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SouthAfricanI
nstit
ute
ofI
nte
rnationalA
ffair
s
Africanperspectives.Globalin
sight
s.
China in Africa Project
O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 1 1 4
Goodwill and Hard Bargains:The DRC, China and India
M a r c h 2 0 1 2
G r e g o r y M t h e m b u - S a l t e r
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A b o u t S A I I A
The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record
as South Africas premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,
non-government think-tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into
public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs
with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research
excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIAs occasional papers
present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in
Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good
governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;
and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the
environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about
SAIIAs work.
A b o u t t h e C h I N A I N A F R I C A P R o J e C t
SAIIAs China in Africa research project investigates the emerging relationship between
China and Africa; analyses Chinas trade and foreign policy towards the continent; and
studies the implications of this strategic co-operation in the political, military, economic and
diplomatic fields.
The project seeks to develop an understanding of the motives, rationale and institutional
structures guiding Chinas Africa policy, and to study Chinas growing power and influence
so that they will help rather than hinder development in Africa. It further aims to assist Africanpolicymakers to recognise the opportunities presented by the Chinese commitment to the
continent, and presents a platform for broad discussion about how to facilitate closer
co-operation. The key objective is to produce policy-relevant research that will allow Africa
to reap the benefits of interaction with China, so that a collective and integrated African
response to future challenges can be devised that provides for constructive engagement
with Chinese partners.
A ChinaAfrica Toolkit has been developed to serve African policymakers as an
information database, a source of capacity building and a guide to policy formulation
SAIIA gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the main funders of the
project: The United Kingdom Department for International Development and the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency.
Project leader and series editor: Dr Chris Alden, [email protected]
SAIIA March 2012
All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information or
storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Opinions expressed are
the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.
Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.
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A b S t R A C t
The economic and political engagement of China and India with the African continent is
growing, but the complex dynamics of this engagement, particularly at country-specific
level, remain under-researched. This study explores historical, political and economic
aspects of India and Chinas relationship with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It
first traces the historical development of China and Indias political and trade relations with
the DRC from the 1950s to the present day. There follows specific consideration of Indian
and Chinese involvement in mining, construction, finance, and telecommunications. The
study shows that while Indian and Chinese business and governments are both significant
drivers of growth in the DRC, the nature of their engagement differs substantially. Significantly,
unlike its Indian counterpart, the Chinese government facilitates access by Chinese state-
owned companies to large mining deposits in the DRC through loans from the state-owned
Export-Import Bank. In the telecommunications sector, however, the most successful Chinese
company, Huawei Technologies, receives no noticeable state assistance. Meanwhile Indias
Bharti has become the DRCs biggest telecommunications investor and operator. Politically,
China has positioned itself as a close ally of President Joseph Kabila while India, the main
troop contributor to the UN mission to the DRC, has a more strained relationship. The study
concludes that China and Indias role in delivering infrastructural development to the DRC
is welcome, but that projects required continued and careful scrutiny by civil society and
the countrys democratic institutions.
A b o u t t h e A u t h o R
Gregory Mthembu-Salter is a researcher and author on Africas political economy. He
writes for the Economist Intelligence Unit and a range of other publications, and has served
on the UN Group of Experts on the DRC. His main research interests are unrecorded trade,
and the links between conflict and natural resources.
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A b b R e v I A t I o N S A N d A C R o N y m S
ACGT AgenceCongolaisedesGrandsTravails (CongoleseAgencyforGreatWorks)
AFDL AlliancedesForcesDmocratiquespourlaLibrationduCongo-Zare
BCPSC BureaudeCoordinationetdeSuividuProgramme
Sino-Congolais TheofficefortheCo-ordinationandFollowUpofthe
Sino-CongoleseProgramme
CITCC ChinaInternationalTelecommunicationConstructionCorporation
CREC ChinaRailwaysConstructionCompany
CCT CongoChinaTelecommunications
DRC DemocraticRepublicofCongo
FNLA FrenteNacionaldeLibertaodeAngola
(NationalFrontfortheLiberationofAngola)
Gcamines LaGnraledesCarriresetdesMines
ITRI InternationalTinResearchInstitute
MMR MiningMineralResources
MPLA MovimentoPopulardeLibertaodeAngola
(PopularMovementfortheLiberationofAngola)
MPR MouvementPopulairedelaRvolution
NDRC NationalDevelopmentandReformCommission
NGO Non-governmentalorganisation
OCPTC OfficeCongolaisdesPostesetTlcommunications
SADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity
SOMIKA SocietMinireduKatanga(MiningCompanyofKatanga)
UNITA UnioNacionalparaaIndependenciaTotaldeAngola (NationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola)
USSR UnitedSovietSocialistRepublic
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I N t R o d u C t I o N
Toanoutsider,theymayseemaperfectfit.TheDRChasbountifulnaturalresourcesand a growing consumerbase,set against a desperately poor infrastructure,a
shortageofskilledlabour,ahighlychallengingbusinessenvironmentandalong-standing
lackofaccesstocapital.Ontheotherhand,thePeoplesRepublicofChinaandIndia
areundergoingrapideconomicgrowth.Theyarethenewworkshopsoftheworldbut
whilerichinhumanresources,includingskilledlabour,increasinglytheylackthenatural
resourcesandrawmaterialstofueltheirdevelopment.Inaddition,ChinaandIndiahave
eachaccumulatedsignificantcapitalreserves,towhichtheirstate-ownedbankshave
privilegedandreadyaccess;andbothshowanincreasingappetiteforrisk,specifically
inAfrica.Furthermore,althoughthereisalong-establishedIndianbusinesscommunity
intheDRC(whichhasattractedmuchcriticismovertheyearsfrommanyCongolese)
neitherIndia norChina carriesa significantmoralburdenin thecountryby wayof
colonialorpost-colonialassociations.
Finally,astheDRCstraditionalWesternalliesanddonorshavegrownmorecritical
andparsimonious,theCongolesepoliticaleliteisseekinglessjudgemental,freer-spending
foreignpartners.Chinaand(toalesserextent)Indiathusfarhavebeenwillingtoassume
thatposition.Ateverygovernment-levelmeetingbetweentheDRC,ChinaandIndia
thereismuchtalkofgoodwillandwin-win,anditistruethatthereseemsanamplitude
ofgoodwillonallsides.Atthesametimehardbargainsarebeingdriven.Indianand
ChinesebusinessinterestsseekprofitablytoengagewiththeDRCwithoutfallingvictim
toitsmultiplepoliticalandeconomicrisks;whiletheCongolesegovernmentandbusiness
sectorlooktoextractmaximumadvantage;intheshorttermforthemselvesanditisto
behopedinthelongrunfortheircountryasawhole.
Thispaperseekstounderstandthesedynamicsastheyplayoutindiplomacy,politicsandeconomicsatinternationalandnationallevel.ItwillexaminetheDRCskeyeconomic
sectorsmining,telecommunications,constructionandinfrastructureaftersettingthe
scenewithabriefanalysisofpoliticalandmilitaryrelationsbetweentheDRC,Indiaand
China.
P o L I t I C A L A N d m I L I t A R y R e L A t I o N S
Respectively under great helmsman Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru,inthe1950sChinaandIndiagavevocalsupportforthethenBelgianCongos
independencemovement.Because ofits activeinterest inexportingits ownstyleof
communistrevolutionwhileblockingtheadvanceoftheSovietUnionsMoscowversion,
ChinawentfurtherthanIndiaincultivatingtieswiththeCongosindependenceactivists.
ChinesegovernmentofficialsfirstmetCongoleseindependenceleaderPatriceLumumba
inAccra,Ghana,attheFirstAll-AfricanPeoplesCongressin1958,andlateratthesecond
suchcongressthefollowingyear.1Lumumba,however,appearedlittleinterestedinChina,
andtothehorroroftheUnitedStatesgovernmentbegantodevelopclosertieswith
theUnitedSovietSocialistRepublic(USSR).
Lumumba,who12 weeks earlierhadassumedofficeas thecountrysfirstlegally
electedprime minister, wasdismissed byPresident JosephKasa-Vubuin September
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1960,butthelegalityofthatactionwasstronglycontested.Lumumbasdeputy,Antoine
Gizenga,subsequentlyestablishedarivaladministrationinStanleyville(nowKisangani).
ChinaswiftlyestablisheddiplomaticrelationswithStanleyvilleandinaletterdated12September121960,offeredtheadministrationGBP21million(itisnotclearwhether,
orto whom,the moneywasactuallydisbursed3)yetwaitedseveralmonthsbefore
actuallyopeninganembassyinthecity.AfterLumumbawasmurderedinJanuary1961
andreplacedasprimeministerbyCyrilleAdoula,Chinafinallysentanambassadorto
Stanleyville;buttheembassyoperatedforonlytwomonths.Inmid-1961theStanleyville
administrationcloseditselfdownfollowingreconciliationbetweenGizengaandAdoulas
governmentinLeopoldville(nowKinshasa).Chinaestablisheddiplomaticrelationswith
theLeopoldvillegovernmentinDecember1961,butGizengaandAdoulasamityproved
short-lived,andGizengawasarrestedinearly1962.InanycasetheChinesegovernment
hadbeenunimpressedbyGizengasrevolutionarypotential,withareportwrittenbya
visitingChineseministerin1961allegingthat:
thenationalliberationmovementofthe Congois mainlyled bycapitalistnationalist
elements.Amongthemwaveringandcompromiseprevailandsotheycannotundertake
correctandfirmleadership.4
TheUNSecurityCouncilauthorisedmilitaryinterventioninCongoinFebruary1961to
endthedeclaredsecessionofthecountrysKatangaandKasaprovinces.Amonthlater
IndiacontributedaninfantrybrigadeaspartoftheUNdeployment.Inlate1962andearly
1963thebrigadeplayedamajorroleinOperationGrandSlaminKatanga,throughwhich
UNforcesseizedcontrolofElisabethville(nowLubumbashi)andJadotville(nowLikasi)
fromthesecessionists.TheUNoperationcompleted,IndiantroopswithdrewfromCongo
inmid-1964.5PierreMulele,fromKwilu(nowBandundu)provinceinthesouth-west,spent1961as
theStanleyvillegovernmentsambassadorinCairo.In1962hemovedtoChinaandfor
severalmonthswastrainedthereinrevolutionaryguerrillawarfare.Mulelereturnedto
Congoin1963andin1964launchedaMaoistrebellioninKwiluthatlastedfiveyears.In
1965JosephMobutuseizedthepresidencyofthecountryanddirectedconsiderableenergy
tocrushingMulelesKwilurevoltandastringofotherrebelinsurgencieselsewhereinthe
country.Underintensepressurefromgovernmentforces,Mulelefledto Brazzavillein
1968,whencehewaslatertemptedbacktoCongowithapromiseofamnestybyMobutu,
whothenhadhimpubliclytorturedtodeath.6MulelesmurdercrushedChinashopesof
successfullybackingrevolutioninthecountryasMobutumusthavehopeditmight.
TheUSgovernmenthadbeeninstrumentalinMobutusassumptionofpowerandfor
atimethetwohadacloserelationship.Unsurprisingly,givenitsactivesupportforMulele
andotherrebellionsagainsthisrule,MobutuwashostiletoChina,althoughlessfervently
sothanhewastotheUSSR.In1973MobutuvisitedChinaandthefollowingyearagain
wentthere,andtoNorthKorea.HereturnedwithapromisefromChinaof$100millionin
technicalaid,ideasfornew,leftistpolicyinitiativesandvaluabletipsonhowtogenerate
apersonalitycult.
ShortlyafterhisreturnthepoliticalbureauoftherulingMouvementPopulairedela
RvolutionannouncedaMao-style,ten-pointradicalisationprogrammeinwhichthe
numberonescourgewasidentifiedaslibertybeingconfusedwithlicense.Theproposed
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remedywasdiscipline,fidelitytoMobutu,andthedesignationofplaceswhichmarked
thelifeofthepresidentassitesofpilgrimage.InJanuary1975Mobutu,whohadtakento
referringtohimselfastheHelmsman,announcedthatfoodshortageswouldbeovercomewithagriculturalbrigades.Hefurtherdeclaredthatunemploymentwouldbeliquidated
bytheendoftheyear,andthatsinceinflationwasamaladyinherentinthecapitalist
systemit would beabolishedby state-decreedpricereductions.Heralding arashof
ultimatelydisastrousnationalisationsinthecountry,Mobutufurtherstatedthatmajor
economicinitiativesshouldbetheexclusivedomainoftheState.7
Meanwhilein1974,thepost-SalazarPortuguesedictatorshipcametoanend,paving
thewayforindependenceandsubsequentcivilwarinPortugalsmainAfricancolonies,
MozambiqueandAngola.Mobutuwasfriendlywithoneofthearmedgroupscompeting
forpowerinAngola,theFrenteNacionaldeLibertaodeAngola(FNLA),which
alsoenjoyedsporadicsupportfromtheCentralIntelligenceAgency.Hewas,however,
hostiletotheMovimentoPopulardeLibertaodeAngola(MPLA),themainbackerof
whichwastheUSSR.FollowingMobutusvisitstoChinatheChinesegovernmentalso
begansupportingtheFNLAandinaddition,theUnioNacionalparaaIndependncia
TotaldeAngola(Unita);mainlyitseemsasawaytothwartSovietambitionsinAfrica. 8
Soon,ChineseweaponrywasmakingitswaytoFNLAmilitarycampsinsideZare(as
MobutuhadbythenrenamedCongo),whiletheUSSRandCubarampedupsuppliesto
theMPLA.WhilethiscollaborationdidmuchtoimproveSino-Zareanrelations,itwas
notenoughfortheFNLAtoconquerAngola.TheMPLAcapturedLuanda,proclaimed
AngolanindependenceinNovember1975,anddecisivelydefeatedtheFNLAinFebruary
1976.Unita,however,formanyyearscontinuedtocontrollargeswathesofthediamond-
richAngolanterritoryborderingZare,andfoughtonuntilthedeathofitsleaderJonas
Savimbiin2002.AlthoughMobutuprovidedsupporttoUnitaandtradeddiamondswith
itsleadershipuntilhelostpowerin1996,theChinesegovernmentbrokewithSavimbiinthelate1970sandestablishedpoliticalrelationswiththeMPLAin1980.9
TheIndianbusinesscommunityinZairewasbadlyaffectedbyMobutusZareanisation
policyofthemid-1970s,whichledtotheforcibletransfertowell-connectedZareans
ofmajorityshareholdingsinIndian-ownedbusinesses.NewDelhi,however,tookno
discerniblestepstoprotectIndianbusinessesinZaireandindeed,appearedtohavelittle
politicalinterestinthecountryasawholeduringMobutusrule.RajendraRai,Indias
ambassadortoZaireduringtheearly1980s,hasrecountedthat:
TherewasnotmuchprospectforenhancedtradeaslongasZaresdifficultiesinpayingfor
itsimportscontinued.TherebeingnoPakistaniembassyinKinshasatherewasnotgoing
tobethestapleIndiandiplomaticactivityofcounteringPakistanipropagandaorstating
theIndiancaseonJammuandKashmir.
Ihadatotaloffourtte--tteswithMobutu,includingtheoneafterthepresentationofmy
credentialsandtheonefortakingleave.TherewasnotenoughcontentinIndiasrelations
withZaretowarrantmorethantheothertwomeetingsIhad.10
IndiawithdrewitsambassadorfromZarein1993,anddidnotsendanotheruntil2006. 11
In1996aRwandan-ledrebelgroup,AllianceofDemocraticForcesfortheLiberation
ofCongo-Zaire(AFDL),invadedZareandmovedswiftlythroughthecountry,easily
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crushingwhatlittleresistanceitencounteredfromZairesarmedforces.Itentered
Kinshasaon17May1997.LaurentKabila,whomtheRwandanmilitaryhadpreviously
selectedasthepublicfaceoftheAFDL,
12
declaredhimselfpresidentofthecountry,whichherenamedtheDemocraticRepublicofCongo.Mobutuhadfledthecitythedaybefore,
anddiedinexileinMoroccofourmonthslater.13
KabilawasoriginallyaLumumbist.Hiscareerasa rebelcommanderbeganwhen
LumumbasenthimtoBurundiinJanuary1964tomakecontactwithChineseofficials
thereandenlisttheirsupportforarebellionineasternKivuprovince. 14Therebellionwas
dulylaunchedwithChinesesupport.Itrumbledoninconclusivelyforyears,degenerating
attimesintounprincipledbanditry(suchaswhenKabilasforcesin1975kidnapped
severalforeignstudentsfromJaneGoodallschimpanzeeresearchcampinGombe,
westernTanzaniaanddemandeda$500,000ransom).15
Kabilahadtravelledto,andspentseveralmonthsin,Chinaduringthelate1970s
andonceinstalledaspresidentoftheDRCsoonrevivedhisChineselinks.Fromthe
starthismainconcernwasmilitaryassistance,andChinaobliged,reportedlysupplying
largequantitiesofweaponsduringthelate1990s. 16AnumberofKabilasmilitaryofficers
includingoneof hissons,JosephKabila,alsowentto Chinafortrainingduringthe
sameperiod.17AtthistimeKabilasrelationswiththeDRCsformerWesternallies
oscillatedbetweenlukewarmandfrigidlyhostile,withfewdonorswillingtoprovide
assistance onKabilas terms. Inadditionto obtainingmilitaryassistance,therefore,
KabilawaskeentoexpandeconomiclinkswithChina.Themainfruitofhisefforts
wastheformationofajointventurebetweentheDRCgovernmentandaChinesestate-
ownedtelecommunicationscompany,ZTE,in2000.ZTEtooka51%stakeinanew
mobilephoneoperatingcompanycalledCongoChineTlcoms(CCT),withtheOffice
CongolaisdesPostesetTlcommunications(OCPT)takingthebalance.
BarelyamonthafterKabilaorderedallRwandantroopsoutoftheDRCinJuly1998,anotherRwanda-backedrebelmovement,theCongoleseRallyforDemocracy,beganawar
againsthisgovernment.TheconflictswiftlydraggedinmostoftheDRCsneighbours.
UgandaalsoopposedKabilabutAngola,NamibiaandZimbabwesupportedhim.After
ayearoffighting,inJuly1999apeaceaccord(theLusakaCeasefireAgreement)was
signedinLusaka,Zambia,bythepresidentsoftheDRC,Zimbabwe,Angola,Rwanda
andUganda.InSeptemberofthatyearthe UNlaunchedamilitaryoperationin the
DRCintendedtooversee,andifnecessaryenforce,thefragileagreement.Asithadbeen
duringthe1960s,IndiaagainbecameoneofthemaintroopcontributorstotheUN
Mission(Monuc)intheDRCfromitsbeginningin2000.ParticularlyinNorthKivu,
whichbordersRwandaandisamongtheDRCsmostviolentandtroubledprovinces,
Indiadeployedthousandsoftroops,andequipmentincludingcombathelicopters.
ChinafirstcontributedtroopstoMonucin2001andin2008therewere234Chinese
militarypersonnelintheDRCoutofatotal1487postedinUNmissionsworldwide. 18
By2011,meanwhile,Indiahadmorethan4000troopsintheDRC.19
KabilawasassassinatedbyoneofhisbodyguardsinJanuary2001andwasswiftly
replacedbyhissonJoseph.Thechangeinleadershipprovidedimmediateimpetusto
thecountrysfalteringpeaceprocess.InJuly2002KabilaandRwandanpresidentPaul
KagamesignedapeaceagreementinPretoria,SouthAfrica,brokeredbySouthAfricas
PresidentThaboMbeki.MostforeigntroopsdepartedtheDRCsoonafterwards.In
December2002,alsoinPretoria,alandmarkpoliticalagreementwassignedbetween
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Kabila,theleadersofthearmedgroupsopposedtohim,andrepresentativesofthose
politicalpartieslackingprivatearmies.Thisinturnledtoanewunitygovernmentheaded
byKabila,whichwassworninon17July2003.
20
ChinacontinuedtosellmilitaryequipmenttotheDRCuntilsometimearound
2008,sincewhennomajorsaleshavebeenreported.Chineseinstructors,however,have
continuedtoprovidetrainingtotheCongolesemilitaryattheKaminabaseinManiema
province,whileeachyearanumberofCongolesemilitaryofficersaresenttoreceive
traininginChina.21AftertheDRCMinisterofDefenceCharlesMwandoNsimbavisited
ChinainOctober2009fortalkswithhisChinesecounterpartLiangGuanglie,anofficial
Chinesestatementsaidthatthetwogovernmentswerereadytoraiserelationsbetween
theirarmedforcestoahigherlevel.22
Kabilahasbeenaskeenashisfather(andastheChinesegovernment)tofoster
economiclinkswithChina.EquallyenthusiastictoextendChinaseconomicreachinthe
DRC,inSeptember2007Beijingsignedamultibilliondollarresources-for-infrastructure
dealbetweenLaGnraledesCarriresetdesMines(Gcamines),aCongolesestate-
ownedminingcompany,andtwoChinesestateconstructioncompanies.Themoneywas
tocomefromChinasstate-ownedExport-Import(Exim)Bank.
Atthesametime,Chinasgovernmenthasbeenincreasinglywillingtouseitsseat
ontheUNSecurityCounciltothebenefitoftheDRC.Forexampleandmuchtothe
irritationoftheUS,BritishandFrenchgovernmentsacandidateforaUNGroupof
ExpertsontheDRCwasvetoedbyChinaintheUNSecurityCouncilinearly2010atthe
requestoftheDRCgovernment,whichhadtakenumbrageatthecandidatesformerwork
foraUS-basedlobbygroup,HumanRightsWatch.23TheChinesegovernmenthasalso
affirmedthatshouldtheCongolesegovernmentgiveMonucssuccessororganisation,the
UNStabilisationMissionintheDRC(newlynamedMonuscoin2010),acleardeadline
toleavethecountry,itwouldsupportthatdemand.24InJuly2007,internationalnewsagenciesreportedallegationscontainedinUN
documentsthatsince2005someIndianpeacekeepersineasternDRChadbeentradingin
goldwithaRwandanrebelmilitia.AnIndianarmygeneralwasapparentlyimplicated. 25
FurtherallegationsaboutillegaltradebetweenIndianpeacekeepersandCongolesearmed
groups,whichweresaidtohavemadetheformerreluctanttoassistinMonucseffortsto
disarmthelatter,surfacedthefollowingyear.TheUNSecurityCouncilvotedtoincrease
MonucstroopdeploymentinNovember2008,butaccordingtoaUSStateDepartment
cablelaterreleasedbythewebsiteWikileaks 26theDRCgovernmentrequestedthatthis
shouldnotincludemoreIndianforces.TheIndiangovernmentthereuponthreatenedto
pullallitstroopsandhelicoptersoutoftheDRC,amovethatwouldhavesubstantially
underminedMonucsmilitarycapacity.
TherefollowedsustaineddiplomaticeffortsbyUNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-moonand
theUSgovernment,resultinginKabilaswritingpersonallytoPrimeMinisterManmohan
SinghofficiallythankinghisgovernmentforitstroopcontributionsandaskingIndia
toremainengaged inthe DRC. The initiative worked,andthe Indian government
rescindeditsthreattopullout.27ReactingtoIndiangovernmentcomplaintsaboutits
relativelackofinfluenceintheupperechelonsofMonuc,BanKi-moonappointedmore
Indianstocommandpositions,asaresultofwhichIndiasLieutenant-GeneralChander
PrakashbecameforcecommanderinJuly2010.28Yetinmid-2011whenRogerMeece,
theAmericanheadofMonusco,requestedthatIndiacontinuetoleaseitshelicoptersto
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themission,therequestwasrefused.MeececommentedthatthewithdrawalofIndias
helicopterswould significantly weaken Monuscos military capacity, but theIndian
governmentwasunrepentant,retortingthatitwasnottheonlycountryintheworldwithcombathelicopters.Indiadid,however,agreetoleaveitstroopsinplaceatleastuntilthe
conclusionofthenextDRCpresidentialandlegislativeelectioninlateNovember2011.29
TheIndiangovernmenthasnobilateralmilitaryco-operativearrangementswiththe
DRC30buthasbeguntotakemoreinterestinstimulatingtradebetweenthetwocountries.
Inthemid-2000sthestate-ownedExport-ImportBankofIndia(EximIndia)offereda$57
millioninitiallineofcreditatpreferentialinterestratestoIndiancompanieslookingto
investorexpandintheDRC.In2011,EximIndiaannouncedanotherlow-interest$267
millionlineofcreditforIndiancompanieslookingtodobusinessintheDRC.31
t R A d e
AccordingtodatacompiledbytheTradeandLawCentreforSouthernAfrica(tralac), 32
ChinastotaltradewiththeDRCincreased33-foldbetween1996and2009,from$44
millionto$1.4billion.33Themainincreasescamefrom2004onwards,withaparticularly
significantleapin2008,whentradealmostquadrupledinoneyear.Nonethelessthe2009
DRC-Chinatradetotalwasstillonly4%ofthevalueofSouthernAfricanDevelopment
Community(SADC)recordedtradewithChinathesameyear,and8.5%ofChinastrade
withAngola.ThislattertradeconsistsmainlyofAngolanoilexports,togetherwithsome
Chineseconstructionandtelecommunicationsitems.Typicallyitaccountsforabouthalf
ofSADCstradewithChina(SADCcontributed45%ofAfricastotaltradewithChinain
2008,and43%in2009).
Table 1: Chinas trade with Africa (import and export), selected indicators, 19952009
($ million)
DRC Angola SADC Africa
1996 44 272 1,920 4,031
1997 31 633 2,569 5,672
1998 52 190 2,162 5,533
1999 20 372 2,429 6,485
2000 19 1,876 4,466 10,598
2001 20 768 3,536 10,799
2002 31 1,148 4,423 12,390
2003 52 2,351 7,117 18,564
2004 136 4,911 12,240 29,456
2005 225 6,954 16,168 39,801
2006 437 11,825 24,182 55,472
2007 553 14,125 31,711 73,543
2008 1,810 25,301 48,922 38,219
2009 1,441 17,046 106,752 90,007
Source:tralac,http://www.tralac.org.za
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TheDRChasrecordedatradesurpluswithChinasince2003.Itsrecordedexportsto
Chinaarealmostexclusivelyrawmaterials,withcobaltproductsfirstfollowedbycopper
products,thentimber,tungsten,niobium,tantalum(coltan)andzinc.ChinasrecordedexportstotheDRC,bycontrast,arehighlydiversified.Telecommunicationsequipment,
thelargestsinglecategory,accountedforjust6.5%ofthe2009total.Otherrelatively
significantitemsincludedtinnedvegetables,footwear,medicines,batteries,andmotor
vehicles.
ThesestatisticsarederivedfromChinasnationaltradefigures.Iftheglobaltrend
intradefiguresappliesinthiscase,theyareprobablyfairlyaccurateasregardsChinas
importsfromtheDRC,butlesssoaboutitsexports.DisaggregatedCongolesestatistics
foritstradewithChinawouldmakeforausefulcomparisonbuthavethusfarproved
hardtofind.InanycasethereliabilityofDRCsnationaleconomicdataisnotoriously
poor,particularlyforproductionandtrade.AgricultureisallbutabsentfromCongolese
productionandtraderecordsandmineralproductionfiguresconsistentlyunder-capture
output.34Furthermore,widespreadcustomsfraudmeansthecountrysimportstatistics
arealsohighlyunreliable.
Box 1: Artisanal miners, taxis and Chinese motorbikes
Most vehicles importe from China are motorcycles, hich are popular throughout the
dRC, particularly in artisanal mining areas. In the gol-rich Ituri istrict of the north-eastern
Orientale Province, artisanal iggers ho strike it rich often invest in Chinese motorcycles,
hich they then use as taxis. Bunia, the largest Ituri ton, teems ith thousans of motorbike
taxis, churning up re ust in its unkempt an un-tarre streets. Nearly all the machinesin Bunia are Chinese an a large proportion of their rivers are associate ith artisanal
gol mining. Chinese motorcycles are popular in Bunia, an it seems elsehere in the dRC,
because they are the cheapest available.
Taxi rivers acknolege that their Chinese machines are of significant ly loer quality
compare to their Japanese counterparts, but in 2011, at just $600-$800, the former cost
roughly half of the latter. Japanese motorcycles ere referre to as bikes for the bosses
by taxi rivers but the Chinese ones ere bikes for us. In Bunia, Inian motorcycles i
not appear to be in iesprea use. Inian-manufacture bicycles are more common
nationie, though anecotal evience from Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Goma an
Bunia suggests that they too are being supplante by less expensive, though poorer quality,
Chinese proucts.35
As they are in other parts of the country, taxi motorcycles in Ituri are subjecte to gruelling
treatment. They carry passengers an goos loas that are frequently enormous, for long
istances over poor roas. Taxi operators o not expect their Chinese machines to last
more than eight months. They calculate, hoever, that in their short life the motorcycles can
earn enough to pay for a replacement an generate aitional profit besies.36
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Table 2: DRCCHINA disaggregated trade data, 19972009 ($ million)
DRC
exportsto China
Of
which:
Cobalt
ores andconcentrates
Copper
ores andconcentrates
DRC
importsfromChina
Of
which:
Telecommuni-
cationsequipment
1997 2 0 0 29 0
1997 2 0 0 50 0
1997 1 0 0 19 0
2000 1 0 0 18 0
2001 7 4 0 13 0
2002 12 8 0 19 0
2003 27 24 2 25 0
2004 100 94 3 37 0
2005 176 148 20 50 0
2006 368 214 105 69 7
2007 460 243 77 93 21
2008 1,579 851 138 232 23
2009 1,119 458 124 321 21
Source:tralac,http://www.tralac.org.za
OfficialIndiantradestatisticsindicateaverylowlevelofIndianexportstotheDRC.
Indias recorded exports, whichwereworth a mere $1million in2007, peakedat
$15millionin2009,andthenfellbackto$10millionin2010.Theofficialfigures,however,aremuchtoolow.Indianpharmaceuticalimportsalonearesaidtoexceedofficial
totalsbya largedegree;thefactthatsomanyoftheseimportsallegedlyhaveexceeded
theirexpirydatesmayaccountfortheirabsencefromIndiasofficialrecord.37Evenso,at
agenerousestimatetotalIndianexportstotheDRCareunlikelytoexceed$50million
ayear,insignificantagainstIndiasexportstoAfricasmoredevelopedeconomies,such
asSouthAfricaandKenya.In2010recordedIndianexportsto SouthAfricatotalled
$2billionandtoKenya,$1.5billion:togetherthosetwocountriesconsumedone-thirdof
allthecontinentsimportsfromIndia.
Table 3: Indias exports to Africa, selected indicators, 2006-2010 (April-March) ($ million)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Africa 5,441 8,407 11,539 11,391 10,308
South Africa 1,526 2,242 3,606 1,980 2,058
Kenya 577 1,309 1,585 1,362 1,452
DRC 2 1 4 15 10
Source:GovernmentofIndia,MinistryofCommerceandIndustry,DepartmentofCommerce,
Systemon Foreign TradePerformanceAnalysis.http://www.commerce.nic.in/ftpa/rgncnt.asp
accessed17July2011
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IfIndiasofficialtradestatisticsaretobebelieved,Africaasawholeexportsroughly
twiceasmuchtoIndiaasitimports.SouthAfricaisthecontinentsmainexporterto
India,responsiblein2010for27%ofrecordedtotalexports.IndiasstatisticssuggestthatIndiastartedbuyingoilfromAfricainsignificantquantitiesin2007.InthatyearNigerias
exportstoIndiaroseto$7billionfrom$72millionin2006,whileAngolasrosefrom
$3millionto$245million,increasingto$1billionin2008.TheDRC,meanwhile,hasrun
amodestrecordedtradesurpluswithIndiasince2008andin2010itsrecordedexportsto
India,at$145million,werenearly15timesthevalueofitsimports.Themainrecorded
exportsarecopperoresand concentrates,followed bycobaltoresandconcentrates.
Ifthereisanexporttradeintimber,itisallbutunrecorded.DiamondsfromtheDRCare
oftencutandpolishedinIndia,buthavegenerallybeenexportedthroughBelgium,Israel
orLebanonanddonotthereforeappearinbilateraltradestatistics.
Table 4: Indias imports from Africa, selected indicators, 20062010 (AprilMarch)
($ million)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Africa 4,041 11,363 14,928 18,904 20,715
South Africa 2,472 2,470 3,605 5,514 5,675
Nigeria 72 7,009 7,612 8,900 7,288
Angola 3 245 1,024 1,386 4,243
DRC 14 17 14 117 145
Source:GovernmentofIndia,MinistryofCommerceandIndustry,DepartmentofCommerce,
System on Foreign Trade Performance Analysis. http://www.commerce.nic.in/ftpa/rgncnt.asp,accessed17July2011
RecordedIndiantradewiththeDRCisclearlyafractionofwhatitcouldbe.According
tosomeintheIndianbusinesscommunity,oneofthemainobstaclestoincreasedtradeis
thelackofabilateralinvestmentprotectionagreement(BIPA).Althoughthepotentialfor
profitabletradeintheDRCisgreat,foreigninvestorshavefacedsomeextremelydifficult
challenges;expropriation,government-sanctionedlootingbythemilitary,hyperinflation,
civil warandtheapparentlyarbitraryalterationor cancellationofcontracts.A BIPA
cannotdefendacompanyfromcivilwarorhyperinflationandwouldprobablybeoflittle
useagainstauthorisedlootingbytheDRCarmedforces,butitcouldhelpwitharbitrary
contractalterationsandcancellations.In2011,abilltoinstituteaBIPAwithIndiacame
beforetheDRCNationalAssembly,withtheIndo-CongoleseChamberofCommerceand
IndustryinKinshasacommentingthatitsadoptioncouldbethekeytoenticing3040
majorIndianinvestorstotheDRC.38
Asthenumber ofChinesecompaniesin theDRCgrows and thevalue oftheir
investmentsrises,BeijingalsowantsabilateralinvestmentagreementwiththeDRC.
TheChinesegovernmentisacutelyawarethatinNigeria,multi-billiondollaroil-for-
infrastructureagreementsnegotiatedwithPresidentOlusegunObasanjoduringthelate
1990swerearbitrarilyditchedbyhissuccessorPresidentUmaruMusaYarAdua;China
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doesnot wantthesametohappenintheDRC.OneseniorChineseembassyofficial
inKinshasaremarked:Thatiswhy weneedthisinvestmentcode.Wearecurrently
negotiatingthiscode.
39
m I N I N G
Aswithitsinformal,unrecordedcounterpart,theDRCsformal,recordedeconomyis
dominatedbymining.Inadditiontoitsindustrialminingenterprisesithasthousands,if
nottensofthousands,ofartisan-minedsitesworkedbyhundredsofthousands,perhaps
millionsofpeople.TheminesrangefromthegolddepositsofOrientaleProvincetothe
tinandcoltanminesoftheKivus,ManiemaandNorthKatanga,fromsouthernKatangas
copperandcobaltminestotherichdiamonddepositsoftheKasas.
IndianandChinesecompaniesintheDRCsminingsectoraremainlyinsouthern
Katanga,wheretheymine,processandtradecopperandcobaltoresandconcentrates.In
manyinstancestheseoresarepurchasedfromartisanaldiggers.OneIndiancompanyis
tradingandminingtinandcoltaninnorthernKatanga,andoneChinese comptoir(buying
house)alsobuysfromartisanaldiggers.OneIndianandthreeChinesecomptoirsbuytin
andcoltanfromartisanalsintheKivusandManiema.Thereappearstobenosignificant
presenceofIndianorChinesecompaniesinminingortradinggoldinOrientale,norin
miningortradingKasaandiamonds.
Copper and cobalt
Morethan100Chinesecompaniesarethoughttobeinvolvedinmining,semi-processing
andtradingcopperandcobaltoresandconcentratesinKatanga.40Inaddition,bylate2011ChinasJinchuanGroupLtdwasedgingclosertoacquiringJohannesburg-based
MetorexLtd,whichoperatestheRuashicopperandcobaltmineinKatanga,forZAR41
9.1billion($1.1billion).MetorexshareholdersvotedtoacceptthetakeoverinSeptember
2011.42Alsoinlate2011Perth-basedAnvilMiningLtd,whichoperatestheKinsevereand
MutoshicopperandcobaltminesinKatanga,agreedtoa$1.3billiontakeoverbyChinas
state-ownedMinmetalsGroup.(Gcamines,AnvilsminoritypartnerinthetwoKatanga
mines,subsequentlyinsistedthatitsconsentwasrequiredforthedeal,whichstipulation,
AnvilwarnedinlateOctober2011,mightjeopardisethesale.43)
Shouldtheysucceed,thosetwotakeoverswouldchangethefaceofChinesemining
intheDRC.Atthetimeofwriting,however,ChineseminingcompaniesinKatangaare
allsmall,low-volumeproducers,rarelyinvolvedinextraction.Instead,mostpurchase
oresfromartisanaldiggersandprocessthemintoconcentrates,orlessoften,intothe
metalsthemselves.AmongthemainChinesecompaniesprocessingcopperandcobalt
oresinKatangaareVolcanoMining,GuangAnCotaMetalCo(CotaMining),Shaanxi
JiaxinMiningCompanyLtd,Magma-Lubumbashi,operatingnear Lubumbashi,andthe
HuachincompanyinLikasi.AccordingtotheKatanganprovincialminesdivision,during
2010thesefivecompaniesbetweenthemproduced10457tonnesofblackcopper(which
containsabout95%copper)outofarecordedoutputinKatangaof53801tonnes,and
35308tonnesofcobaltconcentrate.44Thatamountedto16%oftherecordedtotalof
cobaltconcentrateand19%ofthat forblackcopper.Itshouldbenoted,however,that
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mostrecordedcopperoutputintheprovinceislistednotasblackcopperbutascopper
concentrate(withthepercentageofcontainedcoppernotdefinedintheofficialfigures),
forwhich2010totalrecordedproductionwas328779tonnes.MagmahasoperatedinKatangasince2002butbeganprocessingmineralsonlyin
2007whentheprovincialgovernmentprohibitedtheexportofmineralores.Ithasadaily
processingcapacityof70tonnesofore,broughttotheplantforsalebyartisanalminers.
Inmid-2011Magmaemployed24Chinesestaffandhadnoimmediateplanstoexpand
production.UnlikemanysmallChineseminingcompaniesinKatanga,Magmacontinued
itsoperationstherewhencommoditypricescrashedin2008.45
Some,butbynomeansalltheChinesecompaniesthatleftduring2008,have
sincereturned.Thereisoftenanairofimpermanencetotheoperationsofthesesmall
companies,withinvestmentininfrastructureatplantsitestypicallykepttoaminimum,
possiblytoenablethemtoclosedownrapidlyandwithoutgreatlossshouldtheneedarise.
Inaddition,thecompaniesChineseemployeesseemreluctanttobringtheirfamiliesto
Katanga,andalthoughthereareChinese-ownedrestaurants,casinos,clinicsandbrothels
inLubumbashi,thereisnoChineseschoolorsupermarket.46
There are several smallIndian companies in Katanga, also processing minerals
purchasedfromartisanaldiggers.TheyincludeGoldenAfricanResourcesinLubumbashi
andDelhi-basedMehulMiningLtd andCongoMinMetin Likasi.Inaddition,three
medium-sizedIndiancompanies,RubaminLtd,ChemafandSocietMinireduKatanga
(Somika),areengagedinlarger-scaleoperations.
Accordingto aninspectorin theKatanga provincialgovernments departmentof
labour:
Ihavebeenaninspectorfor11years,andhaveinspectedalotofChinesecompanies.The
conditionsarebarbaric.TheydontrespectpeopleWesternandSouthAfricancompaniesrespondtoourrecommendationswithimprovements,buttheIndiansandChineseare
terrible.Insteadofrespondingtoourrecommendations,theyprefercorruption.Wegetpaid
$50amonth,soitiseasytocorruptus.47
IntheviewofMoseKatumbi,thegovernorofKatanga:
TherearebigChinesecompaniesthatrespectourlawsandIndiancompaniestoo.But
therearemanysmallercompaniesthatdonotrespectourlawsespeciallyconcerning
pollution.48
Thegovernorclaimsthattheproblemwithhisprovincesinspectorateisnotcorruption
butcapacity.Itisalackofexpertise.Theyarenottrainedandweaskfortraining.We
havenolaboratories.49
RubaminisIndiaslargestprocessorofzincoxideandcobaltbutitssubsidiaryin
KatangaisitsonlyAfricanventure.ThecompanyarrivedintheDRCin2004andin
2008invested$25millioninaplanttoprocesscopperandcobalt.Theplantcanproduce
10000tonnesofblackcopperand15000tonnesofcobaltconcentrate(78%cobalt)a
year.Rubaminitselfactivelymineduntil2010whenitsexplorationpermitwasrescinded
andsincethenhasreliedonorepurchasedfromAnvilMiningandartisanaldiggers.
DependenceonthesesourcesalonehasmadeRubaminsaccesstocopperandcobaltores
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moredifficultbutnonethelessthecompanyplanstoincreaseitscopperandcobaltore
productionto50000tonnesayear.ItexportsitsoutputalmostexclusivelytoChina. 50
In2010RubaminrecordedproductioninKatangaof564tonnesofcopperconcentratesand348tonnesofblackcopper.Curiously,provincialstatisticsdonotshowanycobalt
output.51
ChemafisasubsidiaryofIndian-ownedShalinaResourcesLtd,whichisregisteredin
theUnitedArabEmirates.In2003ChemafacquiredfromGcaminestheEtoileopenpit
mineandUsokemineralprocessingplantnearLubumbashi.In2008,Chemafupgraded
theUsokeplanttopermitcoppercathodeproductionthroughaprocessofsolvent
extractionand electro-winning (SX-EW),which increases output andqualitywhile
reducingcosts.ShalinahassinceindicatedthatitintendstolistontheLondonMetal
Exchange.52Chemafsrecordedoutputin2010was504tonnesofcobaltconcentrate,
17055tonnesofcobaltcarbonate(CoCO3),and15196.5tonnesofcoppercathode.53
TheUsokeplantisnotoriouslocallyforallegedenvironmentalpollution.According
to onenon-governmentalorganisation(NGO)in Lubumbashi, Chemafsoperations
generatelargeamountsofdust;theplantpollutesthelocalwatersupply;pumpsout
sulphurousair;andposesaserioushazardtonearbyresidents.TheNGOfurtheralleges
thatChemafhasrefusedtodiscusstheseconcernswiththelocalcommunityandinstead
handedouttokenfinancialcompensationtoasmallselectionofthoseaffected.54In2010
theprovincialminingenvironmentalinspectorateinstructed Chemafto constructa
waterpurificationplant.Asofmid-2011theinspectoratehadnotverifiedwhetherornot
thishadtakenplace.Theinspectoratehasblamedpowercuts,notChemaf,forUsokes
sulphuremissions.55ChemafappearsreluctanttomeettheNGOorlocalcommunity
representativesbuthasvigorouslydefendeditsrecordinthelocalpress,insistingitis
notpollutingthewatersupply;isworkingonthedustissue;andisactiveinarangeof
socialinitiatives.ApersonalvisittotheUsokeplantinmid-2011confirmedthattheairwasheavywithsulphurandheavytruckactivitywasthrowingupdust.56Theclose
proximityofresidentialsettlementstoChemafsoperationsisclearlyhighlyproblematic
andifpeoplearetoremaintherethesituationneedsurgentattention.Usokeislocated
inaminingandindustrialzoneofLubumbashi,however,andthequestionofresidential
settlementappearsoneforthemunicipalityratherthanChemaftoresolve.
SomikahasbeenactiveinKatangasince2001.ItoperatesKisanfumemineinKolwezi
asajointventurewithGcamines,andaprocessingplantinLubumbashi.Commissioned
in2003,thelattergetsthebulkofitsmaterialfromKisanfume,withanother30%from
artisanaldiggersandothermines.Theplant,whichhasbeenupgradedtousetheSX-EW
process,producescoppercathodeandacobaltconcentratecontaining30%cobalt.
AccordingtoSomikasmanagementtheplantproduces300tonnesofcoppercathode
andafurther300tonnesofcobaltconcentrateeachmonth,withanincreaseto1000
tonnesofeachbytheendof2011.ItsellsitsoutputtoChina,shippingthroughDares
SalaaminTanzania.SomikadoesnotusetheraillinkbetweenKatangaandDaresSalaam
buttransportsitsproductbyroadduetotheapparentlyexcessivelogisticalproblems
involvedinrailmovement. 57KatangaMinistryofMinesstatisticsshowthatin2010
Chemafproduced24332tonnesofcobaltconcentrate,12412tonnesofcobalthydroxide
and2840tonnesofcoppercathode.58
In 2008 Gcamines, two Chinese parastatals (China Railways and Sinohydro
Corporation),andtheZhejianHuayouCobaltCompanyformedajointventurecalled
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Sicomines.SicominesintendstodeveloptheMashambaWestandDikuluwecopperand
cobaltdepositsinKatanga,forwhichithasearmarkeda$3billioninvestment.Themoney
isintheformofaloanfromChinasEximBankbutisconditionalonthecompletionofafeasibilitystudythatcanshowthatthemineshaveprovenreservesof10milliontonnes
ofcopper.59
Inmid-2011aSicominesrepresentativeinLubumbashicouldnotconfirmthatthe
companyhadbeenabletoprovetherequiredreserves,butstatedthatafeasibilitystudy
hadbeensenttoChinasNationalDevelopmentandReformCommission(NDRC).
ShouldtheNDRCacceptthestudyitappearsthatEximBankwillreleasethefunds.The
representativesaidthecompanyconsidereditfeasibletodeveloptheminingassetsand
thattheprojectwasprogressingmoreslowlythanhadbeenenvisagedbutwasdeveloping
favourably.60CompletionofthefeasibilitystudyanditssubmissiontotheNDRCwasalso
confirmedbytheDRCgovernmentsBureaudeCoordinationetdeSuividuProgramme
Sino-Congolais(BCPSC),whichisinchargeofadministrationandfinanceforthe
agreementsinfrastructuralprojects.61AseniorofficialintheChineseembassyinKinshasa,
however,commentedthattheissueofSicominesreserveswasabigquestion,which
worriesus.62TheriskisthatifMashambaWestandDikuluwereservesareinsufficient
theEximBankmaynotreleasepromisedfundsnotonlythosefordevelopingthemines
butalsoamootedfurther$3billionloantofinanceplannedinfrastructuralprojectsacross
thecountry.
Tin and coltan
In2009Somikaestablishedatinandtantalumdivision,MiningMineralResources
(MMR).MMRoperatesseveral comptoirsthatpurchaseartisan-minedtinandcoltanin
northKatanga.In2010,theprovincialgovernmentgrantedMMRexclusiveaccesstofourminesitesinthatregion,whereMMRisalsodevelopingsemi-industrialmining.In
return,MMRhasbegunaseriesofsocialprojectsinandaroundthosesites.MMRisalso
implementingamineralstaggingandtraceabilityschemedevisedbyInternationalTin
ResearchInstitute(ITRI),aUK-basedassociationworkingundertheauspicesoftheUN
SecurityCouncil.ThetraceabilityprojectispartofITRIsprogrammetoimplementdue
diligence,63asdefinedbytheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentin
itsguidanceforcompaniessourcingmineralsfromconflict-affectedandhigh-riskareas.64
MMRhasappliedtotheminesministryinKinshasaforexploitationrightstoitsnorth
Katanganassets,butbyJanuary2012hadreceivedtheserightsforonlyoneofthemines.
InthesixmonthstoApril2011MMRsaiditexported1000tonnesoftinconcentrate,
containing65%tin,apparentlytoChina.65
MMRhasalsobegunconstructionofatinsmelterinLubumbashionthesiteofthe
existingSomikacopperandcobaltprocessingplant.Thiscouldhaveasignificantimpact
ontheDRCtinandtantalumminingsector.TheMMRsmelterisscheduledtobegin
operationsduring2012,andwillbringthecompanystintoahighlevelofpurity,ensuring
thatsomeofthemetalsaddedvalueremainsintheDRC.Thesmeltercouldalsoenable
MMRtoreceiveoutputfromothertinminingcompaniesinthecountryfortolltreatment.
SomeKivu-basedtinandcoltancomptoirs,taintedbytheirassociationwithso-called
conflictmineralsinthoseprovinces,havebeenexcludedfromdoingbusinessinKatanga.
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ThishasbeenacontroversialmovebutGovernorKatumbihasbeenunapologetic:
Inotherprovinces[intheDRC]peoplehaveusedmineralstokillpeople.Idontwant
thosepeoplecominginanddoingbusinessinmyprovince.Idontwanttohearthatthese
peoplearecomingtobuyinKatanga.Sowehaveinsistedontraceability.Anythingthatcant
betracedcannotbeexported.Anyway,IcantallowKivumineralsin.Thesemineralsare
blockedbyUSlaw.Also,Isaidtheotherdaybeforeeveryone,publicly,thatwhoeverdoes
thisminingmusthaveastrongsocialelement,andwehavetoknowwheretheyarebased.
Theymustbeseriouscompanies.Theirmineralsmustbetraceable.Thatishowwewillbe
abletoexport.66
KatumbisstancehaspromptedaccusationsfromaffectedKivu-based comptoirsthathe
hasanundisclosedbusinessrelationshipwithMMR,aclaimthatbothheandMMRhave
denied.
In20102011severalKivu-basedcomptoirsthathadsurreptitiousbuyingoperations
innorthKatangadisruptedchangedtheirapproachandestablishedtheirownofficially
registeredbranchesinKatanga.67TheChinese-ownedcompanyTTTMining,withitshead
officeinGoma,NorthKivu,wasoneofthoseaffected.Duringthisperioditsetupan
officialcomptoirinKalemie,northernKatanga,whereitwasreputedtopayhigherprices
thanMMR.68
Until2010theprovincesofNorthandSouthKivuandManiemaproducedand
exportedfarmoretinandcoltanthandidKatanga.Duringthatyear,however,again
inabidtocomplywiththeSecurityCouncilsrequestregardingduediligenceandUS
legislationonconflictminerals,manyofthemaininternationaltinandcoltansmelters
introducedastipulationthattheywouldbuyonlytaggedmaterialfromtheDRC.No
taggingscheme,however,hasyetbeenimplementedineithertheKivusorManiema.Thishasledtoadefactoembargoonmaterialfromthoseprovinces,exceptforminerals
smuggledoutofthecountry,orboughtby comptoirssellingtosmeltersthathavenot
introducedtheserequirements.AlmostallsuchsmeltersareinChina.
ThemaincomptoirscarryingoutthesepurchaseshavebeenTTT,HuayingTrading
andDonsonInternational,allChinese-owned.Inmid-2011AfrometbasedinGomaand
BukavuwastheonlyIndian-ownedcomptoiroperatingintheKivus.AllAfrometsoutput
issenttoIndiaforsmeltingatthefacilityofthecompanysDelhi-basedowner,MetTrade
IndiaLtd.69
I N F R A S t R u C t u R e , C o N S t R u C t I o N A N d F I N A N C e
Chinas Exim Bank committed itself in 2008 to a $3 billionloan for a variety of
infrastructuralprojects,includingroadandrailwayconstructionandrehabilitationand
thebuildingofnewuniversities,hospitalsandschools.Theseprojectsinthemainareto
beimplementedbytwoChinesestate-ownedcompanies,ChinaRailwaysConstruction
Company(CREC)andSinohydroCorporation.Thisloanisadditionaltothe$3billion
loantodevelopminingassetsheldbySicomines,inwhichChinaRailwaysandSinohydro
aremajorshareholders.ThemoneyistobereleasedasandwhentheEximBankapproves
theSicominesfeasibilitystudyreferredtoabove.
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notapublicmarket.Itiscompletelydifferent,soitisgoingtobemoreexpensivethenopen
tender.Butwehaveindependentconsultantswhoareevaluatingeverything.74
Ilungasargumentcapturesthe essenceofthe officialDRCand Chinesegovernment
position,namelythattheagreementispremisedonla bonne volonte (goodwill)andthat
forthisreasoncriticswhobecometoofocusedonspecificsaremissingthepoint.Based
onthisgoodwill,andalsointhelightofare-visitationclauseinthecontract,Congolese
governmentofficialshavearguedthatanyproblematicaspectsoftheagreementcanalways
berevisitedsothatthepositionoftheDRCgovernmentvis--visChinawillalwaysbeone
ofgagnant-gagnant (win-win).Itcouldbepointedout,however,thattoolargeaninfusion
ofgoodwillcouldeventuallyworktothedisadvantageofChina;shoulditbecometoo
closeabedfellowitmightprovevulnerabletoanyunilateralwithdrawalorunprincipled
deploymentofleveragebytheotherparty.
Chinese government officials and representatives of CREC and Sinohydro in
KinshasahavealsodisputedGlobalWitnessscontentionthattheyhavenotassumed
anycommercialrisk.TheyhavepointedtothefactthatbothCRECandSinohydrohave
alreadystarted,andinsomecasescompleted,infrastructuralprojectsintheDRC,well
beforethecompletionandapprovaloftheSicominesfeasibilitystudythatisthetrigger
forthepromisedEximBankloan.75Theseprojectsincludetherehabilitationoftheroad
fromKasumbalesaontheZambianbordertoLubumbashiandthe30JuinBoulevardand
othermajorroadsinKinshasa.EximBankisreportedtohavereleased$128millionin
2010,withplanstoreleaseafurther$622millionduring2011.Aspartofthisprocess,
inJanuary2011thebanksigneda$360millionloanagreementfortheconstructionofa
240MWdamatBusangainBas-Congoprovince.Onlyfrom2012onwards,itnowseems,
willthevalueofthefundsmadeavailablebythebankbedeterminedbytheproductivity
ofSicominesminingassets.76MoiseEkangaLushyma,headoftheBCPSC,whichcontrolsthefinancesofthe
infrastructuralprogramme,providedevenhigherfiguresfordisbursements:
Since2009theEximbankhasreleased$518millionfortheSicominesagreement.In2009
wereceived$350millionforinfrastructureconstruction,includingthe Cinquantenaire
hospital,theAvenuedeTourisme[and]theLubumbashi-KasomenoroadinKatanga
$128millionwasreleased[in2010],andthatfinancedthe30Juin[Boulevard]andthe
esplanadeforthePalaisduPeuple[inKinshasa]TheChineseareinadvanceofwhatwas
envisaged.Itistheminingthatisgoingslower.77
TheprobablereasonforEximBanksdecisiontoprovidefinancing,andforCRECand
Sinohydrotocommenceconstructionprojectsbeforebeingrequiredtodoso(which
musthavehadatleastBeijingsconsentand,perhaps,explicitinstruction)isCongolese
politics.ForhisNovember2011electioncampaign,PresidentKabilaneededtoshowthe
Congolesepeopletangibleevidenceofhisoft-promisednationalreconstruction.In2006
Kabilacampaignedonaticketof cinq chantiers(fivetasks),whichincludenewandbetter
infrastructure,butwithoutthehigh-profileeffortsofCRECandSinohydrotodatehe
wouldhavehadpreciousfewprojectswithwhichtoseektoimpresstheelectorate.There
canbenoquestionthatthegoodwilldecisionofChinesestate-ownedcompaniestolend
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moneyandstartbuildingthreeyearsbeforethepolldateprovidedinvaluableassistance
toKabilassuccessfulre-electioncampaign.
AnotherprobablereasonfortheearlystartisthatCRECandSinohydrobroughtconsiderableamountsofequipmentandlargenumbersofpersonnelintotheDRCin
anticipationoftheSicominesloan;theywouldbesittingidleifthecontractweretobe
followedtotheletter.Usingcapacityavailableonthegroundmayalsobewhy,since2009,
CRECandSinohydrohavesubmittedlowtendersfor,wonandimplementedarangeof
EU,AfricanDevelopmentBankandWorldBank-financedprojectsintheDRC. 78These
includea400-metrebridgeinBandundufinancedbytheWorldBankandconstructedby
Sinohydro.Ithasdramaticallyeasedtransportlogisticsintheprovince.79
Utilising otherwise under-active capacity is certainly important for CREC and
Sinohydro,andtheoft-toutedgoodwillseemsgenuineenough,butthereisalsoahard
bargainunderlyingthebonhomie.Chinasdomesticeconomicgrowthreliesonincreased
accesstonaturalresources,andparticularlyminerals,inaneraofrapidlyrisingcommodity
prices.TheDRCisacornucopiaofmanyitemsontheChinesegovernmentswishlist.
Beijingisthereforeseekinglong-termaccesstotheDRCsresourcesonfavourableterms
andapparentlyhasdecidedthatthesurestroutetosuccessliesinprovidingdiplomatic
andfinancialsupportandconstructioncapacity,insuchawaythatDRCscurrentpolitical
eliteremainsinplaceaslongaspossiblewhilebecomingincreasinglydependentonChina.
Inafurthersignofthetimes,inMarch2011thestate-ownedChinaDevelopment
Bank,wasreportedtohavesignedaloanagreementwiththeDRCforanundisclosed
sum.Themoneyisto financeinfrastructuraldevelopmentinthemining,oil,roadand
agriculturalsectors.Ithasnot,however,beenrevealedwhat,ifany,Congoleseassets
willstandsuretyfortheloan,norwhich(presumablyChinese)companieswilldothe
work.80Thesuspicionamongsomecriticsisthatthetermsofthedealweresufficiently
controversialtobeheldbackuntilafterthe2011presidentialelection.81TheIndiangovernmentlikestocontrastitsapparentlyfreemarketapproachwith
thegovernment-directedstrategyofChina.AccordingtooneofficialinIndiasKinshasa
embassy:
Weare not in competi tion with China, and unlike them, we do not exchangeminerals
forinfrastructure.WhenIndiancompaniescomehere,theymightseekadvicefromus,
butwedonotopenthedoorsforthem.Ourbusinessesknowhowtodotheirjob.Indian
businessmenareverysmart.82
ByallaccountstheIndianembassyisrighttobemodestaboutitseffortstoassistIndian
businessintheDRC.Historically,however,Indiasgovernmenthasnotbeenasfree-market
andnon-interventionistasitisnow.Indiangovernmentspractisedvariantsofsocialist
economicsfornearly50yearsafterindependencein1947,andthecountrysbankswere
nationalisedbyPrimeMinisterIndiraGandhiin1969.Deregulationornot,inmid-2011
state-controlledinstitutionsstillcontrolled75%ofbankdepositsinthecountryandsince
2007oneofthelargestofthem,theStateBankofIndia,isreportedtohaveembarkedon
alendingspree,allegedlywithpoliticalovertonesthathavemorethanawhiffofBeijing
aboutthem.83
In2011,EximIndiaapproveda$267millionlineofcreditforIndiancompaniesdoing
businessintheDRC,withprioritytobegiventopowerprojectsandurbanrailways.
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Althoughthereiscertainlyapoliticalaspecttotheseloanagreements,evidencesuggests
thatIndiasambitionsforitsrelationswiththeDRCaresomewhatlowerthanthoseofthe
Chinesegovernment.JudgingbytheprojectssofarfinancedbytheEximIndialoan,theIndiangovernmenthasrelativelymodesttargets,pushingforafewIndiancompaniesto
winconstructioncontractsandgainsomemarketsharewhileatthesametimeacquiring
expertiseinimplementingdevelopmentprojectsinAfrica.Asonewell-informedIndian
sourceinKinshasaputit:
WeInd ians arent going for major publici ty. Itsmore about Indian companies gaining
experience,implementingturnkeyprojectswithnothingelseaskedinreturn.Thereisno
barter.84
AmongtheprojectsfinancedwithEximIndiamoneyaretwodams,oneatKakobolaon
theLufukuRiverinBandundu,andtheotheratKatendeontheLuluaRiverinWestern
Kasai.Theformerhasadesignedoutputof9MWandhasbeencostedat$42million,and
thelatterwillproduce20MWandcost$168million.Theprojectsarebeingcarriedout
byNewDelhi-basedAngeliqueInternationalLtd.WorkonKakobolabeganinFebruary
2011.85
t e L e C o m m u N I C A t I o N S
AlsowithitsheadquartersinNewDelhi,IndiasBhartiAirtelLtdisbysomewaythelargest
investorintelecommunicationsintheDRC.BhartiboughttheDRCnetworkoftheKuwaiti
telecommunicationscompanyZainGroupinmid-2010,renameditAirtelDRC,andison
tracktoinvest$400millioninitsoperationsbymid-2012.SubscribernumbershaverisenfromfourtofivemillionsinceBhartitookover,withthecompanytargetingeightmillion
usersby2012.MobilephonenetworkcoverageisrelativelyextensiveintheDRC,butAirtel
DRChasnonethelessidentifiedsixtownswithpopulationsofmorethan100000,and238
with50000ormore,whichcurrentlyhavenonetworkcoverage.Airtelworkswitha
rangeofpartners,includingIBM,SwedensEricsson,andChinasHuaweiTechnologies.Its
parentcompany,Bharti,hasbecomethefifthlargestmobilephonecompanyintheworld.
ItbasesitsAfricanoperationsinNairobi;of15AfricadirectorsonlyoneisIndian,while
theremainderarefromAfrica.TheCEOofAirtelDRCisfromCameroun. 86
CCTis51%ownedbyChinasZTECorporationand49%bytheDRCgovernments
OCPT.Itwasformedin2000withaChinaEximBankloanof$12.5million,enablingCCT
topurchaseequipmentfromZTE.87Inmid-2011CCThadsomeonemillionsubscribers,
increasedfromabout600000in2008.CCTsnetworkcoverageisnotasextensiveasthose
ofAirteloritsmaincompetitorVodacom,butitsserviceisthecheapest. 88Competitors
haveclaimedthatthisisbecauseCCTpaystoolittletax,butthecompanyinsiststhat
itreceivesnofavoursandhasalwayspaidasubstantialtaxbill. 89ZTEdidnotinvest
significantfundsinCCTaftertheoriginalEximBankloanandinOctober2011soldits
shareinthecompanytoFranceTelecom-Orangefor$10million.FranceTelecom-Orange
alsopurchasedtheOCPTsshareofCCTforafurther$7millionandagreedtopay$71
milliontotheDRCgovernmentforanew10-yearlicence,and$185milliontosettle
CCTsdebts.90
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HuaweiTechnologiesestablisheditselfintheDRCin2004andwonitsfirstmajor
contracttherein2006.Thatcontract,tosupplyequipmentatacostofmorethan$120
milliontoTigo,amobilephoneoperatorassociatedwithLuxembourg-basedMillicomInternationalCellular,wascompletedin2009. 91 Huaweissecondmaincontractwas
agreedin2008withOCPT,toinstallcode-divisionmultipleaccesstechnologyforits
network,startinginKinshasaandextendingtotherestofthe country.Workbeganin
2010.ThefollowingyearHuaweialsobegancollaboratingwithVodacomandsupplying
equipmenttoAirtel.HuaweiacquiredsomeprimerealestateonKinshasasBoulevard
du30Juinwhereitisbuildinganoffice,atrainingcentre,asportscentreandapartment
blocksforitsstaff.Thebuildingswerescheduledforcompletionattheendof2011,ata
costofaround$20million.92
InadditiontoitsCCTinvestmentZTEhasitsownpresenceintheDRCasasupplier
ofequipmenttomobilephonenetworks,thoughonasmallerscalethanHuawei.The
companyisalsoreportedtobemakingtentativeinvestmentsincommercialagriculture.
Thegovernmentissaidtohaveapprovedinprinciplea100000hectareallocationtoZTE
in2007.93ZTEswebsite,however,statesthatitsonlylandcurrentlyinproductionisa10
hectareexperimentalfarmforplantinghigh-yieldcrops.94
ThethirdprominentChinesecompanyinvolvedinDRCtelecommunicationsisChina
InternationalTelecommunicationConstructionCorporation(CITCC).CITCChasbeenin
theDRCsince2006,providingandlayingfibreopticcables.In2008itwonacontractin
conjunctionwithFrancesAlcatel-Lucent(whichhasa50%stakeinChina-basedAlcatel
ShanghaiBell),toconnectKinshasabyfibre-opticcabletoMoandaontheAtlanticcoast.
Alcatel-LucenthadpreviouslyconnectedMoandatotheSouthAtlantic-3/WestAfrica
SubmarineCable,acommunicationscablelinkingPortugalandSpaintoSouthAfrica,
withconnectionstoseveralWestAfricancountriesenrouteandacontinuationlinkfrom
SouthAfricatoIndiaandSouthEastAsia. 95CITCCsworkwascompletedinlate2009,leavingthecompanywithlittletodobutmaintaintheMoanda-Kinshasalinewhileit
seeksothercontracts.96
C o N C L u S I o N
ThepresenceofIndianandChinesebusinessesintheDRCisincreasingandBeijing
andNewDelhiaresignificantdriversofthatgrowth.Thetwogovernmentsprofessed
bounteousgoodwilltowardstheDRCseemsgenuineenough;butatthesametimeboth
wantaccesstothecountrysrawmaterialsandcontractsfortheirconstructioncompanies.
ThekeydifferencebetweentheapproachesofChinaandIndiaasregardsstate-bank
financeisthatChinasloantotheDRCisnotsimplytofinanceinfrastructure,butalso
todevelopminingassetsjointlyheldbyChineseandCongolesestate-ownedcompanies.
EximIndia,bycontrast,hasnotlinkedanyofitsinfrastructureloanstominingorother
formsofnaturalresourceextractionbyIndiancompanies,anditdoesnotappeartobe
Indiangovernmentpolicytodosoinfuture.WhereasChinasgovernmentisfacilitating
accessbyChinesestate-ownedcompaniestolargeminingdepositsthroughitsEximBank
loan,theonlyIndianminingcompaniespresentintheDRCareprivatelyownedand
competeforaccesstoDRCresourceswithoutanysignificantgovernmentassistance.(It
shouldbesaidthatliketheirIndiancounterparts,themorethan100privatelyowned
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ChinesecompaniesinvolvedinminingintheDRCappeartoreceivelittlesignificant
assistancefromtheirgovernment.)
ChinesecompaniesarewellontheirwaytodominatingtheDRCconstructionsector,thankstoprojectslinkedtotheEximBankloan,andothersfinancedbyinternational
developmentbanksandtheDRCgovernment.Thecompaniesarehighlycompetitive
oncostbutthequalityoftheirworkishardertoassess.TheDRCgovernmenthas,
however,statedthatithasmechanismsinplace,includingexternalconsultants,toensure
thequalityofChinese-builtinfrastructure,andtheChinesecompaniesconcernedare
emphaticthattheirworkmeetsinternationalstandards.InthepasttheDRChasproveda
challengingenvironmentforinfrastructure;timewilltellhowdurabletheChinese-built
roads,buildingsandperhapsrailwaysare.Atthisstage,Indianconstructioncompanies
arealongwaybehindtheirChinesecounterpartsandlooksettoremainso,althougha
few,suchasAngeliqueInternational,arepickingupworkinthepowersector,mostly
financedbyEximIndia.
Intheminingsector,IndianandChinesecompaniesintheDRCremainminnows
comparedwiththebigUS,Canadian,AustralianandSouthAfrican-listedcompanies.Two
ofthelast,however(MetorexandAnvil),areintheprocessofbeingboughtbyChinese
companies;andwitha$3billioninvestmentonthestocksandprobablywithaccessto
morecapitalifnecessary,Sicominescouldwithinadecadebecomeoneofthetopthree
miningenterprisesinthecountry.
ThescaleofBhartiAirtelsinvestmentinCongolesetelecommunicationsdwarfsall
others,includingChinesecompanies.Huawei,however,isoneofBhartissuppliersinthe
DRC,andalsosuppliesmostothernetworksinthecountry.
InmanufacturedgoodsChinasshareofDRCtotalimportsislikelytoincrease,inline
withglobaltrends,whileIndiasseemssettoremainlow.TheDRCisthefourthmost
populouscountryinAfricawithmorethan60millionpeople,buttheirbuyingpowerislow.ThepresenceofChinesecompaniesintheretailsectorremainsmodest;noCongolese
cityhasaChinatown.Bycontrast,asinsomanyAfricancountries,Indian-ownedshops
andbusinessesproliferate,insomecasesdatingfromthecolonialperiod.Theycommand
alarge,butunrecordedproportionoftotalretailtrade.
TheDRCgovernmenthasdrawnincreasinglyclosetoChinaandvaluesbothits
bilateral military assistance, and thediplomatic support the Chinese government
providesintheUN.ThisbuysChinesestate-ownedcompaniesactiveintheDRCa
goodmeasureofprotectionfromtheCongoleseauthorities.TheirChineseemployees,
forexample,seemabletoenterandleavethecountrywithoutmuchhindrancefrom
immigrationofficials,andtheirequipmentmovesfairlyreadilyatcustomsposts.Onlyin
thetelecommunicationssectorhavestate-ownedChinesecompaniesreportedproblems
withexcessiveandarbitrarytaxation.Lifeisharder,however,forprivatelyownedChinese
companies,whicharenotprotectedbytheirgovernmentandmustfendforthemselvesin
anoftenverydifficultoperatingenvironment.
TheDRCspoliticalrelationswiththeIndiangovernmentaremuchpricklierthanthose
withChina.TheDRCgovernmentincreasinglyhasregisteredobjectionstoMonuscos
presence,withthepresidentin2010callingonittoleavebytheendof2011. 97Indiais
themissionslargestcontributoroftroops,andtheDRCgovernmenthasbeenparticularly
aggrievedthat,asnotedabove,someIndianUNtroopshaveattimesgrowntoofamiliar
withtherebelmilitiatheyaresupposedtooppose.Thiswould,perhaps,beacceptableto
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theIndiangovernmentifitreceivedmorecreditfromtheinternationalcommunityforits
effortsintheDRC.Asitstands,althoughIndiahasreceivedsomeplauditsforitswork
inMonusco,itsgovernmenthasalsobeenirritatedbyperiodic,damninginvestigationsbyWesternmediaintothebehaviourofitstroopsandbythepersistentreluctanceofUN
SecurityCouncilpermanentmembersandotherwell-resourcedcountriestosupplytroops
oftheirowninanysignificantnumbers.
Noscientificstudyoftheissuehasbeencarriedout,butitappearsa widelyheld
convictionintheDRCthatmostChineseandIndiancompaniesarepooremployers,
reportedlyoffering lowwages and hostile working conditions and providing only
parsimoniouslyforsocialupliftmentprogrammes.Therearesomeshiningexceptions,
Bhartibeingthemainone,andmanyIndianandChinesecompaniesloudlyenumerate
theirapparently generoussocial programmes. Yet negative perceptions remain,and
havebeennotedbyoppositionpoliticians.PresidentialaspirantEtienneTshisekedi,for
example,statedpubliclyseveraltimesbeforeandduringthe2011electioncampaignthat
ifelectedhewouldsuspendChineseinfrastructureandminingcontracts.Tshisekedi
professedtobeworriedaboutalackoftransparency;andindeedanecdotalevidence
suggeststhatthe oft-notedpropensityof Congolese state officials toseekkickbacks
has beenwell understood by Chinese companies implementingthe infrastructural
componentsofthecontracts.Ifbriberyhasbeenasprevalentasallegedthereisboundto
beresistancefromtheDRCauthoritiestoanyeffortstoshinealightontheprocess,for
fearofuncoveringtheirownmisdemeanours.
Thelackofaccountabilityoftheauthoritieshasbeenwidelyrecognisedasone
of themajor problems in theCongolese political system.If Chinas presence and
business practicesarefurther underminingit, thecountryspolitical developmentis
commensuratelyheldback.
WhilesomeofthepoliticalimplicationsofChinasEximBankdealareworrying,theChineseandtoalesserextentIndianroleindeliveringinfrastructuraldevelopment
intheDRCappearswhollywelcome.AtindependencetheDRCwasamongthemost
industrialisedcountries in sub-Saharan Africa(after South Africa),98buttodayits
infrastructuremostlyliesinruins.Sincethelate1990sWesternbankshaveshownsome
appetiteforriskattendingCongoleseminingventuresbut havegenerallybaulked at
thecountrysinfrastructuralbacklog,leavingthefieldtointernationaldevelopmental
institutionssuchastheWorldBankandAfricanDevelopmentBank.Theselatterstill
haveavitalroletoplayintheDRC,buttheirfundsareinsufficientanditisineveryones
interestthattheyhavebeenjoinedbyChinese,Indian,andincreasingly,othercountries
state-ownedbanks.
Thebestwaytoensurethemaintenanceofinternationalstandardsoftransparency
inallloanagreementswiththeDRCwouldbe thecreationofinstitutionalfinancial
partnershipsonprojects,andcontinuedscrutinybycivilsocietyandthecountrys
democraticinstitutions.Thatreallywouldbegagnant-gagnant.Itwouldimprovethe
prospectsforafairandopenbalanceintheDRCbetweengoodwillandhardbargains,not
simplyonthepartofChineseandIndianparticipantsbutallthecountrysinternational
partners.
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e N d N o t e S
1 LarkinB,China and Africa 19491970: The Foreign Policy of the Peoples Republic of Republic of
China. Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1971,p.47.
2 GBPisthethree-lettercurrencycodeforBritishPounds.
3 LarkinB, op. cit.
4 Ibid.,p.56.
5 Thememoirfromwhichthequoteistakencanbefoundat:http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/
LAND-FORCES/Army/Galleries/Wars/UN/Congo/.
6 Nzongola-NtalajaG.The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: a Peoples History. London:ZedBooks,
2002,pp.128131.
7 Youn g C & T Tur ner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairean State.Madison:Universityof
WisconsinPress,1985,pp.350353.
8 Ibid.,p.376.
9 UniversityofStellenbosch:CentreforChineseStudies.Evaluating Chinas FOCAC commitments
to Africa and mapping the way ahead.Stellenbosch,2010,p.17.
10 SeeMobutuscountryandotherplacesathttp://www.vidushaka.com/mcplaces.html.
11 InformationobtainedfromEmbassyofIndia,Kinshasa,May2011.
12 StearnsJ,Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. Philadelphia: PerseusBooks,2011,p.53.
13 Mthembu-SalterG,TheDemocraticRepublicofCongo:RecentHistory,inAfrica South of the
Sahara 2011,London:EuropaPublications,2010,pp.322323.
14 StearnsJ,op. cit.,p.83.
15 StearnsJ,op. cit.,p.85.
16 ShinD,MilitaryandSecurityRelations,inRotbergR(ed.),China into Africa: Trade, Aid and
Inuence.Baltimore:BrookingsInstitutionPress,2008,p.161.
17 StearnsJ,op. cit.,p.185.18 ShinD,op. cit.,p.177.
19 PersonalinterviewwithUNofcial,Kinshasa,May2011.
20 Mthembu-Salter,G,2010,op. cit.,p.325.
21 PersonalinterviewwithMonuscoofcial,Kinshasa,May2011.
22 EconomistIntelligenceUnit,The Political Scene.DRC Country Report December 2009,London,
2009,p.16.
23 PersonalinterviewwithUNofcial,NewYork,February2010.
24 PersonalinterviewwithYangDongju,politicalcounsellor,EmbassyofthePeoplesRepublicof
China,Kinshasa,May2011.
25 Agence France Presse,IndianpeacekeepersinCongoaccusedofgoldtrafcking,13July2007.
26 Washington Post,Urgentdemarche:ThreatenedIndianpeacekeeperswithdrawalfromthe
DRC, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/world/wikileaks/cable40.html.
27 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/indias-withdrawal-of-
helicopters-from-congo-points-to-wider-trend/2011/06/10/AGH5loUH_story.html.
28 SeeSecretaryGeneralnamesIndiasLieutenantGeneralChanderPrakashForceCommander
forUNOrganizationStabilisationMissionintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,http://www.
un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sga1255.doc.htm.
29 Washington Post,IndiaswithdrawalofhelicoptersfromCongopointstowidertrend, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/indias-withdrawal-of-helicopters-from-
congo-points-to-wider-trend/2011/06/10/AGH5loUH_story.html.
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30 PersonalinterviewwithIndianembassyofcial,Kinshasa,May2011.
31 PersonalinterviewwithRashidPatel,PresidentoftheIndo-CongoleseChamberofIndustry,
Trade,Mining,AgricultureandServices,Kinshasa,May2011.
32 Datasourcedfromtralac(TradeandLawCentreforSouthernAfrica)http://www.tralac.org/,
accessed1June2011.
33 See http://www.tralac.org/cgibin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news&cat=1044&cause_
id=1694#china.
34 PersonalinterviewwithPierrotMalobaKitumba,ChefdeBureauProvinicaledesMines,
MinistredesMines,DivisionProvincaleduKatanga,Lubumbashi,May2011.
35 Authorsobservations,20102011.
36 InformationinBox1principallyderivedfrompersonalinterviewsinMarch2011withWilly
Musingo,presidentofAssociationdesChauffeursduCongoSectionMotoinBunia,and
IsiadoreTamile,administrativesecretaryofAssociationdesOrpailleurspourleDeveloppement
etleReconstructiondePaixenIturi,inMongbwalu.
37 Personalinterviewwithformerpharmaceuticalmanufacturer,Kinshasa,May2011.
38 PersonalinterviewwithRashidPatel,op. cit.
39 PersonalinterviewwithChineseembassyofcial,Kinshasa,May2011.
40 PersonalinterviewwithMoseKatumbi,governorofKatanga,May2011.
41 ZARisthethree-lettercurrencycodeforSouthAfricanRands
42 Mining Weekly, Metorex shareholders approve R9.1bn Jinchuan offer Johannesburg
2 September 2011, http://www.miningweekly.com/article/metorex-shareholders-app rove-
r91bn-jinchuan-offer-2011-09-02.
43 Mining Weekly,AnvilwarnsMinmetalsdealcouldbeinjeopardyJohannesburg31October
2011, http://www.miningweekly.com/article/anvil -warns-minmetal s-deal-could -be-in-
jeopardy-2011-10-31.
44 DRCDivisionProvincialedesMines,ProvinceduKatanga.Statistiques des Notes De DebitRelatives a la Redevance Minire de Janvier Decembre 2010 (Produits Minires par Tonnes).
Kinshasa,2011.
45 PersonalinterviewwithSophieBai,MagmaMinerals,Lubumbashi,May2011.
46 Authorsobservations,andpersonalinterviewswithMagmaMineralsemployees,Lubumbashi,
May2011.
47 Personal interview withlabourinspector, Katanganprovincialdepartment of labour,
Lubumbashi,May2011.
48 PersonalinterviewwithMoseKatumbi,op. cit.
49 PersonalinterviewwithMoseKatumbi,op. cit.
50 PersonalinterviewwithNavin Dalmia,managing director,Rubamin Ltd, Lubumbashi,
May2011.
51 DRCDivisionProvincialedesMines,ProvinceduKatanga,op. cit.
52 ChemafProductionupdate:Q42008,January2009.Sourcedfromwww.chemaf.com.
53 DRCDivisionProvincialedesMines,ProvinceduKatanga, op. cit.
54 PersonalinterviewwithJean-PierreOkenda,CarterCenter,Lubumbashi,May2011.
55 Personalinterviewwithminesenvironmentalinspectorate,Lubumbashi,May2011.
56 AuthorsvisittoUsokeplant,Lubumbashi,May2011.
57 PersonalinterviewwithManojPatil,generalmanager,Somika,Lubumbashi,May2011.
58 DRCDivisionProvincialedesMines,ProvinceduKatanga, op. cit.
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59 ChinaRailwayGroupLtd,AnnouncementofDiscloseableTransactionInvestment,in Societ
par Actions a Responsibilit Limite, HongKong,2008
60 PersonalinterviewwithZhangQiyao,generalsecretariat,vice-director,Sicominingindustry
stockcompanylimited,Lubumbashi,May2011.(Companytitletakenfrombusinesscard.)
61 PersonalinterviewwithMoiseEkangaLushyma,executivesecretary,BureaudeCoordination
etdeSuividuProgrammeSino-Congolais(BCPSC),Kinshasa,May2011.
62 Personalinterviewwithseniorofcial,Chineseembassy,Kinshasa,May2011.
63 SeeUNSecurityCouncilResolutionS/Res/1952(2010).
64 OECD(OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment)DirectorateforFinancial
andEnterpriseAffairs:Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conict-Affected and High-Risk Areas,Paris,2011,accessed9September2011http://www.oecd.
org/document/36/0,3746,en_2649_34889_44307940_1_1_1_1,00.html.
65 PersonalinterviewwithMineralMiningResourcesrepresentatives,Lubumbashi,May2011.
66 PersonalinterviewwithMoseKatumbi,op. cit.
67 SpittaelsS&CaesensE,The Complexity of Resource Governance in a Context of State Fragility.
Antwerp:InternationalPeaceInformationService(IPIS),2010.p.21.
68 Personalinterviewwithcivilsocietyactivist,Lubumbashi,May2011.
69 PersonalinterviewwithAfrometrepresentatives,July2010.
70 EconomistIntelligenceUnit,2009,op. cit.
71 EconomistIntelligenceUnit,DRC Country Report December 2010,London2010.
72 GlobalWitness,China and Congo: Friends in Need,London:2011p.6.
73 Ibid.,p.6.
74 PersonalinterviewwithCharlesMedardIlungaMwamba,directorgeneral,AgenceCongolaise
desGrandsTravails,KinshasaMay2011.
75 PersonalinterviewswithChineseembassyofcials,CREC(ChinaRailwaysConstruction
Company)andSinohydrorepresentatives,Kinshasa,May2011.76 Surveying Sicomines,Africa-AsiaCondential4,5.March2011.
77 PersonalinterviewwithMoiseEkangaLushyma,executivesecretary,BureaudeCoordination
etdeSuividuProgrammeSino-Congolais,Kinshasa,May2011.
78 Personalinterviewwithdirectorofaninternationalbank,Kinshasa,May2011.
79 Fordetailsoftheprojectsee:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/
AFRICAEXT/CONGODEMOCRATICEXTN/0,,contentMDK:22828886~menuPK:50003484~
pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:349466,00.html.
80 EconomistIntelligenceUnit,DRC Country Report June 2011,London,2011.
81 Personalinterviewwithmininglawyer,Lubumbashi,May2011.
82 PersonalinterviewwithIndianembassyofcial,Kinshasa,May2011.
83 The Economist,Thependulumswingsagain:Chinasbankingsystemisnotagoodmodelfor
India.,11June2011,p.67.
84 PersonalinterviewwithIndianbusinesscommunityleader,Kinshasa,May2011.
85 Africa Mining Intelligence,649,4,June2011.
86 PersonalinterviewwithAntoinePamboro,managingdirector,AirtelDRC,Kinshasa,May
2011.
87 Mthembu-SalterG,Price Power: Chinas Role in the Telecommunications Sector of the Democratic
Republic of Congo,ChinainAfricapolicyreport5,Johannesburg:SouthAfricanInstituteof
InternationalAffairs,2008p.10.
88 Ibid.,p.11.
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89 PersonalinterviewwithCCTofcial,Kinshasa,May2011.
90 FranceTelecom,FranceTelecom-Orangetoacquire100%ofCongoChineTlcom(CCT),
pressrelease,Paris, 20October2011.
91 Mthembu-SalterG,op. cit.,p.10.
92 PersonalinterviewwithGauthierKadima,Huawei,Kinshasa,May2011.
93 BrautigamD,ChinaandtheAfricanlandgrab:TheDRCoilpalmdeal,15March2010,
http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2010/03/china-and-african-land-grab-drc-oil.html.
94 ZTEEnergyCompanyLtd,Congo(Kinshasa)agriculturalexperimentalplot,http://www.
zte-e.com/en/prod_js.aspx?ID=738.
95 Mthembu-SalterG,2008,op. cit.,p.3.
96 PersonalinterviewwithCITCCrepresentative,Kinshasa,May2011.
97 ThedeadlinecameandwentwithnomovementfromMonusco,andthegovernmentreliedon
themissionforlogisticsduringpresidentialandlegislativeelectionsattheendofthemonth.
ButthegovernmentsrhetoricalantipathytowardsMonuscohasremained.
98 EconomistIntelligenceUnit,DRC Country Prole 2008,London,2008.p.25.
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