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Bases of Human Rights in Hinduism

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HinduismandHumanRights:AConceptualApproachArvindSharma

Printpublicationdate:2004PrintISBN-13:9780195665857PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:October2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195665857.001.0001

BasesofHumanRightsinHinduism

ArvindSharma

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195665857.003.0002

AbstractandKeywords

ThischapterexaminesthefoundationsofhumanrightsintheWesternworld,asapreludetoidentifyingtheirbases,ifany,inHinduism.FourfoundationsofhumanrightscanbeidentifiedinthecurrentliteratureonthesubjectintheWest.Thesearelegal,moral,ethical,andreligiousinnatureorconception.Accordingtothepositivisticorlegalviewofhumanrights,humanrightsarelegalentities—nomore,noless.Themoralviewofhumanrightsisgroundedintheperceptionthathumanrights,aslegalentities,stemfromamoralvisionoftheworld,ofwhichtheyconstitutealegalexpression.TheethicalviewofhumanrightsmaybetracedtoBentham,andespeciallyhissuccessor,JohnStuartMill.Thereligiousviewsuggeststhathumanrightscanbederivedfromthedifferentreligioustraditionsoftheworld.

Keywords:humanrights,Westernworld,legal,moral,ethical,religious,Bentham,JohnStuartMill

I


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ItmightbeusefultobeginbyexaminingthefoundationsofhumanrightsintheWesternworld,asapreludetoidentifyingtheirbases,ifany,inHinduism.FourfoundationsofhumanrightscanbeidentifiedinthecurrentliteratureonthesubjectintheWest.Thesemaybrieflybedescribedaslegal,moral,ethical,andreligiousinnatureorconception.

LegalViewofHumanRights

Accordingtothepositivisticorlegalviewofhumanrights,humanrightsarelegalentities—nomore,noless.Thusaccordingtothisviewhumanrightsare‘whatthelawssaytheyare’.1Thisraisestwoquestions:whatdothelawssaytheyare;andwhatarethelawswhichsayso?Minimally,theselawsincludetheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,adoptedandproclaimedbytheGeneralAssemblyoftheUnitedNationson10December1948(seeAppendixI).Maximally,‘inpracticaltermsifasubjectisinatreaty,itisanissueofhumanrights’.2Moreconcretely,thetermhumanrightsisusedinthischaptertocovertheprovisionspertainingtorightsprovidedforinthefollowingdocuments:theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(1948);theInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(1966);theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(1966),andthetwooptionalprotocolstothelatterCovenant.3

Suchaviewofhumanrightsnaturallyfollows,forinstance,fromthefollowingcommentofJamesNickel:‘TheformulationbytheUnitedNationsin1948oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsmadepossiblethesubsequentflourishingoftheideaofHumanRights’.4RobertTraerthinksthatthereasonsresponsiblefortheflourishingofhumanrightsmaybemorecomplex.5Neverthelesstheparturition,ifnotthe(p.5) conception,ofhumanrightscouldperhapsreasonablybeidentifiedwiththeUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.

MoralViewofHumanRights

Themoralviewofhumanrightsisgroundedintheperceptionthathumanrights,aslegalentities,stemfromamoralvisionoftheworld,ofwhichtheyconstitutealegalexpression.Fromsuchapointofview,humanrights,inthewordsofLouisHenkin,are‘simplythosemoralpoliticalclaimswhich,bycontemporaryconsensus,everyhumanbeinghasorisdeemedtohaveuponhissocietyandgovernment’.6

Itispossibletoproposethattheconceptofhumanrightscanbederivedfromamoralperspectiverootedinthevariousreligioustraditionsofhumanity.Thismaybedemonstratedbyaseriesoflogicalsteps.Asafirststeponecouldarguethat

Theworldreligionsdohavealargelysharedmorality:murder,lying,stealing,sexualimpropriety,andsoonareuniversallyprohibited.Moreover,evenmoregeneralprinciplesareoftensharedamongtheworldreligions.Forinstance,intheChinese,Hindu,Buddhist,Zoroastrian,Christian,andIslamictraditionsamongothers,wefindaremarkablysimilarconceptionofhowtotreatothers:

Donotimposeonotherswhatyouyourselfdonotdesire.

TheAnalects,XV:24,Confucius(551–479BC)


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Oneshouldneverdothattoanotherwhichoneregardsasinjurioustoone’sownself.This,inbrief,istheruleofdharma.Yieldingtodesireandactingdifferently,onebecomesguiltyofadharma.

MahabharataXII:113,8

Hewhoforthesakeofhappinesshurtsothers,whoalsowanthappiness,shallnothereafterfindhappiness.

Hewhoforthesakeofhappinessdoesnothurtothers,whoalsowanthappiness,shallhereafterfindhappiness.

TheDhammapada131–2

Thenatureonlyisgoodwhenitshallnotdountoanotherwhateverisnotgoodforitsownself.

Dabistan-i-dinik94:5

Loveyourneighbourasyourself.

GospelofMark12:33(RSV)

(p.6) Nomanisatruebelieverunlesshedesiresforhisbrotherthatwhichhedesiresforhimself.

Muhammad,fromtheHadith7

JosephRunzohasidentifiedthefollowingfourconstituentsofthemoralpointofviewingeneral:

(1)takingothersintoaccountinone’sactionsbecauseonerespectsthemaspersons;(2)thewillingnesstotakeintoaccounthowone’sactionsaffectothersbytakingintoaccountthegoodofeveryoneequally;(3)abidingbytheprincipleofuniversalizability—thatis,thewillingnesstotreattheactionsasmorallylaudableorpermissibleonlyifsimilaractsofothersincomparablecircumstanceswouldbeequallylaudableorpermissible,andtotreattheactionsofothersasmorallyimpermissibleonlyifsimilaractsofone’sownwouldbeequallymorallyculpable;(4)thewillingnesstobecommittedtosomesetofnormativemoralprinciples.8

Asathirdstep,thepresenceorprevalenceoftheseelementsinthevariousreligioustraditionscouldbedemonstratedasfollows:

Takingtheseinreverseorder,ofcourse,differentreligioustraditionsanddifferentcultureswillspecifythenormativeprinciplein(4)differently.Butalltraditionsshareuniversalizability(3),foraswesawwhenwedistinguishedKant’sethics,thisisalogicalfeatureofanymorality.Thewillingnesstotakeothersintoaccount(2)isapsychologicalfeatureofthemorallife,andit,too,issharedbyalltheWorld


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Religions.ThisbringsustothekeysharedelementofthereligiousethicsofalltheWorldReligions:(1)takingothersintoaccountinone’sactionsbecauseonerespectsthemaspersons.ThisisthecruxoftakingthemoralpointofviewandsothecruxofthesharedethicsoftheWorldReligions.9

Asafourthstep,thekeyelementunderlyingallofthesemaythenbeidentifiedasconsistingofrelationality.Thusrelatingtootherpersonsbecomesakeyfactorinmoralagency.ThisismostobviousintheKantiandictumthatoneshould‘alwaystreatothersasendsinthemselvesandnotmerelyasmeanstoanend’.ItisalsoobviousintheBuberian‘I-thou’formulation:‘WhenIconfrontahumanbeingasmyYouandspeakonthebasicwordI-Youtohim,thenheisnothingamongthingsnordoesheconsistofthings.’Inotherwords,thereisaradicaldifferencebetweentreatingpeopleasthingsandtreatingthemaspersons.Totreatpersonsasthingsamountstotreatingthemasan‘it’ratherthanas‘you’accordingtoBuber.Italsomeanstotreathumanbeingsaslessthanhuman.10

Thisbringstheargumentintothemoralsphere.However,

Theobligationtotakethemoralpointofviewisnotamoralobligation,forthatwouldbecircular.However,relationalityisareligiousobligation,forontheviewofWorldReligions,onecannotrelatetotheTranscendentunlessonerelatesto(p.7)otherpersons.Hencetakingthemoralpointofviewisareligiousobligation.Consequently,religionsupervenesonmorality.Thatis,religionencompassesbutismorethana‘religiouspointofview’.Justasthemoralpointofviewfunctionsasthewellspringandthepointofcommonalityanduniversalityformoralvalueandtruths,sotoothereligiouspointofviewisthewellspring,thepointofcommonality,andthemanifestationofuniversalityinreligion,eventhoughtheadherentsoftheWorldReligionshavequiteadifferentspecificreligiousworld-view.11

Thefinalstepconsistsinrecognizingthatabeliefintheintrinsicworthofpersonsisacrucialcomponentofthispointofview:

InRelationshipMoralityJamesKellenbergerexplainsthemoralpointofviewbyarguingthat‘theultimategroundingofobligation,andfinallyofallmorality,isasinglebutuniversalrelationshipbetweeneachandall,’suggestingthatitisarealizationofthis‘person/personrelationship’tootherswhichcreates‘asenseofdutygroundedinarecognitionoftheintrinsicworthofpersons’.Sincereligionsupervenesonmorality,tobegenuinelyreligiousistorealizetheperson/personrelationshipKellenbegeridentifies,butwiththeaddedorsuperveningdimensionoftherealizationofasingleuniversalrelationshipbothamongallpersonsasspiritsandwiththeTranscendent.Icallthisuniversalreligiousrelationshipa‘spirit-spirit’relationship.

Suchabeliefconstitutesthecoremoralconceptofhumanrights.

EthicalViewofHumanRights


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IfwemaytracethemoralviewofhumanrightstoLockealthoughelaboratedaboveinthecontextofworldreligions,wemaytracetheethicalviewofhumanrightstoBentham,despitehisdescriptionofhumanrightsas‘nonsenseonstilts’,12especiallyashissuccessor,JohnStuartMill,arguedthat‘aperceptiveandfar-sightedutilitariansupportsstrongrightsbothofdemocraticparticipationandofindividualfreedomofaction’.13

However,utilitarianismmaynotalwaysrepresentadimensionofvirtueorethics;itmightevensubvertit.Consider,forinstance,thefollowingsocialDarwinianperspective:

Judgementspassedinaprimitivesocietyontheconductofitsmembersarerelated,asfaraswecansee,nottothebettermentoftheirinnernature,butonlytocollectivewell-being;anditisargued,onthisbasis,thatthoseformsofconductwhichmakeforthesurvivalofsocietyarealonepraised,andthosethatdonotarecondemned.Whatisgoodorbadforthehiveispreciselywhatisgoodorbadforthebee.Thisoriginallyutilitarianmotiveis,incourseoftime,forgotten;but(p.8)themodesofconductremain,itisexplained,constitutingwhatisnowstyled‘virtue’.14

Inotherwords,wefeelrighttalkingaboutrightsbecausebyinsistingonthemforothersweareonlysecuringouroverallprotection.Thislineofreasoningisattractivebut,accordingtotheIndianphilosopher,M.Hiriyanna,specious.Hegoesontoexplainthatevenwhenwegrantthat:

Whatwetermthe‘highervalues’haveoriginatedfrommodesofbehaviourwhichonceservedonlyutilitarianpurposes,thereisonepeculiarityaboutthemwhichrequiresproperexplanation.Itisthat,atonestageinthisprocessoftransformation,theyhavecometomanifestaqualitativedistinction,withtheimplicationthattheyoughttobesoughtinpreferencetothosethatarepurelyutilitarianintheircharacter.Thegenetictheoryhasnothingtosayabouttheemergenceofthisdistinctionor,‘thegrowth’,asithasbeenwellput,‘ofwhatwasintowhatwasnot’.Thatistosay,itleaveswhollyunexplainedwhat,aspointedabove,isessentialtotheverynatureofvalue.Itshouldthereforebeconcludedthatthereissomethinguniqueintheconstitutionofhumannature,whichservesasthenecessaryconditionoftheideallife,which,asalreadystated,isintrinsictothenatureofman,andaccountsforhisfeelingsthatheisnotmerelyafinerkindofanimal…15

Axiologicalspaceisthuscreatedfortheemergenceofhumanrights.Butwealsonoticethatthismoveawayfromtheutilitariancalculuspointsinthedirectionofmorality.

TheReligiousViewofHumanRights

Themoralvisionasabackdropofhumanrightswasreferredtoearlier.Suchamoralvisioncouldemergeonitsownoffandon,orfromasecularviewoftheworld;oritmightbegroundedinareligiousvision.RobertTraerseemstoinclinetowardsthislastviewwhenhewrites:


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Infact,humanrightsareatthecenterofaglobalmorallanguagethatisbeingjustified,elaborated,andadvocatedbymembersofdifferentreligioustraditionsandcultures.ThisistruenotmerelyintheWestbutalsoinAfricaandAsia.ItistruenotonlyintheFirstandSecondWorlds,whereliberalandsocialisthumanrightstheorieshaveevolved,butintheThirdWorldaswell.Jews,Christians,Muslims,Hindus,Buddhists,andadvocatesofreligioustraditionsindigenoustoAfricaandAsiafundamentallyagreeabouthumanrights.16

Hencehumanrightscanalsobederived,atleastpotentially,fromthedifferentreligioustraditionsoftheworld,andnotjustfromtheirsharedmoraluniverse.

(p.9) IITherelativemeritsanddemeritsofgroundinghumanrightsonthesefourfoundationsmaynowbeconsidered.Thegreatmeritofthelegalviewofhumanrightsisthattheyaretherebymadejusticiable,andcanbeenforcedinacourtoflaw.Thegreatdangerofadoptingthelegalviewofhumanrightsisthatwhatisconferredbylawcanbetakenawaybylaw.TheIndianexperienceinthisrespectissalutary.ThefundamentalrightsoftheIndianConstitutionwereineffectsuspendedduringtheproclamationoftheEmergencybyMrsGandhiin1975.

Themeritofthemoralviewofhumanrightsisthattheyare,onthataccount,naturalandthereforeinalienable.In1977,aquestionnairewascirculatedamongtheleadersofthePhilippinesbytheUniversityofthePhilippinesLawCentreandthePhilippinesCouncilofPolicyScience.Itincludedthefollowingquestion:Whatdoyouunderstandby‘humanrights’?Doyoubelievethathumanrightsareinherentinmanorthattheyaregrantedbythestate?Whatisyourviewonthesubject?

ThereplygivenbyReynaldoS.Capule,apoliticalleader,reflectsthestrengthofthemoralbasisofhumanrights:

Humanrightsareinherentornaturalandarenotgrantedbythestate.Evenatthebeginningofhistory,peopleexistedinasocietywhereeverymemberhadequalrights,forexample,equalrightsinmakinguseoftheland,equalrightstotheproductsoflabour,equalrightsintheprotectionofthesecurityoftheindividualorofthesocietyasawholeandotherrightsneededinordertolive.17

Theweaknessofthemoralbasisofhumanrightsliesinthedisputednatureofauniversalmorality,aconceptwhichmustbecarefullydistinguishedfromthatofuniversalmoralconsciousness.Itcanperhapsbereasonablyclaimedthatmoralconsciousnessisauniversalphenomenon;thatistosay,everyonepossessesasenseofrightandwrong.However,everyonemaynotagreeonwhatisrightandwhatiswrong,andthequestionofauniversalmoralitycanthusbecomeanissue.ThebeliefiswidespreadamongAmericanbusinessmen,forinstance,thattheConfucianethicsetsChinaapartfromothercivilizations,aviewsometimessharedbyChineseCommunists.18

Themeritoftheethicalviewofhumanrightsconsistsinthecorrectiveitprovidesagainst


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takingtooindividualisticaviewofhumanrights,byappealingtothecommongood.SomeofthesearereflectedinArticles22–27oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights.SuchprovisionsenableaThirdWorldperspectivetoberecognizedintheDeclaration,a(p.10) perspectiverootedinitsmorecommunalformsofsocialorganization,ahistoryofcollectivestruggleagainstimperialisminthecolonialeraand,subsequently,thewidespreadadoptionofasocialisticorientation(nowintheprocessofreassessment)inthepost-colonialera.Theshortcomingoftheethicalapproachistheobjectificationitinvolvesoftheindividualintheinterestofanabstractcommongood.Anextremeexamplemightbeofhelp.Asthepercapitaincomeiscalculatedonthebasisofincomedividedbythepopulation,itmightbeconceivablethatreducingpopulationcouldraisepercapitaincome.Thusonemustdistinguishbetweengenocideandfamilyplanningaswaysofraisingpercapitaincome.

Thestrengthofthereligiousviewofhumanrightsliesinitsabilitytotapintothedeeplyandwidelyheldbeliefsofthevariousreligioustraditionsandevenhelpprovideacommonplatformaroundwhichreligiouszealcouldbemobilized.However,itsverystrengthcanturnintoaweakness,ifthatreligiousenthusiasmhasalreadybeenchannelledintoalegalorquasi-legalstructure,partsofwhichareantitheticaltohumanrights.Theobviousexamplesofsuchadevelopmentarethesharī‘ahinIslamandthecastesysteminHinduism.Theseobstaclesmaynotbeinsuperable,19buttheyareobstaclesnevertheless,althoughRobertTraerhasrecentlyarguedvigorouslyforanchoringthehumanrightstraditionintherights-positivedimensionsofthevariousreligioustraditions.20Itisinthislightthatthefollowingintriguingquestiondeservestobepursued:

Anintriguingquestionarisesastowhetherdifferingculturescanarriveatasimilarconclusionaboutrightsbyratherdifferentroutes—someviaexplicitphilosophizing,aswithLocke,KantandothersintheWest;othersbycontemplatingreligioustextsandduties(ashere,theMīmāṁsāandtheGītā);othersagainbyexploitingideasofritualandperformativebehaviourtowardsothers(e.g.liinChinaasasourceofrights).Itwouldbeahappyoutcomeifso:sinceitwouldallowaconfluencemodelofworldsocietytoestablishitself—differingcivilizationslikesomanyriverscomingtogether,likethereverseofadelta.21

IIIFromtheHindupointofview,eachofthesebasesofhumanrightscouldbealignedtooneofitsfourfundamentalaxiologicalorientationscalledpuruṣārthas.Thesearekāma,artha,dharma,andmokṣaandforourpurposesmaybetranslatedasreferringtothesensate,politico-economic,moral,andmetaphysicaldimensionsofhumanexistence.Theethicalviewofhumanrightsconnectswiththedimensionofkāmainthesense(p.11)thatitinvolvestheassessmentoftherelativemeritsoftheelementsdesired(kāma=desire)bytheindividualvis-à-visthecommunity.Thelegalviewcanbelinkedwithartha,whichtakesapositivisticviewoflaw.22Themoralviewofhumanrightscansimilarlybeconnectedtodharmaandthereligiousviewwithmokṣa.

Alltheselinkswillbedevelopedindetailinwhatfollowsbuttheconclusionmaybe


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anticipated.Hinduthinkingisstronglyinfavourofgroundinghumanrightsinmoralityordharma.Forgroundingitinkāmawouldbetoohedonistic,inarthatoopositivisticandarbitrary,andinmokṣatooremoteandeventransgressive.Groundinghumanrightsinamoralvisionwouldmeangroundingthemontheirhomeground.Thetaskoftherestofthesectionistomakethispointapparent.

ItwasclaimedabovethattheethicalgroundingofhumanrightscanbeseenascorrespondingtotheHinduvalueofkāma.Atfirstblushthismightseemsomewhatoddforseveralreasons.Forone,KāmaisthegodofloveinHinduismsothatwhenŚivais‘dwellingonhissacredmountainintheHimalayasindeepyogictrance’and‘theHindugodoflust,Kāma,triestodistracthimfromhismeditation,Shivaburnshimtoashes’.23Similarly,whentheaffectionthefemaledevoteeĀṇṭāḷhasforKṛṣṇa‘eventuallyturnedintoadesiretomarryhim,’then,‘inherdevotionalhymns,ĀṇṭāḷentreatsKāma,theHindugodofloveanddesire,toattractKṛṣṇatoher,tomakehimherhusband’.24Whathasallthistodowithhumanrights?SofarnothingexceptperhapsherrighttomarryunderArticle16thoughwearenotsurewhethershehadthe‘freeandfullconsentoftheintendingspouse’,namelyGod.However,kāmaor‘thequestforpleasure’,25asavalue,usuallyconsideredaninferiorvalue,wasraisedtothehighestwhendirectedtowardsGod.Thiscreatesroomfortranslatingkāmainourowncontextasthesatisfactionofdesiredends.Thisenablestheutilitariancalculustobebroughtintoplay,aswellasthelapidaryutterance,whichevokestherightnotonlytolifeandlibertybutalso‘thepursuitofhappiness’.WhatisrightandwrongwiththisgroundingofhumanrightsinkāmabecomesclearifwefollowtheexampleofGilbertHarmanasappliedbyJamesFishkin:

Letusfirstimagineadoctorwhomustchoosebetweenconcentratingononepatienttotheexclusionoffiveothersinanemergencysituationorsavingthefiveothers.Inthissimplifiedsituation,ifwemustchoosebetweensavingonelifeandsavingfive,manyofuswouldsupporttheutilitariancalculationthatthefivebesaved.Isay‘utilitarian’becauseinintroducingnofurtherfactsaboutthesixpatients,Iammakingiteasyforautilitariantocountthemequallyandtotreatthe(p.12) savingoflifeasaplaceholderfortheproductionofafuturestreamofutility.Furthermore,thiscalculationwouldappearquitefavourabletoutilitarianismbecausebycountinglivesratherthanutilitiesordollars,Iampermittingtheutilitariantoavoidthewell-knownParetiandifficultieswithinterpersonalcomparisons.

Thesecondstepintheexampleistoimaginethesamedoctorwithfivepatients,eachofwhomrequireadifferentorgan(oneakidney,anotheralung,anotheraheart,etc.).Withouttherequiredtransplants,theywilleachdieintheimmediatefuture.Thedifficultyisthatthereisnoavailabledonor.

Thereis,however,apatientinroom306whohasalltherequiredcharacteristicsandorgansingoodcondition.Hehascheckedinforaroutinesetofphysicalexams.Ifhewerekilledandtherequiredorgansredistributed,fivelivescouldbesavedatthecostofonelost.


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Now,thisisthepointinanti-utilitarianhorrorstorieswhentherejoindersfocusonthedangersofexceptions,thevalueofmaintainingongoingpractices,andthedisutilityofaclimateoffearthatmightbecreatedifexceptionstoanon-goingpractice—suchasthosedefiningtheroutinephysicalexam—werepermitted.MuchthatGibbardsaysalongtheselinesispersuasive.Furthermore,hisproposedrighttoprotectionfromarbitrarylossoflifeorlibertymightbeheldtoprotectthepatientinroom306—evenwhentheutilitariancalculationsmightsupporttakinghislifeintheinterestsofsavingfiveothers(andevenwhensecrecyanddeceptionmightbeemployedtopreventfearandotherformsofdisutilityfromenteringthecalculation).26

ThisscenarioisnotinconsistentwiththepictureoftheIndianmaterialistswhoacknowledgeonlykāmaastheprimaryvalue,27forwhom‘themoralityofanactiondependsonthequantityofpleasureityields’,28thispleasureprinciplebeingelevatedtoacommunallevelinourcontext,whichrequiresamovefromahedonistictoautilitarianinterpretationofkāma.

ThelegalviewofhumanrightspertainstotheHinduvalueofartha,especiallyaselaboratedintheArthaśāstra,29afamoustextonpolity,andsectionsdealingwithsimilartopicsinalliedliterature.30Thevalueofarthaisheldtobesupremebythe‘legalists’,31takingprecedenceoverdharmaormoralityperse.32ThistrendculminatesintheNāradasmṛti,whichestablishestheroyalcommandastheultimatesourceofdharma.33Ithasevenbeenmaintainedthatinthelightofthisvalue:

Thestateiswelcomedbythosewhowishprosperityandproperty.Privatepropertyisacreationofthestate.Throughfearofthekingthepropertyoftheweakissecured:‘Ifthekingdidnotexercisethedutyofprotection,thestrongwouldforciblyappropriatethepossessionsoftheweak,andifthelatterrefusedtosurrenderthemwithease,theirveryliveswouldbetaken.Nobodythen,withreferencetoanyarticleinhispossession,wouldbeabletosay“thisismine”.’34

(p.13) Thereligiousviewofhumanrightspertainstothevalueofmokṣa.Thedifficultyinsustainingthisviewasabasisofhumanrightsisbothsublimeontheonehandandmundaneontheother,speciallywhenviewedfromtheperspectiveofamajorschoolofHinduthoughtknownasAdvaitaVedānta.Thepersonwho,inthislife,hasattainedthesummumbonumoflife,althoughactiveinlife,nolongeracts‘fromanyselfishimpulseorevenfromasenseofobligationtoothers’.Infact,‘thecommonlawsofsocialmoralityandritualwhicharesignificantonlyinreferencetoonestrivingforperfectionaremeaninglesstohim’.Somuchsothat‘impulseanddesirebecomeonetohim.Heisnotthenrealizingvirtuebutrevealingit’.35Itisclearthatinthisformofliberation(mokṣa)theliberatedpersonmayseeno‘other’vis-à-viswhomrightsmaybeasserted.

Thewholeissueofhumanrightsispredicatedondistinctionsamonghumanbeingsandobjects,butthiswholeworldviewtendstobeunderminedbythisversionoftheliberativevisionofHinduism,whichpossessesapronouncedlyunitivecharacter.M.Hiriyannahighlightsthispointwithexceptionalclarity:


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Whatisthebearingofsuchaviewofultimaterealityonoureverydaylife?Themoststrikingfeatureofthelatteristheconviction,whichitinvolves,viz.,thatdiversityisrealandultimate.Thepresuppositionofmost,ifnotall,oftheactivitiesoflifeisthatonemanisdifferentfromanother.Theveryeffortsmadethroughsocialandpoliticalorganizationstounifymenimplythattheyregardthemselvesasdistinct.Ifmanisdistinctfromman,hisdistinctionfromhisphysicalenvironmentisevenclearer.Itisnotmerelymanthatisdistinctfrommatter;matteritself,whetheritservesasanadjunctoftheselflikethephysicalbodyandtheorgansofsenseorasitsenvironment,seemstobediverseinitscharacter,eachobjecthavingitsownindividualityor,astheUpanishadsexpressit,itsownname(nāma)anditsownform(rūpa).Itisobviousthat,ifmonismisthetruth,nopartofthisdiversitycanbeultimate.ThatisthesignificanceoftheteachingoftheUpanishads,sofarasourcommonbeliefsareconcerned.36

Onthemundaneside,theliberatedperson,undertheinfluenceofhisorherpreviouskarmabeingworkedout,maynotrespecttherightsofothersasinthecaseofafigurecalledAlarka37butthisisrarethoughqualitativelysignificant.

ItistheaxiologicalorientationofHinduismprovidedbythevalueofdharma,whichseemstoholdthebestpromiseinofferingasolidgroundingofhumanrights,butonlyaftersomecautionhasbeenexercisedinthisrespect.Althoughthetermdharmahasamultitudeofmeaningsandassociations,oneneedstoidentifyanddistinguishbetweenthreesenses(p.14) inthepresentcontext.Thefirstistheuseoftheworddharmainaritualisticcontext,asintheschoolofMīmāṁsā.ThepointtobespeciallykeptinmindistheMīmāṁsāview

thattheVedateachesdharma(religiousduty).Whatisdharma?ItiswhatisenjoinedintheVeda…[However]thecommandsoftheVedashouldnotbemistakenforthoseofordinarymorality[although]itistruethatordinarymoralityisrequiredforamanbeforehegainscompetencetoperformtheritualsenjoinedintheVedas.38

Theworddharmahasanothermeaningaswell.Fromanotherperspectivetheduties[dharma]are‘thoseofthecastes(varṇa-dharma),’and‘thoseofthestagesinlife(āśrama-dharma)’.39Thesetwoarejointlyreferredtoasvarṇāśrama-dharmaandarenotlikelytocarryusveryfarinthepresentcontextastheyarespecifictoclassandstationinlife.

Wearenowleftwiththethirdsenseoftheworddharma—sādhāraṇa-dharma,ordutiescommontoallirrespectiveofclassorstationinlife.TheirpresenceinHinduismhasnotreceivedtherecognitionitdeserves.Theyhavebeenliving,asitwere,undertheshadowofthevarṇāśramadharmaandoftenconsideredsecondarytoit,40althoughthisisamootpoint.Letusthereforefirstgivethemtherecognitiontheydeserve.P.V.Kane,thenotedauthorityonHindutextsdealingwithdharma,writes:

Apartfromthespecificqualitiesrequiredtobepossessedbythemembersofeach


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ofthefourvarṇas,allDharmaśāstraworksattachthehighestimportancetocertainmoralqualitiesandenjointhemonallmen.ManuX.63,Yāj.I.2,Gaut.Dh.S.VIII.23–25,Matsya52.8–10(quotedaboveonp.1652)prescribeforallvarṇasabriefcodeofmorals,suchasahiṁsā,truthfulness,non-stealing(i.e.nowrongfultakingofanother’sproperty),purityandrestraintofthesenses.TheMitākṣarāonYāj.I.22explainsthattheword‘sarveṣām’thereinstatesthatthesemoralqualitiesifpractisedarethemeansofDharmaforallmenfrombrāhmaṇastocaṇḍālas.41

Itisthesequalitieswhichestablishapersonasavirtuous,self-regardinghumanbeingwhoregardsothersaswell.Theabilitytopractisesuchvirtuesisaspecialfeatureofbeinghuman—asignofhumanworthanddignity.Thisconsiderationisfurtherenhancedbythefactthat,amongallcreatures,humanbeingsaresaidtobetheonesbestpoisedforsalvation.Thequestforsuchsalvationrequiresfivenegativeandfivepositiveobservances,whichareunaffectedbyconsiderationsoftimeandspaceandthereforetrulyuniversal(YogasūtraII.30-1).Thesearevirtuallyidenticalwiththesādhāraṇadharmas.42ItisthereforeourviewthataHinduperspectiveonthebasesofhumanrightswouldrecommendtheirgroundinginmorality,thebrandofuniversalmoralityjustmentioned.

(p.15) OnemightalsoaddthatHinduismdisplaysaspecialconsciousnessoftheweaknessesassociatedwithothergroundingsofhumanrights—theutilitarian,thelegal,andthereligious(i.e.,metaphysical).Apopulardidacticverseconsiderstheutilitarianapproachascrass.Itdeclaresthat‘itisthesmall-mindedwhocalculateonthebasisofhisandmine,forthelargeofheartlookuponthewholeworldasasinglefamily’.Moreover,theutilitarianwillingnesstosacrificethepersonfor‘thelargercalculation’(readinstitution)doesnotsitwellwithHinduism.

AthemerunningthroughoutHinduismisthatinstitutionsexistforthesakeofman.Thestateistoservethebestinterestsofindividualhumanbeings.Somehownationstendtolosethissimpletruth.BrotherhoodbecomesaUnitedNationsratherthanaunitedpeople.Nationsbecomecompetitiveratherthancooperative,andthegameofnationsbecomestooexpensiveandtoodangeroustoplay.Howmuchlongercannationsspendoverhalftheirwealthandproductionfortheweaponsofwar?Whatisthepointofwarsinwhicheveryoneloses?Whywageawarinwhichnoonesurvives?Cantheauthorityofnationsbebasedondharmaratherthanondanda(coercivepower)?Indiahasraisedsuchquestions,andshehasrefusedtoenterintothecoldwar.Shehaschosenaninternationalpolicyofnonalignment.ThisisanexpressionofauniversalhumanismorahumanCatholicism,whichhasbeenatworkinIndiaformanyhundredsofyears.IndiaoutofherHindutraditionmayyetleadthenationsoftheworldintoanewformofnationalism,whichismorehumanisticthannationalistic.Hinduismspeaksforhumanityagainstthenation.MankindawaitstheimplementationoftheancientVedicadmonition:

Oneandthesamebeyourresolve,andbeyourmindsofoneaccord.


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Unitedbythethoughtofallthatallmayhappilyagree.43

Hinduismingeneralalsorecoilsfromthepurelylegalapproach.TheconceptofthegoldenageinHinduismisoneinwhicheveryoneperformshisorherduty,sothateveryone’srightsaresimultaneouslyhonoured.Humanrightsthusareourrightsashumanbeings.Thistiesintoanotherdimensionofdharmawhichequatesrightwithrights,andseesnoneedforapositivisticaffirmation,anattitudewhichaccordingtoTroyWilsonOrganisquiteconsistentwithdemocracywithitsemphasisonrights:

TwoaspectsofHinduismmaybementionedasrelevanttothedemocraticexperience.Oneisthedoctrineofdharma.Thepossibilityoforganizingastatecomposedofpeopleforwhomdutyisthewaythingsaredoneratherthananobligationoneassumesundercoercionisveryappealing.TheHindudoeshisdharmanotbecauseheisforcedto,notbecauseheisafraidnotto,notbecauseheenjoysit,butbecauseone’sdharmaisjustwhatonedoes.Thenotionofnotdoingone’sdharmaisalmostincomprehensibletotheHindu.Dharma-motivatedpeopleoughttomakegoodcitizensinademocracy.Theotheraspectof(p.16) Hinduism,whichisimportantfordemocracyinIndiaandintheworld,iswhatmaybecalledhumanism.44

Asforthemokṣaorreligiousorientation,TroyWilsonOrganonceagainhighlightsthefactthathumanismsufficesforHinduism.Hencethetitleofhisbook:TheHinduQuestForThePerfectionOfMan,fromwhichwecite:

ThePerfectedManistheUniversalMan.IndividualityisnotlostbutiselevatedanddignifiedaseachmanmirrorstheIdealManaccordingtohisowntalents.BoththeManandallmenparticipateinthegoaloftheperfectingprocess;thuscatholicityismanifestedidealisticallyandpluralistically.HinduismsoconceivedisVisvajanina,acatholicreligion.TheBhagavadGita,theonescripturecommontoallHindus,issometimesreferredtoas‘thegospelofhumanity’.RabindranathTagorewascharacterizedbyNehruas‘thegreathumanistofIndia’.AfineBaulsongcelebratesthegloriesofman,andsetsthethemeforthisfinalchapter:

Man,man,everyonespeaksofman!Whatisman?Manishealth,manislife,manisthejeweloftheHeart;VeryfewonearthknowthetruthofMan.Manknowsalove,whichothercreaturesknownot,Man’slovehelpshimtoknowtheRealMan,ThusmanknowsMan;Thestrengthofman-in-Manisunderstoodbymanalone.

TroyWilsonOrganthenproceedstopointouthowVedicthoughtbecomesprogressivelyanthropocentric.WhiletheVedichymnstreatofthegodsandtheBrāhmaṇatextsdealwithritual,thefocusoftheUpaniṣadsisincreasinglythehumanbeing.ThisthenbecomesaconstantfeatureofHinduthought.IntheMahābhārataitisdisclosedasthetruthof


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truthsbyBhīṣma,asthesupremesecretdoctrine:‘ThisisthesecretandsupremedoctrineIannouncetoyou.Thereisnothingintheuniversehigherthanman.’InthesamespiritTulsīdāsdeclaresintheRāmcaritamānas:‘knowthatdevoteeofRāmatobegreaterthanRāma’,whileCaṇḍīdāsa,anotherfamousmedievalpoetdeclares:‘Listen,brotherman;thetruthofmanisthehighesttruth,thereisnotruthaboveit.’45

Afterall,itismoralitywhichsetshumanbeingsapartanyway,accordingtothepopularHinduview.

IVThepointisnotwithoutcontemporarysignificance.Thecentralconsiderationonemusttakeintoaccounthereisthefactthatalthoughthe(p.17) ‘Indianconstitutionlistsanimpressiveseriesof“fundamentalrights”…itdoesnotgroundtheminanything,whetherinindividualhumannature,therequirementsofhumancommunity,orthecreativeintentionofGod.Whatcanbecreatedbylegislativefiatcanbealteredorabrogatedinthesameway.’46ThepracticalsignificanceofthisobservationisillustratedbyP.V.Kane’sobservationthatsofarastheIndianConstitutionisconcerned,

from1950therehavebeentenamendments[thiswaswrittenin1962]whileintheUSAtherehavebeenonly22amendmentsduringaperiodofabout170years.TheveryfirstamendmentwasmadewithinlessthanayearandahalffromthedaytheConstitutioncameintoforce.ItaffectedaboutadozenArticles,amongwhichtherewerethreeArticlesdealingwithfundamentalrights,viz.,15,19,31.Onefailstounderstandthemeaningofthewords‘fundamentalrights’inaConstitutionwhichtookovertwoyearsofdeliberations,iftheycouldbechangedwithin[sic]ayearandahalf.47

ProfessorJ.B.Carmanobservesverypertinently,whileassessingProfessorP.V.Kane’snegativeverdict:

IthasbeenpointedoutinanothercriticalanalysisofthesefundamentalrightsthattheIndianequivalentof‘dueprocess’inAmericanlawislegislativeenactment.Thereisthereforenoexplicitappealtothatwhichisright(ius)beyondtheletteroftheenactedlaw(lex).ThisisapointthatProfessorKanedoesnotmake,butitisnotveryfarawayfromhismajorconcern,thattheconstitutiondoesnotrecognizethefundamentaldharmaaffirmedbytheHindutraditionandsetsnospiritualobligationforthestateitselforforthepeople.48

Heisalsoquitecorrectinhisobservationthat‘thisisapointonwhichscholarsoftheHindutradition,bothinsideandoutsideit,arelikelytoagree,eveniftheyhavedifficultyinagreeingonthecontentofdharma’.49

Thosewhohavepursuedthislineofthought,however,havetendedtoshowastrikingtendencyinthepresentcontexttowardsunderstandingdharmainthesenseofduty.OnemaygivetheprideofplaceheretoMahatmaGandhi(1869–1948)whodeclared,whenaskedwhathethoughtoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,beforeitwas


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adoptedin1948:

Ilearntfrommyilliteratebutwisemotherthatallrightstobedeservedandpreservedcamefromdutywelldone.Thus,theveryrighttoliveaccruestousonlywhenwedothedutyofcitizenshipoftheworld.Fromthisonefundamentalstatement,perhapsitiseasyenoughtodefinethedutiesofManandWomanandcorrelateeveryrighttosomecorrespondingdutytobefirstperformed.50

WefoundthatalthoughhumanrightscanbeconnectedwitheachofthefourcomponentsoftheHindudoctrineofpuruṣārtha-catuṣṭayaor(p.18) catur-varga(thedoctrineofthefourendsoflife),itisarguablythedimensionofdharmaormoralitywhichseemstoprovidethemostsecureanchorforit.Thewordisusuallyunderstoodinitssenseofdutywhensoemployed.ElsewherealsoGandhiremarksonthe‘validityonlyofthoserightswhichweredirectlyderivedfromdutywellperformed’.51Hispoliticalheir,PanditNehru,lamented,whiledeliveringtheAzadMemorialLectureson‘IndiaTodayandTomorrow’in1959:

Allofusnowtalkofanddemandrightsandprivileges,buttheteachingoftheolddharmawasaboutdutiesandobligations.Rightsfollowdutiesdischarged.52

Thepre-eminentmodernscholarofclassicHindulaw,ProfessorP.V.Kane,sharedthissenseofgrievanceandarticulateditatsomelength.Heremarkedthat‘theConstitutionmakesacompletebreakwithourtraditionalideas.Dharmasūtrasandsmṛtisbeginwiththedharmas(duties)ofthepeople(varṇasandāśramas)’.53HegoesontocitePanditNehruasnotedabove,andafterpointingoutthataccordingtohim‘rightsfollowdutiesdischarged’headds:‘unfortunatelythisthoughtfindsnoplaceintheConstitution’.54Itissignificant,though,thatwhenheactuallyaddresseswhatkindsofdharmashouldbeinvokedinthecontextoftheConstitution,heturnsnottovarṇāśrama,butsādhāraṇadharmas,ordutiescommontoall:

Itisremarkablethatthedirectiveprinciplesofstatepolicymostlycontainprovisionsontheeconomicsystemforraisingpeople’sstandardofliving(Art.43,47,&c.),i.e.itlaysemphasisonlyonthematerialthingsforthepeople.Itseemstobeassumedthatifmaterialprosperityorbenefitsareassuredfor,thenthereisnothingmoretobedonebytheState.ThepresentauthorfeelsthattheDirectivePrinciplesshouldalsohaveputequalorgreateremphasisonmoralorspiritualvaluesandshouldhavecalledupontheStatetopromoteamongthepeoplehighmoralstandards,self-discipline,co-operation,senseofresponsibility,kindliness,highendeavor.Manisamany-sidedbeing.Thesatisfactionofmerephysicalneedsisnotenough.Manhasintellectual,spiritual,culturalandsocialaspirationsalso.Thesocio-economicpatternforthefuturemustbebasedonthefoundationofthebestpartofourtraditions,theruleofdharma,thedutiescommontoallasdeclaredbyManuX.63andYāj.I.122.Asecularstateshouldnotanddoesnotmeanagodlessstateorastatethathasnothingtodowithmoralandspiritualvalues.55

Onewaytotakethiscommentistolookuponit‘astheoverlyidealisticandimpractical


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reflectionofaretiredprofessor—Kanewastheneighty-two’,56asJ.B.Carmansuggests.ButhealsohintsthatP.V.KanemaybeexpressingaconcernherewiththefactthattheConstitutiondoesnotappealtoanythingbeyondtheletterofthelaw,thatthisisashortcoming(p.19) andthatitcouldperhapsberectifiedbyanappealtodharma,nottothedharmaspecifictothestationsandstagesoflife,buttothedharmawhichconsistedof‘dutiescommontoall’.

WhatisimplicitinKaneismadeexplicitbyR.C.Pandeya,who‘stressesthatfortheIndiansallrightsarederivedfromduties’,andthussuggeststhat‘thefirstprincipleofhumanrightsisburiedinArticle29oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights:‘Everyonehasdutiestothecommunityinwhichalonethefreeandfulldevelopmentofhispersonalityispossible’.57ThisshiftinemphasisfromtheindividualtocommunaldimensionofdharmaistobewelcomedandconstitutesamajortransformationinHinduismwroughtbyMahatmaGandhithroughpreceptandpractice.Nevertheless,italsoposesadifficultyinthepresentcontext.Totheextentrightsaremadedependentonduties,theyremainvulnerabletoabridgement.Itcouldbearguedthatrightsrepresentaspirations,whichmayneverbefullyachieved.Ourpointisthatiftheyarenotconsideredinalienable,theybecomevulnerabletoabridgementbothinprincipleandinpractice.Onemustdistinguishherebetweentheprincipleandpracticalpromiseofrights.Ourfearisthattheybecomeliabletobeingcompromisedeveninprinciple,iflinkedtodutiesasamatterofprinciple.Howsoeverwholesomethisconnectionmightseemonthefaceofit,nevertheless,itseemsdesirablethatrightsmusthavemorethanmerelyareciprocalexistenceandthattheymustpossessamorallocationwheretheycouldcontinuetoresidedespiteanybreachintheoryorpractice.Ourobjectionisthatmorallylocatingthemindutiesleavesthemvulnerableintheverymannerfromwhichwewishtoprotectthemmost.Thispointmaybestrengthenedwiththehelpofacontemporaryexample.AnamendmentwasintroducedintheIndianConstitutionduringMrsIndiraGandhi’sEmergencyasArticle51-AdetailingthedutiesofIndiancitizens.WhileitistemptingtothinkthatthiscouldbeanattempttogroundtheConstitutioninsomethingbeyondit,likedharma,thefactsindicateotherwise.DuringthisEmergency,manyofthefundamentalrightsweresuspendedanditcouldbearguedpersuasivelythattheintentionherewastomakepeoplemoredutyorientedsothattheybecomelessassertiveofrights,manyofwhichweresuspendedduringtheEmergency.Ifthiswasindeedthereason,theinsertionofthesectionondutieswasmorethanjustapoliticalact,itmightwellhaveconstitutedaprofoundattemptatculturalandevenreligiousmanipulation,whichhadgoneunnoticedandremainsundetected.

Onceitisconcededthathumanrights,intheHinducontext,shouldbegroundedinmoralityandnotleftfree-floatingasitwere,thenextquestionwhicharisesis:shouldtheybetiedtoaspecificmoralvalueorbe(p.20) lefttofree-associate,asitwere,withthewholerangeofmoralvaluesinHinduism?Ourreluctancetotiethemwithdutyassuchsuggeststheneedtobemorespecificinthisrespect.Atthispointthesuggestioncouldbemade,onthebasisofthefollowingpassageintheBṛhadāraṇyakaUpaniṣad(I.4.14)thathumanrightscouldbetiedtotheultimaterealityortruth,thatis,satyam,withjusticeasthevitallinkbetweenthetwo:


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Verilythatwhichisjustice(dharma)istruth(satyam).Thereforetheysayofamanwhospeaksthetruth,hespeaksjusticeorofamanwhospeaksjustice,thathespeaksthetruth.Verily,boththesearethesame.58

Thisthread,whileitisbeingrelinquishedhere,willbepickedupinalaterchapter.

Conclusion

Hinduaxiologyhasbeencloselyassociatedwiththefourfoldgridofthepuruṣārthas.Inthischapterwediscoveredthatthevariousconnectionswhichcanandindeedhavebeenmade,bothintermsofIndianandWesternthought,betweenhumanrightsandvaluesin

eachofthequadrantsbelow.

Afterananalysisoftheconnectionswhichcanbeforgedbetweenhumanrightsandeachofthevalues,itwasfeltthatdharmaormoralityprovidesthemwiththesafestanchorinHinduism,whenthetermisunderstoodtorepresentthecategoryofsādhāraṇadharmaorsāmānyadharma.

Thisconclusion,however,isopentosomecriticismswhichmustbemetbeforeitcanbeaccepted.Itcouldbearguedthatsuchaconclusionreliesexcessivelyonthefourfolddivisionofthegoalsofhumanendeavourknownasthepuruṣārthas.Accordingtothisviewsuchaclassificationlendsacertainneatnesstotheargumentbutatthecostofoversimplification.Thereisconsiderablemeritinthiscriticismanditcouldbeplausiblymaintainedthatthefourfoldclassificationisanattempttoreducetheteemingpluralityofhumanaspirationstomanageableproportions.Itcouldevenbeurgedthatthenumberfourhereismerelyanumericalcodeformanyandfurtherthatthislogicmayapplynotonlytothedoctrineoffourpuruṣārthasbutalsotothedoctrineoffourvarṇas(orclasses);fourāśramas(orstagesoflife);andfouryugas(orages).Thus(p.21) theseexpressionscouldbereadasalludingtomanyclasses,manyperiodsoflife,andmultipledivisionsoftime.ThefactthattheexpressionnānāvarṇaalsoappearsinHinduliteraturealongwithcaturvarṇalendsfurthercredencetothisview.Theconclusionisalsocapableofbeingquestionedfromanotherperspectiveaswell.Onecouldask‘whethersuchdistinctionsarereallyproductiveinviewofthemoreintegratedapproachtakenbyHinduphilosophyandtheconceptualcategoriesthemselves’.Accordingtothisviewthecategorizationofhumanendeavourintodharma,artha,kāma,andmokṣaisnodoubtafeatureofHinduaxiologybut

ThiscategorisationdoesoverlookthefactthattherearenotsuchcleardivisionsinHinduthoughtor,rather,thatthesedivisionsexistintheHindumindandtheinterpretationsofscholars,butthereismoretobesaidabouttheinterrelationshipofthosefourcategories.Theproblemthatisnotdiscussed,whereasitshouldatleastberaised,isthatinHinduthoughtofallorientationsanddescriptions,dharmaismoreorlessexplicitlyseenasasuper-categorycomprisingallfourelements.Indeedthistermhasmanymeanings.Alltheaimsofhumanlifearelinkedto


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dharmaasthecentralculturalexpectationthateveryoneandeverythingshouldbeconducivetomaintenanceofahigherorder,maybetheHindu‘ruleoflaw’,butcertainlynotamodernhumanrightsagenda.59

Thesecriticismsarehelpfulaswarningsagainstanover-relianceonthefourfoldclassificationbutitispossibletomaintainthatthesignificanceofthesecriticismsintermsofthemainargumentisratherlimitedforthefollowingreason.ThebasicpointthattheconceptofhumanrightscanberelatedtotheconceptofhumanaspirationsinHinduismremainsunscathed.Whatisatissueisthelevelofcategorization.Whenlookedatinthiswaythecriticismsactuallyendupbystrengtheningtheconclusion.Whenitisarguedthathumanendsmaybemorethanjustfour,orrathermany,thejustificationforhumanrightscansimilarlybebroadenedinlinewiththerecognitionoftheirplurality.Forinstance,thecategoryofarthaalonecanincludethecaseforbothkindsofhumanrights—thepolitical-civilandthesocio-economic.Similarly,thecategoryofkāmacancoverreproductiveaswellasculturalrights.ThusthelinkbetweenhumanrightsandthedoctrineofhumanaspirationsinHinduismisnotsnapped,ratheritissoclosethatitcanstretchorcontractasthetermsofreferencearemodified.Tellingevidenceinfavourofthiscomesfromthesuggestionthattheprimaryfocusondharmashouldnotbeallowedtobeobscuredbyotherpuruṣārthas.IthasalreadybeenpointedoutthatthejustificationforhumanrightsinHindutermsismostsolidlyforthcomingfromdharmaitself.

(p.22) Amoresubstantialcritiquehastodowiththeunderstandingofdharmaas‘anidealisticallyself-controlledorder…groundedintheindividualandthelocal,notinsomenationaloreveninternationalsphere[asthe]primarylocusfortheproductionofhumanrightsprinciplesintheHinducontext’.60Theconceptofdharmaincludesthisviewbutisnotconfinedtoitorconfinedbyit,aswillbedemonstratedamplyinsubsequentchapters,justashumanrightsdiscoursecannotbeconfinedtoorconfinedbyonedimensionofit.61

DerogabilityofHumanRightsCurrentpoliticalandlegaldiscourseissorepletewithappealstohumanrightsastoleavetheimpressionthathumanrightsdiscoursedoesnotprovidefortheirderogationinanycontext.Thismayindeedbetrueinthesensethathumanrightsrepresentnormswhichwewouldideallyneverliketoseecompromised.Areadingofthe1948UniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsreinforcessuchanimpression.However,theDeclarationreceivesitsconcreteformintheCovenantswhichwereadoptedbythevariousnationstatescomprisingtheUNO.Thesedocumentsyieldtorealisminrecognizingthatundercertainconditionsitmaybepermissiblenottoholdthestatesaccountabletotheideallevelofperformance.Inotherwords,humanrightscouldbeconsideredderogableundercertaincircumstances.

Thisisanissuewhichmustnowbefacedsquarelyforbothpracticalandtheoreticalreasons,speciallyastworelativelyrecentevents,onemorerecentthantheother,servetohighlightsuchvulnerabilityofhumanrightsdiscourse.ThefirstoftheseistheEmergencyimposedbyMrsIndiraGandhi,asIndia’sPrimeMinister,in1975andthe


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secondisthewaragainstterrorismonwhichtheUSAhasembarkedafter11September2001.ThefactthatIndiaandtheUSAconstitutethelargestdemocraciesintheworldmayhelpexaltthemtothestatusofparadigmcases,whichactuallycutstotheheartofthematter.Humanrightsfirstemergedascitizensrightsagainstthepowerofthestate,butwhatifthestateitselffeelsthreatenedeitherthroughactualorperceiveddangertoitsexistence,byinternalrebellionaswasthecasewiththeEmergencyimposedbyMrsGandhi,orbyexternalterrorasisthecasewiththewaragainstterrorismcurrentlybeingconductedbytheUSA?Theimmediateeffectinboththecaseswasthecurtailmentofcitizens’rightsand,therefore,humanrights.ThishappenedquiteexplicitlyduringtheEmergencyinIndiafromJune1975toMarch1977,62andalsoseemstobealikelyfalloutofthecurrentwaronterrorismintheUSA,giventheregnant(p.23) moodthat‘nationalsecuritytrumpshumanrights’.63Whatisonetomakeofsuchdevelopmentsastheyseemtostrikeattheverybasisofhumanrights?

Whatmakestheissueparticularlyimportantisthatitisnotanunanticipatedone.BoththeCovenantsreferredtointheearlierpartofthischapterprovideforderogationstobemadeintimesofemergency,justasallconstitutionsprovideforthesuspensionofrightsinthecaseofinternalrebellionandexternalaggression.Insuchacontextitseemsonlyfairtoask:ifHinduismcouldprovidebasesforhumanrights,doesitalsoprovidefortheirderogation?

Hinduethicsandjurisprudencedoindeedpossessacategorywhichbroadlyconformstothatofderogability,namely,thatofāpad-dharmaorsimplyāpat.J.DuncanM.Derrettexplains:

Anentirechapteroftheśāstra(supposedlyobsoletetoday—orperhaps,onthecontrary,theonlyjustificationintheeyesoftheorthodoxfortheirownanomalousproceedings)isdevotedtoāpat,‘timeofdistress’.Itthrowslightonthecharacteroftheinjunctionsthemselves.Thisisalawofexceptionalcircumstances.Thetheorywasthatrestrictionsonpowersandtheseriousnessofsocialmisconductandcrimeswereautomaticallymodifiedinatimeofdistress.Thisusuallymeantpublicdistress,suchasinvasionsbytheenemy,drought,famine,plagueandthelike.Insuchcircumstancesmarriagesotherwiseimpropercouldbeenteredinto,improperadoptionscouldbeperformedand,moststrikingofall,thenormalprecautionagainstcrimeandsinmightberelaxed.64

Hegoesontosay:

Moreover,asweseefromManuXI,16–18,whichenablesaBrahmantostealfromapersonoflowercasteenoughtostayhishungerifhehasnoteateninthreedays,evenapersonaldistress,notreallyqualifyingfortherelaxationsappropriatetoāpad,whichshouldbeageneralmisfortune,mayservetovarythenormalrigourofthelaw.Itmustthereforebeborneinmindthattheinterpretationofthelawwasnevercompleteunlessthesurroundingcircumstancesoftheallegedoffenderhadbeentakenintoaccount.Thefullrigouroftheśāstraunmodifiedbyāpad-dharmawouldseemtomostHindusoftodayunreasonable,thoughthecourtshavenever


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appliedthatsystemofmodificationconsciously.65

Atypicalexampleofitsapplicationwouldbethefollowing:amemberofa‘caste’isnormallyexpectedtofollowone’sownallottedvocation,butinatimeofcrisis(āpad-dharma)onemayadoptthemodeoflivingofanother,usuallylowercaste.Certainrulesaremeanttobeobservedsometimesevenintheprocessofsuch‘derogation’butthemainpointshouldbeobvious.Byanalogythenonecouldarguethatāpad-dharma(p.24)conformsinitsessentialstotheconceptofderogability.Neverthelessthereisneedtoproceedwithcaution.

Thediscussionofāpad-dharmainHindujurisprudencetypicallyproceedsinthecontextofcaste,orwhatiscalledvarṇa-dharma.Thecategoryofvarṇa-dharma,however,thustypicallyappliestoallthefourvarṇas:thoseofpriest(brāhmaṇa);warrior(kṣatriya);agriculturalistandtrader(vaiśya);andlabourerorservant(śūdra);whilethatofderogabilityappliestothestate.Thegeneraltreatmentofāpad-dharmainHinduliteraturethussuffersfromoverdeterminationinthepresentcontext.Theproperparallelhere,itseems,isnotprovidedbythevarṇasystemingeneralbutthecategoryofwhatiscalledrāja-dharmaordutiesofthekingintermsofHindutaxonomy,acategorywhichproperlyconstitutesasubjectofkṣātra-dharma.Sothequestiononenowneedstoaskis:whatdoHindutextssayabouttheroleofāpad-dharmainthecontextofrāja-dharmaratherthaninthecontextofvarṇa-dharma?

Itisinterestingthenthatthecategoryofāpad-dharmaisnotappliedtorāja-dharmaassuch.Itisratherthedutyofthekingtoassistpeopleintimesofcrisis.Thusifthevarṇascannotfollowtheirvocations,itisthedutyofthekingtomaintainthosebrāhmaṇas,kṣatriyas,vaiśyas,andśūdraswhocouldnotmaintainthemselves.66ThisisnottosaythatthetextstakeaPollyannaishviewofpolitics,foritisinterestinginthiscontextthattheTwelfthBookoftheMahābhāratadealssimultaneouslywithrāja-dharmaandāpad-dharma.67Thepossibilitythatadynastymaybethreatenedisvisualized.Thus‘whenthesurvivalofadynastyisthreatened,actionswhichwouldotherwisebeunrighteous(adharma)couldberighteous(dharma)andviceversa’.68Itisperhapsalsoinstructivethat‘thisreversaliscomparedtothedispensationfromdietarylawsduringfamine,suchasapprovalofViśvāmitra’sstealingdogmeat[sic]fromanuntouchable’.69Thetypicalexampleisprovidedbythepossibilitythat‘akingmayruinhisenemy’sstatebythekillingofpeopleanddestructionofroadsandmines…’

Thisprovisionhoweverreferstotheking’sbehaviourtowardsthesubjectsofanotherkingdom.Theproperexampletoconsiderthenwouldbethestepsthekingcouldtakeintheeventofacrisisinhisownkingdom,forexample,afinancialcrisis.P.V.Kanenotesthat

Kauṭ(V.2),Manu(X.118),Śānti81,ŚukraIV.2.9–10permitthekingtotakeevenone-thirdorone-fourthpartofthecropsintimeofdistress(āpad).IthashowevertobenotedthatKauṭilyarequiresthekingtobeg(yāceta)ofthepeopleforthisheavytaxation,heemploystheword(praṇaya)requestforsuchdemands,suchtaxationwasnottobeleviedfrominferiorlands,andheexpresslysaysthatsuch(p.25) ademandforexcessivetaxationistobemadeonlyonceandnottwicein


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thesamedistress.Śānti(81.26–33)containsaspecimenofalongaddresstobegiventothepeoplewhenakingdemandshighertaxationindanger(suchas‘iftheenemyinvadesyou,youwillloseallincludingyourwives,theenemywillnotrestoretoyouwhatherobsyouof’&c).Theword‘praṇaya’occursinthissenseintheJunagadhInscriptionofRudradāman(E.I.vol.VIII.p.36II15–16).70

Thesemeasures,thoughburdensome,arehardlyviolativeoftherightsofthecitizens.AsūtraofPāṇini(VI.3.10)alsoreferstocertainspecifictaxes.

Theseappeartohavebeencustomaryleviesimposedbythekingonspecialoccasionstomeeturgentexpenditures.Someofthesetaxesinmoderntermsarepāg(perhead),tāg(peradultofpolltax),hār(perplough),etc.ItmaybenotedthatPāṇinidoesnotnamethembytheusualwordkarafor‘tax’,buttheyareknownbythemoreemphaticword,kāra.PāṇinimentionsaspecialclassofofficersnamedKāra-kara(III.2.21),whoitappears,wereentrustedwiththeraisingofthesetaxes.TheSamañña-phalaSuttamentionsanofficercalledKāra-karaka(II.38).71

AprovisionintheArthaśāstraofKauṭilya(V.2)doesallowseizureofwealthfromseditiousorirreligiouselementsinacrisis,whichisviolativeofhumanrights.ItshouldhoweverbesetalongsidethefactthattheYājñavalkya-smṛti(II.192)requiresthekingtorespecttheusagesofhereticalsectspresumablyinnormaltimes,72althoughsometimesthisinstructionisrestrictedtosectsnotopposedtotheVedas.73Theseexamplesservetoillustratetheoperationoftheprincipleofāpād-dharmainthecontextofrāja-dharma.

Theconceptofāpad-dharmainthecontextofrāja-dharmaisalsoconceptuallymatchedbytheāpad-dharmaasitappliestoprajā-dharma,ortherightsanddutiesofthecitizens.TheMahābhārata(Anuśāsanaparva61.32–33)exhortsthepeopleto‘girdthemselvesupandkillacruelking,whodoesnotprotecthissubjects,whoextractstaxesandsimplyrobsthemoftheirwealth…’74ProvisionsinŚānti-parva(92.6),Manu(VII.27.34),andYājñavalkya(I.356)arelessdrasticand‘appeartojustifyatleastdeposingakingifnottyrannicide’.75Anotchlessdrasticisjustdrivingthekingaway.TaittirīyaSaṁhitā(II.3.I)providesearlyevidenceofkingsbeingdrivenawayandinfactthe‘Sautrāmaṇiiṣṭiisprescribedasariteforakingtoregainakingdomfromwhichhehasbeendrivenaway’.76

Ifforsomereasonthekingprovedirremovable,thesubjectscouldsimplyleavehiskingdom,followingthelineofleastresistance.Infactthe‘mostpotentindependentactionofthepeople…wasemigrationto(p.26) anotherkingdom’.77Thusin‘thefifthcenturyADawholesilk-weavers’guildmovedfromatowninLāṭa(southernGujarat)toDaśapur(modernMandasor)inMālvā(MadhyaPradesh)’.78InoneinstancefromsouthIndiaundertheHoysalas(c.twelfthandthirteenthcenturies),‘thegovernmentyieldedinitstaxdemands,andthepeoplereturned’.79

Hindujurisprudencethusprovidesfortheexceptionalcaseinthecontextofthecasteduties;thedutiesofthekingtowardsthesubjectsandofthesubjectstowardstheking


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inaway,comparabletothatofderogationinthecontextofhumanrights—andmaythereforebejudgedhospitabletosuchaconcept.

Notes

Notes:

(1).DavidP.Forsythe,HumanRightsandWorldPolitics,Lincoln:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1983,p.3.

(2).RobertTraer,FaithinHumanRights,WashingtonD.C.:GeorgetownUniversityPress,1991,p.11,note7.

(3).TheInternationalBillofHumanRights,NewYork:UnitedNations,1993,p.1.

(4).JamesW.Nickel,MakingSenseofHumanRights:PhilosophicalReflectionsontheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1987,p.xi.

(5).RobertTraer,op.cit.,p.15,note58:‘Forinstance,AmnestyInternational,whichtodayprovidesinvaluableadvocacyindefenceofthehumanrightsofprisonersofconscience,wasfoundedbyPeterBerenson.Whydidhedoit?“Weknowfromthingshe’ssaidthatEleanorRooseveltandMartinLutherKingwereinfluences,yetinhisownchemistrytherewashisJewishbackground,thebelloftheHolocauststilltolling,andhisCatholicbelief,shapedinpartbythepeasantPope,JohnXXIII,whostrippedlayersoffanossified,evencorruptchurchandrevealedthefreshnessoftheliberatingteachingofJesusofNazarethbeneath”,JonathanPower,AgainstOblivion:AmnestyInternational’sFightForHumanRights,218.’

(6).LouisHenkin,‘Rights:AmericanandHuman’,ColumbiaLawReview79:3:405,April1975,emphasisadded.

(7).JosephRunzo,GlobalPhilosophyofReligions:AShortIntroduction,Oxford:OneWorld,2001,pp.187–8.

(8).Ibid.,p.188.

(9).Ibid.

(10).Ibid.

(11).Ibid.,pp.188–9.

(12).EllenFrankelPauletal.(eds),HumanRights,Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1986,p.11.

(13).AllanGibbard,‘UtilitarianismandHumanRights’inop.cit.(eds)EllenFrankelPauletal.,p.92.

(14).M.Hiriyanna,IndianConceptionofValues,Mysore:KavyalayaPublishers,1975,p.


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11.

(15).Ibid.

(16).RobertTraer,op.cit.,pp.10–11

(17).CitedinRobertTraer,op.cit.,p.163.

(18).Wm.TheodoredeBaryandTuWeiming(eds),ConfucianismandHumanRights,NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1998,p.xiii.

(19).SeeAbudallahiAhmedAn-Na’im,TowardAnIslamicReformation:CivilLiberties,HumanRightsandInternationalLaw,Syracuse:SyracuseUniversityPress,1990.

(20).RobertTraer,op.cit.,passim.

(21).NinianSmartandShiveshThakur(eds),EthicalandPoliticalDilemmasofModernIndia,NewYork:St.Martin’sPress,1993,p.xi.

(22).TheextentofwhichHinduLawcanbeconsideredpositivisticinatechnicalsenseisadebatablepointbutthegermoftheideathatthestatecanintervenetoestablishwhatwewouldnowcallahumanrightsregimeoveragainstanarchyisclearlypresent(seeR.P.Kangle,TheKauṭilīyaArthaśāstra,Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass,1988(1965),PartIII,p.230;P.V.Kane,HistoryofDharmaśāstra,Poona:BhandarkarOrientalResearchInstitute,1973,Vol.III,p.892;AinslieT.Embree,ed.,TheHinduTradition,NewYork:RandomHouse,1972,ChapterV).

(23).DavidR.Kinsley,Hinduism:ACulturalPerspective,secondedition,EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1993,p.93.

(24).Ibid.

(25).LouisRenou,TheNatureofHinduism,tr.PatrickEvans,NewYork:WalkerandCompany,1951,p.106.

(26).JamesFishkin,‘UtilitarianismVersusHumanRights’,inop.cit.,(eds)EllenFrankelPaul,etal.,pp.105–6.

(27).T.M.P.Mahadevan,OutlinesofHinduism,Bombay:ChetanaLimited,1971,p.67.

(28).Ibid.

(29).HartmutScharfe,TheStateinIndianTradition,Leiden:E.J.Brill,1989,p.21.

(30).Ibid.,p.22.

(31).P.V.Kane,op.cit.,Vol.III,p.9.

(32).HarmutScharfe,op.cit.,p.215.AlsoseeA.L.Basham,TheWonderThatWasIndia,


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NewDelhi:Rupa&Co.1999,p.114.

(33).R.C.Majumdar(ed.),TheAgeofImperialUnity,Bombay:BharatiyaVidyaBhavan.1968,pp.348–9.

(34).TroyWilsonOrgan,TheHinduQuestForthePerfectionofMan,Athens,Ohio:OhioUniversity,1970,p.124.

(35).M.Hiriyanna,OutlinesofIndianPhilosophy,London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1932,p.381.

(36).M.Hiriyanna,EssentialsofIndianPhilosophy,London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin,1949,pp.24–5.

(37).S.K.RamachandraRao,JīvanmuktiinAdvaita,Madras:JBHPrakashana,1979,pp.49,62.

(38).T.M.P.Mahadevan,op.cit.,p.135,emphasisadded.

(39).Ibid.,p.69.

(40).SeeA.L.Basham,op.cit.,pp.113,131,340.

(41).P.V.Kane,op.cit.,Vol.V,PartII,p.1637.

(42).BarbaraStolerMiller,Yoga:DisciplineofFreedom,Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1996,p.53.

(43).TroyWilsonOrgan,Hinduism:ItsHistoricalDevelopment,Woodsbury,NY:Barron’sEducationalSeriesInc.,1974,pp.372–3.

(44).Ibid.,p.372.

(45).TroyWilsonOrgan,TheHinduQuestforthePerfectionofMan,pp.333–4.

(46).JohnB.Carman,‘DutiesandRightsinHinduSociety’,inHumanRightsandtheWorld’sReligions,(ed.),LeroyS.Rouner,NotreDame,Indiana:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1988,p.120.

(47).Cited,ibid.

(48).Ibid.

(49).Ibid.,p.119.

(50).SeeRobertTraer,op.cit.,pp.131–2.

(51).M.K.Gandhi,HinduDharma,Ahmedabad:NavajivanPublishingHouse,1958,p.351.


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(52).CitedbyJohnB.Carman,op.cit.,p.119.

(53).P.V.Kane,op.cit.,Vol.V,PartII,p.1664.

(54).Ibid.

(55).Ibid,.pp.1669–70.

(56).JohnB.Carman,op.cit.,p.120.

(57).RobertTraer,op.cit.,p.132.SeeR.C.Pandeya,‘HumanRights:AnIndianPerspective’,inPhilosophicalFoundationsofHumanRights,Paris:UNESCO,1986.

(58).S.Radhakrishnan,ThePrincipalUpaniṣads,AtlanticHighlands,NJ:HumanitiesPress,1992,p.170.

(59).Anonymousreferee’sremarks.

(60).Ibid.

(61).SeeMichaelIgnatieff,TheRightsRevolution,Toronto:CanadianBroadcastingCorporation,2000.

(62).GirilalJain,TheHinduPhenomenon,NewDelhi:USPBDPublishersDistributorsLtd.,1994,p.142.Alsoseep.101.

(63).MichaelIgnatieff,‘IstheHumanRightsEraEnding?’,TheNewYorkTimes,5February2002,p.A29.

(64).J.DuncanM.Derrett,Religion,LawandStateinIndia,NewYork:TheFreePress,1968,pp.95–6.

(65).Ibid.,p.96.


(67).HartmutScharfe,op.cit.,p.18.

(68).Ibid.,pp.211–12.

(69).Ibid.,p.211,note60;seeMahābhārataXII.139.36ff.

(70).Ibid.,p.211.

(71).V.S.Agrawala,IndiaasKnowntoPāṇini,Varanasi:PrithviPrakashan,1963,pp.416–17.



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(73).Ibid.,p.104.

(74).Ibid.,p.26.

(75).Ibid.

(76).Ibid.

(77).HartmutScharfe,op.cit.,p.68.

(78).Ibid.,p.171.

(79).Ibid.,p.171,note406.

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