ADB and the Environment Case1

Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement with NGO Forum on the ADB

Southern Transport Development Project

Sri Lanka 1

Southern TransportDevelopment ProjectSri LankaContributors:

Rathnawalee Nettipola,

Janaka Kumara

Dilena Pahtragoda,

Cinthaka Kalutota

Suranja Kodithuwakku

by

HEMANTHAWITANAGE

Sri LankanWorkingGroup onTrade andIFIs

A Monitoring Framework for ADBs Environment Policy based on Four Case Studies

ADB and the Environment 2

Executive Summary

I. Introduction1. Project in General2. Project in Terms of its Sectoral Context History of the proposed Sri Lankan Expressway Network3. Project in Terms of its Country-specific Context

II. Project Description1. Origins to Status Quo2. Change Model3. Project Diary4. Concerns Weak public participation Inadequate Information Disclosure Inadequate Resettlement Changes in Project Design Lack of Alternative Options Assess ment and Faulty Evaluations Weak Environmental Standards Adverse Social Impacts

5. Activities Taken by Affected People and NGOs Filing of Human Rights Case Inspection Process Appeal to Supreme Court

III. Project Monitoring1. Monitoring Schedule2. Monitoring Plan3. Monitoring against national and ADB Environmental Provisions Project in Context of National Environmental Act Project in Context of ADB Environment Policy4. Monitoring against Desirable Environmental Standards5. Monitoring against Other ADB Policies

IV. Conclusion

O u t l i n e



Sri Lanka 3

A DBs EnvironmentalPolicy requires theconsideration of environmental problems indevelopment decisionmaking. The Environmental ImpactAssessment is a document whichanalyzes the environmental impacts.

The Southern Transport Develop-ment Project is a construction of anexpressway connecting Matara andColombo by a 128 kilometer road.The road crosses through four riverbasins and many other wetlands. Italso passes many villages and de-molishes over 1,200 houses.

The EIA was done for a three-ki-lometer corridor and it was not aproject specific EIA per se. It was sub-ject to heavy criticism as it did not prop-erly address the environmental and so-cial impacts.

The project is covered under theSri Lankan Environment Policy1 andthe Resettlement Policy2 and is alsosubject to ADB policies and provi-sions such as the Involuntary Resettle-ment Policy, the Operations Manual(OM) Section 20 from 1997 on Envi-ronmental Considerations in ADB Op-erations, the Information DisclosurePolicy and the Policy on Inspection.

The OM on Environmental Con-siderations has very few concretesafeguard provisions for environmen-

E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y

tal protection. One requirement isthe completion of an EnvironmentalImpact Assessment for Category Aprojects likely to have significant en-vironmental impacts. STDP falls in thiscategory. Even though an EIA wasdrafted for STDP, it is inadequatebecause it does not include all thegeographical areas covered by theroad trace, and secondly, does nottake into consideration major envi-ronmental concerns, such as thefact that the road crosses four riverbasins, over one hundred wetlandsand two thirds of trace is covered withpaddy fields. Further there is no envi-ronmental monitoring for the project.Social impacts were prioritised dueto the involvement of the affectedcommunities but environmental is-sues were not properly addressed.

The main reasons include the lack of consideration of the

environmental impacts bythe road designers,

lack of willingness to addressthe environmental issues dueto the road being used by poli-ticians for their own means

inadequate law enforce-ment in settling disputes overthe affected environment atlocal level,

Insufficient human capacityand funds in the project moni-toring and approving agen-cies such as Central Environ-mental Authority.



The local implementing agenciesdo not make it their priority to imple-ment relevant ADB policies. This maybe due to ignorance of the specificrequirements in the policies. In someinstances, the main implementingagency does not bind the contrac-tors and subcontractors to environ-mental provisions required by ADB.

The main contractor in STDPseems to be concerned about fol-lowing environmental requirements.However, it is impossible for the con-tractor to mitigate the environmen-tal impacts due to design problems.

The project still faces controver-sies due to significant social impacts.Although there is a resettlement planit was not released to the public. Thislack of transparency is a major rea-son for the disputes. The road con-struction has started from one endeven though some of the lands havenot yet been officially acquired. Thispressures the people and the agen-cies when taking decisions.

The approach of the ADB and therelevant government agency staff isnot acceptable. But the lessonslearned in this case show that peoplewere empowered in some areas tofight against the wrong decisions.Democratic space has been im-proved for some communities due tothe involvement of local and inter-national NGOs. For example, people

in Galanigama, Akmeemana andKahathuduwa used the ADBs in-spection panel as well as the humanrights commission to the SupremeCourt to try to get redress. Also theprocess shows how governmentagencies and even the ADB abusepower in decision making. The af-fected people did not receive sup-port from the general public in thiscampaign, but nevertheless, therewas a lot of media attention.

This campaign also shows thatthe environmental concerns of thepeople were not properly high-lighted since social issues such as re-settlement was a major concern.Therefore the concerned institutions,i.e. IFIs, local agencies and civil so-ciety groups need to follow the en-vironmental policies and regulationsboth on national and internationallevel to make sure that the presentgeneration protects the environmentand nature for future generations.

1 Under the National Environmental Act (NEA)a project in thin magnitude needs to followthe Environmental Impact Assessmentregulations and should be open for publiccomments for a 30 day period. In the STDPan EIA was done and two public hearingswere held for obtaining oral comments.2 The Sri Lankan Resettlement policy wasprepared in 2001 with the technicalassistance of the ADB



Sri Lanka 5

The Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) whichis locally known as Colombo-Matara Expressway is an infrastructure developmentproject. The project is now jointlyfunded by the ADB (Asian Develop-ment Bank) and the Japanese Bankfor International Corporation (JBIC).The total project cost is 27 billion ru-pees (approximately US $ 600 mil-lion). The financial resources comeas follows from different sources. JBICcontributes the stretch of Kottawa toKarandeniya which is 66.9 km and theADB contributes funding for the restof the highway i.e. from Karandeniyato Matara which is 59.5 km.

Under the ADB environmentalcategories, Loan No: 1711 SRI South-ern Transport Development Project(2000-2005) comes under the cat-egory A projects with potential tohave significant adverse environ-mental impacts for which an Envi-ronmental Impact Assessment (EIA)is required.

The consulting agencies involvedin the design are Wilbur Smith Asso-ciates in association with Resource

The Project in General

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Development Consultants (WSA &RDC) and the construction has beenawarded to Kumagai Kumi, a Japa-nese company. The EnvironmentalImpact Report (EIAR) report was con-ducted by consultants from the Uni-versity of Moratuwa.

According to the EIA this projecthas been justified as a project forpoverty alleviation and in that senseis in line with the poverty reductionstrategy. However, this justification cre-ated local controversy. The EIA states

The proposed Express-way, by enabling speedingtransport of produce, willhave a positive influence onagriculture by way of expand-ing markets, reducing wast-age during transportation,timely availability of inputs,quicker disposal or produce,etc. The outputs of agricultureand fisheries are highly perish-able and large amounts of pro-duce go waste during transpor-tation of produce from south-ern areas of the country tolarge urban centres like Galle,Kalutara, and Colombo1 .



The Road Development Authority (RDA) definesthe objectives of the proposed Expressway projectas follows:

To provide the required accessibility andmobility for the future developmentof the southern Province and part ofWestern and Uva Provinces included in the

Proposed Southern Development Plan.

To provide a highway to act as a catalystin encouraging and attracting industriesand services for the economic andsocial development of the Western and

Southern provinces and beyond.

To provide a highway that will be part ofa proposed access controlled highwaynetwork in Sri Lanka to improveinter-regional transportation.

(EIAR, March 1999)

1 Chapter 6 page 46 of the Environmental Impact Assessment report, Southern ExpresswayDevelopment project, Main Text, 1999



Sri Lanka 7

The Project in Termsof its Sectoral Context

ADB is a long-time donorin the Sri Lankan RoadSector. The followingloans and TechnicalAssistance (TAs) havebeen provided by the ADB in the re-cent past.

However, the STDP was ADBsfirst road project in Sri Lanka thatinvolved the actual construction ofnew roads rather than the merewidening of the existing roads.

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S ri Lankas first expressway was designed in1991 to link KatunayakeInternational Airport toColombo city. The ad-verse impacts of this project, in-cluding involuntary resettlementraised vehement protest amongthe project affected peopleand a lawsuit was filed with thehelp of Environmental Founda-tion in 1993. As a result theproject was changed. Projectconstruction began in 2001 butstopped again in 2002 due to in-sufficient funds.

The second expressway isthe Southern Transport Devel-opment Project. The third ex-pressway in this nature was pro-posed in 1996 and is known asOuter Circular Road which wasto be constructed around Co-lombo city. All other major ex-pressways were also to belinked to this expressway. Thethird expressway was alsostopped due to strong publicprotests.

History of the proposedSri Lankan expressway network

The fourth expressway was pro-posed to link the Outer CircularRoad and city of Kandy which is thelast kingdom located in the centralprovince. This will be a 112 kilome-ter long road. At present, affectedcommunities are voicing strong pro-test about this expressway.

The fifth proposal will link Co-lombo and Anuradhapura whichis the first kingdom and the firstcapital of Sri Lanka. This is still atthe designing stage.

During the last elections heldin April 2004, the present opposi-tion party (former governing re-gime) proposed 27 expresswaysincluding a 22 kilometre bridge tolink Sri Lanka and India.

In all the cases the displace-ment of the people is a majorproblem. In addition, damageentailed in all these cases will notonly cause harm to the environ-ment but also result in serious ad-verse impacts for the inhabitantsof the environment.



Sri Lanka 9

MAJOR EXPRESSWAYS PROPOSED INITIALLY

Colombo-Anuradhapura

Colombo-Kandy

Outer Circular Road

STDP

PROPOSEDEXPRESSWAYNETWORK OF THELAST REGIME



I n 1992, the RDA decided tobuild a highway from Colombo to Galle to facilitate thedevelopment of the Southernregion, which is referred to asthe Southern Expressway. RDAs origi-nal design was called the OriginalTrace (OT), but it was then reviewedand a trace was drawn which in-cluded some part of the OT, but withmodifications. This was called theCombined Trace (CT).

The ADB and JBIC agreed to fundthe project. The required EIA andsocio- impact studies were com-pleted in 1996. The Central Environ-mental Authority (CEA) gave permis-sion to carry out the project in 1999.But they requested that the route tobe changed in some parts to so thatsome of the wetlands in this partcould be saved.

The RDA responded by draftinga new trace which is called the FinalTrace (FT). No EIA was done for thesechanges. The people to be affected

were not consulted. They weremerely informed and RDA simplywent ahead with the new trace.

The final trace will be a 128 kilo-meters long, 80 meters wide road-way, jointly funded by the ADB (54Kilometers) and the Japanese Bankfor corporation (JBIC -74 Kilometers).The acquisition width for road con-struction will be 80 m and the roadplatform is designed for an A1 fourlane highway, with provision for ex-pansion to six lanes at a future datewithout any further acquisitions.

The proposed expressway islocated in the southern part of SriLanka, in a corridor from Colomboto Matara lying approximately 5 - 11km inland of the existing A2 Road.At the Colombo end the proposedhighway starts from a point inMakumbura, at 21 km on the highlevel Road. At the Matara end theproposed trace ends at Hittatiya,about 4 kilometers from Nupe, onMatara- Akuressa Road.

Project in Terms of itsCountry-specific Context



Sri Lanka 11

The proposed trace traversesthrough the four districts of Colombo,Kalutara, Galle and Matara1 and thefollowing 17 Division Secretariat Divi-sions: Homagama, Horana, Banda-ragama, Kalutara, Dodangoda,Matugama, Walallawita, Bentota,Elpitiya, Karandeniya, Baddegama,Bope- Poddala, Akmeemana,Habaraduwa, Welipitiya, Malim-bada and Matara.

It crosses 4 major rivers in the SouthWestern Southern part of Sri Lanka,viz Kalu Ganga2 , Bentara Ganga, GinGanga and Polwatta Ganga.

According to the Pre-feasibilityStudy Report (1993) it was proposedto have intermediate interchanges atMoonamalwatta( near CP 27)Navadagala( near CP 37) Narawala( CP 62) and Dorape( near CP 70) withlink roads to Aluthgama/ Bentota,Kosgoda. Ahungalla, Dadalle/ Galleand Koggala on the existing A2.

But the proposed combined tracewill have interchanges inPolgasowita, Welmilla, Ramukkana,Wewita, Wadugama, Lewwanduwa,Nawadagala, Kurundugahahe-tekma, Baddegama, Thotagoda(Akmeemana) Padinnoruwa andKokmaduwa.

The first kilometer from the Mataraend has an elevation slightly below

mean sea level (MSL), but beyondthat the ground level of the tracecentre line is above MSL, with mostlymild undulations, varying betweenelevations 0.0 and 60.3 m above MSL.

1 Colombo and Kalutara districts arewithin the Western province and Galle andMatara districts are within Southern province

2 Ganga means a river

MAPPROPOSEDTRACE



According to Road Development Authority(RDA), the proposedhighway is intended asa limited and controlledaccess road. RDA is the executingagency for this project. This proposedexpressway will link Sri Lankas capi-tal, Colombo, with Matara on theSouthern cost.

The concept of the SouthernExpressway was introduced by RDAin late 1980s. The original trace wasdesigned by RDA in 1992. Theproject was started in 1994 withoutthe mandatory EIA. ThereforeEnvironmental Foundation Ltd (EFL)1

Organisation of the Safeguard ofLife and Environment (OSLEN)2 withother NGOs and community groupswere able to stop the work.However, with the fundingassistance of the ADB and theJapanese Bank for InternationalCorporation (JBIC) RDA againinitiated this highway project in 1996.

In 1996, the consultant appointedby the ADB came up with analternative design to the original RDAtrace which is known as the ADBtrace. However, at the EIA stage,both RDA and the ADB trace werecombined and the new trace isknown as the combined trace. TheEIA was submitted to the authoritiesin 1997.

The EIA was opened for publiccomments in 1999 and two publichearings were held. The project wasapproved under the EIA procedurein 1999.

1 Environmental Foundation ltd., is anenvironmental NGO which provide legalassistance for the public to protect theirenvironmental and social rights

2 OSLEN was a very active environmentaland consumer network around this period.They organized the people around thehighway and educated them of thecomponents of the road.

P r o j e c t D e s c r i p t i o n

1. Origins to Status Quo



Sri Lanka 13

Change Model



Project Diary

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Sri Lanka 15

The public consultation procedure was questioned by thepublic as bad procedure.Many people who will be affected were not consulted.From the beginning there were somecontroversial issues among the af-fected communities and the imple-menting agency.

The main controversies wereweak public participation/ consulta-tion process; inadequate informationdisclosure; inadequate resettlement,changes in project design, lack of al-ternate options assessment and faultyevaluations, weak environmental stan-dards and adverse social impacts.

Weak Public Participation

At the beginning of the project, thegovernment officers in Divisional Sec-retariats and RDA failed to give in-formation about the ResettlementPlan and project details., to the com-munities, saying that they also werenot aware of these things or they didnot allow the issuance of some docu-ments (even the road map) to thegeneral public. ADBs Involuntary Re-

settlement Policy says that the af-fected people should be fully in-formed and closely consulted on re-settlement and compensation op-tions. But the consultations did notinclude any discussion, consultation,or information about where and howthe affected people were going tobe resettled.

The current approved design ofthe road has not been given to thepublic and this amply exhibits the in-efficiency of the implementingagencies of the project that havenot been accountable and trans-parent in their approaches. RDA hasnot designed a comprehensivedrainage plan.

There is a lack of information dis-semination to the general publicabout the project and the Resettle-ment Plan. RDA has held only onepublic meeting in the divisions al-though they claim that they had sev-eral meetings. RDA officers invitedthe local level government officer,Grama Niladhari, and the SamurdhiOfficer instead of affected peopleto these meetings.

Concerns



When some people protestedthe surveying of their lands, RDAbrought the police and terrorized vil-lages such as Akmeemana andGalanigama. In one case, policearrested a woman in Akmeemanaarea who opposed the surveying ofher land. She was arrested while herchild was along at home. She wasthe only parent for her child.

Inadequate Information Disclosure

Other than the EIA document,people did not have access to anyother documents. The EIA wasopened to the public for a 30 daycommenting period in 1999. It wasnot easy to obtain the ResettlementPlan which should be available toeverybody. It was very hard to obtainproject related documents from theADB Resident Mission and from theRDA and even from the ADB head-quarters.

Inadequate Resettlement

After the implementation of theMahawali Project in 1985, STDP wasthe second project to create hugeproblems through resettlement. Totallands of 8745(951.17 ha) are plannedto be crossed by the highway. Ac-cording to the resettlement plan1

Current estimate show that5683 households of all categories

will be affected. Moreover 1488structures, which include 1315homesteads and 151 commer-cial establishments, will be af-fected. Of these 214 house holdsare considered vulnerable.

From that number only 865 houseowners will receive alternate landsfrom the project.

However, the original estimatewas only 622 structures under thecombined trace and 938 structuresunder the Original RDA trace.2

Therefore the selection of the FinalTrace which includes more resettle-ment and destruction cannot bejustified. Estimated resettlementcost is Rs 2,861,503,350 with 10% con-tingency which is the equivalent toUSD 29.75 million.

.Land acquisition started in July

2000 and is continuing to date. RDAstime frame for the implementationof the resettlement was from March2001 to December 2003. The govern-ment acquired the land for thisproject under the section 2 of theLand Acquisition Act.

In some cases, the displacedpeople said that they were not in-formed earlier and that they did notreceive or see the Section 2 notices.People were not aware about theland acquisition and the resettle-



Sri Lanka 17

ment procedures. Earlier on, RDA didnot take any step to initiate publicparticipation and raise publicawareness. Hence the affectedpeople protested against this situa-tion and ten different communitiessent complaints to the ADBs Inspec-tion Committee.

After the protest in September2001, RDA opned four offices inGalanigama, Mathugama, Galleand Kurundugaha-hathakma. RDAappointed resettlement officers andresettlement assistants to work withthe affected people. Then they triedto collect the information of the af-fected people and to identify theresettlement sites. But all this pro-cess was dependent on the per-sonal views of the respective re-settlement officers as some officerssaw the road as a major step to-ward over-all development, whileothers were sympathetic to the situ-ation of the affected people. Nei-ther the ADB nor the governmenttook efforts to improve the resettle-ment monitoring system. The oneconsultant hired under ADB to per-form the monitoring, does not repre-sent a sufficient attempt at ad-equate monitoring.

In 1999, the Sri Lankan Govern-ment put into effect a National Re-settlement Policy with the assistanceof the ADB consultants. The dis-

placed people from the STDP projectwere to be resettled according tothe above policy, which was verysimilar to the ADB ResettlementPolicy. However, the way the re-settlement happened shows that theRDA did not follow this policy.

For example the policy states that

Affected people should befully involved in the selection ofrelocation sites, livelihood com-pensation and development op-tions at the earliest opportunity.

It also states

To assist those affected to beeconomically and socially inte-grated into the host communities;participatory measures shouldbe designed and implemented.

The above descriptions of theconsultation process demonstratethat these provisions were not imple-mented in STDP.

Because of the inspection com-plaints and the other letters of theaffected people, RDA was askedto submit a Resettlement ActionPlan before the loan was made ef-fective. RDA submitted the Re-settlement Action Plan to ADB inNovember 2002 and the loan be-came effective.



RDA valued the properties ofthe affected people of the Co-lombo Matara Highway under sec-tion 17 of the Land Acquisition Act,but these evaluations were not highenough. RDA then initiated theLand Acquisition and ResettlementCommittee (LARC). This committeeconsisted of five members includ-ing the division secretary (chair-man), resettlement officer, and theaffected person. There were sepa-rate LARC committees for eachfamily. The head of the family is themember in the committee. The pur-pose of the LARC was that eachaffected person could set his/herprice for compensation. 3

The success of this set-up de-pends on the bargaining power andthe social status of the respectiveaffected person. Also in some casesit depends on the personal attitudesof the divisional Secretary. RDA ac-quired the lands in 1996 at the South-ern end (Sulthanagoda Goda-gama and Akurugoda area). There-fore the LARC committee has valu-ated this land to the market valueof the year 1996.

Changes in Project Design

The Sri Lankan Government selectedtwo alternative traces for the devel-opment of a Southern Expresswaycalled the Original RDA trace and

the Combined Trace. The fact thatthe trace used throughout the docu-ments and studies is not the one thatthe Road Development Authority isimplementing constitutes a violationof ADB and National policies. TheCentral Environmental Authority(CEA) in its approval has given rec-ommendations to closely follow theoriginal trace as the combinedtrace involves a lot of environmen-tal impacts.

The lack of an on-site monitoringsystem meant that the executingagencies failed to take responsibil-ity for the resettlement activities inthe project. In most of the reportedcases, we found that political pres-sure was applied to influence the di-rection of the original trace. For ex-ample, at one point the trace inAkmeemana area was changed bya politician in the area so that theroad would no longer cross throughhis electorate.

The EIAR indicated that 622houses were to be demolished bythe Road. But the resettlement planstates that this number is 5683. Thisnumber is much higher than thenumber of affected houses underthe combined trace which wouldhave affected 938 houses. However,we learnt that RDA also does nothave accurate knowledge or assess-ment of the actual situation.



Sri Lanka 19

Lack of Alternate OptionsAssessment and Faulty Evaluations

Affected people and the NGOs whosent comments on the EIA during thepublic commenting period and dur-ing the public hearings proposed anumber of primary alternatives forthis project. These included expan-sion of the existing highway, con-struction of an electrified railway line,use of sea connections, constructionof a 4 lane highway instead of theproposed six lane highway and ma-jor alternatives.

Furthermore, a number of sec-ondary alternatives were pro-posed for some sections of thehighway. For example, somegroups roposed an elevated high-way for the section where floodingis a serious problem.

According to the feasibility studya six-lane highway is necessary forthe section from Colombo to Kalutarawhich is about 20 kilometres. The re-maining section only needs a 4 lanehighway. However, none of theseoptions were positively evaluated bythe feasibility study or the EIA.

Weak Environmental Standards

This project was started in 1992and an Environmental Impact As-sessment Report (EIAR) was pro-

duced in 1994 showing varioustraces. A trace was chosen and theEIAR was updated in 1996. Howeverit was not issued for comments. Afterthe funds were made available, con-sultants were called in and RDAagreed on a better trace. The EIARwas then amended for the data onthe new trace and it was publishedin 1999.The base data is now 7years out of date and is conse-quently not accurate.

The road trace which goesthrough Akmeemana is not includedin the approved EIAR. The EIAR refersto the combined trace goingthrough Poddala, Meepawala,Labuduwa, Totagoda, Madin-noruwa, Kokmaduwa and Godag-ama. But now the road is goingthrough Poddala, Narawala,Walawaththa, Thalgasyaya, Niyaga-ma, Ihalagoda, Godamuna,Pinnaduwa, Godawatta andAnkokkawala. Some of these areasare not included in the original EIAR.

When the Central Environmen-tal Authority gave approval to thisproject, they imposed certainterms and conditions on RDA. Theapproval imposed 58 conditionsunder 11 sections including a moni-toring program.

According to the conditions un-der the monitoring program, RDA



should prepare a monitoring planwhich should approved by the moni-toring committee. A monitoring pro-gram should be implemented assoon as the approval is granted. Ac-cording to those conditions, the CEAcan question the RDA if there areany violations.

The implementation of STDP be-came very controversial due to thewide-spread displacement of localcommunities. In addition, the 40 %of the proposed trace traversesacross flood retention areas such aswetlands and paddy fields. There-fore many hydrological impactsare anticipated.

Adverse Social Impacts

Most of the adverse social impactsrelate to the resettlement of the af-fected people The design of theroad construction does not take intoaccount access to health care, edu-cation and related services of theaffected communities.

For example, in the case of schoolchildren being displaced, RDA offic-ers gave letters to the school princi-pals which stated the childs pre-ferred choice of school. Howeverwhen children applied to their schoolsof choice, the school principals didnot always respect these letters.

The residents of the villages alongthe proposed trace are from fami-lies that have been there for severalcenturies. The area is self sufficientand also relatively crime-free. Whatwill happen to these traditional fam-ily ties? For the villagers this social net-work is the most important asset thatthey have. There was no attempt fromRDA or ADB to mitigate this aspect.

1 Page vi section 3 Executive Summerypf the Resettlement Implementation Plan. Acopy was received from the ADB Resident Mis-sion for a request made by Heather Mundy,of Galanigama. However RDA did not openthis document to the general public

2 Chapter 6 page 48 of the EIA



Sri Lanka 21

Activities Taken byAffected People & NGOs

Until 1996, no united movement existed among theaffected people.. Due tothe involvement of Environmental Foundation Ltd(EFL), Organization for the Safeguardof Life and Environment (OSLEN) andthe Green movement of SriLanka(GMSL), the affected peoplewere informed on the impacts andpossible actions.

As a result, in 1998, the NGOs in-volved succeeded in organizing asolidarity movement of the affectedpeople from the expressway. As a firststep, village level committees wereorganized. Already established com-mittees and the new committeesthen joined together and formed amass movement.

This movement periodically orga-nized campaigns along the road wayand in the major cities to protest againstthe expressway, to educate politiciansand the bureaucrats on the impactsand to get the media publicity.

The protest movement was at itsheight at the time the EIA wasopened for public comments in 1999.Affected people and the NGOs in-volved jointly attended the publichearings and the environmental or-ganizations succeeded in educatingthe public on the EIA and the nega-tive impacts. This helped improve thepublic commenting. Both GreenMovement of Sri Lanka and the SriLankan Working Group on ADB werevery active during this period. As aresult, RDA organized a meeting toexplain the compensation packageand the road design.

After this meeting the road designwas changed in some sectors andnew people become affected. Thepeople who had been affected bythe old design left the campaign atthis stage. The environmental organi-zations worked with the newly af-fected people in the same fashion. Amass demonstration was held in frontof the ADB resident mission in 2001and a petition was handed over to



the Resident representative. Althoughthere were several meetings after this,no major changes have taken place.

Filing of Human Rights Case

Three communities along the high-way decided to file human rightsaction before the National HumanRights Commission, claiming thatRDA and the Government of SriLanka disregarded human rights indesigning the expressway. 97 personsfrom Galanigama and 457 fromAkmeemana joined this petition.

Public Interest Law Foundation(PILF) later assisted them with these hu-man rights cases. Of the three humanrights cases, one came fromGalanigama, one from Akmee-manaand one from another affected house-hold, Heather and Cyril Mundy filedthe third case. However, the caseswere delayed in the commission forvarious reasons and the people de-cided to file three writ applications inthe Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal appointeda judiciary committee to study thetraces. According to the report of thecommittee, these areas had alreadybeen covered in the EIA that wasprepared before 1999. The Court ofAppeal observed:

It is true that at the time theEIAR was prepared, the FinalTrace was not envisaged. How-ever ... the Final Trace was not analteration that would come un-der Regulation 17(i)(a) and sec-tion 23EE [of the Act].1

The Court dismissed the writ ap-plications, in the exercise of its dis-cretionary powers, holding that:

[When balancing thecompeting interests] the con-clusion necessarily has to bemade in favor of the larger in-terests of the community whowould benefit immensely bythe construction of the pro-posed expressway . . . theadoption of the CombinedTrace would undoubtedly re-sult in irreversible damage tothe eco-system in the BolgodaWetland area. Therefore theonly option is to adopt the Fi-nal Trace which ... will resultonly in the displacement of af-fected people in that area ...the obligation to the society asa whole must predominateover the obligation to a groupof individuals, who are so un-fortunately affected by theconstruction of the express-way. 2



Sri Lanka 23

Inspection Process

At the same time the Sri LankanWorking Group on ADB (SLWG) edu-cated the affected people on theavailability of the Inspection Com-mittee of the ADB. As a result, tendifferent communities filed com-plaints with the Inspection Commit-tee of ADB in 2001. They believedthat the policies such as Resettle-ment Policy and Information Policyof ADB have been violated.

There were three separate com-plaints from Galanigama, Akmee-mana, and Kahathuduwa and ajoint complaint came from otherseven community groups. In the pro-cedure of the Inspection on STDPGalanigama and Akmeemana werein forefront. Galanigama andAkmeemana were in the 9th stageaccording to the Diagram in the ADBInspection Policy.

In the conclusion concerning theauthorization of an Inspection, theBank Inspection Committee re-jected the point about the align-ment actually selected for the roadconstruction when formulating theReport and Recommendation forthe President, saying that alignmentconsidered in the RRP consisted of3-4 km wide corridor in which the fi-nal alignment was expected to belocated and which includes the re-quested area.

According to Sri Lankan law, sec-tion 48 of the1980 of the National En-vironmental Act (as amended sec-tion 56 of 1988) requires a site spe-cific EIA for a new developmentproject. But the EIA for this project isnot a site specific EIA as it covers acorridor of 3-4 kilometres.

From the point of view of the in-volved NGOs, the argument of thecorridor is not seen as valid, and inaddition to that, several affectedhouseholds in the Galanigama areafall outside of this 3-4 km. The com-munities failed to receive justice fromthe domestic law of the country.Therefore they complained to the re-course mechanism of the Bank al-though it failed to give them justice.The Board Inspection Committeeconcluded that an inspection of theSTDP was not warranted based insuf-ficient evidence. The Board Inspec-tion Committee stated that:

22. In deciding whether torecommend to the Board that theBoard authorize an inspection ofthe Project, the Committee hasgiven careful consideration to theRequest and the Response theretoand to other relevant documents.On the basis of the documentspresented to it the Committeehas, based on the reasons givenabove, maintained that the Re-quest is not clearly ineligible norclearly frivolous.



23. It has, however, alsocome to the conclusion that thevery detailed and thoroughanalysis made by Managementin its response to the substantiveallegations of non-compliancewith policies made by the Re-quester appears to establish con-vincingly that the allegations ofnon-compliance were un-founded in all cases.3

The Bank Inspection Committeerejected the Akmeemana requeston the same grounds. Regarding therejection of the other seven com-plaints, and the Kahathuduwa com-plaint the committee stated;

In accordance with para-graph 35-37 of the Inspection Pro-cedure, the committee has care-fully considered the requests andin the light other documents. Ithas concluded that the Requestshas not presented reasonableevidence that the communitygroups rights and interest havebeen or are likely to be directly,materially and adversely af-fected by an action or omissionof ADB as a result of ADBs failureto follow its operation policiesand procedures. The Committeehas therefore determined that atthis stage in time Requests clearlyineligible and no written responseto the Requesters by ADB man-agement is required.4

However, communities feel thatthe above statement is false. TheADB reviewed its Inspection Functionin 2003, recognizing that the designand prescribed inspection processhad so far been a failure. On June8, 2004, the affected communitiesof STDP filed a new Inspection Re-quest under ADBs revised Inspec-tion Function.

Appeal to the Supreme Court

When the Court of Appeal decisionwas against the opinion of the pub-lic, the claimants decided to go tothe Supreme Court and asked for arevision. Judgement was deliveredin February 2004 and according tothe plaintiffs We both won and lost

The Court found that the devia-tions in Bandaragama andAkmeemana were alterations re-quiring CEA approval after compli-ance with the prescribed proce-dures and the principals of naturaljustice. It confirmed that the discre-tion to refuse relief by the Court ofAppeal was justified, but that theAppellants ought to have beencompensated for the infringementof their rights under Article 12(1) andthe principles of natural justice.

The Supreme Court orderedRs.75,000 to be paid to each of thepetitioners in addition to the amountdue under the Land Acquisition Act.



Sri Lanka 25

The court also ordered costs ofRs.50,000 for each of the three casesplus the reimbursement of the Judi-cial Committee costs of Rs.100,000.Because there are some 47 petition-ers in the South that means that totalcost to the state is nearly Rs.4 million.

The Court also ruled that the ap-pellants were adversely affected bythe deviations and were thereforeentitled to a hearing, under the audialteram partem rule as well as Article12(1).Judgment also says that

If it is permissible in the ex-ercise of a judicial discretion torequire a humble villager toforego his right to a fair proce-

dure before he is compelled tosacrifice a modest plot of landand a little hut because they areof extremely negligible value inrelation to a multi-billion rupeenational project, it is neverthelessnot equitable to disregard totallythe infringement of his rights: thesmaller the value of his property,the greater his right to compen-sation.5

1 Appeal Court order2 Excerpts from the Supreme Court Order3 Management response to Gama

Surakeema Sanvidhanaya4 ADB management response to the vil-

lagers of Kahathuduwa.5 Supreme Court decision


ADB and the Environment 26P r o j e c t M o n i t o r i n g

Monitoring Schedule

Following visits were done for the monitoring.

doireP tnevE

2002yaMht61-9 MGABDAdednettA

2002enuJ51elpoepehtdetsissa-gniteemytinummoCtsriF

noitazinagrotniojahsilbatseot

2002enuJ72-62 tisivetistsiF

2002yluJht7 gniteeMytinummoCdnoceS

2002yluJ31-21 tisivetiSdnoceS

2002rebotcO tisivetisdrihT

rebmevoNts12-023002

tisivetiShtruoF

4002lirpAht52-12 tisivetishtfiF



Sri Lanka 27

Monitoring Plan

Therefore following types of monitoring wereidentified for the monitoring programme.

Blasting and drilling activities

Exploitation of construction material

Transportation of material

Noise

Soil erosion

Surface water quality

Surface water quantity

Ground water quantity

Air Quality

Displacement and resettlement of people

A lthough the NGOs involved tried to obtain acopy of the MonitoringPlan government agencies refused to disclosethe plan, although it is a public docu-ment. Therefore, the NGOs involvedresorted to preparing their own moni-toring plan based comprehensive

studies of the EIA report.

The objective of the monitoring waso determine whether the construc-tion of STDP poses an unacceptablerisk to the environment, society andeconomy of the area. The majorconcerns related to the sociologicaland hydrological aspects.



Monitoring AgainstNational and ADBEnvironmental Provisions

The project in the context of NationalEnvironmental Act

The project was started in 1992without ADB or JBIC involvements. ADB came to thescene in around 1996. By thenSri Lanka had its own EIAregulations. 1994 RDA started fillingthe road without any EIA or even aproper feasibility study. This is a viola-tion of the local environmental laws.However, ADB does not take respon-sibility for the violation of local laws.

But a local EIA was done in 1999and it was opened for public for 30days under the national EIA process.Two oral public hearings were heldjust after the end of the 30 day com-menting period.

However the public hearings wereneither adequate nor adequatelypublicized. The decision of the hear-ings was not adequately transparent.

According to the ADB environ-mental categorization projects in thisnature comes under the category Awhich require a detailed EIA. In thiscase they have prepared the rightdocument both at country levelsand ADB level.

However this Environmental As-sessment was done for the com-bined trace which is the amalgam-ated trace of original RDA Trace andthe ADB trace.

This trace was not fully approvedby the Central Environmental Au-



Sri Lanka 29

thority. The combined trace was sup-posed to cross through Bolgoda wet-land in the western Province andKoggala wetland in the Southernprovince.

Both these wetlands are very im-portant. On that basis, the combinedtrace was not approved in Bolgodaarea . Alternatively they asked thatthe road be moved inland.

The RDA moved the road within3 kilometre corridor to the right endof the corridor. However some ofthese villages were not even stud-ied in the EIA. The Issue inGalanigama came in this waywhich is became a reason for theinspection case and also for thehuman right complaint and thenbefore the Supreme Court.

There was similar incident inAkmeemana area. According to theresidents in the area the road wasmoved to their village to protect twoage old abandoned tea factories.Some people think a politician wasbehind this move. However this mat-ter was also ended in the inspectioncase and Supreme Court.

The Project in the Context of ADBEnvironment Policy

The1997 OM is very weak on concreteprovisions for environmental protec-tion and none of the other provisionsare relevant to the STDP case. How-ever, the preceding description of theenvironmental impacts and the fol-lowing section clearly demonstratethe violation of environmental stan-dards in this project.



Monitoring Against DesirableEnvironmental Standards

Document Completeness

According to widely accepted and practiced standards an EnvironmentalImpact Assessment should include the following components:1 ,

1 (Unfortunately, the new Environment Policy does not yet apply to STDP. We have to look atOM Section 1997, and the Environmental Assessment Guidelines of 1998).

nalP sliateddnaytilibaliavA

,nalPtnemeganamlatnemnorivnEhtiwslaedRAIEehtfo01retpahC

dnastnemeriuqeRlanoitutitsnI.margorpgnirotinomlatnemnorivne

noitaulavednagnirotinomtcejorPeludehcsdnanalp

otseussiehtotderrefer01retpahCsahtidnasegatsllatarotinom

hcihwseicnegaehtdednemmocergnirotinomehtnievlovnidluohs

)NALPONRAFOSTUB(.eettimmoc

nalPnoitazinagrOmaetgnirotinomehtfoegdelwonkehtotnalphcusoN

seitinummoc

nalpdnufeetnarauGlatnemnorivnE nalphcusoN

nalpdnufgnirotinomehT nalpdnufhcusoN

dnuftnempolevedytinummocehT dnufhcusoN

dnufdnanalpycnegnitnoC dnufdnanalphcusoN



Sri Lanka 31

Document Completeness

tnemucoD

tnemucodlasiarppatcejorPsihtotsseccaoN

tnemucod

)noissessops'BDA(ydutsytilibisaeF sseccaoN

ehthtiw(nalpgnireenignedeliatedehT)tnemnrevoggniworrubevitcepser

selurerusolcsidnoitamrofnIsseccaoN

s'BDA(noitanimaxelatnemnorivnelaitinInoissessop

rednuenodAIEylnOelbaliavawallacol

tnemucodlasiarppacimonoceynAehtniytimrofinuatubyrav(elbaliava

noitarepowonktonoD

Shelf life of the EIA document

The data used in this EIA is reason-ably new. The data is taken fromdocuments mostly published in thelast decade. Also some of the dataused has been taken from the South-ern Corridor project, Draft final Re-port, Interim Report, Daft Initial SocialImpact assessment and from the Ini-tial environmental examination pub-lished in 1998. Therefore the data setused for the EIA can still be consid-ered applicable.

Review of other similar projects

A similar project was done in SriLanka in 1994 which is ColomboKatunayake Expressway. This projectalso created a lot of controversy. Asa result of a case filed by the Envi-ronmental Foundation on behalf ofthe affected people the originaltrace was abandoned and a freshEIA was prepared to minimize thesocial and environmental impacts.However, the project still had severalproblems such as political influence,



displacement and adverse impactson fishermen due to the crossing ofa lagoon. RDA did not draw lessonsfrom this negative experience whenit designed STDP.

Respect for standards, associate lawsand treaties, local, national andinternational

The final order of the Supreme Courtcase shows that it violates humanrights. This cannot be taken as aproject that promotes sustainabledevelopment.

Access to environmental informa-tion, environmental decision makingenvironmental justice

Access to information in this case isfar from adequate. Due to the lackof information and political influ-ences, there was no justice in envi-ronmental decision making.

Consistency with the CountrysOverall Development Strategy

Alignment with country developmentstrategy by the ADB

The governments underlyingstrategy for the country strategy is todevelop today and conserve to-morrow. Government plans aremade to increase the GDP and to

keep the growth rate above 8%. Thegovernmet believes that only goodinfrastructure can bring about thisgrowth rate. Therefore the govern-ment concentrates more on express-ways and the power generation sec-tor. This is mostly because of the domi-nation of ADB, Word Bank and IMFmacroeconomic policies. Howeverthese macroeconomic policies donot give benefit to the poor. In thiscase the project aligns with the Gov-ernment strategy. But the majority ofSri Lankans oppose the present de-velopment strategy of the country.

Alignment with local plans

Local plans are normally pre-pared by the governing regime.Therefore STDP is compatible withthe local plans, too.

Capacity of consultants

The EIA was done by local con-sultants from the University ofMoratuwa. They had experience insuch assignments.

Stakeholders

Simplified stakeholder analysiswas not undertaken as part of theEIA. However, public hearings and asocial survey for the social impactassessment were conducted.



Sri Lanka 33

The process of this developmentshows that RDA and the ADB are play-ing the dominant role. Only very fewpeople living along the road activelyparticipated in the process. The major-ity of the villages have no access to de-cision making process. They were andare being left out in policy dialogue,discussion and decision-making.

Participation is mostly happeningthrough the local EIA process. Therewas no empowerment from the gov-ernment, ADB or the RDA. But civil so-ciety groups such as Sri Lankan Work-ing Group on ADB, Green Movementof Sri Lanka and the EFL took a role ininvolving the affected people.

People actively participated inthe public commenting period andin the oral hearings. Some villages inGalanigama, Kahatuduwa, andAkmeemana organized themselvesand filed court cases and even anInspection Panel case.

The most active stakeholderswere the RDA and the ADB. Somepoliticians also took an active role ininfluencing the process to their ends.The public which is the main stake-holder in this case very rarely partici-pated in the process as they werenot informed and not empowered.Only few who are knowledgeableparticipated in the process.

Project Stakeholdersand their Interests

Below is a list of the project stake-holders and their interests:

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tnempolevedlanoitanllarevo

:syawhgiHdnatropsnarTfoyrtsiniMdnalavorppatcejorP

krowtendaorehtfotnempoleved

:ADR seiticrehtootsseccaysaE

:ytirohtuAlatnemnorivnElartneC,gnirotinom&lavorppA

latnemnorivneotecnerehdasdradnats

tnatlusnoC dnangisedtcejorP:tnemssessatcapmifonoitaraperp

sOGN ecitsuj,ecnanrevoGdooG:tnemnorivnetcetorp,ytiuqe&

:elpoePdetceffA ,snrecnoclaicoS,snrecnoclatnemnorivne

tnemeltteser

BDA gnitsissa,sdnuffognivoM:detseuqerrofsCMD

otsseccaedivorp;stnempolevedrotcesetavirpdnasnoitaroproc

.tnemevlovni

:snaicitiloplacoL tnempoleveDrofsboj,stcartnocbus,noissimmoc,dnaytirohtuagniniag,sretroppus

.setovgniruces



Table for Stakeholder Analysis (Importance and Influence)

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sseccuStcejorProfecnatropmIfoleveL

woL hgiH

foleveLecneulfnI

ninoisiceDgnikaM-

hgiH

aideM,sOGN

,muroFOGN(sOGNI,LEIC,IEOF,WALE,CIB

,napaJIEOF,AACO)SECAJ

aimedacAslaudividnI

BDAfoyrtsiniMdnaLSOG

tropsnarTADRAEC

weiveRAIEeettimmoC

snaicitiloplacoL)srekamnoisiced(

yraiciduJ

woLegraltacilbuP

tnemnrevoGrehtOseicnega

detceffatcejorPelbarenluv(elpoep

)puorglatnemnorivnelacoL

sOGN



Sri Lanka 35

Monitoring AgainstOther ADB Policies

This case is a very good example for monitoring theADBs Resettlement Policy. Thebasic principles of the policystate thatInvoluntary resettlement

should be avoided where fea-sible, where population displace-ment is unavoidable; it should beminimized by exploring all viableproject options.1

The proposed option of the roadtrace did not meet this requirementand the present trace has the high-est number of resettlement. The sec-ond principle states

If individuals or a communitymust lose their land, means oflivelihood, social support sys-tems, or way of life in order that aproject might proceed, theyshould be compensated and as-sisted so that their economic andsocial future wall generally be atleast as favourable with the

project as without it. Appropriateland, housing, infrastructure, andother compensation, compa-rable to the without project situ-ation, should be provided to theadversely affected population,including indigenous groups,ethnic Minorities, and pastoralistswho may have usufructs or cus-tomary rights to the land or otherresources taken for the project.

This principle was grossly violatedand no support was given to the re-located households other than pro-viding compensation in cash. Theywere not advised on how to usemoney, identifying new lands andbuild new houses.

The third Principle states that

Any involuntary resettle-ment should, as far as possible,be conceived and executed asa part of a development projector program and resettlementplans should be prepared with



appropriate time bound actionsand budgets. Resettlers shouldbe provided sufficient resourcesand opportunities to re-establishtheir homes and livelihoods assoon as possible.

This did not happen in STDP andonly certain persons got adequatecompensation but the majority werenot provided adequate compensa-tion. Originally they were providedthe market rate but later a gazettenotification was published that af-fected people will get governmentvalue plus 25% extra.

The fourth principle states

The affected people shouldbe fully informed and closelyconsulted on resettlement andcompensation options. Whereadversely affected people areparticularly vulnerable, resettle-ment and compensation deci-sions should be preceded by asocial preparation phase to buildup the capacity of the vulnerablepeople to deal with the issues.

This provision was also grossly vio-lated. The resettlement plan is still notavailable for the affected people whilehalf of the acquisition is already done.

The next principle states

Appropriate patterns of so-cial organization should be pro-moted, and existing social andcultural institutions of resettlersand their hosts should be sup-ported and used to the great-est extent possible. Resettlersshould be integrated economi-cally and socially into hostcommunities so that adverseimpacts on host communitiesare minimized. One of the effec-tive ways of achieving this inte-gration may be by extendingdevelopment benefits to hostcommunities.

There was no awareness of ex-isting social and cultural institutionsand there was no program to inte-grate affected people into the hostcommunities.

Although the resettlement wasstarted in 2000 the Resettlement planwas done in October 2002. This is aclear violation of the policy.

1 Involuntary Resettlement Policy of theADB, August 1995



Sri Lanka 37C o n c l u s i o n

This project created controversies from the early panning stages to the construction phase.. The problemaspects include ADB policyviolations, disregard of national lawsand regulations and disregard ofthe social and environment rights.

Affected people have used allpossible actions time and again toobtain redress. While some peoplebenefited from these actions,there is still a large number of af-fected people who have yet toreceive justice.

Recourse could not beachieved through administrativepractises, political influence, localjudiciaries or through the ADBs ac-countability mechanism. Somesuccess was achieved however,when the Supreme Court ac-cepted that the human rights ofaffected communities have beenviolated.

This is a good case to prove thatthe ADB has violated its policies.ADBs Involuntary ResettlementPolicy, its Environment Policy andPublic Disclosure Policy have beengrossly violated. The case alsoshows that inspection mechanismis merely lip service.

If the bank policies need to beapplied in local cases the Bank hasto play a major role by familiarisingthe implementing agencies andother stakeholders with its policies.The ADB needs to make sure thattheir DMCs and local implementingagencies respect the Banks policies.At the same time the Bank should un-derstand and respect the vision of thelocal people and the Bank should beaccountable to the people.

In particular, the ADBs Environ-ment Policy was violated. In thiscase The Supreme Court foundthat NO EIA had been conductedfor the stretches of the road whichwere changed, which is in viola-tion of Environment Policy. Thisshows that the affected peoplewere denied the opportunity toparticipate in decision making. Fur-ther, there is no environmental man-agement plan and no active envi-ronmental monitoring committee.

Our investigations revealed thatthere are no adequate mitigationin place to address the environ-mental problems at the construc-tion sites. Therefore the Bank hasthe immediate responsibility tomake sure that project follows theBanks Environment Policy at leastat the construction stage.


ADB and the Environment 38R e f e r e n c e

1 Operation Manual section 21 issued on 1 December 1992 - Asian devel-opment Bank.

2 Proposal for the Monitoring and Evaluating the Implementation of theADBs Environmental Policy by PRRM, February 2003

3 Environmental Impact Assessment report, Southern Expressway devel-opment Project Main Text University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka March 1999.

4 Handbook on Resettlement A guide book to good practice, Asian de-velopment ,1998

5 Resettlement Implementation Plan Volume 1, October 2002, Road De-velopment Authority

6 OM Section 1997, and the Environmental Assessment Guidelines of 1998).

ADB and the Environment Case1

Documents

Transcript of ADB and the Environment Case1