THE BLUE BOOK:
An Advanced Strategy Guide
for No-limit Hold'em Cash
Games
By
Reid Young
Copyright 2010, Reid Young
THE BLUE BOOK: An Advanced Strategy Guide for
No-limit Hold'em Cash Games
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PLAYER TYPES 24
PRE-FLOP PLAY 28
FLOP PLAY 86
RIVER PLAY 139
TURN PLAY 166
TURNING HANDS INTO BLUFFS 177
OVER-BETTING AND UNDER- BETTING 209 ALL
YOUR OPTIONS
LEADING (INTO THE PFR) 226
QUANTIFYING LEVELING 236
MISCELLANEOUS CONCEPTS 243
MOVING THROUGH LIMITS 255
FOREWORD
My experience with Reid has been a positive one.
While he was a student of mine, Reid demonstrated a
thirst for learning. He quenched that thirst by asking
the right questions to the right people. As a result, Reid
has become someone to whom people ask questions.
Off the poker table, Reid has been great towork with as
a part of Leggo. He has shown ambition, punctuality,
and responsibility- qualities that most pokerplayers lack
severely. I wish him and this book nothing but success.
- Aaron "Aejones" Jones, high stakes poker professional
PREFACE
I regret that there will he a few odd
soundingintroductions to the various subjects in this book.
The subjects on which I write are quite interconnected, a
flaw inherent of the subject matter, so there frequently will
be oddly arranged ideas. I apologize in advance for any
confusion this causes you as a reader and a student of the
game.
There will also be a number of oddly placed questions,
mostly rhetorical and colloquial, within this book. The
reason for this stylistic choice is to attempt to grasp the
active attention of the reader, just as your attention should
be engaged in a poker game. I want you to actively consider
every single thingl write about just as you would consider
every single perceivable tendency of your opposition and
every option available to you in a game. Eventually, when
these questions have been properly addressed by both of
us, you will become
a better player and a better poker thinker than your
competition and that means more poker success for
you.
Finally, I'd like to say that there are few joys as great
for me as a student's success. I wish you all the best and
great success in your poker endeavors unless we are in a
hand together.
And for the 48456th time..
THE BLUE BOOK: An Advanced Strategy Guide for
No-limit Hold'em Cash Games
INTRODUCTION
The Blue Book isn't aiming to teach you what to think,
but rather how to think. This book is aimed at poker players
of all skill levels and I truly believe that it is a text that could
and should be revisited throughout a poker player's career.
The nuanced nature of the game offers near infinite faceted
approaches and observations to the game. As your game
changes, so will your responses to the questions herein
asked. The questions in the text are designed to stimulate
the growth of any level of poker player, from intermediate
to advanced player.
When I first started playing poker, I would frequent
the gambling section of many bookstores only to be
disappointed to find the same introductory books and a lack
of a volume truly reflective of the online player's approach
to beating the games as they've developed in the last few
years. The information that fills the
bookshelves has become outdated and less valuable to
those intermediate players seeking continued growth for
their game. The problem is that these poker books, often
filled with over-simplified and outmoded thought
processes, were mostly systematic in attempts to teach a
casual player the art of survival in the average poker game.
Nothing available comes close to touching on how to
decisively win in a tough game, a daunting thought that
now plagues many professional players as the general
public and other players have become more educated. If
information is power, I felt powerless playing poker once I
moved past my first few limits and I didn't know where to
go to imporve. With more people selling the same
mass-produced and watered- down poker systems, the
masses are able to absorb them. That is how I got stuck and
bundled in as part of that group of stagnant-minded
players. I have learned the systems that don't work in tough
online cash games and I have since moved past them and
onto working on the thought processes that you will need
to engage in order to beat the higher games that are almost
always entirely comprised of professional poker players.
his book will help to bring to light the fact that a
uniform poker system cannot be applied to different
types of players because each player is unique with his
or her own playing style. My goal is to teach you the
adjustments that you need to make based on reads you
glean by playing with each different person. Every play
you deconstruct and every adjustment you learn to
make is going to add to your win rate. We're also going
to delve much further into topics less explained by other
poker literature in order to better understand our
opponents' mistakes and our own mistakes.
- Reid Young, LeggoPoker.com coach "SHOOTAA"
Note: He recently announced that he is no longer part
ofLeggo.
GETTING STARTED:
A HAND EXPLAINED
I will be covering lots of topics in this book. As I've
said, the topics are all interconnected. Below is a sample
hand that shows how the ideas connect and how I constantly
ask myself questions having to do with many different
subsets of general poker theory and how these ideas often
lead to a well informed and logically based decision given
the limited information we have in a situation. Once you
learn to see the game as a multidimensional playing field, a
new world of poker will be at your fingertips. Let's start by
taking a glimpse into my mind during a strategic hand.
Hand info:
Type: Cash Games Game: NL HokTem Table: Buddy Blinds: $10/$20
Posts big blind $20 Seat 3: VILLAIN($ 1,970) Dealer, Posts small blind $10 Seat 6: HERO ($2,030) Dealt to HERO [AsJd]
Pre-flop: (Pot: $30) RAISE HERO, to $60 CALL VILLAIN, $40
Here, I make a standard raise pre-flop to three times
the big blind with AJo and my opponent calls. He had
been re-raising me a decent amount pre-flop, so I
expect his range to include:
• Several suited and connecting hands
• Medium-to-high broadway hands
• Occasional slow-played big hands
Flop: (Pot: $120)[6d,8d,Js]
BET VILLAIN, $100 RAISE HERO, to 320 CALL VILLAIN, $220
My opponent leads into me on the flop, which is
strange given how much he had been check-raising flops as
draw heavy as this one in the recent past. He should realize
that my range of hands for c-betting and calling a raise
should widen to combat his high check- raising frequency
and so I would expect his stronger hands to attempt a
check-raise most of the time. Concurrently, there are many
draws with which I might also raise his flop lead bet, so I am
not expectim him to fold. As I do not see him taking his line
with many legitimate hands, I expect him to at least call a
raise or re-raise me with a weaker hand, if I elect to raise his
flop lead. Given our recent history, I elect to raise with my
top pair, top kicker. He calls, which, to me, represents the
weak hand I believe him to have. This hand would be either
some weak draw that he isn't comfortable getting all-in on
the flop by calling an all-in bet after he
3-bets my flop raise or a slow played monster trying to
induce a turn bet from what he views to be a range
comprised mostly of draws and bluffs. There are several
straight draws and a flush draw on the board and it's likely
in his eyes that the combinations of my hands that are draws
and pure bluffs that raise this flop are far more prevalent,
combinatorically speaking, than the hands that I'm able to
raise for value.
Turn ($760) [6d,8d,Js,5h] CHECK VILLAIN BET HERO, $500 CALL VILLAIN, $500
I bet the turn large enough to get value with what I
believe to be the best hand and to charge his likely draw.
The off-suit five coming on the turn brings some
combinations of hands that are now a pair and gut shot,
hands like 98 s, that he might play this way, and so I can bet
a larger amount of money because he expects to have more
equity against my range and is therefore able to put more
money in the pot. Once I bet $500 into a
$760, he'll be getting 1260/500 or about 2.5-1 on a turn call.
This makes it pretty easy for him to call with a lot of his
range while leaving me a credible looking river bet that I
could be using to bluff or to value bet. Remember, a larger
portion of my perceived range is still draws. Once he just
calls the turn, I'm expecting him to have either a flush
draw that paired the turn or picked up a gut shot and now
has enough equity to call, a weaker made hand that he
wants to induce more action from the air portion of my
range, or a pair and gut shot type hand.
River: (Pot: $1,760) [6d,8d,Js,5h,4d] BET VILLAIN, $1,090 and is ALL-IN
Immediately when I see the river card, I'm expecting to
lose the pot to what I thought to be his very strong range
and I'm feeling very frustrated with the deck for making me
miss what I thought was going to be an easy value bet all-in
on the river. Almost every single hand I thought to be in his
range just hit! Flush draw, check.Pair-plus-straight-draw,
check. He shoves
into me though, which is odd given our above analysis. This
can only leave him with the pair and straight draw portion
of his range, and I'll explain why. When he simply called my
raise on the flop every single hand in his range with a seven
or a flush draw that could make it to this river without
making a turn mistake is discounted because I know he's a
great player, so I know he won't be making the mistake of
calling the turn without showdown value against me. If he
were to continue with a flush draw like KdTd, I would
expect him to get the money in on the flop or to check-raise
me all-in on the turn because he's priced out of a turn call
and might be uncomfortable check-calling the still unknown
river on an already scary board with king- high.) If he has
5d7d, 9d7d, Td9d, Qd9d or QdTd I'm expecting him to get
those all-in on the flop because of the massive equity those
hands have against my range and with how often he should
expect a three-bet on the flop to take down the pot, given
how weak he is perceiving my range of hands. I would also
expect him to check-raise most of his combination hands
(flush draw plus pair or flush draw plus straight draw)
because
I might bluff three-bet him on the flop given his high
check-raising frequency over the last twenty hands. Also,
I have the Jd in my hand, so there cannot be any hands in
his range.
Next, let's consider the 7x hands that could possibly get
to the river by taking his line of lead and call the flop and
check and call the turn. He doesn't play 57 off-suit,
abbreviated as 57o, 97o, J7 suited (abbreviated as J7s) type
hands pre-flop out-of-position 100 big blinds effective
(-$2000 effective stacks in this game) unless he's re-raising
me pre-flop as a bluff. It's even less likely that he would bet
and call those hands rather than check-call or check-raise
with them. If he led into me and called my raise with a
straight draw like that, then his outs might not be clean if he
makes a straight on a diamond turn and I know he realizes
this is a bad play and that he, being a skilled player, would
not make it. Also, if he doesn't hit the turn in some way, he'll
have to be either check-raising me without much equity if
called or check-folding a lot of turns, and I know he knows
he
can't win by folding. So the 7x hands are also out of his
range, or at least extremely discounted.
We've narrowed his entire range down to weaker made
hands. So now why is he shoving all in on the river,
especially one he should expect me to bluff with my air
almost always? From conversations we had about three
months before this hand took place, I realized that he
understands the value of turning made hands into a bluff.
This board ran out in such a way that it looks like it heavily
hit his range and I think that he's capable of realizing that if
I'm going to give him credit for flushes and straights here
that it's very unlikely, especially with how wide a range he
perceives me to raise this flop and to bet on this turn, that he
thinks I can call here. He's betting $1090 to win $1760, so if
he's bluffing, it only has to work -38.2% of the time.
Given all of what we've considered during the hand
and that I think my particular hand beats the few weak
made hands he might play this way (J9, JT, perhaps QJ and
KJ). I decided to call.
CALL HERO, $1,090
Showdown:
VILLAIN SHOWS [Jh, Tc] HERO SHOWS [As, Jd] HERO wins the pot of S3,939.50 with a pair of Jacks
The above is the explanation of a $2,000 buy-in
heads-up no-limit hold'em hand that I played against a
friend of mine not too long ago. Does all this happen in my
head every single hand of no-limit hold'em I play? Yes it
does. In one's mind, you're obviously not writing
paragraphs like you're trying to explain the hand in detail.
If you're a smaller stakes or new player, this particular
hand might not be a mental cake walk either. My goal is to
get you to the point where it will be easy for you to go
through these thoughts in every step of every hand that
you will ever play after actively reading this book. By active
reading, I mean that you should be doing some
calculations in the margins, asking yourself questions
about similar hands you've played, and
exploring the possibilities. Poker is a game of near
infinite permutations. So limiting yourself to only the
example in this book would be a serious mistake if
you're seriously trying to take your game to the next
level.
A Note on Ego
The first thing that I discuss with all my students is
how the presence of your ego may affect your poker game.
If you can't admit to yourself that you're just a person, just
like any other player, who will make mistakes in a game of
mistakes, then much more likely than not, you're in big
trouble.
However, ego can also be a good thing. It may help
you to squelch fears about taking shots when you should,
to face tough competition, and to give you the drive to
better yourself to feed your need to be the best. Of course,
let's not go overboard with this mentality if
we're always playing the best-of-the-best, we're going to
lose money or win far less than we could be in easier equally
available games at similar stakes. There's something to be
said for grinding a smaller stake to build a bankroll to be
able to play in a potentially softer and higher stakes game.
There's also something to be said about spending a stagnant
poker career bum hunting and only playing the weaker
competition with every day filled with waiting for a
recreational or bad player to take a shot at playing in your
regular game. If all you do is wait around for soft
competition, you will not improve as much as the other
guys fighting in the trenches, and the money you can make
in your poker career will be much less than the harder
working players
So I propose that we practice a little balance with our
respective egos. It's tough to say what the best mix of the
two cases presented will be, but we can be sure that it's
certainly not all of one or of the other.
CHAPTER 1:
PLAYER TYPES
This book has been made to show you that there is not
a system for beating poker. There is no one move or play
that will act as a panacea for all your poker problems. The
reason that a system cannot be applied to poker is that the
variables in the game are near infinite and always
changing. This book has been made with the intention of
teaching you how to actively think in order to adapt to
those variables, not how to robotically respond to them
with one of a few choices.
At first, the pessimists out there might be depressed
about the above statements. However, I hope that you
realize how this actually is fantastic news! This means there
are almost infinite decisions in the game that give
you the opportunity to play better than your opponent.
And as we know from other poker theory, causing our
opponents to make mistakes and playing better than our
opponents in a given spot are tiny steps taken on the way to
winning. If we can make better decisions than the
opposition in every spot, we'll be at the top of the game,
continuously pushing the limits and bringing online poker
to levels never before achieved by average, system-centric
players.
If someone's betting frequency in a certain spot is too
high, we will heighten our bluff-raising and calling
frequencies. If an opponent always over-bets all in on the
river, we will adjust and widen our river calling range and
our range of made hands that we check to him. It will
surprise you how long this list could go and how long your
list will go after reading this book. For the reason that all of
these dynamics feed off of each other, this book may seem
slightly disconnected. Unfortunately, as above-stated, it's
an unavoidable drawback about writing about the subject
and one that
we'll have to get through together. For this reason, in some
sections of the book I have written instructions to turn to
another section in attempts to alleviate confusion caused by
the interconnectedness of the subject matter when the
surrounding theory has yet to be explained.
Our goal, as aspiring poker geniuses, is to be able to
explore as many of these possible dynamics in such a
detailed and thorough manner that we will play better and
adjust better than the opposition. We will be able to dissect
a player not as one of a few types, but as an agent of his or
her exact actions. Our reads will become more than the
usual phrase-long description per player and we'll win
more as a result of our efforts. Each decision will be based
on our opponent's range in an exact spot, not on a loose
idea of his general image, which is nearly useless. Because
poker is a game of imperfect information, the nature of our
decision in each spot may be based on extrapolated data we
have gleaned from other tendencies. The better we become
at
extrapolation and observation, the better our decisions
will be and the more we will win.
CHAPTER 2:
PRE-FLOP PLAY
re-flop play isn't the battleground for high stakes play.
The edges are too small and the variance is too high. If it
were the case, you would see the nosebleed players getting
hands like A4o all in pre-flop and being ecstatic. So why
doesn't this happen? It is because there are bigger skill
edges and more variables to interpret better than your
opposition post-flop. That said, pre- flop play is important
because the decisions you make pre-flop will often impact
how the largest hands you play will be played post-flop and
because so much of getting out of tough spots where you
are mistake-prone in poker is simply knowing how to avoid
them. In order to avoid difficult spots, it will help us to
know the general theory about the foundations of our
pre-flop decisions.
Raising Pre-Flop
I'm not going to go too far into specific hands to use
in every instance pre-flop. Charts are frequently irrelevant
or incomplete and so I'll just be giving you some food for
thought so that you can make your own decisions that will
work for any pre-flop situation, regardless of stack sizes
and opponents. The game of No- Limit Texas Hold'em is
very dynamic and so you need to be equipped to make
your own decisions in different spots and to learn how to
weigh and interpret the many different factors we will
want to consider before choosing to raise a hand pre-flop.
Domination
Generally, if we're raising pre-flop, we want to be
called by dominated hands. For example, the case is rare
that you would want to raise hands like K9o under the
gun in a 6-max game. If you flop top pair with a hand like
K9o after you've raised first to act in a tough game and
get multiple streets of action, you're likely to be behind.
The decision to choose which hands to open are
largely dependent on your opposition's pre-flop calling
ranges. If we are playing at a table with a weaker player
who calls 80% of his hands, then there will be more
opportunities to open K9o. Why is this not a hard-set rule
that we could add to a reasonably sized chart of some sort?
A chart under thousands of pages long would be
unintelligible because you still have to worry about
players yet to act, all of whom may play in very different
ways and have different mind-sets based on
previous hands played in the game or session. Will they
often times re-raise your opens and play back at you with
good (difficult to interpret) bluffing frequencies? Will they
be calling with hands that dominate you so often that
raising your particular hand will be a mistake? Will they be
floating your flop continuation bets often and making
post-flop difficult for you? Will you be out of position
versus potential callers? If any of these are answered "yes,"
then it is likely your best play with K9o to fold pre-flop.
As stack sizes go up, domination becomes less
important because your implied odds go up. For instance,
the choice to call with suited Ax hands, often with position,
will have a very dynamic value depending on stack sizes
and how likely you are to get paid if you do make the nut
flush. Hands like Q8s may make unlikely straights or two
pairs for which an opponent may not give you credit,
whereas 50 big blinds effective, the main concern by far is
being on the bad end of a top pair versus top pair situation.
Specific stack sizes with
which to call weaker hands vary based on the
opposition's tendencies, the players yet to act pre-flop,
and so many other factors that an attempt to quantify a
correct stack size with which to begin calling such
hands is almost certainly a non- fruitful exercise. The
more imprecise variables that we attempt to quantify
the less certain and the more general our idea of hands
to play pre-flop in these spots become. The decision
becomes one rooted more in theory than in a
mathematically quantifiable objective choice.
Adjusting to the opposition's
Pre-Flop aggression
If everyone at the table is re-raising you often, then
you will want to take steps to adjust to your opponent's
pre-flop aggression. You should probably widen your
four-betting range pre-flop and/or tighten your pre-flop
opening range. Instead of having to fold hands like 64s
in a spot, we will have more hands like 99 that we may
choose to four-bet with the intention of calling an all-in bet
as a result of a tighter pre-flop raising range. Instead of
folding our weaker hands, we might also choose to four-bet
as a bluff. We will elaborate on these two specific
adjustments later in the chapter, but before continuing to
read, try to figure out why four- betting a hand as weak as
99 and calling an all-in is quite often a good play versus
many people with the level of aggression in today's games.
How many reasons can you think of before continuing to
read?
The same logic that applies to raising pre-flop applies to
re-raising pre-flop. Imagine a case where it is extremely
likely that if you call with AQo, that you will be squeezed.
Next, imagine a case where if you re-raise AQo pre-flop, the
original raiser will fold hands like AJo and ATs. Finally,
imagine both of these cases being true of the same hand and
that player who we believe will fold AJo and ATs type
hands raises and we haveAQo on the button. AQo is
usually a clear call in this instance.
After calling the three-bet, you may choose the best of
many ways to play back at a squeezer based on the
squeezer's pre-flop and post-flop tendencies.
If the squeezer continuation bets missed hands every
single time and will bet the flop and turn oftentimes on Axx
and Qxx boards, then perhaps calling is the best option
pre-flop with the hopes of seeing such boards or of trying
to get your ace high hand to showdown. If he is squeezing
hands like AJs and KQo and he is squeezing so often that it
is hurting your ability (lessening your implied odds) to call
with speculative hands such as small pocket pairs pre-flop
in similar spots, you may want to shove as a way of
balancing with the times you decide to re-raise hands like
small pairs. Additionally, if he plays very well post- flop,
then perhaps re-raising (usually all-in, unless you are so
deep that you imagine him to be folding only worse hands)
is the best play. The decision is going to be made based on
your opponent's calling range when you re-raise, how often
he will be folding to your re
raise, the money in the pot before your re-raise, what
you must risk to re-raise, and your equity against his
calling range with your specific hand. After a simple
math calculation, you should know the weakest hands
with which this play will be profitable at a specific time
with a specific set of circumstances. There are examples
of the math describing this type of play later in the
book.
By going all-in, we will realize our equity against
his weaker made hands like AJs and 88, as well as
discouraging him from bluffing in the future, an often
over-looked positive externality for when we shove and
the squeezer folds. Even if we are called by a better hand
in the specific hand we choose to back-raise this AQo,
he will realize our ranges in this spot are balanced and
well- suited or adjusted for his style of play. These
adjustments will force him to readjust his pre-flop
tendencies and allow us to call with more of our speculative hands in- position pre-flop knowing that he will have a more polarized range of hands for squeezing pre-flop. If he does not feel the need to adjust, we are
obviously content in taking his money by exploiting his pre-flop over- aggression in this instance.
Calling Pre-Flop
(In-Position)
When considering a call pre-flop, we should apply
the same concepts that we believe our opposition is
considering when choosing hands to open in single-
raised pots pre-flop. Always ask yourself if you're
dominating your opponent's raising range with your
hand and how often you think you'll be able to take the
pot away through some combination of floating and
bluff-raising (see chapter 3 on flop play).
Other questions to ask when considering a pre-flop call
include:
• How often you will flop something deceptive
enough to win a large hand?
• How often your opponent will pay you off when you
have a deceptive hand?
• How well do you know your opponent's post-flop
tendencies? (the better you know them, the better you
can play marginal hands in position with more
information and the more mistakes you are able to
force him to make against your range)
We talked about dominating hands already, so let us
move to our next question: are there a lot of boards I'll be
able to float using randomization by equity with this
particular hand and will this opponent allow himself to be
bluffed on later streets?
First, let's define what I mean when I say "randomization
by equity." The term itself is something I believe Aaron
Jones coined, but the concept is one familiar to all
successful poker players. The idea is that at certain times
every player should be bluffing in order to balance the
times that he is betting for value, or in this case, the reverse,
floating when we have made hands in our range of hands.
Because we are able to choose the hands with which we
will bluff and because we will be playing against observant
opponents, it's sometimes necessary to randomize these
bluffs in order to not give away information about how we
play. It's important to distinguish between a "mandatory
bluff spot," a time when you have one of the hands you
have chosen to use as a bluffing hand in a certain spot, and
a great situation to bluff. Consider
Qcjh o n a K c T h 3 s 4 d board when your opponent called
your flop bet. This example shows what we mean by
"randomization by equity." You'll notice that Qcjh has a lot
of equity against a flop calling range on this particular
board, whereas a hand like 9s8s would have less equity
because the cards are both below middle pair and there are
no
draws that the river card will complete for this hand.
However, against certain opponents, if the turn is an ace,
you might do well enough betting your entire air range to
show a profit given the large portion of a certain opponent's
range that may be folding. For our floating example, we
should choose hands that have the best equity to use to call
flops and bet turns. Obviously, there are exceptions to the
rule, including times when you believe your opponent is
very likely to check-raise the turn and you have a lot of
equity and do not want to fold your hand to a raise. This
idea will be better explained in Chapter 3, which focuses on
flop play, especially the sections on barreling and on
floating.
JTo is a hand a lot of my students seem hesitant to call
with in position, but it works out very well for our floating
ranges as there are a lot of flops with which we connect and
are subsequently able to float, especially against looser and
more passive opposition. Now, choosing hands pre-flop
partially based on their floating merit is a pretty involved
and complex situation to
dissect, so we'll start out with a brief examination of a few
boards on which we will play different hands in the same
manner in order to emphasize the reasoning of both
floating and of protecting our floats. By protecting our
floats I mean that we will also be calling flops with made
hands to mask the times when we choose to float. Calling
with made hands and calling with weak draws play off of
one another because one helps the other in ways I will soon
discuss in a more in depth way in the chapter on flop play.
Essentially, a hand like JT has a much longer list of
boards on which one may find oneself wanting to call with
a made hand or to float. Some examples include 794, T83,
Q83, KQ6, and KT3. Notice how even a hand as weak as
Q8s has much more value than Q7s, not only due to its
obviously superior high-card value, its ability to make
higher top pairs, but also because of the vast amount of
boards that may facilitate a profitable float against
particular opponents. For Q8s, there are more boards with
similar textures to T94 and J93 that might
roll off compared to a hand like Q7s and the more obvious
458 boards for Q7s to float or to check-raise. Q8s has the
obvious gut shot to the four-straight flops, as in the Q7s
example, in addition to the less obvious, and therefore,
more valuable, two-card straight draws. Considerations
like this are a significant part of determining profitable
hands pre-flop.
With the knowledge that playing back on certain boards
is more profitable when your hand has some added equity
or outs to improve, caution should be exercised. If a board
like J96 comes and we call our opponent's continuation bet
with any hand, as a float or with a made hand, it is
important to realize the perception of our range and how
wide it will seem to many opponents. With such a wide
perceived range, perhaps as wide as any gutshot in our
pre-flop calling range, our opponent's betting frequency
should increase, if he is in tune with the dynamics of such a
board. The higher betting frequency from our opponent
means more bluffs and thinner value bets on future
streets. It also means that we should adjust accordingly.
We can out-manoeuvre our opponents who might
consider expanding their ranges against a wide
perceived floating range by incorporating a number of
effective strategies such as:
• Double-floating (floating again on the turn)
• Calling down lighter
• Raising turns and/or rivers both for value and as a
bluff.
In order to successfully double-float, the best
tendencies of an opponent to see that makes the play
profitable are going to be that opponent rarely check-
calling rivers with made hands, which is almost always
the case on such draw-heavy boards, unless he has seen
us double-floating in the past, and not three-barrel
bluffing as often as he should be. It's quite intuitive that
the more air in our opponent's checking range on the
river, the more successful a bluff will be after a double-
float. Our opponent should be less likely to check and
call a river with a made hand because when several
draws miss, our opposition's main concern will be
balancing thin value-betting with his bluff range. He
should want to value bet instead of bluff catch with his
made hands in order to get called lighter by us and to make
more money from the times that we call with worse hands,
which will happen quite often when many draws in his
range miss the board. Additionally, over a general range of
poker players, it is extremely unlikely that our opponent
will view us as someone who is double-floating compared
to the times that we will call down lighter because of all the
missed draws on a given board, which means that most
opponents will be giving up on blank rivers because they
figure to be called too often to have their bluff show a
profit. We will see in the chapters on turn and river play
why giving up because you think you will be often called
by better isn't necessarily a great idea (see Chapter 4).
In this more passive river scenario against the opponent
who will give up his bluffs on a blank river, a double float
becomes much more profitable. You have no more to do
than a "simple" math equation determining how often a
certain opponent will be
giving up by the river and if that percentage of times will
warrant a double-float and a river bluff plus the
consideration of the expected value of your gutshot or
whatever weak draw with which you chose to continue.
Note that when you are calculating the value of the play in
its entirety that our turn play is independent of our flop
float, which we already determined to be profitable, and so
the flop float should not be part of your double- float
equation. The word simple is in quotations because you
will have to account for his change in bluffing frequency on
certain river cards and therefore attempt a somewhat
complicated calculation to obtain an accurate success rate
for the play for all possible different river permutations.
For example, the same opponent is probably extremely
likely to bet flop, turn, and river with T8s on a J946K board
as the opponent who check-folds the river on a J9469 board.
These permutations, the specific cards on which a certain
player continues a bluff or gives up are often going to cause
a small error in calculation. However, if you find the
correct opponent against whom to employ this play, you
won't have to worry so much about the smaller
mistakes in your calculations because your profits should
be quite large relative to the small adjustments or
mistakes in the estimation of his bluffing range for
certain river possibilities.
The best way to find the answer to how profitable a
double-float is will be to do a few G bucks calculations (see
chapter 4) in order to determine how often we will get to a
river with the hand we decide to float the turn and our
opponent will be checking that river, presumably always to
fold his hand.
Another important consideration is if your perceived
range after calling a turn is wide or full of stronger made
hands and the relevance of this perception on your
opponent's river bluffing frequency. If you decide to try to
double-float on a drawy board, even the more passive
opponents with the betting lead will realize that your turn
call indicates a lot of pair-plus-draw type hands that might
now be forced to fold on the river to another bet. If your
range is perceived as such, it's less likely you
will induce a river check often enough in order to give
yourself a profitable turn float followed by a river bluff.
Still another consideration is if your hand has any value
in deception and if it will hit often and hard enough for this
value to be realized. This consideration goes hand-in-hand
with the above consideration because the more deceptive
your draw is, the more disconnected the board will be. For
example, floating twice with K8o on 567A and then rivering
a 9 has little value in deception, whereas floating twice with
a hand like Qh8h on Jh9s4c2h and then rivering a Td has an
obvious increase in value, which is referred to as implied
odds.
If we know we are playing an observant opponent,
simply having our opponent know that more hands are in
our pre-flop range in some spots will give us more credit for
value hands when we choose to float because we are able to
credibly represent a wider and more believable range of
made hands. If we miss a draw when
calling down in-position, for example, with a small pair and
a flush draw, there is nothing that says betting when
checked to on the river or raising a river bet will be bad if we
think our showdown value is no longer strong enough and
as long as our opponents perceive that we are bluffing in
close proportion to the frequency of us having the hands
which we are representing and our opponents have a river
bluffing range, or more specifically a folding to a river raise
range (see Chapter 6 on Turning Hands into Bluffs). If things
get too out of hand with our bluffing frequencies in these
types of spots, we will be called down too lightly to show a
profit with our bluffs. It's important to note why I said
"having our opponent know" about our pre-flop range,
especially before attempting to represent an unlikely hand.
If he is not aware of our calling range in a particular spot, he
might ascribe a different range to us and therefore give a
bluff or value bet more or less credit than our actual ranges
should dictate, depending on his thought process for the
particular spot. People often assume that their opposition
plays like they play and they interpret bets as their
opponents would
interpret them, especially with no access to other
information to the contrary and this false assumption is the
cause of many mistakes. The idea that our range is different
than what our opponent thinks it is the difference between
an actual range and a perceived range. Getting the two
confused is often costly and false assumptions are often
avoided by avoiding fancier plays that require strong reads
or evidence about an opponent's range to show a profit
when no such information is known. Always keep in mind
the difference between your perceived range and your
actual range in every spot of every hand that you will ever
play and you will be a lot more successful.
Calling Pre-Flop
(Out-of-Position)
If an opponent has an extremely tight raising range
from a certain position or just in general, then calling out of
position with hands like KTo and QTo may not be a part of
a good game plan. The positive externalities of future bets
you induce, or pots you are able to take away by
representing wider ranges for value, may not be enough to
offset the reverse implied odds of the situation. In other
words, the idea of our pre-flop hand selection goes back to
dominating hands. If we are always dominated or even
often dominated in a spot, folding and sometimes
three-betting the hand pre-flop may be the best way to play
the hand against a particular opponent. The best way to
avoid tough spots is to avoid putting yourself into the
situation where they will often occur. However, it's
important to distinguish between a tough spot and a
non-profitable spot. Sometimes, a spot will foster so many
difficult decisions
against a well- playing opponent that the expected value of
the situation will plumet because our opponent will use
position to outplay us, making sure we win the minimum
and lose the maximum at all the right times. Difficult spots
don't always mean money-losing spots; however, the two
often go along with each other because the more mistakes
someone makes in poker, the more money they will lose.
Large and difficult decisions with a semi-face up range on
the river after checking and calling flop and turn is a fairly
common example of the quintessential "tough spot" in
No-Limit Hold'em. Without position, our opposition
controls the frequencies of betting as the board changes and
so it's very difficult to play well versus someone who has a
solid read of your range and who is able to exploit that read
by three-barrelling and over-betting effectively, by which I
mean your opponent will bet in a way that induces you to
make a mistake by either calling or folding too often.
Another consideration when calling with weaker hands out
of position is your opposition's barrelling frequencies. In
other words, if we check and call a flop continuation bet on
a board of Qh9s3c with KcTs, are the chances of the
following scenarios taking place going to make the flop call
profitable: our opponent giving up and we win by bluffing
a river or by showing down the best hand, plus the implied
odds of us turning either a king or a jack, and plus the
chances he barrels us lighter in the future when we have a
made hand, having seen us check-fold the turn in a similar
spot with what should be assumed to be a draw, given the
draw heavy nature of the board and the unlikelihood that
we would hold a made hand of respectable strength, one
that is unlikely to be sucked out on on such a board.
If your opponent is betting every turn or at least with
great frequency, a better plan for the hand could be to
check-raise his flop continuation bet in order to stymie our
opponent and take away the initiative. A flop check-raise
allows us to take down the pot immediately
some of the time, bluff the turn some of the time, and
improve to the best hand if our opponent is not prone to
three-betting the flop. The more likely an opponent is to
three-bet a flop, the less profitable a check-raise bluff or
semi-bluff will be on the flop.
The flop check-raise is a bit different of an approach
than my default strategy to playing poker, but it is also an
effective plan of attack in the right situation. Let your
particular opponent be the determining factor of which
default game-plan is best. By default, I prefer mostly the
check-and-call method in these spots because I find it lower
variance and easier to balance. However, a deceptive mix of
the two is necessary at times to keep adjusting good players
confused. By easier to balance I mean that it may be more
difficult to start check-raising medium strength hands, like
98o in the instance of a Qh9s3c board and expect to be able
to show down as often and as confidently (making less
mistakes) than if you check-called it and avoid turning your
range as faceup on future streets. There may be
times you check-raise 98o, the turn is a king and you decide
to turn your hand into a bluff to fold out Qx and worse
hands, only to run into Kx or a two-pair or better type
hand, whereas, checking and calling the flop avoids
putting in a lot of money out-of-position and without much
confidence in your hand or knowledge about where it is
relative to your opponent's range.
Whichever choice you are making about your strategy
for playing a given hand, make sure that you are also
making other choices to disguise your range in that same
spot. For example, check-calling KJo on Qh9s3c and
check-raising KJo on Kh9s3c might be bad against some
people, mostly good hand-readers because of how weak
future check-calls will seem and will be. Balance in these
spots is extremely important, otherwise, you're running the
risk of being exploited by good players. Choosing the
hands to play pre-flop in order to balance these spots will
strongly affect how your range appears to the competition
when you call out-of-position.
I know that some people have commented on
instructional videos that f vemade about how they
wouldn't call hands like KJo out-of-position. Hopefully,
this section sheds some light on my reasoning and shows
how being able to balance my out-of-position play justifies
the tougher post-flop spots.
Re-Raising Pre-Flop
(In-Position)
Generally, the best choices of hands to use to re-
raise in position are hands with which you would like
more action (premium pairs, AK, etc.) and hands that
are slightly too weak to call (hands you're relying on
getting your opponent to fold). This strategy is more
aptly described as three-betting a polarized range pre-
flop, and it's the best way to play against a lot of
opponents, especially ones from which we do not have
much information.
The strategy behind using hands that are slightly
worse than our calling requirements in order to bluff reraise
pre-flop is that they will be the strongest hands we can use
without "wasting" the value of our calling hands.
Three-betting often with these types of hands will
eventually create an image of re-raising lightly pre-flop to
induce more action when we do happen to have good
enough hands to take more action. The occasional bluff
helps to balance our pre-flop re-raising range because
sometimes we will actually have good hands for which we
want action. If we are not bluffing some of the time, we
become very easy to read and easy to play against, both of
which are detriments to our win rate. Our expectation with
a given hand, say 44, if we call pre-flop in position, may be
higher than it would be three- betting that specific hand.
The idea that other hands may have more value post-flop
than by re-raising pre- flop as a bluff goes for similar
speculative hands like suited connectors or weaker
broadway hands.
Re-Raising Pre-Flop
(Out-of-Position)
We all know the importance of position in poker. If we
do not have position, then our opponents have more
information with which to make their decisions and they
have an easier time deciding what to do with draws,
especially weaker ones. They have the ability to float more
often and to make cheaper raises as bluffs because we will
often be put in situations where we would have to risk a
significant percentage of our stack in comparison to their
risk.
Though not a crucial consideration with 100 big blind
stacks and below, when we three-bet out-of- position, we
will be less able to call a four-bet from our opponent, given
our positional disadvantage. For this
reason, most of the time we should still be using a polarized
range to three-bet. Of course, there are always departures
from the "rule." I say "rule," because without the necessary
information on how to adjust, I believe a polarized
three-betting range to be the most profitable way to
construct a three-betting range. The point of this book is to
show you that, in poker, the rules are not set- in-stone. So
now the question is, how do we go about adapting to
different re-raising tendencies of our opposition? Let us
examine a few case studies to illustrate possible pre-flop
adjustments to different player styles in order to eventually
realize an overall game plan.
First, imagine an opponent who never four-bets
pre-flop. He calls all three-bets in position and has been
seen to call three-bets often over a large sample of hands.
For someone like this, we should depolarize our range of
hands we choose to three-bet for value. We can depolarize
our range because now we are expecting to be called by
more hands that we dominate. For example,
now we can three-bet hands like AJ and KJ because we
believe him to be calling with hands like QJ and JT. The
times that we will both make top pair and the money goes
in are going to favor a depolarized range for us because
those times will occur more often given our opponent's
wider calling range, thus we make more money by
adjusting to our opponent's pre-flop tendencies.
Next, let us examine someone who only four-bets us
or folds to our three-bets pre-flop. If someone chooses to
play all their hands pre-flop this way, unless he's
four-betting and or calling all-ins so often that we would
want to get AJo all-in pre-flop (if he's bluffing about 41 % of
the time with lOObb with a semi-wide range for value,
four-bet calling hands like 99), then there is no reason to
depolarize our three-betting range here as we would be
putting ourselves into situations to get blown off of the best
hand pre-flop where we would make more bets on average
by calling the same hand pre-flop. Having to fold a good
hand pre-flop against
this opponent type also means that we are never going to
have the advantage of dominating his range unless we
adjust by calling those good hands like AJ and KJ pre- flop.
Another consideration when choosing hands with
which to three-bet someone pre-flop is their raise size. The
smaller the raise size your opponent chooses, the deeper the
effective stack-to-pot ratio is, which means the more hands
they should be able to defend, expecting more implied odds
and, therefore, more profit when they make deceptive
hands. The dynamic that a deeper pot-to-stack ratio creates
is often extremely aggressive because of the nature of how
profitable having a lighter calling range in this spot can be
and how much more likely one is to get action by
four-betting a big hand pre- flop. A lighter calling range for
the opposition means that our three-betting range should be
lighter, which means his four-betting range should be
wider. This means that our opponent will be calling with
hands that we'll be dominating more often should we
choose to
depolarize our three-bet range. Because we are
depolarizing our three-betting range, our opponent's
four-bet bluffs will have a greater success due to the
extremely unlikely nature that we are three-betting enough
combinations of value hands strong enough to comfortably
withstand action given our depolarized three-betting
range. There simply aren't enough combinations to balance
our three-betting range in that way in this spot; therefore,
we have to widen our five- betting range, which usually
means an all-in bet with lOObb stacks, or begin calling
four-bets lighter, which can be tricky, especially when we
are out-of-position. Calling four-bets sets us up for a tough
spot because with the sizing of a smaller open, our
three-bet and his four-bet will also be smaller, meaning that
our five-bet shove will be risking a full buy-in while we
expect to win significantly less bets if our opponent folds
his hand. The dynamic that is present with good players
when other good players are raising smaller pre-flop shows
why a smaller pre-flop raise size is such a powerful weapon
and certainly one with which I would recommend
experimenting.
Notes on Small Pairs
Sometimes you won't be able to call profitably with
smaller pairs out-of-position against a good opponent.
Your flop check-raise bluffs and lead bluffs won't work
often enough to show a profit and you'll miss the flop too
often. For these reasons, three-betting with your smaller
pairs instead of folding them may enable you to squeeze a
tad more value from the hand and make the play more
profitable than a fold. If you make a set after your opponent
calls, it will be extremely well disguised, and so you have
great implied odds. If you have a problem barrelling weak
draws too often against an opponent with good calling
frequencies, with smaller pairs you will miss the flop about
88% of the time and avoiding a situation where you may be
forced to barrel off a lot of your stack in order to have a
chance at winning a hand may be the best plan of action. A
positive part about playing weaker pairs out-of-position is
that it's very easy to get away from the hand once you
miss a worrisome flop because there will usually be at least
two over-cards on the board and your equity against your
opponent's range, not to mention the decisions you will be
forced to make on later streets will likely both be poor. In
this pre-flop spot out-of-position against an aggressive and
capable player with a wide and disguised range of hands
where we are considering three-betting smaller pairs, this
subset of hands follow our earlier discussed guideline of
"hands that aren't quite good enough to call with are
therefore the best hands to bluff with pre-flop."
Using the next best hands from the hands with which
we may profitably call ensures that our three- betting range
is as strong as possible. Smaller pairs, depending on our
opponent's four-bet/calling range, can be great hands with
which to five-bet shove as a semi-bluff. A lot of the time we
are called, we'll be up against AQ or AK and will be racing.
Try doing a few expected value equations and adding or
taking away a few pocket pairs from our opponent's calling
range and
notice how relevant it is to know with which pairs he's
capable of calling an all-in bet after he four-bets pre-
flop.
Four-Betting Pre-Flop
If you are noticing that your opponent is
employing a strategy involving three-betting pre-flop
with more than his fair share of hands that would like to
get all-in before the flop, there are many adjustments
you will need to make in order to avoid being run over
by him. As often as you want to steal the blinds to
bolster your win rate, good players aren't going to lay
down their hand every time for you and give you what
could be their pots.
We already discussed calling more hands in
position in order to play post-flop in such a way that
negates as much of your opponent's re-steal equity as
possible. Another way that one is able to negate this
edge is by having a balanced four-bet range, both with
value hands and with bluffs.
Choosing a four-betting frequency is going to be
dependent on the three-bettor's three-betting range at the
time of the hand in question and his five-betting range
given the game flow and the player's tenancies. Many
dynamics can come into play that will affect your
opponent's decision to three-bet, all of which were
explained earlier in the 'Re-Raising Pre-Flop' section, and
most of which will be more important than looking at his
statistics in order to solve for a 'perfect' four- betting range.
Again, the meta-game considerations, especially in any
spot where your data-mined statistics are often over too
small of a sample size to be significant, are going to
out-weigh the information given by hands played in
previous sessions.
Another, and somewhat odd, type of four-bet to work
into your game is a four-bet shove. The only time I think
using this play has merit is when you have called
an opponent's opening raise, either with a weaker hand or
with a slow-played hand, and another opponent after you
squeezes the two, or more, of you with around 100 big blind
effective stack sizes. If the first opponent, the original
pre-flop-raiser, folds, then deciding whether or not to shove
a hand like pocket 3 s is as simple as solving an easy
expected value problem based on how often the squeezer is
bluffing and with what hands he has in his value range. For
example, take the following case at 5/10 no-limit with $1,000
effective stack sizes: the cutoffraises to $30, we decide to call
with TdTh on the button, the small blind folds, the big blind
squeezes to $120, and the cutoff folds. We are now
presented with three main choices, assuming we've ruled
out folding: call the squeeze, make a small re-raise, or go
all-in. If we call the big blind's squeeze then we turn our
range somewhat face-up due to the fact that we'll have
speculative hands in this spot more often than slow- played
hands simply because of the more combinations of
speculative hands compared to premium hands. Our range
also appears weak if we choose to call the big blind's
squeeze in light of the the fact that we'd usually
re-raise our premium hands in order to balance with the
times we'd re-raise as a bluff pre-flop. Re-raising small
pre-flop also causes problems by failing to cause our
opponent to make some mistakes because a smaller four-bet
allows our opponent to play better against our range. For
example, our opponent might five-bet shove something like
AJ with which he expects to have some folding equity that
he might also fold to our shove because with hands such as
AJ he expects to be dominated or racing against our shoving
range. Given the flaws in the other two choices with which
we are presented in this spot with around 100 big blind
stacks. I'm of the opinion that making an all-in bet is the
easiest way to balance the range of hands with which you
choose to continue as well as the best way to force your
opponent to make mistakes against your range. Here's how
the math works out in this particular spot with TdTh,
assuming this player squeezes 12% of the time in this spot
on average and that he's planning on calling a shove with
99+, AQ+, which is 5.2% of hands.
Our read of his range in this spot means that he's calling
(5.2/12)* 100% = 43.33% of the time and folding 56.67%
of the time.
TdTh is 44.2% vs a range of 99+,AQ+.
EV(shove) = (percentage of times we take down the pot) (the pot if villain folds) + (percentage of times our opponent calls) (total pot when villain calls * (our equity when called - the amount we risk to shove)
EV(shove) = 0.567 (185) + 0.433 (2035 * 0.442 - 970) EV(shove) = 104.83 + (-30.56) EV(shove) = $74.27
As with all the expected value calculations and
scenarios we examine, I recommend running them
many times with different numbers that represent
different assumptions about our opponents' play in
order to familiarize yourself with different possible
situations that may occur while you're playing poker.
Five-Betting Pre-Flop
Let's first examine the simplest scenario in which we
might find ourselves five-bet shoving, a heads-up five-bet
all-in. Assume we're against a reasonably aggressive and
balanced player who will be four-betting us as a bluff 60%
of the time as we are considering five- bet shoving with
pocket 3s. The other 40% of the time, he has his value
range, which consists of 99+, AQs+, and AK. PokerStove
shows us that pocket 3s is 30.594% to win against this
particular balanced heads-up opponent's value range.
Assuming that our opponent will four-bet us to 240 over
our 100 three-bet, our expected value equation looks like
this in our fictitious heads-up match:
EV(100bb) - (percentage opponent folds) (pot we win when opponent folds) + (percentage opponent calls) (total pot * our equity when called - what we risk) EV(100bb) - 0.60 (340) + 0.40 (2000*0.30594 - 900) EV(100bb) - 88.752
Our expected value equation shows that we should
make just over $88.75 on average with our five-bet shove
against this opponent at this time in a heads-up match.
Let's change the stack sizes and the pre-flop sizing a
bit and see what happens as stacks get a bit deeper, at
150bb effective stacks. We'll keep the same hand and
assume that he has the same range for calling a shove. We
are also changing our three-bet size to 110 and our
opponent's four-bet size to 250.
EV(150bb) = 0.6 (360) + 0.40 (3000*0.30594 - 1390) EV(150bb) = 27.128
150bb effective, we would win just under $27.13 by
five-bet shoving pocket threes. The reason our expected
value changes so much is because we are risking more to
win very close to the same amount that is in the pot
pre-flop. What this means is that our opponents should
realize this situation and be four-betting as a bluff more
often and thereby making more money, expecting us to
tighten our five-betting range significantly. If that is the
case, well have to change our expected value equation a bit.
Obviously, filling the pages of this book with expected value
calculations would show how to adapt and adjust in all the
different spots, but doing the calculations is something
relatively simple that you should be able to do and to get
used to doing. Experimenting with different calculations
will make you remember the numbers you calculate and
teach you how to work with expected value calculations if
you're unfamiliar with them.
Due to the aggressive nature of today's games and the
fact that there is so much dead money in the pot, you'll find
that the option to five-bet the pre-flop four- bettor presents
itself regularly and from many different positions. First of
all, let's see how often our opponents have to fold here to
make a bluff profitable.
Full Tilt Poker Table (6 max) - $5/$10 - NL HE
Seat 1: HERO ($1,053) Seat 2: VILLAIN 1 ($1,067) Seat 4: VILLAIN 2 ($863.10) Seat 5: VILLAIN 3 ($1,057) Seat 6: VILLAIN 4 ($1311), is sitting out VILLAIN 2 posts the small blind of $5 VILLAIN 3 posts the big blind of $10 The button is in seat #2
*** HOLE CARDS *** Dealt to HERO [Ac,3c] HERO raises to $30 VILLAIN 1 has 15 seconds left to act VILLAIN 1 raises to $105 VILLAIN 2 folds VILLAIN 3 has 15 seconds left to act VILLAIN 3 raises to $250 HERO?
I have played with both VILLAIN 1 and VILLAIN
3 for many hands and both view me as mostly
straightforward, but aggressive and capable of making
crazy plays at good times; although, bluffing here might
be a bit optimistic!
I know that VILLAIN 1 three-bets about 8% of his
hands on the button and that he's probably calling with JJ+,
AK if I shove, which accounts for 3% of hands. That means
he'll be folding [l-(3/8)]* 100 percent of the time, or 62.5%.
We also know that VILLAIN 3 is a very aggressive regular
capable of recognizing that VILLAIN 1 and HERO will both
be folding enough of the time to bluff some percentage of
the time, let's say pessimistically 60%, since it's likely more
often than 60% of the time since it's such a good bluff spot
and there are few combinations of value hands relative to
how often VILLAIN 3 is likely bluffing. For value, let's
assume that he's raising 99+, AQs+, AKo and that he will
fold 99 and half his TT combos to HERO's shove, because it
looks so strong. So we'll give VILLAIN 3 a total range 40%
comprised of half the combos of TT, JJ+, and AK and 60% of
his range comprised of bluffs. Simply put, we believe he will
fold to our raise 60% of the time and call with the top 3.2% of
total hands the other 40% of the time.
In order to calculate the expected value for this situation
we have to break down the calculation into a number of
smaller equations and add them. The formula for this
expected value calculation is:
[ calculation missing from the book ]
This expected value equation shows that the
expected value is the sum of a number of situations, i
situations, multiplied by the probability of that situation
occurring. All the probabilities summed should be equal
to 100% because we're calculating the expected value of
a particular situation in full.
First, let's outline the four situations that are taking
place.
1. The button folds and the big blind calls.
2. The button calls and the big blind folds.
3. Both the button and the big blind call.
4. Both the button and the big blind fold.
Now that we've defined the four values that we'll be
adding, let's calculate the probability that each occurs and
then the value of each of the four possible outcomes.
1. BTN folds and BB calls. The button's folding
percentage facing a five-bet shove, given all the hands he is
three-betting, is 62.5%. The big blind's calling percentage is
40%, the amount of the time we estimate him to be bluffing.
In order to get the likelihood of both events occurring we
have to multiply the two and by doing this, we get 25%.
We'll use the same methods for the rest of the calculations.
2. BTN calls and BB folds. Because the big blind's calling
range is now affected after the button calls, we must
recalculate his new folding range in order to get
the proper probability. The probability of the button calling
is still 37.5%. Given a button call, a showing of extreme
strength, we're narrowing the big blind's calling range to
half the combinations of QQ, KK, and AA. So if at first the
big blind is calling with the top 3.2% of hands, half of the TT
combinations and JJ+,AK, and his new calling range is 1.1%
of hands, that means he'll be folding (2.1/3.2)* 100% =
65.63% of the 40% of the time he was going to call, calling
34.38% of the time of that 40%. So again, we multiply the
probabilities and to get the likelihood of the big blind
calling, 0.34375*0.40 *100% = 13.75%. So he folds 100%
-13.75% of the time, or 86.25%. The probability of the button
calling and the big blind folding is therefore:
0.375*0.8625*100% = 32.34%.
3. BTN calls and BB calls. We have already determined the
big blind's new and tighter calling range given a button call
and the probability that he calls after the button has called
to be 13.75% of the time. So the
probability of the button and big blind calling is
0.375*0.1375* 100% = 5.12%
4. BTN folds and BB folds. The probability that both
villains fold is simply the respective likelihoods of them
folding multiplied together. 0.625*0.60*100% = 37.5%.
Just to check if we have all the events' likelihoods
correctly calculated, we'll add up all the probabilities.
5.12% + 32.34% + 37.5% + 25% = 99.96%, which is an
acceptable error given rounding throughout our
numerous calculations.
Next, we should calculate the probability that Ac3c
wins versus each of the calling ranges that we have
constructed in scenarios 1-4.
1. Ac3c vs 1/2(TT), JJ+, AK
30.2% vs 69.8%
2. AC3c vs JJ+, AK
29.9% vs 70.1%
3. Ac3c vs JJ+, AK vs 1/2(QQ), KK+
19.8% vs 27.5% vs 52.7%
4. We win the pot 100% of the time.
As shown before in our expected value calculation,
we need to multiply the probabilities of each event
happening by the expected value of each event.
EV(1) = 0.25 (2244 * 0.302) - 1037 = -89.83 EV(2) - 0.3234 (2389 * 0.299) - 1037 = -104.36 EV(3) = 0.0512 (3206 * 0.198) - 1037 = -20.59 EV(4) - 0.375 (105 + 250 + 5) = 135
EVtotai = EV(1) + EV(2) + EV(3) + EV(4)
EVtotai = "$79.78
So we have shown this particular five-bet shove to be
slightly negative expectation, but with slightly different
circumstances, with more aggressive players
involved or a different hand that does better against our
opponents' calling ranges, this play, although high
variance, could certainly have positive expectation. The
perception of your ranges after you are called making this
play will get you much more action on your stronger
hands. While it's difficult to factor a specific value for this
perception into an expected value formula, it should
certainly be mentioned and a consideration if the
parameters for this play end in a neutral or even slightly
losing expected outcome.
Slow-Playing
There are times when slow-playing a hand pre-flop
may be more advantageous than re-raising it for value.
Simply put, when you think your opponent or players yet
to act will make a bigger mistake against your specific
holding than if you re-raise with it, then it could be better to
slow-play.
Other advantages to slow-playing pre-flop include the
fact that it makes you less predictable not only pre- flop, but
also post-flop. Firstly, if you call with large pairs some of
the time pre-flop, especially in late position, you will be less
susceptible to light re-raises, squeeze plays, because your
opponents will have to be wary of your slightly stronger
range. If your opponents are not wary, then they are
making more of a mistake against your range by re-raising
with the same frequency pre-flop, which means you will
win more money from them. Additionally, you will be
given a bit more credit if you choose to bluff-raise a
continuation bet on a board like 2d3d8h because your
opponent will have to include some slow-played large
hands in your range.
Obviously, the benefits to slow-playing pre-flop are
many, but when should we slow-play and how often? The
'when' is a bit more complex than the 'how often,' as it is
essentially a function of the 'how often.' So let us first
examine the 'when.' An example of a likely
profitable time to slow-play pre-flop is when you have been
three-betting so often that you can tell somebody is about to
do something about it by four-betting you as a bluff or with
a wider value range with the intention of calling an all-in
bet with something like AQo. Because people are expecting
you to three-bet all of your good hands due to your
aggressive pre-flop image, when you call with a strong
hand pre-flop you will appear extremely weak to observant
players. If your range appears weak, good, aggressive
players will attack with a wider range of air and believe
you less often when you do end up playing back at them.
Before you choose to slow-play a big hand pre-flop, you
should weigh the value of a slow-play against the
possibility of somebody four-betting your three-bet and
going with their hand if you move all-in. Even if someone is
folding pre-flop, a four-bet is usually around twenty-two
through twenty-seven big blinds, which is a lot to win
without a showdown. You should compare those numbers
and the chances of an opponent four-
betting and folding to an all-in to how often someone is
squeezing and calling a back-raise all-in. Alternatively, if
you choose to call, you should use how often your
opponent continuation bets after squeezing and how often
they follow through on the turn when called on the flop as
a basis for your comparison. When considering the two
pre-flop options, its interesting to see how squeezing
combined with continuation betting, when sized by a good
player, is going to be about the same amount of big blinds
as a pre-flop four-bet. The similarity in sizing makes it
fairly simple to compare the two scenarios with certain
opponents.
Another good time to slow-play pre-flop is if you
are against an opponent who folds too many pre-flop
re-raises. If you are not getting action on your good
hands versus this particular opponent, then you may
want to start calling with your strongest hands in
attempts to induce more action post-flop and re-raise
more often with bluffing hands. We have already
touched on this topic when examining re-raising pre-
flop. We can summarize the above by saying that if it is
unlikely that our opponent will call our re-raise with a
worse hand when we have a premium holding, then it is
usually a better play to call pre-flop with that hand and
to slow-play in order to maximize the hand's value.
The same strategy of how to determine if this reason to
slow-play is more profitable than re-raising pre-flop applies
as in our first comparison about our two different choices of
whether or not to slow-play. We should compare the
likelihood of someone stacking off lightly post-flop
compared to how often they are giving us action on our
re-raises with their worse hands pre-flop. For most people,
this comparison will become a function of how often you
have been seen re-raising pre-flop by the player(s) in
question, but you will find that some players will not adjust
and they will simply wait for JJ+ or AK before continuing
pre-flop. It's also important to realize that our two examples
are not mutually exclusive, meaning that both can possibly
happen at the same time.
You should be careful not to slow-play too often,
especially if you are liberal with your re-raising pre-flop.
The more often you slow-play pre-flop, the weaker your
re-raising range will be perceived as a direct function of the
amount of slow-playing that is taking place and shown
down. In other words, if your opponents know that you
never re-raise with A A, then they do not have to put AA in
your re-raising range, and it becomes a bit weaker and you
become a bit easier to read.
It would be somewhat difficult to notice that you were
completely without a particular hand in your pre- flop
re-raising range, only a near unrecognizable drop in your
pre-flop all-in percentage that could be attributed to any
number of other dynamics. The sample size of this event
taking place with showdown would be extremely small,
even over a large amount of hands. Also, any competent
opponent would assume that slow-playing such a strong
hand pre-flop isn't your standard way to play that
particular premium hand.
However, assessing a single hand is not the point of
considering this example. We are talking about a game of
ranges, not one of hands, and if your opponent sees a single
hand slow-played pre-flop, he will likely, and probably
should, extrapolate this slow-play sighting to the fact that
your re-raising range is a bit weaker than he would have
thought had he not previously considered you to be
slow-playing hands pre-flop.
The dynamic created by slow-playing pre-flop is a
good example of how everything in poker balances and
how dynamics always play off of one another. If you
choose to play a hand a certain way, then it should
probably be less likely you're playing it the same way in a
similar situation later against observant and capable. Each
time you show down a hand your ranges become more
divulged to your opponents and your knowledge of their
views of your ranges become more divulged. Almost
every time you choose to do something in poker, your
choice is going to affect your later actions and your
opponents' perceptions of those actions. So
the better you learn to adjust and to play according to your
opponent's adjustments, the better your ranges will do
against your opposition's ranges.
CHAPTER 3:
FLOP PLAY
Many of the ideas written in this section will also
apply when the same concepts are considered for play on
the turn. For example both floating and raising as a bluff
will be touched on in the chapter on turn play, but the
majority of the theory herein discussed for those types of
plays will hold true for play on later streets.
The Anatomy of a
Continuation-Bet: Betting
the Flop as the Pre-Flop-
Raiser
For those of you who are newer to poker and are
unfamiliar with the definition of a continuation bet, a
continuation bet is a bet that follows a pre-flop
aggression in order to represent a strong range of
holdings post-flop.
There are many questions that surround the
anatomy of a flop continuation-bet in a single-raised
pot (ex. we raise pre-flop UTG and the button calls).
Here are the questions that we plan to examine every
single time we ever consider a continuation bet along
with their respective explanations:
1. How does my range rate against my opponent's range?
In general, and depending on many factors, the
pre-flop-raiser will be able to represent a stronger range
before the flop than a caller. There are several reasons for
this perception of strength compared to a caller's range
including our opponent's pre-flop ranges and tendencies.
A simple example is that if our opponent always re-raises
with hands QQ+, then we can take those out of his range
when he is unable to do so with our range. Our opponent
also has to worry about being in a dominating situation
with reverse implied odds. Basically this means that our
opponent will sometimes fold hands like K9o pre-flop
when we're raising with hands like JTs that he actually
beats at the time because he's playing against our range,
not our specific hand,
and the same worry will occur post-flop if he re-raises
hands like AQ and AK most of the time in a certain
position. For example, this fear of pre-flop domination will
give us more folding equity on king-high boards and allow
us to win the pot with a simple continuation bet versus
many of our opponent's holdings, as his range will be less
rich with Kx hands.
2. What are the effective stack sizes and how will this affect
action on future streets considering our flop continuation bet
sizing?
Often in a hand, our goal will be to set up an all-in bet
by the river or a least the threat of an all-in bet if we are
bluffing. The first step is choosing a flop bet size that works
for this purpose if stack sizes are such that your flop bet size
will be a determining factor. 300 big blinds deep, we aren't
going to start by betting four times the pot as a continuation
bet. It's important to note that if you and your opponent are
deep-stacked that continuation betting a large amount,
something like
three times the pot. is a terrible idea for a myriad of reasons.
In fact, we'll want to choose a standardized flop
continuation bet in most spots against most opponents. One
important departure from this norm is if we are called by
someone playing a stack significantly shorter than the
somewhat normal lOObb buy-in. If we can threaten their
stacks at a lower cost, why not do it? Our bluffs are cheaper
and our ability to threaten our opponent's stack by the river
remains while we risk less money. A word of warning is that
any change in bet-size may have an unpredicted effect
against a certain opponent, so be sure of whom you're
dealing with first and their possible interpretations of your
changing bet size.
3. How often will my flop bet force me to continue on the turn?
See Chapter 5 on turn play and barreling
4. How does the recent history of our match effect the
credibility or lack of credibility, of my continuation bet?
If your opponent perceives you to be continuation
betting a large percentage of hands, he or she will be more
likely to widen his or her calling and/or raising ranges. The
proper readjustment to the type of opponent who calls more
often is to value bet thinner and to bluff less often. You may
also be bluff-raised more often, which means that you may
want to pot control your medium strength hands to avoid a
tough decision later in the hand, especially if you're out-of-
position against your opponent(s) and he/they are capable
of raising flops with a well-balanced range, making it tough
to make a good decision against their flop-raise. By
polarizing your flop continuation bet range against this type
of opponent, you avoid the tough decisions that come with
playing marginal hands in large pots against a
well-balanced range.
5. What types of boards are better to induce more or less
folds?
The percentage of times that your opponent folds is
largely dependent on the board texture and his pre-flop
position. Generally, the drier the board, the more often
most of your opponents will fold. The quintessential
example of a dry board is Ad9s3h. There is no connectivity
and so it is unlikely that you will be called by a draw, in the
conventional sense of the word, as 5d4d or JsTs are
basically the only reasonable "draws" to be had on that
board. Compare this board to something like Qs8h4s where
there are tons of straight draws and a flush draw your
opponent may hit. It's also a bit more likely that your
opponent would just call you pre-flop than re-raise you
with a hand containing a queen. This makes his range
slightly richer in Qx hands than it may be in Ax hands.
Obviously, these examples are speaking in generalities and
each player's ranges will be different, the idea is that there
are few or no examples or cases to examine that will hold
for every single player. I'm
simply teaching you what to think about as you consider a
continuation bet and you're the one meant to apply these
many considerations to a particular player on a particular
board texture at a particular time in- game.
Your opponent's position pre-flop is also going to be a
major factor in how often a continuation bet will take down
the pot and how well his pre-flop range will connect with
certain board types. If your opponent is in position and
you're opening in late position, his calling range should be
fairly wide given the position from which you have opened
and the position from which he has called. The earlier the
position you open from, the less likely you will be to win
the blinds outright and this means that your opponent's
calling range should adjust to your stronger pre-flop range
from early position. Your opponent should be calling less
often for fear of being dominated and having poor reverse
implied odds post-flop. The later the position of your
opponent, the less people he has to worry about re-raising
pre-flop and so there should be more speculative hands his
range that expect to see a flop fairly regularly with less of a
compounded worry of each individual behind him re-
raising. In short, we have determined that you will see
more folds to your continuation bet the less connected the
board
6. How should I react against a flop raise of my
continuation bet?
Generally, if you have to ask yourself this question and are
legitimately confused about the answer after having
continuation bet a given hand, you have made a mistake by
continuation betting in the first place. Ideally, we want to be
able to predict our opposition's raising frequencies well
enough, bet hands with which we know how to react, and
check hands with which we know how to react to a bet in
order to check-raise, to check-call, or to check-fold. Against
a very good player who balances his flop calling and raising
ranges well for bluffs and for value, there are inherently
going to be tough decisions for his opponents after they
continuation bet. You're just going to have to outwit people
here, or "soul read,"
as we like to say, usually based on some combination of the
opponent's tendencies, meta-game considerations, and
stack sizes.
For other considerations on raising flops and what to
do when raised, such as how your opponent, history, flop
texture, certain hands, and position should affect your
decisions, see the below section on bluff-raising and how to
react to frequent flop raises.
7. When should I not continuation bet? What should I do with
my hand if I check the flop as the pre-flop- raiser?
This is a question for which the answer will be
dependent on your history with your opponents and your
reads on their tendencies when the pre-flop-raiser checks to
them. Your decision here is somewhat based on what your
actual hand is and has a lot to do with how you think your
opponent will view you at this
point in the game. On very connected boards on which
you may often give up, it may be a good time to check-
call as a trap, and likely continue to do so on future
streets depending on the board if the following criteria
are met:
• Your opponent bets when checked to very often
• Your opponent is capable of betting all three streets
for thin value, thinner perhaps than he might call
you down with
An example of a questionable continuation bet could be
if you raise As2s and the flop comes AdTs8d and you
feel you'll be confused if your continuation bet is raised.
This board on which your opponent's range may play
aggressively and trickily may be a good time to check
and represent a slightly weaker hand like JTo. You'll
also get more value if someone is trying to bluff you off
of a Tx hand and believes that they need to bet the flop,
turn, and river with a bluffing hand to fold out the
weak-made-hand you're representing with a flop-check.
If the board turns out to be unfavourable by the river, then
check-calling again may become more of a read- based play
than a trap. As more and more of your opponent's perceived
range connects with the board, you should usually be more
likely to fold a marginal hand, especially in the cases when
playing an opponent you believe to be randomizing bluffs
by equity. If our opponent randomizes his bluffs with how
well his hand connects with the board, then the more draws
that hit the board, the stronger his range will be. However, if
our opponent simply bets when checked to every time, the
scarier the board gets, the more likely he is to keep betting
his pure air range and therefore over- compensate for how
often he is actually value-betting. When done properly this
play should induce an overaggressive opponent to have too
much air in their range by the river, making call downs
extremely profitable, especially as the board gets scarier,
which will induce your opponent's air combinations to bet
with extremely high frequency.
If your hand is as strong as JsJc on a Jh8d2d flop and
your opponent bets into you after you've checked the flop,
realize how likely it is that your opponent has either a bluff
or a draw because he likely would have reraised QQ+
pre-flop and you block most of the Jx combinations with
your specific hand. In this case, you should adjust your play
based on his likelihood to continue (semi)bluffs. If he'll call a
check-raise and bluff shove over a turn bet with all of his
draws, maybe check-raising the flop and belting the turn to
induce a raise is the best line. There are definitely many
different lines that could prove the most profitable against a
particular opponent at a particular time.
Some of you may realize that check-raising the turn
will likely fold out his weaker draws and pure air that
would continue to bluff if the board gets scarier. The reason
we raise here is that we may also choose to take this line
with a draw of our own. Hoping to fold out better high card
hands that are also drawing or even pure bluffs that our
opponent could have on the flop,
given our show of extreme weakness by checking such a
coordinated board. Raising also might induce lots of action
from a hand like a flush draw on the flop that may choose to
take a free card later on in the hand instead of continuing to
bluff on blank turns and-or rivers
If we are check-raising or check-calling in this spot
with only strong hands, an observant opponent will notice
and adjust his game plan. Think about how profitable a
play that check-raising as a bluff can be here if your
opponent is bluffing nearly 100% of the time when you
check, betting only his best hands for value for worry of not
knowing what to do if raised, and checking back everything
else. You win extra money from a lot of his range that
would have probably otherwise folded the flop. Even if
your opponent is only betting all his gut shots and flush
draws when you're checking, realize how much of his range
only those few hands make up compared to the value
portion of his range. Against other and more aggressive
types of
opponents, their range will be extremely wide in this
instance and will be comprised of mostly hands that will
fold to a check-raise.
To practice the effects of a check-raise versus different
opponent types, try the following:
1. Write out villain's flop range from the JJ example on a
piece of paper and list all possible outcomes for when we
check to him (note the fewer combinations of Jx hands,
which may influence our decision to bet or to check on the
flop).
2. Now write out his range of hands for when we
continuation bet below the first range you've written.
3. Compare the ranges and the combinations of hands
you've written to see the likelihood of a bet in each case.
Which is more profitable? How situational is your
comparison? How often will your opponent continue in
each case? Give yourself different "reads" on your pretend
opponents and manipulate his ranges accordingly. This
exercise will mimic how you should be thinking while
playing poker.
In position, especially when our opponent assumes that
we are going to continuation bet, we might want to balance
a checking back range in order to avoid the tough spots he'll
create by check-raising if he is assuming that the majority of
our air range will be betting a certain flop texture and not
continue after being raised. This worry can be compounded
on draw heavy boards on which many turns would be scare
cards for our specific hand. If our opponent has more
information about our frequencies than we have on him in a
certain spot, then we need to change something in order to
avoid him taking advantage of our tendencies. In this case,
continuation betting some boards textures too often may be
easily exploited by smart and aggressive opponents.
It's important to include some hands that would
almost welcome two streets of action in a check back range
in order to bluff catch confidently on the turn and on most
rivers and to have our opponent realize that simply because
we have checked back a flop that betting the turn and river
with his entire range isn't necessarily going to be profitable.
Because checking back stronger hands will make your
opponent more hesitant about bluffing you on the turn and
river, you should realize that your flop continuation bet
range will be perceived as more polarized, and probably
weaker on the boards on which you choose to check back
given that your best chance to win the pot may be by
continuation betting your air on the flop when it's very
likely you'll be bet into on the turn. If your opponent can
assume that you are continuation betting the majority of
your air and you are checking back most of your medium
strength hands, then it's not a far leap of logic to assume
that you will have air very often when you are continuation
betting certain board textures as it's extremely likely that
the air portion of your range will far outweigh the strongest
portion of your range in terms of which you
are combinatorially more likely to possess on the flop. For
this reason, it's important to mix in some delayed-
continuation bets, or checking back air that we plan to
bluff with if checked to again on the turn.
Checking back the flop as the pre-flop-raiser is a
useful play to utilize if you feel exploited on the flop or like
you're getting the worst of a continuation bet dynamic on a
certain board texture with a marginal subset of your
pre-flop raising range. Because you have the need to check
back marginal hands in your range, you should also have
stronger hands to balance with these marginal hands and
total air hands to strengthen your delayed continuation bet
range. If you don't know how to react to flop check-raises,
but feel comfortable against a turn and river leading range
on most turns and rivers, then checking back the flop is
almost always the obviously correct choice for the
situation. If you're mixing up your play with good and bad
hands, you'll have to be wary of how to navigate your
opponent's adjustments. His main weapons to combat
frequent
flop-checks instead of continuation bets would be leading
and check-raising later streets, both of which he should be
doing with a range of bluffs and a range for value. How
often and with what types of hands you should be checking
back the flop is dependent on how often you expect to be
check-raised on a given flop, your ability to withstand that
potential check-raise with your specific holding, and how
often you expect to be lead into on certain turns and rivers.
You will also have occasion to bluff-raise some turns and
rivers that hit your checking back range hard and that are
unlikely to hit your opponent's calling range. A common
example of this scenario is when we raise on the button and
we are called by one of the blinds. If we are lead into on a
draw heavy board on the turn, after the flop goes check-
check, on lower board pairing turn cards, say cards 2
through 9, those cards are still well within our range given
our well-balanced flop checking back range given how
smaller flop pairs are frequently vulnerable to heavy action;
whereas, our opponent will have a range mostly comprised
of stronger made hands, semi-bluffs, and pure air, all of
which become bluff-catchers to our
turn raise. Almost all of these hand types will also be put
into very difficult river spots, especially because we, as the
pre-flop-raiser, control the betting size and frequency on
certain river cards.
8. How does my position influence my continuation bet
frequency?
We touched on this question while explaining what to
consider after question 5. To elaborate, if you have position
on your opponent you will have more information to use
when making your strategic decisions post-flop. For
example, if your opponent has a strong leading range, then
you can discount his future value range that checks to you
because some of it should be leading into you to balance his
blurt leads. If your opponent rarely check-raises, you're able
to bet your weaker made hands and weaker draws on the
flop without fear of being put into a tough decision against
a well-balanced range of hands. These two examples
illustrate scenarios in which a continuation bet will
generally be met with less resistance by your opponents.
Also, realize that you're opening wider ranges from
later positions as there are fewer people who have yet to act
and there is a higher likelihood that you will steal the blinds
and antes uncontested. This means when you're called and
see a flop, your opponent may be smart enough to realize
that he may be able to get away with some bluffs if you're
opening very a wide range and continuation betting too
often for how much air is in your range. It's difficult to come
up with an exact number for the percentage of times you
should check back, either with made hands or to give up. In
order to balance your play due to the many dynamics one
should consider when you are thinking about checking
back.
9. Which of these considerations matter for this/these
specific opponent(s)?
The answer to this question is a concept that took me
quite a while to understand. Sometimes, your opponent will
allow you to do whatever is best for the situation you're
facing. In other words, due to lack of perception, monetary
attachment, or ability to make adjustments, your
opposition's tendencies will make it so that your flop
decisions as to whether or not to continuation bet will be
drastically skewed to one end of the betting or checking
frequency spectrum and you will have an easy flop decision
about whether or not you should continuation bet. There are
times when you can routinely bluff and your opponent will
fold everything but top pair or better. Other times, your
opponent will never fold, so you just have to wait until you
make a hand to value bet and maximize value when called.
Better opponents are going to use a hybrid of these two
cases to make it difficult for people to play well against
them. However, if you spot a person who plays closer to one
of these ways, adjust accordingly and you will be doing
much better than using some default well- balanced range.
It's tempting to romanticize the idea of balance and being
more balanced than your opponent
means that you will win more money than they will.
Balance is an extremely important idea, but against
someone who isn't paying attention to how you play
certain hands, it's nearly or completely irrelevant to
balance, assuming playing an exploitative style will net
the most profit. Remember, poker is not a game based on
systems and set ranges in certain spots. Almost
everything in the game should be adjusted at some point
or another based on the information at your disposal.
Flop Texture
During the section on continuation betting I briefly
mentioned flop texture as a determining factor of how to
react on certain boards. It is an important factor because
some boards play differently than other boards and you
need to know why they are different. The most important
takeaway from a discussion of flop texture is the fact that
different boards foster action with different combinations of
hands. Some boards give many combinations of hands
enough equity to call or semi- bluff raise, to continue in
some way, while other boards that are more disconnected,
are likely to foster straight forward play for a few reasons:
1. Disconnected boards do not present many possible value
combinations and therefore, are generally bad boards on
which to bluff (or at least with the same frequency with
which you'd bluff a more connected board).
2. Your bluffing frequency should be a function of how often
your opponent will fold to your bluff. How often a good
player will fold is based on how often both of your
perceived range hits a given board, along with meta-game
considerations and several other factors.
All other things being equal, flop texture is going to have a
lot to do with how often someone will give you credit for a
hand and so very connected boards require a different kind
of balance than less connected boards. Your opponent
should be checking the more connected boards, anticipating
being played at if he elects to continuation bet. Because he's
checking to give up some of the time, he should also be
checking some good hands and the adjustments continue.
Floating
Floating is a call on one street typically, not
necessarily, with decent equity against an opponent's range
in order to take the pot away on a later street by bluffing.
Floating is a more specific type of call because the play will
only be profitable in terms of future expected value and in
terms of how often you'll be able to take the pot away from
your opponent if he makes some display of weakness and
you are better able to bluff on a later street. Let's clarify our
definition a bit more and examine how to employ floats in
our game plan in order to win more and to make our
strategy difficult to combat. The idea of a float is that it is a
multi-street play, so it cannot be discussed in full in one
chapter of this book the way I have chosen to order the
chapters. So for the reader's ease of comprehension, I will
herein discuss floating in full detail of its implications for
multiple streets of play and for future hands.
Future Expected Value of a
Float
Obviously, we might hit our weak draw and stand to
win a large pot because of both the deceptive nature of the
draw and the likelihood of its connectedness with our
opponent's range of hands if he continues to bet into our
newly strengthened hand and range. Something that may
be less evident about the theory and reasoning of floating is
how the image of these floats will garner us more action in
the future.
Consider the following scenario:
• The cutoff opens and we elect to call with Qcjd on
the button
• Flop is Kd9c4s
• We call a flop continuation bet
• We decide to fold to a turn bet on the 2d
Next time we're in a similar turn situation, realize
how much more likely it is that we will be further ahead
of our opponent's range with a hand with vulnerable
showdown value. If we call on the turn with a hand like
8s9s, especially against the right type of opponent who
is adjusting to what happened in the Qcjd hand, then
our equity versus his range should be significantly
higher. If our opponent perceives our range to be
comprised of a lot of floats and not many kings, given
our passive pre-flop play, he should adjust his turn
barrelling range to one that is extremely wide in order
to fold out our queen high and jack high floats. If we
know that our opponent is making this adjustment and we
may assume he's a thinking player, then we should widen
our calling range, expecting to be bluffed on the turn and
possibly the river more often given our recent history of
our earlier "failed" float.
The above example shows that the results of floating
are much more than a hand-by-hand expected value
calculation. We'll be making money from folding turns we
miss with our floats, even though we lose that specific
hand, because we'll be fostering action against observant
opponents on boards on which we have hit against their
increasingly wide turn and possibly river barrelling
ranges.
Displays of Weakness
If our opponent checks on a turn which misses our float, it
often brings up a question of whether or not it's best to:
A. bet as a bluff with our floats to balance with the
times we're value betting
or
B. take a free card to realize the equity of our draw
with 100% certainty and make a decision about bluffing
the river if we are checked to again.
The answer to the question of "should we bet?" is the
combination of many smaller questions that will often
corroborate one another to yield us a clear turn
decision.
Question #1: How often is your opponent check- raising
the turn or check-calling to induce you to betting from
your hands that floated the flop?
If the answer is "never," especially in regards to the
check-raise part of the question, then the decision to bluff
becomes a much easier one. A turn check from an opponent
likely to take this line with his entire range is the perfect
opportunity to make a very profitable turn bet because we
will always realize the equity of our draw since we'll never
be raised off of it, and we'll gain folding equity by betting
into our opponent the times he has chosen to give up on the
hand. However, most opponents who realize what's
happening when your bet frequency is high in spots after
you might float and bluff when checked to will incorporate
some type of balance in these turn spots, either by
check-calling or check- raising more often, in order to thwart
your attempts to exploit his turn tendencies.
The better and more balanced opponents you will
likely face will incorporate check-calling and check- raising
on turns following flops which have a large potential to be
floated because they realize the board texture and how it
will affect your turn betting frequency. In general, the
drawier the flop, the more often you should expect an
opponent capable of floating to bluff at some point later on
in the hand, assuming most people use hands that hit the
board to randomize their floats. The idea of a wider bluffing
range on draw heavy boards also means that this type of
player should be value betting thinner at some point in the
hand in order to balance his bluffing range and to avoid
being exploited by observant and capable opposition.
Given the conclusions we have arrived at about board
texture and turn play when we're in position, does this
mean our opponent should be barrelling these draw heavy
boards as a bluff with a wider range and/or higher
frequency when we are the out-of-position player? Perhaps.
We have to resolve the conflict of the
math problem of the likely positive expected value of
betting almost our entire range in a given spot to fold out
weaker draws with the worry of widening our turn range so
much that our river bluffing range includes too much air
when it is in fact perceived as tighter. For example, if a great
bluff card falls and we bluff after having bet the turn with a
hand that is totally disconnected with the board and we are
called by a better hand, which is much more likely given
our wider range, then our perceived range is open to a few
different interpretations by our opponent, specifically
either our opponent will consider if we will be bluffing too
often or we will be bluffing less often after the hand in
question is shown down, if you're being double floated or
semi-bluff-raised on the turn, your attempts at barrelling
even lighter than the default ranges you have constructed
that mostly rely on a combination of randomization by
equity and scare cards falling are likely to cost you money
in future hands if you cannot out-adjust the opponent who
sees evidence of your extremely wide turn betting range.
The problem with over-stepping the boundaries of bluffing
our fair share
of hands, ones that connect with the board, is that we
cannot be certain how the information we are transmitting
about a wider range will be interpreted by our observant
opposition.
Our opponent may counter our heightened propensity
to bluff the turn and to bet the turn for thinner for value by
checking turns in order to check- raise a balanced range of
bluffing and value hands, in this dynamic, our opponent
does not sacrifice balance for exploitation, at least in such a
memorable way that might help us to play better against
him in the future. He also does not turn his hand somewhat
face up by check-calling the turn, allowing us to play as well
as possible against the weak range of hands with which he
will be most likely to take this action. Of course, it's possible
to check-call strong hands on the turn, but if he chooses to
trap in this manner, then it's more likely he is sacrificing
value that he would get from betting the turn and then the
river or by check-raising the turn with such a strong hand. If
we are more likely to check back
turns and bluff the river when checked to, our opponent
will be able to make lighter river calls taking into
consideration our perceived range, his hand, and his pot
odds, but he will not be able to abuse the aforementioned
turn dynamic. So far we have outlined a few reasons both to
check the turn and to bet the turn on draw heavy boards.
Let's ask a few questions so we can weigh the value of each
option and so we can make the best decision about which
dynamic to exploit versus certain opponents.
Reasons to bet turn: If we're bet into by a tough and
well-balanced opponent on a river after checking back a
float without showdown value, we will have a pretty tough
choice for which the outcome is likely close to breakeven or
slightly losing for us. Our opponent controls the frequencies
with which he is taking this line and it is unlikely that we'll
be able to play very well against it, especially if he leads us
to make false assumptions on the river such as "he will bluff
all of his missed draws when checked to." Other reasons to
bet
the turn are that we aren't able to threaten stacks by
checking the turn against this opponent, unless we
check-raise the river. If we wait until the river to bluff, we'll
have to balance that by checking back some good hands on
the turn from which we'd like value, which we'd get by
betting the turn and river. Also, such a large portion of our
opponent's range on the river will be bluffs that we may
have gotten more value by betting the turn and inducing a
bluff-raise to fold out parts of our assumed-to-be draw
heavy range.
Reasons to check the turn: We should get more
information about our opponent's hand and learn how
successful a bluff will be given his reaction to the turn and
river cards and how they improve or hurt our opponent's
perceived range comprised of draws and weaker made
hands. Against a predictable opponent for whom we have
solid reads, our river decision will be easy and likely quite
profitable.
Question #2: When we are in position, will our opponent
check his entire range again on the river?
If your opponent will check his entire range on the
river to induce a value bet from your probable worse hand
that you chose to pot control on the turn or a float that
probably missed again on the river, then you should
probably lean towards betting the turn with your floats
more often when you can represent a wider and stronger
range of hands, especially if your opponent is capable of
employing the dynamic choices of using a balanced
river-check-raise range. Of course when we are bluffing a
wide range of hands, we should also be value betting a wide
range of hands. If your opponent picks up on the fact that
you're balancing your turn betting range by value betting
thinly, then you may want to readjust your turn betting
range, since you should expect to be called or check-raised
with a wider range on the turn given how wide a range your
opponent knows you have on some turns. Another
consideration in this dynamic has to do with our next
question.
Question #3: How many floats are in your perceived range on
certain turns?
On a board like Kc9c6h versus your late position
flop-call, there are many more combinations of floats than
strong value hands in your range. If you're against a
perceptive opponent, you should be increasingly wary of
bluffing later on in a hand and of his likely adjustments to
the board texture to thwart the profit margin of your wide
range of floats. You can also tailor your range to your
opposition's adjustments by floating fewer hands and
bluffing less often if he is playing back often on turns.
Therefore, you may choose to fold something as weak as
7s5s on this board, considering:
• Your pair outs are less likely to be good by the river and
those outs are less likely to be live and/or more likely to be
conditional
• You're going to be barrelled too often on the turn
compared to the times you're going to get paid if you
make your hand
• The times your opponent will check and fold this
very drawy board on the turn
• Our equity against our opponent's range with our
particular float is decidedly weaker than other floats in
our range such as QJ and JT
If our opponent is planning on check-calling turns
and/or some rivers to induce us to bluff when he has a
weaker made hands (ex: 98s) on the turn, then we have a
decent amount of equity with our stronger floats. If we
expect him to frequently check-raise our turn bet or to
check-call the turn and river if the river is a blank, we might
be best by avoiding a turn dynamic by checking back the
turn and bluffing rivers with what we determine to be an
optimal frequency against our
opponent's possible holdings and river check-raising
frequency. However, if we know he doesn't expect us to be
floating, then betting is generally going to be our best
action. These ideas obviously follow from our above
examinations from the opposite point of view.
In summary, betting the turn is advantageous when the
following are true:
• We have a high likelihood of folding out some hands
with very weak showdown value (such as ace high)
because we can usually better threaten stacks by
threatening multiple streets of action
• Our opponent is rarely checking and calling good
hands on multiple streets
• We do not expect to be check-raised on the turn
The more likely you are to be check-raised, the less
you should bluff a medium-strength draw for all the
reasons discussed. A medium-strength draw's value is
different for each opponent you play. The reason for the
varying value of a turn (semi-)bluff is that your equity
against your opponent's range of hands he could check-
raise your (semi-)bluff on the turn will change
depending on the range with which they decide to
attempt a turn check-raise.
A decision for your opponent to check-raise a turn
will mostly be a function of game flow, board texture,
and stack sizes. Examining the following will help you
to determine the likelihood of you being check-raised
on a turn against an opponent you may trust to play the
same way in similar situations:
Question #4: Has he check-folded a turn before?
If he has, it may be more likely you will be check-raised,
depending on the opponent, of course.
Question #5: Are there several combinations of possible
floats on the flop that he expects you to call with and then
bluff the turn?
If yes, then he will probably be check-raising the turn more
often than on a different board.
Question #6: Are stacks such that he can fold out your
medium strength draws?
If once you bet turn you are committed to calling his
raise, regardless of its size, with a naked flush draw for
instance, then it's most likely he'll bet the turn himself if
he wants any folding equity. Another consideration is a
short stacked scenario is that if his turn raise size is
straddling the border on committing
you to the pot with a lot of your weaker draws, then he
might not think he would be able to credibly represent a
bluff. In this one, his turn check-raise should be viewed as
very strong. This means that, in general, people should be
bluffing weaker draws to balance with their stronger value
hands (anything you would want to call a check-raise or
that would like to be check-called twice) on the turn. This
also means that stronger draws that are not strong enough
to bet/call the turn, like a baby flush draw, should be
checking back in most cases.
If you check-call a weaker made hand after
continuation betting a board with a highly connected board
texture (a dubious decision in many instances that will be
ignored for the sake of the point) and a strong draw hits the
river, you may want to check and call another bet if you
believe it's highly likely that the strong draw hitting will
narrow your opponent's value range and make him bluff his
weaker missed draws more often (probably close to 100%).
If he is only betting top pairs and better on the turn for
value, but all
gutshots as a bluff, then you should see that his river range
is probably very highly skewed towards bluffs on a large
number of rivers.
Betting also helps us to avoid being bluffed by a
bet-check-bet line. Say we call a Kd7h9c flop with 5c6c and a
turn 2d goes check-check. If we're betting into our opponent
as a bluff on a non-8 river, we have a pretty tough choice.
Our opponent controls the frequencies with which he is
taking this line and it is unlikely that we'll be able to play
well against it. We would also bet the turn if we aren't able
to threaten stacks by checking the turn and when we want to
avoid having to balance by checking back good hands on the
turn from which we'd like value.
I believe the dynamic created on the turn by floating, on
both sides of the aggression and both in position and
out-of-position shows why the spot is so interesting from
both points of view. Because both players have so many
considerations in order to exploit their opponent and to
avoid being exploited, it's a dynamic on which it
is well worth spending the time to anticipate adjustments
and to quantify the adjustments your reads lead you to
make with mathematics. Turn play is still an unsolved
ground in No-Limit Hold'em. After this section on floating,
it is easy to see why there is much work to be done
considering the dynamics of turn play!
Question #7: Do we have showdown value with our
float?
Let's say that the cutoff raises and we call with AdQd
on the button. The flop is JhTd4c. And we call our
opponent's continuation bet hoping for a turn diamond,
ace, king, or queen. We also intend to continue on some
other turns that miss our opponent's semi-bluffing range
because we have good equity against a lot of his turn
betting range, hands like Jc9c. Because we are ahead of
most of our opponent's semi- bluffing range, we deduce
that we have some showdown value with our hand.
The answer to this is also a function of how likely your
opponent is to check the turn and/or river in order to
induce bluffs from you when your range has a lot of draws
in it. If he checks the turn, he'll likely be checking a blank
river to induce a bluff with his weaker made hands. When
considering a bluff when checked to on the turn or on the
river, you're getting the worst of both worlds as it's unlikely
you fold out anything better by betting as a bluff and the
fact that you'll have the best hand often enough in order to
show down profitably makes inducing a bluff on the river
the likely best play. Because your opponent is expecting
you to bet air like 9d7d, KdQd, and 9h8h, if he checks the
river with a weak made hand, then he will almost always be
calling your bet. If he is checking the river, it's with a plan
to either call or to fold and because we beat all of our
opponent's failed turn bluffs, we should just take the
showdown with our AdQd.
Bluff-Raising
Sometimes boards will come down that hit your
perceived range very hard and you will have a hand that
has completely missed the flop, if you have a very marginal
hand and you're against an opponent who is capable of
barrelling as the board gets scarier for the range of hands
you're representing by calling a flop continuation bet, you
may want to raise the flop as a bluff.
Generally, a flop call, especially on a drawy board,
represents a range with marginal strength because many
players will give lots of action with a draw on such a board
if they think they have good equity versus a calling range as
well as some folding equity. Against players who
continuation bet and barrel too often, but often enough that
you will make mistakes on future streets, you may be best
off choosing to raise the flop as a (semi)bluff.
As far as sizing goes, assuming 100 big blind stacks,
you do not have to raise to a very large size to put your
opponent to a test for a large portion of his range of
borderline hands. A borderline hand is a hand like JsTd on
QsTs4h that your opponent continuation bets, expecting
you to call with almost all of your range. A large benefit of
having a flop-raise dynamic is that you take away his ability
to get value in spots like this one with marginal hands and
force him to play a more pot controlling style or a guessing
game in which you control the frequencies on future streets,
which, if you play well, shouldn't end well for him. Let's say
we call a $30 raise pre-flop in position and decide to raise a
flop continuation bet of $50 to $150. Immediately we are
risking $150 to win $140 (assuming we aren't either of the
blinds) and so our bluff only has to work slightly more than
half the time in order to be profitable. If we assume that
after our opponent three-bets the flop that we have an easy
decision to fold or to continue (note: by an easy flop
decision that I mean we would almost never raise a hand
like KhQh on QdTd3h and subsequently
fold to a flop three-bet or ever raise 8c7c and shove over
a three-bet), then we won't be put into tough spots that
may lead to larger post-flop mistakes. Typically when
we are in position, we will be able to play better after the
flop action should our opponent elect to call our raise
and so raising in position as a bluff should be more
profitable than out-of-position.
Ways in which our opponents will combat our
flop-raises have been touched on when I mentioned the
pot-control method of polarizing continuation bet
ranges. Other methods our opponent may use to
combat this certain flop dynamic include:
• Check-raising flops, both for value and as a bluff
• Three-betting our flop raises, both for value and as
a bluff
• Stop raising as much pre-flop with marginal hands,
thereby attempting to avoid marginal spots post-flop
Check-Raising Flops
Once our opponent realizes that we are raising flops so
often that it's unlikely that we are always holding a good
hand, he should be mixing up his play and include some
flop checks with both good and bad hands. If he can't win in
one dynamic, he may try to exploit another dynamic in the
same spot. A part of this different dynamic could include
checking hands that he wants to check-raise bluff. Hands
like gutshots that have some equity, but not enough to
continue if raised after a continuation bet, might be best
used for this play because we don't mind folding them if
three-bet on the flop. To add to the efficacy of our
flop-check-raise-bluff, if our check-raise is called on the flop
when we are using a gutshot to bluff, then we have many
turns which we may credibly represent when our perceived
range is strengthened in addition to the times we hit our
gutshot and make a strong hand. Different players will
induce flop-bluffs to check-raise-bluff on different board
textures and so it's important to pay attention to your
opponent's range in these types of spots because it will
directly affect the range of value hands that you will be
comfortable with when facing heat if you do choose to
value bet a flop when checked to by the pre-flop-raiser.
Three-Betting Our Flop-
Raise
As a bluff or for value, our opponent should start
three-betting, or re-raising, our flop raise because our
flop-raising range should be wider given that we're
widening our flop bluffing range. By anticipating that
our opponent will eventually make a play against our
flop-raise with a wider range, whether it be with a bluff
or with a made hand with which he's taking a stand, our
value range should be widened accordingly.
Not Raising as Often Pre-
Flop (Polarizing Pre-Flop)
If our opponent is anticipating being put into marginal
spots post-flop with his marginal made hands, then he can
choose to raise a more polarized range pre- flop. This will
assure that he will more often hit a flop either hard or not at
all, rather than hitting something mediocre. A key strategy
for dealing with difficult spots in poker is to avoid them in
the first place.
CHAPTER 4:
RIVER PLAY
Note: I have chosen to discuss river play prior to a
discussion of turn play for reasons that will be evident
after the reading of this chapter.
The concepts presented within this chapter will help
you to:
• Call people down more profitably
• Understand how much of someone's range you're
attempting to fold out on a given turn or river
• Understand whether or not a certain bet size is
more profitable with a bluff or with a value bet
Like turn play, river play is going to be an extension of
the previous street of play. By the river, we'd like to be able
put our opponent on a fairly narrow range of hands based
on the way that he played pre-flop, on the flop and on the
turn. Narrowing down our opponent's range is going to be
important for value-betting and for bluffing. It is a process
that is going to improve with experience and by paying
close attention to the examples and questions that I am
giving and discussing in each chapter.
It's important to remember the general theme of this
book: there is no one answer to beating No-Limit Texas
Hold'em. Everyone plays differently, often in-line with
their personality or temperament. Therefore, your reactions
to their perceived ranges, predicted reactions, and
adjustments against your ranges will certainly impact the
best strategy for playing each hand. All of these ideas rolled
into one equation may sound a bit optimistic, but Galfond
Dollars will allow us to do just
that if we have the correct data to enter into our
expected value calculations.
Galfond Dollars Explained
In order to understand what we mean by Phil
Galfond'sGalfond Dollars, or G Bucks, we should first
define Sklansky Dollars, or Sklansky bucks. Sklansky bucks,
as first defined by David Sklansky in his book The Theory
of Poker, shows us the expected value of a single hand
against another hand. For example, if we are all-in pre-flop
with Acjs versus KhKd in a $2000pot, $1000 of which is our
money, we expect to win $572 on average. The expected
value equation for this hand versus hand match-up is
EV = (% win of A J) (total pot) - (what we risk) EV = (0.288)(2000) - (1000) EV = $576-$1000 EV = $424
The calculation shows that on average we expect to lose
$424 of our original $ 1000 investment into the pot.
Galfond Dollars are more applicable to an actual poker
game because with G Bucks we consider an entire range of
hands against a specific hand. The information we get from
G Bucks calculations is a lot more applicable because we are
attempting to put our opponent on a range of hands and
not a specific hand. This process of hand-reading will allow
us to make better plays against well-balanced players. Well-
balanced players will make certain plays with more than a
single hand, some as a bluff and some as a value bet. A G
Bucks calculation will allow us to decrease our margins of
error as well because our calculation is set up in terms of
combinations of hands better than a specific hand.
Usually, it is advantageous in practice to choose our
lowest and "purest bluff-catcher." A pure bluff-catcher is
a hand that meets the following criteria:
• weakest hand with which we get to a certain point
in a hand
• does not block any of our opponent's semi-bluffs
• only beats a bluff
When we use pure bluff-catchers in our G Bucks
calculations, we create a starting point in our minds on
certain boards from which we are able to adjust based
on a number of factors such as card removal and
bluffing frequencies. If we have 8c8d by the river on a
2c6c7hKdQd board facing a river bet we can take a club
out of villain's range as well as the 8c and 8d and which
lower his bluffing frequency due to card removal and
how many 8x hands villain has by the river that were
semi-bluffs continuing river aggression hoping to
induce a fold from a hand below Kx. We should also
account for the fact that our opponent may not continue
bluffing the river each time he gets to the river. These
points will be expanded, but first let us go over a simple
example of a G Bucks calculation.
Our Hand: JhTs Board: Jd8h3d8d2c
Play History: We have been bet into on every street,
including a $200 bet into the $300 river pot.
Current Action: We are on the button versus a cut-off
pre-flop-raiser; we were heads-up to the flop and are now
facing a $200 river bet.
The scenario gives our opponent a good incentive to bluff
because he should suspect that we are still drawing and he
will be able to make us fold with a river bluff a good
percentage of the time. We will assume for this example
that he will bluff the river with 100 percent of his turn
range.
We can deduce Villain s range to be:
• all straight draws, including gut-shots
• all diamond hands he'd open pre-flop
. KJo+
. 88 • JJ+
. Ad
Against this range, we win about 33% with JTo. It is
actually a bit more, but we will use 33% for the sake of
simplicity
If we win 33% of the time, we will lose 67% of the time.
Now we have the information needed to create an
expected value (EV) equation
EV(Call) = (percentage we win * 0.01)(total pot) - (percentage we lose * 0.01) (what we risk by calling) EV(Call) - (0.33)(500) - (0.67)(200) EV(Call) = 165 - 134 EV(Call) = 31
So by risking a river call of $200 into this $500 pot against
the range we assigned to Villain, on average we expect to
win $31.
What if Villain chooses a different bet size with this
range than $200 in our example? How should we react? We
can set our EV equation equal to zero and solve for X in
order to figure out the maximum bet size we are able to
profitably call because the EV of calling and folding will be
the same at the point of indifference, the breakeven point
between calling and folding. The calculation here is
assuming that the EV of raising as a bluff is less than zero.
EV(Call) = 0 0 = (0.33)(300 + x) - (0.67)(x) 0 = 99 + 0.33x - 0.67x 0 = 99 - 0.34x 0.34x = 99 x = 99 / 0.34 x = 294.12
Check:
0 = (0.33)(300 + 294.12) - (0.67)(294.12) 0 = 197.06 - 197.06 0 = 0
These calculations show that the maximum bet size
we are able to profitably call is $294.12. Does this mean
that if Villain bets enough on the river, we should be
folding our entire range, or at least JTo? That depends
on a number of factors and a calculation of a range-
versus-range analysis that I will not be explaining in this
book because it is extremely tedious and inaccurate
given small mistakes we make with our opponent's
range and our range in a given spot. It would be like
trying to calculate the probability of an outcome step-
by-step where we were not even sure of the likelihoods of
the other events involved. I would recommend taking the
time to consider adjustments to make to someone
over-betting their entire range on a given river, especially
when a lot of your range will be somewhat face-up
bluff-catchers. Over-betting, for this reason, and the nature
of the unpredictability and the timing of the play, becomes
something difficult to play well against.
Because these calculations are somewhat tedious and
complicated, it is very difficult to do them in the middle of a
game, especially if you are multi-tabling and have other
decisions occupying your time and concentration. I have
found that the best way to get a grasp on when you should
call and fold in certain spots, other than intuition gained
from playing thousands of hands, is to do some calculations
away from the table. I have provided a few examples that
deal with common spots and that show how slightly
different cards may
significantly affect the choice of the best river play in a
given situation.
For all the following G bucks calculations, we will
assume that we are playing 5/10 NL and that we are in the
BB and the SB is raising us to $30 pre-flop, continuation
betting $50 on the flop, betting $135 on the turn, and betting
$280 into us on the river for a total pot of $430 ($710 with
our call). We are also not concerned here with calling the
turn bet, we are only looking at these calculations as
independent river decisions (numbers may differ slightly
from rounding error and pre-flop range assigned to the SB).
When "Board A" is part of a different board's range, that
just means that you should append the earlier board's
range to that example's range. Notice what changes from
board-to-board. One board may be the exact same except
for an added flush draw on the turn or a third card of a suit
on the river. The idea is to show the relative impact of each
board change to our specific hand, assuming our opponent
is using a randomization
by equity to determine his turn and river bluffing
frequencies.
Board A = 2s3sQcAsJc Hero's hand = 8h8d
Villain's range = KQ+; 45-46; 56; JT+; Ks5x+; spade hands; Ax; 22-55; 4x; 5x; 3 off-suited pure air hands. 8h8d is good on Board A 23.5% of the time and bad 76.5% of the time.
EV (Call) = (%win) (total pot) - (% lose) (the bet to call) EV (Call) = (0.235)(710) - (0.765)(280) EV (Call) = 167.1 -214.1 EV (Call) = -47.0
Board B = 2s3sQcAcJh Villains range = Board A's range without air hands; club hands; 8h8d is good on Board B 29.1% of the time and bad 70.9% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.291)(710) - (0.709)(280) EV(Call) = 206.3 - 198.7 EV(Call) = 7.6
Example 2
Board A = 4h9dQcKs3h Hero's hand = Tc9h Villain's range = T5+; J5+; Kx; AQ+; 44; 99; QQ+ Tc9h is good 42.1% of the time and bad 57.9% of the time.
EV(Call) - (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) - (0.421 )(710) - (0.579)(280) EV(Call) - 299 - 162 EV(Call) - 136
Board B = 4h9dQdKs3d Hero's hand = Tc9h Villain's range = Board A; diamond hands Tc9h is good 35.7% of the time and bad 64.3% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.357)(710) - (0.643)(280) EV(Call) = 253 - 180 EV(Call) = 73
Board C = 4h9dQdKs3s Hero's hand = Tc9h Villain's range = Board B Tc9h is good 46.5% of the time and bad 53.5% of the time
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.465)(710) - (0.535)(280) EV(Call) = 330 - 150 EV(Call) = 180
Board D = 4h9dQc8s3s Hero's hand = Tc9h Villain's range = 48s-49s; 98; Q5+; 44; 99; QQ+; KT-KQ; Tx; Jx; 75-76 Tc9h is good 53.2% of the time and bad 46.8 of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.532)(710) - (0.468)(280) EV(Call) = 378 - 131 EV(Call) = 247
Example 3
Board A = 3s4sTdJh8c Hero's hand = 9c9h
Villain's range = spades; A2; A5; Q9+; AT+; 52s-62s: 56-57; 67; 3c4c; T3s-T4s; J5+; T8; 33-44; TT+; QT-KT 9c9h is good 42.4% of the time and bad 57.6% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.424)(710) - (0.576)(280) EV(Call) = 301 - 161 EV(Call) = 140
Board B = 3s4sTdJh8s Hero's hand = 9c9h Villain's range = Board A; 8sXx 9c9h is good 34.9% of the time and bad 65.1% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.349)(710) - (0.651)(280) EV(Call) = 248 - 182 EV(Call) = 66
Board C = 3s4sTdJs8c Hero's hand = 9c9h Villain's range = Board A; Some one card flush draws 9c9h is good 43.5% of the time and bad 56.5% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.435)(710) - (0.565)(280)
EV(Call) = 309 - 158 EV(Call) = 151
Example 4
Board A = 2sTc9h2d2c Hero's hand = 9d5d Villain's range = 86-87; JK-JK; 99+; J8-Q8; J7; Txs; T5o+ 9d5d is good 48.7% of the time and bad 51.3% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.487)(710) - (0.513)(200) EV(Call) = 146.1 -102.6 EV(Call) = 43.5
Board B = 2sTc9hAd2c Hero's hand = 9d5d Villain's range = Board A; Ax hands 9d5d is good 34.2% of the time and bad 65.8% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.342)(710) - (0.658)(200) EV(Call) = 102.6-131.6
EV(Call) = -29
Board C = 2sTc9hKd2c Hero's hand = 9d5d Villain's range (1) = Board A Villain's range (2) = Board A; Qx; Jx
Range (1) 9d5d is good 23.6% of the time and bad 76.4% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.236)(300) - (0.764)(200) EV(Call) = 70.8 - 152.8 EV(Call) = -82
Range (2) 9d5d is good 42.7% of the time and bad 57.3% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.427)(300) - (0.573)(200) EV(Call) = 128.1 -114.6 EV(Call) = 13.5
Board D = 2sTc9h6d2c Hero's hand = 9d5d Villain's range (1) = Board A; 66; -6X
Villain's range (2) = Board A; 66; -6X; 7X; 8X
Range (1) 9d5d is good 44.7% of the time and bad 55.3% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.447)(300) - (0.513)(200) EV(Call) = 134.1 -110.6 EV(Call) = 23.5
Range (2) 9d5d is good 60.8% of the time and bad 39.2% of the time.
EV(Call) = (%win)(total pot) - (%lose)(the bet to call) EV(Call) = (0.608)(300) - (0.392)(200) EV(Call) = 182.4 - 78.4 EV(Call) = 104
To break away from the purely theoretical instances in
which our opponent may be assumed to be betting 100% of
his turn betting range on the river for value or as a bluff
like in the above examples, we may choose to discount our
opponent's river range for certain cards and quantify it in
an expected value equation using mathematics. For
example, it is intuitive that most
people will not bluff blankrivers as often as rivers that
complete some sort of draw on the board. The type of G
Bucks calculation in which an opponent's river range is
discounted is what will most often mirror reality and the
betting describe problems faced in actual poker games.
In order to make such a calculation, let's arbitrarily
assume that our equity is 31.3% against an opponent's river
betting range of 100% of his hands which bet a certain turn
card. On a blank river, let's assume that our opponent is
only bluffing with half of his air hands and so we must
discount his river betting range to account for his
assumptions about our calling frequencies when all draws
miss on a certain river. Let's say that if we call when our our
opponent isbetting 100% of his turn range, we are beating 62
combinations of hands out of a possible 198 combinations,
which is where we got that we are 31.3% to win against
100% of his turn range on the river. Because we have a pure
bluff catcher, we know that he will never be value-betting a
worse hand than
the one which we are holding. Therefore, we may
simplydivide the 62 combinations of hands we beat in half,
so now we only beat 31 combinations of hands, given that
he's giving up with his bluffs on a blank river half of the
time. We then subtract those 31 combinations from our
total of a possible 198 combination to get 167 combinations.
Now when we call the blank river, accounting for a
discounting of his bluff range, we will win [(31/167)*100%]
= 18.6% of the time.
This idea of discounting our opponent's river bluffing
range is an extremely relevant and important one because
the rivers on which our opponent bets 100% of his turn
betting range are not as frequent as timeshe will choose
smaller amount of his turn range with which to continue
bluffing. However, counting combinations of hands can be
tedious, especially when ranges are wide and there are
many combinations. Let's look at another example to show
us how to circumvent the tedious nature of this EV
calculation.
Let's assume that we will win when we call a certain
river bet 136/428 times, or that we beat 138 of our
opponent's possible 428 combinations of hands for which
he isbetting the river. In other words, we will win 31.8% of
the time if we call the river. Again, our opponent may not
necessarily bet certain rivers with 100% of his turn betting
range. Let's again discount our opponent's range and
pretend that he is giving up half of the time, in order to
make the math easy to follow. After discounting his river
betting range as we did in our above example, we have
determined that we will win 68/360 times (18.9%). For an
actual hand, counting out all of these combinations is
extremely time consuming. Here's a little tip to avoid
wasting time counting hand combinations. In this example,
we know our hand's equity against the 100% of a player's
turn betting range is 31.8%. Let's treat this number like
318/1000. Now let's say we would like to discount his river
betting range and assume that he's only betting with half of
his bluffs, making this number 159/841. Now we will win
18.9% of the time if we call the river
bet. Does our answer look familiar? Now you know a
simple way to short-cut the time-consuming nature of
counting individual hand combinations when doing such a
calculation.
I'd like to stress the point that I made at the beginning
of this book: Poker played against thinking and adapting
players cannot have a system to follow that will always
make you a winner.
While G Bucks calculations will help you to derive
your own turn and river betting ranges in order to
maximize value from bluffing and from value betting, the
ranges you derive will not be set ranges you play with
against everybody or the ranges that your opponents will
use when attempting to bluff or to value bet you. It's
doubtful that you will even be able to have the same range
against one opponent from one hand to the next because of
how he will adjust to what he sees that you show down.
The point of learning these calculations is so that you
realize the implications of
bleeding off bets when someone is three-barrelling too
often and of ideal spots for thinner value bets. You will get
a better grasp on three-barrelling and how often it should
work in certain spots and which hands to use in order to
bolster an aggressive image that will get you paid in the
future. All of these adjustments are not static. The
adjustments are dynamic and each one will add to your win
rate when you learn how to adjust better than the other
players with whom you are playing. You'll realize that
almost everybody's ranges are constantly changing from
different happenings in the poker game and that your goal
isn't to solve their game given a single hand in a single
situation. Your task in becoming a better poker player is to
out-adjust and to out-think the opposition, therefore
causing you to make fewer mistakes and consequently, win
more money in all situations.
When determining how often a given opponent is
bluffing on the river, it's often helpful to assume that his use
of a "scare card," often one that also improves his
semi-bluffing range, usually ensures that he will be
bluffing with the part of his bluff range that missed the
scare card. Usually, the scarier a card is for a caller's
perceived range, the more of a person's range that will be
bluffing that card in a given spot because that person is
expecting you to make a mistake on that card with your
range by folding too often.
Sometimes you will bet so thinly in a given spot that
your opponent will call you with a better hand. At first
thought, this may seem like a bad result. In actuality the
play is going to be great for our bluffing range because
our opponent will make two key realizations about our
ranges:
1. Our ability to bet such a wide of a range of hands for
value.
2. The number of hands with which he gets to a
certain spot that are considering a call that are in
jeopardy of becoming bluff catchers on a later street
because of how thinly we are able to bet for value.
The knowledge of our thin value bet makes it very
difficult for our opponents to adjust to our barrelling range.
The definition of a value bet is "betting a hand that when
called wins the pot at least half of the time. There are times
when you will have a hand that when called you win more
than half of the time, but when you are called some of your
range will overlap with a few hands that are better hands
than your hand in your opponent's range; however, this
should not deter you from a value bet just because you
might lose the pot when called.
The most important takeaway from this chapter, other
than general knowledge of how to calculate people's ranges
and how they do against your specific hand at a specific
time, is that some people have different bluffing ranges
from street to street. One person's flop-bluff range might be
significantly wider than his turn-bluffing range and his
turn-bluffing range much wider than his river-bluffing
range. Against this
type of person, folding hands as strong as top pair by the
river could be a good play due to his very small
river-bluffing frequency compared to his river-value-
betting frequency. These player types are less common in
the highest games and more common at smaller stakes
games because good players realize the implications of
balancing thin value bets with bluffs.
A transitional experiment into our next chapter is to
attempt G Bucks calculations for the turn. While a specific
turn spot in itself may seem interesting, the problem itself
becomes much more dynamic when we consider our
opponent's varying interpretations of what to do on
different river cards with the different parts of his range.
All of the different possible river cards may inspire our
opponent to choose to give up with bluffs, value-bet thinly,
over-bet for value or as a bluff, or choose a certain bet size.
A slightly negative expected value turn-call may lead to a
highly profitable river scenario if we can correctly assume
100% of our opponent's turn betting range may bet on
certain rivers
that fall often enough to offset our slightly bad turn call. We
may also be able to make a slightly bad turn-call if we have
reason to believe that our opponent will give up a bluff on
most blank rivers. Much like our river calculations, practice
with the calculations will help you to intuit decisions in
these varying and close spots that come up on certain turn
cards when you are considering a call of an opponent's bet.
CHAPTER 5:
TURN PLAY
Having extensively explored flop play and river play,
we'll move on to our next challenge: turn play. Our turn
play is going to be an extension of our flop play in many
instances, particularly when we have the initiative. Our turn
plays are also going to be derived based on the assumptions
gained by the way our opponent's pure bluff catchers
should react given certain rivers, covered in chapter 4. We'll
have the initiative on the turn if (1) we continuation bet as
the pre-flop-raiser and were called, (2) we bet-three-bet the
flop and are called, (3) if we check-raise the flop and are
called, or (4) if we lead the flop and are called. So let's go
through each of these scenarios and see how our turn play
should change based on a number of factors.
We continuation bet as the
pre-flop-raiser and we are
called
This is probably the simplest scenario to analyse;
although, it will change based on your opponent's flop
tendencies. For example, if your opponent raises all of his
flush draws on the flop, but calls your continuation bet
when you bet into him, then a flush isn't likely to be in his
range if a flush draw hits on the turn with three cards of a
single suit out on the board. This read on our opponent
means that our turn barrel, a continuation of our flop
aggression, will be scarier to him because our perceived
range will improve more than his range. This read-based
example sets the foreground for a general rule of
barrelling the turn, although we'll see that sometimes
there are exceptions to the rule and that reads may be
taken too far, especially if our opponent is capable of
varying his play.
It is advantageous for us to continue to barrel the turn
if our perceived range improves versus what we view our
opponent s range to be. This idea is especially true if the
turn improves our equity by giving us a gut shot, a flush
draw, or a weaker pair that we expect to be behind our
opponent s flop calling range because we now may append
the chances of our hand possibly improving on the river if
we are called on the turn to the success of our turn bet.
Our aim is to construct an estimate for a turn betting
range based on what we have determined our river ranges
should be in the certain spots in order to show a profit while
preserving a balanced range against the more observant
opposition we encounter. By using G Bucks, we are able to
decide in a fairly accurate way how often and with what
hands we should also be betting the turn. I used the phrases
"loosely construct" and "fairly accurately" for a few reasons.
The first reason I use these phrases is because we will not be
able to
predict with 100% certainty in what way a given player will
play his range in a certain spot or in what way that player
will adjust to some glaring (in his perception) tendency or
something that we have shown at a showdown. The second
reason is because we should be adjusting our ranges on
certain turn cards because they will force our opposition to
make more mistakes given how his imperfect knowledge of
our ranges will coincide with how a scary turn card
improves our perceived range over his own range. The
consideration of a turn scare card being in our range
compared to considering a non-scare card skews the math
of a turn call to the negative in many cases, especially in the
cases where our opponent's hand is likely to improve to a
hand that bests our possibly turned hand.
An easy example for a spot that many people like to
use a slightly wider turn betting range is when a scare card
comes that rarely improves our opponent's range for
example, consider the following scenario:
Pre-Flop: We raise 5h6h UTG The cutoff (a very aggressive pre-flop player) calls our raise, we are heads-up
Flop: The flop comes 2h2s9c We continuation bet We are called
Turn: Turn is the Kc, bringing a flush draw to the board
We decide that betting again will fold out enough
of our opponent's range on the turn to show a profit.
The turn bluff combined with the fact that we have the
added possibility of a scary river card falling means that
we can again bluff and induce a mistake by our
opponent, possibly adding value to our turn bluff. I say
that it is possibly adding value to our turn bet because
our opponent may decide that if we are bluffing the turn
king and club draw that we will continue our bluff on a
club river 100% of the time; therefore, his turn call
commits him to a river call. We almost never expect our
opponent to have a Kx hand given his pre-flop and flop
play and because of the fact that the king helps our
perceived range, it should give pause to most of his range.
If we are intending to barrel hands like QJ and turned flush
draws in addition to 9x hands and better on this turn, our
opponent will see that any 33-88 hand is close to drawing
dead or, at best, a small favourite against the hands we are
representing on the turn. Additionally, our opponent will
realize that he'll have to navigate a lot of tricky rivers if he
is somehow ahead on the turn.
For those rare times that we are caught using this play
it actually helps us to get thinner value in the future which
is always nice. With every piece of information that our
opponents pick up from us, we also have the ability to
react, both to our play as well as to our opponent's
responses and actions. Keep in mind that everything your
opponent notices gives you an opportunity to better
readjust than your opposition and therefore play even
better and make more of their
money more often. However, if it gets to the point where
your opponent thinks you are going to barrel such scare
cards with your entire range and you actually are, against a
good hand reader, you're going to lose a lot of money and
quickly. A better opponent may adjust to your adjustments
better than you adjust to his adjustments. For these reasons,
I caution you to use this adjustment sparingly.
Unlike the above example where we expect to have
more folding equity because of our strengthened perceived
range, there are times where we will rarely have folding
equity because of our unimproved perceived range on the
turn. Consider the board Th9h7c2c. If we have the same
pre-flop action as in the previous example and our flop
continuation bet is called with a hand like Qcjc, we have a
fairly standard and clear turn second barrel; although, this
bet probably does not have as much folding equity as a bet
on the Ac turn. For the reason that we expect to be called
more often on a blank turn, we may have a few hands in our
range given the flop action with which we could adjust
our ranges a bit and choose not to barrel this turn blank.
Pretend on this board that we have Acjd and that we
continuation bet the flop because we rarely expect to he
raised by our opponent. If we check and our opponent bets,
then we might expect to have to make multiple streets of
difficult calls on a very coordinated board that is likely to
become even more coordinated in such a way that the
board would allow our opponent to better bluff us off our
ace-high hand. Because we have determined our perceived
turn betting range to be extremely wide and it is not likely
to contain many hands that will check on the turn and
expect to continue, we might decide to check Acjd to induce
bluffs from draws. Since we do not expect to fold out many
or any better hands by betting the turn and we have fairly
good equity going into the river, this is a good hand to
choose to check-call the turn. If we double barrel on this
board with any (semi)bluff in our range,
we are probably going to be relying on a river scare card or
a river card that improves our hand to either fold out or to
get value from our opponent's hand, given the high
likelihood of our opponent putting in more money on such
a draw heavy board on the turn.
These two examples are not considerations in what I
would call a "standard G Bucks calculation". In other words,
I would assume that for most players that their 5h4h does
not bluff the turn in the first example and that Acjd does bet
the turn in the second example. However, small deviations
from the normal perceived ranges an opponent would
expect from you are the definition of how you win money in
poker. The previous two examples illustrate how we cannot
actually derive or solve a turn betting range solely based
upon our above discussed river ranges calculated using G
Bucks. The examples also illuminate the fact that some
small deviations are actually going to be better for your win
rate. These deviations are solvable if we assume we have
perfect knowledge of our opponent's adjustments
to our perceived range on a given turn in addition to his
likelihood of making a good play on certain rivers when
certain cards come, meaning his ability to predict accurately
the nuanced variances in our chosen range of hands.
You are certainly welcome to attempt the multiple
equations to figure out a range of hands to use in a very
specific spot against a very specific opponent, stack size,
and position, but the truth is that these calculations are so
convoluted and involved that they are essentially pointless,
other than their ability to give us, as players, a general idea
of how often and with what hands we should continue in
certain spots. So many unquantifiable factors have to be
considered that you are probably best off learning the
implications of certain rivers and guesstimating the best
turn play given your hand, the board, meta-game, your
opponent, and your perceived range. You can fairly well
analyse turn bluffs and valuebets in a vacuum, apart from
every other factor. However, considering the implications
of getting
to the river with too little or too many hands will likely
overcomplicate things and bring up glaring mistakes to
which your opponent will easily adjust once you attempt to
take on the permutations necessary to calculate the value of
a certain barrelling opportunity or call-down in its entirety.
You can also use these same ideas when you are
facing action from another player on the turn. If you have a
good grasp on your opponent's ranges on the river, you
will likely have a good grasp on when to call and when to
fold the turn if you have studied G Bucks enough.
However, making a close turn decision, especially
out-of-position, will lead to many tricky river decisions,
which means a lot of mistakes. Even if we know our
opponent's turn range for betting hands, we may not know
how often and with what hands he bets the river. For that
reason, our turn decisions, especially those made
out-of-position, should warrant more caution.
CHAPTER 6:
TURNING HANDS
INTO BLUFFS
In order to understand the seemingly complicated
concept of turning hands into bluffs, we first need to
debunk the definition of the term 'showdown value'.
There are two quite different definitions of the term in
the poker community. One definition is correct; the
other is not, because it describes a very limited case.
Showdown value (n.)
Definition 1: A pair or ace high that will win sometimes if
your opponent is bluffing or gives up.
This term is absolute in nature, meaning that if your
cards connect with the board, you have showdown value.
Definition 2: A hand that is rated ahead of your opponent's range
often enough to dissuade you to bluff
This is a relative term and can change based on your
range of hands you 're able to represent and the range of
hands that your opponent can represent. For example,
having As2s on Ks9c2dQh4h after you check and call a flop
bet, the turn goes check/check, and you're considering your
river action is much different to floating a continuation bet
on JhTc4d with AdQd, checking back a turn 2c when your
opponent (the pre- flop-raiser) checks and you are
considering whether or not to bet when you are checked to
on a 5h river.
The difference in these two definitions is that the first
one is going to give you the wrong impression about the
value of your hands and of your opponent's likely hands in
a given spot. Sometimes you should be turning a made hand
into a bluff (i.e. a worse hand is extremely unlikely to call
your bet) for the reason that your hand has no showdown
value (in the sense of the second definition) and that the
range you represent by betting is extremely strong for this
reason. Now that we have the definitions out of the way,
let's rewind and simplify things a bit.
Let's assume that we can rank our range on a given
board from 0-10, 0 being absolutely nothing and 10 being
the nuts. Sometimes what we're ranking 0 is going to be a
paired hand and sometimes what we're ranking 7 (say top
pair with a good kicker) will rarely be called when we bet.
Are you starting to see where this is going?
Sometimes when we bet our weakest hands in our
range (what we're ranking 0-2), our range is not only
lacking air, but also is perceived as much stronger when we
bet. This heightened perception of strength is because now a
bet represents a stronger part of this non-air range, one that
is often ahead of our opponent's checking range on the turn.
This dynamic is another positive externality to all of our
out-of-position floating. The cards that might come on the
turn or river to improve our perceived range against our
opponent's range that allow us to bluff some of the time
either by raising our opponent's turn or river bet or by
betting the river after he checks the turn. Notice how the
hands with which we are choosing to bluff, those ranked
0-2, are actually made hands. This idea might be confusing
because of how some people wrongly define showdown
value, but by looking at ranges and not at absolute hand
values, the matter becomes much simpler.
If an opponent catches onto our strategy of betting all
of our 0-2 (bluffs) and all of our 7-10 (value bets) ranked
hands, then he will realize that checking rivers turns our
hand face up as something in our 3-6 range.
Our opponent will be able to use this knowledge to his
advantage and it will allow him to value bet very thinly
and effectively. If we check and call some of our
moderately good hands, hands we would rank close to 7
(those that beat some hands that our opponent would
value bet into us when we check the river, especially
given our 'turning hands into bluffs' dynamic), then we
might even get more value from the "7" ranked hands in
our range than if we lead out on the river with a bet
given our opponent's interpretation of our river range.
An example of the idea of checking moderately
strong hands on the river to induce a value bet from
worse while keeping worse hands from folding if we
lead the betting on the river can be illustrated by the
following scenario:
• We are in the big blind
• A very loose and predictable player opens on the
button
We call Asjs
• We check and call a Kc9s3h flop
• A turn 4s checks through
• We check a river Jh. expecting our opponent to
value bet any Jx hand in his range as well as some non-
zero amount of bluffs from his air range in attempts to
fold out 9x and below
Given our earlier analysis of this player's range, we
expect him to fold almost all hands worse than Asjs if
we bet the river ourselves. By checking we will
maximize the value of our hand as well as balance our
river checking range with the times we are checking
weaker hands with the intention of folding to a river
bet. Another important question that you should be
asking when considering balancing a river checking
range is when and with what parts of our range should
we check raise rivers?
In order to be able to check and decide to call, to fold,
or to check-raise when faced with a river bet with some of
our hands, we should choose to use the weaker of our
hands to check-raise the river as a bluff because the
stronger ones will possibly beat some of our opponent's
value betting range. With our strongest hands, say those
ranked 10, we may choose to go for a check-raise for value
if we determine it to be more valuable than simply betting
the river. So when check- raising the river in spots where
we'll typically bet with the very bottom of our range, we
should use our extremely strong hands to check-raise for
value and use the weakest hands in our river check-raising
range as bluffs.
Hand 1
To explain the hand below, I'll break it down into a
street-by-street analysis and explain why I took each action
and the theory behind the actions starting with the flop
play. These examples will help you familiarise yourself
with 'turning hands into bluffs' examples.
Seat 1: VILLAIN 1 ($1,015) Seat 2: VILLAIN 2 ($1,207) Seat 3: VILLAIN 3 ($1,045) Seat 4: HERO ($1,985) Posts small blind $5 Seat 5: VILLAIN 4 ($2,000)Posts big blind of $10 Seat 6: VILLAIN 5 ($970)
Dealt to HERO Thjh Pre-flop: (Pot: $15)
FOLD VILLAIN 5 FOLD VILLAIN 1 FOLD VILLAIN 2
RAISE VILLAIN 3, to $30 CALL HERO, $25 CALL VILLAIN 4, $20
Flop: (Pot: $90) 9s3cKh
CHECK HERO CHECK VILLAIN 4 BET VILLAIN 3, $60 CALL HERO, $60 RAISE CILLAIN 4, to $180 CALL VILLAIN 3, $120
CALL HERO, $120
On the flop, the button pre-flop-raiser continuation
bets a somewhat disconnected king high flop, which he will
do with most of his range, expecting to induce folds often
from the other two players in the hand.
Because I know this and because I have a gutshot and
back-door flush draw, I decide to make an out-of- position
float and call his continuation bet hoping to turn a queen,
jack, ten, or heart or that the turn will check through and I'll
have the opportunity to bluff the river if I'm still
unimproved.
However, the big blind raises both of us and after the
button calls I have another decision. A raise represents a
very strong and narrow range of hands where my perceived
range is quite wide, which generally makes it a bad time for
a bluff. Because the big blind is raising in such a spot, where
his range is extremely wide
compared to the hands that he's representing. I decided to
make another float with my hand.
Also, the button's flop call is going to help me to
represent strength because I know he's capable of floats
with similar hands as well as calling with many weaker
made hands and my over-call on the flop looks that
much stronger given both of the other player's
perceptions of my range given the perception of their
respective ranges. In other words, the big blind is
mostly going to give up with his bluffs and the button is
going to pot control almost all of his hands on the turn,
since his range is largely weaker made hands, and allow
me an excellent river bluffing opportunity.
Turn: (Pot: $630) 9s3cKhTc
On the Tc turn I get what I was hoping for because
my perceived range improves again and both players
elect to check. This turn play, a show of weakness by
both players, means that on the river, even if the big
blind had something as strong as KJ, given everything that
has happened in the hand so far, if I bluff, he'll have a very
tough call, and probably a losing one against my actual
range.
River: (Pot: $630) 9s3cKhTc8s
BET HERO, $460 FOLD VILLAIN 4 FOLD VILLAIN 3 RETURNED TO HERO, $460
On the river the button knows that if I bet that I have
done so with the knowledge of what has happened in the
rest of the hand and he will also have to give me a lot of
credit for betting into two people when their ranges look
strong and probably also fold nearly his entire range,
making this river bluff an extremely profitable and creative
play
Hand 2
A street-by-street analysis of the following hand
will show a very important concept about turning hands
into bluffs and how there are good and bad times to put
the theory into practice.
Seat 1: VILLAIN 1 ($1,045) Seat 2: VILLAIN 2 ($1,849.25) Posts small blind $5 Seat 4: VILLAIN 3 ($3,135) Posts big blind $10 Seat 5: HERO ($2,137) Seat 6: VILLAIN 4 ($400)
Dealt to HERO AdQc Pre-flop: (Pot: $15)
RAISE HERO, to $30 FOLD VILLAIN 4 FOLD VILLAIN 1 CALL VILLAIN 2, $25 FOLD VILLAIN 3
Flop: (Pot: $70) 8dAh9s
CHECK VILLAIN 2 BET HERO, $50 CALL VILLAIN 2, $50
On the flop, my opponent check-calls, which is no
surprise given the drawy nature of this board and with the
fact that I expect him to play almost all the hands that
would connect with this board given our deep stacks and
his increased implied odds with his drawing hands post
flop.
Turn: (Pot: $170) 8dAh9s4c
CHECH VILLAIN 2 BET HERO, $120 RAISE VILLAIN 2, to $400 CALL HERO, $280
I get check-raised on the turn, which doesn't make
sense for many hands given that we're so deep and that
raising the flop in order to begin building a pot is usually
the best way to make money. Because my opponent knows
this and I assume he likes money, his turn raise appears
incredibly weak to me and I'm often expecting to see some
sort of weak straight draw that is attempting to fold out a
similar type of hand of mine.
River: (Pot: $970) 8dAh9s4c2s
BET VILLAIN 2, $810 CALL HERO, $810
The river blanks off and it's very conceivable that he's
bluffing again in order to fold out hands that I may have
floated on the turn against what he thinks is a strong line
and the implied odds that he thinks I would think I would
have to make a light turn call profitable. Villain shows
bottom pair, which is a poor way to play his hand in my
opinion and shows a very important
concept you should always consider when you want to
turn a hand into a bluff. My opponent didn't realize
how wide of a range of hands he was representing on
the turn and used a hand that was actually closer to the
middle of his range in his bluff range, rather than use a
hand at the bottom of that range like a missed straight
draw. Not only is the fact that he's representing a wide
range of hands make his bluff suspect, but also it's
unlikely that he would play a strong hand this way,
especially with deep stacks.
Results: VILLAIN 2 SHOWS 7s8s HERO SHOWS QcAd HERO WINS POT $2,587
Hand 3
In this hand, I am turning a hand into a bluff that
will be forced to navigate some tricky rivers and may be
well-behind our opponent's turn value-betting range.
Seat 1: VILLAIN 1 ($1,000) Seat 2: VILLAIN 2 ($1,163) Seat 3: VILLAIN 3 ($1,969) Seat 4: VILLAIN 4 ($1,000) Posts big blind $10 Seat 5: HERO ($1,182) Seat 6: VILLAIN 5 ($1,005)
Dealt to Herojsjh
Pre-flop: (Pot:$15) RAISE HERO, to $30 FOLD VILLAIN 5 CALL VILLAIN 1, $30 FOLD VILLAIN 2 FOLD VILLAIN 3
Flop: (Pot:$95) Ah9c7s CHECK VILLAIN 4 CHECK HERO BET VILLAIN 1, $60 FOLD VILLAIN 4 CALL HERO, $60
Turn: (Pot: $215) Ah9c7s8h CHECK HERO BET VILLAIN 1, $160 RAISE HERO, to $1,092 and is ALL-IN FOLD VILLAIN 1 RETURN HERO, $932
In order to avoid making a mistake on this street
and on the river, I decided to bluff-raise the turn,
expecting to fold out most of his range because of my
pre-flop raise and my flop check-call, I'm not
representing any air. On the turn, I believe the range of
hands I'm representing, mostly turned two pairs and
straights, are well ahead of his turn value-betting range
in this spot and so he will be force to fold too often
given his assumptions about my range.
Hand 4
In this hand, I'm playing a smart and observant
opponent who has seen me turn hands into bluffs in the
past. Therefore, I know in some cases I can get value
from a wider range of hands on the river if he is
expecting alot of my hand combination that bet to be
both made hands and bluffs. In terms of shifting my
river betting range more towards the 6-10 portions of
my range and away from bluffing the 0-2 portions of my
range.
$5/$10 NL Hold'em Cash Game, 2 Players BTN: $2,183 Hero (BB): $2000
Pre-flop: JcKd dealt to Hero (BB) BTN RAISE, to $30 HERO CALL, $20
Flop: (Pot: $60) 4c6hKc (2 Players) HERO CHECK BTN BET $40 HERO CALL $40
Turn: (Pot: $140) 9s (2 Players) HERO CHECK BTN CHECK
River: (Pot: $140) Qc (2 Players) HERO BET $110 BTN CALL $110
Results: (Pot: $360, Rake $0.50) BTN MUCK 9c8s HERO SHOW JcKd AND WINS POT
Because this opponent assumed that I would be
bluffing my 4x hands and my missed straight draws on
the river, he decided to make a call with a weak holding
in terms of absolute strength, realising that my range
does not rely on absolute strength, but the perception of
absolute hand strength. In other words, because he
believed that I might check some of my 7-10 hands in order
to induce a bluff or a value bet from a worse holding from
him, this discounts the combinations in my perceived value
range. This opponent also knows that I will be betting most
of my hands worse than 9x on this river, the 0-2 portion of
my range, and so he makes an adjustment and calls with a
much weaker hand, hoping to catch me bluffing with a
worse made hand.
Unfortunately for him, I had a hand that is in my value
range this time. Having seen this adjustment my opponent
made against my range, I can value-bet the river more
thinly and more accurately because I know he'll be calling
me with a wider range. If he assumes I'm making this
adjustment, then he may realize that my river checking
range should appear extremely weak to him and he may
take the opportunity to bluff.
Hand 5
Here is an example of a good time to turn a hand
into a bluff where an opponent tried to bluff me.
Unfortunately for him, I made the nuts on the river.
$1000.00 USD NL Texas Hold'em 6MAX
Seat 1 is the button Seat 1: VILLAIN 1 ($1368.25) Seat 2: VILLAIN 2 ($1097.00) Seat 3: VILLAIN 3 ($1000.00) Seat 4: VILLAIN 4 ($650.00) Seat 5: HERO ($2153.25) Seat 6: VILLAIN 5 ($1015.00) VILLAIN 2 posts small blind $5.00 VILLAIN 3 posts small blind $10.00
Dealt to HERO: TcQc VILLAIN 4 folds HERO RAISE, to $30 VILLAIN 5 CALL, $30 VILLAIN 1 FOLDS VILLAIN 2 FOLDS
VILLAIN 3 FOLDS
Flop: 6sjc8d HERO BET, $50 VILLAIN 5 CALL, $50
Turn: As HERO BET $120 VILLAIN CALL $120
River: 9h HERO BET $280 VILLAIN 5 RAISE $815 HERO CALL $535
Results: VILLAIN 5 SHOWS Tdjd HERO SHOWS TcQc HERO WINS $2042 from the main pot
What makes this play interesting is that there isn't
really any air in either of our ranges. If he assumes that I
am randomizing my barrel range by equity, meaning
that I'm choosing the best hands out of my range with
which to semi-bluff the turn, then the only total air
hands I should have are KQ and missed spade draws, few of
which are not paired or better by this river. I should also
realize that he can't have any air by the river and so without
knowing what he's capable of, this would be an optimistic
call with something as strong as A8. Because my calling
range is so narrow compared to how wide my river betting
range seems to be, his shove seems like a fantastic play. His
raise may only fold out my air hands which he already beats
and not be worth the risk if I don't believe him to play his
strong hands the same way and if I know he is capable of
turning hands into bluffs. It's up to you to figure out if the
proportion of someone's air range and their made-
hand-folding range to the hands with which they will call a
raise and if risking the extra amount of your stack, often a
lot of money by the time you choose to raise a river bet as a
bluff is going to be a profitable investment. In order to
calculate the best play, you should set up a simple expected
value equation. Let's describe the set-up to our equation and
then look at an example.
When your bluff works, he folds and you win the pot
X% of the time. When your bluff fails, subtract your river
raise amount Y% of the time for when he calls and you lose
your river raise. For an example, let's assume that we are
facing a $200 bet into a $300 pot on the river and we go all-in
for $800 as a bluff, which will work 60% of the time. Is this
bet profitable? Let's follow our description and make an EV
calculation.
EV = (0.6*500)-(0.4*800) EV = 300-320 EV = -20
Our expected value equation, in which we win the $500
pot 60% of the time and lose our $800 raise 40% of the time,
shows that the expected value of our bluff is - $20.
Figuring out this expected value problem is going to
be paramount when you're deciding whether or not to
turn a made hand into a bluff. You can guesstimate
your opponent's calling range by looking at your
perceived range against his and factoring in any
outlying tendencies that may change things a bit. Like if
your opponent makes huge folds too often or calls too
often or if he's tilting and more likely to call or to fold.
The Combinatorics of
Turning Hands into Bluffs
Against better players, you will often find yourself in
tricky spots where your range is fairly defined and they
are able to exploit this by turning something into a bluff
some unknown % of the time in order to force you to
make a mistake in a certain spot. The following example
is a hand that I played against a very good high stakes
NL player. I posted this hand on the LeggoPokker.com
HSNL forum,feel free to go visit the forum and give the
hand your two cents.
Here is my post:
"I'm not sure if he knows who I am on stars, but I'd say
for the majority of my play on Full Tilt he regards me as
a decent/solid regular capable of doing some weird
spewy crap at times. I'm also about 80% certain he can
turn at least some of his hands into a bluff (I guess
multiply his bluff range by 0.8 or something, I don't
know)."
$1000 USD NL Texas Hold'em Seat 2 is the button seat 1: VILLAIN 1 ($1806.00) seat 2: VILLAIN 2 ($3155.00) seat 3: VILLAIN 3 ($2112.75) seat 4: VILLAIN 4 ($2108.00) seat 5: HERO ($2341.00) seat 6: VILLAIN 5 ($2346.00)
VILLAIN 3 posts small blind $5 VILLAIN 4 posts big blind $10
Dealt to HERO: KsKc HERO RAISES $30 VILLAIN 5 FOLDS
VILLAIN 2 FOLDS VILLAIN 3 CALLS $25 VILLAIN 4 FOLDS
Flop: 8d9s3h VILLAIN 3 CHECKS HERO BETS $50 VILLAIN 3 CALLS $50
Turn: 8h VILLAIN 3 CHECKS HERO BETS $140 VILLAIN 3 CALLS $140
River: 7d VILLAIN 3 CHECKS HERO BETS $380 VILLAIN 3 RAISES $1125 HERO?
$745 to call.
"What range do you give him by the turn and how much of
that is he turning into a bluff (if any) on the river? Iguess
that about takes care of my reads... Oh I'd also like to add
that I took a while to size my river bet and that he
check-raised somewhere between quick and relatively
quick.
I'm not sure how he's interpreting this river bet size
either or if that affects his check-raise range at all."
After posting, I then proceeded to read about 20 HSNL
regulars and other people say 'instafold', 'easy fold', and
'fold'. After getting all the responses that I had expected to
see I then felt it was time to add my opinion of the outcome
of this hand.
Pot on the river = $1950 To call his raise = $745 Pot odds -2.62:1 (I have to be good 27.6% of the time in order to break even on a call)
We'll give my opponent in this hand a single hand that
he could turn into a bluff, a pocket pair, for six
combinations. There are two combinations of A8s remaining
and one of the 87s (we'll say four just to discount offsuit 87,
which is very generous towards his value range) and three
combinations of 77. Even with these ridiculously generous
assumptions that help my colleagues to prove their
dissimilar point of view, there are still 10 combinations of
value betting hands versus six combinations of bluffing
hands (1.67:1).
If villain can get to the river with 77, 33-66, TT, and one
third of the JJ combinations also get there that can possibly
bluff, then he onlyhas to be using one of those hands to
bluff, out of 5.33 hands, which seems fairly reasonable if not
even too optimistic.
It is very unlikely that people often slow-play sets
200bb deep on this board. I think any non-zero chance of
villain slow-playing can be explained away by attributing
the pot odds equivalent possibility of him
turning another combo of a hand into a bluff here and so
it's a moot point. In other words, I am being generous with
how the math problem could be written in order to
alleviate any worry or rebuttal a sceptical person mayhave
about this hand.
If he's turning one of his missed (non-boat) pocket
pairs into a bluff on the river, it means that I will win (6/16)
* 100% = 37.5% of the time when I call his river raise.
The way that our assumptions set up the expected
value equation for this problem, is an extremely close spot.
I believe that the math is skewed to ease the minds of
sceptics, but VILLAIN 3 is an extremely good player and
good players will make your decisions very close and
difficult, attempting to force you into making a mistake.
While this spot is a close decision, it revisits an important
concept about turning made hands into bluffs: against
great hand readers, you would have to be able to credibly
represent value hands that you would
play the same way as the strongest hands in your range. In
these spots, balance is extremely important. I've probably
missed some value by checking sets three times to an
aggressive opponent in those specific hands. However, later
when I check-raise the river, that same opponent has to give
me credit for me having a stronger range than a lot of
people would have in the same spot because of the way he
saw me play my strong hand earlier. Turning made hands
into bluffs is not only an interesting concept, but also a
great help to your poker game against other thinking
players and a good lesson in balance. It also forces you to
play actively and to always consider your range in every
spot that comes up throughout every hand you play, which
will rapidly improve your poker play compared to
auto-piloting through matches.
CHAPTER 7:
OVER-BETTING
AND
UNDER-BETTING -
ALL YOUR
OPTIONS
It is very important that you are asking yourself
each time that you choose a play, "what options do I
have and which is the best decision for this spot and
what are the implications of my decision now on future
hands that I play?" These considerations apply not only
for the specific point in the hand that you are in, but also
for later on in that hand and for your game as a whole. If
you are caught in a bluff now, will your opponent call
every value bet you make for the rest of his life? If so,
your bluff is more profitable because of how your
opponent will interpret your range in the future in
similar spots.
Two options beyond to bet or not to bet in a certain spot that
people don't often consider or understand why they should
consider are over-betting and under-betting the pot.
Over-betting:
Betting over the size of the
pot.
Complex definitions aside, over-betting is something
that a lot of people do not have in their game. It's a complex
topic from a theory perspective. Mathematically, it's
difficult to play against for your opposition, especially in
the spots we will discuss. That's why I believe it to be a
good weapon that should be in your ever growing
repertoire of potential best play decisions.
When our opponent's range is capped, i.e. he likely has
a certain "best" hand from the way he has played his hand
to this point, an over-bet will make his future decisions in
the hand very difficult. Often when we decide to over-bet
into a capped range, the cap for our opponent's range will
be a relatively low strength hand compared to all the hands
we are able to represent on
certain boards. His decisions will be especially difficult
due to the fact that our range, because it's so balanced and
how the board has run out, will be uncapped. The way
certain boards run out mean that we can have the nuts and
a lot of hands close in absolute strength, while our
opponent is far less likely to have the nuts. Another
positive aspect of over-betting all-in mostly seen in re-
raised pots or on the river in single-raised pots, is that it
stops our opponent from bluffing us off a potentially better
hand (ex. his smaller straight draw raises our river bet with
a missed ace-high draw) and we make a mistake by
folding.
Hand 1
Seat 1: VILLAIN 1 ($2,481) Posts big blind $10 Seat 2: VILLAIN 2 ($470) Seat 4: VILLAIN 3 ($3,999) Seat 5: HERO ($2,634) Seat 6: VILLAIN 4 ($990) Posts small blind $5
Dealt to HERO Tcjs
Pre-flop: (Pot: $15) FOLD VILLAIN 2 RAISE VILLAIN 3, to $30 CALL HERO, $30 CALL VILLAIN 4, $25 CALL VILLAIN 1, $20
Flop: (Pot: $120) 9c9dTh CHECK VILLAIN 4 CHECK VILLAIN 1 BET VILLAIN 3, $70 CALL HERO, $70 FOLD VILLAIN 4
Turn: (Pot: $260) 9c9dTh5h CHECK VILLAIN 3 BET HERO, $180 CALL VILLAIN 3, $180
River: (Pot: $620) 9c9dTh5hKc CHECK VILLAIN 3 BET HERO, S2,354 and is ALL-IN CALL VILLAIN 3, $770 and is ALL-IN RETURN HERO, $1,584
Showdown: SHOWS HERO Tcjc SHOWS VILLAIN 3 KdKh VILLAIN 3 wins the pot of $2,157 with a full house, kings full of Nines
This hand ties together a few concepts and
introduces a new one: how over-betting a medium
strength hand turns the hand into a bluff and when to
make this play. Granted, this particular situation is
fairly rare as we must be making a thin turn bet that is
followed by a river card that hits our range so hard that
our perceived range becomes much stronger than our
opponent's range. Given our strength, we should then make
a bet in order to fold our opponent off of nearly all of his
holdings. The math for this concept is fairly complex and
variable for each opponent, and so I won't be going into it in
this book; however, it's intuitive that risking slightly more
than a pot-sized bet in order to win the pot 95+ percent of
the time is an obviously profitable investment. Much of the
reasoning behind this calculation being so convoluted and
probably meaningless is because when one over-bets, it's
often difficult to determine a near-exact calling range for
your opponent.
In the above hand example I am checked to on the turn
and decide to bet in order to balance with the times that I'm
betting my large amount of straight draws in this spot and
to get value from worse hands that are inducing my draws
to bluff. I can be expected to be called by many worse hands
because my opponent is a thinking player who is aware of
my range well enough
in this spot in order to make a light call on the turn after
he checks to me. Once my opponent called the turn and
from the way he had been playing, I was nearly certain
that his range was capped at AA and was most likely
another Tx type hand as I would expect most of his
premium hands to be betting or check-raising this turn
when he is planning to continue betting for value. I
would suspect that he would choose to use his weaker
hands to induce bluffs for the reasons discuss in the
section on floating in Chapter 3.
On the river, my opponent checked again and
rather than making a smaller bet like $280 that would
possibly open me to a check-raise bluff or that would
likely only be called by a slightly better hand, I decided
to over-bet shove the river, representing any hand better
than AT. I have all of KJ. KQ. 9x. and QJ combinations
in my range in this spot and given the way he played his
hand on the turn, my range of hands is significantly
ahead of his range of hands on the river. I felt that in
order to only represent the aforementioned range it was
necessary to over-bet, thereby polarizing my range.
Because the only air hands I could have had were the four
combinations of 87s. I also expected to get a lot of credit in
this spot. Unfortunately I ran into his rivered full-house
and I lost the pot. Aside from my loss of this hand. I think
that I make quite a bit of money on average from this play
versus this opponent in this particular spot.
If we bet larger than the pot, then our opponent will
have had to win a larger percentage of the time to make his
call profitable because he has worse pot odds. With a
semi-face-up weak range, this will be extremely difficult to
do for him because we are the ones who control the
frequency of our over-bets. It would be very difficult for
him to trap us or to have correct slow-play frequencies to
counter our over-betting strategy without losing value in
other spots when we decide to take a showdown with our
weaker hands or not to bluff the river.
Hand 2
Here's another example of a time that I over-bet
because my perceived range by the river is quite wide.
Because most of my opponent's range is Qx and so
many draws missed the board on the river, I need to
offer my opponent a worse price on his river call in
order to make my river bluff profitable. Try assigning
me a range in this spot and assume that I can over-bet
KQ+ for value while the rest of my air makes the same
bet.
Full Tilt, $5/$l0 NL Hold'em Cash Game, 4 Players LeggoPoker.com Hand History Converter BB: $680.25 Hero (UTG): $1,000 BTN: $2,104.75 SB: $1,756.50
Pre-Flop: Jc8c dealt to Hero (UTG) Hero raises to $30
BTN folds SB calls $25 BB folds
Flop: (Pot: $70) 3cQc9d (2 Players) SB checks Hero bets $55 SB calls $55
Turn: (Pot: $180) 6h (2 Players) SB checks Hero bets SI50. SB calls $150
River: (Pot: S480) 9h (2 Players) SB checks Hero bets $765 and is ALL-IN SB folds
Results: $480 Pot ($2 Rake) Hero showed Jc8c and WON $478 (+$243 NET)
Another great time to over-bet is when your bet is
only going to be called by a great hand regardless of the
amount you bet. This premise of over-betting works
especially well because most of the time a board runs out
in such a way that this situation arises, it is also quite
similar, perhaps the same, as when your range is
uncapped and your opponent's range is capped.
Eventually, in these situations, people will feel
obligated to take a stand with the top of their range and
make a call to avoid folding 100% of their range in these
spots.
Hand 3
It's important to over-bet for value as well as with
bluffs in order to balance your over-betting range.
PokerStars, $10/$20 NL Hold'em Cash Game, 5 Players LeggoPoker.com Hand History Converter
Cutoff: $475.00 Button: $497.00 SB: $915.65.00 BB: $1,688.00 Hero(UTG): $2335
Pre-flop: KcQc dealt to Hero Hero raises to $60 (UTG) 3 folds BB ll $40
Flop: (Pot: $130) 9dTd6h (2 Players) BB checks
Hero bets $100 BB calls $100
Turn: (Pot:$330) Jc (2 Players) BB checks Hero bets $260 BB calls $260
River: (Pot: $850) As (2 Players) BB checks Hero bets $1,915 and is All-in ($1,268 to call) BB folds
Under-betting: making a bet
that is very small relative to
the pot size.
Under-bets are primarily used for two reasons:
1. A cheap bluff.
2. When we're coaxing our opposition into making a
bad call with deceptively good pot odds against our
range and/or to induce a bluff-raise from him in the
same spot.
In both cases, this type of bet size is best used when
there is little or no air in our range and our opponent's
range is extremely weak in comparison.
For value, we want to choose a bet size that is almost
bordering on what anything might call, knowing it's almost
always beat. Our opponent might justify his call by telling
himself that he is getting information about our range and
that he will make money from the combination of his
marginal or bad call and his newly acquired information in
the long-run. He might also just be curious and call with
something that's almost never good.
Under-betting is not meant to be a blocker bet. The
difference between the two is that a blocker bet is meant to
get calls from weaker hands and to allow us to comfortably
fold our hand to a raise. We have already said here that our
opponents range should be extremely weak before we
decide to under-bet for value, and its quite unlikely we'll be
raised on the river for value. Also, if we are raised, the
matter of comfortably folding goes out the window because
we are now facing a very strange line that represents not
very many good hands, especially hands that most people
are capable of raising for value. This is fairly often a
desperate bluff from an opponent misinterpreting our small
bet size for
weakness. After you under-bet and call a raise, you might
get owned by a river check-raise here or there, but I've
definitely won some big pots with very marginal holdings
facing river raises that made no sense for my opponent's
range.
Realizing all your options is crucial. Consider, for
example, a scenario in which we're under-betting for value
and then three-betting as a bluff over someone's river raise
in order to fold out their entire range. Consider bluffing
someone's over-bet. There are many more possibilities than
you have likely considered in this game. Be vigilant and
mindful while playing poker and while you're away from
playing the game and you're sure to find different and new
spots to explore that may confuse your opponents.
CHAPTER 8:
LEADING (INTO THE
PRE-FLOP-RAISER)
Leading into the pre-flop-raiser, affectionately
known as "donk betting" or "donking", is a strategy that
has become more prevalent as people have started to
understand continuation bets a bit better. As we have
discussed, it is often a mistake, especially against a great
and well-balanced player, to continuation bet too often,
especially with weaker made hands that are going to be
put into tough spots if they get raised. If it is difficult for
us to have a clearly correct turn play after we check-call
the flop, then sometimes leading can create a clear turn
play when check-raising or check-calling the flop may
lead to confusing turn and/or river spots.
An examination on leading and literature surrounding
the topic are almost non-existent in the poker community.
Therefore, by working on your leading game, I think that
we all stand to up our win rates by quite a bit as
adjustments to leading are yet to be examined in full or put
into practice in many games.
It is also important to note that because our perceived
range is much stronger on these boards, on which we will
soon elaborate, it is reasonable to assume that a decent
hand reader will be folding quite a few hands if he believes
that we have a balanced leading range. In order to create
the perception of a balanced range, we cannot always lead
air and always check-raise the nuts. If we play our hands in
such an unbalanced way, we will become easy to read and
we will be called down too lightly to make our bluffs
profitable against perceptive players and good hand
readers.
So with all the ideas we just examined we can begin to
construct a leading range. It is important to realize
that the boards on which we are choosing to lead are often
ones prone to changing quite a bit as the hand progresses,
so our perceived range may quickly become so strong
relative to our opponent's flop calling range that if we were
leading a weaker made hand, then there may often be
times we might want to lead our weak hand again as a
bluff. If we were leading with one semi- bluffing hand and
another draw in our perceived range gets there, we may
choose to lead again, continuing our (semi)bluff.
I think the best way to start thinking about leading
ranges is to look at some leading examples and then to add
other hands into our range on a specific board type in
order to balance bluffs with value bets. Remember how we
extrapolated our turn betting ranges, albeit somewhat
loosely depending on the specific turn card, from a good
river bluff range? We are going to use a similar technique
to determine good leading ranges.
Example
Pre-Flop: We call a button raise in the big blind with Qsjc
Flop: Ts8s3h
Notice how almost the entire deck is a scare card
for a significant part of our opponent's flop calling
range after we lead the flop. Any 7, any spade, 9, T, J, Q,
K, or A are scare cards that may hit the turn and give
our opponent pause with much of his flop calling range.
We also improve in terms of absolute strength on a lot
of these turn cards as well as improve our equity versus
our opponent's flop calling range. If our lead is called on
the flop we know that other than the five cards known
to us at the time that there are a remaining 47 cards in
the deck and of those 47 cards 25 of those cards (53.2%
of the deck) allow us to semi-bluff or value bet the turn
according to our plan of creating a range of hands with
which to continue on the turn based on improvements in
our equity. If we are called on the turn, the river will be a
scare card or a card improving our hand quite often as well
(24/46 cards or 52.2% of the time).
Even if our opponent has a hand as strong as 8x, he will
often be put in extremely difficult spots as the board and
our range appears to lessen the absolute strength of his
hand. If he has a straight draw we dominate J9o for
example, we could make a dominating hand which he may
give action to on the turn. When determining to continue
bluffing the river, assuming we continue to bluff the turn
the 53.2% of the time that we improve, we will have to
determine our opponent's likely worst hand for calling a
river bet of a given size and weigh the sizing with our
bluffing and value betting combinations of hands versus the
combinations of hands with which he gets to the river in a G
Bucks calculation (see Chapter 4: River Play).
Part of the problem of how amazing leading as a bluff
can be on some boards is that we also need to be leading
good hands in order to protect the times that we lead with
hands like queen high or a small spade draw, otherwise we
are able to be raised off of our hand too often and our
opponents will be able to adjust to our skewed frequencies
and exploit our play. Inherently, leading a balanced range,
as compared to a check- calling range, is going to be
difficult because leading medium-strength hands is usually
not advantageous against the range that gives our lead
action, especially across multiple streets. If we lead a
medium-strength hand, then our decision of what to do
when raised is a bit more complex and will likely lead to
mistakes against our opponent's hand. If we decide to call,
future streets can be difficult on coordinated boards out-of-
position. If we decide to three-bet the flop, it's unlikely that
our medium-strength hand does well against a range of
hands with which our opponent will commit his stack. The
problem in this case is that taking all of the medium hands
out of our range polarizes our leading range to very strong
value hands, or at least
hands with which we believe we are able to make the best
decisions on future streets, and semi-bluffs. Currently, a
leading game hasn't been explained or perfected by many
players and so people are still playing poorly against
leading when their opposition is probably leading far too
many hands as a bluff compared to the times that opponent
is leading for value. It's just like betting when checked to by
the pre- flop-raiser on certain boards, it works so often that
balance isn't an issue against 99% of people, and that's
something that we can exploit if we are in that enlightened
1% of poker players.
On the other side of the action, when facing a lead it's
important to realize the mentality of someone leading into
the pre-flop-raiser and their game plan and reasoning for
leading. To sum up the game plan we above outlined,
balancing for most players isn't necessary because their
opponents allow them to play in an exploitative way.
Assumptions by our opposition that we will react just
as poorly to leads as their average opponent gives us the
opportunity to force them into making a mistake.
Two ways we able to force such a mistake are by:
1. Widening our bluffing ranges on "scary flops" which
they will often lead
2. Widening our calling ranges on "scary" turns and
rivers which they will often continue to lead on after
we have called a "scary flop"
Both of these actions would be taken because we
expect our opponent's leading ranges to be unbalanced
and mostly composed of weaker semi-bluffing hands.
Adjustments made in a poker game should be based on a
function of how often our opponent's leading range is a
bluff and how often he is capable of three-betting the flop
as a bluff or floating out-of-position and bluffing a later
street.
You have already read how to calculate the expected
value of a play against a given range of hands
and I believe that leading ranges and folding ranges to
flop-raises or giving up on certain barreling cards is so
subjective that any sample exercises I could do here would
be almost entirely useless in the way that a single G Bucks
calculation is nearly meaningless. Now that you know
what to do try some expected value equations against
different leading ranges, what percentage of hands in that
range will fold to a raise, what percentage of hands in that
range will re-raise a raise, and what percentage will call.
By practicing the outcomes of several different plays
against several different ranges, you won't have to discover
in-game what the best play is after the chips go in the pot,
which is often the most pricy way to learn poker.
CHAPTER 9:
QUANTIFYING
"LEVELING"
Poker players love to talk about leveling one
another into a call or a fold in certain spots. By "leveling",
most people mean that they are trying to make an opponent
react a certain way based on the perception of a certain
action. People accept the mentality that they have tricked
someone if a certain outcome happens and think that they
have failed if their trick "does not work".
However, poker players should be thinking about
their opponent's possible range of hands and how their
ploy will skew their opponent's range in a certain
direction not just a specific hand. Leveling is like the
Sklansky Dollars terminology for what we come across
once we address the combinatorics and ranges involved in
one's interpretation of any given action, given previous
actions.
By breaking down the word leveling and by better
examining what it is meant to represent in terms of read
based mathematics, we are able to make better decisions,
ones that are more rational and more profitable rather than
superstitious and impulsive. Once an opponent reaches a
certain inflection point and we think that he is adjusting his
ranges in a way that allows us to make a different play more
profitably than another play, we should obviously choose
the latter play. This inflection point is what is often called
leveling by poker players, but the name for the inflection
point confuses some people into thinking that all
adjustments are spots on the other side of an inflection point
that should change how a range is played, instead of how a
range is adjusted. Over-adjusting to meta-game will cause
you to
lose money in some spots that might be avoided or even
more profitable by a smaller adjustment of your range.
Take the example of the beginning of a heads-up
match, the match begins and we know that our opponent is
capable of calling three-bets lightly, especially early in a
match, and so our plan is to start off three-betting a
depolarized range. We are dealt AJ and decide to three-bet
and our opponent folds to our raise. A few hands later after
some raising and folding pre- flop, no re-raising, we are
again dealt AJ. Again, we decide to three-bet, but this time
our reasoning is different because we believe that we have
come closer to an inflection point where our opponent's
pre-flop adjustment to our range might make our three-bet
more profitable than our first three-bet. Along with the read
that we have suggesting that he is capable of calling hands
which we dominate such as AT, A9s and KJ, we realize that
he is likely at some point to four-bet us lightly. This
pre-flop adjustment is inevitable given that we have
already three-bet him a few times at the very
beginning of the match and because we know he is a good
player who won't allow himself to be run over by re-raises.
Some players four-bet early as a bluff to set a tone for the
match and to send a message while other players do it out
of frustration, but the fact is that we expect this player to be
bluffing here more often than an average time when he is
re-raised pre-flop, and so for all the times we re-raise this
player, this situation may be one of the best times to
five-bet shove. At the beginning of the match, we were
uncertain of his four-betting range, but knew a bit about his
calling range. Now we are not only confident three-betting
this hand to get called by worse hands, but also fairly
confident in that we have a profitable five-bet shove as we
approach (or reach) the inflection point or the "breaking
point" when he decides to four-bet our three-bet as a bluff.
Let's say that away from an aggressive dynamic that
our opponent will be four-betting us as a bluff 35% of the
time and calling an all-in with a range of 99+, AQs+ and AK.
Our expected value for five-bet shoving Acjh here (after our
opponent four-bets to $240 over our $100 three- bet) lOObb
effective is:
EV (shove) = 0.35(340)+0.65(2000*0.30326-900) EV (shove) = 119 + (-190.762) EV (shove) = -71.762
After we have already three-bet him once in the match
and we expect him to adapt by four-bet bluffing about half
of the time and still call the same range of hands for value,
our EV of shoving with Acjh changes to:
EV (shove) = 0.50(340) + 0.50(2000*0.30326 - 900) EV (shove) = 170 + (-146.74) EV (shove) = 23.26
Notice how we're not calling the pre-flop situation
one when we are leveling our opponent into four-bet
bluffing us. Rather than thinking we are catching our
opponent bluffing pre-flop this exact time that we three-bet
we are adjusting the percentage that he bluffs a few points
higher given how we think our opponent thinks. This
adjustment to the percentage of times he is bluffing is the
best way for us to quantify his thought process and how it
will affect the hand. By imagining the dynamic as one
strictly based on leveling, we may incorrectly assume that
he won't be bluffing enough of the time here to shove or
that he is bluffing so often that we could shove a worse
hand that wouldn't do well enough against his calling range
to make a five- bet shove a profitable play in this spot.
I've already written about why trying to quantify
the expected value of a hand in which one or more of the
players in it over-bets is probably not worth the inaccurate
attempt, but I will write that the more often one over-bets,
the more likely an over-bet will be
called. If you are representing an extremely narrow
range of hands very often, an observant opponent will
realize that you're betting with more than just your
share of cards in a certain spot an capitalize on that
realization by calling more often. While it's difficult to
say how much more often and quite dependent on the
particular opponent in question, it is intuitive that the
more often and in succession that you are able to over-
bet, the more likely it is that one of your opponents will
take a stand and you will be called, and the more
expected value the play has when you're betting for
value.
By adding and removing combinations of
bluffs and value-bets from villain's range based on the
flow of the game we are able to make rational and more
profitable choices instead of going with an intuitive gut
feeling that may lead us astray. We want to escape the
need to play a guessing game and embrace a
mathematically supported plan based on our reads of
our opponent's (future) adjustments.
CHAPTER 10:
MISCELLANEOUS
CONCEPTS
Representing a Bluff
There are situations where calling a raise may actually
represent a stronger hand range than re-raising. Calling
may represent a stronger range because because in many
spots, you forfeit the illusion that you are trying to get
folding equity and you might be turning your hand face up
as extremely strong. Here is an example of a hand where the
value range that we are representing is extremely narrow
and so calling our opponent raise and failing to represent
air may be a large mistake that costs us lots of value.
Full Tilt, 6-MAX, DEEP $5/$10 - No Limit Hold'em
Seat 1: VILLAIN 1 ($1,000) Seat 2: VILLAIN 2 ($2,000) Seat 3: VILLAIN 3 ($5,253) Seat 4: VILLAIN 4 ($1,005) Seat 5: HERO ($1,958) Seat 6: VILLAIN 5 ($2,819) VILLAIN 4 posts the small blind $5 HERO posts the big blind $10 VILLAIN 3 is BTN
Dealt to HERO: 7h7s VILLAIN 5 RAISE, to $30 4 Fold. HERO CALL, $20
Flop: 3h3c7d Hero checks VILLAIN 5 bets $50 HERO raises to $180 VILLAIN 5 has 15 seconds left to act VILLAIN 5 has requested TIME VILLAIN 5 raises to $415 HERO has 15 seconds left to act
The important concept to realize by studying this
hand is thai we should three-bet in this spot both as a
bluff and for value. Because calling makes it so unlikely
that we have any air in our range, a three-bet will also
help us to get more value and build a pot versus our
opponent's non air range. He also may choose to float
because the range of hands that we're representing is so
polarized and fast played, something which many
people are not willing to do for fear of losing action.
There were my intentions when I decided to check-raise
the flop versus this particular opponent.
HERO raises to $720 VILLAIN 5 has 15 seconds left to act
VILLAIN 5 has requested TIME VILLAIN 5 calls $305
Turn: Ts HERO has 15 seconds left to act
Because we said that some of the time our
opponent will be floating and because we have
purposefully left just enough money for a pot size bet,
we should consider checking the turn in case he wants
to bluff us there or in case he has a weaker draw such as
56hh that could improve to a worse made hand on the
river Our turn check may also plant the idea in his mind
that we intended to give up on the turn if called on the
flop and widen his river calling range.
HERO checks VILLAIN 5 has 15 seconds left to act VILLAIN 5 has requested TIME VILLAIN 5 checks
River: 4s HERO has 15 seconds left to act HERO bets $1,235, and is ALL-IN
VILLAIN 5 calls $1,235
Showdown: HERO shows 7s7s VILLAIN 5 mucks KcKs HERO wins the pot ($3,972) with a full house: Sevens full of Threes
In this example of why it's important to represent air,
we are bet into by an opponent who isn't representing a
wide hand range for value given the combination of how
wide his flop check-call range is, the unlikelihood that the
turn 2h improves his specific hand, and the fact that this
opponent would be most likely to check-raise strong hands
on a draw heavy flop. We obviously have a profitable turn
call and possibly a profitable river call if our opponent
chooses to continue his bluff. Because calling should mean
to our opponent that most of the time we have showdown
value, he may be unlikely to continue blufiing on rivers that
don't improve any of his perceived semi-bluffing range. For
this reason, and to balance the times we would like to
bluff-raise this opponent when he takes a line that
represents nothing, we should raise our hand for value
and hopefully induce a larger mistake from our
opponent like a call without the correct implied odds or
three-betting the turn as a bluff. In this hand, we
successfully induced the latter and made much more
money while preserving a balanced strategy by
representing air with our turn raise.
Full Tilt 6-MAX $3/$6 - No Limit Hold'em
Seat 1: VILLAIN 1 ($1,318.50) Seat 2: VILLAIN 2 ($600) Seat 3: VILLAIN 3 ($444.90) Seat 4: HERO ($756.75) Seat 5: VILLAIN4 ($210) Seat 6: VILLAIN 5 ($975.95)
VILLAIN 4 posts SB $3 VILLAIN 5 posts BB $6 HERO is BTN
Dealt to HERO Qc9s Folded to HERO HERO raise to $15 VILLAIN 4 folds VILLAIN 5 has 15 seconds to act VILLAIN 5 calls $9
Flop: 3dQhTc VILLAIN 5 checks HERO bets $24 VILLAIN 5 calls $24
Turn: 3dQhTc2h VILLAIN 5 bets $54 HERO raises to $132 VILLAIN 5 has 15 seconds left to act VILLAIN 5 raises to $936.95, and is all in HERO calls $585.75. and is all in VILLAIN 5 shows 9hjh HERO shows Qc9s $219.20 returned to VILLAIN 5
River: 3dQhTc2hAd HERO wins the pot ($1,513.50) with a pair of Queens
Using other Players Perceived
Ranges to Strengthen our
Perceived Range
This hand shows how sometimes our opponent's
perception of how we should be interpreting how other
players react to our range may force them to make false
assumptions about the strength of our perceived range.
Giving us too much credit for a strong hand.
$2000.00 NLHE Seat 1: VILLAIN I ($2284.00) Seat 2. HERO ($3179.00) Seat 3: VILLAIN 2 ($2492.00) Seat 4: VILLAIN 3 ($3997.00) HERO posts small blind $10 VILLAIN 2 posts big blind $20
Dealt to HERO AcTs VILLAIN 3 raises $60.00 VILLAIN 1 folds HERO calls $50.00 VILLAIN 2 calls $40.00
Flop: Jd7d9c HERO bets $140 VILLAIN 2 calls $140 VILLAIN 3 calls $140
On the flop, this is a good board for us to represent a
strong range of hands and also one that our opponent's may
both check back a lot of the time so we lead with a gut-shot
and an over-card, with decent equity, but not enough to
make us comfortable getting stacks in on the flop. This hand
is a great example of the options to consider in the section
on leading
Turn: 4s HERO bets $420 VILLAIN 2 calls $420 VILLAIN 3 calls $420
On the turn, we can make a few assumptions given
the play of our opponents on the flop. The first caller is
very unlikely to have a hand like JJ+ because of pre-flop
and unlikely to have other strong hands of the strong
likelihood that we'd give him more action with the hands
in our range if he did raise the flop. We can also apply
similar logic to the pre-flop-raiser and therefore imagine
their ranges as fairly weak the majority of the time. They
both have to worry about a lot of scary turn cards killing
their action if they do have good hands. Therefore, we can
cap both of their ranges reasonably well at around AJ, and
so we lead again, predicting that weaker straight draws
like KQ will be forced to fold, we stop them from bluffing
us off of ace-high if we do decide to stop betting, and
hands like JT and 98 will begin to feel the heat of our
aggression and be
concerned about the threat of a large river bet. Whether
or not they fold on the turn is player dependent, but the
most important part of this hand is that the more action
each player gives us on our increasingly strong looking
bets, the tighter the range that they should assume that
we are bluffing. They know that we know our bluffs
shouldn't work against strong made hands often and so
we shouldn't too often continue with a bluff, especially
now that the turn doesn't improve any of our semi-
bluffing range.
River: 3s HERO bets $2559 VILLAIN 2 folds VILLAIN 3 folds Returned un called bet $2559 to HERO HERO wins $1858 from the main pot VILLAIN2 "so sick, 999?"
Finally, by the river, we are using our same logic
from the turn combined with the fact that the pot is so
big that both people would likely shove any hand on the
turn with which they were reasonably comfortable,
especially the second player to act. At the time of the hand,
I was also fairly confident that the pre-flop-raiser was
drawing, given his actions and timing, especially on the
turn. We go all-in for a slight over-bet, basically only
worried about making the non-pre-flop-raiser fold.
Because he knows that we have to consider the pre-flop-
raiser's range as tighter and slightly less capped, he then
has to give our third barrel more credit, knowing that we
should assume bluffs to be called more often. Also, because
our range probably included some air on both the flop and
on the turn, it's become increasingly unlikely that we are
still bluffing on the river, and more likely that we are
expecting one of the two players, especially the second to
make a call. As we predicted, the first player tank folded
and the second player folding instantly, making a missed
draw, as predicted, most likely. This hand shows how the
perceptions of other players' ranges within a hand can
change the perception of our range.
CHAPTER 11:
MOVING
THROUGH THE
LIMITS
Some things you'll likely be confronted with after
learning and experimenting with everything in this
book are the problems associated with moving up
through the limits. While it's a good problem to have,
there are certainly adjustments to be made and
misconceptions that could stunt your growth or cut into
your win rate upon entering into regular play in a new
limit. There are a few different mentalities that you may
adapt, sometimes wrongfully, and that your opponents
may assume that you adapt if they assume you're scared
money and over-adjusting to the players in the new
limit.
Shot taking
When taking shots at a limit, sometimes under-
rolled, it's important to realize that other regulars who
know you may think that you are a mark for some high
variance abuse. This thought process is because the
better players will realize that you should be variance
adverse when a higher percentage of your bankroll is on
the line. For this reason, I recommend a slightly snugger
style than your normal style of play, both to avoid the
variance when you cannot stand it and to avoid making
mistakes by making some incorrect assumptions about
your opposition. Playing w ith tighter ranges pre-flop
will also hurt your opponent's chances to make you fold
as often as they assume you will if they are trying to re-
raise you often as a bluff. Playing extremely tight in this
situation may even be more profitable than your normal
game plan because of how often some people will be
bluffing you. especially pre-flop when it is cheaper. Be
careful, those same assumptions about players bluffing
you more often may lead you to make mistakes based
on the idea that people are always making moves
against you or that all your bluffs will get much more
credit, since you're a new player to the limit. These
possible mistakes lead us into our next topic:
Fancy-play-syndrome (FPS)
A tempting over-adjustment many players make
when entenng a new limit is to think automatically that
everyone is omniscient and capable of seeing into your
soul and, therefore, what used to be your standard play
in a spot is going to be the wrong play or that the value
of the play is drastically diminished. Think about this
idea for a moment. Those plays are a large part of how
you made it this far to begin with, so why would you
abandon them now? If you're well-balanced in all the
spots we've been discussing, your value bets and bluffs will
still do well. They may not do quite as well, but this is
something that comes w ith mov ing into a more
challenging game. Your opponents will be more skilled
hand readers and your ranges will become more apparent
to them quicker than they will become evident to worse
players. Therefore, they are less likely to pay you off with
worse hands when you value bet and less likely to fold to
your bluffs when they have hands better than your hand.
Another way to say this is that they will be less likely to
make mistakes against your ranges in spots they've already
seen you play. Even though their reasoning might be
sounder, haphazardly debunking your game plan is more
often than not going to be a one-way ticket back to the next
lower limit.
Making it as a Poker Player
Once you are beating 1/2 online and are able to make
$4000 a month for about 8 hours of work per week, you may
feel tempted to feel like you have made it.
If you want to be the best, then you should avoid
complacency. It simply cannot exist for you. 1 know I've
spent parts of an organic chemistry class calculating how
much I can make a year by playing 6 hours of 400nl a day.
That was a few years ago now, but the great feeling that
washed over me when I saw that huge number at the
bottom of my chemistry notes still upsets me a bit. That
feeling will make you complacent and ambivalent to the
competition's efforts to improve. When this happens, forget
about being the best, you should be thinking about winning
at your regular limit! Poker is an ever evolving game and as
more training tools become available to the masses such as
video
producing sites, private coaching, and amazingly written
books, people will get better. Make sure you do not fall by
the wayside. I have never been one to be content with
mediocrity in a subject for which I have passion and you
will see that this is the one thing that the top players have in
common. Stylistically, some will differ from others Away
from the tables, some may spend more frivolously than
others. I will guarantee you that no matter who they are
away from the table, the best players have been obsessed
with the game and have put in the work alone or with a
close group of poker friends
Challenge yourself to realize that you should never
really "make it" as a poker player. To believe you have
made it is to accept your current set of standards for
your win rate, your game, and yourself and I believe it is
to fail. Put in the hours and keep working or you will get
passed by the pople who will not stop working in order
to better themselves.
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