7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
1/60
MARCOS MENDOZA vs. FRANCISCO DE LEON
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 9596. February 11, 1916.]
MARCOS MENDOZA, plaintiff-appellee,vs. FRANCISCO DE LEON ET AL.,defendants-appellants.
Luis Morales for the appellants.
Hugo Sansano for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND CORPORATE
POWERS; LIABILITY TO PRIVATE PERSONS.
The Municipal Code confers both governmental andbusiness or corporate powers upon municipal
corporations. For the exercise of the former it is not liableto private persons. It's liability to them for the wrongful
exercise of the latter is the same as that of a privatecorporation or individual.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFICERS AND AGENTS Officers and agents of municipal corporations charged
with the performance of governmental duties which aretheir nature legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial, are not
liable for the consequences of their official act unless it
be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, with theexpress purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Officers of municipalitiescharged with the administration of patrimonial property
of a municipal corporation are liable for mismanagementof its affairs as are directors or managing officers of
private corporations; not for mere mistakes of judgment,but only when their acts are so far opposed to the true
interests of the municipality as to lead to the clearinference that no one thus acting could have been
influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests,but that they must have acted with an intent to subserve
some outside purpose regardless of the consequences tothe municipality and in a manner inconsistent with its
interest.4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The defendant councillors
regularly leased an exclusive ferry privilege to theplaintiff for two years. After continuous user of a little
more than one year, they forcibly evicted him on thepretext that he was not operating the ferry leased to him.
Held: Under the evidence of record, that there is nomanner of doubt that this pretext was absolutely without
foundation and as there was therefore no occasion
whatever for rescinding the contract, the defendant
councillors are liable personally for the damagesresulting to the lessee by their wrongful action.
D E C I S I O N
TRENT, Jp:
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
2/60
This is an action for damages against theindividual members of the municipal council of the
municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation
of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege awarded to the
plaintiff under the provisions of Act. No. 1634 of thePhilippine Commission. After user of a little more than
one year, the plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and inpursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein
defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry toanother person.
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organizedunder the Municipal Code have both governmental and
corporate or business functions. Of the first class are theadoption of regulations against fire and disease,
preservation of the public peace maintenance ofmunicipal prisons, establishment of primary schools and
post-offices, etc. Of the latter class are the establishmentof municipal waterworks for the use of the inhabitants,
the construction and maintenance of municipalslaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing
establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. Act No.1634 provides that the use of each fishery, fish-breeding
ground, ferry, stable, market, slaughterhouse belonging
to any municipality or township shall be let to the highestbidder annually or for such longer period not exceeding
five years as may have been previously approved by the
provincial board of the province in which themunicipality or township is located.
The twofold character of the powers of amunicipality, under our Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is
so apparent and its private or corporate powers so
numerous and important that we find no difficulty in
reaching the conclusion that the general principlesgoverning the liability of such entities to private
individuals as enunciated in the United States are
applicable to it. The distinction between governmental
powers on the one hand, and corporate or proprietary orbusiness powers on the other, as the latter class is
variously described in the reported cases, has long beenrecognized in the United States and there is no dissent
from the doctrine.
In Wilcox vs. City of Rochester (190 N.Y., 137), it
was said:
"The broad general doctrine of the
Maxmilian case (Maxmilian vs. Mayor, etc.,New York, 62 N.Y., 160), which is certainly
not now open to question in the courts of thisState, is that 'two kinds of duties are imposed
on municipal corporations, the onegovernmental and a branch of the general
administration of the state, the otherquasiprivate or corporate;' and 'that in the exercise
of the latter duties the municipality is liablefor the acts of its officers and agents, while in
the former it is not.' (Cullen, J., in Lefrois vs
Co. of Monroe, 162 N.Y., 563, 567.)"
The Maxmilian case is quoted with approval in
Bond vs. Royston (130 Ga., 646).
In Co. Comm's of Anne Arundel Co. vs. Duckett(20 Md., 468, 476; 83 Am. Dec., 557), it was said:
"With the regard to the liability of apublic municipal corporation for the acts of its
officers, the distinction is between an exercise
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
3/60
of those legislative powers which it holds forthe public purposes, and as part of the
government of the country, and those private
franchises which belong to it, as a creation of
the law; within the sphere of the former, itenjoys the exemption of the government, from
responsibility for its own acts, and for the actsof those who are independent corporate
officers, deriving their rights and duties fromthe sovereign power. But in regard to the
latter, it is responsible for the acts of thosewho are in law its agents, though they may
not be appointed by itself."
This case is quoted with approval in Trammell vs.
Russellville (34 Ark., 105; 36 Am. Rep., 1); and inMcIlheney vs. Wilmington (127 N. C., 146; 50 L. R. A.,
470).
In Cummings vs. Lobsitz (42 Okla., 704; L. R. A.,
N. S., 1915 B, p. 415), it was said:
"A distinction is made between the
liability of a municipal corporation for theacts of its own officers in the exercise of
powers which it possesses for the publicpurpose and which it holds as agent of the
state, and those powers which embrace private
or corporate duties and are exercised for the
advantage of the municipality and itsinhabitants. When the acts of its officers come
within the powers which it has as agent of thestate, it is exempt from liability for its own
acts and the acts of its officers; if the acts of
the officer or agent of the city are for the
special benefit of the corporation in its privateor corporate interest, such officer is deemed
the agent or servant of the city, but where the
act is not in relation to a private or corporate
interest of the municipality, but for the benefitof the public at large, such acts by the agents
and servants are deemed to be acts by publicor state officers, and for the public benefit."
The distinction is also recognized by Dillon in hiswork on Municipal Corporations (5th ed.) sections 38
and 39.
As is indicated in some of the above quoted cases,
the municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers oragents in the performance in the performance of its
governmental functions. Governmental affairs do not losetheir governmental character by being delegated to the
municipal government. Nor does the fact that such dutiesare performed by such officers of the municipality which,
for convenience, the state allows the municipality toselect, change their character. To preserve the peace,
protect the morals and health of the community and so onis to administer government, whether it be done by the
central government itself or is shifted to a local
organization. And the state being immune for injuries
suffered by private individuals in the administration ofstrictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed
by the municipality in the performance of the sameduties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute.
"The state cannot, without its consentexpressed through legislation, be sued for
injuries resulting from an act done in the
exercise of its lawful governmental powers
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
4/60
and pertaining to the administration ofgovernment. . . . Municipal corporations are
agents of the state in the exercise of certain
governmental powers. The preservation of the
health and peace of its inhabitants and fireprotections afforded the property owner, are
governmental functions." (Burke vs. City ofSouth Omaha, 79 Neb., 793)
In Nicholson vs. Detroit (129 Mich., 246; 56. L. R.A., 601), it was said:
"It is the well-settled rule that the stateis not liable to private persons who suffer
injuries through negligence of its officers and the rule extends to townships and cities
while in the performance of state
functions, imposed upon them by the law.
This subject is fully discussed in Detroit vs.Blackeby (21 Mich., 84; 4 Am. Rep., 450). It
was there held that cities are governmentalagencies, and that their 'officers are in no such
sense municipal agents; that their negligenceis the neglect of the municipality; nor will
their misconduct be chargeable against them,
unless the act complained of be either
authorized or ratified.' And in a large numberof cases it has been held that there is no such
liability on the part of such governmentalagency unless it has been imposed by statute,
and in such case it is necessarily limited bythe statute."
In Claussen vs City of Luverne (103 Minn., 491;
15 L. R. A., N. S., 698), it was said:
"It is elementary that neither the statenor any of the subdivisions, like a
municipality, through which it operates, is
liable for torts committed by public officers,
save in definitely excepted classes of cases.The exemption is based upon the sovereign
character of the state and its agencies, andupon the absence of obligation, and not on the
ground that by no means for remedy has beenprovided. 'The government,' said Mr. Justice
Story, 'does not undertake to guarantee to anyperson the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs, since that would involve it
in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, whichwould be subversive of the public interest.'
(U.S. vs Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat., 720; 6 L. ed.,199; Beers vs. Arkansas, 20 How., 527; 15 L.
ed., 991) This general exemption has beenapplied to municipal corporations in so far as
the acts complained of were, in the languageof the memorandum of the trial court, 'done in
exercising powers for the public at large as a
governing agency.' While so acting, the citycannot be held liable for misfeasance; and . . .the rule ofrespondeat superiorhas no
application."
Nor are officers or agents of the Governmentcharged with the performance of governmental duties
which are in their nature legislative, or quasi judicial,
liable for the consequences of their official acts, unless it
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
5/60
be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, andwith the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the
plaintiff. If they exercise their honest judgment in the
performance of their duties, their errors cannot be
charged against them. (People vs. May, 251 Ill., 54; SaltLake County vs. Clinton [Utah, 1911], 117 Pac., 1075;
Comanche County vs. Burks (Tex. Civ. App., 19140, 166S. W., 470; Monnier vs. Godbold, 1166 La., 165; 5 L. R.
A., N. S., 463; Ray vs. Dodd, 132 Mo. App., 444;Johnson vs. Marsh, 82 N. J. L., 4; Gregory vs. Brooks, 37
Conn., 365; Lecourt vs. Gaster, 50 La. Ann., 521.) So itmay be said that in so far as its governmental functions
are concerned, a municipality is not liable at all, unless
expressly made by statute; nor are its officers, so long as
they perform their duties honestly and in good faith. Themost common illustration of both phases of this rule is
the action for false imprisonment so often broughtagainst a municipality or a municipal officer. (Bartlett vs.
City of Columbus, 101 Ga., 300; 44 L. R. A. 795; Petersvs. City of Lindsborg, 40 Kan., 654.) So, in Field vs. City
of Des Moines (39 Iowa, 575), it was held that amunicipality, acting under authority given it by the
central government to destroy houses in the path of a
conflagration, was not liable in damages in the absenceof a statute expressly making it so.
From what has already been said, it should be clear
that a municipality is not exempt from liability for thenegligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or
business functions. In the administration of itspatrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private
corporation or individual 153113-13 so far as its liabilityto third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its
contracts, valid entered into, may be enforced and
damages may be collected from it for the torts of itsofficers or agents within the scope of their employment
in precisely the same manner and to the same extent as
those of private corporations or individuals. As to such
matters the principles respondeat superiorapplies. It isfor these purposes that the municipality is made liable to
suits in the courts.
"Municipal corporations are subject to
be sued upon contracts and in tort. In aprevious chapter we have considered at length
the authority of such corporations to makecontracts, the mode of exercising, and the
effect of transcending the power. This leavesbut little to add in this place respecting their
liability in actions ex contractu. Upon anauthorized contractthat is, upon a contract
within the scope of the charter or legislativepowers of the corporation and duly made by
the proper officers or agents they are liablein the same manner and to the same extent as
private corporations or natural persons."(Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed.,
sec. 1610.)
The same author says in section 1647:
"The rule of law is a general one, that
the superior or employer must answer civilly
for the negligence or want of skill of his agentor servant in the course or line of his
employment, by which another, who is freefrom contributory fault, is injured. Municipal
corporations, under the conditions herein
stated, fall within the operation of this rule of
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
6/60
law, and are liable, accordingly, to civilactions for damages when the requisite
elements of liability coexist. To create such
liability, it is fundamentally necessary that the
act done which is injurious to others must bewithin the scope of the corporate powers as
prescribed by charter or positive enactment(the extent of which powers all persons are
bound, at their peril, to know); in other words,it must not be ultra vires in the sense that it is
not within the power or authority of thecorporation to act in reference to it under any
circumstances. If the act complained of
necessarily lies wholly outside of the general
or special powers of the corporation asconferred in its charter or by statute, the
corporation can in no event be liable to anaction for damages, whether it directly
commanded the performance of the act orwhether it be done by its officers without its
express command; for a corporation cannot ofcourse, be impliedly liable to a greater extent
than it could make itself by express corporate
vote or action."It often happens that the same agent or agency has
both a governmental and a corporate character. Such, for
instance, are a municipal water system designed both forprotection against fire (a governmental function) and to
supply water to the inhabitants for profit (a corporatefunction) (Omaha Water Co., vs. Omaha, 12 L. R. A., N.
S. 736; 77 C. C. A., 267; 147 Fed., 1; Judson vs. Boroughof Winsted, 80 Conn., 384; 15 L. R. A., N. S., 91); a
municipal light plant both for lighting the streets (a
governmental function) and for furnishing light to theinhabitants at a profit (a corporate function) (Fisher vs.
New Bern, 140 N. C., 506; 111 Am. St. Rep., 857); an
agent who is at the same time a police officer and a
caretaker of a municipal toll bridge (Woodhull vs.Mayor, etc., of New York, 150 N. Y., 450). It is, also,
sometimes the case that considerable difficulty isexperienced in determining whether a particular
municipal duty is governmental or corporate.
But questions such as these do not arise in the case
at bar. Here it is clear that the leasing of a municipal ferryto the highest bidder for a specified period of time is not
a governmental but corporate function. Such a lease,when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the
lessee which the municipality is bound to respect. Thematter is thus summed up by Dillon on Municipal
Corporations (5th ed., sec. 1306):
"Ordinances made by municipalities
under charter or legislative authority,containing grants to water and light
companies and other public servicecorporations of the right to use the street
pipes, mains, etc., upon the condition of the
performance of service by the grantee, are,
after acceptance and performance by thegrantee, contracts protected by the prohibition
of the Federal Constitution against theenactment of any State Law impairing the
obligation of contracts."
Again, this author, adopting the language of the
court inIn re Fay (15 Pick. [Mass.], 243), says, in section
277:
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
7/60
"If a municipal corporation, seized of aferry, lease the same, through the agency of
the mayor and aldermen, with a covenant of
quiet enjoyment, this covenant will not
restrain the mayor and aldermen fromexercising the powers vested in them by
statute, to license another ferry over the samewaters, if in their judgment (which cannot be
reviewed by the courts) the public necessityand convenience require it. On such a
covenant the city may be liable to thecovenantees; but the powers vested in the city
officers as trustees of the public cannot be
thus abrogated. If, however, the city in its
corporate capacity is the legal owner of anexclusive franchise, its grantees or lessees
would hold it, notwithstanding any license toothers, whether granted by the mayor and
aldermen or any other tribunal."
It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions
of the Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, above referredto, the plaintiff had a vested right to the exclusive
operation of the ferry in question for the period of his
lease. Were the municipality a party to this action, itwould be patent that a judgment for damages against it
for the rescission of the contract would be proper. This,
be it said, is the usual method of exacting damages, eitherex contractu orex delicto arising from the exercise of
corporate powers of municipalities. But the presentaction is against the members of the municipal council
personally, and the question arise: Are they liable? Inadministering the patrimonial property of municipalities,
the municipal council occupies, for most purposes, the
position of a board of directors of a private corporation.In disposing of the local public utilities, if the term may
be used, such as the fishing and ferry rights, etc., they
must exercise considerable judgment. It requires some
considerable amount of business acumen to compelperformance on the part of lessees of these privileges in
accordance with the terms of their leases and in a mannerin which will not cause the property to deteriorate.
Questions must continually arise which are not expresslyprovided for in the contracts and which must be settled, if
possible, in a manner that will preserve the just claims ofthe municipality. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that
on occasion the councilors may have reason to believe
that a particular contract has been rescinded by the other
party or has never been legally entered into, in both ofwhich cases, decisive steps must be taken to safeguard
the interest of the municipality. Thus, in Municipality ofMoncada vs. Cajuigan (21 Phil. Rep., 184), the lessee of
a municipal fishery was evicted for failing to pay hisquarterly rents. The municipal authorities rightly held
that the contract was rescinded but forcibly evicted thelessee instead of resorting to the courts. Hence, in an
action by the municipality against the lessee and his
bondsmen to recover rent arrears, damages were allowedthe lessee on his counterclaim for the loss caused by theforcible eviction. Nevertheless, we do not think the
councilors could have been personally held liable for
their error in resorting to forcible eviction of the lessee.
Theirs was an error of judgment, and honest mistake ontheir part as to the rights of the municipality in the
premises. We think the rule of personal liability shouldbe with municipal councilors in such matters as it is with
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
8/60
the directors or managers of an ordinary privatecorporation.
"Under the rule that directors are notliable for mistakes of judgment, it follows
naturally that they are not liable for themismanagement of the corporate affairs where
such mismanagement is a mistake ofjudgment. The wisdom of this rule is not only
approved by common experience but by lawwriters and all courts. A rule so rigid as to
hold directors personally liable for honestmistakes in corporate management would
deter all prudent business men from acceptingsuch positions. The remedy of stockholders in
all such cases is by a change in the directory. .. . The rule is that the courts will not interfere
even in doubtful cases. But directors andmanaging directors may be liable for
mismanagement to warrant the interpositionof a court either as against the contemplated
action of the directors, or a majority of thestockholders, or to give relief by way of
damages after the action has been taken; a
case must be made out which plainly showsthat such action is so far opposed to the true
interests of the corporation itself as to lead to
the clear inference that no thus acting couldhave been influenced by any honest desire to
secure such interests, but that he must haveacted with an intent to subserve some outside
purpose, regardless of the consequences to thecorporation, and in a manner inconsistent with
its interests." (Thompson on Corporations,sec. 1298.)
In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of
evidence that there was any justifiable reason for forcibly
evicting the plaintiff from the ferry which he had leased.On the contrary, the defendant councilors attempted tojustify their action on the ground that the ferry which he
was operating was not the one leased to him; this in spiteof the fact the vice-president had personally placed him
in possession of it more than a year before, and the factthat he had operated this ferry for over a year, evidently
with the knowledge of the defendants. The evidence is soclear that the ferry of which the plaintiff was
dispossessed was the one which he had leased that noreasonable man would entertain any doubt whatever upon
the question. Hence, we cannot say that in rescinding thecontract with the plaintiff, thereby making the
municipality liable to an action for damages for no validreason at all, the defendant councilors were honestly
acting for the interests of the municipality. We are,therefore, of the opinion that the defendants are liable
jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the
ferry privilege in question. In reaching this conclusion,we have not failed to take into consideration the rule
enunciated in Dennison vs. The Moro Province (R. G.No. 8173, March 28, 1914; not reported), nor the
distinction made by the courts in the United Statesbetween the liability of a municipal corporation, made
such by acceptance of a village or city charter, and the
involuntary quasi corporations known as counties, towns,
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
9/60
schools districts, and especially the townships of NewEngland. Upon the question of the amount of damages
sustained, we accept the findings of the lower court.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, andAraullo, JJ.concur.
Moreland, J. concurs in the result.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 71998-99. June 2, 1993.]
EMILIANO R. DE LOS SANTOS,
SPOUSES NORMA A. PADILLA and
ISIDORO L. PADILLA and the HEIRSOF FRANCISCO DAYRIT, petitioners,vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, HON. JUDGE
CICERO C. JURADO, NESTOR
AGUSTIN and EDILBERTO CADIENTE,respondents.
Isidoro L. Padilla for petitioners.
Joaquin G. Mendoza for E. Cadiente.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, Jp:
Questioned in the instant petition for review on certiorari is
the Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court1affirming the December 1, 1982 Order of the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII at Pasig2in Civil Case
Nos. 46800 and 46801 which states in toto: Cdpr
"It appearing that the construction of the roadand creek in question was a project
undertaken under the authority of the Ministerof Public Works, the funding of which was
the responsibility of the National Governmentand that the defendants impleaded herein are
Edilberto Cadiente and Nestor Agustin and
not the Republic of the Philippines whichcannot be sued without its consent, this Court
hereby resolves to dismiss these two (2) cases
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
Civil Case Nos. 46800 and 46801 were both filed on July13, 1982 by petitioners who are co-owners under TCT No.
329945 of a parcel of land located in Barrio Wawa,Binangonan, Rizal with an area of nineteen thousand sixty-
one (19,061) square meters. In Civil Case No. 46800,petitioners alleged in the petition for prohibition that in
October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, LorenzoCadiente, a private contractor and the Provincial Engineer of
Rizal constructed a road nine (9) meters wide and one
hundred twenty-eight meters and seventy centimeters
(128.70) long occupying a total area of one thousand onehundred sixty-five (1,165) square meters of their land. prcd
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnotes7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
10/60
Petitioners added that aside from the road, the saidrespondents also constructed, without their knowledge and
consent, an artificial creek twenty-three meters and twenty
centimeters (23.20) wide and one hundred twenty-eight
meters and sixty-nine centimeters long (128.69) occupyingan area of two thousand nine hundred six (2,906) square
meters of their property. Constructed in a zigzag manner, thecreek meandered through their property.
Alleging that if completed, the road and the creek would
"serve no public profitable and practicable purpose but for
respondents' personal profit, to the great damage andprejudice of the taxpayers and the petitioners," the same
petitioners invoked their rights under Art. IV, Secs. 1 and 2,of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution and prayed for
the issuance of a restraining order or a writ of preliminaryinjunction to stop the construction. They also prayed that
after hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered: (1)declaring illegal the construction of the road and artificial
creek which was made without their knowledge and consent,
"without due process and without just compensation and in
violation of the provision of statute law and of the PhilippineConstitution;" (2) issuing a permanent prohibition; (3)
ordering respondents to pay petitioners "jointly andcollectively" P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and P600.00 for
each appearance, and (4) ordering the respondents to pay thecosts of the suit.3
An action for damages, Civil Case No. 46801, on the otherhand, was founded on Art. 32, paragraphs 6 and 7 of the
Civil Code and the constitutional provisions on the rightagainst deprivation of property without due process of law
and without just compensation.
Thereafter, the two cases were consolidated. On November11, 1982, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss
both cases on the following grounds: (a) with respect to
Civil Case No. 46800, the pendency of Civil Case No.
46801 which involved the same parties and cause of action;(b) both cases were in reality suits against the state which
could not be maintained without the State's consent; and (c)lack of cause of action.
Consequently, the lower court issued the aforequoted Order
of December 1, 1982. Their motion for the reconsideration
of said Order having been denied, petitioners elevated (to)the cases to this Court through an "appeal by certiorari"
which was docketed as G.R. No. 63610. The SecondDivision of this Court, however, referred the cases to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Sec. 16 of theInterim Rules.4In due course, the appellate court rendered
a Decision on May 22, 1985 which disposed of the casesthus:
"Accordingly, the two actions cannot bemaintained. They are in reality suits against
the state which has not given its consent to besued (Minister [sic] vs. CFI, 40 SCRA 464;
Isberto vs. Raquiza, 67 SCRA 116; Begosa v.Chairman, PVA, 32 SCRA 466). Appellants'
remedy lies elsewhere.
Appellants assert that the taking of their
property in the manner alleged in these twocases was without due process of law. This is
not correct. The appealed order has not closed
the door to appellants' right, if any, to just
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnotes7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
11/60
compensation for the alleged area of their landwhich was expropriated. The court below
dismissed the cases for lack of consent on the
part of the state to be sued herein. We repeat,
appellants' remedy for just compensation lieselsewhere.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is infull accord with the evidence and the law and
is hereby therefore affirmed in all its parts.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED."5
Consequently, petitioners elevated the cases to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari. The petition isanchored on the ruling of the Court inAmigable v. Cuenca6
which states: ". . . where the government takes awayproperty from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale," a suit may properly be maintained against
the government.
We hold for the petitioners.
That the principle of state immunity from suit cannot beinvoked to defeat petitioners' claim has long been settled. In
Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu,7the Courtheld:
". . . The doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the
government followed the procedure indicated
by the governing law at the time, a complaintwould have been filed by it, and only upon
payment of the compensation fixed by the
judgment, or after tender to the party entitled
to such payment of the amount fixed, may it'have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned' to appropriate the same to thepublic use defined in the judgment. If there
were an observance of procedural regularity,petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they
are now. It is unthinkable then that preciselybecause there was a failure to abide by what
the law requires, the government would stand
to benefit. It is just as important, if not more
so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on thepart of the officialdom if the rule of law were
to be maintained. It is not too much to say thatwhen the government takes any property for
public use, which is conditioned upon thepayment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submitsto the jurisdiction of a court. There is no
thought then that the doctrine of immunity
from suit could still be appropriatelyinvoked."
We find the facts of theMinisterio case on all fours with the
instant cases insofar as the fact that the respondentgovernment officials executed a shortcut in appropriating
petitioners' property for public use is concerned. As in the
Amigable case, no expropriation proceedings were initiated
before construction of the projects began. In like manner,
nowhere in his pleadings in the cases at bar does the
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnotes7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
12/60
Solicitor General mention the fact that expropriationproceedings had in fact been undertaken before the road and
artificial creek were constructed. Thus, quoting the answer
of the defendants in Civil Case No. 46801, the Solicitor
General summarized the facts which defendants consideredas constituting justification for the construction as follows:
"10. The construction of the road and creek inquestion on the property which at the time
was said to be public property, was initiated,
and construction effected, through the usual
and ordinary course, as shown by thefollowing:
a. November 5, 1979 Engr.
Data who was the incumbent DistrictEngineer submitted (thru channels)
plans, program of works and detailed
estimates for approval of higherauthorities, thru the initiation of Mayor
Ynares and Assemblyman GilbertoDuavit;
b. February 18, 1980 RegionalDirector Eduardo L. Lagunilla, MPW
Region IV, EDSA, Quezon Cityendorsed said request to the Minister of
Public Works;
c. February 13, 1981
Assemblyman Gilberto Duavit sent a
hand-written follow-up note regarding
the project;
d. June 17, 1981 Theundersigned defendant Nestor Agustin
was designated Chief Civil Engineer of
the Rizal Engineering District, Vice
Engr. Cresencio Data who reached hiscompulsory retirement age;
e. September 23, 1981 Fundsin the amount of P588,000.00 was
released for partial implementation of
the project. The total amount requested
was P1,200,000.00;
f. October 19, 1981 The
undersigned submitted a request to the
MPWH Central Office seekingauthority to effect implementation of
the project;
g. October 29, 1981 The
Regional Director approved the plans
and program of works for the project inthe amount of P588,000.00;
h. November 11, 1981
TheHonorable Minister Jesus S. Hipolito
granted the request to undertake theimplementation of the project;
i. November 25, 1981 Projectimplementation was started;
j. March 3, 1982Construction
of rock bulkhead was completed;
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
13/60
k. November 23, 1981 P249,000.00 was released for
improvement (deepening and diverting
of flow) of Binangonan River which
was a complimentary structure ofBinangonan port system;
l. April 19, 1982
Implementation was started. Contractfor this project was approved by the
Regional Director in favor ofEDILBERTO CADIENTE
CONSTRUCTION;
m. May 21, 1982 Deepening
slightly of the adjacent portion of therock bulkhead was completed.
11. The construction of the structures wasdone in good faith;
The construction of the roadway and
deepening of the creek was designed togenerate for the municipality of Binangonan,Rizal more benefits in the form of substantial
revenue from fishing industry, parking area,market rentals, development site, and road
system improvements. The area covered bysaid public improvements is part of the
Laguna Lake area which is submerged inwater even during dry season. The municipal
mayor of Binangonan, Rizal stated that saidarea is public property."8
Public respondents' belief that the property involved ispublic, even if buttressed by statements of other public
officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioners'
property. As TCT No. 329945 shows, the property wasregistered under the Torrens system in the names of"Emiliano R. de los Santos, married to Corazon Dayrit; and
Norma Alabastro, married to Isidoro L. Padilla" as early as
March 29, 1971. Had the public respondents, including the
other officials involved in the construction, performed theirfunctions by exercising even the ordinary diligence expected
of them as public officials, they would not have failed tonote that the property is a private one. A public
infrastructure losses its laudability if, in the process ofundertaking it, private rights are disregarded. In this
connection, the Court said inRepublic v. Sandiganbayan:9
"It can hardly be doubted that in exercising
the right of eminent domain, the Stateexercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from
its proprietary rights orjus gestionis. Yet,even in that area, it has been held that where
private property has been taken inexpropriation without just compensation
being paid, the defense of immunity from suit
cannot be set up by the State against an action
for payment by the owner."
Public respondents' assertion that the project had been
completed on May 21, 1982 meets strong opposition from
the petitioners who insist that the project "until now is not
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnotes7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
14/60
yet finished."10This factual issue needs determinationwhich only the trial court can undertake. Thus, the need for a
full blown trial on the merits. We do not subscribe to the
appellate court's suggestion that the remedy of the
petitioners "lies elsewhere."
The filing of another case to determine just compensation issuperfluous. The issue may be threshed out below forpractical reasons in the event that it is shown later that it is
no longer possible to prohibit the public respondents from
continuing with the public work. As held in theAmigable
case, damages may be awarded the petitioners in the form oflegal interest on the price of the land to be reckoned from
the time of the unlawful taking.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and CivilCases Nos. 46800 and 46801 shall be REMANDED to the
lower court for trial on the merits after the Republic of the
Philippines shall have been impleaded as defendant in bothcases.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Davide, Jr.andMelo, JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison,ponente, AssociateJustices Abdulwahid A. Bidin and Marcelino R.
Veloso, concurring.
2. Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, presiding.
3. Record of Civil Case No. 46800, pp. 4-5.
4. Rollo, p. 19.
5. Rollo, p. 22.
6. L-26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360.
7. L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464.
8. Comment of Public Respondents, pp. 3-5, quoting the
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 4-5, which in turn lifted theanswer in Civil Case No. 46801 of Nestor Agustin,
represented by then Solicitor General Estelito P.Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E.
Agpalo and Solicitor Gloria Fermo-Berin, pp. 3-4(Rollo, pp. 42-44).
9. G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 212,231.
10. Petitioners, Reply to Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 56.
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/16543#footnotes7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
15/60
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 90478. November 21, 1991.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT), petitioner,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R.
TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R.SANTIAGO, respondents.
Dominador R. Santiago for and in his own behalf and ascounsel for respondent Tantoco, Jr.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; RAISON D'ETRE. The
resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raisond'etre of courts. This essential function is accomplished by
first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant factsfrom the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the
parties, andsecond, after that determination of the facts has
been completed, by the application of the law thereto to theend that the controversy may be settled authoritatively,
definitely and finally.
2. ID.; ACTIONS; NATURE AND OBJECT OF
LITIGATIONS. Seventy-one years ago, inAlonso v.
Villamor, this Court described the nature and object oflitigation and in the process laid down the standards by
which judicial contests are to be conducted in this
jurisdiction. It said: "A litigation is not a game of
technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled andskilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps
and destroys the other. It is, rather a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the
facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial andindecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done on the merits. Lawsuits,unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid tojustice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts. There should beno vested right in technicalities. . . ."
3. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS; ULTIMATE FACTS MUST BECONTAINED THEREIN. Every pleading "shall contain
in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and directstatement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omittingthe statement of mere evidentiary facts."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BILL OF PARTICULARS, RESORTEDTO IF ULTIMATE FACTS ALLEGED ARE TOO
GENERAL. Parenthetically, if this requirement is notobserved, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or
"not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity toenable . . . (an adverse party) properly to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of
particulars seeking a "more definite statement" may be
ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of abill of particulars is, however, limited to making more
particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading. It is notits office to supply evidentiary matters. And the common
perception is that said evidentiary details are made known to
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
16/60
the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof isadduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings.
5. ID.; ID.; PARTIES SHOULD DISCOVER OR INFORMTHEMSELVES OF ALL THE FACTS RELEVANT TO
THE ACTION; MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH THE
DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY MECHANISM SET FORTHIN RULES 24 TO 29 OF THE RULES OF COURT. Thetruth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and
learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the
purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the
trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial shoulddiscover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the
action, not only those known to them individually, but alsothose known to their adversaries; in other words, the
desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in thedark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible
through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth inRules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has
been that ample discovery before trial, under proper
regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary ends of
modern procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issuesfrom trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also
requires parties to play the game with the cards on the tableso that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is
measurably increased."
6. ID.; ID.; MODES OF DISCOVERY; PURPOSE. The
various modes or instruments of discovery are meant toserve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under
Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between theparties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative
to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable
the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtainthe fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in
the dark.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIELD OF INQUIRY. To this end, the
field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions orinterrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party iscalled as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry
extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be
ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which
are privileged. The objective is as much to give every partythe fullest possible information of all the relevant facts
before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial.The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing
depositions) of the Revised Rules of Court.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCORDED A BROAD AND LIBERAL
TREATMENT AND AVAILABLE TO BOTH PARTIES.What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit
of information which may be useful in the preparation fortrial, such as the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves;and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition,
and location of any books, documents, or other tangiblethings. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent'scase. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by
both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end,either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts
he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
17/60
procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosurecan be compelled from the time of trial to the period
preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise."
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY BE AVAILED OF WITHOUT
LEAVE OF COURT AND GENERALLY WITHOUT
COURT INTERVENTION.
In line with this principle ofaccording liberal treatment to the deposition-discoverymechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions
(whether by oral examination or written interrogatories)
under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25,
and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may beavailed ofwithout leave of court, and generally, without
court intervention.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION.
The Rules ofCourt explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary
to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the
complaint has been served. It is only when an answer hasnot yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained
over the defendant or property subject of the action) thatprior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of
discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues arenot yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear. On the
other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by(a) production or inspection of documents or things in
accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental
examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be
granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATIONS.Of course, there are
limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be
undertaken without leave and without judicial intervention.
"As indicated by (the) Rules . . ., limitations inevitably arisewhen it can be shown that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. And
. . . further limitations come into existence when the inquirytouches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the
recognized domains of privilege" In fine, the liberty of aparty to make discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the
matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and notprivileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within
the bounds of the law.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERROGATORIES; MAY BE
AVAILED OF WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT AFTERANSWER HAD BEEN SERVED; LEAVE OF COURT
NECESSARY BEFORE FILING OF ANSWER.
Itshould initially be pointed out as regards the private
respondents "Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories" datedFebruary 1, 1988 that it was correct for them to seek
leave to serve interrogatories, because discovery was being
availed ofbefore an answer had been served. In such a
situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over anydefendant or over property subject of the action" but before
answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), inrelation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories
to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." But there wasno need for the private respondents to seek such leave to
serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiffs (datedAugust 2, 1989) after they had filed their answer to the
PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for the
Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
18/60
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IF A PARTY SERVED WITHINTERROGATORIES IS A JURIDICAL ENTITY, THE
SAME MAY BE ANSWERED BY ANY COMPETENT
OFFICER; RULE APPLIED BY ANALOGY TO THE
PCGG. The petitioner's first contention that theinterrogatories in question are defective because they (a) do
not name the particular individuals to whom they arepropounded, being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are
"fundamentally the same matters . . . (private respondents)sought to be clarified through their aborted Motion . . . for
Bill of Particulars"are untenable and quickly disposed of.The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately
confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the party
served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a
public or private corporation or a partnership or association,"
the same shall be "answered . . . by any officer thereofcompetent to testify in its behalf." There is absolutely noreason why this proposition should not be applied by
analogy to the interrogatories served on the PCGG. That theinterrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without
naming any specific commissioner or officer thereof, isutterly of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a
reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the
interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereofcompetent to testify in its behalf."
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBJECT OF DISCOVERYDIFFERENTIATED FROM SUBJECT OF BILL OF
PARTICULARS.That the matters on which discovery isdesired are the same matters subject of a prior motion for
bill of particulars addressed to the PCGG's amended
complaintand denied for lack of meritis beside thepoint. Indeed, as already pointed out above, a bill of
particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-called
evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt proper subject
of discovery.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERROGATORIES; GROUNDS FOROBJECTION.Neither may it be validly argued that theamended interrogatories lack specificity. The merest glance
at them disproves the argument. The interrogatories are
made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's
expanded complaint and inquire about details of the ultimatefacts therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to
object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the groundof lack of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are
being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it.But until such an objection is presented and sustained, the
obligation to answer subsists.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INQUIRY ON FACTUAL
MATTERS, NOT A GROUND.That the interrogatoriesdeal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's
proof upon trial, is not ground for suppressing them either.As already pointed out, it is the precise purpose of discovery
to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on thepart of all parties even before trial, this being deemed
essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence ismade is advanced from the time of trial to the period
preceding it.
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
19/60
17. ID.; EVIDENCE; A PARTY MAY MAKE HISADVERSARY HIS WITNESS; RULE APPLIED IN CASE
AT BAR. Also unmeritorious is the objection that the
interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and
officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No.14 and related issuances. In the first place, there is nothing at
all wrong in a party's making his adversary his witness. Thisis expressly allowed by Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
18. ID.; ACTIONS; MODES OF DISCOVERY;
INTERROGATORIES; PERMIT PARTIES TO ENGAGEON A "FISHING EXPEDITION". The PCGG insinuates
that the private respondents are engaged on a "fishingexpedition," apart from the fact that the information sought
is immaterial since they are evidently meant to establish aclaim against PCGG officers who are not parties to the
action. It suffices to point out that "fishing expeditions" areprecisely permitted through the modes of discovery.
19. ID.; ID.; COUNTERCLAIM; A DEFENDANT WHOFILES A COUNTERCLAIM CAN IMPLEAD PERSONS
STRANGERS TO THE ACTION. A defendant who filesa counterclaim against the plaintiff is allowed by the Rules
to implead persons (therefore strangers to the action) asadditional defendants on said counterclaim. This may be
done pursuant to Section 14, Rule 6 of the Rules.
20. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; MODES OF
DISCOVERY; INTERROGATORIES; PCGG'SIMMUNITY FROM SUIT; NOT A GROUND TO REFUSE
TO ANSWER THE INTERROGATORIES. The PCGG's
assertion that it or its members are not amenable to any civil
action "for anything done or omitted in the discharge of thetask contemplated by . . . (Executive) Order (No. 1)," is not
a ground to refuse to answer the interrogatories. The
disclosure of facts relevant to the action and which are not
self-incriminatory or otherwise privileged is one thing; thematter of whether or not liability may arise from the facts
disclosed in light of Executive Order No. 1, is another. Nodoubt, the latter proposition may properly be set up by way
of defense in the action.
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ANSWER THERETO MAY BE
UTILIZED AS FOUNDATION FOR ACOUNTERCLAIM.The apprehension has been
expressed that the answers to the interrogatories may beutilized as foundation for a counterclaim against the PCGG
or its members and officers. They will be. The privaterespondents have made no secret that this is in fact their
intention. Withal, the Court is unable to uphold theproposition that while the PCGG obviously feels itself at
liberty to bring actions on the basis of its study and
appreciation of the evidence in its possession, the parties
sued should not be free to file counterclaims in the sameactions against the PCGG or its officers for gross neglect or
ignorance, if not down right bad faith or malice in thecommencement or initiation of such judicial proceedings, or
that in the actions that it may bring, the PCGG may opt notto be bound by rules applicable to the parties it has sued,
e.g., the rules of discovery.
22. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATE IMMUNITY
FROM SUIT; MAY BE WAIVED BY FILING OFACTIONS; THE PCGG CANNOT CLAIM A SUPERIOR
STATUS TO THE STATE; IT MAY BE REQUIRED TO
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
20/60
TESTIFY OR PRODUCE EVIDENCE IN ANY JUDICIALPROCEEDING IT HAS ITSELF INITIATED. The
PCGG's postulation that none of its members may be
"required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial . . .
proceeding concerning matters within its officialcognizance," has no application to a judicial proceeding it
has itself initiated. As just suggested, the act of bringing suitmust entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence;
by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation andscope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the
rights and duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, theabsurd would have to be conceded, that while the parties it
has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge
all the facts" within their knowledge and in their possession,
it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion. The State
is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, asa rule, be sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that infiling an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and
sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of anordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or
preferred status to the State, even while assuming torepresent or act for the State.
23. ID.; ID.; CONSENT TO BE SUED MAY BE GIVENEXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY; WAIVER APPLIES
EVEN IF STATE IS PERFORMING GOVERNMENTALFUNCTION. The suggestion that the State makes no
implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in sodoing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or
non-governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a
distinction without support in principle or precedent. On the
contrary"The consent of the State to be sued may be
given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
manifested either through a general law or a special law.Implied consent is given when the State itself commences
litigation or when it enters into a contract." "The immunity
of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff mayavail itself of the different forms of actions open to private
litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action againstthe private parties, the state surrenders its privileged position
and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latterautomatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set
up whatever claims and other defenses he might haveagainst the state . . . (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth
E., pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L.ed.
899)'" It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of
eminent domain, the State exercises itsjus imperii, as
distinguished from its proprietary rights orjus gestionis.Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where privateproperty has been taken in expropriation without just
compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suitcannot be set up by the State against an action for payment
by the owner.
24. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; MODES OF
DISCOVERY; PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OFDOCUMENT; DISCLOSURE OF RELEVANT
DOCUMENTS, MANDATORY; CASE AT BAR. TheCourt finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory,
there is good cause for the production and inspection of thedocuments subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989.
Some of the documents are, according to the verification of
the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material
allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be
used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
21/60
into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules ofdiscovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare
for pre-trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be
produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the
counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; theirdisclosure may not be opposed.
25. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE. Due no doubt to thedeplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and
operation of the modes of discovery earlier mentioned, there
also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application
of said modes is a complicated matter, unduly expensive anddilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. For
example, as will already have been noted from the precedingdiscussion, all that is entailed to activate or put in motion the
process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule25 of the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery directly to a
party of a letter setting forth a list of questions with therequest that they be answered individually. That is all. The
service of such a communication on the party has the effect
of imposing on him the obligation of answering the
questions "separately and fully in writing under oath," andserving "a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after service of theinterrogatories . . ." The sanctions for refusing to make
discovery have already been mentioned. So, too, discoveryunder Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than the
service on a party of a letter or other written communicationcontaining a request that specific facts therein set forth
and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto
appended, be admitted in writing. That is all. Again, the
receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect
of imposing on him the obligation of serving the party
requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denyingspecifically the matters of which an admission is requested
or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach
of the matters of which admission is requested shall bedeemed admitted." The taking of depositions in accordance
with Rule 24 (either on oral examination or by writteninterrogatories) while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless
by no means as complicated as seems to be the lamentablyextensive notion.
D E C I S I O N
NARVASA,Jp:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and
Dominador R. Santiago together with Ferdinand E.Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr.,
Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pinedaare defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan.
The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by thePresidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaintwhich initiated the action was denominated one "for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution anddamages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive
Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
22/60
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. andSantiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
"MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF
OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov. 3, 1987.1The PCGGfiled an opposition thereto,2and the movants, a reply to the
opposition.3By order dated January 29, 1988, theSandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and
accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG forty-five (45)days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain
allegations.4
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to
file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court"dated February 1, 1988, and "Interrogatories under Rule 25."
5Basically, they sought an answer to the question: "Whowere the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its
Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint)who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs.
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago as
defendants in the . . . case?"6The PCGG responded by
filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out saidmotion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer,"
"weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereoflacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant
under any guise."7
On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of
January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint.8As regards this expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago
reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through aManifestation dated April 11, 1988.9
Afterwards, by Resolution dated July 4, 1988,10theSandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of
particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding
them to be without legal and factual basis. Also denied was
the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleading datedFebruary 9, 1988. The Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the
complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough,"there are adequate allegations . . . which clearly portray the
supposed involvement and/or alleged participation ofdefendants-movants in the transactions described in detail in
said Complaint," and "the other matters sought forparticularization are evidentiary in nature which should be
ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . . . ." It also opined
that "(s)ervice of interrogatories before joinder of issue and
without leave of court is premature . . . (absent) any special
or extraordinary circumstances . . . which would justify . . .(the same)." llcd
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim under date of July 18, 1988.11In
response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with
Motion to Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim."12
The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989.13On July
25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-TRIAL BRIEF.14The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and
all other parties were required to submit pre-trial briefs on or
before that date.15
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with theSandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to
Plaintiff,"16and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnotes7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
23/60
Interrogatories to Plaintiff"17as well as a Motion forProduction and Inspection of Documents. 18
The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual detailsrelative to specific averments of PCGG's amended
complaint, through such questions, for instance, as
"1. In connection with the allegations . . . in
paragraph 1 . . ., what specific property orproperties does the plaintiff claim it has the
right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr.and Santiago for being 'ill-gotten'?"
"3. In connection with the allegations . . . inparagraph 10 (a) . . ., what specific act or acts
. . . were committed by defendants Tantoco,Jr. and Santiago in 'concert with' defendant
Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance orpursuit, of the alleged systematic plan of said
defendant Marcos to accumulate ill-gottenwealth?"
"5. In connection with . . . paragraph 13 . . .,what specific act or acts of the defendants
Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago . . . were committedby said defendants as part, or in furtherance,
of the alleged plan to conceal assets ofdefendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?"
"7. In connection with . . . paragraph 15 (c) . .. is it plaintiff's position or theory of the case
that Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc., includingall the assets of said corporation, are
beneficially owned by either or both
defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos andthat the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago,
as well as, the other stockholders of record of
the same corporation are mere 'dummies' of
said defendants Ferdinand and/or Imelda R.Marcos?"
On the other hand, the motion for production and inspectionof documents prayed for examination and copying of
1) the "official records and other evidence" onthe basis of which the verification of the
Amended Complaint asserted that theallegations thereof are "true and correct; llcd
"2) the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-TrialBrief as those "intended to be presented and
xx marked as exhibits for the plaintiff;" and
3) "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG
which chronicles the discussion (if any) andthe decision (of the Chairman and members)
to file the complaint" in the case at bar.
By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989,the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatoriesand granted the motion for production and inspection of
documents (production being scheduled on September 14and 15, 1989), respectively.
On September 1, 1989, the PCGG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989
(allowing production and inspection of documents). It
argued that
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnotes7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
24/60
1) since the documents subject thereof would be marked asexhibits during the pre-trial on September 11, 1989 anyway,
the order for "their production and inspection on September
14 and 15, are purposeless and unnecessary;"
2) movants already know of the existence and contents of
the document which "are clearly described . . . (in) plaintiff'sPre-Trial Brief;"
3) the documents are "privileged in character" since they are
intended to be used against the PCGG and/or itsCommissioners in violation of Section 4, Executive Order
No. 1, viz.:
"(a) No civil action shall lie against the
Commission or any member thereof foranything done or omitted in the
discharge of the task contemplated bythis Order.
(b) No member or staff of the Commissionshall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative, oradministrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance."
It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the
Amended Interrogatories,19which the Sandiganbayantreated as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of
August 21, 1989 (admitting the Amended Interrogatories).The opposition alleged that
1) the interrogatories "are not specific and do not name the
person to whom they are propounded . . .," or "who in the
PCGG, in particular, . . . (should) answer theinterrogatories;" LibLex
2) the interrogatories delve into "factual matters which hadalready been decreed . . . as part of the proof of the
Complaint upon trial . . .;"
3) the interrogatories "are frivolous" since they inquire about
"matters of fact . . . which defendants . . . sought to . . .(extract) through their aborted Motion for Bill of
Particulars;"
4) the interrogatories "are really in the nature of a
deposition, which is prematurely filed and irregularlyutilized . . . (since) the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first
present its evidence."
Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on
September 18, 1989.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2)
Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denyingreconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of
documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the
permission to serve the amended interrogatories on theplaintiff (PCGG).20
Hence, this petition forcertiorari.
The PCGG contends that said orders, both dated September29, 1989, should be nullified because rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.More particularly, it claims
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnotes7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
25/60
a) as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatoriesto the plaintiff PCGG:
1) that said interrogatories are not specific anddo not name the particular individuals
to whom they are propounded, being
addressed only to the PCGG;
2) that the interrogatories deal with factualmatters which the Sandiganbayan (in
denying the movants' motion for bill ofparticulars) had already declared to be
part of the PCGG's proof upon trial;and
3) that the interrogatories would make PCGGCommissioners and officers witnesses,
in contravention of Executive OrderNo. 14 and related issuances;
and
b) as regards the order granting the motion for production of
documents:
1) that movants had not shown any good
cause therefor;
2) that some documents sought to be produced
and inspected had already beenpresented in Court and marked
preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, andthe movants had viewed, scrutinized
and even offered objections thereto andmade comments thereon; and
3) that the other documents sought to be
produced are either
(a) privileged in character or
confidential in nature and their
use is proscribed by the
immunity provisions ofExecutive Order No. 1, or
(b) non-existent, or mere products of
the movants' suspicion and fear.
This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October27, 1989, directing the Sandiganbayan to desist from
enforcing its questioned resolutions of September 29, 1989in Civil Case No. 0008.21
After the issues were delineated and argued at no littlelength by the parties, the Solicitor General withdrew "as
counsel for plaintiff . . . with the reservation, however,conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478, the
provisions of Executive Order No. 292, as well a thedecisional law of 'Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.,'
(G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990)22to submit hiscomment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this
. . Court if called for by circumstances in the interest of the
Government or if he is so required by the Court."23This,
the Court allowed by Resolution dated January 21, 1991.24
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnotes7/29/2019 State - Nature of Liability
26/60
Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Macerenadvised the Court that the cases from which the Solicitor
General had withdrawn would henceforth be under his
(Maceren's) charge "and/or any of the following private
attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko, MarioJalandoni and such other attorneys as it may later authorize."
25
The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the
parties have fully ventilated their respective positions, the
Court now proceeds to decide the case. prLL
Involved in the present proceedings are two of the modes ofdiscovery provided in the Rules of Court: interrogatories to
parties,26and production and inspection of document and
things.27Now, it appears to the Court that among far toomany lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not a
regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about
the nature, purposes and operation of the modes ofdiscovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable
disinclination to resort to themwhich is a great pity forthe intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery
mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as theexperience of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates,
effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed upadjudication.28Hence, a few words about these remedies is
not at all inappropriate.
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the
raison d'etre of courts. This essential function isaccomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material
and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence
adduced by the parties, andsecond, after that determination
of the facts has been completed, by the application of thelaw thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled
authoritatively, definitely and finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law
in this jurisdiction is occupied with assuring that all the facts
are indeed presented to the Court; for obviously, to theextent that adjudication is made on the basis of incompletefacts, to that extent there is faultiness in the approximation
of objective justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no
less than of judges to see that this objective is attained; that
is to say, that there be no suppression, obscuration,misrepresentation or distortion of the facts; and that no party
be unaware of any fact material and relevant to the action, orsurprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his
attention during the trial.29
Seventy-one years ago, inAlonso v. Villamor,30this Court
described the nature and object of litigation and in theprocess laid down the standards by which judicial contests
are to be conducted in this jurisdiction. It said:
"A litigation is not a game of technicalities in
which one, more deeply schooled and skilled
in the subtle art of movement and position,entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather acontest in which each contending party fully
and fairly lays before the court the facts inissue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial
and indecisive all imperfections of form andtechnicalities of procedure, asks that justice
be done on the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels,
are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/print/18506#footnotesTop Related