Influences and Remedies for Union Density in France and Britain;
A brief Comparison
Word Count: 2215
By Charles Audley, s2158468
Critical Essay for 7024EHR, International Human Resource Management
Semester 2 2012
Gold Coast Campus
Historically, trade union density grew steadily across Europe during the post-
WWII era, but experienced a downturn during the 1990’s and 2000’s (Scheuer, 2011).
Several theories have sought to explain this decline, however, structural, institutional,
cyclical/global, and strike-related causes appear consistently throughout the literature
(Bryson, Ebbinhaus & Visser, 2011; Clark, Contrepois & Jefferys, 2012; Sano &
Williamson, 2008; Scheuer, 2011). Two powerful European economies have been
selected for this discussion; France and Britain. Under the Varieties of Capitalism
(VoC) model, both countries, to a degree, represent Liberal Market Economies
(LMEs), although France is occasionally labelled as a state-business-elite LME or
“statist-LME” (Peck & Theodore, 2007), due to the unique low density/high coverage
effect observed. The VoC framework will be utilised to make comparisons between
France and Britain in union density causes and possible remedies, while other factors
such as the Ghent system, political affiliations, structural reforms and the role of co-
ordinated worker mobilisations will be explored. How these two countries, both
members of the European Union (EU), have had their trade union density affected by
the aforementioned forces will be investigated throughout, with an emphasis on not
merely how, but also why these nations may wish to address the situation.
Theoretically, trade unions have the potential to significantly influence
organisational performance (Bryson, Forth & Laroche, 2011). They may do this
negatively by, for example, fighting for above-market wages or bargaining for
expensive improvements in worker conditions. Conversely, trade unions have the
potential to enhance profits, i.e., by raising productivity or assisting effective
organisational change. Empirical evidence suggests that negative effects typically
prevail (Bryson, Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2011; Bryson, Forth & Laroche, 2011; Hirsch,
2008), and this has contributed to increasing tensions and strained relations between
trade unions and employers (Palier & Thelen, 2011). Firstly, labour unions and trade
unions are not synonymous. Labour unions are, generally speaking, only concerned
with the working lives of the individual, whilst trade unions encompass changes at a
broader social and political level. These differences are often obscure or overlapping,
and frequently poorly defined (Meardi, 2010), however for the sake of consistency,
here we shall deal with trade unions, rather than labour unions. Similarly, whilst
viewing trade union decline through the lens of membership provides an interesting
insight (Visser, 2002), the role of unions is central to the argument that without their
existence, capitalism does not have the crucial balance that mitigates worker
exploitation (Bryson, Ebbinghaus & Visser, 2011).
When identifying structural indicators of union density, the most commonly-
cited factors include white-collar status, employment in the private sector, the move
towards part-time and casual employment, and the rise in traditionally non-union
sectors such as the service and retail industries (which are typically dominated by the
female labour force) (Bryson, Ebbinhaus & Visser, 2011; Scheuer, 2011). Britain has
moved away from being an industrially driven economy, becoming increasingly
service-oriented, a sector which traditionally seen low levels of unionisation due to
the prevalence of P/T and casual employees. The French have a particularly strong
industrial economy, with numerous world-leading chemical, pharmaceutical and I.T.
companies (Palier & Thelen, 2011). Furthermore, restructuring of the industrial
sector, outsourcing of positions to the service sector (again, typically P/T and casual
employees), and the progressive privatisation of France’s iconic state owned
enterprises have all contributed to decreasing union density (Palier & Thelen, 2011).
While differing sectors enjoy corresponding traditional benchmarks for union
saturation, age also plays a significant role.
While total union membership has experienced a overall modest decline in
Europe, this effect may be compounded based on the historical “inverted-U” age-
related trend in unionisation, identified by Blanchflower (2007). Interestingly, this
pattern crosses both LMEs and CMEs, and suggests that across most European
countries, the probability of union membership increases steadily, and peaks for
individuals aged in their late 40’s, then steadily declines after that point. Despite this
historical trend, in EU countries for which data is available, retired workers constitute
a considerable (17.2%) proportion of total union membership (Visser, 2006). France
in particular has this free-rider effect, with older workers enjoying all the benefits a
trade union affords, while negating to maintain their union dues (Blanchflower, 2007).
However it is due to the gradual shift of collective bargaining from
government powers, into sector-wide bargaining, and finally down to individual
corporations that may be responsible for the majority of changes in union density
(Blanchflower & Freeman, 1992). This changing pattern dilutes the power to reform
on a broad level and replaces it with limited, narrow-focused collective bargaining
agreements. If trade union density is to be restored to post-WWII levels, it will require
the shift back to collective bargaining at a larger level, perhaps even including trade
blocks such as the EU. This would of course require enormous commitment and
compromise at an unprecedented international level, yet it can begin with a simple
shift away from individual agreements that female-dominated labour markets and
sectors (i.e., retail and service industries) now employ. Historically, dramatic
turnarounds in density have occurred, most notably following the President of the
American Economic Association declaration in that trade unions in the US were dead,
which led to a worker revolt, militant action and unprecedented revival of unionism
during the Roosevelt era (Kaufman, 2001). This brings us to institutional forces
affecting trade union density.
As two advanced industrialised Western European economies, France and
Britain could not be more different in their approach to trade unions. Despite having
very similar populations and economic output and living standards, the two are often
labelled as affiliating with different clusters of industrial relations (Visser, Beentjes,
Gerven & Stasio, 2009). Expanding a level deeper into the VoC approach, which
refers to both France and Britain as existing on the LME continuum, Britain is seen as
a ‘Liberal’ IR state, while France is referred to as a ‘State-centred’ approach (Clark,
Contrepois & Jefferys, 2012). Britain has a much more complex and procedural
approach to IR negotiations, whereas France has more of a broad, all-encompassing
style where unions exercise considerable influence (Bryson, Forth & Laroche, 2011).
A highly influential researcher in institutional economics, John Commons
(1931), was grappling with a definition for ‘institution’ more than eighty years ago,
and little has changed. Whether a reference to laws, law enforcement, or the style of
government in power, institutional forces in France and Britain have had an impact on
union density, by altering the environment in which the ‘game’ is played (Meardi,
2010). Simultaneous to the decrease in union density has been the increase in the
number of countries who are members of trade blocs, such as the EU, NAFTA and
WTO (Blaschke, 2000). As Britain and France are both members of the EU (France
one of six original member states in 1952, with Britain following as a first round
enlargement in 1973), they share a single economic market, which enables most
goods, services, money and people to move about relatively freely (Gabrisch &
Werner, 1998; Wood & Quaisser, 2008).
Private sector union density is roughly three times higher in Britain than in
France (Bryson, Forth & Laroche, 2011). A large part of this difference in France is
due to the free-rider problem (non-unionised employees gaining advantage due to the
efforts of their unionised counterparts, and subsequently taking advantage of anti-
discrimination legislation) is not one that is easily solved, and is seen as almost
inevitable to some extent, even in highly uinionised sectors or workplaces (Scheuer,
2011). If addressing union density had to identify a single possible foothold, in France
it may be ushered in by the recent election of Francois Hollande-led socialist
government, who traditionally have encouraged unionism whilst promoting capitalist
ideals (Gill, 1998). This return to socialism may encourage both younger and older
workers to return to unionism as part of a desire to strengthen the influence of unions
with the newly elected government, in order to pass legislation that benefits both
workers and the economy. Another massive influence on union density is the effect of
cyclical influences, such as the global economy.
Both France and Britain experienced a slump in economic output following
the recent GFC. This can in part be explained by their relatively high exposure to the
international economy via multinational entities, which places both in a position to be
on the receiving end of both boom and bust cycles (Perraton, Goldblatt, Held &
Mcgrew, 1997). Immediately preceding the GFC (between 1998 and 2003), not a
single country in the 34-member Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) experienced a rise in union density (Blanchflower, 2007). This
trend suggests that some global force is responsible, and indeed, this is often
attributed directly to the GFC (Scheuer, 2011). A simplistic model suggests this is not
a problem during time of low unemployment, however the GFC increased the
exposure to income inequalities, and this, coupled with the unions’ diminished
influence with politicians, has lead to poor outcomes for the individual workers.
Private sector union density is roughly threefold higher in Britain than France.
However, union intervention in France occurs at a much lower level in France than
Britain, that is, a single union representative in France can win agreements which
apply to all workers on-site, irrespective of the union affiliation (Bryson, Forthe &
Laroche, 2011). In Britain however, even if a workforce is heavily unionised, the
extent to which a union has influence is highly dependent upon the employer. The
result is that many French workers have their pay rates established via collective
bargaining agreements, while British workers are typically impeded by union
relations within their organisation.
The presence or absence of the Ghent system (an unemployment scheme
which is administered and distributed by labour unions rather than a state-run body) is
often identified as a key driver of union density. Compounding the effects of the
Ghent system erosion in France, relatively low unemployment levels may be
responsible for the decreasing density of trade unions, as workers gradually evolve
into free-riders (Lind, 2009). This hypothesis suggests, however, that following the
recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that a return to unionism is likely. The Ghent
system, adopted by France in 1905, should bolster union density, thus far, the
opposite has occurred. This can be accounted for by the erosion over time of the
Ghent in France, which has slowly shifted unemployment insurance responsibilities to
the state, hence reducing the reliance upon unions (Lind, 2009). The British who have
never adopted the Ghent system, see a shallower decline in union density (Scruggs,
2002).
If a dramatic change in union density is to occur in the near future, it is likely
to be in response to a realisation that unbridled capitalism largely contributed to the
GFC (Sano & Wiliamson, 2008). Without the various collective protections that
unions offer workers, there is no viable alternative to voice the concerns and fight for
the working class. Despite the ramifications of the GFC and implications of the Ghent
system, collective worker mobilisations typify a potentially game-changing TU
density factor: strike-related activity.
As the changes brought about by the GFC/GEC unfold in unpredictable ways,
such as the destabilisation of the EU (Bryson, Forth & Laroche, 2011), in France the
highly co-ordinated and organised collective worker mobilizations, once so prevalent
in the 1970’s, are still being seen (Meardi, 2010). Although levels of collective strike
action have decreased significantly since the 1970’s, strikes are still much more
common in France than Britain (Palier & Thelen, 2011). In a recent comparison of
strike days per 1000 employees in the construction industry, Hale (2008) estimated
that British workers took an average of 13 days, compared with an average of 46 days
in France. This discrepancy can be explained by the differing manner in which unions
engage with employers in France and Britain (Bryson, Forth & Laroche, 2011).
Union density and strike activity are often mentioned as being associated in
the literature (Sano & Williamson, 2008). French workers strike at a ratio of 3:1 in
comparison with British workers, and union density, particularly public sector
density, is often highest during periods of strike activity, although no causal link has
been established (Palier & Thelen, 2011). The underlying feature of the comparison is
that while British unions often threaten to strike, this is often enough to expedite
negotiations, whereas French unions typically bypass advance strike notification and
mobilise popular street protests, which has even been directly linked to the 1997
Socialist Party victory (Jeffreys, 2001).
To summarise, despite both France and Britain being solid European
economies with comparable outputs, the union density disparity is glaring, and until
very recently, saw little on the horizon to indicate imminent change. Policy
implications seem to be a leading contender for stemming the decline in union
density, with a move towards collective bargaining at the national level and away
from institutional level control (Sano & Williamson, 2008). It is unlikely the Ghent
system will play a significant role in stemming TU density in France, and in Britain
the welfare system is already under considerable funding pressure. With the advent of
the highly flexible workforce (P/T and casual employees, very often with a high
proportion of female workers), unionisation has struggled to capture another
proportion of potential members. Collective worker mobilisations may well be the
vehicle to force change via a grass-roots movement, as the highly-interconnected
global market reacts to the volatility that strike-related activity attracts. If unions are
to tackle the problems that unimpeded capitalism has dealt the global economy in
recent years, they must address the problem at the national (governmental) or
international (EU, WTO) level, which will necessitate a coordinated, justified, and
politically persuasive approach. If current events such as the Arab Spring are any
indication, the ability for such responses to gain overwhelming social momentum are
too large for any organisation, sector, government or trade bloc to ignore.
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