When do donors matter?The politics of promoting social
protection in sub-Saharan Africa
Bath, 8th September 2015
An adapted political settlements approach
Formal and informal
institutions
Paradigmatic ideas
Existing policy context
Problem frames,
policy ideas
Distributional regime:
- development strategy
- taxation
- social services
- social protection
Domestic and transnational
factions
Political prioritisation of SP Ruling coalition’s orientation to SP (long vs short-term)
Intended and unintended impacts: - regime legitimation, negotiated compromise - instability resulting from change in resource distribution and holding power
Political settlement
Domestic and global policy
advocates
Issue-specific policy coalition
Proposals rejected, revised or adopted based on compatibility with PS
Implementation, as intended or adapted to fit PS incentives
Resource distribution
Global factors
Bilateral and multilateral donors
Donors, IOs, INGOs
Global economic factors
Constraints related to implementation capacity
Research designCountry Political settlement Social assistance Health insurance
Ethiopia Potential developmental coalition
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)
Pilot Community-Based Health Insurance
Kenya Competitive clientelism
Cash transfer schemes (OVC, elderly, disabled)
Proposed Social Health Insurance Scheme
Rwanda Potential developmental coalition
Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP)
Mutuelles de Santé
Uganda Weak dominant party
Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE)
Proposed National Health Insurance Scheme
Zambia Competitive clientelism
Social Cash Transfers Proposed Social Health Insurance
Our cases: different types of political settlements (Khan 2010)
HORIZONTAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: EXCLUDED ELITES
WEAK STRONG
VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER: LOWER LEVEL FACTIONS
WEAK
STRONG
POTENTIALLY DEVELOPMENTAL DOMINANT COALITIONRWANDA, ETHIOPIALonger-term horizons Implementation capabilities high
VULNERABLE AUTHORITARIAN COALITION
WEAK DOMINANT PARTYUGANDAImplementation capabilities weakened by multiple demands and ‘blockers’
COMPETITIVE CLIENTELISTKENYA, ZAMBIAShorter-term horizons: threat of powerful excluded elitesImplementation capabilities weakened
Understanding elite commitment to social protection:
Rwanda’s VUP
Tom Lavers, ILOBath, 8th September 2015
Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP)
• Targeted programme to address poverty:– Public works (2008)– Direct support (2009)– Financial services (2010)
• Progress by 2014: 168 of 416 sectors (PW); 240 sectors (DS)
• DS expected to reach all sectors by 2015/16• 2/3 government financed, 1/3 donors
Rwanda’s dominant party political settlement
• RPF military victory in 1994. Political settlement consolidated around 2000. – No strong elite opposition– Relatively centralised power and cohesive coalition– Strong top-down control mechanisms– But vulnerability and questions over legitimacy
• Key ideas:– Moving beyond ethnicity, promoting national unity – Rapid, inclusive socioeconomic progress is the only means
of overcoming past divisions, giving everyone a stake in country
The VUP within the distributional regime• PRSP (2003-05)– Reasonable growth: 6.4% per annum 2001/02 – 2005/06– But rising inequality (0.51 Gini), low rate of poverty
reduction (3.5%), high regional inequalities• Identified as priority in 2007 leadership retreat• EDPRS 1 (2008-13)– Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) as one of three
flagship programmes– Aims to end extreme poverty by 2020
Policy ‘bricolage’
Donors funded study tour to Ethiopia to look at PSNP• Fit with GoR ideas (similar to GoE): anti-
dependency, productivityAlso integrated with existing government initiatives:• PDL-HIMO – labour-intensive infrastructure
development• Ubudehe – social mapping• Decentralisation – implemented by umurenge
Implementation challenges
• Is social protection really the priority? – Low labour intensity of public works ~50%– Infrastructure development dominates local
government incentives • Targeting problems in Ubudehe– No correlation between ubudehe and quantitative
surveys (Sabates-Wheeler et al, 2015)– New approach currently being rolled out
Conclusions
• Elite commitment in search of a policy• Top-down, elite driven response to threat
resulting from re/distribution• No evidence of bottom-up pressures• Policy translation, not diffusion• Competing priorities – poverty reduction
or infrastructure?
• Advocacy and finance alone is insufficient to generate elite commitment to social protection:– Ultimately domestic politics dominates– Dangers of ‘working with the grain’?
• Distributional regime matters:– Challenge to existing systems of rent distribution can make social
protection attractive, e.g. Rwanda, Zambia• Difference in process between PDCs and the rest:
– Elite perception of threats vs building local political / electoral support
– Centralised vs fragmented decision making– Implementation based on top-down targets vs vulnerable to
political capture– Also different types of policy? ‘Productive’ SN vs SCTs
Comparative analysis: Emerging themes
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