What’sinaCreditReport?
TheHonorableJanKarlin,U.S.BankruptcyCourtfortheDistrictofKansasProfessorKatherinePorter,UniversityofCaliforniaIrvineSchoolofLaw
TableofContents
1. SummaryofResearcha. Introductionb. EffectofBankruptcyonCreditREPORTc. EffectofBankruptcyonCreditSCOREd. SecuredLendinge. CreditCardOffersf. Differencesbetweenchapter7andchapter13filersg. EffectsofReaffirmationh. OngoingFinancialDifficultiesi. ConsumerReluctancetoBorrowj. BeyondBorrowing:EffectsofLowCreditScore/BadCreditReport
2. FairCreditReportingActandFTCStaffCommentary3. ExcerptsfromFICO(FairIsaacCo.)site4. Advice:It’sEverywhere
a. Creditreportingagenciesb. Lawyersc. TheWeb
5. Credit:It’sNOTEverywhere(despitetheplacards!)a. Collateralized,termloansb. Revolving,unsecuredcredit
6. Bibliographyforfurtherreading
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SummaryofResearch
IntersectionofBankruptcyandCreditReporting/Scoring
Introduction
Bankruptcygivesindividualsafreshstartbyallowingthemtodischargemuchof
theirunsecureddebt.But,theconsequencesofbankruptcydonotendwhenthelegal
processiscomplete.Afterbankruptcy,familiesstillmustfigureouthowtomakeendsmeet
andhowtointeractwiththecrediteconomy.Inthissummary,Ihighlightkeyfindingsfrom
researchonhowconsumersborrowafterbankruptcy.
Thereare3creditreportingbureaus:Equifax,TransUnion,andExperian.Each
bureaumaintainsafile—i.e.,acreditreport—oneveryborrower,listingthe“typesofcredit
youuse,thelengthoftimeyouraccountshavebeenopen,andwhetheryou’vepaidyour
billsontime.”Thereportalsolists“howmuchcredityou’veusedandwhetheryou’re
seekingnewsourcesofcredit.”Thisinformationcomesfromcreditfurnishers,whosend
updatestoeachofthecreditbureausontheiraccounts.
Thecreditreportalsoincludespriorandcurrentaddresses,anylawsuitsorarrests,
andbankruptcyfilings.Thisinformationcomesfromcourtrecords.Delinquencieson
utilities(cable,cellphone,electricity,etc.)andrentalpaymentscanbelistedinacredit
report,althoughagoodhistoryofutilityandrentalpaymentsisnotlistedonacredit
report.Anindividual’ssalary,occupation,title,employer,datesemployed,oremployment
historyarenottypicallyincludedonacreditreportorusedtocomputeacreditscore.
Theinformationinthecreditreportisusedtocalculatethecreditscore,ameasure
oftheriskassociatedwithextendingcredittoanindividual.Themostwidelyusedcredit
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scoreistheFICOscore,anumericalscorerangingfrom300to850.Eachcreditreporting
bureaumayhaveadifferentFICOscore,becausethecreditscoreisbasedonasnapshotof
theparticularinformationheldbythatcreditbureauattheexactmomentintimethescore
isgenerated.Page13showsmoredetailonhowscoresarecalculated.
EffectofBankruptcyonCreditREPORT
Therearetwodistinctissueswithrespecttobankruptcyandcreditreports.First,is
thelegalrequirementthatbankruptciesmaynotappearmorethan10yearsafterfiling(in
contrasttothe7yearsformostotherkindsofseriousdelinquencies).Thisisnota
mandate,however,andsomecreditbureausappeartoremovebankruptciesfromreports
atthe7‐yearmark.Thisisparticularlylikelyforcompletedchapter13bankruptcies.
Usingdatafrombankruptciesfiledinthe1990s,DavidMustofoundthatconsumer
borrowingincreasedsignificantlyattheten‐yearmarkwhenbankruptcieswereexpunged.
DavidMusto,WhatHappensWhenInformationLeavesaMarket?EvidencefromPost‐
BankruptcyConsumers,77J.BUS.725(2004).Heattributesthisincreasedborrowingtothe
improvedcreditscoreresultingfromthechangeincontentofthereport.
Thesecondissueiswhatgetsreported.Whilefilingisnearlyalwaysnotedfromthe
publicrecords,manyotherkeyaspectsofthebankruptcyarenotcaptured.Thereportdoes
notshow,forexample,thepercentageofdebtproposedorpaidinachapter13case.
FederalTradeCommissionguidanceindicatesthatcreditbureaus“should”noteifa
bankruptcywasdismissedorifadebtwasdischargedinbankruptcybutthisinformation
appearslessreliablyreported.
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EffectofBankruptcyonCreditSCORE
Themostrecentstudiesindicatethatcreditscoresarenotenduringlydiminishedby
bankruptcy.Forfourdifferentgroupsoffilers(spanning2002:Q1‐2005Q3,2005:Q4‐
2007:Q2,2007:Q3‐2009:Q4,and2010:Q1‐2010:Q4—essentiallybeforeandafter
bankruptcyreform,andbeforeandafterthefinancialcrisis,)creditscorerecoveryis“very
dramatic.”Jagtiani&Liat11.BothChapter7andChapter13filersseemtoreturntotheir
previousriskscorelevels(asoffourtosixquarterspriortothebankruptcyfilingwithin
aboutoneyearafterfiling).Id.Somemightquibblewithwhetherfourtosixquartersprior
istheappropriatebaselineforcomparison,giventhatdatafromthe2001and2007
ConsumerBankruptcyProjectsshowmorethanhalfofdebtorsreportseriouslystruggling
withtheirdebtsformorethantwoyearsbeforefiling.RonaldMann&KatherinePorter,
SavingUpforBankruptcy,98GEO.L.J.289,313‐14(2010).Nonetheless,JagtianiandLi’s
findingseemstocontradictthecautionarytalesthatitwilltakemanyyears—includingthe
seventotenyearsuntilthebankruptcyisremoved—forcreditscorestoincreasemarkedly.
Atthetimeoffiling,theaveragescoreforbankruptcyfilersisbetween520‐540.Ittypically
recovers60ormorepointsinthefirstsixmonthsafterfilingandthenflattensoutforthe
nextyear.Jagtiani&Liat29(Fig.1).
Infact,forconsumerswithlowcreditscores,abankruptcyfilingmayactually
increasecreditscores.Cohen‐Cole,etal.,at5.3.Comparingagroupofnon‐filerswithfilers
(casesfiledin2004),theauthorsfoundthat18.3%offilersimmediatelyhadgreateraccess
tocreditafterfilingthanbefore,andthosewiththelowestpre‐filingcreditscoreswere
mostlikelytobeinthisgroup.Id.
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FICOitselfsaysthatforapersonwithacreditscoreof680,abankruptcywould
dropthecreditscoretobetween530and550.Forapersonwithacreditscoreof780,a
bankruptcywoulddropthecreditscoretobetween540and560.Thesenumberswillvary
significantlydependingonindividualfactors.Foreclosuregenerallyhasalessdeleterious
effect,butagainvariesbyindividual.FICOdoesoffersomeexamples.Forapersonwitha
creditscoreof680,aforeclosurewoulddropthecreditscoretobetween575and595.For
apersonwithacreditscoreof780,aforeclosurewoulddropthecreditscoretobetween
620and640.
SecuredLending
Securedlendingforthosewithblemishedcredithasbeeninfluxforthelastfew
years.Inthepast,bankruptcydebtorsexperienceda“paradoxofsecuredcredit,”withsuch
loansbeingsignificantlyhardertoobtainthanunsecuredcredit.KatherinePorter,
BankruptProfits:TheCreditIndustry’sBusinessModelforPostbankruptcyLending,93IOWA
L.REV.1369,1402,1406(2008).Usingdatafromchapter7filersin2001,Porterfoundthat
55%ofthosewhosoughtacarloaninthenextthreeyearsself‐reporteddifficultyin
obtainingaloan.Id.at1406.
Today,nearlyallborrowersfacesomeconstraintsinthemortgagemarket
comparedtobeforetheforeclosurecrisis.Theneedforalargedownpaymentandfull
incomedocumentation,however,contributeassignificantlytobankruptcydebtors’barrier
asdoeslowcreditscore.Inthelastfewmonths,severallendershaveloweredtheir
minimumrequiredcreditscoreandanewwaveofspecialtysubprimemortgagelenders
hascroppedup.
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Carlendershaveaddressedincreasedriskbysimplychargingmuchhigherrates
andincreasingtheirdefaultstrategies.“Buyhere,payhere”autodealersactuallyincreased
marketshareduringtherecessionasdefaultedhomeloansloweredthecreditscoresofa
largerfractionofconsumers.KatherinePorter,BuyHerePayHereDealerships,CREDITSLIPS
BLOG(Jan.4,2012),http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/01/buy‐here‐pay‐here‐
dealerships.html;KenBensinger,Ahardroadforthepoorinneedofcars,LATIMES(Nov.3,
2011),http://www.latimes.com/business/buy‐here‐pay‐here/la‐fi‐buyhere‐payhere‐
20111103‐story.html#page=1.
Someautolendersmarketdirectlytobankruptcyfilers.Nearly90%ofchapter7
filersinthe2001ConsumerBankruptcyProjectreportedreceivinganofferforacarloan.
Porter,BankruptProfits,at1403(Fig.3).Anotherstudyfoundthat48%offilersobtainone
ormorevehicleloanpost‐bankruptcy.Han&Li,at504.
Immediatelyfollowingfiling,thedollaramountofautoloansandhomemortgage
loanstendstobelow,butincreasessignificantlyabouttwoyearsafterfiling.SeeJagtiani&
Li,at12.Thissuggeststhatsecuredlending,whichareoftenfairlyhigh‐dollarloans
comparedtounsecuredcredit,mayrequirealongerwaitingperiodbeforecreditiswidely
available.
CreditCardOffers
Han,etal.,foundthatfilersareatleastaslikelyandsometimesmorelikelyto
receivecreditcardoffersthannon‐filers,supportingtheideathatlenderstarget
bankruptcyfilerswhowillnotbeabletofileforbankruptcyagainforseveralyears.See
Han,etal.,at3.ThissupportsPorter’shypothesisthatthereisaspecializedmarketfor
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postbankruptcylending.Porter,BankruptProfits,at1398(“Nearly88%ofdebtors
reportedthatlendershadreferencedthedebtor’sbankruptcyintheircreditmarketing”).
Despitetheseoffers,thereissomeevidencethatdebtorscurbtheircredituse.
Porterfoundthatonly65%ofchapter7filershadacreditcardatthethree‐yearpost‐filing
mark.Amongthosewhohadcards,themediannumberwas2.Porter,LifeAfterDebt,at13.
Thosedebtorswithcardsreportedanaveragedebtof$1092.Comparedtothosewhohave
nobankruptcyrecord,filershavefewercreditcards,arelesslikelytousecreditcardsin
general,andhavecreditlimitsthatare$12,000lowerthannon‐filers.Han&Li,at492,501,
504.However,filerswhodohavecreditcardsaremorelikelytoborrowhigheramounts,
carryanunpaidbalance,andpayhigherinterestratesthanaresimilarlysituated
individualswhohavenotfiledbankruptcy.Han&Li,at504.Existinglenderstendto
dramaticallylowerindividuals’creditlimitimmediatelyfollowingabankruptcyfiling,and
anynewlenderstendtooffersubstantiallylessfavorableterms.Han,etal.,at15‐16;
Jagtiani&Li,at15.
Filersaremorelikelytouseexpensivecreditsources,suchaspaydayloans,
suggestingalackoflessexpensiveborrowingoptions.Han&Li,at492.
Differencesbetweenchapter7andchapter13filers
Thereappearstobeonlyonestudythatexaminesthedifferenceincreditaccess
betweenchapter7filersandchapter13filers.Thisislargelyduetodatalimitations.Itis
alsodifficulttoaddresstheprohibitiononborrowingwithoutpermissioninachapter13
case.
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A2013researchpapershowsthatchapter13filersfareworseintermsofcredit
access.Chapter7filers’creditcardusagetendstorecoverapproximatelysixquartersafter
filing,butchapter13filers’creditcardusagetendstocontinuetodecline.Jagtiani&Li,at
12.Thisdifferencesuggeststhatthepatternofnichebankstargetingfilerhouseholds
identifiedbyHan,etal.,appliesonlytoChapter7filers.Seeid.at13.Chapter13borrowers
alsoreceivehigherinterestratesthanchapter7filers.Id.at18.Thebanonreceivinga
dischargeforeightyearsfollowingachapter7dischargelikelymakestheseconsumers
moreattractivethanchapter13filersinongoingcases,whicharemorelikelythannotto
bedismissedwithoutdischarge.Also,chapter13filersareobligatedtofollowtheir
repaymentplans,meaningtheirdisposableincomeisalreadycommittedtoexisting
lenders.Seeid.at14.
EffectsofReaffirmation
Manycreditorssuspendreportingtocreditbureausonaccountsthatareeitherina
pendingbankruptcyorhavebeendischargedinbankruptcy.Thereasoningisthatthe
bankruptcydischarge,whichwipesouttheloanbutnotthesecurityinterest,leavesthe
creditorwithnoreportingrequirements.Asaresult,onceabankruptcypetitionisfiled,
debtorswhocontinuetomaketimelypaymentsmaynotgetthebenefitsofthosetimely
paymentsontheircreditreports.Ifadebtorsignsareaffirmationagreementwiththe
creditor,however,thecreditorwillcontinuetoreportthemonthlypayments.Thisisthe
logicthatreaffirmationcanhelpdebtorsrebuildtheircreditscores.
Theprosandconsofsigningreaffirmationagreementsonsecureddebtin
bankruptcyarewidelydebated.Ofcourse,signingareaffirmationagreementreaffirmsa
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debtor’spersonalliabilityfordebt,andthisisoftennotinthedebtor’sbestinterestwhere
thedebtexceedsthevalueofthecollateral,employmentincomeisuncertain,ortheterms
ofthesecuredtransactionareotherwiseunfavorable.Despitethesecons,debtors’
attorneysarestillcognizantthatsomepersonalpropertysecuredcreditors(e.g.,Ford
MotorCredit)requireareaffirmationagreementifadebtorwishestoretainthecollateral.
Italsomaynotbeinadebtor’sbestinteresttolockincredittermsastheyexistat
thetimeofthepotentialreaffirmation,e.g.,ifadebtorcanforeseerefinancinglaterduetoa
homevaluationincrease.Ontheotherhand,somecreditors,suchasWellsFargo,refuseto
refinanceamortgageloanunlesseitherthedebtorreaffirmeditinbankruptcyorthecourt
issuesacomfortorderthatsuchareaffirmationwouldnotviolatethedischarge.The
obviousalternativeisforthedebtortorefinancewithadifferentlender,i.e.,onenot
involvedinthebankruptcy.
Thepotentialbenefitofreaffirmingforcreditscorepurposesissmallatbest,and
likelynegligible.Althoughtimelymonthlypaymentsareimportantforadebtor’scredit
score,theyareonlyonefactorinthecreditscorecomputation.Otherfactorsarealso
important.Forexample,ifaloanbalanceishighandthedebtwouldcauseahighutilization
ratioorariskofover‐extension,thenthenegativesofhavingthedebtlistedmayoutweigh
thebenefitofhavingthemonthlypaymentsappearonthecreditreport.
OngoingFinancialDifficulties
Afterbankruptcy,consumersstruggletopayroutinebills,suchasutilities.
KatherinePorter&DeborahThorne,FailureofBankruptcy’sFreshStart,92CORNELLL.REV.
67,86(2006).Thosewhoaremostlikelytostruggleafterbankruptcyarethosewith
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incomesthatcontinuetodeclineafterfiling.Id.at124.ZagorskyandLupicaanalyzeddata
fromtheNationalLongitudinalStudyofYouth,whichregularlysurveyedasampleofbaby
boomersbeginningin1979.JayL.Zagorsky&LoisR.Lupica,AStudyofConsumers'Post‐
DischargeFinances:Struggle,Stasis,orFresh‐Start?,16AM.BANKR.INST.L.REV.283,292
(2008).Inaregressionanalysiscontrollingforseveralfactors,theyfoundthatfilerswere
lesslikelytoownahomeorhaveacreditcardthannon‐filers.Id.at314.Whilefilers
eventuallyseemedtocatchuptotheirnon‐filingpeers,incometookatleast13yearsto
equalize,savingslevelstookatleast12years,andnetworthtookatleast20years.Id.
Bankruptcyfilershaveenduringfinancialvulnerabilities.
AnanalysisofdatafromtheFederalReserveBoard’sSurveyofConsumerFinance
showsthatalthoughbankruptcydebtorsweremorelikelytoberiskaversethanarenon‐
filersasmeasuredbyseveralcriteria,debtorsweremorelikelytohaveoverspentinthe
yearpriortothesurvey.Han&Li,at495,501.Strugglingtomakeendsmeetafter
bankruptcy,debtorsmayturntoborrowing,particularlyastheirresistancetocredit
erodes.
ConsumerReluctancetoBorrow
Debtorsgenerallyborrowatmuchlowerlevelsandhavefeweraccountsforyears
afterfiling.Whilethesupplysideeffectsdiscussedabovehaveobviousinfluence,thereis
bothsurveyandcreditbureaudatathatsuggestdebtorsthemselvesavoidcredit.Inthe12‐
18monthsafterfiling,debtorshadoneorfewer“hardinquiries”percalendarquarter.
Jagtiani&Liat29(Fig.3.)Thesehardinquiriesreflectacreditorevaluatingthereportto
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makeadeterminationonanapplicationforcredit(“softinquiries”arethosewhere
creditorsmightpullreportstoselectconsumersformarketing).
BeyondBorrowing:EffectsofLowCreditScore/BadCreditReport
Inrecentyears,creditbureaushavemarketedconsumercreditdataforpurposes
beyondassessinglikelihoodofrepayment.Creditchecksareroutineformanyjobs,
includingentry‐levelpositionssuchasretailclerks.Maroto,at103.Creditdataalsoinform
insurancedecisions(specifically,carinsurance)andapartmentrentals.Thereare
sometimesspecificscoresforthesedecisions,suchasinsurance,thatdifferfromthetypical
FICOscoreforcreditassessment.Informationonbankruptcy’seffectonthesescoresisnot
available,butsurveydatashowthatbankruptcyfilersreportbeingtoldbynon‐lendersthat
theirbankruptciesarethereasontheyweredeniedasapplicants(forjobs,insurance,
apartments,etc.)DeborahThorne,PersonalBankruptcyandtheCreditReport:Conflicting
MechanismsofSocialMobility,11JOURNALOFPOVERTY23(2007).
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FairCreditReportingAct,15U.S.C.§1681c§605.Requirementsrelatingtoinformationcontainedinconsumerreports(a)Informationexcludedfromconsumerreports.Exceptasauthorizedundersubsection(b)ofthissection, no consumer reporting agency may make any consumer report containing any of thefollowingitemsofinformation:
(1)Casesundertitle11[UnitedStatesCode]orundertheBankruptcyActthat,fromthedateofentryoftheorderforrelieforthedateofadjudication,asthecasemaybe,antedatethereportbymorethan10years.(2)Civil suits, civil judgments,andrecordsofarrest that fromdateofentry,antedate thereportbymorethansevenyearsoruntil thegoverningstatuteof limitationshasexpired,whicheveristhelongerperiod.(3)Paidtaxlienswhich,fromdateofpayment,antedatethereportbymorethansevenyears.(4)Accountsplacedforcollectionorchargedtoprofitandlosswhichantedatethereportbymorethansevenyears.(5)Anyotheradverseitemofinformation,otherthanrecordsofconvictionsofcrimeswhichantedatesthereportbymorethansevenyears
FederalTradeCommission,OfficialStaffCommentary,§607(b)(3)ReasonableProcedurestoEnsureMaximumPossibleAccuracy.F.Reportingofcreditobligation—
(1)Pastdueaccounts.Aconsumerreportingagencymustemployreasonableprocedurestokeepitsfilecurrentonpastdueaccounts(e.g.,byrequiringitscreditorstonotifythecreditbureauwhenapreviouslypastdueaccounthasbeenpaidordischargedinbankruptcy),butitsfailuretoshowsuchactivityinparticularinstances,despitethemaintenanceofreasonableprocedures to keep files current, does not violate this section. For example, a consumerreportingagencythatreportsaccuratelyin1985thatasof1983theconsumerowedaretailstoremoney,withoutmentioningthattheconsumereventuallypaidthedebt,doesnotviolatethissectionifitwasnotinformedbythestoreortheconsumerofthelaterpayment.(2)Significant,verified information. A consumer reporting agencymust report significant,verifiedinformationitpossessesaboutanitem.Forinstance,aconsumerreportingagencymaycontinuetoreportapaidaccountthatwaspreviouslydelinquent,butshouldalsoreportthat the account has been paid. Similarly, a consumer reporting agency may includedelinquenciesondebtsdischargedinbankruptcyinconsumerreports,butmustaccuratelynote the status of the debt (e.g., discharged, voluntarily repaid). Finally, if a reportedbankruptcyhasbeendismissed,thatfactshouldbereported.
FederalTradeCommission,OfficialStaffCommentary§607,item6.Content of ReportAconsumerreportneednotbetailoredtotheuser'sneeds.Itmaycontainanyinformationthatiscomplete,accurate,andnotobsoleteontheconsumerwhoisthesubjectofthereport.Aconsumerreportmayincludeanaccountthatwasdischargedinbankruptcy(aswellasthebankruptcyitself),aslongasitreportsazerobalanceduetoreflectthefactthattheconsumerisnolongerliableforthedischargeddebt.Aconsumerreportmayincludealistofrecipientsofreportsontheconsumerwhoisthesubjectofthereport.
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ExcerptsfromFICOsite
Paymenthistory(35%):Looksatwhetherpastcreditaccountshavebeenpaidontime—includingcreditcards,retailaccounts,installmentloans,financecompanyaccounts,andmortgageloans.TheeffectofmissedpaymentsontheFICOscorevariesbasedonhowlatethemissedpaymentwas,howmuchwasowed,howrecentlythemissedpaymentsoccurred,andhowmanymissedpaymentstherewereintotal.Ontheotherendofthespectrum,agoodrecordofpaymentincreasesaFICOscore.
Thiscategoryalsoincludesanybankruptcies,foreclosures,lawsuits,wageattachments,liens,andjudgments.Olderitemsanditemswithsmallamountscountlessthanneweritemsoritemswithlargeramounts.
Ingeneral,mostnegativeinformationremainsonthecreditreportfor7years(missedcreditaccountpayments,collectionaccounts,andalljudgments).Paidtaxliensremainonfilefor7yearsfromthedatethetaxlienispaid;unpaidtaxliensremainonfileindefinitely.Chapter7,11,and12bankruptciesremainfor10yearsfromthedatethebankruptcywasfiled.CompletedChapter13bankruptciesremainfor7yearsfromthedatefiled,butremainfor10yearsifnotcompleted.Amountsowed(30%):ThiscomponentoftheFICOscoreitselfcompilesinformationfromfivedifferentfactors:(1)theamountowedonallaccounts(thetotalbalanceowedforalldebt);(2)theamountowedondifferenttypesofaccounts(creditcardsversusinstallmentloans,etc.);(3)theamountowedoncertaintypesofaccounts(creditutilizationratio);(4)thenumberofaccountswithbalances(whetherthereisariskofover‐extension);and(5)theamountofinstallmentloanowedcomparedtotheoriginalloanamount(i.e.,thepercentageoftheinstallmentloanthathasbeenpaid).Lengthofcredithistory(15%):Thelengthofcredithistorycomponenthasthreefactors:(1)howlongcreditaccountshavebeenestablished,whichincludestheageoftheoldestaccount,theageofthenewestaccount,andanaverageageofallaccounts;(2)howlongspecificcreditaccountshavebeenestablished;and(3)howlongithasbeensincecertainaccountswereused.Generallystated,alongercredithistorywillleadtoahighercreditscore.Newcredit(10%):ThenumberofaccountsopenedandthenumberofrecentinquiriesbylendershaveasmallimpactontheFICOscore.Alargenumberofrecentinquiriesornewaccountscanindicategreaterrisk.Typesofcreditused(10%):Considersthemixofcreditcards,retailaccounts,installmentloans,financecompanyaccounts,andmortgageloans.Thiscomponentmeasuresaborrower’sexperiencewithdifferenttypesofaccounts,andthetotalnumberofaccountsheld.
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Advice:It’sEverywhere
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Credit:It’sNOTEverywhere(despitetheplacards!)
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BibliographyCreditReportingandBankruptcy
Andriotis,AnnaMaria&Sidel,Robin,CreditCardsforRiskiestCustomersRoarBack,WALL
ST.J.(June27,2014),http://online.wsj.com/articles/credit‐card‐lenders‐pursue‐riskier‐borrowers‐1403807505Bensinger,Ken,Ahardroadforthepoorinneedofcars,LATIMES(Nov.3,2011),http://www.latimes.com/business/buy‐here‐pay‐here/la‐fi‐buyhere‐payhere‐20111103‐story.html#page=1.Boustanifar,Hamid,PersonalBankruptcyReform,CreditAvailability,andFinancialDistress(Jan.2013),availableathttp://www.hhs.se/Education/PhD/PhDF/Documents/Boustanifar_Bankruptcy%20reform.pdf.Cohen‐Cole,Ethan,BurcuDuygan‐Bump,&JuditMontoriol‐Garriga,ForgiveandForget:WhoGetsCreditAfterBankruptcyandWhy?(Fed.ReserveBankofBoston,WorkingPaperNo.QAU09‐2,2009),availableathttp://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2009/qau0902.htm.Dewan,Shaila,InHomeLoans,SubprimeFadesasaDirtyWord,NYTimes(June28,2014),availableathttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/business/in‐home‐loans‐subprime‐fades‐as‐a‐dirty‐word.html?_r=0.Dobbie,Will,DebtReliefandDebtorOutcomes:MeasuringtheEffectsofConsumerBankruptcyProtection(UpjohnInstituteforEmploymentStudies,2013DissertationSummaries),availableathttp://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=dissertation_awards.Duhl,Gregory,DividedLoyalties:TheAttorney’sRoleinBankruptcyReaffirmations,84AM.BANKR.L.J.361(2010).Foley,RachelLynn,ReopeningaChapter7CanBeCrucialForADebtor’sFreshStart,AM.BANKR.INST.J.,Mar.2013.Grillot,Nicholas,DisfavoringReopeningofCasestoEnterReaffirmationAgreements,AM.BANKR.INST.J.,Mar.2013.
Han,SongandGengLi,HouseholdBorrowingafterPersonalBankruptcy,43J.OFMONEY,CREDITANDBANKING491(2011),availableathttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1538‐4616.2010.00382.x/abstract.
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Han,Song,BenjaminJ.Keys,andGengLi,CreditSupplytoPersonalBankruptcyFilers:EvidencefromCreditCardMailings(FederalReserveBoard,WorkingPaperNo.2011‐29),availableathttp://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2011/201129/201129pap.pdf.Jagtiani,Julapa&WenliLi,CreditAccessandCreditPerformanceAfterConsumerBankruptcyFiling:NewEvidence(FederalReserveofPhiladelphia,WorkingPaperNo.13‐24),availableathttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2269621.Maroto,Michelle,TheScarringEffectsofBankruptcy:CumulativeDisadvantageAcrossCreditandLaborMarkets,91SOCIALFORCES99(2012).Mayer,CarolineE.,BankruptcyandSwampedwithCreditOffers,WASH.POST,Apr.15,2005,availableathttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/articles/A54745‐2005Apr14.html.Porter,Katherine,BankruptProfits:TheCreditIndustry’sBusinessModelforPostbankruptcyLending,93IOWAL.REV.1369(2008).Porter,Katie,BuyHerePayHereDealerships,CREDITSLIPSBLOG(Jan.4,20126:05AM),http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/01/buy‐here‐pay‐here‐dealerships.html.Porter,Katherine,LifeafterDebt:UnderstandingtheCreditRestraintofBankruptcyDebtors,18AM.BANKR.INST.L.REV.1(2010).Thorne,Deborah,PersonalBankruptcyandtheCreditReport:ConflictingMechanismsofSocialMobility,11JOURNALOFPOVERTY23(2007).Zagorsky,JayL.&LoisR.Lupica,AStudyofConsumers'Post‐DischargeFinances:Struggle,Stasis,orFresh‐Start?,16AM.BANKR.INST.L.REV.283,292(2008).
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