Bela Bhatia - The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar

Economic and Political Weekly April 9, 20051536

Khet par adhikar ke liye ladho, desh mai janwad ke liye badho(Fight for land rights, march towards democracy in the

country – Liberation slogan)Saamantshahi ke kille ko dwasth karai, janwad ke durg ko nirmankarai

(Let us smash the castle of feudalism, and build that ofdemocracy – PU slogan)

Apni satta, apna kanoon(Our power, our law – MCC slogan)

IIntroduction

The present study seeks to shed light on the Naxalitemovement in central Bihar. My priority is to develop anunderstanding of the movement from the perspective of

the people who make up its mass base including members,supporters, and activists at the village level. Valuable as theyare, most scholarly accounts of the Naxalite movement haveneglected this important dimension, i e, the point of view of theparticipants.1 These accounts tend to be based on the experiencesand writings of the leaders, or on secondary literature such asmedia and government reports. A view of the Naxalite movementas politics of the people needs to be developed.2 In this view,people are seen not just as supporters, but also as actors andthinkers who ultimately shape the movement. This approachinvolves asking who these people are, what they think, how theyact, and why they think or act the way they do. Answering theseand related questions is indispensable to develop an understand-ing of ‘the movement within the movement’.

This study relies mainly on two years of fieldwork in the villagesof central Bihar, in 1995 and 1996.3 During this period I visited(and often revisited) more than 50 villages under Naxalite in-fluence and talked with the participants of the movement, theiropponents, and the representatives of the state. More recentdevelopments are briefly discussed in a postscript.

IINaxalite Movement in Central Bihar

The Naxalite movement in Bihar can be divided into twophases: the formative phase from 1967 to 1977 and the currentphase from 1977 onwards.4 Prior to the imposition of theEmergency in 1975, the movement had been able to spread inparts of two or three districts, but during the Emergency it facedheavy state persecution and had to lie low. However, by the late

1970s, it had been able to reorganise itself and was once againon an upswing. The phase after 1977, therefore, saw the revivalof the movement, significant reformulations of its political line,and the emergence of new Naxalite groups.

During the formative phase, local struggles initially sprung upin the Mushahari region of Muzaffarpur district in north Bihar,in parts of Bhojpur and Patna districts in central Bihar, and inHazaribagh, Ranchi, Singhbhum, and Dhanbad districts of southBihar (now Jharkhand). These struggles were modelled after theNaxalbari uprising and were initiated by various members of theAll-India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolution-aries (AICCCR) or its successor, the CPI(ML), as well as byNaxalite groups outside the AICCCR fold (mainly the MaoistCommunist Centre).5

Many of these actions were sporadic, and were not part of asustained movement. In Bhojpur, however, the Naxalite move-ment took root, starting from village Ekwari where JagdishMahato, a local teacher who had forged links with Naxaliteleaders from West Bengal, led a protracted struggle againstexploitative landlords. The Naxalites who came to Bhojpurbelonged to the ‘pro-Lin Piao group’, which later developed intothe present CPI(ML)Liberation, also known as ‘Liberation’.

The Naxalite movement in Bihar, as in other Indian states, isheavily factionalised (see the chart for a summary of party historyfrom 1967 to 1982, as viewed by Liberation). At the time of myfieldwork, in 1995-96, approximately 17 Naxalite groups func-tioned in different parts of Bihar. Except for the Maoist Com-munist Centre (MCC), all others were CPI(ML) groups. The mostimportant groups were Liberation, Party Unity and MCC. Thesefactions broadly represent the three main trends within themovement in Bihar and in the country as a whole: on the Naxalitespectrum today in Bihar, MCC is considered to be extreme left,Liberation is drifting towards the ‘parliamentary path’, and PartyUnity is somewhere in between. This section examines someimportant features of each of these groups. The other Naxalitegroups in Bihar are outside the scope of this article.

Liberation6

Central Bihar is the stronghold of Liberation. It was here thatLiberation first found a firm footing in Bhojpur in the late 1960sand early 1970s. From Bhojpur, Liberation spread to adjoiningareas of central Bihar, and also to parts of south Bihar (Jharkhand)and north Bihar. At the time of my fieldwork (1995-96), theLiberation group functioned in approximately 30 districts of

The Naxalite Movement in Central BiharThe main achievement of the Naxalite movement in central Bihar is that it has empowered the

labouring and oppressed classes. The equations of power have changed drastically. Yet, thequality of material life in the villages has not improved because the Naxalite leaders are

not interested in ‘development’. There is now a tiredness among the people, which has resultedin a stalemate. The Naxalite movement will thrive only if it lets people’s concerns guide thevision of the parties. Another problem is factionalism; if the movement unites and focuses

on people’s concerns it could make a real difference in Bihar.

BELA BHATIA

Economic and Political Weekly April 9, 2005 1537

undivided Bihar and Jharkhand, including 11 districts of centralBihar.

Even though the Liberation group considers itself the trueinheritor of the CPI(ML) legacy, its political line has changeddramatically from that of the original CPI(ML). In 1978, a‘rectification campaign’ was launched by the party with thepurpose of bringing about changes in the style of work. Afterbeing launched, however, the campaign went well beyond theinitial objective, as the need for fundamental changes to the partyline and practice began to be voiced. These changes wereformalised in a special party conference held in July 1979. Themost important outcome of this conference was the decision tobegin open mass activities through the formation of appropriatemass organisations.

This ushered in a phase of mass politics. The Indian People’sFront (IPF) and the Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha (BPKS) wereformed in the early 1980s. The aim of BPKS was to lead thepeasant movement in Bihar, while IPF was to intervene in thenational political scene. Both organisations flourished. The BPKSled significant peasant struggles in central Bihar in the 1980sand remains a significant force. The IPF also evolved as apowerful people’s movement in the course of time. Its visionwas, initially, to develop as a broad forum of Communist revo-lutionary organisations and other democratic forces in the coun-try. This vision, however, could not be sustained because theparty (Liberation) held on to a leadership role and failed todevelop IPF as an autonomous confederation. IPF, therefore, didnot develop beyond a mass organisation of the Liberation group,though a powerful one.

Quick on the heels of the decision to initiate open massactivities was the decision taken by the party at its third congressin December 1982 to contest elections on tactical grounds.7 Ina special conference convened in July 1990, the party decidedto resume open functioning. This decision was formalised at itsfifth congress in December 1992. In 1994, the Indian People’sFront was disbanded. The party was recognised by the ElectionCommission in 1995, and was able to contest the 1995 assemblyelections and 1996 parliamentary elections as CPI(ML).

Party Unity8

As the name indicates, Party Unity’s original aim was uni-fication. It came into existence on January 1, 1982 with a mergerbetween two CPI(ML) groups: CPI(ML)Unity Organisation(henceforth UO) and Central Organising Committee CPI(ML)(henceforth COC). In the following years, three other CPI(ML)groups joined.9 Party Unity itself merged with the CPI(ML)People’s War Group (PWG) in August 1998. The united groupis now called the CPI(ML) People’s War (PW). Since themerger took place after the end of my fieldwork in 1996,this Naxalite faction is referred to as Party Unity (PU) in thispaper.

As PU leaders see it, all the parties which merged togetherto form the present PU were part of the ‘third trend’ prevailingin the CPI(ML) camp in the early 1980s. Parties of the third trendupheld the Naxalbari uprising, the positive and historical roleof the original CPI(ML) and of Charu Mazumdar as the founderleader, and the basic line of the original CPI(ML). However, theseparties conceded that deviations and mistakes had occurred, andwere keen to make appropriate corrections to theory and prac-tice.10 PU’s example underlines the fact that while the history

of the CPI(ML) party and movement is replete with splits andfactionalism, there is also a history of mergers.

Jehanabad is a stronghold of Party Unity. Besides, PU-ledpeasant movements are also strong in parts of the adjoining Gayaand Patna regions and in Palamau. The most popular open frontof Party Unity is Mazdoor Kisan Sangram Samiti (MKSS),banned in 1986 and renamed Mazdoor Kisan Sangram Parishad(MKSP) in 1994.11

Maoist Communist Centre

In its self-identity and political image, MCC represents the‘hardline wing’ of the Naxalite movement. Completely banned,MCC leads an entirely underground existence.12 As a result,reliable information on MCC is difficult to obtain. The followingaccount is based on a series of interviews with the MCC spokes-person in Bihar in July-October 1996, as well as on some primaryliterature supplied by him.

MCC was formed on 20 October 1969. The initial differencesbetween the MCC and the CPI(ML) are spelt out in a documentcirculated by MCC in June 1971.13 MCC considered the CPI(ML)’spolitical line and practice until 1971 to suffer from ‘left devia-tionism’ and asserted that this trend would have to be opposed,like its right counterpart (represented by the CPI(M)).

Even though MCC’s central critique of the CPI(ML) line wasits then extreme position, paradoxically, it is MCC which todayis faced with the accusation of being kattarpanthi (extremist)in the Naxalite camp. Even before the ban of its open fronts in1994, MCC’s emphasis was on underground party action andits mass fronts were relatively confined. In its inner-party func-tioning, in particular in the implementation of the principle ofdemocratic centralism, MCC is known to be more centralisedthan democratic.

As it turns out, MCC has achieved little success in buildinga mass People’s Army for guerrilla warfare. Instead, it has becomeknown for actions that have invited condemnation not only frombourgeois circles, but also from the Naxalite movement itself.For example, on several occasions MCC has retaliated againstmassacres by upper caste landlords by carrying out counter-massacres of upper caste men. In fact, MCC leaders have threat-ened to kill four ‘class enemies’ for every victim of a massacre.14

Other examples of actions that have attracted wide criticisminclude brutal punishments in people’s courts (justified as ‘thewill of the people’) and severe threats against those who parti-cipate in elections.

MCC is most active in districts that are now part of Jharkhand.In central Bihar, it is considered to be strongest in Gaya, followedby parts of other districts such as Jehanabad, Aurangabad, andPatna.

IIIWho Are the Naxalites?

Some broad features of the Naxalite movement are relativelyeasy to identify. The social base of the movement in central Biharconsists overwhelmingly of the landless, small peasants withmarginal landholdings, and to a lesser extent middle peasants.In caste terms, the base of the movement consists of lower andintermediate castes.15 This applies to the Hindu as well as Muslimcommunities. The movement, however, also has some supportersamong the higher castes and classes. Their presence is particularly


felt in the leadership of the movement. Beyond these features,also observed by other scholars, little is known about the identity,motives and worldview of the Naxalites. In this section, I attemptto shed some light on this based on my fieldwork in PU andLiberation areas (mainly the former) in 1995-96.16 The discussionrelies mainly on people’s testimonies: perceptions of the mem-bers and supporters of the movement and, where possible, oftheir opponents.

People’s Perceptions

The Term ‘Naxalite’

Even though the term Naxalite is part of the vocabulary of thepeople of central Bihar, it is understood in different ways.“Everybody calls you Naxalites. What is your understanding ofwho a Naxalite is, and what does the term mean?” The responsesto this question reflected diverse perceptions of the term, andof the Naxalite movement itself. Below is a sample of responsesto this question obtained from members, supporters, and localcadres of the Naxalite movement in different villages.

Do we know how to read and write that we can tell you?(a common answer)We may be called Naxalites or by another name.... but we do notgo anywhere nor come from anywhere.... we just do our work.(another common answer)Before the sangathan (collective) came to our village, we had heardthat the sangathan is Naxalite. It cuts mudis (heads). It is dan-gerous. We did not have a lot of knowledge nor information then.When we came closer and had a chance to talk our knowledge grew.Dushman varg (enemy class) spoke about them with fear. Othersconsidered them acche log jo hamare hak mein hai (good peoplewho are in our favour).In English ‘lite’ means prakash (light), right? So we say naksha-lite – making a new map (naksha) for Bharat (India) with ourlight. We wish that the aam janata (ordinary people), those whosehouses are in darkness be influenced by our light. We wish to givelight in the darkness...to take those who are in the dark out of it.Aane wala prakash (next-light) is Naxalite.Naxalite means [pointing at the back of the neck] nas kaat karprakash lana (cutting the nerve and bringing light).The zamindars (landlords) say Naxalite. We say Naxalbari. Wesupport the Naxalbari movement and its objectives. We are fol-lowing the vichardhara (ideology) of Naxalbari. We are walkingon the same path. But our zamindars say, “this is a Naxalite –who cuts nas (nerves) of the upper castes and carries out theirsafaya (annihilation).” They say that the Naxalites want to keepyou under their control with the butt of their rifles. They say thisso that others may hate the Naxalites and fear them.No, we are not Naxalites! We fight for our children, for our hak(rights). We ask for three kilos of grain as mazduri (wages). Wedo not consider Naxalite as Naxalite. It is a party..... Who isNaxalite? Those who have been oppressing us and sucking ourblood or we who are trying to change the situation?We are Naxalvadi (Naxalite). Sarkar calls us ugravadi (extrem-ists), but we are not ugravadis. Those persons are ugravadis whoare exploiting and oppressing, who are cheating and robbing, whoare raping women day and night. Only such persons can be calledugravadis. Then there is one more word which the sarkar uses– aatankvadi (terrorist). When in our country a neighbouringcountry enters, terrorizes and then leaves, then this is calledaatankvadi. But the shashak varg (ruling class) and the punjipati(capitalists) here say that these are the Naxalites, the ugravadis,the aatankvadis. But that is not the case. They do not say anything

to the real ugravadis and aatankvadis. But Naxalvadi we are. Ifthey call us that, then they call us correctly.If somebody who demands his rights is a Naxalite, then we arealso Naxalites. We ask for our rights – you may call us Naxaliteor what you will.

People who decided to join or not join the Naxalites had inmost cases heard about the Naxalites before they actually metthem. A large majority of the people in Jehanabad, some of whomsubsequently joined the movement, had initially understood theNaxalites to be people who indulge in maar-kaat (beatings-slashings), jo chai-inch chhota kartai hai (those who reduce [thebody] by six inches). These initial perceptions changed once theycame into contact with some leaders and members of individualfactions at the village level. Their personal contact made themrealise that the maar-kaat of the Naxalites was with a difference,and that they were aachai log (good people) with good intentions.Many of them joined the movement on the basis of this percep-tion, others hoped that the Naxalites would deal with theiroppressors.

After joining the sangathan, their understanding of its objec-tives grew. Some cadres were now able to relate it to Naxalbariand the movement which spread subsequently. These cadrestoday clearly affirm: ‘Yes, we are Naxalites!’ However, a largemajority continue to express their understanding in popular terms.As the testimonies above indicate, some of these popular per-ceptions of the term are: naksha...lite (a new map and light), aanewala prakash (next light), nas kaat kar prakash lana (cuttingthe nerve and bringing light). Historically less conversant, butpolitically no less astute, those who offer these explanationsidentify themselves as Naxalites less through the label thanthrough the actions of the movement. The initial association withmaar-kaat faded away with the shift in emphasis from ‘anni-hilation’ to open mass movements and people’s own participationin these movements. The Naxalite movement began to be un-derstood by them as a struggle for basic rights.

The testimonies convey an anti-system sentiment. There isawareness of the existence of classes in society, that the interestsof one class may clash with those of another, and that in orderto draw the ‘map’ (naksha) anew those in darkness would needto be taken towards ‘light’; the future vision is metaphoricallyconveyed as light. The testimonies suggest that the Naxalites havea fair idea of the important components of their struggle for basicrights as well as a knowledge of their opponents – the zamindars,the sarkar, the punjipati, the shashak varg. In their self-identity,therefore, the Naxalites clearly see themselves as individuals whohave chosen a path which clashes with the existing order.

However, their struggle for basic rights has met with fierceopposition and condemnation. Their attempt to assert the ‘right’had turned them into ‘wrong’ in the eyes of a large part of theworld. The Naxalites and their movement have been abused forso long by the State, the establishment and the upper classes thatthe negative connotation of the term Naxalite has been internalisedby some of the Naxalites themselves, as we can see from thetestimony of the person (Aakash) who began by exclaiming, “No,we are not Naxalites!” Like Aakash, some Naxalites deny all thewrongs that are commonly attributed to the movement to theextent that they may distance themselves from the term itself.They define who they are by who they are not and in so doingaffirm the positive values of the Naxalite movement.

In the perception of the Naxalites, therefore, the term ‘Naxalite’defies a single interpretation. The various participants understand


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it in their own terms. However, behind these differences therelies a common theme comprising of basic values such as justice,freedom from oppression and standing up for one’s rights.

On Revolution and the Party

Feudalism will have to be rooted out steadily, otherwise it willuproot you. Samantvaad har aadmi par chaya hua hai (feudalismlies like a shadow on every person). Until feudalism is rooted out,kranti (revolution) cannot be achieved.17

Before the sangathan came, we did not have a lot of gyan (knowl-edge). The sangathan gave us shiksha (education) regarding thepresent system and the need to overthrow it (palatna). India isa ardh-samanti (semi-feudal) and ardh-upnivaishik (semi-colo-nial) country. There is foreign capital also in our country. We haveto end this foreign capital and utilise the capital of our own country.The downtrodden people have to rise above the system. Eachindividual should get education. Each individual should get food.We got books to read about Marx, Lenin and Mao. From thesewe learnt that Marx was a revolutionary, and so were Lenin andMao Tse-tung. We read a little bit about all the three. We havenot read a lot but understood that what Marx and Lenin wantedto say was that this sadi-gali vyavastha (rotten system) shouldbe destroyed, the exploitation of one human being by anothershould end, humankind should be liberated from this. This is whatMarx and Lenin wanted to say.

The Naxalite movement has a long-term agenda of achievinga revolution. How do the people who join the movementconceptualise ‘revolution’? People do not have a textbookunderstanding of revolution, but they do have some notion ofradical change. They use the word badal (change) more oftenthan kranti (revolution). One can safely say that badal representstheir own understanding while kranti or nayee janwadi kranti(new democratic revolution) are additions to their politicalvocabulary. They understand badal as a change in their existingsituation; their newly learnt notion of kranti adds a vision ofbuilding a new society which is more equitable and just. Theyalso understand revolution to be a ladai (struggle) between them(i e, their party) and their opponents (i e, landlords, police andgovernment).

Do the members and supporters of a revolutionary movementsuch as the Naxalite movement perceive themselves as ‘revo-lutionaries’? Within the Naxalite movement, krantikaris (revo-lutionaries) are understood to be those who are ready to giveup everything, even their lives, for the cause. They recognise itto be a long process for which they have seen many of theircomrades die. The self-perception of the people as krantikarican be felt more at the cadre level than at the level of people inthe villages. Similarly, it can be felt (it is articulated as such) morein the underground party organisation than in the open fronts.Outside the former, people rarely call themselves krantikaris.

Why Do People Join the Movement?

Diverse reasons motivate the people to join a revolutionarymovement. A broad distinction can be made between ideologicaland non-ideological motives.

Ideological Motives

In this category, a distinction needs to be made between‘formal’ ideology and the ‘informal’ understanding of such an

ideology or the popular perception of it. Individuals who chooseto join the movement with full knowledge of its ideology andrevolutionary agenda can be understood to be motivated by the‘formal’ ideology. Leaders of the movement at the block leveland upwards tend to fall into this category. We can also call theseindividuals ‘informed revolutionaries’.

Besides these ‘informed’ ones are those who are ‘instinctualrevolutionaries’. These are individuals who have an instinctualurge to fight against injustice and who get attracted to therevolutionary message of the movement. These revolutionariesmay have witnessed the oppression perpetrated on or by theirown families and caste, and instinctively rebel against this injustice.Their coming across Marxist-Leninist ideology and joining themovement is more like finding partners with the same concern.There are many committed and inspiring Naxalites in this cat-egory of instinctual revolutionaries. A large majority of thecadres, especially those at the village level, and the people whocomprise the backbone of the movement are in this category.

People in both categories can be seen to have revolutionaryintentions. However, these categories are not clear-cut. I am notsuggesting that informed revolutionaries are not instinctual orvice versa. Instinctual revolutionaries also in their own waysmake ‘informed’ choices, though the basis is different.

Ideological motives of some kind apply to both groups, eventhough only the first has a clear understanding of formal Marxist-Leninist ideology. At the village level, with few exceptions, thereis little understanding of the formal ideology of Marxism-Leninismamongst the people who constitute the mass base of the move-ment. In fact, very few seem to have heard of Russia or China,leave alone Marx, Lenin and Mao. Thus, at the village level fewpeople have joined the Naxalite movement on the basis of itsformal ideology. This, however, does not mean that people haveno ideological motivations. It is just that their ideologicalmotivations are based on their own interpretation and understand-ing of revolutionary ideology.

When we try to determine the salient aspects of the ideologywhich resonate with the deprived sections, we find that people whosupport the Naxalite movement do so mainly because they feelthat the Naxalites share their sense of injustice, are ready to liveand suffer like them, and fight on their behalf. The Naxaliteideology also strikes a chord with the people because it finds expres-sion in concrete struggles on immediate issues that concern themlike land distribution, implementation of minimum wages, etc.

Need and Survival

Many people join the movement, especially its open fronts,for non-ideological reasons and with non-revolutionary inten-tions. They recognise the injustice of their circumstances andrealise that only a collective struggle is likely to redress it. Itis in this respect that the ‘class struggle’ appeals to them.

Among the needs that the people hope that the party will addressare better wages, land redistribution, freedom from harassment,etc. Many individuals also approach one or the other Naxalitefaction with specific personal requests such as retribution forrape, protection in the face of threats and arbitration ofproperty disputes.18 Interestingly, the form and language of suchrequests (e g, petitions to the local party committee) are oftensimilar to those of petitions made to the government. In fact,the Naxalite parties are also known in some areas as lal sarkar(red government).


Some times joining the Naxalite movement is a matter ofsurvival. The nature of local politics in central Bihar is such thatit is often impossible for people to remain neutral. People belongingto the lower castes and classes, more often than their middle andupper counterparts, join the movement for this reason. In centralBihar, the CPI(ML) is the only party which gives priority to theirinterests and has a strong presence at the local level. The factthat the Naxalites are armed adds to their attraction in this respect.

Opportunism

Members of different classes sometimes choose to align them-selves with whatever Naxalite faction happens to be locallypowerful and is likely to be beneficial to them, irrespective ofits ideology.

There are many specific forms of opportunism. For instance,some individuals may join the Naxalite movement to settle scoreswith their enemies or to gain advantage in a private conflict overissues such as division of family property. Another type ofopportunism is based on fear: some high-caste landlords and richpeasants join the movement out of fear of becoming the next‘targets’. Similarly, in situations where the upper castes (e g,rajputs and bhumihars) are in conflict with each other, one ofthe sides may align with a Naxalite group for the sake of self-protection. Sometimes individuals simply join the Naxalitemovement as a shortcut to local power.

Other Motives

Aside from the motives discussed so far, other factors of aseemingly more ‘superficial’ nature can also influence people’sdecision to join the Naxalite movement, or a particular Naxalitefaction. For instance, the popularity of different factions oftendepends simply on ‘who came first’. Whichever faction is thefirst to set foot in a particular area is likely to win broad support,if it talks about justice and rights and has the power to take cudgelson behalf of the underprivileged. Another example is the occa-sional transmission of political preferences from generation togeneration. I have come across families in Bhojpur where onecan meet second-generation or even third-generation cadres. Lastbut not least, the personality factor (personal appeal of cadres)has a strong influence on the popularity of different Naxalitegroups in particular areas. A leader of high integrity and reli-ability, who is able to guide the people and be with them throughthick and thin, often attracts many followers. A sound ideologymay have little following if its proponents are not individualsof high calibre.

Collective identities like caste, class and gender also play acrucial role in determining who joins the movement and why.By and large, an individual follows the family, the family followsthe caste, and the caste is influenced by other social groups ofsimilar status. A caste may be factionalised and have more thanone leader; political allegiance may be divided accordingly.

IVCase Study: Challenge

to Samanti Dabdaba in Ekwari

Bhojpur today is sitting on a volcanic edge. During the lastthree decades, ever since the struggle described by the labourersas izzat ki ladai (fight for dignity) began, many battles have been

fought. The struggle of the dalits against the samanti dabdaba(feudal power) of the upper castes and classes continues un-abated. This struggle has plunged the villages of five blocks ofBhojpur district (where the Liberation group is active) into anextended period of turmoil, the end of which is nowhere in sight.The story in Ekwari village (Bhojpur district) illustrates thesituation.

Ekwari is a village at war. The mood is tense, the class dividesharp and clear. People of both sides, participants and witnessesto the class war, can often be found discussing the latest eventsin low voices in small groups. These events are often dramatic.For instance, on November 25, 1995, when I was returning fromthe dalit tola of Ekwari to the main village with a local woman,we met another woman. In whispers the latter related to mycompanion that the police had unearthed a dead body from thenearby mango grove.

The deceased, a brahmin, was from a neighbouring village.He had been reported missing for around 10 days. Accordingto one version of the events, he had been kidnapped by membersof the Ranbeer Sena before being killed. This version came froma bhumihar who was among the kidnappers, but who maintainedthat he had tried to dissuade the others from killing the victimas he was a brahmin. The story, and the sight of the unearthedbody, aroused some curiosity from villagers and children. By theevening, however, the same villagers were engrossed in a filmthat was being shown in the open air. Clearly, there is nothingunusual about death in Ekwari. Since the Naxalite movementbegan, as many as 85 individuals have been killed on the sideof the landowners, and perhaps an equal or larger number onthe side of the poor.

Ekwari is one of the largest villages in Sahar block, with apopulation of approximately 9,000 in 1995. Roughly, one thirdare kisans (farmers), and the remaining two thirds are mazdoors(labourers) who are either completely landless or have marginallandholdings. Bhumihars (about 250 households) are the majorlandowners in Ekwari. As Sankh Singh, a prominent bhumiharleader who was on the ‘hit list’ of the Naxalites, tried to emphasise,the landed in Ekwari were not zamindars but kisans who usedto be ryots of the zamindar of Benaras before independence.19

The largest landholdings in the village today are below 100bighas. However, landowners in Ekwari are called zamindarsby the labourers since they not only own a major share of theland but also retain overwhelming political control over villageinstitutions such as the gram panchayat.

It was this insistence on maintaining political control that gotthe bhumihars in trouble in 1967. During the fourth stateassembly elections that year, Jagdish Mahato (an educatedyouth of koeri caste) was severely beaten by the henchmen ofthe landlords for attempting to prevent them from rigging votes.20

Meanwhile, news of the Naxalbari uprising (which tookplace the same year) had spread far and wide. Naxaliteslogans calling for armed revolution had also started appearingon the walls of some towns of Bhojpur. The Naxalite messagecaught the imagination of Jagdish Mahato, who startedlooking for like-minded friends. In this endeavour, he wasjoined by Rameshwar Ahir, a yadav dacoit turned rebel who hadreturned to Ekwari after serving a 12-year sentence formurdering a constable.21 The izzat ki ladai (fight for dignity)had begun. At this stage, Jagdish Mahato is reported tohave travelled to West Bengal in order to forge links withNaxalite leaders there. The Naxalites who subsequently came


to Bhojpur later developed into the present CPI(ML)Liberation.22

Initially, the focus was on annihilation of oppressivelandlords and their henchmen, and a fight against the state. Thestruggle against the landlords was not only about land, butalso against their samanti (feudal) attitudes and behaviour.Jagdish Mahato is said to have described this hangover fromthe past in the following words: “the landlord’s moustache hasgot burnt but the twirl still remains”. Jagdish Mahato andRameshwar Ahir were killed in 1972 and 1975, respectively.Sometimes fondly called Marx and Engels, these two foundersof the Naxalite movement in Bhojpur had no prior Communistbackground.

After the formation of the mass fronts of the Liberation groupin the early 1980s, the movement started focusing on other issues,such as land and wages. Diverse means of struggle were usedincluding strikes, dharnas, roadblocks and gheraos. These struggleson different issues were often against the same landlord. Oneexample is the struggle of the Naxalites against Sankh Singh andhis family.

Sankh Singh was considered the leader of the anti-Naxalitegroup in Ekwari in 1995. He and his relatives, including his sonsand nephews, were said to be leading members of the RanbeerSena, a Bhumihar-based army formed in 1994. When I inter-viewed Sankh Singh in November 1995, he mentioned that hisland had been lying parti (fallow) for five years due to the aarthiknakebandi (economic blockade) imposed on his family by theNaxalites. Before 1990, he said, he had employed on an averagearound 150 labourers in his fields. The blockade extended to alleconomic activities. One truck and two buses plied by one ofhis close relatives were destroyed; his tractor was burnt. Anyattempts to overcome the blockade were thwarted and sometimeshad serious repercussions, including many instances of firingfrom both sides. Five members of his family had been killed,beginning with his father, Nathuni Singh, in 1972.23

An observer in Ekwari is left somewhat confused as to whatreally is the issue at the centre of the class war that has torn thevillage apart year after year. Ceiling-surplus land does not existin Ekwari. Wages remain below the minimum prescribed, andlow in comparison to the levels that prevail in struggle areas ofJehanabad. Sankh Singh and the mukhiya, Baijnath Singh,contended that, “kuch baat ki ladai naike, gundai ki ladai ba”(there is no issue involved in this fight, it is only hooliganism).24

Asked who the gundas (hooligans) were, they pointed to theNaxalite leaders, whom they said had incited the mazdoorsagainst them.

And yet all this ‘ladai’ has not been without results. The powerof the landed upper castes, and their samanti dabdaba (feudalpower), have been decisively challenged. The dignity of a landlessagricultural labourer, and of the labourer as a human being, hasbeen achieved. This local ‘freedom struggle’ has also createdunprecedented political consciousness among the labourers.

The Ekwari story is an extreme case, but similar stories applyto many other villages of Bhojpur. In Dhanwar Bihta and Belaur,for instance, bitter struggles have been fought against localtyrants. Notable struggles against samanti dabdaba have alsotaken place in other villages such as Gorpa, Gulzarpur, Baruhi,Nannor, and Nadhi. The outcome of these battles is much thesame everywhere: feudal power has been undermined and thedignity of the labourers has been restored, but protracted violencehas also left a long trail of blood and tears.

VThe Struggle on the Ground

The Naxalite movement is best understood through its actionson the ground. Its ideology is understood by the people fromthese actions. In the remainder of this article, I shall focus on‘the struggle on the ground’ – the specific issues that the movementhas taken up and the strategies and tactics it has followed.25

Basic Economic Rights

As the preceding section illustrates, the struggle issues activelytaken up by the Naxalite movement reflect the practical needsand expectations of its mass base. These relate primarily to whatmay be seen as basic economic, social and political rights. Amongthe economic issues that have been taken up by the movementare (1) land rights; (2) minimum wages; (3) common propertyresources; and (4) housing.

Land Rights

In Naxalite areas, one occasionally comes across a red flagresolutely planted in the middle of a field. This means that theland is contested and that the Naxalites have staked their claimover it. This land is usually ‘surplus land’ (above the legalceiling), or misappropriated gairmajurwa (common) land. Insome cases, the land belongs to an absentee landlord.

If the claims of the Naxalites are uncontested by the landowner,the transfer of land is fairly smooth. However, this is rarely thecase. Usually, the landowner contests the claim, and a prolongedbattle begins. If the issue cannot be resolved through peacefulmeans, it often results in violent clashes. If the Naxalites win,the land is subsequently distributed to the poor for agricultureor housing purposes. There have also been instances of landremaining in the hands of the party (instead of being distributed)and being leased to sangathan members on a sharecropping basis.I have not come across any instances of land being distributedto women.

The movement has also attempted to change tenancy relations,for example by demanding the implementation of tenancy regu-lations and better sharecropping terms. In some areas, the movementhas attempted to enforce batai (equal shares for landlord andtenant), though this struggle has not been without problems. Inparticular, when the terms of sharecropping improve, landlordssometimes react by reducing the amount of land they lease out.

Minimum Wages

In many villages, prior to a wage struggle, the labourers weregiven approximately half paseri kacchi (1 kg and 750 gms) ofcoarse rice with some lunch and sometimes also breakfast.There was no knowledge of an officially stipulated minimumwage. Today, in struggle areas, even though the wages are notuniform, they tend to be in the range of 3 to 3.5 kgs of grainper day. This increase has had a positive impact in the non-Naxalite villages too.

There has also been an increase in the wages paid to thelabourers at harvest time. Prior to the wage strikes, the harvestersused to receive one bojha (headload) for every 21 bojhas ofharvested crop; this has risen to 1 bojha for every 10 bojhas.The increased rate benefits not only the casual labourers, but also


the halwahas or bandhuas (who are employed for one agriculturalyear). In addition, some other changes have been achieved,including an equal wage for women (even though gender dif-ferences persist in some areas), a set number of work hours, andan improvement in the quality of grain paid.

A unique aspect of these wage strikes is the degree of unitynot only among the labourers of a particular village, but alsoamong the labourers of the surrounding area, making it impos-sible for a landlord to hire labourers from nearby villages. Often,these wage strikes are part of a general economic strike againsta landlord, called aarthik nakebandi (economic embargo orblockade) – as happened to Sankh Singh in Ekwari. Such ablockade includes a boycott of the landlord and his family bythe labouring poor of different castes who refuse their servicesto him. As a consequence of these blockades, land may be leftfallow for many years. The situation can often take a volatileturn and lead to violence.

Struggle for just wages is one of the most important issuestaken up by the Naxalite movement in central Bihar, with con-siderable success. The advantages of this issue were recognisedearly on: it could be taken up by the mass fronts of the CPI(ML)without much dependence on the underground squads; it coulddraw and unite a large number of labourers across castes on aclass basis; and it had a good chance of success since an increasein wages was long overdue. For all these reasons, the wage issuewas a useful starting point for the Naxalite groups.26 But asstories from village after village in central Bihar reveal, even

to achieve this basic minimum, long struggles had to be wagedwhich at times became bloody battles.

Other Economic Issues

The Naxalite movement has also fought for the rights of thepoor to common property resources. In doing so, the movementhas asserted the identity of the poor as equal members of a village.These struggles are over gairmajurwa land as well as full accessto the village pond. Used for washing clothes, bathing buffaloes,etc, these ponds are also an important source of fish. The questionof who has rights over the fish has never been settled to thesatisfaction of all the villagers. The general government policyhas been to auction the fish to the highest bidder. Often, the locallandlord gets the fish for a low price since his bid goes unchal-lenged. This system is considered unfair by the poorer sectionsof the village, for whom fish is a much needed food supplement.The Naxalite movement has challenged the landlords’ monopoly,established control over ponds on behalf of the poor and deviseda fairer system of distribution.

Another economic issue often taken up by the Naxalite movementrelates to housing. Owning a residential plot is very importantfor the poor, since it means some security. Living on homesteadland belonging to the landlord (the standard arrangement in earlierdays) increases the dependence of labourers on their employers.With the help of Naxalite groups, labourers are sometimes ableto resettle on reclaimed gairmajurwa land.


Basic Social Rights

The Naxalite movement in central Bihar has fought againstexploitative relations in social as well as in economic terms. Izzat(dignity or honour) is one of the crucial social freedoms it hasattempted to restore. Even though the dalits of the region continueto face many deprivations, there is now a greater sense ofconfidence and autonomy. Most importantly, the Naxalitemovement has been effective in its assertion of dalits as humanbeings and individuals entitled to equal rights. Instances of rapeof lower caste women have decreased dramatically. Arbitratrybeatings are no longer tolerated. Labourers are free to sell theirlabour to whomever they please. Dalit children are able to goto school. Labourers are able to wear clean clothes, sit in frontof their homes on khatias (string cots) welcome their guestswithout interference from the landlords, amongst other gains. Allthis has come about because the landed are no longer in a positionto exercise illegitimate power with impunity.

Another important social right is protection from violence andharassment. Insecurity and fear have always been part of the dailylives of the poor. To some extent this continues today; the Naxalitemovement itself, and the repression it has unleashed, havecontributed to the general atmosphere of fear, mistrust andsuspicion that prevails in central Bihar. However, some progresshas been made in eliminating some earlier forms of violence,most prominently the violence of organised gangs.

Organised criminal gangs (giroh) proliferated in many districtsof Bihar since the 1960s. These samanti rangdaar (feudalhooligans) did not belong to any particular caste, though a largenumber of them were bhumihars, rajputs, or from middle castessuch as yadav and kurmi. In 1978, when Party Unity first triedto build its base in Jehanabad district, it had to tackle thedominance of criminal gangs in the area. The most notorious gangsin Jehanabad then were those led by Raja and Deepa, Ramanand,Hare Ram, and Bindu Singh. As one of the activists said:

Ever since I became old enough to understand, I have seen thepeople of my village and surrounding area being in their viciousgrip. The villagers were totally frustrated. One giroh specialisedin stealing cattle (maveshi chor). They would come in the nightand take bullocks, buffaloes, cows, and even goats and pigs fromthe dalits. Another giroh used to be called motor chor. After 1967,when electricity came to our villages for the first time, these gangsdismantled the new fittings and stole the cables and any other itemof value. Besides, there were numerous other instances of theft,molestation, rape, threats and intimidation. Except the landlordswho could organise their own protection and were recognised astakatwar (powerful) by the marauders, all others – the landless,middle peasants and even rich peasants – were affected.27

The Naxalite squads were effective in targeting the mostnotorious gang leaders, and considerably reduced the strengthof these groups.28 Elimination of criminal gangs has been aconcern not only of Party Unity, but also of other Naxalite groups.In this respect they have achieved substantial results.

Basic Political Rights

Struggles for the economic and social rights mentioned earlier,by their very nature, involve an assertion of basic political rights.For example, when the poor struggle for minimum wages, or landreform, they are asserting their constitutional right to justice.Similarly, women who used to be constantly exposed to arbitrary

sexual harassment (even rape), and who now have the powerto resist and even punish their aggressors, can be seen to defendtheir constitutional right to personal liberty and dignity.

Here again, the Naxalite movement has achieved some success.The poor and oppressed of rural Bihar, who used to be invisibleas far as upper classes and the state were concerned, are nowa visible – even powerful – political force. Agricultural labourersare able to think of themselves as citizens with the same politicalrights as the landlords, and to a large extent even to assert thisequality in practice. Also, their perception of poverty as a matterof ‘fate’ (naseeb) has changed; now they often see it as a matterof injustice. In other respects, too, the poor of Bihar strike theobserver for their political consciousness. In both rural and urbanareas, people take strong interest in political matters, and are wellinformed about political issues.

Another important political right which has been denied tomany in central Bihar is the right to vote. People were often keptaway from the polling booths by henchmen of the upper castesand classes who would cast the votes on their behalf in favourof their own candidate. Since Liberation included participation inelection as part of its political line, people in Liberation areas havebeen able to exercise their right to vote. In these areas, the party’scandidates are contesting elections, cadres oppose booth captur-ing, and the party ensures that its supporters are able to vote.29

VIMeans of Struggle

Open and Nonviolent Forms of Struggle

Open actions of the Naxalite movement have received littleattention from the media or the state. However, in practice a largepart of the Naxalite movement’s activities are ‘nonviolent’. Thishas been so in the second phase of the Naxalite movement (from1977 onwards), when different groups began to organise openactivities with varying degrees of emphasis. Over the years,nonviolent protest has taken many forms and has been gearedto varying objectives. Common forms of nonviolent action includesabha (meeting), bandh (closure), aarthik nakebandi (economicboycott), samajik bahishkar (social boycott), jan adalat (people’scourt), dharnas (e g, the 14-day dharna organised by Liberation inAra against Ranbeer Sena in 1995), gheraos (e g, the famous gheraoof the state assembly after the Arwal massacre in 1986), rallies(including silent marches, torch processions, and more), chakka-jaam (road blocks), putla dahan (effigy burning), and of coursestrikes. Even hunger strikes have figured in this rainbow of agita-tions, as when Liberation MLAs and cadres launched an indefinitefast after the Bathani tola massacre in 1996, demanding an enquiry.

Cultural media (sanskritik madhyam) such as songs and playshave an important role in mobilisation, especially since a largemajority of the people in central Bihar are illiterate. Often thesongs are made by people themselves and convey their existingreality with great poignancy. The cultural fronts of the Naxalitemovement (such as PU’s Abhivayakti) are very popular. Someof their songs, published in small booklets, are so popular thateveryone seems to know them.

Underground and Armed Forms of Struggle

Underground and armed action has been an important part ofthe Naxalite movement from its inception. In the first phase of


the movement, when mass mobilisation was considered un-necessary, the movement relied almost exclusively on armedtactics. This changed with the formation of open fronts.

In the case of Liberation and MCC, people became familiarwith the underground party before the mass organisations, sincethe latter were formed only in the 1980s. Liberation’s open fronts(in particular the Indian People’s Front) were able to flourishbecause the party made a conscious decision to promote massorganisations. MCC, in contrast, continued to emphasise armedaction and its open fronts never gained much popular support.

By the time PU was formed in the late 1970s, the importanceof building mass movements was already felt. Accordingly, PUdecided to begin with mass movements and then slowly buildits armed wing. But in the very first meetings with labourers inSikaria village (Jehanabad district), they realised the importanceof building armed strength. According to a senior member ofParty Unity, who was present in these meetings:

This was in 1979. There was an atmosphere of terror in the wholeregion due to the feudal forces and criminal gangs. Even thoughthe labourers had heard about us and wanted to speak to us, theywere too scared to invite us to their village. However, we wereable to establish contact with a few active members of the JPmovement, and had asked them to arrange a meeting with somelabourers, introducing us as individuals who belonged to a garibonki party (party of the poor). On the agreed day, around midnight,we met in the badhar (open fields) outside the village. We expecteda small group, but were surprised to find around 40-50 men waitingfor us. They had come with lathis, bhalas and gadasas.The terrorised villagers explained that they would have taken usto the village but could not because it was too risky. The malikshad warned them that if they brought the ‘Naxalites’ to the villagethey would be severely punished. If a dalal (informant) reportedthe meeting to the maliks, in all likelihood their hamlet would beburnt. ‘Then who will protect us?’ they asked. The labourers didnot even have the right to meet. The attitude of the maliks was,‘raad-raiyan meeting kare, aur hum log bardash karenge?’ (ifthe rabble dare have a meeting, are we going to tolerate it?).In this initial meeting we stressed that issues such as izzat, wages,land and basic democratic rights could be taken up. But weemphasised that the fight would have to be fought on our ownstrength. We would have to be prepared to face the feudal forcesdirectly and not depend on the government. When we explainedthis, the labourers immediately said: “We have understood. Youare Naxalvadis (Naxalites), you talk about takat (strength).”People started coming in large numbers. After a few meetings webegan to feel that there was something they were hesitating to tellus. Finally, one of them spoke out. He said that they had beencoming to meeting after meeting expecting each time to gethathiyar (arms), but that even though we talked about the needfor samna (confrontation) and hathiyarband kranti (armed revo-lution), we were not providing arms. When did we plan to do so?We understood then that they were actually demanding arms.30

In practical terms, underground armed action is undertaken bythe dasta (squad). A dasta tends to have approximately six to10 members. Most dasta members are local residents from thelabouring classes. Some squads have middle-class members,possibly from other states such as West Bengal. These dastasare organised on militaristic lines (involving hierarchy, disciplineand a uniform).

The squad functions under the directives of the party andundertakes a variety of actions such as safaya (annihilation) ofa landlord, attack on a police picket (e g, to snatch rifles andammunition), or even a strike on another Naxalite faction. In the

case of annihilation of landlords, advance warnings (includingwritten warnings) are usually given, and alternative measuressuch as boycotts are often tried before resorting to safaya.Landlords who have chosen to mend their ways have the optionto ‘surrender’ in front of a lok adalat.

The most important role of the squad is to protect the openfronts, which are often attacked or repressed. The relationshipbetween the open and underground movement, however, is notwithout tensions.

Not all squad members are members of the party. In this respect,a squad member is like any other member of the open movementand has to pass the same criteria before he is accepted as a partymember. The fact that squad members are armed gives themquestionable power, considering that not all of them have beenfound suitable for party membership. On the other hand, beinga squad member involves little private gain and considerablerisks. Moreover, once a person chooses to be a member of a squadhe has few options. It is difficult if not impossible for him torevert to the life of an ordinary villager.

Mention should be made of the daily lives of squad members.These are individuals who have forsaken the sunlight and per-sonal freedom. Their life begins in darkness when the villageis asleep. A squad, for the sake of safety, has to be on the moveall the time. It leaves its base late at night and has to reach anew shelter before dawn. Danger is always present. Squad membersface the threat not only of ‘class enemies’ but also of possibleinformants within their own fold. They can never relax and haveto be alert at all times.

The daily life of squad members also has its share of depri-vations. They are almost totally dependent on the people for theirsurvival. And since most of their supporters are poor, their foodand shelter tend to be very basic. In their own self-perception,however, their living conditions have considerably improved.Pointing at his canvas shoes, one squad member mentioned thatin the initial years they could not even afford shoes, let alonea uniform. Wearing a lungi, they used to move barefoot in pitchdarkness, unmindful of thorns or sharp stones.

Connections between Open andUnderground Actions

As we saw, each Naxalite group has its open fronts, even thoughthe link between these fronts and the underground party is notpublicly acknowledged. Each of these fronts has its own mani-festo and organisational structure. Some of these open fronts,such as MKSS and IPF, have become very popular, not unlikesome autonomous movements in other parts of the country, suchas Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha (Chhattisgarh) and KashtakariSangathana (Maharashtra). However, there is a crucial differencebetween these movements and those led by the Naxalite fronts.The difference lies in the extent to which these movements areautonomous. In the case of the Naxalite fronts, the link with the‘party’ is vital. However discreetly, the party provides leadershipand protection to the open fronts. This link is both a strengthand a weakness of these open organisations.

The party consists of selected people who subscribe to itsideology and revolutionary aims. Some party members may alsobelong to open fronts and work as a link between the two. Theparty, of necessity, has to remain underground. It is the ultimateauthority and is not answerable for its decisions or actions tothe open fronts, though the latter need to hold the party in high


esteem if the relationship is to work. While the party providesthese organisations with protection, it also counts on their supportin many diverse ways. For example, it depends on them for logisticsupport, and relies on their cooperation to avoid being targetedby the police.31

The open and the underground are therefore intimately linked.Together they make a whole, each complementing the other. Therelationship between the two is, however, far from simple andat times even problematic. For example, in the mid-1980s atension between Party Unity and its open front, MKSS, resultedin a split in the latter. In the case of Liberation too, IPF had tobe disbanded in 1994 because it had become so popular that theidentity of the party itself was at stake.

VIIOn Revolutionary Violence

People in the Naxalite villages do not comment openly on thequestion of arms. The following testimonies of leading membersof MKSS in Jehanabad (some of whom may also have beenmembers of the party) illustrate their perceptions in this regard.

Without hathiyar (arms) we feel that we shall not be able to fight.With arms we feel confident, we feel we have shakti (power). Wefeel that we shall be able to settle the fight (final kar sakenge).If we do not have hathiyarband shakti (armed power), then howwill we counter the zamindar’s anger? Can his anger be counteredby just wagging our fingers at him? Without hathiyarband shakti,it is not possible to ensure janata ki raksha (people’s protection).If we do not have arms, then nobody will take our committee (theMKSS village committee) seriously. Each will do according tohis will. They will think – ‘what can they do to us’? When thisshakti is there, they feel dar (fear). They know that if they do notobey us then we have the power to destroy them.

To what extent are people prepared for the consequences ofthis kind of politics? By and large, people (especially cadres)are aware that incarceration and even death may well be the priceto pay. As one cadre said:

There will be a lot of problems. We may even be killed. Duringthis period, many have been martyred. Kheti mein beej dala jatahai aasha par ki ugega. Usi dhang se samajvaad ka ek sapnadekh kar hamlog chal rahe hai. (Seeds are sown in the field inthe hope that they will grow. Similarly, with a dream of socialismwe are walking.)

Time and again, while talking about some ‘martyred comrade’,party workers remind the people that tears have to become bullets.That their politics hides in its folds possibilities of destructionas well as creation, death as well as life, is clear to all Naxalites.Even in the midst of grief and suffering, a Naxalite may unflinch-ingly affirm that armed struggle is essential. So did Suraj, a youngPU squad member, as he sat leaning on the wall below the framedphotographs of Pankaj, Manju, and Aditya, his three sathis whohad been martyred the previous year. The lower part of his bodywas covered with a blanket and it took me some time to realisethat one of his legs had just been amputated after an encounterwith the police. I could discern no regret in his eyes, only someanxiety for his landless family which depended on him, the onlyson, for survival as his father (also a squad member) had alsobeen killed in action.

The perceived need for armed struggle is easy to understand.In central Bihar, killing of men who are guilty of extreme offencessuch as rape is to some extent culturally sanctioned – more so

than in other parts of India. Safaya of oppressive landlords isaccepted with similar relief. For labourers who have been at thereceiving end of upper caste violence for centuries, it is naturalto seize the opportunity to protect themselves, and maybe evento retaliate. This is all the more so as the state has miserablyfailed to give32 them protection; instead, it has preferred to protectthe property of the privileged.32 For those who see the captureof state power as the ultimate aim of the movement, resort toviolence is all the more necessary. Even the successful function-ing of the open fronts, according to the party, depends heavilyon the protection they receive from underground squads (calledsuraksha dasta, protection squads, by the party).

The use of arms has been effective in some respects. Forinstance, zamindars and dacoits are no longer able to terrorisepeople with impunity:

Because we have arms, the zamindars have shrunk with fear. Also,gangs of bandits and dacoits, who used to loot people’s houses,have been vanquished. Because of these atrocities, the people usedto feel very insecure. This has come to an end.

The possession of arms has also helped to resolve some conflictswithout actual resort to violence. For example, in Nyona village(Jehanabad), the activists pointed out that the wage issue wasresolved peacefully only because of the armed capacity of thesangathan. The same issue had been raised earlier by the labourers,using the same methods (e g, negotiation and peaceful strike),but the zamindars had ignored their demands, as they had nobargaining power.

Magar ham logon ke paas koi shakti to tha naheen ki us se hamun logon ko dabaen, to voh log mana naheen (we had no powerto put any pressure on them, so they ignored our demands).

The practice of revolutionary violence, however, raises severalproblems. First, the use of violence has created a tension betweensafaya (annihilation) and sangathan (organisation), or betweenhathiyarband shakti (armed power) and lok shakti (people’spower). Sangathan builds on lok shakti, and the Naxalitemovement owes much of its popularity to the open fronts. Incontrast, armed actions such as safaya have to be highly secretiveand rely on a hierarchical structure of power. It is difficult forthe sangathan to be truly democratic, and to fully realise thepower of lok shakti, as long as it is controlled by a secretive andhierarchical party. Moreover, even if the party owns up to itsactions as it always does, the state can only target the visibleactors, i e, members of the open fronts. In that sense the ‘van-guard’ party lets the people bear the brunt of its actions (whichare undertaken on behalf of the people, but without their knowl-edge and consent).

Another problem is the danger of escalation, as violence breedsviolence. While the need for suraksha (protection) is invokedto justify violence, it is not clear whether people are safer todaythan they used to be. They are better armed, but this has alsoled to a backlash on the part of upper classes and castes. Whilepeople are less vulnerable to unilateral violence from the land-lords, they are more exposed to the spiral of retaliatory violence.The spiral of violence also runs the risk of reducing the revo-lutionary class struggle to a ‘politics of revenge’, well capturedby what one hears at the local level on both sides, khoon ka badlakhoon se lenge (blood will be avenged with blood). Often, atthe peak of the conflict between caste senas and one of theNaxalite factions, revolutionary activity gets reduced to mere tit-for-tat strategy. In the process, other activities are neglected as


most of the energy of the cadres is focused on defence andretaliation. The revolutionary value of this retaliatory violenceis far from clear.

A third issue is the corrupting influence of armed power.Unprincipled individuals may join the movement out of attractionfor armed power, for the sake of private gain. Also, there is alwaysa risk that arms may not be used responsibly within the movement.Animosity or factionalism among Naxalite groups, for instance,has often taken a lethal turn.33 Even if armed power is notmisused, the mere possession of arms by some discouragescriticism and dissent within the sangathan.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that the price of thisretaliatory violence is paid first and foremost by ordinary people.Many parts of central Bihar have reached a war-like situation,where people live in constant terror and suspicion, and areexposed to the worst forms of violence on a daily basis. Peoplehave been living under these circumstances for many years andcountless lives have been lost. Even if the spiral of violence hasrevolutionary value, the question remains whether it is justified.34

The Naxalite leaders argue that there was no alternative.However, the possibility of alternatives should not be dismissedlightly. The most prominent achievements of the Naxalitemovement (increase in wages, assertion of izzat, resistance againstsocial oppression, claiming illegally occupied land) could per-haps have been attained without large-scale violence if the Naxaliteshad greater faith in the power of popular mobilisation. No doubtsome lives would have been lost due to repression but the spiralof retaliatory and wasteful violence might have been averted.

VIIIConcluding Remarks35

The declared goal of the Naxalite movement – revolution –remains unaccomplished. As we reflect on this, it becomes clearthat revolution is not a widely-shared goal in the movement, butrather a dream of the leadership. People do aspire to badal(change) in their lives and the society at large. Badal, however,does not mean an affirmation of kranti (revolution). When peoplejoin the movement, it is assumed that they stand for kranti, or thatthey will do so in due course (with a rise in their ‘political conscious-ness’). In fact, they often join the movement for short-term goals,in response to their immediate situation. Interpreting the move-ment in this light helps to assess its achievements and failures.

The main achievement of the Naxalite movement in centralBihar is that it has empowered the labouring and oppressedclasses. The confidence of agricultural labourers, the poorest ofthe poor in this region, has increased remarkably. They have beenable to challenge many oppressive practices, and the equationsof power at the local and regional levels have changed drastically.In their self-image as well as in the perception of their formermasters, they are no longer vulnerable or inconsequential. Powerand fear have changed houses, at least to some extent. Thestruggle for izzat has not been in vain.

Having said this, we need to ask to what extent this empower-ment has translated into a ‘better life’. Respect and self-respectthemselves are of course part of a better life – something thelabourers value dearly. However, this is not the end of theiraspirations. Like everyone else, they also long for an improve-ment in their everyday existence: better food and housing, educationfor their children, adequate employment, freedom from fear andviolence, leisure and laughter. In that respect the outcome of the

Naxalite movement is mixed. Empowerment has been achievedonly at the cost of considerable suffering. There has been freedomfrom old fears but not all fears – old fears have been replacedwith new ones. Similarly, while there has been an increase inwages, reclaiming of gairmajurwa land for housing purposes,and some seizing of ceiling surplus land for agricultural purposes,development has been a casualty. In the climate of tension andfear that prevails in central Bihar, development activity (bothprivate and public) is extremely difficult. Naxalite leaders havetaken little interest in enhancing the quality of life in the villages,arguing that all reform would have to follow revolution. In fact,development efforts like building roads have often been hindered,e g, by extracting taxes from the contractors. The bottom lineis that the Naxalite leaders are not interested in the ‘development’of the region. Some even consider that the more underdevelopedthe region, the better are the prospects of revolution. They regarddevelopment as antagonistic to revolutionary consciousness. Also,darkness and inaccessibility (in the absence of roads and elec-tricity) mean physical safety and some protection from staterepression.

However, these dire conditions under which the Naxalitemovement operates are taxing for the people as well as for theactivists. An observer can sense a kind of tiredness if not ex-haustion among the people. In many places where the Naxalitemovement was active in the past, this has led to a situation ofstalemate. Former activists often slip into being politically in-active, or defect to other political parties that are less demanding.After so much hardship, and with no imminent end to the strife,it is understandable that some of them should give up. Revolutionhas turned out not to be a short-term affair, and nor is a protracted‘people’s war’ easy to sustain.

Does the Naxalite movement have a future? I would argue thatit has not lost its relevance, and may have considerable potential.The need for a movement committed to the interests of the poorremains undiminished. Mainstream political parties have paid lipservice to popular slogans such as garibi hatao (remove poverty),and may be able to get the vote of the poor, but the poor areunder no illusion that these parties represent them.

However, the Naxalite movement will thrive only to the extentthat its vision resonates with the people. The wider the gapbetween the two, the higher the chances that the movement willfizzle out. The present formula is a marriage of conveniencebetween the leaders who dream of a Maoist revolution and peoplewho aspire for practical change. In order to bring about a genuinepeople’s movement, the Naxalite leaders have to be ready to walkat the pace of the people and let their concerns guide the visionof the movement.

When the movement has done this, it has been extremelypopular. This is the experience of the open fronts. In the caseof both Liberation and Party Unity, it is really the mass fronts(e g, IPF and MKSS) that have caught people’s imagination.People identify with the mass fronts because it is in these frontsthat they really participate. When villagers refer to hamra party(our party), often they are referring to the mass fronts. The massfronts are accountable to the people, since they depend onpeople’s support and cannot afford to ignore their concerns. Itis between the underground party and the people that the dangerof a gap of vision arises.

The main problems of the Naxalite movement relate to the partyrather than to the open fronts. For example, factionalism is mainlya problem of the Naxalite ‘parties’. Caught in the mire of internecine


conflicts, the various Naxalite factions end up working againstthe interests of the very people they claim to defend. The quarrelsbetween party leaders inevitably lead to divisions among thepeople themselves, with, say, agricultural labourers of one factionbeing pitted against those of another. If people’s concerns wereto guide the vision of these individual factions, the risk offactionalism would be reduced. Indeed, there would be morecommon ground, and ideological differences would take theback seat. If the Naxalite movement unites and focuses onpeople’s concerns, it could make a real difference in central Biharand beyond.

Postscript

Eight years have passed since the fieldwork for this essay wascompleted. Meanwhile the situation in Bihar (and the new stateof Jharkhand which was formed in 2000) has not changed much.In the continued absence of credible governance, the lives of therural poor are still mired in deprivation, insecurity, strife andstruggle. Corruption, criminalisation and violence have furtherpervaded the fabric of the society and politics in the state. Realdemocracy in Bihar remains an elusive dream.

The Naxalite brand of politics continues to dominate anddetermine the contours of alternative politics in Bihar. A sharperpolarisation however has emerged between the major Naxalitegroups, specifically between Liberation on the one hand and aconsolidation of likeminded ‘underground’ parties on the other.Party Unity had merged with the People’s War Group on August 11,1998 and formed People’s War (PW). Meanwhile, with thestrengthening of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) after1996, and the formation of the Coordination Committee of MaoistParties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) on July 1,2001, there was a stronger emphasis on unification of Maoistforces in south Asia. Even as PW continued its negotiations withMCC, the latter merged with several other smaller groups in-cluding its own splinter group Revolutionary Communist Centre(Maoist) which had split from it in 1999 and a Punjab-basedgroup, Revolutionary Communist Centre (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist). The new organisation formed in January 2003 was calledMaoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). On October 14,2004, PW and MCCI have merged and formed the CommunistParty of India (Maoist).

Amongst other changes that need to be mentioned, one is thespread of the movement to new areas. While central Bihar remainsa stronghold, the movement has grown stronger in other regions.In the intervening years it has made impressive inroads in northBihar districts, especially in Champaran and Siwan. This appliesto both the Liberation group as well as to the underground parties.

In the years following the merger with PWG in 1998, therehas been a marked decrease in open and democratic forms ofstruggle and a greater focus on militaristic interventions in erstwhilePU areas. As it is, the mass movements suffered due to theactivities of the Ranbeer Sena, which spread beyond Bhojpur(where it emerged in 1994) to adjoining districts of Jehanabad,Gaya and Patna. However, significantly, this period has alsowitnessed a weakening of the Sena on account of internal conflicts,which worsened after the arrest of the Ranbeer Sena founder,Barmeshwar Singh on August 29, 2002. As a result, massacresof the poor have also declined in recent years.

In 2001-02, internecine conflict between PW and MCC on theone hand and Liberation on the other was at its height. Even

though this has decreased recently, Liberation neverthelesscontinues to be targeted on account of being ‘revisionist’ (e g,participating in electoral politics). Meanwhile, in Liberationareas, the panchayat elections in 2001 (held in Bihar for the firsttime after 1978) saw impressive participation of people and localleaders (often dalit) who had emerged in the last two decadesof concerted mobilisation and action. A significant number ofdalit mukhiyas have now replaced their upper caste-classpredecessors.

Underground Naxalite groups have also made their presencefelt at the national level by building alliances with other leftmovements in the country in order to fight the forces of impe-rialism and globalisation. A notable effort in this respect wasMumbai Resistance, organised as a parallel event to the WorldSocial Forum in January 2004. Likewise, links with the Com-munist Party of Nepal as well as other Marxist-Leninist-Maoistparties elsewherehave been forged.

The state, for its part, continues to use diverse tactics to dealwith the Naxalite movement. In the intervening years, a fewinstances of death of Naxalites in police custody and encounterkillings have occurred besides arrests of important leaders likeArvind of Party Unity. The Supreme Court on April 15, 2002confirmed the death penalty on four poor peasants from Gayadistrict who were involved in the Bara massacre led by MCCin 1992. A mercy petition to commute their death penalty intolife sentence is pending with the President of India. After thePrevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) came into force in June2002 it was extensively used in Jharkhand; in fact, Jharkhandhas the largest number of POTA detainees in the country. Andeven as the UPA government repealed POTA in 2004, its pre-decessor Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,1985 (TADA) is still in force. Indeed, nine years after itslapse, TADA was alive and kicking in the plains of Bihar. OnApril 2, 2004, the Supreme Court convicted 14 persons to lifeimprisonment under the Act.36

On different lines, in Andhra Pradesh peace talks wereinitiated with People’s War and Janashakti leaders in Octo-ber 2004 following more than five years of effort by theCommittee of Concerned Citizens. The talks were welcomed, butby January 2005 it appeared that the brief hope about peacehad evaporated.

Email: [email protected]

Notes[This paper is based on my doctoral thesis (Bhatia 2000). I am grateful toAnand Chakravarty, Tilak Dasgupta, Jean Dreze, David Hardiman, GeoffreyHawthorn and Manoranjan Mohantry for helpful comments].

1 Insightful studies of the Naxalite movement in Bihar include Mukherjeeand Yadav (1980), Urmilesh (1991), Nimbran (1992), Singh (1995),Gupta (1993), Sinha (1996), among others; see also Banerjee (1984).In addition to these major studies, articles have been published on specificaspects of the Naxalite movement in Bihar, such as women’s participation,electoral participation, or the evolution of the movement in specific areas.Party literature and media reports provide a rich source of primarymaterial (see particularly Sen et al 1978, Liberation 1986 and Ghosh1992).

2 Ranajit Guha (1982) also argues for a politics of the people in the contextof the history of Indian nationalism. He contrasts this approach with theelitist historiography of Indian nationalism which ‘fails to acknowledge,far less interpret, the contribution made by the people on their own, thatis, independently of the elite to the making and development of thisnationalism’ [Guha 1982:3].

��


3 In this paper, the term ‘central Bihar’ is rooted in the geography ofundivided Bihar (inclusive of the districts that are now part of Jharkhand,earlier ‘south Bihar’). Strictly speaking, this region is now in ‘southBihar’, in terms of the geography of post-2000 Bihar. Within centralBihar, the study villages were located mainly in the districts of Patna,Jehanabad, Gaya, Aurangabad and Bhojpur.

4 The year 1977 is an appropriate demarcating line because it marks theend of one phase and the beginning of another for the Naxalite movementnot only in Bihar, but also in India as a whole [Bhatia 2000].

5 The AICCCR was an interim organisation formed in Calcutta in November1967 (shortly after the Naxalbari uprising), in an attempt to uniteall revolutionary communist groups. Some groups that supported theNaxalbari struggle did not join AICCCR, notably the ‘Dakhin Deshgroup’, which included the original leaders of the present MaoistCommunist Centre. On May 1, 1969, AICCCR was disbanded andCPI(ML) was formed.

6 This section draws on interviews with Vinod Mishra (January 17, 1996),then general secretary of the CPI(ML) Liberation, Pawan Sharma (April 21,1994), then secretary of the Bihar state committee, and Ramjatan Sharma(October 17, 1996), then secretary of the Bihar state committee.

7 The Liberation group has been contesting elections since 1985. Untilthe 1995 assembly elections, it was contesting under the banner of IPF,from 1995 onwards it started contesting as CPI(ML).

8 This section is based on primary literature of the party as well as interviewswith prominent members of the party and its front organisations.

9 These were: Centre for Unity, a small West Bengal-based organisation;a faction of CPI(ML) CT which called itself Coordination Centre andwas functioning in Punjab; and the Bihar faction of the CCRI(ML) whichwas active in the Khagadia district of north Bihar. For further details,see Bhatia (2000).

10 The two other trends consisted of (1) individuals and groups who ceasedto appreciate anything positive in the Naxalbari movement and theCPI(ML) and either left it or ‘turned towards a right deviationist,liquidationist or revisionist line’; and (2) others who were not ready toadmit that some mistakes had been made and continued to propagatethe original line without any changes and ‘drifted towards extreme formsof left sectarianism’ (CPI(ML) Party Unity, 1997, p 1).

11 At the local level the organisation continues to be called ‘Sangram Samiti’or ‘MKSS’; hence, I have continued to refer to the organisation as MKSSin this paper. This is also to avoid confusion with other names (e g,Mazdoor Kisan Mukti Manch) by which the organisation was knownin different regions in 1986-94, in order to circumvent the ban. Since1994, when the organisation was officially renamed MKSP, manydocuments have been authored as MKSP. I have retained MKSP whilereferring to these.

12 I have used the word ‘party’ for MCC, as I have for Liberation and PartyUnity; however, in MCC’s case the term is not strictly accurate sinceMCC even today considers itself a ‘coordination committee’. In practice,MCC is often referred to as a party, and the term also helps to distinguishthe underground organisation from its mass fronts.

13 See Liberation, July 1971-January 1972, Vol 5, No 1; reprinted in Senet al, 1978, pp 313-20.

14 For further discussion of massacres, see Bhatia (1997, 2000). It is aftersuch a counter-massacre that MCC was banned, in 1987.

15 This includes not only the ‘scheduled castes’, but also lower backwardcastes. It is important to note that while most scheduled-caste familiesare landless, the converse is not true: a large proportion among the landlessbelong to lower backward castes.

16 Observations from MCC’s area of influence have not been possible sinceI was unable to conduct fieldwork in those areas. In Liberation areassuch as Bhojpur, the atmosphere was too tense for people to contemplatereflective questions of this kind.

17 This and the following quotes are from Party Unity cadres and squadmembers.

18 In some cases, individuals have been reported to join the movement forseemingly trivial reasons, which however matter a great deal to the personconcerned. For example, an activist of MKSP reported that Ajit had joinedthe open front in Gaya because he had lost his bullock and wanted helpto find it. Another person approached MKSP for help in a disputeinvolving a neighbour’s newly-constructed window.

19 By this he did not mean that bhumihars were self-cultivating. Due tosocial restrictions, bhumihar men do not touch the plough, and bhumiharwomen do not even go to the fields. Bhumihars are therefore highlydependent on the labourers for cultivation.

20 Mukherjee and Yadav (1980), pp 43-44.21 Mukherjee and Yadav (1980), pp 53-54.22 See the first part of this article.23 Sankh Singh himself was subsequently killed by the Naxalites, about

two years after I interviewed him.24 They also claimed that prior to the Naxalite intervention they used to

have good relations with the mazdoors, based on mutual dependence.As Sankh Singh maintained, ‘mazdoor hamara hath ba, goud ba’ (labourersare our hands and feet).

25 This account of the struggle on the ground should not be regarded asexhaustive. Some important aspects of the Naxalite movement, such asthe response of the state as well as of upper castes and classes, internecineconflicts within the movement, and engagement with electoral politics,are dealt with in Bhatia (2000).

26 However, one disadvantage of wage struggles is that they are often partlydirected against small peasants who employ wage labour; this narrowsdown the support base of the movement (personal communication fromAbhay, a PU leader).

27 Interview with Arvind, secretary, Mazdoor Kisan Sangram Parishad(MKSP), July 1996.

28 In some instances, the police was protecting these gang leaders. Forexample, even though the government had announced a cash prize ofRs 50,000 for Ramanand dacoit, when the Naxalites targeted him thepolice gave him wholehearted protection (in spite of which he waseventually killed).

29 MCC, for its part, has a policy of poll boycott and often threatens sanctionsagainst people who vote. However, MCC’s poll-boycott campaigns havebeen relatively unsuccessful (Bhatia, 2000).

30 Interview with PU leader, July 1996.31 Interestingly, many agricultural labourers refer to the mass fronts as

hamara party (our party). The word party therefore has different meanings,and has to be interpreted in context.

32 As one person put it, ‘jiske paas paisa hai uska yeh sarkar hai; jiskepaas paisa naheen hai uska duniya mein koi sahara naheen hai’(whoever has money, the government is his; those who have no moneyare without protection in the world).

33 The issue of factionalism within the Naxalite movement is dealt within Bhatia (2000), chapter 7.

34 Further, the spiral of violence contributes to a negative perception ofthe Naxalite movement in the minds of many observers, even those whoare otherwise sympathetic to the ideals of the movement.

35 This concluding section builds not only on the material presented earlier,but also on other aspects of my study of the Naxalite movement in centralBihar (Bhatia, 2000).

36 What is intriguing is not only that a lapsed law can still be in force,but also that seven of the convicts had already been tried by a TADAcourt in 1998 and deemed non-guilty.

ReferencesBanerjee, Sumanta (1984): India’s Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite

Uprising, Selectbook Service Syndicate, New Delhi.Bhatia, Bela (1997): ‘Anatomy of a Massacre’, Seminar, February.– (2000): ‘The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar’, PhD thesis, University

of Cambridge, to be published as a monograph.Ghosh, Suniti (ed) (1992): The Historic Turning-Point: A Liberation

Anthology, Vols 2, Calcutta, S K Ghosh.Guha, Ranajit (1982): ‘On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial

India’ in Ranajit Guha (ed), Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South AsianHistory and Society, Oxford University Press, Delhi.

Gupta, Tilak Das (1993): ‘Recent Developments in the Naxalite Movement’,Monthly Review, Vol 45, pp 8-23.

Mukherjee, Kalyan and Rajendra Yadav (1980): Bhojpur: Naxalism in thePlains of Bihar, Radhakrishna Prakashan, Delhi.

Nimbran, Amrik Singh (1992): Poverty, Land and Violence, Layman’sPublications, Patna.

Sen, Samar, Debabrata Panda and Ashish Lahiri (1978): Naxalbari andAfter: A Frontier Anthology, Vols 2, Kathashilpa, Calcutta.

Singh, Prakash (1995): The Naxalite Movement in India, Rupa and Co,New Delhi.

Sinha, Arvind (1996): ‘Naxalbari ke teen dashak’, Philhal, Vols 18 and 19,September 16 and October 1.

Urmilesh (1991): Bihar ka Sach: Krishi Sankat aur Khetihar Sangharsh,Prakashan Sansthan, New Delhi.

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