8/18/2019 The Pruitt Igoe Myth
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The Pruitt-Igoe MythAuthor(s): Katharine G. BristolReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Architectural Education (1984-), Vol. 44, No. 3 (May, 1991), pp. 163-171Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1425266 .Accessed: 30/11/2012 11:05
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8/18/2019 The Pruitt Igoe Myth
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slumswere
racially
egregated.
lacks
occupied
he area
immediately
north of
downtown,
while whites
tended to live to the south.
The
black
ghetto expandedparticularly
ast with
the
postwar
nflux of
poor
black
population
romthe South. As the
growing
lums
crept
closer o the
central
business
district,
ity
officials
nd the localbusi-
ness
community
eared he
accompanying
ecline n
property
alues
would threaten
he economichealthof
downtownrealestate.
They
responded
y
developing comprehensive
lan
to
redevelop
he zone
immediately
urrounding
he
downtownbusiness
ore.2
Using
the
urban
redevelopment
rovisions
f the
1949
Hous-
ingAct, St. Louis' Land Clearance ndRedevelopmentAuthority
planned
o
acquire
nd clear xtensive
ractswithin
the slums
and
to
sell
them at
reduced ost to
private
evelopers.
hese
redevelopment
projects
were
slated o
accommodate
mainly
middle-income
housing
and
commercial
development
n an
effort to lure the middle class
back o the
central
ity.
At
the same
ime,
the St.
Louis
Housing
Au-
thority
wouldclear
and
or the
construction
f
public
housing.
These
projects
were
ntended o
provide
arge
numbers f
low-rentunitsto
the
poor
n
order o stem
ghetto
expansion,
nd also o accommodate
households
displaced
by
redevelopment
nd other slum
clearance
projects.3
Pruitt-Igoe
was
one
of
these
publichousingprojects.
Located
on
a
57-acre
ite on the northside black
ghetto,
t was one
of several
tracts hathad been
targeted
or slumclearance nder he
postwar
e-
development lan.
In
1950
St. Louis
received federal
ommitment
for
5800
public
housing
units,
abouthalfof which
were
allocated
y
the St.
Louis
Housing
Authority
to
Pruitt-Igoe.
The
2700-unit
project
wouldhouse
15,000
tenants t
densities
higher
han he
origi-
nal slum
dwellings.
The
high
density
esulted rom
housing
and rede-
2. Aerial iewof
Pruitt-goe.Courtesy
Missouri istorical
ociety)
I _ _
\
/
'
IJ
1.
.L. J.
,
1~
I
I ii
I I
3. Site
plan.
Courtesy ogerMontgomery)
velopment
fficials'
expectations
hat
these
projects
would
eventually
come to
housenot
only
those
displaced
y
slum clearanceor
Pruitt-
Igoe,but alsobydemolition orredevelopmentrojectsndforfuture
public
housing.
In
1950
the St. Louis
Housing
Authority
commissioned
he
firm
of
Leinweber,
amasaki
& Hellmuth o
designPruitt-Igoe.
he
architects'
askwasconstrained
y
the sizeand ocation
of the
site,
the
numberof
units,
and the
projectdensity,
all
of which had been
pre-
determined
by
the St. Louis
Housing
Authority.
Their first
design
proposals
alled for a mixtureof
high-rise,
mid-rise,
and
walk-up
structures.
Though
this
arrangement
as
acceptable
o the local
au-
thority,
t
exceeded he federal
goverment's
maximum
llowable
ost
per
unit.At
this
point
a
fieldofficer f the
federal ublic
Housing
Ad-
ministration
P.H.A.)
ntervened nd
insisted
on
a scheme
using
33
identical
eleven-story
levator
buildings Figures
and
3).4
Thesede-
sign changes
ook
place
n the context of a strict
economy
and effi-
ciency
drive within
the P.H.A. Political
opposition
to the
public
housingprogram
was
particularly
ntense n
the
conservative
political
climateof the
early
1950s.
In
addition,
he outbreak
f the
Korean
war hadcreated nflation
and materials
shortages,
and the
P.H.A.
found tself n the
position
of
having
o
justifypublic
housingexpen-
ditures
o an
unsympathetic
ongress.5
Despite
the intense
pressure
or
economical
design,
he archi-
tects
devoteda
great
deal of attention o
improving
ivability
n the
high-rise
nits.
One of their
strategies
asto
use two
popular
ew de-
May
1991 JAE
44/3
164
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4. View c
Society)
5.
Diagr
^,,
eJ~
.J1,_~,z
-I
t
X
'
-U.
-
sign
features:
kip-stop
levators nd
glazed
nternal
alleries Figures
L
*~izIjifrEEh--
"
..'i
r
---^
4
and
5).
Thesewere ntended o create"individual
eighborhoods"
I
.W
m_t*i;-lli "
*-
lh;
..
g 4
:;r
conceived s
"vertical
allways."
kip-stop
levators
ransported
esi-
'7i
i~,
Lrr:
<
11
. . ...
dents
o
the
gallery
evel,
romwhich
they
wouldwalk
o
their
apart-
U
rt:l.'_-,,'
.
'
(
..
ments.
Laundry
and
storage
rooms also
opened
off the
galleries.
:,,B
11;W w;.xt.
i:
i
^When
Pruitt-Igoe
was
published
n
the Architecturalorum
nd Ar-
i:
jiy
,'~y
l
-,tt
dg
chitectural
ecord,6t was these
specific
design
eatures hatreceived
^
;
tlt:
_
the
most attention.
The Architecturalecord
praised
he
skip-stop
l-
^k^^CtS?w-
^i^I
_ evators
nd
galleries
s innovative
compensations
or the shortcom-
_9fB |^ ^ ^_
~
~a.h~-.~ingsf thehigh-rise ousing orm:
Sinceall of
these
are,
under ederal
egislation,
ombined ow-
)f
a
Pruitt-lgoe
uilding.Courtesy
Missouri
istorical
rent
housing
andslum-clearance
projects,
ocatednear he heart
of the
city,
a
high-rise,high-density
olution
was
inescapable,
and
the
problem
was how to
plan
a
high-rise
roject
n a
huge
scale,
and still
provide,
o the
greatest
xtent
possible
under
.....m---i...~
present
legislation,
ommunities ith
individualcaleandchar-
acterwhich
would avoid the
"project" tmosphere
o
often
criticized.7
Even after the architects
had
switched
to an all
high-rise
scheme,
hey
facedcontinued
pressure
romthe Public
Housing
Ad-
ministrationo keepcosts o a bareminimum. n a 1975studyof the
St. Louis
Housing
Authority's
xpenditures
n
Pruitt-Igoe,
olitical
scientist
Eugene
Meehan
analyzed
he extentto
which these
budget
constraints ffected he final
design.
n addition
o the elimination f
amenities,
uchas children's
play
areas,
andscaping,
nd
ground-floor
bathrooms,
he cost
cutting targeted
points
of
contactbetween he
[jB|B
tenants
nd the
living
units."The
quality
f
the hardware as
so
poor
..Jj-jI^^
~~that
doorknobs
nd ockswerebroken n initial
use.
..Windowpanes
wereblown from
inadequate
rames
by
wind
pressure.
n
the kitch-
ens,
cabinets
weremadeof the thinnest
plywoodpossible."8
Pruitt-Igoe
was
completed
n
1954.
Though originally
on-
ceived as
two
segregated
ections
(Pruitt
for blacks
and
Igoe
for
^^^B
i~ |whites),
a
Supreme
Court decision handed down that same
year
.~l~
^JIBiB-~
forced
desegregation.Attempts
at
integration
ailed,
however,
and
ammaticection.
Courtesy
oger
ontgomery)
Pruitt-Igoe
was an
exclusively
black
project
virtually
from
inception.
Overall
Pruitt-Igoe's
irsttenants
appeared
pleased
with their new
housing.Despite
the
relatively
heap
construction
quality,
he units
still
represented
much
higher
evelof
amenity
han the
dilapidated
units
hey
had
vacated
r been
orced o leave.
By
1958, however,
onditions ad
begun
o
deteriorate. ne of
the first
signals
was a
steadily
declining occupancy
rate.As
Roger
Montgomery
has
persuasively
rgued,
St. Louis'
housing
officials
failed o
anticipate
hanging
postwar
demographic
rends hat dra-
1 65
Bristol
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matically
ffected he
inner-city
housing
market
nd threatened
he
viability
of
public housing projects.9 Pruitt-Igoe
was conceived at a
time when the
demand
for
low-income
housing
units
in
the inner
city
had never been
higher,
due
to
widespread
dislocation caused
by
slum
clearance,
urban
renewal,
and the federal
highway program.
However,
by
the time the
project opened
in
1954,
this
demand
had
tapered
off.
Slow
overall
metropolitan
population
growth
and
the
overproduction
of
inexpensive
suburban
dwellings
helped open
up
the
previously
tight
inner-city
rental market to blacks.
Many
chose to live in inex-
pensive private dwellings
ratherthan in
public
housing.
Pruitt-Igoe's
occupancyratepeakedin 1957 at 91% and immediatelybegan to de-
cline.
This
decline
in
occupancy
directly
impacted
the St. Louis
Housing
Authority's ability
to
maintain the
project,
as
Eugene
Meehan has
amply
demonstrated.?1
Under the
1949
Housing
Act,
lo-
cal
housing
authorities were
expected
to
fund
their
operations
and
maintenance out of rents
collected
from tenants. In
a
period
of
rising
costs and
declining occupancy,
the
Housing
Authority
was
placed
in a
cost-income
squeeze
that
impeded
its
ability
to
conduct basic
repairs.
In
addition,
average
tenant income was
declining.
The
project
came
increasingly
to be inhabited
by
the
poorest
segment
of
the black
population: primarily
emale
heads
of households
dependent
on
pub-
lic assistance. These
demographic
shifts and economic
pressures
re-
sulted in chronic
neglect
of maintenance and mechanicalbreakdowns.
Elevators ailed to work and vandalism went
unrepaired.
In a
project
increasingly
nhabited
by
the
poorest
and most
demoralized
segment
of
the
population,
the vandalism came also
to
be
accompanied
by
in-
creasing
rates of violent crime.
The
ongoing problems
of
vandalism, violence,
and fiscal insta-
bility
prompted
a number
of
efforts to
salvage Pruitt-Igoe.
In
1965
the first of severalfederal
grants
arrived
o
provide physical rejuvena-
tion
and
the
establishment
of social
programs
to benefit the
residents
and to
combat further
rent
arrearages.
The
programs
had little effect:
Occupancy
rates
continued
to
decline,
crime rates
climbed,
and
rou-
tine
management
and maintenance were
neglected.
In
1969
Pruitt-
Igoe
tenants
joined
residents of
two other
St. Louis
public housing
projects
n
a massive nine-month rent strike. This further
depleted
the
Housing
Authority's
limited financial
reserves
and
aggravated
he
va-
cancy
problem,
prompting
H.U.D. to consider
closing
the
project.1
In an effort
to determine whether
explosion
or
traditional
headache-
ball demolition would be
cheaper,
all the
remaining
tenants were
moved to
11
buildings,
and
on
March
16,
1972
a
demolition
experi-
ment levelled three
buildings
in
the center
of
the
project.
Despite
some last-minute rehabilitation
plans,
in
1973
H.U.D. decided to de-
molish the rest
of
the
project,
and
finally
finished
it
off
in
1976.
Rise
of
the
Pruitt-lgoe
myth
Clearly
here
were
a
number f
powerful
ocialand economic actors
at
play
n the riseand fall of
Pruitt-Igoe.
Yetfor most architects he
entire
tory
can be reduced o a one-line
explanation:
he
design
was
to
blame.This
interpretation
ained
ts
greatest
cceptance
n the af-
termath
of
the
project's
demolition.The roots of the
Pruitt-Igoe
myth,
however,
o
back
o
the first
years
f
the
project's
istory.
The deterioration f
Pruitt-Igoe
becameevident
only
a
few
years
fter ts
completion
n
1954,
andthe local
press
notedas
early
s
1960thatcertaindesign eaturesxacerbatedheproject's roblems.'2
The
skip-stop
levators
nd
galleries,
ar
rom
promoting
ommunity
association,
had
proved
o be
opportune
environments or
violent
crime.
Forced
o walk
through
he
galleries
o reach
heir
apartments,
residents
were
threatenedand attacked
by
gangs,
who
used these
spaces
as
hangouts.
Residents
were also
frequently
ttacked n the
elevators.
This connection between
imputed
design
flaws
and
Pruitt-
Igoe's
deteriorationirstcame
o
the attentionof awide audience f
design professionals
n
1965,
when the
growing
notoriety
of
the
project
prompted
Architecturalorum o
publish
a secondarticle n
Pruitt-Igoe.
n "TheCase
History
f a
Failure,"
ames
Bailey
etracted
virtually
ll of Forum's arlier
tatements bout he
project,
cknowl-
edging
that
many
of the features
praised
n their 1951 articlehad
proved
o be
hazards,
atherhan
improvements
o the
quality
f life:
The
undersizedlevators re
brutally
attered,
nd
they
reekof
urine
rom
children
who
misjudged
he time
it
takes o reach
their
apartments.
y
stopping
nly
on
every
hird
loor,
he el-
evators fferconvenient
settings
or
crime. ...The
galleries
re
anything
but cheerful ocial enclaves.The
tenantscall them
"gauntlets"
through
which
they
must
pass
o
reach
heir
doors.
...Heavy
metal
grilles
now
shield he
windows,
but
they
were
installedoo late o
prevent
hree hildren
rom
falling
ut.
The
steam
pipes
remain
exposed
both
in
the
galleries
nd the
apart-
ments,
frequentlyinflicting
severe burns. The
adjoining
laun-
dry
rooms
are
unsafe
and little
used. ....The
storage
rooms are
also locked-and
empty. They
have been
robbed of
their con-
tents so often that tenants
refuse to use them.'3
To his
credit,
Bailey
tempered
his criticism of the architecture
by
pointing
out
that the
problems
at
Pruitt-Igoe
went
deeper
than
physi-
cal
design.
He
mentioned,
in
particular,
he absence of adult males as
heads of
households,
the
project's
notoriety,
and the deficient man-
agement
and maintenance.
Nonetheless,
Bailey's
article aid the
foun-
May
1991
JAE
44/3
166
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dation for a continuous rearticulationof the
Pruitt-Igoe
story
throughout
the late sixties
and
early
seventies
as the situation at
Pruitt-Igoe
ontinued o deteriorate.
The trialdemolitionof
1972
brought Pruitt-Igoe
unprec-
edented
attention
n
the architecturalnd
the national
press.
Architec-
tural
Forum,
AIA
Journal
Architecture
lus,
and
The
Architects
ournal
all
published
articles
n the failure
of the
supposedly
nnovative
de-
sign
features.'4
Life,
Time,
The
Washington
ost,
and
The
National
Observer,
mong
others,
reported
n the demolition
experiment
nd
pointed
o
the
architecture
s one of the
contributing
auses.'5
hese
articles
represent
he first
appearance
f
the
Pruitt-Igoemyth.
No
longer
confining
their criticism o
particular
rchitectural
eatures,
suchas the
open
galleries,
he criticsnow
began
o relate he
project's
failure o flaws
n
the overall
approach
r
designphilosophy.
he
gen-
eral heme hat
emerged
was
that he architects
ere nsensitiveo the
needsof the
lower
class
population
ndwere
trying
o use the
design
to forcea
middle-class,white,
lifestyle
on
Pruitt-Igoe
esidents.For
example,
an
article
n
Architecture lus
argued
hat the
design
was
simply nappropriate
or the social tructures
f
the
people
who were
going
to live there.
George
Kassabaum,
ne of the
project
rchitects,
was
quoted
as
saying,
"Youhad
middle
classwhites ike
myself
de-
signing
for an
entirely
different
group."'6
The
implication
was that
low-income
urbanblacks
constituted a tenant
group
with
special
needs:Theywere not instilledwith the middleclassvalueof taking
pride
n the
upkeep
of their
environment,
nd
they
also
brought
with
them certaindestructivebehaviors.As the
Washington
ost
put
it,
therewasan
"incompatibility
etween he
high-rise
tructure nd the
large
poor
familieswho
came o
inhabit
t,
only
a
generation
emoved
from
the farm."17
This
interpretation
f thedemiseof
Pruitt-Igoe
eceived
strong
reinforcement
hen it
appeared
n
OscarNewman's
Defensible pace
in
the
same
year
as the trialdemoliton.This seminal ext
of the then
emerging
discipline
of environment nd behavior
argued
hat there
was a
direct
relationship
etween
physical
nvironments nd
human
behavior.
According
o
Newman,
he
widespread
andalism
nd
vio-
lence at
Pruitt-Igoe
esulted romthe
presence
f excessive
indefen-
sible"
public
pace.i8
Corridors ere oo
long
andnot visible rom he
apartments.
he
residents id not feel that hese
spaces
"belonged"
o
them and so
made
no
effort to maintain or
police
them. The
entryways,
ocated
n
large,
unprotected pen
plazas,
did not allow
tenants
any
control
overwho entered
he
buildings.
Newman
urther
argued
hat
by
designing
public
housing
n
such a
way
as to
provide
an
appropriate
mountof
private, emiprivate,
nd
public
space,
ar-
chitects ouldreduce iolence
andvandalism
n the
environment.
With all the attention
beingpaid
to the
project's
esign
n the
early
1970s,
a
strong
associative
ink
was
forged
between rchitectural
flaws
and
Pruitt-Igoe's
eterioration.
n
1965
James
Bailey
hadtaken
care o
point
out that
two of
the
major
auses
of the
deterioration
f
Pruitt-Igoe
ere
chronically
nadequate
maintenance
nd
the increas-
ing poverty
f tenants.
By
1972
thesecrucial lements f the
story
had
been all but
forgotten
n
the
rush
o
condemn
he
architecture.
t is
the
privileging
f
these
designproblems
ver
the much more
deeply
embedded conomicandsocialonesthatconstitutes he coreof the
Pruitt-Igoe
myth.
The
mythignores
he connection
between
Pruitt-Igoe's rob-
lems and the fiscal risis
of the
St. Louis
Housing
Authority,
r what
Eugene
Meehanhas calledthe
"programmed
ailure" f American
publichousing.'9
Politicaland socialambivalenceo
public
housing
had resulted
n
a token
housingprogram
urdened
y
impossible
is-
cal
management
onstraints. he federal ublic
Housing
Administra-
tion also
impededpublichousing
fforts
y
insisting
n
unrealistically
low
constructioncosts. The
myth
also omits the
subordination
f
public
housing
to
postwar
urban
redevelopment
rograms.
Federal
dollars
helped
cities
clear
unsightly
lums
and assisted
private
nterests
in
developing
aluable
nner
city
land. Public
housingprojects
were
confined
o
the unwanted ites n theheartof the
slums,
and
devel-
oped
at
high
densities o
accommodatehose
displaced
y
the whole-
saleclearance fpoorneighborhoods.
The
myth
also
ignores
heconnection
between ocial
ndiffer-
enceto the
poverty
f inner
city
blacks
nd
the
declineof
Pruitt-Igoe.
In
1970
sociologist
Lee
Rainwater rote Behind
Ghetto
Walls,
ased
on the
findings
of a
massive
participant
bserver
tudy
conducted
during
he
mid-1960s
at
Pruitt-Igoe.20
ainwater
argued
hatthe vio-
lence
andvandalismhat
occurred t the
project
werean
understand-
able
response
y
its
residentso
poverty
andracial
discrimination.
n
his view
architectural
design
was neither
he
cause
nor
the cure for
these
problems.
mproved
housing
conditionsand other
effortsdi-
rectedat
changing
he behavior f the
poor
were,
n his
opinion,
use-
less
f
not
accompanied
y
efforts o
raise heir
ncome evel.
This evidence
directly
contradicts he
Pruitt-Igoe
myth
by
demonstrating
he
significance
f the
political
and
economic ources
of
Pruitt-Igoe's
ecline.In
addition,
t
reveals hat
the
type
of
argu-
ment
proposed
n
Defensible
pace
s a subtle orm
of
blaming
he vic-
tim.
The idea of
defensible
space
s
basedon the
assumption
hat
certain
"populations"navoidably
ring
with them
behavioral
prob-
lems hathave
o be
designed gainst.
This
kind
of
argument
oesnot
question
why
public
housingprojects
end to be
plagued
by
violent
crime n the
first
place.
It
naturalizeshe
presence
of
crime
among
1
67
Bristol
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low-income
populations
ather han
seeing
t
as
a
product
of
institu-
tionalized
conomic
nd
racial
oppression.
Pruitt-lgoe
and the end
of
Modernism
Despite
he
extensive
vidence f
multiple
ocialand economic auses
of
Pruitt-Igoe's
eterioration,
he
Pruitt-Igoe
myth
hasalso
become
a
truism
f the environment nd behavioriterature.or
example,
ohn
Pipkin's
Urban
Social
Space,
standard
ocial-factors
extbook,
uses
Pruitt-Igoe
s an
example
f indefensible
space
and of the lackof fit
between
high-rise uildings
nd
owerclass ocial tructure. In ocial
terms,
public
housing
has beena failure.
ocial
tructures
avedisin-
tegrated
n the desolate
high-rise ettings....Many
rojects
re
ripe
or
demolition.
One of the most notorious...was
Pruitt-Igoe.
When
built,
it
won an
architectural
prize,
but...
it
epitomized
he ills of
public
housing."21
This
passage
s notable
because t illustrates
ne
particular
x-
ample
of how the
Pruitt-Igoe
myth
has
grown
by
incorporating
is-
information.
Though
it is
commonly
accorded
the
epithet
"award-winning,"
ruitt-Igoe
neverwon
any
kind
of
architectural
prize.
An earlier t. Louis
housingproject
by
the same eam
of
archi-
tects,theJohnCochranGardenApartments, idwin two architec-
turalawards.
At some
point
this
prize
eems
o
have
been
ncorrectly
attributed o
Pruitt-Igoe.
This
strange
memory
apse
on the
part
of
architects
n theirdiscussions
f
Pruitt-Igoe
s
extremely
ignificant.
Beginning
n the
mid-1970s,
Pruitt-Igoe
began
ncreasingly
o be
usedasanillustration
f
the
argument
hat he
International
tyle
was
responsible
or the failure
f
Pruitt-Igoe.
he fictitious
prize
s essen-
tial
to
this
dimension
f the
myth,
because
t
paintsPruitt-Igoe
s the
iconicmodernist
monument.
The association
f
Pruitt-Igoe's
emise
with the
perceived
ail-
uresof the Modern
movementhad
begun
as
early
s
1972.
In
the af-
termathof the
project's
demolition,
several
writers
suggested
hat
insensitivity
o
residents' eeds
was
typical
of modern
architecture.
The Architectsournalalled hedemolition f Pruitt-Igoethemod-
ern movement's
most
grandiloquent
ailure."22 ith
the
critique
of
Modernism
emerging
n
the
1970s,
t was not
surprising
hat
a num-
ber of criticsand
theorists,
who can
be
loosely
ermed
Postmodern,
began
to use
the
project
n
their
writing
to
represent
he
Modern
movement.
The first
mportant ppearance
f
Pruitt-Igoe
n a
critique
of
Modernism
ame
n
1976
when
Colin
Roweand Fred
Koetter
used
the
photograph
of the demolition
n their introduction
o
Collage
City.
This section
of
the
bookwasdevoted
o
a
demonstration
f the
premise
hatthe Modernmovement's rchitecturalnd socialrevolu-
tion
had backfired. nstead
of
furthering
he
development
f a new
society,
"the
city
of modern
architecture,
oth as
psychological
on-
struct and
as
physical
model,
had been
rendered
tragically
ridiculous... he
city
of
Ludwig
Hibersheimer nd Le
Corbusier,
he
city
celebrated
y
CIAM and advertised
y
the Athens
Charter,
he
former
city
of
deliverance
s
everyday
ound
increasingly
nad-
equate."23
hough
Roweand Koetter o
not refer o
Pruitt-Igoe
pe-
cifically,
the
implication
of the
photograph's
nclusion
is
clear.
Pruitt-Igoe
s usedas
an
example
f this
"city
of modernarchitecture"
whose revolution ailed. It
presents
Pruitt-Igoe
s a
product
of the
ideasof
Hibersheimer,
e
Corbusier,
nd
CIAM
and
implicates
he
inadequacy
f their deas
n the demolition f the
project.
Only
one
year
after he
publication
of
Collage
City,
Charles
Jencks
urther
advanced his
interpretation
n The
Language
f
Post
Modern
Architecture. n the introduction
to his discussion
of
Postmodernism,
encks
asserted
hat
the
demolitionof
Pruitt-Igoe
represents
hedeath
of
modernarchitecture.
ikeRoweand
Koetter,
he associated
Pruitt-Igoe
ith the rationalist
principles
f
CIAM,
and
particularly
ith the urban
design
principles
f Le Corbusier. ccord-
ing
to
Jencks,
ven
though
the
project
was
designed
with the inten-
tion of
instillinggood
behavior
n the
tenants,
t
was
incapable
of
accommodatingheir ocialneeds:
Pruitt-Igoe
was constructed
according
o the most
progressive
ideas
of CIAM.. and
it won an
award
romtheAmerican
n-
stitute
of Architects hen t
was
designed
n
1951.
It consisted
of
elegant
slab blocks fourteen
storeys
high,
with rational
"streets
n
the
air"
which
weresafe rom
cars,but,
as it turned
out,
not safe
rom
crime);
"sun,
pace
and
greenery",
hich Le
Corbusier alled
he "three ssential
joys
of
urbanism"
instead
of
conventional
treets,
ardens
nd
semi-privatepace,
which
he
banished).
t had a
separation
f
pedestrian
nd vehicular
traffic,
he
provision
f
play
space,
and ocal
amenities uch
as
laundries,
reches
and
gossip
centers-all rational ubstitutes
for traditionalpatterns.24
Theseuses
of the
Pruitt-Igoe
ymbol
added
significantly
o the
Pruitt-Igoe
myth.
Like he
defensible
spaceargument
opularized
y
Oscar
Newman,
heseaccounts
ailed o locate
Pruitt-Igoe
n its
his-
torical
ontext
and
thereby
gnored
videncehateconomic
risis
nd
racialdiscrimination
layed
he
largest
ole
in
the
project's
demise.
Now,
they
addeda set of ideas
about he
architects'ntentions
n
de-
signing
the
project.
Both accounts
presented
he
project
as the ca-
nonicalmodernistmonument
Jencks
n
particular
erpetuating
he
May
1991
JAE
44/3
168
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8/18/2019 The Pruitt Igoe Myth
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mistaken dea that t was an
award-winning esign).
They
described
the
project
s
Modernist ot
only
n
formal
erms,
but
in
political
nd
social ermsas
well,
as
reflecting
n
agenda
or social
engineering.
These uses
of
Pruitt-Igoe
misrepresented
he
designers'
nten-
tions and the extent
to
which the architects ontrolled he
project's
design.
As
the
summary
f
Pruitt-Igoe's
istory
demonstrates,
much
of the
project's esign
was determined
y
the St. Louis
Housing
Au-
thority
ndthe federal ublic
Housing
Administration.
he
architects
had
no
control
over he
project's
solated
ocation,
ts excessive
ensi-
ties,
the elimination
of
amenities,
or the use
of
high-rise
elevator
buildings.Their taskwas limitedto providing heformof the indi-
vidual
buildings
nd
incorporating
s much
amenity
s
possible, iven
the
restricted
budget.
In
carrying
ut
this
task,
the architects id follow the formal
conventions
of modern architecture.
Pruitt-Igoe
was one of
Leinweber,
amasaki
& Hellmuth's irst
major
ommissions,
o it is
certain
hat
they
wished o
makean
impression
n their
architectural
peers.
The
glazedgalleries
ombinedwith
skip-stop
levators,
he
ex-
tensive
open spaces
between
the
slabs,
and
the minimalistsurface
treatment
ertainly
eflected he
prevailing
nterest
n Modernism s
elaborated
y
CLAM.
However,
he use of these ormal onventions
doesnot demonstrate
hat the architects
ad
particular
ntentionsor
social
reform. n
fact,
n
published
tatements
MinoruYamasaki x-
pressed
doubt thatthe
high-rise
ormwould havea beneficial ffect
on
public
housing
enants.
These
statements
appeared
n a series f articles
n
the
Journal
f
Housing
n whichYamasaki
engaged
n a debatewith the
progressive
housing
reformer atherine
auer.25 amasaki efended
high-rise
e-
sign,
not
on
its
architectural
erits,
but as
the best
possible esponse
to
whathe
perceived
s the social
imperative
f
slum
clearance
nd
the
economic
necessity
or urban
redevelopment.
iventhe
high
cost of
urban and
occupied
by
slum
housing,
he
argued,
t is most economi-
cally
efficient o
acquire
mall
parcels
nd buildat
high
densities.Yet
despite
ts economic
advantages,
amasaki
as
skeptical
f the value
of the
high-rise
as
a
form
for mass
housing:
"the ow
building
with
low
density
s
unquestionably
more
satisfactory
han
multi-story
iv-
ing.
...If I hadno economic r social
imitations,
'd
solveall
my
prob-
lemswith
one-story
uildings."26
e
defended
high-rise esign
as
the
onlyway
to
respond
o
external
conomicand
policy
conditions.
In her
defense
of low-rise
housing,
CatherineBauer
suggested
that the
policy
of
clearing
slums and
then
rehousing
ow-income
populations
n
high-density
entral
ity
projects
s not
necessarily
he
result
of
economic
imperatives
ut
a
conscious hoice
on
the
part
of
policy-makers.
igh-density
nner
city
projects
re he resultof mak-
ing
publichousing
subordinate
o
urban
redevelopment
chemes:
f
business nterests
nd
city
officials
were
willing
to
locate
projects
n
the urban
periphery
hen the
high-density,
igh-riseprojects
would
be
unnecessary.
Bauercriticized
Yamasaki
ess for
his
architectural
views han
for
his
politics;
he was
too
willing
o
give
in
to
prevailing
profit-motivated
edevelopment
nd
housingpolicy.
In his
statements
n this
debate,
Yamasaki
hardly
its the
image
of the radical ocial
reformer
depicted
by
the
Pruitt-Igoe
myth.
His
firm
did indeed
adoptparticular
esign
eaturesn order o conform
to the latest rends ndwas
nsensitive
o
the
potential
ffects f
those
features.
The
architectsalso
incorrectly
assumed hat the
galleries
wouldhelppromote ommunitynteractionnwhatwasbound o be
a harsh
nvironment.Yet before
making
any
of
these
decisions,
hey
had
agreed
o
workwithin
he frameworkf the
large-scale,igh-rise,
high-density
project
mandated
by
urban
redevelopment ractices.
Rather
han
socialreformers
destroying
he
public
housingprogram
with their
megalomaniac esigns,
he architectswere
essentially
as-
sive n their
acceptance
f the dominant
practices
f
their
ociety.
Despite
its
dubious
authenticity
or
historical
accuracy,
he
Pruitt-Igoe
myth
had achieved
he
status
of
architectural
dogma
by
the late
1970s.
The idea
hat
Pruitt-Igoe's
ailure
esulted
rom he in-
sensitivity
f orthodoxmodernist
design
ound a
receptive
udience
and became
an
illustration
or
many
Postmodern nd
anti-Modern
texts. Peter
Blake,
n Form
FollowsFiasco:
Why
ModernArchitecture
Hasn tWorked,choed he assertionhat
Pruitt-Igoe
ollowed"Ville-
Radieuse"
design
deas.
As a
result,
he
argued,
herewas
"no
way
this
depressing
roject
ouldbe
made
humanly
habitable"nd communi-
ties
of
high-rises
re
nherently
oomed.27
t
alsobecame convenient
symbol
or
Tom
Wolfe to include n his
attackon the
importing
of
German-inspired
930s
architectureo the
UnitedStatesafter
World
War
II.28
n FromBauhauso Our
HouseWolfe
repeated
he
by
now
generally ccepted
iction
that the
project
was an
award
winner,
and
then added
a
fabrication f
his
own,
asserting
hat n
1971
a
general
meeting
was held at which the residents
alled
for
blowing up
the
buildings.29
The
Pruitt-lgoe
myth
as
mystification
Why
is the
Pruitt-Igoe
myth
so
powerful?
here s
clearly
mple
evi-
dence that architectural
design
was but
one,
and
probably
he
least
important,
f several
actors
n
the demiseof the
project.Why
then
has
the
architecture
ommunity
been so insistent hat
the failure
of
Pruitt-Igoe
as ts
own
fault?
At one
level,
the
myth
can be
understood
simply
as a
weapon
in
an
ongoing
conflict
betweendifferent actionswithinthe architec-
1
69
Bristol
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9/10
ture
profession.
he
two mostcentral
critiques
f
the
design
of
Pruitt-
Igoe
have come fromsuccessormovements o
High
Modernism:
Postmodernism,
nd environment nd behavior.For
proponents
f
these new
approaches,
uch as Oscar
Newman or Charles
Jencks,
Pruitt-Igoe
rovides
convenient mbodiment f all the
alleged
ail-
ings
of Modernism.
However,
hough
hese
successors re
critical f
the
modernist
approach
o
the
design
of
public
housing,
hey
do not
question
he
fundamental otion that
it
is at the level of
design
hat
publichousing
ucceeds
r
fails.
They
attribute
he
problems
f
pub-
lic
housing
o
architectural
ailure,
and
propose
as a solutiona new
approacho design.Theydo not in anysignificantway
acknowledge
the
political-economic
ndsocial ontext or the
failure
f
Pruitt-Igoe.
This
is because he
myth
is more
than
simply
the
result
of
debate
within architectural
ulture: t serves t a much more
profound
evel
the
interests
f
the architecture
profession
s a whole.
As
we
have
een n
tracing
he
riseof the
Pruitt-Igoemyth,
the
architects'ersionhas
consistently
nsisted
n
the
primary
ignificance
of the
project's
verall
design
n its
demise.This
interpretation
enies
the
existence f
larger roblems
ndemic o St. Louis'
publichousing
program.
By
attributing
more
causal
power
to
architecturehan to
flawed
policies,
rises
n
the local
economy,
or
to class
oppression
nd
racism,
he
myth
conceals he
existence
f
contextualactors
tructur-
ing
thearchitects' ecisions nd
fabricates central
olefor architec-
ture
n the success r failure f
public
housing.
t
places
he
architect
in the
position
of
authority
ver
providing
ow-income
housing
or
the
poor.
This
presentation
f
the architect s the
figure
of
authority
n
the
history
of
Pruitt-Igoe
s reinforced
y
linking
he
project's
ailure
to the defects
of
High
Modernism.
The
claim hat
Pruitt-Igoe
ailed
because t was
based
on an
agenda
or
social
reform,
erived
rom
he
ideas
of Le
Corbusier
and the
CIAM,
not
only
presupposes
hat
physical
design
s central o the successorfailureof
public
housing,
but also that the
design
was
implemented
o
carry
ut the
architects'
social
agenda.
Whatthis
obscures
s
the
architects'
passivity
n
the face
of a much
larger
genda
hat
has ts rootsnot
in
radical ocial
reform,
but in thepolitical conomyof post-WorldWarIISt. Louisandin
practices
f racial
segregation. ruitt-Igoe
as
shaped
by
the
strategies
of
ghetto
containment
nd inner
city
revitalization-strategies
hat
did not emanate rom the
architects,
ut rather rom
the
system
n
which
they
practice.
The
Pruitt-Igoe
myth
therefore ot
only
inflates
the
power
of the
architecto effect ocial
change,
butit masks he ex-
tent to which the
profession
s
implicated,
nextricably,
n
structures
and
practices
hat t
is
powerless
o
change.
Simultaneously
with its function
of
promoting
he
power
of
the
architect,
he
myth
serves o
disguise
he actual
purpose
nd
im-
plication
f
publichousing
by
diverting
he debate o the
question
f
design.
By
continuing
o
promote
architecturalolutions o whatare
fundamentally
problems
of
class and
race,
the
myth
conceals the
complete
nadequacy
f
contemporary
ublichousingpolicy.
It
has
quite
usefully
hifted he blamefrom the sourcesof
housingpolicy
and
placed
t on the
design
professions.
y
furthering
his
misconcep-
tion,
the
myth
disguises
he
causesof the failureof
public
housing,
and
alsoensures he
continued
participation
f the
architecture
pro-
fession n
tokenand
palliative
fforts
o
address he
problem
of
pov-
erty
n
America.The
myth
is a
mystification
hatbenefits
everyone
involved,
xcept
hose o whom
public
housingprograms
re
suppos-
edlydirected.
Notes
1.
St. Louis
City
Plan
Commission,
Comprehensive
ity
Plan
(St.
Louis,
1947),
pp.
27-34;
James
Neal
Primm,
Lion
of
the
Valley
Boulder,
CO:
Pruett,
1981),
pp.
472-473.
2.
"Progress
r
Decay?
St.
LouisMust Choose:The
Sordid
Housing
Story,"
St. Louis
Post-Dispatch,
arch
3, 1950,
Part
Four
n
a Series.
3.
For the role
played
by
the
public
housing program
n
St. Louis redevel-
opment
plans,
ee
RogerMontgomery,
Pruitt-Igoe:
olicy
Failure
r
Societal
Symp-
tom,"
in
BarryCheckoway
and Carl V.
Patton,eds.,
The
Metropolitan
Midwest:
Policy
Problemsnd
Prospectsfor hange
Urbana:
University
f Illinois
Press,
1985),
pp. 230-239; andKateBristolandRogerMontgomery, TheGhostof Pruitt-Igoe"
(paper
delivered t the
Annual
Meeting
of
the Association
of
Collegiate
Schoolsof
Planning,
Buffalo,
NY,
October
28,
1988).
On the
relationship
f
public
housing
o
urbanrenewalmore
generally,
ee
Mark
Weiss,
"The
Origins
and
Legacy
f
Urban
Renewal,"
n
P.
Clavell,
J.
Forester,
nd W.
Goldsmith,
eds.,
Urbanand
Regional
Planning
n
an
Age
ofAusterity
New
York:
Pergamon
Press,
1980);
Richard
O.
Davies,
HousingReform uring
he Truman dministration
Columbia:
University
f
Missouri
Press,
1966);
and Arnold
Hirsch,
Making
the SecondGhetto:Raceand
Housing
n
Chicago,
940-1966
(Cambridge:
ambridge
University
Press,
1983).
4.
Eugene
Meehan,
The
Quality f
Federal
Policymaking:rogrammed
ail-
ure
n
Public
Housing
Columbia:
University
f
Missouri
Press,
1979),
p.
71;
James
Bailey,
"TheCase
History
of a
Failure,"
rchitecturalorum
123
(December1965):
p.
23.
5.
U.S. Public
Housing
Administration,
nnual
ReportWashington,
D.C.,
1951);
Davies,
HousingReform,
p.
126-132.
6. "SlumSurgeryn St. Louis,"Architectural orum 4 (April1951):pp.
128-136;
"Four
Vast
Housing
Projects
for
St. Louis:
Hellmuth,
Obata and
Kassabaum,nc.,"
Architecturalecord
20
(August
1956):
pp.
182-189.
7.
"FourVast
Housing
Projects
orSt.
Louis,"
.
185.
8.
Meehan,
Quality,
.
71.
9.
Montgomery, Pruitt-Igoe,"p.
235-239.
10.
Meehan,
Quality, p.
60-63, 65-67,
74-83.
11. In
1965
the U.S. Public
Housing
Administration
P.H.A.)
was
incorpo-
rated
into the
newly
created
Department
of
Housing
and Urban
Development
(H.U.D.).
12.
"What's
Wrong
with
High-Rise?,"
t. Louis
Post-Dispatch,
ovember
14,
1960.
13.
Bailey,
"Case
History,"
p.
22-23.
May
1991 JAE
44/3
170
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8/18/2019 The Pruitt Igoe Myth
10/10
14. "St.
Louis
Blues,"
Architectural orum
136
(May
1972):
18;
Architect's
Journal
uly
26,
1972);
Wilbur
Thompson,
"Problems
hat
Sprout
n
the Shadow
of
No
Growth,"
AIA
Journal60
(December1973);
"The
Experiment
hat
Failed,"
Ar-
chitecture lus
October
1973).
15.
"The
Tragedy
of
Pruitt-Igoe,"
Time,
December
27,
1971,
p.
38;
Jerome
Curry,
"Collapse
f a
Failure,"
The
National
Observer,
ay
20,
1972,
p.
24;
Andrew
B.
Wilson,
"DemolitionMarks
UltimateFailure f
Pruitt-IgoeProject,"
Washington
Post,
August
27, 1973,
p.
3.
16.
"The
Experiment
hat
Failed,"
.
18.
17.
Wilson,
"Demolition,"
.
3.
18.
Oscar
Newman,
Defensible
pace
New
York:
Macmillan,
1972)
pp.
56-
58,66,77,83,99,
101-108, 188,207.
19.
Meehan,
Quality, p.
83-87,
194-198.
20. Lee
Rainwater,Behind GhettoWalls;BlackFamilies n a FederalSlum
(Chicago:
Aldine
Publishing,
970),
pp.
9,
403.
21. Mark
LaGory
and
John
Pipkin,
Urban Social
Space
(Belmont,
CA:
Wadsworth,
981),
p.
263.
22.
Architect'sJournal
.
180.
23.
Colin Rowe
and Fred
Koetter,
CollageCity
(Cambridge,
MA: MIT
Press,
1976),
pp.
4,
6.
24. Charles
Jencks,
The
Language
f
Post-Modern
rchitecture
New
York:
Rizzoli,
1977),
pp.
9-10.
25.
Minoru
Yamasaki,
"High
Buildings
for
Public
Housing?"
Journal
of
Housing
9
(1952):
p.
226;
Catherine
Bauer,
"Low
Buildings?
atherine
Bauer
Ques-
tions Mr.
Yamasaki's
rguments,"
ournal
fHousing
9
(1952):
p.
227.
26.
Yamasaki,
HighBuildings," .
226.
27.
Peter
Blake,
Form
Follows Fiasco:
Why
Modern
Architecture
Hasn't
Worked
Boston:
Atlantic
Monthly
Press,
1977),
pp.
80-81.
28.
Tom
Wolfe,
From
Bauhaus
to Our
House
(New
York: Simon
and
Schuster,
981),
pp.
73-74.
29. Actually n the late seventiesa localcommunityredevelopment roup
that
ncluded
ormer
Pruitt-Igoe
esidents
madea
proposal
o
buy
and
renovate our
of the
buildings,
but were
urned
down
by
H.U.D.
Mary
Comerio,
"Pruitt-Igoe
nd
Other
Stories,"
ournal
fArchitectural
ducation
4
(Summer,
1981):
pp.
26-31.
1
71
Bristol
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