&S 176:

Because in multi-party conversations more than one participant may speak(or write) different utterances within a segment, the terms speaker and hearerdo not differentiate the unique roles that he participants maintain in asegment of a conversation. We will therefore use the terms initiating conversational participant (ICP) and other conversational participant(s) (OCP)…

Some terminology:

ICP = Initiating conversational participant

Some terminology:

OCP = Other conversational participant(s)

G&S 178

[W]e distinguish one of [the purposes in a given discourse] as foundational tothe discourse. We will refer to it as the discourse purpose (DP).

Some terminology:

DP = Discourse purpose

G&S 178

For each of the discourse segments, we can also single out one intention -the discourse segment purpose (DSP).

Some terminology:

DSP = Discourse segment purpose

Some terminology:

DSP = Discourse segment purpose

The overall intention of the DP or some DSP will also be called its primary intention

G&S 178

Typically, an ICP will have a number of different kinds of intentions thatlead to initiating the discourse.

G&S 178

Typically, an ICP will have a number of different kinds of intentions thatlead to initiating the discourse. … The kinds of intentions that can serve as discourse purposes or discourse segment purposes are distinguished fromother intentions by the fact that they are intended to be recognized….

G&S 178

Typically, an ICP will have a number of different kinds of intentions thatlead to initiating the discourse. … The kinds of intentions that can serve as discourse purposes or discourse segment purposes are distinguished fromother intentions by the fact that they are intended to be recognized….Discourse purposes and discourse segment purposes share this propertywith certain utterance-level intentions that Grice (1969) uses in definingutterance meaning.

Grice, H.P., Philosophical Review, 68 (2), 1969:Utterer's Meaning and Intentions

Meaning

Meaningnn

Meaning

Meaningn Meaningnn

timeless(≈semantic)

applied timeless(≈contextually fixed)

utterance-typeoccasion

(≈by implicature)

This is the kind of meaning that isinteresting for Ginzburg & Sagat 11-12:30

Meaning

Meaningn Meaningnn

timeless(≈semantic)

applied timeless(≈contextually fixed)

utterance-typeoccasion

(≈by implicature)

Utterer'soccasionmeaning

Meaning

Meaningn Meaningnn

linguistic meaningUtterer'soccasionmeaning

timeless (≈semantic)applied timeless

(≈contextually fixed)utterance type occasion

„U utters x intending A:

(1) to produce r

By uttering x, U means something is true iff the followingconditions hold:

(1) to produce r

(2) to think U intends A to produce r

(1) to produce r

(2) to think U intends A to produce r

(3) to think U intends the fulfillment of (1) to be based on the fulfillment of (2)“

• too weak• inducement examples (Urmson)• bridge face examples (Stampe, Strawson)• ₤5 example (Schiffer)• war captive example (Searle)

• too strong• examinee• confession• …

lead to the refined Definition (2), the first part of which isof interest here

(A) (f ) (c): (a) U uttered x intending 1. A to think x possesses f

By uttering x U meant that *ψp is true iff

ψ in the above formulae names an appropriate propositionalattitude, e.g., belief . * is a „mood marker“.

(A) (f ) (c): (a) U uttered x intending 1. A to think x possesses f 2. A to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p

(A) (f ) (c): (a) U uttered x intending 1. A to think x possesses f 2. A to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that U intends A to think that U ψs that p 4. A, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that

U ψs that pand (for some cases)5. A, on the basis of the fulfillment of 4., himself to ψ that p

To extend Grice's definitions to discourse, we replace•the utterance x with a discourse segment DS,

G&S 199

To extend Grice's definitions to discourse, we replace•the utterance x with a discourse segment DS,•the utterer U with the initiator of a discourse segment ICP, and

G&S 199

To extend Grice's definitions to discourse, we replace•the utterance x with a discourse segment DS,•the utterer U with the initiator of a discourse segment ICP, and•the audience A with the OCP.

G&S 199

(A) (f ) (c): (a) U uttered x intending 1. A to think x possesses f 2. A to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that U intends A to think that U ψs that p 4. A, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that

U ψs that pand (for some cases)5. A, on the basis of the fulfillment of 4., himself to ψ that p

(OCP) (f ) (c): (a) ICP uttered DS intending 1. OCP to think DS possesses f 2. OCP to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. OCP to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that ICP intends OCP to think that ICP ψs that p 4. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that

ICP ψs that pand (for some cases)5. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of 4., himself to ψ that p

By uttering DS ICP meant that *ψp is true iff

(OCP) (f ) (c): (a) ICP uttered DS intending 1. OCP to think DS possesses f 2. OCP to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. OCP to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that ICP intends OCP to think that ICP ψs that p 4. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that

By uttering DS ICP meant that *ψp is true iff

A small change suggests itself: "uttering" has to be substituted by"initiating".

(OCP) (f ) (c): (a) ICP initiated DS intending 1. OCP to think DS possesses f 2. OCP to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. OCP to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that ICP intends OCP to think that ICP ψs that p 4. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that

By initiating DS ICP meant that *ψp is true iff

G&S 199

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning.

G&S 199

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions.

G&S 199

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. We are not yet addressing the issue of discourse meaning, but are concerned with the role of DP/DSPs in determining discourse structure and in specifying how these intentions can be recognized by an OCP.

G&S 199

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … Although the intentional structure of adiscourse plays a role in determining discourse meaning, the DP/DSPs do notin and of themselves constitute discourse meaning.

G&S 199

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [Discourse level intentions] appear to besimilar to utterance-level intentions in kind, but differ in that they occur in acontext in which several utterances may be required to ensure theircomprehension and satisfaction.

To complete this extension, the following problems must be resolved:

1. specifying the discourse-level intentions and attitudes that correspond to the utterance-level intentions and ψ's that p;

G&S 199

2. identifying the kinds of fs that contribute to determining discourse-level intentions;

G&S 199

3. identifying the modes of correlation (the c's) between features of the discourse segments and types of discourse-level intentions;

G&S 199

3. identifying the modes of correlation (the c's) between features of the discourse segments and types of discourse-level intentions;

4. specifying how the discourse-level intentions can be recognized by an OCP.

G&S 199

Now we know some of the “intrinsic” properties of the relevant intentions and theproblems with them. What about the structure?

Intentions that are intended to be recognized achieve their effect only if theintention is recognized.

G&S 178

Intentions that are intended to be recognized achieve their effect only if theintention is recognized. … [T]he intention that motivates the ICP to engagein a discourse may be private.

G&S 178

In the sample dialogue, the purpose surely is to bring it about that the wing is fixed.The motivation might be greed for money...

G&S 178

G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions.

G&S 178

G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP.

G&S 178

G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. … Wehave identified two structural relations: dominance and satisfaction precedence.

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3

Dominance:

DSP1 … DSP3 are dominated by DP

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3

Dominance:

DSP1 … DSP3 are dominated by DPDSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DP

Contribution:

G&S 178

G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. … Wehave identified two structural relations: dominance and satisfaction precedence.… The dominance relation invokes a partial ordering on the DSPs that we willrefer to as the dominance hierarchy.

G&S 178

G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. … Wehave identified two structural relations: dominance and satisfaction precedence.… For some discourses, including task-oriented ones, the order in which theDSPs are satisfied might be significant, as well as being intended to berecognized.

G&S 178

G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. … Wehave identified two structural relations: dominance and satisfaction precedence.… We will say that DSP1 satisfaction-precedes DSP2 … whenever DSP1 mustbe satisfied before DSP2.

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3

Dominance:

DSP1 … DSP3 are dominated by DPDSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DP

Contribution:

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3

Dominance:

DSP1 … DSP3 are dominated by DPDSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DPDSP1 satisfaction-precedes DSP2DSP2 satisfaction-precedes DSP3DSP1 satisfaction-precedes DSP3 Contribution:

Satisfaction-precedence

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3

Dominance:

DP DOM DSP1, DP DOM DSP2, …DSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DPDSP1 SP DSP2DSP2 SP DSP3DSP1 SP DSP3 Contribution:

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3

Dominance:

DP DOM DSP1, DP DOM DSP2, …DSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DPDSP1 SP DSP2DSP2 SP DSP3DSP1 SP DSP3 Contribution:

[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action.

G&S 179

[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions.

G&S 179

[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … What is essential for a theory of discourse structureis that such intentions bear certain relations to one another.

G&S 179

[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … In this paper, we distinguish between thedetermination of the DSP and the recognition of it.

G&S 179

[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … In this paper, we distinguish between thedetermination of the DSP and the recognition of it. We use the term determination to refer to a semantic-like notion, namely the completespecification of what is intended by whom; we use the term recognition torefer to a processing notion, namely, the processing that leads a discourseparticipant to identify what the intention is.

G&S 179

[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … In this paper, we distinguish between thedetermination of the DSP and the recognition of it. We use the term determination to refer to a semantic-like notion, namely the completespecification of what is intended by whom; … the same information thatdetermines a DSP may be used by an OCP to recognize it.

G&S 179

[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … In this paper, we distinguish between thedetermination of the DSP and the recognition of it. We use the term determination to refer to a semantic-like notion, namely the completespecification of what is intended by whom;

G&S 179

So, a determination is a list consisting of• a list of intentions

G&S 179

So, a determination is a list consisting of• a list of intentions• a list of dominance relations

G&S 179

So, a determination is a list consisting of• a list of intentions• a list of dominance relations• a list of satisfaction-precedence relations

G&S 179

So, a determination is a list consisting of• a list of intentions• a list of dominance relations• a list of satisfaction-precedence relations

This completelydescribes theintentionalstructure

G&S 199

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [Discourse level intentions] appear to besimilar to utterance-level intentions in kind, but differ in that they occur in acontext in which several utterances may be required to ensure theircomprehension and satisfaction.

G&S 199,200

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse.

G&S 199,200

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse.

Not all the DSPs, however, need to be expressed.

G&S 199,200

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse. … [T]he participants share theassumption of discourse sufficiency: it is a convention in a communicativesituation that the ICP believes the discourse is sufficient to achieve theprimary intention of the DP.

G&S 199,200

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse. … [T]here is an assumption that theinformation conveyed in the discourse will suffice in conjunction with otherinformation the ICP believes the OCP has (or can obtain) to allow forsatisfaction of the DP.

We will hear something similar in the lecture on coordination!

G&S 199,200

The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse. …To be more concrete, we shalllook at … two cases, one involving a belief, the other an intention to performsome action.

G&S 199,200

G&S 200

Discourse structure • a structure of intentions • belief case

In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p.

G&S 200

In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to believe a proposition, say qi for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments).

G&S 200

In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to believe a proposition, say qi for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to believe each of the qi and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe the qi provide support for p.

G&S 200

In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to believe a proposition, say qi for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to believe each of the qi and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe the qi provide support for p. … Viewed intuitively, [ICP's]belief that qi provides support for p, underlies his intention to get [OCP] tobelieve p by getting him to believe qi.

G&S 200

In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to believe a proposition, say qi for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to believe each of the qi and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe the qi provide support for p. … Viewed intuitively, [ICP's]belief that qi provides support for p, underlies his intention to get [OCP] tobelieve p by getting him to believe qi. … This relationship plays a role in therecognition of DSPs.

G&S 199,200

G&S 201

Discourse structure • a structure of intentions • action case

An analogous situation holds for a discourse segment comprising utterancesintended to get the OCP to perform some set of actions directed at achievingsome overall task …

G&S 201

An analogous situation holds for a discourse segment comprising utterancesintended to get the OCP to perform some set of actions directed at achievingsome overall task … The full specification of the DP/DSP contains agenerates relation that is derived from a relation defined by Goldman (1970).

The analogous formulation for the action case can be written as follows:

In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A.

In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to perform an action, say ai for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments).

In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to perform an action, say ai for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to perform each of the ai and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe that the ICP believes that ai is appropriate to generate A.

In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to perform an action, say ai for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to perform each of the ai and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe that the ICP believes that ai is appropriate to generate A.… Viewed intuitively, [ICP's] belief that ai be appropriate to generate Aunderlies his intention to get [OCP] to perform A by getting him to performai.

In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to perform an action, say ai for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to perform each of the ai and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe that the ICP believes that ai is appropriate to generate A.… Viewed intuitively, [ICP's] belief that ai be appropriate to generate Aunderlies his intention to get [OCP] to perform A by getting him to performai. … This relationship plays a role in the recognition of DSPs.

Remember the benchmark discourse:

One possible discourse structure could be this:

An analysis in the spirit of G&S (though not authentical)

DSP1 = DSP2 ⌂ DSP3 ⌂ I1

DSP1 = DSP2 ⌂ DSP3 ⌂ I1 = = {(Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (take Cnst the orange screw))), ..., ...}

DSP1 = DSP2 ⌂ DSP3 ⌂ I1 = = {(Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (take Cnst the orange screw))), (Intend Cnst (Believe Inst (fix Cnst the three bars))), ...}

The solutionfor DSP3 is notvery plausible. Yet,DSP3 DOM DSP4.Hence, DSP4should onlycontribute to DSP3.On the other hand,DSP4 SP DSP6, sothey must be DSs.

DSP1 = DSP2 ⌂ DSP3 ⌂ I1 = = {(Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (take Cnst the orange screw))), (Intend Cnst (Believe Inst (fix Cnst the three bars))), (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (fix Cnst the bar with the orange screw)))}

Discourse structure

G&S 176

Discourse structure

G&S 176

Discourse structure • an attentional state

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.

G&S 179

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants.

G&S 179

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. It is inherently dynamic, recording the objects,properties, and relations that are salient at each point of discourse.

G&S 179

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces;

G&S 179

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; changes in attentional state are modeled by a set of transitionrules that specify the conditions for adding and deleting spaces.

G&S 179

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; changes in attentional state are modeled by a set of transitionrules that specify the conditions for adding and deleting spaces. We call thecollection of focus spaces available at one time the focusing structure and theprocess of manipulating spaces focusing.

G&S 179

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; changes in attentional state are modeled by a set of transitionrules that specify the conditions for adding and deleting spaces. We call thecollection of focus spaces available at one time the focusing structure and theprocess of manipulating spaces focusing.

G&S 179

Indeed, the focusing structure is sometimes also called focus structure.

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; … a focus space … contains those entities that are salient …

G&S 179

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; … a focus space … contains those entities that are salient …The focus space also includes the DSP

G&S 179

The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; … a focus space … contains those entities that are salient …The focus space also includes the DSP

G&S 179

G&S 180

… the focus structure does not include the intentional structure as a whole.

A focus space contains (representations of)objects,

Objects o1/1,…,o1/n

A focus space contains (representations of)objects,

Properties p1o1/1,…,pm

A focus space contains (representations of)objects,their properties,

Relations r1<os/t,…,ou/v>,…

A focus space contains (representations of)objects,their properties,relations amongst them, and

DSP1 FS1

A focus space contains (representations of)objects,their properties,relations amongst them, and the current Discourse Segment Purpose

DSP1 FS1

A focusing structure is a stack offocus spaces

Relations r1<ow/x,…,oy/z>,…

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

Note that only for reason of limitations due to the use of a certain textprocessor and the finiteness of the variables available the number of objects, properties etc. in both focus spaces are equal. Of course, this number in fact may be different.

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

Relations r1<oo/p,…,oq/r>,…

DSP3 FS3

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

DSP3 FS3

Objects in lower stack places are reachablefrom higher stack places

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

DSP3 FS3

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

DSP3 FS3

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

DSP3 FS3

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

DSP3 FS3

Objects in lower stack places are reachablefrom higher stack places, but not vice versa.

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

DSP3 FS3

Objects in lower stack places are reachablefrom higher stack places, and objects in thesame stack place are reachable.

DSP2 FS2

DSP1 FS1

DSP3 FS3

… the focusing structure is parasitic on theintentional structure …

G&S 180

Discourse structure

G&S 176

Discourse structure

G&S 176

Discourse structure

The interaction between the described structures restricts the set of possiblediscourse descriptions

Discourse structure • interaction between structures

G&S 176

The results of the processing, the completed structures, differ in some respect:• the structure of the sequences is built up during discourse and exists in full size only in the end of it;

G&S 176

The results of the processing, the completed structures, differ in some respect:• the structure of the sequences is built up during discourse and exists in full size only in the end of it;• similarly, the structure of intentions is constructed successively;

G&S 176

The results of the processing, the completed structures, differ in some respect:• the structure of the sequences is built up during discourse and exists in full size only in the end of it;• similarly, the structure of intentions is constructed successively;• the attentional state in the end of the discourse is empty.

G&S 176

The results of the processing, the completed structures, differ in some respect. How, if at all, do the various structures restrict one another?

G&S 176

G&S 180

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops.

G&S 176

G&S 180

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. Notehowever that the relevant operation may sometimes be indicated in thelanguage itself.

Recall the slide on cue phrases …

G&S 180

the end, ok, fine

Oops, I forgot

G&S 178

Inter-ruptions

Now it can be see how this fits together

G&S 180

G&S 178

G&S 176

G&S 180

G&S 176

G&S 180

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. Notehowever that the relevant operation may sometimes be indicated in thelanguage itself. … [T]he focusing structure, like the intentional and thelinguistic structures, evolves as the discourse proceeds.

G&S 176

G&S 180

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. Notehowever that the relevant operation may sometimes be indicated in thelanguage itself. … [W]hen the discourse is being processed, only theattentional state can constrain the interpretation of referring expressionsdirectly.

G&S 176

G&S 180,182

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. …[T]he focusing structure is the central repository for the contextualinformation needed to process utterances at each point in the discourse.

G&S 176

G&S 180,182

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. …It distinguishes those objects, properties, and relations that are mostsalient at [any] point and, moreover, has links to the relevant parts ofboth the linguistic and intentional structures.

The considerations concerning discourse structure just indicated rely on anunderstanding of the relevant processing issues.

Discourse structure

The considerations concerning discourse structure just indicated rely on anunderstanding of the relevant processing issues. This invites to a closer lookat the processing side.

Discourse structure

The considerations concerning discourse structure just indicated rely on anunderstanding of the relevant processing issues. This invites to a closer lookat the processing side. So, this is where we are…

Discourse structure

G&S 175

Discourse processing

The part of the theory that is related to processing will be introduced by way ofexample.

The part of the theory that is related to processing will be introduced by way ofexample. Recall the example from the introduction…

Cnst: Ja. Yes

Available Bolts

Inst: Und steckst sie dadurch, also

And you put it through there,

let’s see

Cnst: Von oben.

From the top.

Inst: Von oben, daß also die drei festgeschraubt werden dann.

From the top, so that the three bars get fixed.

Cnst: Ja.

Intended Junction

Intended Result

Some more stuff must be added, as indicated earlier.

Focus Space StackLinguistic StructureIS Relations

A first analysis of the sample discourse. Consider the followingstructure.

The underspecified focus space for I1 has to be pushed

The underspecified focus space for I1 is already pushed

I1 DOM I2

DS2 can not be analyzed in a more fine-grained way

I1 DOM I2

DS2 can not be analyzed in a more fine-grained way.Esp., it does not contain other DSs.

I1 DOM I2

I2: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (take Cnst the orange screw)))

I1 DOM I2

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3

I1 DOM I2

I4: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (put Cnst it [O2] through there)))

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3

FS4I3 DOM I4

I1 DOM I2

I4: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (put Cnst it [O2] through there)))This analysis doesn't work, because FS2 is already in the trash

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3

FS4I3 DOM I4

I1 DOM I2

General pattern: Anaphora is not possible among expressionsin DSs whose focus spaces do not appear on the stacksimultaneously.

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3

FS4I3 DOM I4

I1 DOM I2

General pattern: As soon as the processing of one DS is finished,the expressions contained in it are no longer accessible.

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3

FS4I3 DOM I4

I1 DOM I2

An alternative solution is needed, where the first utterancesare not contained in a separate DS.

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3

FS4I3 DOM I4

This is one such possibility.

First, the current focus space has to be pushed, i.e., thespace corresponding DS1

Inst's first intention is unclear, hence I1 must be left underspecified

The intention behind DS2 is unclear in the beginning, hencethe focus space should be "underspecified"

I1 DOM I2

The intention behind DS2 is unclear in the beginning, hencethe focus space should be "underspecified". FSs remain onthe stack as long as the corresponding DSPs DOM another.

I1 DOM I2

The intention behind DS2 is unclear in the beginning, hencethe focus space should be "underspecified". So FS2 is pushedonto FS1.

I1 DOM I2

FS1 is still on the stack, hence "it" can refer to the orangescrew with the slit

I1 DOM I2

I2 DOM I3

I3: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (put Cnst it [O1] through there)))

I1 DOM I2

I2 DOM I3 FS3

I1 DOM I2

I2 DOM I3

Typically, DS4 is classified as a clarification, but G&Soffer no explicit treatment of such a type of subdialogue

I1 DOM I2

I2 DOM I3

DS4 is treated as an interruption. Hence its focus space is tobe removed from the stack as soon as its treatment is finished

I1 DOM I2

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I4: (Intend Cnst (Intend Inst (confirm Inst direction)))

I1 DOM I2

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I1 DOM I2

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I1 DOM I2

There is a problem with an implicit reference in DS5 to "put itthrough" in DS3. But this is neglected for the time being.

I2 DOM I3 FS5

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5

I1 DOM I2

I5: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (fix Cnst the three bars)))

I2 DOM I3 FS5

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5

I1 DOM I2

Not until now can the underspecified FS2 be filled up

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5

I1 DOM I2

I2: (Intend Cnst (Believe Inst (fix Cnst the three bars)))

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5

I1 DOM I2I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5

I1: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (fix Cnst the bar with the orange screw)))

I1 DOM I2I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5

Finished: The stack is empty and all DSs and DSPs are in

Intuitively, taking should satisfaction-precede putting through.

Intuitively, taking should satisfaction-precede putting through. This fact,however, is not representable according to the chosen analysis.

No alternative analysis, however, can treat anaphora in cases like these.

G&S 175

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