1 Approaches to dialogue Peter KühnleinHannes Rieser

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Approaches to dialogue

Peter Kühnlein Hannes Rieser

http://129.70.104.40/TCD/

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Intentionalist approaches to dialogue

Part IX:


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Characteristic of intentionalist approaches:The chief explanatory notion is that of a certain type of mental state of adiscourse participant – the intention she has.

Intentions have a disputed ontological status: Are they reducible to other (mental)states or are they states in their own rights?

E.g., one could try to do this reduction:1. S intends to A just in case2. S desires that G and3. S believes that Aing leads to G(obvious problems)

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Characteristic of intentionalist approaches:The chief explanatory notion is that of a certain type of mental state of adiscourse participant – the intention she has.

Intentions have a disputed ontological status: Are they reducible to other (mental)states or are they states in their own rights?This question (and questions concerning many other properties of intentions) willnot be discussed here.

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Approach under consideration:Grosz, B.J. & Sidner, C.L., Computational Linguistics, Vol. 12 (3), 1986:Attention, Intention, and the Structure of Discourse

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As we develop it, the theory of discourse structure will be seen to beintimately connected with two nonlinguistic notions: intention and attention.

G&S 175

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As we develop it, the theory of discourse structure will be seen to beintimately connected with two nonlinguistic notions: intention and attention.Attention is an essential factor in explicating the processing of utterancesin discourse.

G&S 175

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As we develop it, the theory of discourse structure will be seen to beintimately connected with two nonlinguistic notions: intention and attention.Attention is an essential factor in explicating the processing of utterancesin discourse. Intentions play a primary role in explaining discoursestructure, defining discourse coherence, and providing a coherentconceptualization of the term "discourse" itself.

G&S 175

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G&S 175

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G&S 175

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G&S 175

So there are two goals for explication: processing and structure.

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Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure?

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Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure? There is evidencethat antecedents in discourse are decreasingly well accessible for anaphoric reference depending on diverse factors.

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Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure? There is evidencethat antecedents in discourse are decreasingly well accessible for anaphoric reference depending on diverse factors. Current theories of anaphoric resolution (e.g., standard DRT or FCS) are bad in capturing this.

“She truly loves her” would have 20 solutionsaccording to standard DRT.

Ann(v)

Berta(w)

Carol(x)

Dorothy(y)

Eve(z)

…

…

…

…

v w x yz

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Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure? There is evidencethat antecedents in discourse are decreasingly well accessible for anaphoric reference depending on diverse factors. Current theories of anaphoric resolution (e.g., standard DRT or FCS) are bad in capturing this.One suggestion (Muskens, van Benthem and Visser (1997)) could be to strengthenstandard dynamic semantics by complementing them with a theory of discoursestructure.

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Discourse structure

Why should one be interested in a theory of discourse structure? There is evidencethat antecedents in discourse are decreasingly well accessible for anaphoric reference depending on diverse factors. Current theories of anaphoric resolution (e.g., standard DRT or FCS) are bad in capturing this.One suggestion (Muskens, van Benthem and Visser (1997)) could be to strengthenstandard dynamic semantics by complementing them with a theory of discoursestructure. Their proposal: Grosz & Sidner (1986).

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Discourse structure

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Discourse structure

Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is a composite of threedistinct but interacting components:

G&S 176

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Discourse structure

Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is a composite of threedistinct but interacting components:•the structure of the actual sequence of utterances in the discourse;

G&S 176

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Discourse structure

Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is a composite of threedistinct but interacting components:•the structure of the actual sequence of utterances in the discourse;•a structure of intentions;

G&S 176

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Discourse structure

Our main thesis is that the structure of any discourse is a composite of threedistinct but interacting components:•the structure of the actual sequence of utterances in the discourse;•a structure of intentions;•an attentional state.

G&S 176

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Discourse structure • the structure of the actual sequence of utterances

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Just as the words in a single sentence form constituent phrases, theutterances in a discourse are naturally aggregated into discourse segments.The utterances in a segment, like the words in a phrase, serve particularroles with respect to that segment.

G&S 177

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

D: Discourse

DS: Discourse Segment

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

G&S 177

The factoring of discourses into segments has been observed across a widerange of discourse types. Grosz (1978) showed this for task-orienteddialogues.

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

G&S 177

The factoring of discourses into segments has been observed across a widerange of discourse types. …Chafe (1979,1989) found differences in pauselengths at segment boundaries.

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

G&S 177

The factoring of discourses into segments has been observed across a widerange of discourse types. …Butterworth (1975) found speech rate differencesthat correlated with segments; speech rate is slower at start of a segmentthan toward the end.

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

U: Utterance

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

t

U: Utterance

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177

Although two consecutive utterances may be in the same discourse segment,…

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177

Although two consecutive utterances may be in the same discourse segment,it is also common for two consecutive utterances to be in different segments.

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177


The trivial case

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177


The nontrivial case

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 U4

G&S 177

It is also possible for two utterances that are nonconsecutive to be in the same segment.

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 DS4

U4 U5

U6

Discourse segments can benested

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 DS4

U4 U5

U6

Discourse segments can benested; this is callednon-strict decompositionalitybecause utterances and discourse segmentscan appear on the same level

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 DS4

U4 U5

U6

G&S 178

Reichman (1981) discusses somewords that function [as indicatorsfor segment boundaries] and coinedthe term clue words.

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D

DS1 DS2 DS3

U1 U2 U3 DS4

U4 U5

U6

G&S 178

We will use the term cue phrasesto generalize on her observation …because each one of these devices cuethe hearer to some change in thediscourse structure.

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G&S 178

We will use the term cue phrasesto generalize on her observation …because each one of these devices cuethe hearer to some change in thediscourse structure.

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G&S 198: Cue phrases

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now, next, that reminds me, and, but


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anyway, but anyway, in any case, now back to

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the end, ok, fine

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the end, ok, fine

I must interrupt, excuse me

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the end, ok, fine


Oops, I forgot

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the end, ok, fine


Oops, I forgot

By the way, incidentally, speaking of,Did you hear about..., That reminds me

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the end, ok, fine


Oops, I forgot


In the first place, first, second, finally,moreover, furthermore

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the end, ok, fine


Oops, I forgot



For example, to wit, first, second, and,moreover, furthermore, therefore

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the end, ok, fine


Oops, I forgot



G&S 178

[T]hese linguistic boundarymarkers can be dividedaccording to whether theyexplicitly indicate changesin the intentional structureor in the attentional stateof the discourse.


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the end, ok, fine


Oops, I forgot



G&S 178

Just as linguistic devicesaffect structure, so thediscourse segmentationaffects the interpretationof linguistic expressionsin a discourse.


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the end, ok, fine


Oops, I forgot



G&S 178

Just as linguistic devicesaffect structure, so thediscourse segmentationaffects the interpretationof linguistic expressionsin a discourse. Referringexpressions provide theprimary example of thiseffect.


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the end, ok, fine


Oops, I forgot



G&S 178

Just as linguistic devicesaffect structure, so thediscourse segmentationaffects the interpretationof linguistic expressionsin a discourse. … Thesegmentation of discourseconstrains the use ofreferring expressions bydelineating certain pointsat which there is asignificant change in whatentities … are beingdiscussed.For example, to wit, first, second, and,

moreover, furthermore, therefore

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This can be applied to the example dialogue that has been reported on inthe introduction as follows

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Dialogue example & situation


"Inst." refers to an instructor"Cnst." refers to a constructor

Common task is to build a toyairplane

Both Ss are separated by a screen.

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The current stage of the construction(constructor side)

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(A)Inst: So, jetzt nimmst du

Well, now you takeCnst: eine Schraube

a screw.Inst: eine <-> orangene mit einem

Schlitz.an <-> orange one with a slit

Cnst: Ja. Yes






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Cnst: Ja. Yes


Available Bolts


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(B)

Inst: Und steckst sie dadurch, also

And you put it through there,

let’s see

Cnst: Von oben.

From the top.

Inst: Von oben, daß also die drei festgeschraubt werden dann.

From the top, so that the three bars get fixed.

Cnst: Ja.

Yes.

Intended Junction

Intended Result


Dialogue example & situation c'td

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(A)Inst: Well, now you takeCnst: a screw.Inst: an <-> orange one with a slitCnst: Yes.

(B)Inst: And you put it through there, let’s seeCnst: From the top.Inst: From the top, so that the three bars get fixed.Cnst: Yes.



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The structuring of the discourse that was done on an intuitive basis can nowbe explained in the theoretical framework.

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The discourse will be used again with more annotation, so the sample textwill from now on be compressed into the following.

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Inst: Well, now you take Cnst: a screw.Inst: an <-> orange one with a slit Cnst: Yes. Inst: And you put it through there, let's see Cnst: From the top.Inst: From the top, so that the three bars get fixed then. Cnst: Yes.



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Some cue phrases contained in the discourse.

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Discourse structure


G&S 176

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Discourse structure


G&S 176

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Discourse structure • a structure of intentions

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G&S 178

A rather straightforward property of discourses, namely, that they (or, moreaccurately, those who participate in them) have an overall purpose, turns outto play a fundamental role in the theory of discourse structure.

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G&S 176:

Because in multi-party conversations more than one participant may speak(or write) different utterances within a segment, the terms speaker and hearerdo not differentiate the unique roles that he participants maintain in asegment of a conversation.

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G&S 176:

Because in multi-party conversations more than one participant may speak(or write) different utterances within a segment, the terms speaker and hearerdo not differentiate the unique roles that he participants maintain in asegment of a conversation. We will therefore use the terms initiating conversational participant (ICP) and other conversational participant(s) (OCP)…

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Some terminology:

ICP = Initiating conversational participant

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Some terminology:


OCP = Other conversational participant(s)

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G&S 178

[W]e distinguish one of [the purposes in a given discourse] as foundational tothe discourse. We will refer to it as the discourse purpose (DP).

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Some terminology:



DP = Discourse purpose

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G&S 178

For each of the discourse segments, we can also single out one intention -the discourse segment purpose (DSP).

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Some terminology:




DSP = Discourse segment purpose

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Some terminology:




DSP = Discourse segment purpose

The overall intention of the DP or some DSP will also be called its primary intention

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G&S 178

Typically, an ICP will have a number of different kinds of intentions thatlead to initiating the discourse.

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G&S 178

Typically, an ICP will have a number of different kinds of intentions thatlead to initiating the discourse. … The kinds of intentions that can serve as discourse purposes or discourse segment purposes are distinguished fromother intentions by the fact that they are intended to be recognized….

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G&S 178

Typically, an ICP will have a number of different kinds of intentions thatlead to initiating the discourse. … The kinds of intentions that can serve as discourse purposes or discourse segment purposes are distinguished fromother intentions by the fact that they are intended to be recognized….Discourse purposes and discourse segment purposes share this propertywith certain utterance-level intentions that Grice (1969) uses in definingutterance meaning.

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Grice, H.P., Philosophical Review, 68 (2), 1969:Utterer's Meaning and Intentions

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Meaning

Meaningnn


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Meaning

Meaningn Meaningnn

timeless(≈semantic)

applied timeless(≈contextually fixed)

utterance-typeoccasion

(≈by implicature)

This is the kind of meaning that isinteresting for Ginzburg & Sagat 11-12:30


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Meaning

Meaningn Meaningnn

timeless(≈semantic)

applied timeless(≈contextually fixed)

utterance-typeoccasion

(≈by implicature)

Utterer'soccasionmeaning


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Meaning

Meaningn Meaningnn

linguistic meaningUtterer'soccasionmeaning

timeless (≈semantic)applied timeless

(≈contextually fixed)utterance type occasion


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„U utters x intending A:

(1) to produce r

By uttering x, U means something is true iff the followingconditions hold:


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(1) to produce r

(2) to think U intends A to produce r



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(1) to produce r

(2) to think U intends A to produce r

(3) to think U intends the fulfillment of (1) to be based on the fulfillment of (2)“



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• too weak• inducement examples (Urmson)• bridge face examples (Stampe, Strawson)• ₤5 example (Schiffer)• war captive example (Searle)


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• too strong• examinee• confession• …


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• too strong• examinee• confession• …

lead to the refined Definition (2), the first part of which isof interest here


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(A) (f ) (c): (a) U uttered x intending 1. A to think x possesses f

By uttering x U meant that *ψp is true iff

ψ in the above formulae names an appropriate propositionalattitude, e.g., belief . * is a „mood marker“.


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(A) (f ) (c): (a) U uttered x intending 1. A to think x possesses f 2. A to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p




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(A) (f ) (c): (a) U uttered x intending 1. A to think x possesses f 2. A to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that U intends A to think that U ψs that p 4. A, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that

U ψs that pand (for some cases)5. A, on the basis of the fulfillment of 4., himself to ψ that p




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100


To extend Grice's definitions to discourse, we replace•the utterance x with a discourse segment DS,

G&S 199


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To extend Grice's definitions to discourse, we replace•the utterance x with a discourse segment DS,•the utterer U with the initiator of a discourse segment ICP, and

G&S 199


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To extend Grice's definitions to discourse, we replace•the utterance x with a discourse segment DS,•the utterer U with the initiator of a discourse segment ICP, and•the audience A with the OCP.

G&S 199


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(A) (f ) (c): (a) U uttered x intending 1. A to think x possesses f 2. A to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that U intends A to think that U ψs that p 4. A, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that

U ψs that pand (for some cases)5. A, on the basis of the fulfillment of 4., himself to ψ that p




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(OCP) (f ) (c): (a) ICP uttered DS intending 1. OCP to think DS possesses f 2. OCP to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. OCP to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that ICP intends OCP to think that ICP ψs that p 4. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that

ICP ψs that pand (for some cases)5. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of 4., himself to ψ that p

By uttering DS ICP meant that *ψp is true iff



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(OCP) (f ) (c): (a) ICP uttered DS intending 1. OCP to think DS possesses f 2. OCP to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. OCP to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that ICP intends OCP to think that ICP ψs that p 4. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that


By uttering DS ICP meant that *ψp is true iff

A small change suggests itself: "uttering" has to be substituted by"initiating".


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(OCP) (f ) (c): (a) ICP initiated DS intending 1. OCP to think DS possesses f 2. OCP to think f correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p 3. OCP to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of 1. and [2.] that ICP intends OCP to think that ICP ψs that p 4. OCP, on the basis of the fulfillment of 3. to think that


By initiating DS ICP meant that *ψp is true iff



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G&S 199


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning.

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G&S 199


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions.

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G&S 199


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. We are not yet addressing the issue of discourse meaning, but are concerned with the role of DP/DSPs in determining discourse structure and in specifying how these intentions can be recognized by an OCP.

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G&S 199


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … Although the intentional structure of adiscourse plays a role in determining discourse meaning, the DP/DSPs do notin and of themselves constitute discourse meaning.

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G&S 199


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [Discourse level intentions] appear to besimilar to utterance-level intentions in kind, but differ in that they occur in acontext in which several utterances may be required to ensure theircomprehension and satisfaction.

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To complete this extension, the following problems must be resolved:

1. specifying the discourse-level intentions and attitudes that correspond to the utterance-level intentions and ψ's that p;

G&S 199


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2. identifying the kinds of fs that contribute to determining discourse-level intentions;

G&S 199


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3. identifying the modes of correlation (the c's) between features of the discourse segments and types of discourse-level intentions;

G&S 199


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3. identifying the modes of correlation (the c's) between features of the discourse segments and types of discourse-level intentions;

4. specifying how the discourse-level intentions can be recognized by an OCP.

G&S 199


Now we know some of the “intrinsic” properties of the relevant intentions and theproblems with them. What about the structure?

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Intentions that are intended to be recognized achieve their effect only if theintention is recognized.

G&S 178


117


Intentions that are intended to be recognized achieve their effect only if theintention is recognized. … [T]he intention that motivates the ICP to engagein a discourse may be private.

G&S 178


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G&S 178


In the sample dialogue, the purpose surely is to bring it about that the wing is fixed.The motivation might be greed for money...

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G&S 178


G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions.

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G&S 178


G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP.

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G&S 178


G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. … Wehave identified two structural relations: dominance and satisfaction precedence.

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DP

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3


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DP

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3


Dominance:

DSP1 … DSP3 are dominated by DP

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DP

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3


Dominance:

DSP1 … DSP3 are dominated by DPDSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DP

Contribution:

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G&S 178


G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. … Wehave identified two structural relations: dominance and satisfaction precedence.… The dominance relation invokes a partial ordering on the DSPs that we willrefer to as the dominance hierarchy.

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G&S 178


G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. … Wehave identified two structural relations: dominance and satisfaction precedence.… For some discourses, including task-oriented ones, the order in which theDSPs are satisfied might be significant, as well as being intended to berecognized.

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G&S 178


G&S 179

DPs and DSPs are basically the same sorts of intentions. If an intention is aDP, then its satisfaction is a main purpose of the discourse, whereas if it is aDSP, then its satisfaction contributes to the satisfaction of the DP. … Wehave identified two structural relations: dominance and satisfaction precedence.… We will say that DSP1 satisfaction-precedes DSP2 … whenever DSP1 mustbe satisfied before DSP2.

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DP

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3


Dominance:

DSP1 … DSP3 are dominated by DPDSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DP

Contribution:

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DP

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3


Dominance:

DSP1 … DSP3 are dominated by DPDSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DPDSP1 satisfaction-precedes DSP2DSP2 satisfaction-precedes DSP3DSP1 satisfaction-precedes DSP3 Contribution:

Satisfaction-precedence

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DP

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3


Dominance:

DP DOM DSP1, DP DOM DSP2, …DSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DPDSP1 SP DSP2DSP2 SP DSP3DSP1 SP DSP3 Contribution:


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DP

DSP1 DSP2 DSP3


Dominance:

DP DOM DSP1, DP DOM DSP2, …DSP1 … DSP3 contribute to DPDSP1 SP DSP2DSP2 SP DSP3DSP1 SP DSP3 Contribution:


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[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action.

G&S 179


133


[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions.

G&S 179


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[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … What is essential for a theory of discourse structureis that such intentions bear certain relations to one another.

G&S 179


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[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … In this paper, we distinguish between thedetermination of the DSP and the recognition of it.

G&S 179


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[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … In this paper, we distinguish between thedetermination of the DSP and the recognition of it. We use the term determination to refer to a semantic-like notion, namely the completespecification of what is intended by whom; we use the term recognition torefer to a processing notion, namely, the processing that leads a discourseparticipant to identify what the intention is.

G&S 179


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[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … In this paper, we distinguish between thedetermination of the DSP and the recognition of it. We use the term determination to refer to a semantic-like notion, namely the completespecification of what is intended by whom; … the same information thatdetermines a DSP may be used by an OCP to recognize it.

G&S 179


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[T]he range of intentions that can serve as discourse, or discourse segment,purposes is open-ended …, much like the range of intentions that underliemore general purposeful action. Thus, a theory of discourse structure cannotdepend on choosing the DP/DSPs from a fixed list …, nor on the particularsof individual intentions. … In this paper, we distinguish between thedetermination of the DSP and the recognition of it. We use the term determination to refer to a semantic-like notion, namely the completespecification of what is intended by whom;

G&S 179


So, a determination is a list consisting of• a list of intentions

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G&S 179


So, a determination is a list consisting of• a list of intentions• a list of dominance relations

141



G&S 179


So, a determination is a list consisting of• a list of intentions• a list of dominance relations• a list of satisfaction-precedence relations

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G&S 179


So, a determination is a list consisting of• a list of intentions• a list of dominance relations• a list of satisfaction-precedence relations

This completelydescribes theintentionalstructure

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G&S 199


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [Discourse level intentions] appear to besimilar to utterance-level intentions in kind, but differ in that they occur in acontext in which several utterances may be required to ensure theircomprehension and satisfaction.

144


G&S 199,200


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse.

145


G&S 199,200


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse.

Not all the DSPs, however, need to be expressed.

146


G&S 199,200


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse. … [T]he participants share theassumption of discourse sufficiency: it is a convention in a communicativesituation that the ICP believes the discourse is sufficient to achieve theprimary intention of the DP.

147


G&S 199,200


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse. … [T]here is an assumption that theinformation conveyed in the discourse will suffice in conjunction with otherinformation the ICP believes the OCP has (or can obtain) to allow forsatisfaction of the DP.

We will hear something similar in the lecture on coordination!

148


G&S 199,200


The intentions that serve as DP/DSPs are natural extensions of the intentionsthat Grice (1969) considers essential to developing a theory of utterer'smeaning. There is a crucial difference, however, between our use of discourse-level intentions in this paper (and the theory, as developed so far) and Grice'suse of utterance-level intentions. … [We] have to consider not only individualbeliefs and intentions, but also the relationships among various discoursesegments (and utterances within a segment) and the purposes the segmentsserve with respect to the entire discourse. …To be more concrete, we shalllook at … two cases, one involving a belief, the other an intention to performsome action.

149


G&S 199,200



150


G&S 200

Discourse structure • a structure of intentions • belief case

In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p.

151


G&S 200


In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to believe a proposition, say qi for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments).

152


G&S 200


In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to believe a proposition, say qi for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to believe each of the qi and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe the qi provide support for p.

153


G&S 200


In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to believe a proposition, say qi for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to believe each of the qi and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe the qi provide support for p. … Viewed intuitively, [ICP's]belief that qi provides support for p, underlies his intention to get [OCP] tobelieve p by getting him to believe qi.

154


G&S 200


In the belief case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to believesome proposition, say p. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to believe a proposition, say qi for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to believe each of the qi and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe the qi provide support for p. … Viewed intuitively, [ICP's]belief that qi provides support for p, underlies his intention to get [OCP] tobelieve p by getting him to believe qi. … This relationship plays a role in therecognition of DSPs.

155


G&S 199,200



156


G&S 199,200



157


G&S 201

Discourse structure • a structure of intentions • action case

An analogous situation holds for a discourse segment comprising utterancesintended to get the OCP to perform some set of actions directed at achievingsome overall task …

158


G&S 201


An analogous situation holds for a discourse segment comprising utterancesintended to get the OCP to perform some set of actions directed at achievingsome overall task … The full specification of the DP/DSP contains agenerates relation that is derived from a relation defined by Goldman (1970).

159


The analogous formulation for the action case can be written as follows:


160


In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A.


161


In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to perform an action, say ai for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments).


162


In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to perform an action, say ai for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to perform each of the ai and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe that the ICP believes that ai is appropriate to generate A.


163


In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to perform an action, say ai for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to perform each of the ai and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe that the ICP believes that ai is appropriate to generate A.… Viewed intuitively, [ICP's] belief that ai be appropriate to generate Aunderlies his intention to get [OCP] to perform A by getting him to performai.


164


In the action case, the primary intention of the DP is to get the OCP to performsome action, say A. Each of the discourse segments is also intended toget the OCP to perform an action, say ai for some i= 1,…,n (where thereare n discourse segments). … [T]he DP includes an intention that the OCPcome to perform each of the ai and, in addition, an intention that the OCPcome to believe that the ICP believes that ai is appropriate to generate A.… Viewed intuitively, [ICP's] belief that ai be appropriate to generate Aunderlies his intention to get [OCP] to perform A by getting him to performai. … This relationship plays a role in the recognition of DSPs.


165




Remember the benchmark discourse:

166


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4


DS2


One possible discourse structure could be this:

167


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4


DS2


An analysis in the spirit of G&S (though not authentical)

168


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4


DS2


DSP1 = DSP2 ⌂ DSP3 ⌂ I1


169


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4


DS2


DSP1 = DSP2 ⌂ DSP3 ⌂ I1 = = {(Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (take Cnst the orange screw))), ..., ...}


170


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4


DS2


DSP1 = DSP2 ⌂ DSP3 ⌂ I1 = = {(Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (take Cnst the orange screw))), (Intend Cnst (Believe Inst (fix Cnst the three bars))), ...}


The solutionfor DSP3 is notvery plausible. Yet,DSP3 DOM DSP4.Hence, DSP4should onlycontribute to DSP3.On the other hand,DSP4 SP DSP6, sothey must be DSs.

171


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4


DS2


DSP1 = DSP2 ⌂ DSP3 ⌂ I1 = = {(Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (take Cnst the orange screw))), (Intend Cnst (Believe Inst (fix Cnst the three bars))), (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (fix Cnst the bar with the orange screw)))}


172


Discourse structure


G&S 176

173


Discourse structure


G&S 176

174


Discourse structure • an attentional state

175


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.

G&S 179


176


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants.

G&S 179


177


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. It is inherently dynamic, recording the objects,properties, and relations that are salient at each point of discourse.

G&S 179


178


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces;

G&S 179


179


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; changes in attentional state are modeled by a set of transitionrules that specify the conditions for adding and deleting spaces.

G&S 179


180


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; changes in attentional state are modeled by a set of transitionrules that specify the conditions for adding and deleting spaces. We call thecollection of focus spaces available at one time the focusing structure and theprocess of manipulating spaces focusing.

G&S 179


181


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; changes in attentional state are modeled by a set of transitionrules that specify the conditions for adding and deleting spaces. We call thecollection of focus spaces available at one time the focusing structure and theprocess of manipulating spaces focusing.

G&S 179


Indeed, the focusing structure is sometimes also called focus structure.

182


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; … a focus space … contains those entities that are salient …

G&S 179


183


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; … a focus space … contains those entities that are salient …The focus space also includes the DSP

G&S 179


184


The third component of discourse structure, the attentional state, is anabstraction of the participants' focus of attention as their discourse unfolds.The attentional state is a property of the discourse itself, not of thediscourse participants. … The attentional state is modeled by a set offocus spaces; … a focus space … contains those entities that are salient …The focus space also includes the DSP

G&S 179


G&S 180

… the focus structure does not include the intentional structure as a whole.

185



A focus space contains (representations of)objects,

186



Objects o1/1,…,o1/n

FS1

A focus space contains (representations of)objects,

187




Properties p1o1/1,…,pm

o1/n

FS1

A focus space contains (representations of)objects,their properties,

188





o1/n

Relations r1<os/t,…,ou/v>,…

FS1

A focus space contains (representations of)objects,their properties,relations amongst them, and

189





o1/n


DSP1 FS1

A focus space contains (representations of)objects,their properties,relations amongst them, and the current Discourse Segment Purpose

190





o1/n


DSP1 FS1


A focusing structure is a stack offocus spaces

191





o2/n

Relations r1<ow/x,…,oy/z>,…

DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1

192





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1

Note that only for reason of limitations due to the use of a certain textprocessor and the finiteness of the variables available the number of objects, properties etc. in both focus spaces are equal. Of course, this number in fact may be different.

193





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1

194





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1



o3/n

Relations r1<oo/p,…,oq/r>,…

DSP3 FS3

195





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1



o3/n


DSP3 FS3

Objects in lower stack places are reachablefrom higher stack places

196





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1



o3/n


DSP3 FS3


197





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1



o3/n


DSP3 FS3


198





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1



o3/n


DSP3 FS3


199





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1



o3/n


DSP3 FS3

Objects in lower stack places are reachablefrom higher stack places, but not vice versa.

200





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1



o3/n


DSP3 FS3

Objects in lower stack places are reachablefrom higher stack places, and objects in thesame stack place are reachable.

201





o2/n


DSP2 FS2





o1/n


DSP1 FS1



o3/n


DSP3 FS3

… the focusing structure is parasitic on theintentional structure …

G&S 180

202


Discourse structure


G&S 176

203


Discourse structure


G&S 176

204


Discourse structure

The interaction between the described structures restricts the set of possiblediscourse descriptions

205


Discourse structure • interaction between structures

206



G&S 176

The results of the processing, the completed structures, differ in some respect:• the structure of the sequences is built up during discourse and exists in full size only in the end of it;


207



G&S 176

The results of the processing, the completed structures, differ in some respect:• the structure of the sequences is built up during discourse and exists in full size only in the end of it;• similarly, the structure of intentions is constructed successively;


208



G&S 176

The results of the processing, the completed structures, differ in some respect:• the structure of the sequences is built up during discourse and exists in full size only in the end of it;• similarly, the structure of intentions is constructed successively;• the attentional state in the end of the discourse is empty.


209



G&S 176

The results of the processing, the completed structures, differ in some respect. How, if at all, do the various structures restrict one another?


210



G&S 176

G&S 180

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops.


211



G&S 176

G&S 180

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. Notehowever that the relevant operation may sometimes be indicated in thelanguage itself.


212


Recall the slide on cue phrases …

G&S 180



213






the end, ok, fine


Oops, I forgot



G&S 178



Push

Pop

Clear

SP

DOM

Inter-ruptions

214


Now it can be see how this fits together

G&S 180


G&S 178



215



G&S 176

G&S 180



216



G&S 176

G&S 180

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. Notehowever that the relevant operation may sometimes be indicated in thelanguage itself. … [T]he focusing structure, like the intentional and thelinguistic structures, evolves as the discourse proceeds.


217



G&S 176

G&S 180

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. Notehowever that the relevant operation may sometimes be indicated in thelanguage itself. … [W]hen the discourse is being processed, only theattentional state can constrain the interpretation of referring expressionsdirectly.


218



G&S 176

G&S 180,182

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. …[T]he focusing structure is the central repository for the contextualinformation needed to process utterances at each point in the discourse.


219



G&S 176

G&S 180,182

[T] he focusing structure is parasitic upon the intentional structure in thesense that the relationships among DSPs determine pushes and pops. …It distinguishes those objects, properties, and relations that are mostsalient at [any] point and, moreover, has links to the relevant parts ofboth the linguistic and intentional structures.


220


The considerations concerning discourse structure just indicated rely on anunderstanding of the relevant processing issues.

Discourse structure

221


The considerations concerning discourse structure just indicated rely on anunderstanding of the relevant processing issues. This invites to a closer lookat the processing side.

Discourse structure

222


The considerations concerning discourse structure just indicated rely on anunderstanding of the relevant processing issues. This invites to a closer lookat the processing side. So, this is where we are…

Discourse structure

223




G&S 175


224




G&S 175


225


Discourse processing

226



The part of the theory that is related to processing will be introduced by way ofexample.

227



The part of the theory that is related to processing will be introduced by way ofexample. Recall the example from the introduction…

228





Cnst: Ja. Yes






229





Cnst: Ja. Yes


Available Bolts


230

(B)

Inst: Und steckst sie dadurch, also

And you put it through there,

let’s see

Cnst: Von oben.

From the top.

Inst: Von oben, daß also die drei festgeschraubt werden dann.

From the top, so that the three bars get fixed.

Cnst: Ja.

Yes.

Intended Junction

Intended Result



231




232




Some more stuff must be added, as indicated earlier.

233


Focus Space StackLinguistic StructureIS Relations



234





A first analysis of the sample discourse. Consider the followingstructure.

235


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4


The underspecified focus space for I1 has to be pushed



DS2

236


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


The underspecified focus space for I1 is already pushed



DS2

237


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2

DS2 can not be analyzed in a more fine-grained way



DS2

238


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2

DS2 can not be analyzed in a more fine-grained way.Esp., it does not contain other DSs.



DS2

239


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS2

I2: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (take Cnst the orange screw)))



DS2

240


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2



DS2

241


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS3

I3: ?

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3



DS2

242


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS3

I4: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (put Cnst it [O2] through there)))

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3



DS2

FS4I3 DOM I4

243


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS3

I4: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (put Cnst it [O2] through there)))This analysis doesn't work, because FS2 is already in the trash

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3



DS2

FS4I3 DOM I4

244


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS3

General pattern: Anaphora is not possible among expressionsin DSs whose focus spaces do not appear on the stacksimultaneously.

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3



DS2

FS4I3 DOM I4

245


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS3

General pattern: As soon as the processing of one DS is finished,the expressions contained in it are no longer accessible.

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3



DS2

FS4I3 DOM I4

246


DS1

DS5

DS6

DS3

DS4

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS3

An alternative solution is needed, where the first utterancesare not contained in a separate DS.

I1 DOM I3

I2 SP I3



DS2

FS4I3 DOM I4

247


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




248


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




This is one such possibility.

249


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




First, the current focus space has to be pushed, i.e., thespace corresponding DS1

250


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




Inst's first intention is unclear, hence I1 must be left underspecified

FS1

251


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




I1: ?

FS1

252


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




The intention behind DS2 is unclear in the beginning, hencethe focus space should be "underspecified"

FS1

I1 DOM I2

253


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




The intention behind DS2 is unclear in the beginning, hencethe focus space should be "underspecified". FSs remain onthe stack as long as the corresponding DSPs DOM another.

FS1

I1 DOM I2

254


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




The intention behind DS2 is unclear in the beginning, hencethe focus space should be "underspecified". So FS2 is pushedonto FS1.

FS1

I1 DOM I2

255


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




I2: ?

FS1

I1 DOM I2

FS2

256


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




FS1 is still on the stack, hence "it" can refer to the orangescrew with the slit

FS1

I1 DOM I2

FS2

I2 DOM I3

257


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




I3: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (put Cnst it [O1] through there)))

FS1

I1 DOM I2

FS2

I2 DOM I3 FS3

258


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS2

I2 DOM I3



259


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




Typically, DS4 is classified as a clarification, but G&Soffer no explicit treatment of such a type of subdialogue

FS1

I1 DOM I2

FS2

I2 DOM I3

260


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




DS4 is treated as an interruption. Hence its focus space is tobe removed from the stack as soon as its treatment is finished

FS1

I1 DOM I2

FS2

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

261


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3




I4: (Intend Cnst (Intend Inst (confirm Inst direction)))

FS1

I1 DOM I2

FS2

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

FS4

262


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS2

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt



263


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS2

There is a problem with an implicit reference in DS5 to "put itthrough" in DS3. But this is neglected for the time being.

I2 DOM I3 FS5

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5



264


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS2

I5: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (fix Cnst the three bars)))

I2 DOM I3 FS5

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5



265


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS2

Not until now can the underspecified FS2 be filled up

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5



266


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3

FS1


I1 DOM I2

FS2

I2: (Intend Cnst (Believe Inst (fix Cnst the three bars)))

I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5



267


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3

FS1


I1 DOM I2I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5



I1: (Intend Inst (Intend Cnst (fix Cnst the bar with the orange screw)))

268


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3


I1 DOM I2I2 DOM I3

I4 Interrupt

I2 DOM I5

I3 SP I5



Finished: The stack is empty and all DSs and DSPs are in

269


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3



Intuitively, taking should satisfaction-precede putting through.

270


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3



Intuitively, taking should satisfaction-precede putting through. This fact,however, is not representable according to the chosen analysis.

271


DS1

DS4

DS5

DS2

DS3



No alternative analysis, however, can treat anaphora in cases like these.

272




G&S 175


273




G&S 175


274

Plan-based approaches to dialogue

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