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2 1CH FOFARMYHiSTORYUNIT
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CHIEF OF ARMY HISTORY CONFERENCE 2010Victory or Defeat: Armies in the Mtermath of Conflict
DAY 1Thursday 30 September 20100900 Opening
Chief ofArmy, LTGEN Ken Gillespie AO, DSC, CSM0915 Keynote:
AGlorious Defeat?How the French Remembered the Armies of the Revolutionaryand Napoleonic WarsAlan Forrest (University of York)
1015 Book launch1030 Morning tea1100 Session 1:
Losing the Insurgent 20th Century: The United States Armyand Reform after the Philippine-American War, 1902-1916David Silbey (Alvernia College)Lessons of Defeat, Lessons for War: The Ottoman EmpireMustafa Aksakal (American University)
1245 Lunch1345 Session 2:
How Military Tradition Prevailed and Reform Failed to Preventthe Collapse of the Russian EmpireJohn Steinberg (Georgia Southern University)
1445 Afternoon tea
1515 War and Peace:The British Army after the Victories of 1918 and 1945George Peden (University of Stirling)
1615 Close and Networking Drinks
DAY 2Friday 1October 20100900 Session 3:
The German Army after the Great War: aCase Study inSelective Self-DeceptionGeoff Megargee (US Holocaust Museum)Liberating Australian New Guinea and British Borneo:the Directorate of Research and Post-HostilitiesPlanning 1943-45Graeme Sligo (Australian Army)
1030 Morning tea
1100 Session 4:Hiroshima Over Hanoi: the Atomic Battlefield in SEATOContingency Planning 1955-1965Damien Fenton (Ministry for Culture and Heritage,New Zealand)
1200 Lunch1300 Session 5:
The Vietnam People's Army: Victory at Home (1975),Success in Cambodia (1989)Carl Thayer (University College, ADFA)The US Army in the Aftermath of Conflict, 1968-77Henry Gale (US Army War College)
1430 Afternoon tea
1500 Session 6:The South African Military and Post-Conflict Integrations in theTwentieth CenturyIan van der Waag (University of Stellenbosch)
1600 Closing remarks
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The Vietnam Peoples Army:Victory at Home (1975), Success in
Cambodia (1989)
Carlyle A. Thayer
P A i i Vi d D f A i i h
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TheVietnamPeoplesArmy:VictoryatHome(1975),SuccessinCambodia(1989)
CarlyleA.ThayerIntroduction
On 22nd December 1944, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) established a
guerilla unit known as the Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Army. This force
comprised thirty-four men under the command of Vo Nguyen Giap. The
Vietnam Propaganda and Liberation Army quickly grew in size and by March
1945 it totaled 1,000 soldiers organised into thirteen companies. It was renamed
the Vietnam Liberation Army.
In August 1945 the VCP-led Viet Minh sized power and the military underwent
another phase of rapid expansion. Its numbers reached 100,000 main force
regulars in late 1946 when hostilities broke out with France. In February 1951,
communist-led military forces were given their present designation, the Vietnam
Peoples Army (VPA, Quan Doi Nhan Dan). As a result of internal mobilization
and assistance from Communist China the VPA not only grew in size but in
structure. By 1954 the VPA totaled 400,000. The VPA regular or main forces (Chu
Luc) were organised into seven divisions (Dai Doan), a number of independent
regiments (Trung Doan) and Battalion Combat Teams with a total strength of
80,000.
During its sixty-five years of existence the VPA fought and prevailed in four
major conflicts: the anti-French Resistance War (1946-54), the anti-American War
(1959 75) th B d W ith Chi (F b M h 1979) d th C b di
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Victory at Home (1975)
During the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese communists adopted the propaganda
fiction that southern political and military forces were independent entities.
Communist military forces in the south, for example, were called the Peoples
Liberation Armed Forces. Increasingly during the Vietnam War VPA main forces
came to dominate the southern battlefield. They were supported by southern
regular, regional and local forces. The VCP Politburo in Hanoi set military
strategy and the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN; more accurately the
Central Committee Directorate for Southern Vietnam or Trung Uong Cuc Mien
Nam) consisting of high-level party officials and military officers, executed this
strategy. In the aftermath of military victory in 1975 there was no need toformally integrate southern communist military forces into the VPA because they
had been operating under a unified command since 1961.
The Vietnam War ended with unexpected suddenness. In the short space of fifty-
five days a communist military offensive centred on the highlands town of Ban
Me Thuot was expanded into a nationwide offensive, the Ho Chi Minh
Campaign, that resulted in the unconditional surrender of all civil and military
forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The swiftness of victory was
unexpected even to the architects of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign. The attack on
Ban Me Thuot, for example, was originally planned as the opening shot in a
series of offensives designed to continue into 1976. According to Van Tien Dung
(1977:25):
The strategic resolution of the Political Bureau was put into effect through the197576 two-year strategic plan: in 1975 we would strike unexpectedly with
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surrendered its forces. According to the official party newspaper, the
Vietnamese revolution has entered a new stage. This change consists mainly ofour countrys shift from war to peace... and from simultaneously fulfilling two
strategic tasks to execution by the entire country of a common strategic task:
socialist revolution and construction (Nhan Dan, 5 September 1975).
The sections below examine the impact of victory on the VPA under three
headings: military rule, maintenance of public order and security;, and economic
construction.
Militaryrule. The Ho Chi Minh Campaign led to the disintegration of the Armyof the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Soldiers broke rank and deserted. Some
took to looting and armed violence. The sudden evacuation of Americanpersonnel, the immediate cut in US assistance, and the collapse of central
authority, added to the chaos. In the confusion of this period tens of thousands of
civilians were internally displaced.
The first priority of VCP in establishing control over South Vietnam was to
ensure the maintenance of public order and security. The VPA was given
responsibility for this task. General administrative functions as well as security
was placed in the hands of Military Management Committees (MMCs) that were
set up in the cities and provinces of South Vietnam.
The MMCs, although mixed civil-military units, were under firm party control.
For example, the Saigon-Gia Dinh MMC, established on 3rd May 1975, was
headed by Colonel General Tran Van Tra, a member of the partys Central
Committee. The Saigon-Gia Dinh MMC quickly instituted the communist
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The MMCs were also set up at province level and below throughout South
Vietnam. As security conditions improved, they were replaced by civilian-dominated Peoples Revolutionary Committees (PRC). For example, the Saigon-
Gia Dinh MMC handed over power to the Ho Chi Minh City (as Saigon was
renamed) PRC on 21st January 1976. The transition from martial law to civilian
rule was competed by April 1976 when North and South were formally reunified
under the name Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Peoples Liberation ArmedForces discarded southern nomenclature and symbols and were formally merged
into the VPA without public ceremony.
Maintenanceofpublicorderandsecurity. The sudden collapse of the RVN wasan unprecedented event for it left a majority of its military forces under arms. In
the interval between the occupation of urban and provincial centres by
communist-led military units and the imposition of martial law, thousands of
armed ARVN troops went into hiding. Some ARVN soldiers conducted diehard
resistance to communist rule. They operated in scattered and uncoordinatedgroups in isolated pockets mainly in provinces adjacent to the Cambodian
border. Anti-communist resistance activity was also carried out by ethnic
minority groups in the central highlands associated with the FULRO
movement1, by Hoa Hao militia located in An Giang province, and, to a lesser
extent, by armed Catholic dissidents. In 1976, it was estimated that the combined
strength of these anti-communist groups ranged between 12,000 and 50,000
(Douglas Pike 1977: 38).
I i h f i i h h fi i i d b h
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became apparent that the MMCs lacked adequate manpower to cope with such
an enormous task and deadlines had to be repeatedly extended. By late August1975 only one-third of ARVN personnel had registered. By December the figure
had risen to one million including RVN civil officials; perhaps 575,000 went
unregistered.
The VPA was tasked with setting up re-education camps for former enemy
personnel, including RVN officials, and ARVN officers and enlisted men, where
they were subject to political indoctrination. The vast majority of ARVN
personnel were released after a short period of confinement. The re-education
camps were quickly turned over the Ministry of the Interior which replicated the
northern system of detention centres in the south. Members of the ARVN officer
corps were subjected to prolonged periods of confinement often in harsh
conditions. According to one close observer, men who had been regarded as
prisoners of war became transformed into political criminals, needing to be
punished (Bui Tin 1995:90).
In the immediate aftermath of victory, in addition to maintaining domestic orderand security, the VPA was assigned various tasks that can be grouped under the
expression stabilizing the lives of the people. VPA personnel and party security
units were ordered to take charge of public utilities and vital industries. They
were aided by covert agents who had been placed in the RVN administration
during the course of the war. No major acts of sabotage were reported and water
and electricity continued to be provided for Saigon residents. Security details
were organized to protect each installation against sabotage. As conditions
stabilized, the military became involved in transporting refugees back to their
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Economic construction. After the formal reunification of Vietnam, the VCPdecided not to demobilize its large standing army but to engage it directly inrepairing war damage and undertake economic construction more generally. The
military therefore became involved in four main areas: agriculture, industry,
communications and transport, and capital construction.
Among the specific jobs assigned to the military were: building new economic
zones where displaced persons were resettled; taking part in capital construction
projects; such as building roads, railways (for example, the 365 km Vinh-Hue
section of the Thong Nhat north-south line), pipelines, industrial plants, airports,
ports, and civil installations; taking part in afforestation and forest exploitation
projects; and engaging in land cultivation and livestock breeding. The VPA
Navy helped to expand the nation's fishing fleet, repair freighters and assumed
responsibility for oil and gas exploration in addition to the transportation of
merchandise between north and south.
In order to accommodate the growing demand for manpower in civilian
reconstruction, military conscription was broadened to include service with'labour shock brigades'. The VPA was also assigned the additional responsibility
of socializing southern youths into the values of a socialist society and work
patterns of a relatively modern organization.
These developments provoked dissent within the military on the part of middle
and high ranking officers who objected to the diversion of the VPA from military
tasks. They argued that continued and increased VPA involvement in
reconstruction would degrade combat readiness, erode discipline and delay the
process of regularization and modernization According to one Hanoi based
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construction were interdependent (Vo Nguyen Giap 1976). In October of that
year the party's Political Bureau re-endorsed the military's involvement in
economic work by stressing that it was 'a fundamental and urgent demand of the
revolution' (Ray 1979:24. That month a General Directorate for Economic
Development was created within the Ministry of National Defence to oversee the
efforts of army units in economic reconstruction tasks.
The matter of the military's involvement in economic reconstruction was further
considered at the VCP's Fourth National Party Congress in late 1976. The
congress adopted a resolution that set out the VPAs tasks in the new stage.
According to this document:
our armed forces have two tasks: always to stand ready to fight and to defendthe fatherland and to actively participate in economic construction. In thisspirit, we must enforce the regime of military service and the army's duty tobuild the economy. We must strive to develop the national defence industry(Vietnam News Agency, 24 December 1976.
The role of the VPA was further elaborated in a speech given by Senior General
Van Tien Dung. He stated:
The army must play an important role in redistributing the work forcethroughout the country and building and consolidating strategic areas whichare important for both the economy and national defence. The entire armymust clearly display the sense of the need to perform labour, to economicallybuild the army, to bring the sense of socialist collective ownership into play in building the country; to increase its knowledge of economic laws, and of
production science and technique, and to implement systems and regulationsinsuring economic efficiency and managerial discipline. We are resolved tostrive to successfully carry out the economic construction task entrusted toour army by the party and state.
In addition to the aforementioned tasks, the party entrusts the army with thed f h h l i h d d f h d f
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The decision of the 4th Party Congress to intensify the involvement of the VPA in
civilian-type economic tasks was a compromise between two tendencies. On the
one hand, the VCP leadership could not afford to pursue policies that maintained
a large unproductive standing army. On the other hand, neither could
Vietnamese leaders sanction a massive demobilization of VPA soldiers into the
civilian economy. Instead, a middle course was chosen. A Hanoi-based journalist
has written:
The case for participation by the armed forces in the economic recoveryprogram was strong. A generation of war had left the army with a nearmonopoly of resources for certain types of construction and it was by far thelargest single source of trained cadres. Disciplined, politicized and oftenpossessing important technical skills, the troops were best equipped to meetreconstruction needs on an emergency basis (Ray 1979:24).
In the months following the 4th Party Congress, 20,000 army officers and other
ranks were slated for specialized training as district-level economic managers
(Vietnam News Agency, 10 October 1977). Conscription was extended to take in
an estimated 25 per cent of all men aged between 18 and 25. Army units,
bolstered by this intake, were assigned a variety of specialized tasks includingthe upgrading of a strategic road network along the Ho Chi Minh Trail; running
state farms; construction of large-scale irrigation works; land reclamation and
other major projects.
Examples of the army's employment in civilian economic tasks include the 8th
Division, located in the Plain of Reeds, which was reported to have reclaimed
and ploughed more than 12,000 hectares of land. Similarly, the Hau Giang
Regiment in the 9th Military Region was said to have spent 'a year of painstaking
efforts digging canals reclaiming land from swampy mangroves and putting up
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Vietnam suffered between 35,000-50,000 casualties in addition to massive
destruction carried out on the economic infrastructure of the northern border
provinces by departing PLA troops. On 5 March 1979 the Vietnamese National
Assembly decreed a state of general mobilization. Vietnamese forces remained in
Cambodia for a decade. When the VPA withdrew in September 1989 they left
behind a Cambodian state that is still in power today. Vietnam could justifiably
claim success in Cambodia. A veteran of the Cambodian conflict, who now holdsthe rank of lieutenant general, told the author that Vietnams success was a
miracle (interview, Ho Chi Minh City, 5 August 2010).
Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and China's attack on Vietnamese resulted
in the rapid expansion of the VPA. Main force strength jumped from 615,000 in
1978 to 1,023,000 in 1979; included in this increase were 400,000 soldiers and
8,000 airmen. This expansion was met by increased conscription and by the
diversion of economic construction units to combat duty.
This section is divided into seven parts. It begins with a brief overview setting
out the domestic and strategic environment in which Vietnam made the decisionto terminate its occupation of Cambodia, withdraw its military forces from that
country, and undertake a massive demobilization of its main forces. Next the
section provides details of the demobilization program and the problems faced
by returning veterans. It then looks at disciplinary and rear service problems
faced by the military during the period of down-sizing. The section then turns itsfocus to the employment of discharged soldiers in army-run enterprises and in
the national defense industry sector.
Withdrawal from Cambodia In 1985 Vietnam faced a domestic socio economic
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high. In response to Vietnams use of force against the Khmer Rouge state, most
regional states, including China, Japan and the members of the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) declared an embargo on aid, trade and
investment with Vietnam. Vietnam was also subject to a long-standing embargo
by the United States first imposed on North Vietnam in 1964 and then extended
over the entire country following unification in 1975.
In 1984, Vietnam adopted a five-year strategic plan to end the conflict in
Cambodia (Thayer, 1994, p. 10). The first phase called for the destruction of
resistance camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. This was accomplished
during the 1984-85 dry season. The remaining phases included sealing off the
border, destruction of resistance guerrilla forces, population security and
building up a pro-Vietnamese Cambodian civilian administration and military
force. These military initiatives were also accompanied by diplomatic efforts
designed to bring the conflict to an end through negotiations.
In late 1986, responding to both domestic and external pressures, the VCPs Sixth
National Congress adopted a comprehensive economic reform program knownas doi moi. This program was designed to transform its Soviet-style socialist
economy into a multi-sector commodity economy under state direction. In other
words, Vietnam would abolish central planning, experiment with market forces
and invite foreign investment from capitalist countries.
In order to accomplish these bold objectives Vietnam first had to liquidate its
involvement in Cambodia by successfully carrying out its strategic plan. Pressure
from Moscow only reinforced Vietnams determination to speed up this process
and leave behind a politico-military structure in Cambodia capable of standing
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in the process of demobilizing one million men from its army. These
developments then set the stage for Vietnam to withdraw all its military forces
from Cambodia and initiate a massive reduction of its standing army.
Demobilisation. In 1987, the VPA was at peak strength. Its main force of 1.26
million regulars was the fifth largest standing army in the world. Only the Soviet
Union, China, the United States and India had larger military forces. To this
number must be added an additional 2.5 million reserves, paramilitary forces
and border guards totalling another 1.24 million. In sum Vietnams defence force
totalled 5 million.2 Included in this number were an estimated 180,000 troops
deployed in Cambodia and a further 40,000 assigned to Laos.
In the second quarter of 1987, following the landmark Sixth National Party
Congress, the VCP Politburo met in secret and adopted Resolution No. 2, On
Strengthening National Defence in the New Revolutionary Stage. This
resolution approved a plan to strategically readjust Vietnamese military forces.
Priority was placed on the withdrawal of Vietnamese combat units from
Cambodia beginning in June 1988 and concluding in September 1989.Vietnamese military forces were also withdrawn from Laos at the same time.
Resolution No. 2 also authorized a massive force reduction program and
approved a new defence doctrine known as peoples war and all peoples
national defence. The new doctrine redefined the roles of the main force,
reserves, and other paramilitary units and laid out plans for the construction of
defence zones, the armys role in the economy and the modernization of the
national defence industry.
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adopted (De Rienzo 1989:9). First, selected officers and other ranks were retired
early on modest pensions. During the period from mid-1987 to late 1990,
according to Defense Minister General Le Duc Anh, 600,000 soldiers, including
100,000 officers, were demobilized, reducing the VPA to 660,000 main force
regulars (Agence France-Presse, 23 December 1990). Included in this number
were 50,000 Cambodian veterans who were withdrawn in 1988-89 (Kyodo News
Service, 1 November 1990). According to the VPA Chief of Staff, General DaoDinh Luyen, Vietnams armed forced were reduced but not restructured
(Karniol, 1993b:32). Reductions were mainly made to infantry, engineering,
administration, logistic units and self-defence forces. The artillery corps,
communications, air force, and navy were not affected (Robinson 1990b:9).
Demobilized regulars were assigned to reserve units and were on call to be
mobilized in case of national emergency.
Vietnams large militia and self-defense forces, estimated at 12 percent of the
population, were also slated to be reduced to about 8 percent of the population
(Robinson 1989). However, according to one report, a number of localities have
gone overboard in reducing the size of the forces, with the militia and self-
defence forces accounting for only one to two percent of the population (Quan
Doi Nhan Dan, 20 December 1990, p. 2). In Military Region 9, for example, it was
reported in late 1990 that only 1.09 percent of the population are members of the
military regions coastal militia and self-defence forces (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 20
December 1990, p. 2). Drastic cuts in the size of militia and self-defence forces
were also confirmed by an article in the army journal that stated [t]he size of the
military and self-defence forces has been reduced to the point where the forces
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The second approach to demobilization involved sending soldiers abroad to
Europe and the Middle East as civilian guest workers. Between 1987 and 1989,
Vietnams Ministry of National Defence dispatched more than 25,000
demobilized soldiers and defence industry workers to the Soviet Union, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria under labour cooperation programs
(Vietnam News Agency, 7 July 1989). In 1989, of the 150,000 Vietnamese working
abroad, mostly in socialist countries, forty percent were ex-soldiers (Hawksley,1989). The third approach to demobilization involved restructuring military
forces into economic units or engineering and labour teams and engaging them
in a variety of production and construction tasks.
Vietnamese officials provided contradictory information on the final targets of
the VPA force reductions. In April 1989, for example, Major General Tran Cong
Man indicated that the ideal size of the standing army should be set at one
percent of the total population (Hawksley 1989; Kyodo News Service, 12 April
1989). At the same time, Lt. Gen. Le Kha Phieu indicated that the VPA would be
reduced to 500,000 by 1994 (BBC World Service, Newsreel Program, 17 April
1989). Several months later General Man indicated that the ultimate goal was to
reduce the standing force to 500,000 by 1992 (Tai Ming Cheung and Hiebert
1989:24). In December 1990 it was disclosed that due to high unemployment in
the civilian sector, demobilization of regular forces had been halted (Agence
France-Presse, 18 December 1990). This marked the end of the strategic
readjustment of the VPA decreed by Politburo Resolution no. 2 issued four years
earlier.
Over the next eight years Vietnam allowed the size of its main forces to drop
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Luyen reported that further cuts in the size of the VPA would continue if the
political and economic climate permitted (Karniol 1993a:32). The cuts have all
been taken from the army, the navy and air force have not been affected.
Problems of returning veterans. Vietnams demobilized veterans entered asociety in transition from socialism to a market economy. State enterprises which
once relied of government subsidies were now forced to turn a profit in order to
survive. Under state regulations, soldiers were theoretically entitled to return to
their former employers, but under the new economic mechanism many
enterprises were in no shape to do so (Dang Vu Hiep 1989:71). Demobilised
soldiers who failed to find employment joined a labour market with
unemployment rates in urban areas as high as twenty to thirty percent, and high
under employment in the rural areas (Williams 1989).
According to Lt. Gen. Nguyen Thoi Bung, the vast majority of soldiers had
received only basic education before they were conscripted (Saigon Giai Phong, 5
August 1989, pp. 1-2). Government policy gave them priority in job training and
education. However, they were so poorly educated that a major effort wasnecessary to provide skills that would make them marketable.
The problem of demobilized army men in the south was particularly severe.
Most soldiers who fought in Cambodia had been conscripted from this region.
They were demobilized en masse over a relatively short period of time.
Government services at all levels were strained to the breaking point to cope
with such numbers. According to figures for Ho Chi Minh City for the 197689
period, only 7.2% of all demobilized soldiers were able to find full-time
employment 24 7% found part time work while the remaining 68 1% worked
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were the last to be hired because prospective employers feared they would be
difficult to supervise. Despite official policy, some employers did not give
priority in hiring to soldiers who had been officially recognized for exceptional
exploits on the battlefield. The same article reported that many well-connected
youths, who succeeded in evading the draft, used their influence to wangle
vocational training, work abroad or jobs in the state sector at the expense of
returning veterans (Williams 1989). In mid-1991, for example, twenty high-ranking officials in Hai Phong were charged with helping their sons evade the
draft.
As early as May 1986, in response to mounting socio-economic difficulties,
southern military veterans grouped together and formed a Club of Former
Resistance Fighters (Thayer, 1992:4546). The Club was initially a mutual aid
association dedicated to improving the lives of veterans but after the Sixth Party
Congress it began to play a more overtly political role. In 1988, after the death of
Premier Pham Hung, a southerner, the Club circulated a petition opposing the
partys official nominee. The Club began publishing its own newspaper that was
highly critical of government and party policies. The paper was suppressed.
The activities of the Club took on added political significance in 1989-90, as
socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe simultaneously with Vietnams military
withdrawal from Cambodia and massive demobilization program. Vietnams
veteran community, estimated at 4 million, was a sizeable constituency (Hiebert,1991a:28). In early 1990, the leader of the Club of Former Resistance Fighters,
Nguyen Ho, demanded that the VCP grant the Club the status of a legal mass
organization. Later in the year, veterans sent hundreds of letters to the party
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colonels whom they suspected as a threat to their power (Bui Tin 1991). Key club
leaders were detained while others were co-opted into a new party-approved
body, the Vietnam War Veterans Association. This association was then
affiliated to the Vietnam Fatherland Front, the control body for mass
organizations led by the party.
Desertion and disciplinary problems. In the post-Cambodia period, Vietnamsgeneral socio-economic malaise, coupled with the difficulties engendered by
demobilization, led to the outbreak of disciplinary problems such as draft-
dodging and desertion. In late 1989, Defence Minister Le Duc Anh noted that
there have been indications of youths balking at joining the army and afraid of
becoming an officer (Hanoi Domestic Service, 4 December 1989). In 1991, it was
reported that half of those of military age failed to report for the compulsory
medical exam (Hiebert 1991b:24).
The following year an investigation into the causes of desertion by new
recruits in the Ta Xanh Division in central Vietnam revealed that they were
poorly educated, had low political knowledge, and feared what they consideredwould be a life of hardship and privation. The manner in which conscription was
carried out did little to relieve the anxieties of new recruits. In some areas force
was used. After arrival at their unit, according to the investigation report, the
new recruits were herded into confined areas surrounded by barbed wire fences
and guarded by military and civil police (Voice of Vietnam, 28 May 1992).
The report on Ta Xanh Division also noted that wealthy families in one district
used their influence to gain exemptions for their children. Influential families
used their positions to ensure that their children were not given hardship
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In late 1990 the National Assembly adopted amendments to the 1981 Law on
Military Service. The length of service for ordinary conscripts was lowered from
three to two years and the number of deferment categories was increased (Nhan
Dan, 5 January 1991 pp. 3-4 and Tuoi Tre, 11 January 1992, p. 7).
Nevertheless problems of desertion continued to be severe in 1991. A review of
the situation in Military Region 2 stated bluntly that the desertion rate has not
declined (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 28 February 1991, p. 2). Even in the Hanoi Capital
Military Region unauthorized absences continued to be a problem, especially by
conscripts who had criminal records and incited others to desert. A study of
twenty-eight deserters from the Capital Military Region noted that 25 percent
said they had deserted because of the harsh discipline meted out by superiors.
Soldiers also deserted in order to provide an income for their poor families (Quan
Doi Nhan Dan, 26 February 1991, p. 2).
A report on the Tay Nguyen Corps noted that the average desertion rate for the
past five years stood at 14 percent (Voice of Vietnam, 12 September 1991). A
study of the causes of desertion in Military Region 9 provided the following
figures: 45 percent due to harsh treatment by superiors, 25 percent due to
difficult living conditions and restrictions on behaviour, 25 percent due to
homesickness and 5 percent due to family pressures (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 19
September 1991, p. 2).
In 1992, Military Region 1 issued instructions to subordinate echelons to make
strenuous efforts to determine the causes of desertion and to formulate effective
policies to retain conscripts in military service. As a result of new policies, during
the second half of the year desertion rates in Military Region 1 were reduced by
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Vietnam, 5 August 1993). The problem of desertion was reduced but not
eliminated entirely.
The same factors that contributed to the rise of desertion as a major problem also
contributed to the rise of other disciplinary problems. In answer to the question
why troops still violated discipline, Major General Le Toan noted that army
discipline was affected by negative trends taking place in general society (Quan
Doi Nhan Dan, 19 March 1992, p. 2). The most common problems were theft and
the illegal sale of weapons and ammunition (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 11 February
1991, p. 2). The VPA responded to these actions by stepping up political
indoctrination and, where necessary, applying punitive measures. Draft-eligible
young men who engaged in three oppositions opposition to the registration,
opposition to medical check up, and opposition to induction orders were
punished in three stages: public criticism in their residential areas, coercive
labour, and finally, prosecution (Tuoi Tre, 11 January 1992, p. 7). Major General
Nguyen Van Phiet reported in early 1992 that these measures were having a
remedial effect and the number of disciplinary violations was generally on the
decline (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 17 March 1992, p. 2).
Rear service. In 1987, when the Politburo decided to conduct a strategicreadjustment of military forces by carrying out a large-scale program of troop
reduction, it was agreed to fund this program by setting aside a fixed portion of
the national budget. Two years later it was revealed that the Ministry of Financecould only come up with two-thirds of the amount of money that had been
allocated (Le Duc Anh 1989). This resulted in a generalized shortage of all
manner of goods and a marked deterioration in the standard of living for
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21
subsidies and poor management techniques which also impacted negatively on
the families of disabled soldiers and war dead and retirees.
According to Senior Lt. General Dang Vu Hiep, a major review of rear service
policy noted that efforts at reform had failed because the basic regulations were
thirty years out of date and they had not been modified to suit the new situation
(Dang Vu Hiep 1989:70). This was particularly true of the system of salaries,
wages, incentives, special allowances and long service benefits. The review
quoted by Hiep also noted the general failure of the system to deliver set
amounts of supplies in sufficient quantity and quality, at a set price, on the date
agreed upon. Conditions along Vietnams borders with China and Cambodia
and in the Central Highlands were very grim as a graphic account by Lt. Gen.
Nguyen Trong Xuyen revealed. In these remote areas daily rations, medicine,
clothing and equipment were all in extremely short supply. Mess halls, sleeping
quarters and recreational facilities were also lacking (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 7
January 1991, p. 2).
Defense Minister Le Duc Anh noted other rear service problems in an address to
National Assembly in late 1989. During 1988, Anh noted, because of the shortage
of funds, it was not possible to build needed storage facilities or pay the costs of
maintaining and repairing weapons and other technical equipment. In his words,
rare and valuable items were left in a state of disrepair. Minister Anh warned
that if funds were not forthcoming in 1990 literally billions of dollars worth ofvaluable equipment could not be repaired or regularly serviced and would have
to be discarded. Some of the equipment was so scarce that it could not be
replaced even if funds were available. A shortage of funds would also lead to
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22
The plight of Vietnams military was also raised by General Doan Khue in a
speech to the Seventh Party Congress in mid-1991. Khue proposed that existing
welfare policies which covered the army and its rear echelons be revised in order
to ensure that the minimum standards were available so soldiers could
satisfactorily fulfil their duties and so that youths were would be attracted by a
career in the army (Voice of Vietnam, 25 June 1991). General Khue also
highlighted the negative effects that budget cuts were having on proper
maintenance. In his view it was necessary to immediately collect a large quantity
of weapons, ammunition and equipment in need of maintenance and repair and
store for future use (Voice of Vietnam, 25 June 1991). Doans views were
seconded by Lt. Gen. Le Kha Phieu who estimated that 70 percent of weapons
and ammunition in storage was deteriorating rapidly or already damagedconsiderably (Bekaert 1992:4).
Vietnams deteriorating conditions contributed to the rise of theft of state
property and other unsanctioned activities. Individual soldiers stole weapons
and supplies for resale. Military vehicles were used illegally to transport civilian
goods, using the protection afforded their officials license plates. In one notable
case air plane frames were undervalued and sold. Police raids in mid-1989
uncovered military units in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City that raised funds by
showing pornographic videos (Hiebert 1989: 23). In sum, military life became
less and less attractive when compared with civilian life (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 14
August 1991, p. 2). Young officers sought transfers or early discharge.
The VPA found it difficult to recruit candidates for its officer training schools
(Nguyen Te Nhi 1991:3536). For example, the Army Infantry Academy in Son
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23
lacked the desire to study (Nguyen Te Nhi 1991:35). Indeed, concern over the
future was a burning social issue for VPA officers who were slated for
discharge or who had been passed over for promotion at a time of force
reduction (Voice of Vietnam, 21 September 1990).
In February 1990, the Ministry for National Defence took the decision to renovate
the logistics system by commercializing it. The new system gave greater
flexibility to the units involved, helped to alleviate the situation of chronic
shortages, and resulted in somewhat better material conditions. Over three years
later, however, medical facilities for army veterans were still under financed
(Branigin 1993a). According to Major General Dang Huyen Phuong, in the past
military units were provided supplies in kind according to set norms. These
units had little or no control over delivery schedules, quantity received or even
quality. Once the policy of commercialization was adopted, however, units could
take the initiative to purchase grain, foodstuffs and fuel in the open market
under contract to suppliers (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 21 September 1992, p. 2). Lt.
Gen. Le Hoa argued that the new decentralized commercial system had marked
benefits which led to immediate improvements. Army units now purchased their
supplies in accord with their actual needs. This resulted in better quality supplies
and a reduction in waste and losses. Transport and storage costs declined and
corruption was reduced as well as fewer layers of administration were involved
(Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 23 March 1992, p. 2).
While Vietnams new rear service policy has helped to improve the material
conditions of active duty units, Vietnams cash strapped economy placed severe
constraints on its maintenance program. According to one defence analyst,
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24
Economic construction. Vietnamese military units have been engaged inbuilding socialism and economic construction tasks since unification. In the
decade up to 1986 Army units of corps (binh doan) size were assigned to new
economic zones, state farms and forests, hydroelectric and water conservancy
projects, building roads, and oil and gas exploration. The scope and nature of the
militarys involvement in production activities underwent a fundamental change
after the adoption economic reforms and the promulgation of PolitburoResolution no. 2 (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 12 May 1991, p. 1). In addition to the
militarys traditional involvement in economic production activities, now
military forces were converted wholesale into economic construction units or
engineering and labour brigades. This was largely a paper exercise in which
military construction units were a legal status under new legislation. By 1989,there were sixteen specialized economic construction divisions in the VPAs table
of organization. One unit, of roughly 12,000 men, was given responsibility for
completing the massive Hoa Binh hydro-electric project northwest of Hanoi.
Brigades and smaller sized units planted rubber, coffee and tea. Some
demobilised units retained their officers and became in effect reserve units
engaged in economic work.
The armys involvement in economic activities aroused debate as to its efficacy.
One school of thought argued that the army had achieved satisfactory results
because it had attained a degree of self-sufficiency and was able to make
financial contributions to the state thereby contributing to national defence
(Hanoi Home Service, 13 August 1989). Another school argued that the army
was inefficient as an economic producer and was a drain on the state budget.
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areas, he argued (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 12 August 1991, p. 3). A commentator
using the pen name Quang Dau argued that recent reforms, which resulted in the
reorganization of military construction units and enterprises, forced these
organizations to adopt business accounting practices while at the same time
arguing for a continuation of their state subsidies for the next couple of years.
This was so these enterprises could move towards self-reliance and learn how to
attract capital.
According to Quang Dau, Resolution No. 33 of the partys Central Committee
Military Commission made it quite explicit that military units would have to
participate in economic-building tasks in order to raise their standards of living
and contribute to national development. These units were expected to become
partially self-sufficient and make contributions to the state budget. Units
assigned to remote areas were expected to engage in various tasks such as water
conservancy, communications, agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Those
volunteering or enlisting to serve with economic construction units could
complete their military service and labour duty at the same time.
During the two-year period ending in August 1989 so many military enterprises
became involved in economic production activities that the table of organization
of the Economic General Department had to be changed four times. Nearly all
the enterprises and factories under the VPAs Technical General Department
engaged in producing goods for the market. This accounted for between 4050percent of total production output (Hanoi Home Service, 13 August 1989). Senior
General Le Trong Tan estimated that the army raised 20 percent of its revenue
from internal sources (Hiebert 1991b:24).
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26
there were seventeen such organizations, including enterprises, state farms and
state forestry groups (Nhan Dan, 10 April 1989, p. 3). These units operated under
the same government regulations for state enterprises. They were required to
take responsibility for proper accounting procedures, accumulating investment
capital, making payments to Military Regions 9 defence budget, and ensuring
that basic living standards were met. The second type of economic work
involved regular units engaging in small-scale agricultural production in areas
around their camps, as well as limited cooperation with units engaged in full-
time work.
Army units in the first category or full-time production, produced lumber,
bricks, tiles and nails for domestic use and coconut fibre rugs for export. They
also re-worked sheet metal, provided transportation services and engaged in
various other projects. Of total earnings received, nearly one-third was
transferred to the military region. These funds were used to purchase tire tubes,
fuel, iron and steel, and service vehicles. Military Region 9 also set aside funds
for social welfare and for the construction of new headquarters and barracks.
Military units that engaged in agricultural activities produced grain, meat, fish
sauce, vegetables, fruit, sugar cane, and coconuts, gathered firewood, and raised
fish, farm animals and poultry.
Major General Cao Van Dom, Chief of the Military Region 9s Rear Services
Department, stated that such economic activity was necessary in order tocompensate for food shortages (Nhan Dan, 10 April 1989, p. 3). In 1988, according
to General Dom, Military Region 9 itself received only one-fifth to one-quarter of
the prescribed food ration for its troops, while troops on duty in Cambodia
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of barracks, vehicles and artillery sheds and warehouses, upgrading hospitals
and dispensaries, 6.5% for maintenance, supplies and replacement parts, 7% as a
liquid asset fund, and 4.5% for welfare support, bonuses and labour protection
(Nhan Dan, 10 April 1989, p. 3).
The debate over the efficacy of the armys involvement in the economy was
debated at a national army-wide conference on production and economic work.
The conference resolved it is unnecessary now to argue whether the armyshould engage in economic work or not but primarily on how to produce
effective results (Hanoi Home Service, 13 August 1989). The conference also
concluded that in accordance with Politburo Resolution no. 2 the army had
sanction to use its manpower, equipment and machinery and official duty time
to engage in production and economic work.
There were basically three different ways that a military unit could become
involved in economic activities: as a national defence production enterprise that
produced military goods as its first priority and then produced civilian products
for the domestic market; as a specialized economic unit, such as a corporation or
general corporation; and as a regular army production installation whose output
was designed to improve the living conditions of the troops (Phan Thu 1991:33).
In March 1989 the Council of Ministers issued Directive No. 46, a major new
policy regarding the militarys role in economic construction. This directive
required that all VPA production and economic building units and defence
enterprises conduct their affairs under the independent economic accounting
system (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 12 August 1991, p. 3). At the same time, the VPAs
General Economic and Technical Department (Tong Cuc Kinh Te va Ky Thuat) was
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28
same state laws as civilian enterprises (Hanoi Home Service, 13 August 1989). In
other words, they were given legal status and were now able to open bank
accounts, including foreign currency accounts, to form legal associations, or enter
into joint ventures with Vietnamese or foreign partners. At the end of 1989
additional army units were engaged in economic activities and transformed into
corporations, general corporations or other types of legal enterprises (Tran Duc
Nghia 1990:36).
One survey of the armys activities in economic production over the period 1986
90 described them as still modest but already encouraging (QuanDoi Nhan Dan,
12 August 1991, p. 3). This survey noted, however, the diversity of activities
undertaken by army units: planting vegetables, cajuput (a plant which produces
aromatic oil), tea and rubber for production purposes; opening virgin land;
establishing forestry zones; land reclamation; apatite, coal and tin mining; cattle
breeding; ship repair; sea food production; and myriad construction activities
such as sea dikes, fresh water canals, new economic zones, roads and highways,
housing, and major state infrastructure development projects.
In 1993 it was reported that 70,000 soldiers or twelve percent of the entire
standing army were employed full-time in various commercial enterprises
(Hiebert 1993:40 and Branigin 1993b). In other words, there has been over an 11
percent increase in the number of soldiers employed in commercial activities
since the adoption of the 1989 reforms. Local militia units were reported to haveset up at least 160 enterprises, while the VPA main force had nearly sixty
organizations, converted into legal entities, engaged in economic activities
involving more than two hundred primary level enterprises (Quan Doi Nhan Dan,
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VPA gave preference in its hiring policies not only to the family members of
active duty personnel but to skilled veterans and their families. Thus national
defence industries served as another outlet to absorb discharged service
personnel.
The long period of Soviet and Eastern European military assistance to Vietnam
resulted in a situation where the Vietnamese army had more modern equipment,
especially construction equipment, than the civilian sector (Dang Vu Hiep1990:54). Vietnams low level of economic development also meant that its
industrial capacity, including national defence industry, was rather primitive.
Vietnam could only manufacture small arms, including machine guns and rocket
launchers, ammunition such as 82mm mortar shells, and a few spare parts but
little else. The major priorities of the national defence industry were to achieve
self-sufficiency in the production of certain medical supplies, manufacture
equipment and weapons for the armys use, provide the technical support
necessary to maintain military equipment and meet the logistics and other needs
of the Vietnam Peoples Army (Voice of Vietnam, 11 March 1991, Nhan Dan, 4
November 1991, p. 3).
In late 1989, General Le Duc Anh announced that the existing structure of
military technology research institutes would be reorganized to focus on
production technology of use to both the military and civilian sectors of the
economy. Vietnams national defence industry quickly took to productionactivities related to the civilian economy. As one writer noted in 1991, defence
factories produced an ever larger amount of civilian goods. Consumer goods
production in military enterprises comprised about half of the production
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national defence industries would be developed gradually and Vietnam would
continue to purchase abroad needed defence equipment and weapons to meet
future needs (Voice of Vietnam, 27 December 1991). In the meantime, in order to
curtail wastage, breakdowns and losses, stress was placed on stock piling,
storing and maintaining military equipment and on standardization of weapons.
The subject of Vietnams national defence industry was a controversial one as the
VCP began preparations for its Seventh National Congress. One radio broadcaststated bluntly that the party draft Strategy for Socio-Economic Stabilization and
Development Up to the Year 2000 has failed to come up with a precise solution,
particularly an investment solution, for the national defence industry (Voice of
Vietnam, 11 March 1991). At the congress the military increased its
representation on the Central Committee for the first time since 1960. This
quickly translated into a larger defence budget in which priority was given to
developing a national defence industry and a modest program of force
modernization.
Conclusion
What has been the impact on victory in the Vietnam War and success in
Cambodia on the VPA? Can these two events be compared?
During the Vietnam War the VPA grew in size and developed into a modern
ground force with specialised corps for armour, artillery, engineering, sappers
and special forces, air defence etc. The VPA became dependent on the Soviet
Union for big ticket military equipment, spare parts, and military assistance.
The Vietnam War arguably was not a conventional interstate war but an
32
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therefore, was assigned major roles not only in maintaining domestic security,
but also in post-war reconstruction and economic development. These missions
reinforced the dual role of the Vietnamese military national defence and
socialist construction and the continued involvement of the military in political
and economic affairs.
The damage caused by the war, coupled with the poor state of Vietnams
economy, prohibited the full scale demobilisation of the army. The VCP directedthe VPA to play a major role in economic development. This laid the seeds for
the VPAs later involvement in commercial enterprises. The armys assignment
to economic construction precipitated a debate with the VPA about the role
military professionalism. Did peacetime economic roles detract from the mission
of national defence?
This debate became moot when the Khmer Rouge regime stepped up its armed
attacks on Vietnam as soon as the anti-American War came to an end. Vietnam
had to mobilise for war on its southwest and northern borders. VPA units that
had been diverted to economic tasks had to be redirected back to their prime
function.
The end of the conflict in Cambodia resulted in different outcomes than the end
of the Vietnam War. Vietnam intervened in Cambodia to halt aggression but
overstretched itself by occupying the country. Vietnam was isolated by the
international community and fell into deeper dependency on the Soviet Union.
The costs of prolonged conflict, a deteriorating domestic economy, and external
pressures, led to one inescapable conclusion: the VPA had to be withdrawn from
Cambodia and rapidly demobilised so Vietnam could pursue a domestic policy
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majority of soldiers who fought in Cambodia were conscripted in the south.
When they were demobilised they entered an economy driven by market forces.
They found it difficult to readjust. Jobs with their former employers were no
longer guaranteed and for many veterans their lot was not a very happy one.
It was during this period that a group of southern veterans became active and
organised themselves to improve their social welfare. This endeavour quickly
turned to political activism which took on a regional tinge. Security authoritiesquickly repressed the Club of Former Resistance Fighters, but permitted the
veterans to organise an official association and join the list of party-approved
mass organisations.
Within a year of the VPAs withdrawal from Cambodia the Soviet empire
collapsed and exposed Vietnams dependency. Vietnam could no longer afford
to maintain the billions of dollars of military equipment it had been given by the
Soviet Union over the last quarter century. The VPA fell into a parlous state
when the grand bargain of 1987 (demobilisation in exchange for a set defence
budget) came unstuck. The VPA moved to make up budget shortfalls by
commercialising the operations of its enterprises and national defence industries.
Today the VPA faces the same issues but in a different form. The VPA must still
carry out two main missions national defence and national construction. VPA
units have responsibility for economic-defence zones in remote areas, for
example. The VCP has ordered the VPA to divest itself of its commercialenterprises. Nonetheless, the VPA will continue to operate national defence
industries and other enterprises that contribute to national security. But in the
new strategic situation greater stress now is being given to military
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The Vietnam P
Success in Ca
Professor CaThe University of Ne
Australian Defen
oples Army:
,bodia 1989
lyle A. ThayerSouth Wales at the
e Force Academy, .
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Outline of
Background
Victory at HoSuccess in CConclusions
resentation
e (1975)mbodia 1989
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. ac
NVA, PAVN or V
military and e
Anti-AmericanCambodian conf
groun
A?
conomic
ar (1959-75)ict (1977-89)
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2. Victor
Peoples Liberation A
VPA regulars dominat
1975 victory unexpe epu c o etnam u
at Home
med Forces
d battlefield
tedcon t ona surren er
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Militar
Ho Chi Minh Campaig s n egra onInternally displaced peMilitary Management
Household re istration
Rule
(March-April 1975)
rsonsommittees (1975-76)
s stem
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conom c
Repair war-time damNew Economic Zone
Capital construction Debate: reconstructi ar on wo ron s
ons ruc on
ge
n v defenceam o a an na
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3. Success i
International isolat -
5-Year Strategic Pl
Doi Moi Renovati o t uro eso ut
n Cambodia
ion
n (1984-89)
onn o. 7
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Demo
From 1.2 million (19
Guest workers in
economic units ter attr t on
ilisation
7) to 660,000 (1990)
East Europe
= 4 4,
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Problems of Ret
From socialist to
Discrimination an u o ormer e
Vietnam War Veter
urning Veterans
arket economy
corruptions ance g ers
ns Assocation
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vas on o conscrDifficulties in recru
Exemptions given t Desertion rife
oniting officers
o wealthy
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Rear
Grand bargain de
Budget shortfalls =
Theft and sale of stLog st cs commerc
ervice
mobilisation and
privation
ate propertya ze
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Economic
Traditional economicMilitary units convert
1989 corporations an
Extra budgetary sourContinued internal de
onstruction
missiond into 16 economic
general corporations
e of incomebate
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ro uc on or eEmployment for v
families Gradual NDI mode
nce an mar eterans and
rnization
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Conclusion
VPA transformed intarmy
Resources poured i o pos -war emo
VPA assigned post-economic roles
ictory at Home
conventional land
to militaryza on
ar construction and
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rawa an emSoutherners face a
Political activism by dependency
Beginnings of force
za onarket economy
eterans
odernisation
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Victory at Home (
975), Success in