PPT
MERGER & ACQUISITION
Adauctions
Yang Cai Sep 17, 2014. An overview of today’s class Expected Revenue = Expected Virtual Welfare 2 Uniform [0,1] Bidders Example Optimal Auction.
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling Jon Feldman S. Muthukrishnan Eddie Nikolova Martin P á l.
VALUING PRIVATE COMPANIES: FACTORS AND APPROACHES TO CONSIDER Presenter Venue Date.
Yang Cai
Securing Auctions using Cryptography
Chapter 23 Competitive Equilibrium 1.Partial Equilibrium 2.General Equilibrium 3.Pareto Optimality.
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling
The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget- Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms Paolo Penna & Carmine Ventre Università di Salerno Italy.
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