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Police Use of Force in Seattle, January 2009 – March 2011
Matthew J. Hickman, Ph.D.
Seattle University
Loren T. Atherley, M.A.
Northwest Justice Solutions
December, 2012
Points of view expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not represent or
reflect views of Seattle University. Please direct all correspondence to either Matthew J.
Hickman ([email protected]) or Loren T. Atherley ([email protected]).
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ABSTRACT
This study provides a descriptive statistical analysis of Seattle Police Department use of
force reports – the same reports that were used in a recent Department of Justice
investigation concerning the use of excessive force. An additional goal of the study was
to attempt to replicate the government’s finding that 20% of uses of force by Seattle
police are excessive or unconstitutional. All use of force records during the period
January 1, 2009, through March 25, 2011, (N = 1,240) were coded for content, including
administrative data elements as well as the content of report narratives. Incidents were
coded for both officer force level and suspect resistance level, in both static and
sequential forms, following Alpert’s force factor method. Relevant Graham factors were
also coded. The incidence of force, incident characteristics, officer characteristics,
suspect demographics, and force factors are described and discussed. The data were also
geocoded and mapped in order to better understand the spatial distribution of police use
of force in Seattle.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2011, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, in
conjunction with the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington (collectively,
“DOJ”), released a report entitled, Investigation of the Seattle Police Department. In this
report, the DOJ described the results of their investigation in Seattle consistent with their
role of identifying “patterns or practices of conduct by law enforcement agencies that
deprive individuals of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States” (p. 1). In both the report and a televised news conference it
was announced that the DOJ found “SPD engages in a pattern or practice of using
unnecessary or excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Section 14141” (p. 3) and “When SPD officers use force, they do
so in an unconstitutional manner nearly 20% of the time” (p. 4).
A finding that 1 out of 5 uses of force are unconstitutional should be taken very
seriously, for if true, it suggests a very serious problem. For the two and a quarter year
period studied by DOJ, this would amount to approximately 250 use of excessive force
incidents. Such a finding demands careful scrutiny to ensure a thorough understanding of
the problem so that police reform efforts will be meaningful and long-lasting.
Unfortunately, the DOJ report does not contain a description of their methodology that
would permit one to directly replicate the analysis.
Absent a clear methodology, we sought to replicate this finding using common
social science methods. In addition, and perhaps more important, we provide a thorough
descriptive analysis of use of force incidents in Seattle. It is our hope that those involved
in police reform efforts will use these data to better understand police use of force in
Seattle and move forward with reform efforts from a rational basis. Specifically, we
provide answers to the following questions:
• When, where, and how often do the police in Seattle use force?
• What are the underlying offenses in use of force incidents?
• What are the characteristics of a typical suspect and what do they do?
• How many officers are typically involved and what do they do?
• How are the interactions distributed in terms of both suspect and officer actions?
• How often might the use of excessive force occur in Seattle?
• How is police use of force geographically distributed in Seattle?
Regardless of whether one agrees with our methods, analysis, and conclusions, we
believe that our creation of a research platform for understanding use of force in Seattle is
a substantial step forward. We believe that our data collection provides a useful and
important decision tool for understanding the nature and scope of police use of force in
Seattle. Our descriptive analysis only scratches the surface of a rich data source, but this
is a necessary first step and is only the beginning of an ongoing program of research. We
anticipate being able to make these data publically available (subject to SPD approval) so
that anyone who is interested may explore the data. We welcome and encourage other
researchers to replicate our findings in the interest of science and the pursuit of
knowledge.
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KEY FINDINGS
Recognizing that some individuals may not have the time or interest in reading
the entire report, we summarize the key findings here. Readers interested in the details of
our methodology and the comprehensive set of findings will want to read the entire
report. In sum, we analyzed 1,240 use of force incidents during the period January 1,
2009 through March 25, 2011.
When, where, and how often do the police in Seattle use force?
Police use of force in Seattle is a statistically rare event. The police in Seattle use
force at the rate of about 2.4 incidents for every 100 arrests. Use of force is more
frequent on weekends, and during the late evening/early morning hours. The West
Precinct has the largest share of use of force incidents, with about one in three uses of
force reported in that precinct. (See Table 3 & Figures 1 - 3)
What are the underlying offenses in use of force incidents?
Officers indicated the type of incident on the use of force reporting forms. This
describes the general nature of the dispatch or on-view incident and associated incident
characteristics. These characteristics are not mutually exclusive, so several type
characteristics may be indicated for a particular incident. Forty percent of the incidents
were reported as involving some type of felony matter, and fights or disturbances were
indicated in 30% of incidents. About 1 in 5 involved violent crimes and/or were drug
related. Eighteen percent were characterized as involving mental/suicidal suspects.
Domestic violence was indicated in 15% of use of force incidents. (See Figure 4)
What are the characteristics of a typical suspect in use of force incidents, and what
do they do?
The vast majority of force incidents involved a single subject upon whom force
was used. The median age for all suspects was 29 years, they were most frequently male
(87%), and most frequently white (45%) or black (40%). The race distribution for
suspects in use of force incidents is roughly equivalent to the race distribution for all
arrestees during the study period. Half of suspects exhibited signs of intoxication (either
drugs or alcohol), and nearly 3 in 10 exhibited signs of mental illness or were suicidal or
delusional. Suspects fled from officers in about one quarter of incidents. Maximum
suspect resistance levels were typically in the form of defensive resistance (48%) or
active resistance (25%). Suspect resistance resulted in WACIC Officer Safety reports
being filed in 19% of the incidents. Suspects complained of injury in about half (51%) of
incidents. (See Figures 5 - 10)
How many officers are typically involved and what do they do?
About 8 in 10 use of force incidents involved either one (48%) or two (33%)
officers who used force on suspects. Overall, the 1,240 incidents involved 650 officers
who used force, one third of whom were involved in a single use of force incident during
the study period. Thirty-one officers (about 5% of all officers involved in use of force
incidents) were involved in 10 or more incidents during the study period as either first
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responding officers or as backing officers, including three officers (about 0.5%) who
were involved in 20 or more incidents. The most frequently reported tactics were hands,
elbows, and arms (used in 80% of incidents), followed by feet, knees, and legs (28%),
and Tasers (23%). Less frequently reported were OC spray (7%), batons (4%), and
canines (3%). Maximum officer force levels were typically in the form of defensive
force (41%), followed by intermediate weapons (29%), and offensive force (24%). (See
Figures 11 - 14)
How are the interactions distributed in terms of both suspect and officer actions?
Results of static force factor analysis (i.e., the maximum officer force level, minus
the maximum suspect resistance level) indicate that resistance and force levels were
matched in about 36% of use of force incidents, and officers used one or two levels of
force higher than suspect resistance in another 45%. Officers used a lower level of force
compared to suspect resistance in about 14% of cases. Officers used three or more levels
of force higher than suspect resistance in about 6% of incidents. Results of dynamic
force factor analysis indicate that most incidents ended by the fourth dyadic officer-
suspect interaction. Officers on average operate at a force deficit during the first two
iterations, transitioning through balance to a force surplus thereafter. Dynamic force
factors are consistent with application of a force continuum. (See Figures 15 – 18)
How often might the use of excessive force occur in Seattle?
Filtering all use of force cases by relevant Graham factors and static force factors
results in a pool of 43 cases (or 3.5% of all use of force cases during the study period)
that were selected as potentially excessive. We strongly caution that further research is
needed to determine the overall utility of our approach, and in a broader sense, whether it
is possible to identify the use of excessive force from administrative records. In the
context of total arrests, this would equate to about 1 potential use of excessive force for
every 1,180 arrests in Seattle. Incidents identified as potentially excessive were more
balanced between 2nd and 3
rd watches (as compared to all force incidents), and were more
frequently on-view incidents as opposed to dispatched calls. All but two cases involved a
single suspect, and typically involved either one (54%) or two (35%) officers. The race
distribution for suspects in potentially excessive cases decreased for whites, and
increased for suspects in the Asian and “Other” categories. Officer tactics (hands,
elbows, arms, etc.) were similar in distribution to those for all use of force incidents.
Subjects were booked in about 60% of these incidents, and some common charges listed
were obstructing, assault, resisting, trespass, and warrants. (See Figures 19 – 21)
How is police use of force geographically distributed in Seattle?
Police use of force is distributed across the entire city; however, there are areas of
clustering and noticeable spatial patterns within the city. Higher densities of use of force
incidents were noted in the general vicinity of the following locations: In the North
Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1)
NE 125th St & Lake City Way NE; and (2) NE 45
th to 50
th Sts & University Way NE. In
the East Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the general
vicinity of: (1) E Pine to E Pike Sts & Broadway to Boylston Aves; and (2) 23rd Ave to
MLK Way & E Cherry St to E Yesler Way. In the West Precinct, there are higher
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densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) Belltown; (2) Pioneer
Square; and (3) International District. Finally, in the South Precinct, there are higher
densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) Rainier Ave & S Genesee
St; (2) Rainier Ave & S Ferdinand St; (3) MLK Way & S Webster to S Othello Sts; and
(4) Rainier Ave & S Henderson St. (See Maps 1 – 2)
METHODS
The lead author submitted a Public Data Request to the Seattle Police Department
requesting all of the use of force reports that were provided to DOJ with regard to their
20% finding. The SPD responded that a Research Agreement would be a more expedient
method for processing the data request, so the lead author requested, and obtained, a
Research Agreement for these purposes. Our research is fully independent and is not
funded by the SPD. We were provided with a series of PDF files containing scanned
images of SPD use of force reporting forms and related documents during the period
1/1/09 through 3/25/11, amounting to 1,240 records in all.
Data for this study were coded from the content of these official SPD Use of
Force reports. Each report included officer identifier information, suspect demographic
information, a categorization of the type of suspect resistance and how force was applied
as well as information about location, booking, injuries and evidence of impairment or
suspected impairment. The first four pages of these reports (more if supplemental forms
are required) are comprised of entries and check boxes which were coded into a computer
database using a numeric coding system. The remainder of the report packet varied
depending on the presence of supplemental documentation, report narratives,
photographs, Washington Crime Information Center (WACIC) reports, Labor and
Industry (L&I) claim forms and Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) call logs as well as
routing information and other administrative documentation. These data fields were
entered as they appeared in the record.
Force Factors
In addition to the variables contained in the form, the authors read the narrative
reports and coded officer-suspect interactions. Force and resistance were classified based
on complimentary scales drawing from previous research.1 For each record in the
dataset, we calculated a static force factor. This compares the maximum force applied by
the officer to the maximum level of resistance (i.e., officer force level minus suspect
resistance level), and takes on numeric values ranging from -6 to 6 (see Table 1).
For example, if the maximum level of suspect resistance was “Resistance 4,” and
that was met with a comparable level of officer force (“Force 4”), this would result in a
static force factor equal to 0, indicating a proportional response. If the officer used a
higher level of force, say Force 5, then the corresponding force factor would be +1,
indicating the officer used one level of force higher than the degree of suspect resistance.
If the officer used a lower level of force, say Force 3, the force factor would be -1.
1 Alpert, G. & R. Dunham. (2004). Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and
Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Table 1. Suspect Resistance and Officer Force Levels
Level Description Level Description
Resistance 1 No resistance. The Subject is
offering no resistance or threat.
Force 1 Officer presence in uniform or
marked police vehicle.
Resistance 2 Verbal resistance to complying
with lawful orders. Subject may
challenge authority or standing
and may present as “dead
weight.”
Force 2 Issuance of lawful orders and light
physical contact to include guiding,
leading and/or handcuffing. No
intentional infliction of pain for the
purpose of compliance.
Resistance 3 Use of posture and verbal threats
of physical violence. Subject may
attempt to intimidate or otherwise
pose a physical threat to officers.
Force 3 Chemical agents for the purpose of
crowd dispersal or distraction.
Tactic is often reserved for large
gatherings, civil disobedience and
fight disturbances.
Resistance 4 Physical non-compliance
including refusal to give up hands
for cuffing and attempts to flee.
Force 4 Physical control tactics such as pain
compliance holds, joint
manipulation and open handed
strikes.
Resistance 5 Active physical resistance to
compliance. Subject may attempt
to strike officers, kick and
struggle free from holds and
compliance positions.
Force 5 Advanced physical control tactics
including closed fisted strikes, knee
and elbow strikes to the body and
the extremities.
Resistance 6 Use of non-lethal weapons to
injure or otherwise actively
assault officers. Drug
paraphernalia, beverage
containers and rocks may be
employed as cutting and impact
weapons.
Force 6 Intermediate weapon use,
deployment of electronic control
weapons and impact weapons for
pain compliance and strikes to the
body and extremities.
Resistance 7 Use of lethal force as presented
by whatever means are available:
firearms, knives and motor
vehicles.
Force 7 Use of lethal force including carotid
artery holds, head strikes, and
intentional discharge of firearms.
In addition to the static indicator of maximum force and resistance, we also coded
dynamic force factors throughout the force incident. Narratives from all 1,240 cases
were read and we coded up to 10 iterations of dyadic action/reaction using the same
coding scheme as was used to code the static force factor. This helps to assess how force
incidents evolve from the perspective of the officer and provides a dynamic overview of
the incident from start to finish. Where multiple officers or suspects are involved, their
actions are represented as a composite.
Weapon draws are a problematic area in use of force research. Some parties
contend that a weapon draw is a use of force, while others contend that it is at most a
threat of force, and still others argue either side depending on the level of the draw and
the motives of the officer with regard to their safety. From a legal perspective, courts
have upheld the right of officers to protect themselves against unknown or potentially
threatening situations by drawing and pointing a firearm when it is reasonable to do so.
Civil rights organizations such as the ACLU contend that drawing and pointing of a
firearm at a subject is an application of force in itself and should be reported whenever it
occurs. As there is no definitive guidance on the reporting of firearms as “cover” or with
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the intention to discharge the weapon, agencies across the country employ different
standards.
During the study period, SPD officers did not report weapon draws consistently.
In fact, the lead author of this report was on scene at one of the use of force incidents that
occurred during the study period, as a ride-along observer on unrelated field research. In
that incident, there was a weapon drawn and pointed at the suspect that went unreported
in the subsequent use of force report. Sometimes there are references to other officers
providing “lethal cover,” or references are made to “felony stop” or “high risk stop”
procedures. Insofar as weapon draws were not consistently reported, we were faced with
a substantial measurement problem. Ultimately we decided not to record weapon draws
because we could not be confident that we were capturing their true incidence. Lethal
force, for the purposes of this study, was only coded when the officer used an impact
weapon on an area of the body with potential to cause lethal injury (such as a head
strike), used a carotid artery hold/restraint, or discharged a firearm.
Use of Excessive Force (UOEF)
Since the 1980’s the United States has been in a slow overhaul of policing and
police powers. The Rehnquist court established an objective reasonableness test on the
use of force by law enforcement officers. The case, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 286
(1989), known more commonly as Graham, has come to be the standard for use of force
analysis.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that with regard to
determining the reasonableness of force, the Fourth Amendment requires that “the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” must be
weighed against the interests of the government. To this end, Graham moved beyond the
four criteria previously applied (the need for the application of force, the relationship
between that need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted,
and whether the force was applied in good faith), and distilled excessive force in the form
of a three-prong test to be weighed with information available to the officer at the time of
action, and without the benefit of hindsight: the severity of the underlying offense, the
immediate threat posed to officers and/or the public, and fleeing or active resistance to
arrest. In assessing the “totality of circumstances,” relevant issues may include the
perception of suspect impairments, psychological threats, outnumbering of officers by
suspects, physical size, and other factors.
Where Graham factors are absent, it can be inferred so too is justification for the
use of force. Our method employs the characteristics of the reported data to identify
factors which would indicate whether the force was justified. In reviewing these data the
authors identified multiple approaches to identifying UOEF cases. Static force factor
analysis, dynamic force factor analysis, force factor modeling and variations of these
analyses enhanced by what we refer to as Graham factor filtering represent some of the
techniques considered. Identifying UOEF incidents can be a subjective process.
Guidance from the Rehnquist decision indicates that there must be a compelling
governmental interest to use force in apprehending a suspect and those factors may only
be judged based on the knowledge of the officer acting at the time, without the aid of
20/20 hindsight. Over the years, the courts have contributed to the case law on the
subject.
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The current legal definition of UOEF is rooted in the constitutional protections
afforded by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically those
provisions regarding search and seizure, cruel and unusual punishment and equal
protection. Some researchers have argued to expand the definition to address
appropriateness of action. The late sociologist Carl Klockars seemed to favor a force-as-
last-resort policy advocating a strict definition that identifies appropriate use of force by
the “highly-skilled-police-officer” standard.2 In this era of modernized, professional
policing and intense scrutiny it is assumed that officers and their command are acting in
good faith. From this perspective, the identification of UOEF incidents is not one of
identifying criminal malfeasance, or overtly abusive, disparate or brutal action on the part
of the police. Rather, UOEF incidents are assumed to be the product of culture,
inadequate supervision, training, professional oversight and/or a combination of these
factors.
The organizational origins of UOEF as a product of psychological, sociological
and environmental factors has driven the artifacts of UOEF underground. From the most
skeptical point-of-view, all cases in which force was used above what was necessary to
match the resistance of the offender are viewed as potentially UOEF incidents. Only
where Graham factors are present justifying force and no alternative exists, and where
the maximum force applied is truly a last resort measure, we presume any highly skilled
officer would have acted accordingly necessitating the action by legal and professional
standards.
UOEF is difficult to identify, and the artifacts of UOEF and empiricism are all
that are available to us. The role of academic research is to employ the scientific process
in search of the truth, and to apply that truth where possible in order to help make the
world a better place in which to live. We are left with the content of official records to
provide indicators of UOEF. These data are naturally limited by their representation of
the officer applying force. We have to assume these reports reflect a degree of bias
toward the officers writing them. As these documents are intended to record justification
for the application of force, the authors used these reports to eliminate those incidents
where force was justified and focus on the remainder for indicators of UOEF.
A hypothetical will demonstrate the problem. While on patrol an officer observes
a juvenile male committing an act of vandalism. The officer approaches the subject,
identifies himself as a police officer and issues a lawful order to the subject to surrender.
The subject flees and the officer gives chase. The suspect is younger, visibly unarmed
and considerably smaller than the officer. In apprehending the suspect the officer tackles
him and successfully takes him into custody. As a result of the tackle the suspect
receives superficial abrasions to his knees and minor bruising, and no medical attention is
required.
Under Graham this incident could be considered UOEF. The subject was not a
danger to the public, he was fleeing but it was a non-violent crime and it is arguable that
there existed no compelling governmental interest for his apprehension. Furthermore, the
arresting officer was plainly aware of these factors at the time that force was applied.
His actions may have derived from the suspect’s lack of respect for formal social
2 Klockars, C. (1995). A theory of excessive force and its control. In W. A. Geller & H. Toch (Eds.), And
justice for all: Understanding and controlling police abuse of force (pp. 11-29). Washington, DC: Police
Executive Research Forum.
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controls. This UOEF incident does not readily appear to be an egregious overreach of
police authority and may not be easily identified by examining force and resistance
levels. Thus, an analysis of the data focusing on large, positive force factors as potential
UOEF would be crude at best.
Graham Factor Filtering As demonstrated by the hypothetical, a more detailed analysis is required to
confidently identify potential UOEF incidents. Rather than bluntly pointing to the
outliers in a distribution of force factors, a systematic identification and elimination of
incidents with sufficient justification for the application of force is more appropriate. We
operationalized Graham factors from the SPD use of force reports as follows (Table 2):
Table 2. Operationalization of Graham Factors
Graham factor Report Section Variable (code)
Evidence of threat or
intention to inflict harm
“Force / Resistance Used
by Subject (check all that
apply)”
Threat level (from
narrative)
- Impact Weapon (2)
- Knife (4)
- Firearm (5)
- Weapon present or suspected (4)
Evidence of intention to
flee
“Force / Resistance Used
by Subject (check all that
apply)…Subject Flight”
- Motor Vehicle (1)
- Foot (2)
- Other (3)
Evidence of a compelling
governmental interest to
intervene or interdict
“Type of Incident (check
all that apply)”
- Felony (1)
- Violent Crime (4)
- Fight Disturbance (6)
- Domestic Violence (8)
- Mental / Suicidal (10)
Indicators of an impaired
rational ability (no single
factor taken as indicator,
multiple factors must be
present)
“Subject Impairments
(check all that apply)”
- Poor Balance (2)
- Rambling / Incoherent Speech (3)
- Smelled of Alcohol (4)
- Subject indicated drug / alcohol use (5)
- Subject indicated not using prescribed
medication (6)
- Slurred Speech (7)
- Possible mental illness / suicidal /
delusional (8)
- Possible intoxication (alcohol / drugs)
(10)
If we assume all incidents where an officer uses force against a citizen and is at a
force surplus (force factors 1 and above) have the potential to be UOEF incidents, we can
begin to eliminate justifiable use of force incidents by applying a logical analysis of the
Graham factors. Most of the factors listed in Table 2 are evidence of a compelling
interest to seek compliance, where the subject poses a substantial risk to officers and/or
public safety. Other factors are counter-indicative of alternatives to force.
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Statistical Significance
Before proceeding with the analysis, a few words on the issue of statistical
significance are in order. Sample-based statistics are estimates of a true population value
(or population parameter) that would have been obtained had one analyzed all of the data
rather than a sample of the data. Due to sampling variability, statistical estimates always
have a degree of error associated with them. Tests of statistical significance are
necessary to determine whether an observed difference in the sampled data is due to a
real and true difference, or if it could’ve been obtained by chance due to sampling
variability.
We have analyzed all UOF incidents during the study period and we do not seek
to generalize our findings beyond the study period. As such, we treat these as population
data. The numbers we report are treated not as sample-based statistical estimates, but
rather as population parameters having no sampling variability associated with them.
Any observed difference in the data is treated as a real and true difference in the data, and
statistical significance is not considered relevant. Therefore, we do not report any tests of
statistical significance, and readers should instead consider the substantive significance of
any observed differences.
ANALYSIS
When, where, and how often do the police in Seattle use force?
During the study period (1/1/09 through 3/25/11), there were a total of 1,240 use
of force reports. In the aggregate, this amounts to approximately 46 incidents per month,
or about 1.5 incidents per day.
In order to better understand the incidence of police use of force, we standardized
force incidents in terms of arrest activity. Table 3 presents arrest-based rates of use of
force during the study period. Overall, police in Seattle use force in about 2.4 out of
every 100 arrests. This rate is fairly consistent over the study period, with monthly rates
varying from 1.9 per 100 (March, 2009) to 3.1 per 100 (April, 2010).
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Table 3. Arrest-based rates of use of force in Seattle
Year
Month
Arrests
Force
Rate of force per
100 arrests
Overall 50,748 1,240 2.44
2009 January 2,080 48 2.31
February 1,850 48 2.59
March 1,929 37 1.92
April 1,926 47 2.44
May 1,945 45 2.31
June 1,933 45 2.33
July 2,049 52 2.54
August 2,015 51 2.53
September 1,914 40 2.09
October 1,918 47 2.45
November 1,695 45 2.65
December 1,744 45 2.58
2010 January 2,052 48 2.34
February 1,847 39 2.11
March 1,900 49 2.58
April 1,827 56 3.07
May 1,934 55 2.84
June 1,958 51 2.60
July 1,950 53 2.72
August 1,895 44 2.32
September 1,870 47 2.51
October 1,909 47 2.46
November 1,711 36 2.10
December 1,757 43 2.45
2011 January 1,889 44 2.33
February 1,531 46 3.00
March* 1,720 32 1.86
Note: Arrest data were provided by the Seattle Police Department.
* Includes all arrests but only force incidents through 3/25/11, thus the
actual rate for March, 2011, is probably higher.
It is important to note that these overall figures can mask important variation by
day of week and time of day. Use of force in Seattle is more frequent on weekends, with
36% of all incidents during the study period occurring on Saturdays and Sundays (see
figure 1). Force is also more frequent during the late evening and early-morning hours,
with 60% of all incidents occurring during the hours 2000-0359 (see figure 2).
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Figure 1. Use of Force Incidents, by Day of Week
142156 160 161
175
235
211
0
50
100
150
200
250
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Day of week
Number of incidents
Figure 2. Use of Force Incidents, by Time of Day
141
360
739
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0400 - 1159 1200 - 1959 2000 - 0359
Time of Day (Watch)
Number of Incidents
The West Precinct has the largest share (34%) of use of force incidents, followed
by the South Precinct (21%). The North and East Precincts each account for about 17%
of incidents (see figure 3). The Southwest Precinct had the lowest proportion of use of
force incidents (10%). Incidents that occurred outside of Seattle are not included in this
figure.
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Figure 3. Use of Force Incidents, by Precinct
215
422
212
262
118
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
North West East South Southwest
Precinct
Number of incidents
What are the underlying offenses in use of force incidents?
Officers recorded the type of incident on the use of force reporting forms. This
indicates the general nature of the dispatch or on-view incident and associated incident
characteristics. These characteristics are not mutually exclusive, so several type
characteristics may be indicated for a particular incident. Forty percent of the incidents
were reported as involving some type of felony matter, and 38% non-felony matters (see
figure 4). Fights or disturbances were indicated in 30% of incidents. About 1 in 5
involved violent crimes and/or were drug related. Eighteen percent were characterized as
mental/suicidal. Domestic violence was indicated in 15% of use of force incidents.
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Figure 4. Percent of Use of Force Incidents, by Type of Incident
40.3
37.5
29.5
21.8
20.0
18.2
15.5
15.2
12.1
10.7
5.9
1.3
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0
Felony
Non-felony
Fight/disturbance
Violent crime
Drug related
Mental/suicidal
Property crime
Domestic violence
Multiple subjects
Traffic related
Warrant service
Civil disorder
Percent of incidents
What are the characteristics of a typical suspect in use of force incidents, and what
do they do?
The vast majority of use of force incidents (94%) involved a single suspect upon
whom force was used. It is important to note that in some cases, the suspect(s) fled or
otherwise left the scene without being enumerated. For example, the use of OC Spray to
stop and disperse fighting crowds after bar closings in Belltown or in Pioneer Square may
result in no enumerated suspect(s). Another example might be mass demonstrations
wherein numerous individuals are involved in an incident but not enumerated. In cases
where the number of individual suspects was not identified, we coded these as zeros;
there were a total of 22 such cases (1.8%) among the total. Figure 5 shows the
distribution of force incidents by the number of suspects upon whom force was used.
16
Figure 5. Use of Force Incidents, by Number of Suspects
22
1171
37 7 2 10
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
0 1 2 3 4 20
Number of suspects
Number of incidents
A total of 1,252 suspects were identified in the use of force records, representing
1,193 unique suspects. The vast majority (96%) were suspects in a single use of force
incident during the study period (see figure 6). There were some “repeat” suspects upon
whom force was used, including 39 individuals who were involved in two incidents,
seven individuals who were involved in three incidents, and two individuals who were
involved in four incidents during the study period.
Figure 6. Suspects, by Number of Use of Force Incidents
1145
39 7 20
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1 2 3 4
Number of incidents
Number of suspects
At the incident-level (i.e., including “repeat” suspects), the average age of
suspects in use of force incidents was 32 years (SD=12), and the age of suspects ranged
from 12 to 78 years. The age distribution exhibits positive skew, so the median age (29
years) is perhaps a better measure of central tendency (see figure 7).
17
Race was determined for 1,262 suspects in use of force incidents. Forty-five
percent were White; 40% Black; 5% Asian; 3% American Indian; and 6% Other (see
figure 8). As shown, these figures are roughly comparable to the race distribution for all
arrestees during the study period (arrestee data were provided by SPD). Whites
comprised 50% of all arrestees and 45% of those upon whom force was used during the
study period. Blacks comprised 38% of all arrestees and 40% of those upon whom force
was used during the study period. Asians comprised 6% of all arrestees and 5% of those
upon whom force was used during the study period. American Indians comprised 3% of
both the arrestee and force populations. Individuals in the “Other category” represented
3% of the arrestee population and about 6% of those upon whom force was used.
18
Figure 8. Race distribution, Suspects in Use of Force Incidents
Compared with Arrestees
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
White Black American
Indian
Asian Other
Race
Percent
All Arestees
Use of Force Suspects
Gender was determined for 1,267 suspects in use of force incidents. (There was
additionally a transgender individual for whom a specific sex category could not be
determined. It is important to note that there were additional transgender suspects, but a
dominant gender was identified in the report for these other cases). Eighty-seven percent
of suspects were male, and the remaining 13% female.
Suspects may exhibit impairments that affect their judgment and behavioral
decision-making. There was no evidence of impairment noted for 26% of suspects in use
of force incidents. However, about half of suspects exhibited signs of intoxication (either
drugs or alcohol) (Figure 9). In about a third of cases, suspects indicated to the officer(s)
that they had been using drugs and/or alcohol (32%), exhibited rambling or incoherent
speech (33%), or smelled of alcohol (36%). Slurred speech (24%) and poor balance
(17%) were also noted impairments. A possible mental illness, suicidal intentions, or
delusional behavior was noted in 28% of incidents.
Figure 9. Percent of Suspects Exhibiting
Impairments, by Type of Impairment
49.5
35.8
33.1
31.9
28.4
24.2
17.0
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0
Possible intoxication (alcohol/drugs)
Smelled of alcohol
Rambling/incoherent speech
Subject indicated drug/alcohol use
Possible mental illness/suicidal/delusional
Slurred speech
Poor balance
Percent of suspects
19
In addition to impairments, suspects fled from officers in about a quarter of
incidents, by either foot (26.5%) or motor vehicle (3.1%). These figures also include a
small subset of cases in which suspects fled by both motor vehicle and foot.
As discussed earlier, we measured suspect resistance by reading report narratives
and coding suspect resistance levels on a seven-point scale. The scale categories
included:
1. Cooperative/no resistance 2. Verbal noncompliance/passive resistance 3. Psychological threat 4. Defensive resistance 5. Active resistance 6. Aggravated active resistance I 7. Aggravated active resistance II
Figure 10 shows the distribution of incidents along the seven-point continuum
described above. In nearly half (48.5%) of all incidents, the highest level of suspect
resistance was defensive resistance. Next most frequent was active resistance, with one
quarter (25%) of incidents falling in that category.
Figure 10. Percent of Use of Force Incidents,
by Maximum Suspect Resistance Level
1.0 9.9 9.0
48.5
25.2
5.7 0.70.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
Cooperative/no resistance
Verbal noncompliance/passive resistance
Psychological threat
Defensive resistance
Active resistance
Aggravated active resistance I
Aggravated active resistance II
Maximum resistance level
Percent of incidents
Another way of gauging the seriousness of suspect resistance in use of force
incidents is by the presence of Hazard Report & Washington Crime Information Center
20
(WACIC) Officer Safety Entry reports filed along with the use of force report. These
WACIC reports are to be completed by officers “… if combative resistance or physical
aggression that is intended to overpower, disable or injure is directed toward an officer.”
These forms instruct officers: “Do not fill out this report if the suspect only physically
pulls away, lies down or acts in other similar non-combative ways.” Once entered into
WACIC, other officers will then be notified about the potentially combative suspect
should they encounter him/her when performing a records check. WACIC reports were
filed in 19% of all use of force incidents during the study period.
Suspects complained of injury in 51% of incidents (although this refers only to
the first suspect reported and is thus conservative), and suspects were reported by officers
as visibly injured in 69% of incidents, but the injuries were sometimes a result of
something that happened prior to police involvement. Among those suspects
complaining of injury, 20% specifically refused treatment. The majority were treated by
EMS personnel at the scene or at a police precinct. In 14 cases (or about 1% of all use of
force incidents), suspects were treated and admitted to a hospital.
How many officers are typically involved and what do they do?
Eighty-one percent of all incidents involved force used by a single officer (48%),
or by two officers (33%) (see figure 11). Another 12% involved force used by three
officers. The remaining seven percent of cases involved force used by four or more
officers.
Figure 11. Use of Force Incidents, by Number of Officers Using Force
596
411
149
58 18 4 2 1 10
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 29
Number of officers
Number of incidents
Our analysis yielded 650 unique officers involved either as first responding
officers or as backing officers in the 1,240 use of force incidents during the study period.
It is important to note that not all officers were accounted for; we recorded up to six
21
officers involved, but there were a few incidents that exceeded that range, including one
incident that involved 29 officers. About a third (34%) of the officers in the use of force
data were involved in a single incident during the study period (Figure 12); about half
(53%) in one or two incidents; two-thirds (66%) in one to three incidents; and about
three-quarters (76%) in one to four incidents. Ninety-five percent of officers in the use of
force data were involved in less than ten incidents during the study period. Thirty-one
officers (about 5%) were involved in 10 or more incidents during the study period, and
there were three officers (about 0.5%) who were involved in 20 or more use of force
incidents during the study period.
Figure 12. Number of Officers Involved in Multiple Incidents,
by Number of Force Incidents
223
119
89
64
39 3322 22
8 3 3 8 2 3 2 3 2 2 1 1 10
50
100
150
200
250
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 23 24
Number of incidents
Number of officers
Slightly more than half of the use of force incidents (55%) resulted from the
dispatch of an officer to a scene, while the remainder (45%) were on-view incidents.
As to the specific tactics employed, we recorded all tactics used by officers (as
indicated on the use of force reporting form) involved in each incident (Figure 13). As
can be seen, hands, elbows, and arms were the most frequently reported (80%), followed
by feet, knees, and legs (28%). Tasers were reported as being used in 23% of incidents.
Less frequently used were OC spray (7%), batons (4%), canines (3%) and other types
(3%).
22
Figure 13. Percent of Use of Force Incidents, by Tactics Employed
79.5
27.7
22.8
7.3
3.6
3.1
2.6
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0
Hands/Elbows/Arms
Feet/Knees/Legs
Taser
OC Spray
Baton
K-9
Other
Percent of incidents
As discussed earlier, we measured maximum officer force levels by reading report
narratives and coding officer force levels on a seven-point scale. The scale categories
included:
1. Police presence, verbal direction 2. Strong verbal order with minimal contact 3. OC spray 4. Defensive force, forcibly subdued suspect with open hands or feet 5. Offensive force, forcibly subdued suspect using closed hands or feet 6. Intermediate weapon 7. Deadly force
Figure 14 shows the distribution of incidents along the seven-point continuum
described above. In about 4 out of 10 incidents, the highest level of officer force was
defensive physical force. Next most frequent was the use of an intermediate weapon,
with almost 3 out of 10 incidents falling in that category. About one quarter (24%) of
incidents involved officers using offensive physical force.
23
Figure 14. Percent of Use of Force Incidents,
by Maximum Officer Force Level
0.0 2.0 4.1
41.0
23.9
28.7
0.30.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
Police presence, verbal direction
Strong verbal order with minimal contact
OC spray
Defensive force
Offensive force
Intermediate weapon
Deadly force
Maximum force level
Percent of incidents
Officer injuries were reported in 17% of incidents, although this figure relates
only to the first officer reported, and is thus conservative. Officers typically self-treated
or were treated by EMS personnel.
How are the interactions distributed in terms of both suspect and officer actions?
Here we report on the distribution of force factors (i.e., level of officer force
minus level of suspect resistance). A value of ‘0’ indicates that police force was
proportional to suspect resistance. Positive values indicate officers using a higher level
of force compared to suspect resistance, and negative values indicate officers using a
lower level of force compared to suspect resistance. In general, officers following a force
continuum model will use a higher level of force in order to overcome a given level of
suspect resistance, thus +1 events (and to some extent, +2 events, some of which may be
an artifact of skipping over OC spray, or going to an intermediate weapon such as the
Taser rather than physically fighting an individual) are to be expected. Overall, about
80% of use of force incidents fell in the 0 to 2 range, and about 14% fell in negative
categories (Figure 15). The remaining 6% were in the 3 to 5 range.
24
Figure 15. Percent of Use of Force Incidents,
by Force Factor (Force - Resistance)
0.4
2.3
10.9
35.6
27.1
17.7
3.9
1.90.3
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Force Factor
Percent of incidents
Since the static force factor only captures the maximum levels of officer force and
suspect resistance, an examination of dynamic force factors may help to understand the
evolution. As previously mentioned, we coded up to 10 dyadic iterations of officer-
suspect actions. More than half of all cases end by the fourth iteration (Figure 16).
Figure 17 shows the average levels of officer force and suspect resistance at each
iteration. Overall, officers on average entered situations at a force deficit, and
transitioned into a force surplus by iteration three. This generally reflects initial attempts
to reason with noncompliant suspects either with voice commands or limited physical
contact.
25
Figure 16. Number of Incidents, by Number of Force-
Resistance Iterations
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Iteration Number
Number of Incidents
Figure 17. Dynamic Force and Resistance Levels
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Iteration Number
Average Force or Resistance Level
Officer
Suspect
Figure 18 shows the average force factor at each iteration. As can be seen, force
factors are generally negative in the first two iterations. Average force factors transition
through zero to positive values thereafter, consistent with the notion of a force
continuum.
26
Figure 18. Dynamic Force Factors
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Iteration Number
Average Force Factor
How often might the use of excessive force occur in Seattle?
As previously discussed, our approach is to filter out cases based on both Graham
factors and static force factors in order to identify a pool of potentially excessive
incidents. Selecting use of force incidents having an absence of Graham factors as
defined (i.e., threat or intention to inflict harm, fleeing, a compelling governmental
interest to intervene, and impaired rational ability), and having a static force factor equal
to or greater than 1, yields an initial pool of 59 cases. Fourteen of these cases were OC
Spray deployments, generally involving large crowds and alcohol establishments, and
resulting in no enumerated suspects. We removed these cases from the pool. In addition,
two of these cases involved animals. In one case, the officer fired a Taser at a dog that
was injuring another dog; the Taser had the desired effect and the dog ran off. In the
other case, the officer fired his sidearm at the dog but missed. Both animal cases were
removed from the pool.
The remaining 43 cases (3.5% of all cases) are characterized as potentially
excessive. In the context of total arrests, this equates to about 1 potential use of excessive
force for every 1,180 arrests in Seattle. We strongly caution that further research is
needed to determine the overall utility of our approach. In a broader sense, we need
socio-legal research to determine whether it is even possible to identify use of excessive
force from administrative records. It should also be noted that the filtering method will
include cases that, upon further review, are probably not excessive; likewise, it will miss
some cases that are. The filtering method relies on the accuracy of administrative data
elements, and it is possible that some characteristics may not be correctly identified in
use of force reports or that omitted details in the forms could result in erroneous
selection. We describe the cases below with these cautions in mind.
Similar to all use of force cases, these potentially excessive cases are slightly
more frequent on weekends, but whereas all force incidents are heavily loaded (60%) in
the 3rd watch (2000 – 0359), the potentially excessive cases are more balanced between
27
2nd (40%) and 3
rd (44%) watches (Figure 19). Similar to all use of force cases, the West
Precinct accounts for about a third (35%) of the potentially excessive cases, but the East
Precinct has a larger share of potentially excessive cases (28%) as compared to that
Precinct’s share of all use of force cases (17%) (Figure 20). One of the potentially
excessive incidents occurred outside the City of Seattle.
Figure 19. All Use of Force and Potentially Excessive Incidents, by Time
of Day
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
0400 - 1159 1200 - 1959 2000 - 0359
Time of Day (Watch)
Percent of Incidents
All Use of Force
Potential UOEF
Figure 20. All Use of Force and Potentially Excessive Incidents, by
Precinct
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
North West East South Southwest
Precinct
Percent of incidents
All Use of Force
Potential UOEF
The types of incidents (i.e., the general nature of the dispatch or on-view incident)
were characterized for 32 of the potentially UOEF cases. 24 were identified as non-
felony, 8 as drug related, 8 as traffic related, 7 as property crime, 4 involved multiple
subjects, 3 involved warrant services, and 1 was identified as a civil disorder. (Note that
these are not mutually exclusive categories).
Suspects in these cases were typically male (83%), and the age distribution is
substantively similar to that for all use of force cases (median 29 years of age). With
regard to race, the proportion of cases involving White suspects declines from all
28
arrestees (50%), to those upon whom force is used (45%), to those involving potential
UOEF (40%) (Figure 21). There are increases in the proportion of Asian and “Other”
suspects from arrestees to EUOF cases. For example, the other category increases from
all arrestees (3%), to those upon whom forced is used (6%), to those involving potential
UOEF (12%).
Figure 21. Race distribution, Suspects in All Use of Force and
Potentially Excessive Incidents, Compared with Arrestees
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
White Black American Indian Asian Other
Race
Percent Arrestees
All Use of Force
Potential UOEF
Incidents identified as potentially excessive were more frequently on-view
incidents (67%), in contrast to all use of force incidents (45%). All but two cases
involved a single suspect, and typically involved either one (54%) or two (35%) officers.
Officer tactics (hands, elbows, arms; feet, knees, legs; Taser; etc.) were similar in
distribution to those for all use of force incidents. Suspects were booked in about 60% of
these incidents, and some common charges listed were obstructing, assault, resisting,
trespass, and warrants.
How is police use of force geographically distributed in Seattle?
As previously noted, the West Precinct has the largest share of use of force
incidents, accounting for just over one-third of the incidents during the study period.
However, precinct-level aggregations mask important local spatial variation in the use of
force. Here, we report on some basic spatial analyses to explore this local variation.
Map 1 is a point map of the greater Seattle area where each point indicates a use of force
incident. As can be seen, use of force incidents are distributed across the entire city. A
cursory visual inspection suggests clustering and other patterning in the distribution of
incidents.
29
Map 1. Point Map of Use of Force Incidents in Seattle
30
Map 2 displays a kernel density estimation of use of force incidents over the study
area. Higher densities are noted on the map in several locations. In the North Precinct,
there area higher densities of use of force incidents in the general vicinity of: (1) NE
125th St & Lake City Way NE; and (2) NE 45
th to 50
th Sts & University Way NE.
In the East Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the
general vicinity of: (1) E Pine to E Pike Sts & Broadway to Boylston Aves; and (2) 23rd
Ave to MLK Way & E Cherry St to E Yesler Way.
In the West Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents in the
general vicinity of: (1) Belltown; (2) Pioneer Square; and (3) International District.
Finally, in the South Precinct, there are higher densities of use of force incidents
in the general vicinity of: (1) Rainier Ave & S Genesee St; (2) Rainier Ave & S
Ferdinand St; (3) MLK Way & S Webster to S Othello Sts; and (4) Rainier Ave & S
Henderson St.
It should be emphasized that this is a very macro-level view of use of force
incidents and that greater specificity can be achieved, especially in the downtown core
and with Precinct-level analyses. We forego such analyses here in order to avoid
potential micro-level spatial labeling and privacy concerns.
31
Map 2. Kernel Density Estimation of Use of Force Incidents in Seattle
32
CONCLUSION
In many ways, this is just the beginning. The descriptive analysis presented in
this report is a necessary first step toward understanding the nature and scope of police
use of force in Seattle, but it is also the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The key findings are
summarized in the front of the report and need not be repeated here. The next step is to
move from description toward explanation.
The spatial component of police use of force is an important area for continued
research. Everything occurs in time and space, and to ignore these aspects of police use
of force is to miss a large part of the story. Merging these data with available crime data,
Census data regarding community characteristics, as well as data from other researchers
engaged in attitudinal studies of Seattle neighborhoods, may prove quite fruitful in
explaining the distribution of police use of force, as well as achieving broader social
justice goals.
Alternative data sources, such as complaints filed with the ACLU or other
entities, should also be brought to bear on the question of the incidence of police use of
force. A significant limitation of the present research is reliance upon official use of
force reports, which contain statements from the officer, witnesses, the investigating
supervisor and members of the SPD chain of command involved in reviewing them, but
not the subject of the action. Further, these reports are written for the purpose of
documenting justification for the application of force. As such they contain an inherent
bias toward police. This is not to say these reports are inaccurate; these are official
statements given by sworn officers whom we presume are giving the most accurate
statement possible.
In reviewing use of force reports, we took no license in interpreting the actions of
either party. But we were also looking for specific elements of interaction (force and
resistance levels) and a more thorough analysis of the report narratives is certainly in
order. One of the benefits of the data file we have generated along with our initial
descriptive analysis is that we now have an accurate sampling frame from which a
statistically valid sample of cases can be drawn for more detailed qualitative analysis.
We close by acknowledging that, despite the relatively benign picture that
emerges from empirical data, the public outrage and calls for a DOJ investigation cannot
be ignored. We entrust our public servants, especially in law enforcement, with
tremendous powers of coercion. When a law enforcement officer uses force against a
citizen it is disturbing. From a psychological standpoint the impact can be dramatic for
bystanders, let alone the subjects of violence themselves. We cannot ignore the reality of
violence simply because it occurs rarely. However, we would hope that those engaged in
police reform efforts would do their best to ensure that such reforms are rooted in a
rational understanding of police use of force, so that their efforts are truly meaningful and
long-lasting.
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