UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURTDISTRICTOFCONNECTICUT
TRE MCPHERSON, PATTIKATE WILLIAMS-VOID,JOHN DOE, JOHN ROE, and THOMAS CAVES, onbehalf of themselves and all others similarlysituated, Plaintiffs, v.NEDLAMONTandROLLINCOOK, in their officialcapacities, Defendants.
CivilNo.3:20cv534(JBA)May6,2020
RULINGDENYINGDEFENDANTS’MOTIONTODISMISS
Plaintiffs,whoarebeingheldinConnecticutDepartmentofCorrectionfacilities,seek
reliefunder28U.S.C.§2241and42U.S.C.§1983onbehalfof themselvesandallothers
similarlysituated.TheybroughtthisactiononApril20,2020,claimingtheongoingCOVID-
19 pandemic places them at unreasonable risk of infection. Defendantsmove to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow,
Defendants’MotiontoDismiss[Doc.#26]isdenied.
I. Background
A. COVID-19Pandemic
BecausetheexistenceandrapidspreadoftheongoingglobalCOVID-19pandemicis
wellknown,theCourtwilldiscussonlythosefactsmostrelevanttothemotiontodismiss.
As of May 5, 2020, there have been 29,973 reported cases of COVID-19 in the state of
Connecticut,and2,556deaths.CASESINTHEU.S.,CentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention
(“CDC”), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html
(lastaccessedMay6,2020).
“COVID-19isthoughttospreadmainlythroughclosecontactfromperson-to-person
inrespiratorydropletsfromsomeonewhoisinfected.Peoplewhoareinfectedoftenhave
symptomsofillness,”but“[s]omepeoplewithoutsymptomsmaybeabletospreadvirus.”
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HOW COVID-19 SPREADS, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-
spreads.html (last accessedMay5, 2020). It also “maybepossible that a person can get
COVID-19bytouchingasurfaceorobjectthathasthevirusonitandthentouchingtheirown
mouth,nose,orpossiblytheireyes.”Id.“ThevirusthatcausesCOVID-19isspreadingvery
easilyandsustainablybetweenpeople.”Id.
“The bestway to prevent illness is to avoid being exposed to this virus.” HOWTO
PROTECT YOURSELF & OTHERS, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html (last
accessedMay5,2020).ToavoidcontractingCOVID-19,theCDCrecommendstakingcertain
precautions,including1)“[w]ash[ing]yourhandsoftenwithsoapandwaterforatleast20
secondsespeciallyafteryouhavebeeninapublicplace”;2)“[a]void[ing]closecontactwith
peoplewhoaresick,eveninsideyourhome”;3)“[p]ut[ting]distancebetweenyourselfand
otherpeopleoutsideyourhome,”including“[s]tay[ing]atleast6feet(about2arms’length)
fromotherpeople,”avoiding“gather[ing]ingroups,”and“[s]tay[ing]outofcrowdedplaces
andavoid[ing]massgatherings”;4)usinga“clothfacecover”wheneveryou“havetogoout
inpublic,”althoughsuchacoveris“notasubstituteforsocialdistancing”;5)“cover[ing]your
mouthandnosewithatissuewhenyoucoughorsneeze”andimmediately“wash[ing]hands
with soap and water for at least 20 seconds”; and 6) “[c]lean[ing] AND disinfect[ing]
frequentlytouchedsurfacesdaily,”including“tables,doorknobs,lightswitches,countertops,
handles,desks,phones,keyboards,toilets,faucets,andsinks.”Id.
“Keepingdistancefromothersisespeciallyimportantforpeoplewhoareathigher
riskofgettingverysick.”Id.“Olderadultsandpeoplewhohavesevereunderlyingmedical
conditions like heart or lung disease or diabetes” are believed to be at “higher risk for
developing serious complications from COVID-19 illness,” based on currently available
informationandclinicalexpertise.Id.AccordingtotheCDC,“thoseathigh-riskforsevere
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illness fromCOVID-19” include:1) “People65yearsandolder”;2) “Peoplewho live ina
nursinghomeorlong-termcarefacility”;and3)“Peopleofallageswithunderlyingmedical
conditions, particularly if not well controlled.” (Id.) Such underlying medical conditions
include“chroniclungdiseaseormoderatetosevereasthma[,]...seriousheartconditions[,]
...severeobesity[,]...diabetes[,]...chronickidneydiseaseundergoingdialysis[,]...liver
disease,” and “[p]eople who are immunocompromised,” from a variety of conditions
“including cancer treatment, smoking, bone marrow or organ transplantation, immune
deficiencies,poorlycontrolledHIVorAIDS,andprolongeduseofcorticosteroidsandother
immuneweakeningmedications.”PEOPLEWHOAREATHIGHERRISKFORSEVEREILLNESS,Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-
extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html(lastaccessedMay5,2020).
AsofMay6,2020, theConnecticutDepartmentofCorrection(“DOC”)reports that
358 of its staff members and 478 of its inmates have contracted COVID-19. COVID-19
TRACKER,ConnecticutStateDepartmentofCorrection,https://portal.ct.gov/DOC/Common-
Elements/Common-Elements/Health-Information-and-Advisories (last accessed May 6,
2020).Thereare100inmateswhohavetestedpositiveforCOVID-19currentlyhousedat
NorthernCorrectionalInstitution(“NorthernCI”),towhichDOChasbeenmovinginmates
whotestpositive,and336inmateshavealreadybeen“medicallycleared”andreturnedto
their original facility. Id.1 Six inmates have died from COVID-19. Id. Plaintiffs allege that
DefendantshavetakeninsufficientstepstolimitthespreadofCOVID-19inDOCfacilitiesand
havedeprivedthemofmeanstoself-protect.
1AttheMay4,2020oralargument,DefenseCounselrepresentedthat,asofthatdate,
116inmateswereundergoingmedicalquarantineatNorthernCIandanothereightinmateshadbeenhospitalized.
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B. ConnecticutStateCourtsDuringCOVID-19Pandemic
ThepartiesdisputethedegreetowhichtheConnecticutstatecourtsremainopenand
available during the COVID-19 pandemic. Six Connecticut Superior Court courthouses
remain open in some capacity during the pandemic. LIST OFCOURTHOUSESWHEREPRIORITY
LEVEL I BUSINESS FUNCTIONS WILL BE HANDLED DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, State of
Connecticut Judicial Branch, https://jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/CourthousesOpened.pdf?v4
(lastaccessedMay5,2020).ThosesixcourthousesareopenonlyonMondays,Wednesdays,
andFridays.REDUCEDDAYSOFOPERATIONATSTATECOURTHOUSES,StateofConnecticutJudicial
Branch, https://jud.ct.gov/HomePDFs/Reduced_Days_Courthouses.pdf (last accessedMay
5,2020).Thecourtswhichareopenarehearingonly“Priority1BusinessFunctions,”which
includes “Criminal arraignments of defendants held in lieu of bond and all arraignments
involvingdomesticviolencecases”butapparentlydoesnotincludeothercriminalmatters
orcivilhabeaspetitions.COVID-19INFORMATIONFROMTHECONNECTICUTJUDICIALBRANCH,State
ofConnecticutJudicialBranch,https://jud.ct.gov/COVID19.htm(lastaccessedMay5,2020).
Plaintiffsassertthat“allhearingdatesforcriminalcasesinwhichthedefendantis
incarceratedhavebeencontinuedenmassefromwhenthepandemicbeganinMarchtothe
endofMayorbeginningofJune”andthat“sentencemodificationhearingssimplyarenot
happeningduringthispandemic.”(Pls.’Opp.toMot.toDismiss[Doc.#34]at7.)Defendants
cite three habeas petitionswhichwere “opened” on April 29, 2020 and two emergency
motionsfiledinexistinghabeaspetitionswhichwereruledonduringthepandemic,(Defs.’
Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismiss[Doc.#26-1]at11n.11,12),butPlaintiffsrespondthatthose
are “the only habeas petitions opened in the entire state of Connecticut sinceMarch 12,
2020,”incontrastwithan“averageof50-60new”habeascasespermonthoverthepastten
years.(Pls.’Opp.at9.)
OnApril3,2020,theConnecticutCriminalDefenseLawyersAssociation(“CCDLA”)
andcertainindividualsfiledacomplaintandmotionforatemporaryorderofmandamusin
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the Connecticut Superior Court against Governor Lamont and Commissioner Cook.
Complaint, Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Ass’n v. Lamont et al. (hereinafter
“CCDLA”),No.UWYCV206054309S(Conn.Super.Ct.Apr.3,2020).Thedefendantsinthat
actionmovedtodismissthecomplaint,assertingavarietyofjurisdictionalarguments.Oral
argumentwasheardbytelephoneonApril15,2020,andthemotiontodismisswasgranted
onApril 24, 2020.OrderRegardingMotion toDismiss,CCDLA et al. v. Lamont et al., No.
UWYCV206054309S(Conn.Super.Ct.Apr.24,2020).
C. Parties
Plaintiffs, who brought this action on April 20, 2020, are five individuals held at
facilitiesoftheConnecticutDepartmentofCorrection.
PlaintiffTreMcPhersonwasa“pretrialdetaineeatBridgeportCorrectionalCenter
heldforlackofa$5,100bond,”(Compl.[Doc.#1]¶9),buthehasbeenreleasedfromDOC
custodysincethefilingofthisaction.PlaintiffPattikateWillliams-Voidis“apretrialdetainee
at York Correctional Institute held for lack of a $75,000 bond.” (Id. ¶ 10.) “She has
hypertensionandhasbeendiagnosedaspre-diabetic.”(Id.)PlaintiffJohnDoeis“abovethe
ageof70andisaprisonerservingasentenceofincarceration,”andhe“hasHIVandhepatitis
C,andrequiresregulardialysisforkidneydisease.”(Id.¶11.)Mr.Doeis“house[d]...witha
cellmate.”(Id.)PlaintiffJohnRoeis“abovetheageof50andisaprisonerservingasentence
ofincarceration.”(Id.¶12.)Mr.Roe“hasHIV”andis“house[d]...inanopendormitorywith
morethanninetyotherpeoplesleepinginbunkbedsincloseproximitytooneanother.”(Id.)
Plaintiff Thomas Caves is “a prisoner serving a sentence of incarceration at Corrigan-
RadgowskiCorrectionalInstitute.”(Id.¶13.)Heis“house[d]...withacellmateandhiscell
isnotcleaned.”(Id.)Mr.Caves“sharesshowers,phones,andcommonspacewithmorethan
eightyothermenhousedinhisunit,”oneofwhom“contractedCOVID-19andfellill...[and]
wassimplylockedinhiscell,withhiscellmate,for15days.”(Id.)
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PlaintiffsallegethatPlaintiff JohnRoe“attemptedto fileagrievanceregardingthe
circumstancesthatledtohisinfectionwithCOVID-19andsubsequentcustody,butwastold
therewerenoformsavailableand‘wedon’tdothose’here”atNorthernCI.(Pls.’Opp.at15
(quotingEx.11toPls.’Opp(RoeDecl.)[Doc.#34-11]¶X).)PlaintiffsalsoallegethatPlaintiff
JohnDoe“filedaninitialgrievance.”(Id.)Defendantsmaintainthattheyhavereceivedno
grievancesfromanyofthenamedplaintiffsandthattheDOCgrievanceproceduresremain
openandfunctionalduringtheCOVID-19pandemic.(SeeExs.N(BennetDecl.),O(CottaDecl.
andBasley-MotleyDecl.)toDefs.’Mot.toDismiss[Docs.##26-15,26-16].)
Plaintiffspropose“twoclassesthattogethercompriseallindividualscurrentlyheld
inDOCfacilities:thePre-adjudicationClassofthoseincarceratedpeopleheldwhileawaiting
adjudicationoftheircharges,andthePost-adjudicationClassofthoseincarceratedpeople
whoareservingacriminalsentence.”(Compl.¶1.)Eachproposedclasscontainsa“medically
vulnerable” subclass, made up of “all individuals 50 and older and those with medical
conditionsthatplacethematheightenedriskofsevereillnessordeathfromCOVID-19.”(Id.)
DefendantNedLamontisthegovernorofthestateofConnecticut.(Id.¶14.)Governor
Lamontissuedinhisofficialcapacity.(Id.)DefendantRollinCookisthecommissionerofthe
ConnecticutDOCandisalsosuedinhisofficialcapacity.(Id.¶15.)“GovernorLamontand
thestateofConnecticutcontrolandoperatetheDOCfacilitiesthrough”CommissionerCook,
who “has immediate custody over” the named plaintiffs “and all other putative class
members.”(Id.¶¶14-15.)
II. Discussion
Defendantsmovetodismissthishybridaction,broughtunder28U.S.C.§2241and
42U.S.C.§1983,onthegroundsthattheCourtlacksjurisdictionbecausePlaintiffshavenot
exhaustedtheirremedies.Specifically,DefendantscontendthatPlaintiffsarebarredfrom
bringingtheir§2241habeaspetitionbecausethey“havefailedtoexhaustavailablestate
courtremedies,”andthatPlaintiffsarebarredfromassertingclaimsunder42U.S.C.§1983
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because they have failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison
LitigationReformAct(“PLRA”).(Defs.’Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismissat1).
In the alternative and in the event that the Court concludes it has jurisdiction,
DefendantsasktheCourttoapplytheYoungerabstentiondoctrineand“declinetoexercise
jurisdiction over these claims because they implicate various state judicial orders and
mittimuses, impacting pending criminal pretrial matters, including detention and bond
orders,aswellasthestatemandamusactionbroughtbythesamecounsel.”(Id.)
TheCourtwilladdresseachargumentinturn.
A. Section2241Exhaustion
Plaintiffschallengethe“conditionsofconfinementatDOCfacilitiesacrossthestate”
ofConnecticut,whichtheyassert“createaheightenedandunreasonableriskofCOVID-19,”
throughawritofhabeascorpusbroughtpursuantto28U.S.C.§2241.(Compl.¶1.)Asa
threshold matter, the Court must determine whether § 2241 is the proper vehicle for
Plaintiffs’petition,asDefendantsasktheCourtto“treatthisasitreallyis:aPetitionfora
writofhabeascorpusbystateinmatesvia§2254.”(Defs.’Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismissat4.)2
TheCourtwillthenconsiderwhatexhaustionrequirementappliestoPlaintiffs’petitionand
whetherthatrequirementmaybeexcusedinthiscase.
The Second Circuit has set forth a framework for determining which petition a
prisonermaybringinseekinghabeasrelief.The“ordinaryvehicle”forastateprisoneris28
U.S.C.§2254, “underwhichsuchaprisonermayhavehissentencevacatedorsetaside.”
2 As the Court will later address, this distinction is significant, because § 2254
specifically mandates that a court may not grant a petition unless the “applicant hasexhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State” or “there is an absence ofavailableStatecorrectiveprocess.”28U.S.C.§2254(b)(1)(A).Incontrast,§2241“doesnotbyitsowntermsrequiretheexhaustionofstateremediesasaprerequisitetothegrantoffederalhabeasrelief.”U.S.exrel.Scrantonv.StateofN.Y.,532F.2d292,294(2dCir.1976).Instead, habeas petitions brought under § 2241 are subject to a “judicially createdexhaustionrequirement.”Theodoropoulosv.I.N.S.,358F.3d162,167(2dCir.2004).
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Carmonav.U.S.BureauofPrisons,243F.3d629,632(2dCir.2001)(discussingdistinction
betweenhabeaspetitionsbroughtpursuantto§2255andthosebroughtunder§2241).In
contrast,“awritofhabeascorpusunder§2241isavailable”toaprisoner“whodoesnot
challengethelegalityofhissentence,butchallengesinsteaditsexecutionsubsequenttohis
conviction.” Id.; see alsoChambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2dCir. 1997) (“A
challenge to the execution of a sentence, however, is properly filed pursuant to Section
2241.”);Kingsleyv.BureauofPrisons,937F.2d26,30n.5(2dCir.1991)(explainingthata
federal prisoner’s habeas petition “seeking [to] vacate, set aside, or correct the initial
sentence” is properly brought under § 2255, where “challenges to the length,
appropriatenessorconditionsofconfinementareproperlybroughtunder28U.S.C.§2241”).
TheSecondCircuithasalsoofferedexamplesofwhatqualifiesasachallengetothe
“execution”ofaprisoner’ssentence.Ithasexplainedthata§2241petitionmaybeusedto
challenge “such matters as the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's
sentencebyprisonofficials,prisondisciplinaryactions,prisontransfers,typeofdetention
andprisonconditions.”Jiminianv.Nash,245F.3d144,146(2dCir.2001);seealsoDhinsav.
Krueger,917F.3d70,81(2dCir.2019)(explainingthata§2241application“providesthe
propermeans”to“challengetheexecutionofasentence,includingchallengestodisciplinary
actions, prison conditions, or parole decisions” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that § 2241 could,
theoretically,beusedtoattacktheexecutionofarestitutionorder);Adamsv.UnitedStates,
372F.3d132,135(2dCir.2004)(statingthata§2241petitionmaybeusedtoseekrelief
from,amongotherthings,“prisonconditionsinthefacilitywhereheisincarcerated”).
Here,Plaintiffsare challenging thecurrenthealthconditionsof their confinement,
which, theyclaim,havebecomeunconstitutionalbecauseoftheCOVID-19pandemicrisk.
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Theyarenotattackingtheirunderlyingsentences.Assuch,§2241isthepropervehiclefor
theirpetition.3
HavingconcludedthatPlaintiffshaveproperlybroughttheirhabeaspetitionunder
§2241,theCourtnowaddressestheapplicableexhaustionrequirement.
Aspreviouslynoted,§2241“doesnotbyitsowntermsrequiretheexhaustionofstate
remediesasaprerequisitetothegrantoffederalhabeasrelief.”U.S.exrel.Scranton,532F.2d
at294.However,“[a]lthoughnotastatutoryrequirement,Section2241hasbeeninterpreted
asrequiringapetitionertoexhaustavailablestatecourtoradministrativeremediespriorto
seeking any relief thereunder in federal court.”Robinson v. Sposato, No. CV-11-0191 SJF,
2012WL1965631,at*2(E.D.N.Y.May29,2012)(citingCarmona,43F.3dat632–34);see
3Atoralargument,DefenseCounselnotedthatothercircuitshaveheldthatprisoners
maynotuse§2241tobringconditionsofconfinementclaims.Indeed,eightoftheelevencircuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that claims challenging prisonconditionscannotbebroughtina§2241habeaspetition,butmustinsteadbebroughtunder§1983.CompareWilbornv.Mansukhani,795F.App’x157,162-63(4thCir.2019)(notingthat“[t]heSupremeCourthasnotdefinitivelyaddressedwhetheraclaimchallengingthepetitioner’splaceofconfinementiscognizableinapetitionforwritofhabeascorpus”andholdingthat“conditions-of-confinementclaimsarenotcognizableinhabeasproceedings”);Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that conditions-of-confinementclaimsfalloutside“thecoreofhabeascorpus”andthusmustinsteadbebroughtin a civil rights claim); Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014) (same),Cardonav.Bledsoe,681F.3d533,537(3dCir.2012)(same);Davisv.Fechtel,150F.3d486,490(5thCir.1998)(same);McIntoshv.U.S.ParoleComm’n,115F.3d809,811–12(10thCir.1997)(same);Grahamv.Broglin,922F.2d379,381(7thCir.1991)(same);andMartinv.Overton,391F.3d710,714(6thCir.2004)(same);withAamerv.Obama,742F.3d1023,1036(D.C.Cir.2014)(holdingthatprisonerscanbringhabeasclaimschallengingtheformoftheirdetention);Adamsv.UnitedStates,372F.3d132,135(2dCir.2004)(statingthata§2241petitionmaybeusedtomayseekrelieffrom,amongotherthings,“prisonconditionsinthefacilitywhereheisincarcerated”);andMillerv.UnitedStates,564F.2d103,105(1stCir.1977)(holdingconditions-of-confinementclaimsarecognizableunder§2241).
However, as Defense Counsel acknowledged, the Second Circuit has adopted andrepeatedlyreaffirmeditsminorityviewthat“[u]nder§2241,aprisonermaychallengetheexecutionofhissentence.”Roccisanov.Menifee,293F.3d51,57(2dCir.2002).ThisCourtdoesnothavelicensetodisregardthisbindingcircuitprecedent.
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also U.S. ex rel. Scranton, 532 F.2d at 294 (“[D]ecisional law has superimposed such a[n
exhaustion] requirement in order to accommodate principles of federalism.”); Foster v.
Murphy, 686 F. Supp. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (explaining that “courts have engrafted a
requirementofexhaustion”upon§2241).
Courts in thiscircuithave“interpreted [§2241] torequireapetitioner toexhaust
available state court remedies before seeking relief . . . in federal court.”Henry v. United
States,No.11-CV-391KAM,2014WL7075800,at*3(E.D.N.Y.Dec.12,2014);seealsoDeLee
v. Conway, No. 9:16-CV-0799 (BKS), 2016 WL 3823808, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2016)
(“Section2241doesnotexplicitlyrequiretheexhaustionofstatecourtremedies,butcourts
haverequiredexhaustiontoaccommodatetheprinciplesoffederalism.”).
Tosatisfy§2241’sexhaustionrequirement,apetitionermust“raiseallclaimsinstate
courtprior to raising them in a federal habeas corpuspetition,” and, indoing so, “‘fairly
present’ each claim for habeas relief in ‘each appropriate state court (including a state
supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the
federalnatureoftheclaim.’”DeLee,2016WL3823808,at*3(quotingBaldwinv.Reese,541
U.S.27,29(2004)).Putotherwise,petitioner“mustgivethestatecourtsonefullopportunity
to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s
establishedappellatereviewprocess.”O’Sullivanv.Boerckel,526U.S.838,845(1999).
Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have not fully exhausted their state court
remedies.AlthoughPlaintiffsbroughtaparallelactioninConnecticutstatecourt,whichwas
ultimatelydismissed,seeCCDLA,No.UWYCV206054309S(Conn.Super.Ct.Apr.24,2020),
theyhavenotrepresentedthattheyhaveappealedorintendtoappealthisdecision.Having
concededthattheyhavenotsatisfied§2241’sexhaustionrequirement,Plaintiffsinsteadask
theCourttoapplyanexceptionit.(SeePls.’Opp.at4-5.)
Because§2241’sexhaustionrequirementisa judicial invention, it is“amenableto
judge-madeexceptions.”Rossv.Blake, 136S.Ct.1850,1857 (2016); seealsoMcCarthyv.
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Madigan,503U.S.140,144(1992)(“WhereCongressspecificallymandates,exhaustionis
required.ButwhereCongresshasnotclearlyrequiredexhaustion,soundjudicialdiscretion
governs.”(citationsomitted));Bastekv.Fed.CropIns.Corp.,145F.3d90,94(2dCir.1998)
(“Statutoryexhaustionrequirementsaremandatory,andcourtsarenotfreetodispensewith
them. Common law (or ‘judicial’) exhaustion doctrine, in contrast, recognizes judicial
discretiontoemployabroadarrayofexceptions[.]”).
There are generally three bases for waiver of a judicially crafted exhaustion
requirement.“First,exhaustionmaybeunnecessarywhereitwouldbefutile,eitherbecause
agencydecisionmakersarebiasedorbecausetheagencyhasalreadydeterminedtheissue.”
Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (addressing judicially crafted
exhaustionrequirementapplicabletoControlledSubstanceActchallenges).“[U]nduedelay,
ifitinfactresultsincatastrophichealthconsequences,couldmakeexhaustionfutile.”Id.at
120.Second,“exhaustionmaybeunnecessarywheretheadministrativeprocesswouldbe
incapable of granting adequate relief,” including situations where “the relief the agency
might provide could, because of undue delay, become inadequate.” Id. at 119-20. Third,
“exhaustionmaybeunnecessarywherepursuingagencyreviewwouldsubjectplaintiffsto
undueprejudice.”Id.at119.
Here, Plaintiffs contend that § 2241’s exhaustion requirement should be waived,
becausethey“willsufferanirreparableinjurywithoutimmediatejudicialrelief,anditwould
befutiletoseekstaterelief.”(Pls.’Opp.at5.)Theyexplainthattheymaysuffercatastrophic
healthconsequencesifrequiredtoexhaust,as“[w]ithoutimmediaterelief,Plaintiffscould
contract[COVID-19]and,withindays,sufferseverephysicalinjury,illness,orevendeath,
harmthatcertainlywouldbeirreparable.”(Id.)PlaintiffsfurtherassertthattheConnecticut
statecourtsystemisnotcurrentlyabletooffersuchimmediaterelief.Theystatethat“[o]nly
six[state]courtsacross[Connecticut]arecurrentlyoperating,”thatthesecourtare“open
onlyforseveralhoursonMondays,Wednesdays,andFridays,”andthatthesecourtare“no
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longer [conducting] any criminal hearings other than arraignments.” (Id. at 5-6 (citing
REDUCEDDAYSOFOPERATIONATSTATECOURTHOUSES);seealsoEx.2(DagostineE-mail)toPls.’
Opp. [Doc. # 34-2] at 2 (“For Criminal Matters, the priority 1 business functions are
arraignments involving incarcerateddefendants, anddomesticviolencearraignments.All
othercase[s],withlimitedexceptions...arenotbeingheardduringthistime.”).)Plaintiffs
alsoprovideane-mailfromtheConnecticutJudiciary’sDeputyDirectorofCriminalMatters
statingthat“[c]asesinvolvingincarcerateddefendants”aretobecontinued“outtolateMay
andJune,”(DagostineE-mailat3),aswellasane-mailfromtheDeputyChiefClerkofthe
CriminalDivisionrespondingtoanemergencysentencemodificationrequeststatingthat
“SentenceModificationsarenotPriority1mattersandwillnotbehearduntilcourtsopen
upforregularbusiness,”(Ex.3(RomanoDecl.)toPls.’Opp.[Doc.#34-3]at2).Additionally,
Plaintiffsassertthatthedocketingofhabeaspetitionshascometoastandstill.Theycontend
theConnecticutstatecourtsystemtypicallydocketsfiftytosixtyhabeaspetitionspermonth,
butasofApril29,2020,onlythreehabeaspetitionshavebeen“openedintheentirestateof
Connecticut since March 12, 2020—i.e., since the pandemic began.” (Pls.’ Opp. at 9).4
Plaintiffs elaborated on this point at oral argument, further noting that the deadline for
responsivepleadingshasbeensetonemonthfromtheirfiling,duringwhichtimeapetitioner
couldcontractCOVID-19andsufferseriousandevenfatalconsequences.Plaintiffsconclude
fromthisthatit“remainsvirtuallyimpossibleforincarceratedpeople—particularlythose
whodonothavealreadyengaged,activelawyersontheirlongstandingcases,andeventhose
4Plaintiffsdescribethehabeasprocesstoinvolve:
Mailingapetitionto the(closed)Rockvillecourthouse;having it forwardedfromRockvilletoHartford,againviamail,atwhichpointaclerkwillreviewitonaWednesdayorFridaybetween9a.m.and1p.m.andthen—assumingithasbeenmarkedontheenvelopeasan“emergency,”—ajudgemayreviewittodeterminewhetherahearingshouldbeheld.
(Pls.’Opp.at9n.9.)
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who do—to obtain relief in state court,” and thus argue that exhaustion of state court
remediesshouldbeexcusedgiventhefast-movingnatureoftheCOVID-19pandemic.(Id.at
11.)
DefendantspaintadifferentpictureoftheConnecticutstatecourtsystem.Defendants
assertthatthe“courtsareopenandarecurrentlyhearingandprocessinginmaterequests
forreleaseviaavarietyofjudicialmechanisms,”andthat“[s]everalinmateshavealready
filedactionsinstatecourtforreleasebasedonsimilarclaimsrelatedtoCOVID-19andthese
claimsarebeingactedupon.”(Defs.’Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismissat10.)Defendantsidentify
onehabeasactionbroughtbyMr.RobertDay“wherewithinseven(7)daysthepetitioner’s
habeasmotionwasfiled,objectedto,andthepresidingjudge...renderedadecision.”5(Id.
(citingRobertDay#253376v.Comm’rofCorr.,No.CV17-4008971-S(Conn.Super.Ct.Apr.
20,2020)).)DefendantsalsodrawtheCourt’sattentiontotheparallelCCDLAclassaction
broughtinstatecourt,notingthat“veryfactthatthesameattorneyswereabletofilesuch
anactioninstatecourtcompletelyrefutesanyclaimthatthestatecourtsare‘closed.’”(Defs.’
Mem.Supp.Mot.toDismissat5.)
Considering the above, theCourt concludes that §2241’s exhaustion requirement
shouldbewaived in lightof theextraordinarycircumstancespresentedby theCOVID-19
pandemic.Plaintiffshaveadequatelydemonstratedthatthestatecourtsystemisoperating
atsuchadiminishedcapacitythatitmaynotbeabletotimelyrespondtoamassivevolume
ofemergencyhabeaspetitions—anumberpotentiallyinthehundredsorthousands,given
thesizeoftheputativeclass—intheurgentmannerthatthosepetitionsrequire.6Asother
5Plaintiffsnotethat“Mr.Day,whohasmultiplemedicalconditionsthatwouldput
himatriskofsevereillnessfromCOVID-19,firstfiledahabeaspetitioninJuly2017,”andhis“emergency motion for bond pending habeas, filed April 13, was denied for failure todemonstratelikelihoodofprevailingontheunderlyinghabeasclaim.”(Pls.’Opp.at10.)
6Plaintiffsallege,“[o]ninformationandbelief,thereareatleast11,840peopleintheproposedClasses.”(Compl.¶76.)
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courtshavenoted,COVID-19ishighlycontagiousandthe“fatalityrateamongtheriskiest
population is about fifteen percent.”Medeiros v. Martin, No. CV 20-178 WES, 2020 WL
2104897,at*1(D.R.I.May1,2020);seealsoPimentel-Estradav.Barr,No.C20-495RSM-BAT,
2020WL2092430,at*3(W.D.Wash.Apr.28,2020)(“Inthehighestriskpopulations,the
casefatalityrateisabout15%.”(internalquotationmarksremoved)).Giventherealityof
thedisease,whichisspreadinginConnecticutprisons,andtheconsequenceofpotentially
catastrophichealthoutcomes,theCourtconcludesthatexhaustionofstateremedieswould
befutile,because,undercurrentconditions,Plaintiffsareatsubstantialriskofcontracting
thediseasepriortocompletingtheexhaustionprocess.
Thisconclusion is reachedwith full recognitionof theConnecticut judiciary’sbest
efforts inthe faceofanunprecedentedglobalpandemic.Thefederalcourtsystem,too, is
significantly limited in itsoperationsdueto thispublichealthemergency.See InreCourt
Operations Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by COVID-19, UNITEDSTATESDISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT (Apr. 27, 2020),
http://www.ctd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/4-27-20-COVID-19-Superseding-General-
Order-Re-Court-Operations__0.pdf (ordering that all in-court and in-person civil and
criminalproceedingscheduledtocommenceonorbeforeJune15,2020aretobecontinued).
Infact,oralargumentsinthismatter,normallyheldinacourtroom,hadtobeconductedvia
videoteleconference,withmanyparticipantslogginginfromtheirhomes.Butgiventhelife-
and-death consequences at stake, prudence warrants allowing Plaintiffs to continue
pursuingthisactioninfederalcourt,whetherornottheyhavefullyavailedthemselvesof
theremediesavailableinthestatecourtsystem.
As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiffsmay seek habeas relief under § 2241
withoutexhaustingstatecourtremedies.
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B. PLRAExhaustion
Plaintiffsalsoseektochallengetheconditionsoftheirconfinementunder42U.S.C.§
1983, and so are subject to a mandatory statutory exhaustion requirement, which
Defendantscontendhasnotbeensatisfied.
A prisoner is limited in his or her ability to bring a § 1983 claim by the Prison
LitigationReformActof1996(“PLRA”),Pub.L.No.104–134,110Stat.1321(1996),which
expresslyrequiresthat“[n]oactionshallbebroughtwithrespecttoprisonconditionsunder
section1983ofthistitle,oranyotherFederallaw,byaprisonerconfinedinanyjail,prison,
or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”42U.S.C.§1997e(a).“[T]hePLRA'sexhaustionrequirementappliestoallinmate
suitsaboutprisonlife,whethertheyinvolvegeneralcircumstancesorparticularepisodes,
andwhethertheyallegeexcessiveforceorsomeotherwrong.”Porterv.Nussle,534U.S.516,
532(2002).
In contrast to the judicially-created exhaustion requirement governing § 2241
petitions, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement may not be excused under any judicially
createdexceptiondoctrine.SeeRoss v.Blake, 136S.Ct.1850,1855 (2016) (rejecting “an
unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception” to the PLRAwhichwould have “permit[ed]
some prisoners to pursue litigation even when they have failed to exhaust available
administrativeremedies.”)TheSupremeCourthasbeenclearthatthePLRA“establish[eda]
mandatory exhaustion regime[], foreclosing judicial discretion” and barring “a court . . .
[from]excus[ing]afailuretoexhaust,eventotake...[special]circumstancesintoaccount.”
Ross,136S.Ct.at1856-57;seealsoBoothv.Churner,532U.S.731,741n.6(2001)(“[W]e
will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where
Congress has provided otherwise. . . . Here,we hold only that Congress has provided in
§1997e(a)thataninmatemustexhaustirrespectiveoftheformsofreliefsoughtandoffered
throughadministrativeavenues.”).
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Butwhile thePLRA’sexhaustionrequirement ismandatory,42U.S.C.§1997e(a)’s
“edict contains one significant qualifier: the remedies must indeed be ‘available’ to the
prisoner.”Ross,136S.Ct.at1856.TheSupremeCourthasillustratedthreecircumstances
whereanadministrativeremedyisnot“available,”thusabsolvingtheprisonerofpursuing
exhaustion:
First, . . . an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite whatregulationsorguidancematerialsmaypromise)itoperatesasasimpledeadend—withofficersunableor consistentlyunwilling toprovideany relief toaggrievedinmates....Next,anadministrativeschememightbesoopaquethatit becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use. In this situation, somemechanismexiststoproviderelief,butnoordinaryprisonercandiscernornavigateit....[F]inally,thesameistruewhenprisonadministratorsthwartinmatesfromtakingadvantageofagrievanceprocessthroughmachination,misrepresentation,orintimidation.
Id.at1859-60.Underthisframework,thereisnoexceptionforthespecialcircumstanceof
“catastrophichealthconsequences”;aplaintiffinsteadmustestablishthattheadministrative
reviewprocessissooverburdened,inefficient,orhostileastobeeffectivelyunavailableto
remedythecomplaint.
PlaintiffsarguethattheConnecticutDOCadministrativeprocedureis“unavailable”
foravarietyofreasons.TheycontendthattheDOCgrievanceprocedure,aspromulgatedin
State of Connecticut Department of Correction Administrative Directive Number 9.6,
operatesasa“deadend”andthatitispracticallyincapableofusebecause“[e]xhaustingthe
grievance process in Connecticut takes a minimum of 75 business days, and up to 105
business days for a grievance that ‘challengesDepartment level policy.’” (Pls.’ Opp. at 18
(quotingEx.15(DirectiveNumber9.6)toPls.’Opp.[Doc.#34-15]at5-8).)Plaintiffsalso
notethat“Connecticut’sDOCdoesnothaveanemergencygrievanceprocedure”toprocess
urgentrequests.(Id.at17.)CitingtheSeventhCircuit,Plaintiffsofferthat“‘[i]fittakestwo
weekstoexhaustacomplaintthatthecomplainantisindangerofbeingkilledtomorrow,
thereisno‘possibilityofsomerelief’andsonothingfortheprisonertoexhaust.’”(Id.at19
(quoting Fletcher v. Menard Correctional Center, 623 F.3d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 2010).)
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Plaintiffs contend that the same logic applieswhereadiseasemaycause seriousor fatal
health consequences well within the timeframe for exhaustion of an administrative
grievanceprocess,whichtakesaminimumofatleasttwomonths.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that “prison administrators [have] thwart[ed]
inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process,” thereby making the process
unavailable. (Pls.’ Opp. at 17 (quotingRoss, 136 S. Ct. at 1860).) They state that named
Plaintiff John Roe, while under medical quarantine at Northern CI, “attempted to file a
grievance regarding the circumstances that led to his infection with COVID-19 and
subsequent custody, butwas told therewereno formsavailable and ‘wedon’t do those’
here,”(RoeDecl.¶X),andnotethat“[c]ourtsinthisCircuithavefoundthesecircumstances
sufficienttosupportaclaimthatthegrievanceprocedurewasunavailable.”(Id.(citingSmith
v.CityofNewYork,2013WL5434144,*14-16(S.D.N.Y.,Sept.26,2013)(holdingevidence
prisonerwastoldbyprisonstaff,“Wearenotabletodealwiththis,”andto“Waititout.See
whatcomes.Calmdown,”supportedclaimthatgrievanceprocesswasunavailable);Scottv.
WestchesterCty.,No.18CV7203,2020WL364251,at*5(S.D.N.Y.Jan.22,2020)(allegations
thatplaintiff“repeatedlyrequestedassistancewritingagrievancebutwaseitherignoredor
toldsomeonewouldhelphim”“plausiblysuggestprisonadministratorsthwartedplaintiff
from taking advantage of the grievance system”)).)7 Plaintiffs argue that this attempt to
exhaust administrative remedies is sufficient to excuse exhaustion for the whole class
because, for purposes of a putative class action, a single plaintiff’s allegation regarding
exhaustion“satisfiestherequirementastoallmembers.”Barfieldv.Cook,No.3:18-CV-1198
(MPS),2019WL3562021,at*8(D.Conn.Aug.6,2019);seealsoLewisv.Washington,265F.
Supp. 2d 939, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“To require each inmatewith the same grievance to
7 Additionally, Plaintiffs’ Counsel offer that anothernamedPlaintiff, JohnDoe, has
attestedthat“hehasfiledaninitialgrievance,butDefendantsrepresentthattheydonothavearecordof it,”butthat“[g]iventheexpeditedbriefingschedule,PlaintiffswereunabletohaveMr.Doesignadeclarationtothisendintimeforthisfiling[.]”(Pls.’Opp.at15.)
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exhausttheiradministrativeremedieswouldbewasteful,andaslongasprisonofficialshave
receivedasinglecomplaintaddressingeachclaiminaclassaction,theyhavetheopportunity
to resolve disputes internally and to limit judicial intervention in the management of
prisons.”).
Defendants maintain that the grievance process is available to Plaintiffs, as the
regulations laid out in Administrative Directive 9.6 remain in effect. At oral argument,
Defense Counsel acknowledged that the state’s prisons are currently facing “unique
challenges and struggles” because of COVID-19, but affirmed that the DOC grievance
procedureisstilloperationalandstressedthatthepandemicshouldnotbecauseto“ignore
jurisdictional limitationson thecourts.”Withoutdisputing thepoint that theConnecticut
DOC lacks any emergency grievance procedure, Defense Counsel noted that the 105-day
grievancetimeframeisanupperlimitandthatit“assumestheworstofpeople”toanticipate
thatthegrievanceprocesswillconsumethemaximumamountoftime.DefenseCounselalso
arguedthatMr.Roe’sdeclarationthathe“askedthecorrectionalofficerforgrievanceforms
andwastoldtheydidn’thaveanyandtheydidn’tdothathere,”(seeRoeDecl.¶2),proves
thathedidnotexhausthisremedies,becauseAdministrativeDirective“9.6tellshimexactly
whattodoifthathappens:fileapieceofpaper,[and]stickitintheinmategrievancebox.”
TheCourtappreciatesthattheConnecticutDOCgrievanceprocedureisavailableand
capable of offering relief in ordinary times. However, these are not ordinary times. The
ConnecticutDOCgrievanceprocedure,whichlacksanemergencyreviewprocess,wasnot
setupwithapandemicinmind.AlthoughDefendants’pointthatnoteverygrievancewill
require105businessdaystoresolveiswelltaken,theimminenthealththreatthatCOVID-
19createshasrenderedDOC’sadministrativeprocess inadequate to the taskofhandling
Plaintiffs’urgentcomplaintsregardingtheirhealth.Forexample,Plaintiffshaveallegedthat
“Classmembersatcertain facilitiesdonothaveaccesstosoap”andthattheirmasks“rip
easily and are not replaced.” (Compl. ¶¶ 59, 62.) Because COVID-19 spreads “easily and
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sustainably,” Plaintiffs risk contracting the disease while foregoing these hygienic
precautionsandattemptingtoexhausttheDOC’sadministrativegrievanceprocedure,which
occurs in four stages and involves an informal resolution process, the filing of an initial
formalcomplaint,andtworoundsofappeals.(SeeDirective9.6at5-8.)Inthiscontext,the
DOC’sadministrativegrievanceprocessisthus,“practicallyspeaking,incapableofuse”for
resolvingCOVID-19grievances.Ross,136S.Ct.at1859;seealsoFletcher,623F.3dat1173
(“Ifaprisonerhasbeenplacedinimminentdangerofseriousphysicalinjurybyanactthat
violateshisconstitutionalrights,administrativeremediesthatoffernopossiblereliefintime
topreventtheimminentdangerfrombecominganactualharmcan’tbethoughtavailable.”).
Assuch,theCourtconcludesthatadministrativeremediesforthereliefthatPlaintiffsseek
areunavailable,andthusexhaustionisnotrequiredforPlaintiffstoproceedontheir§1983
claims.8
8Havingreachedthisconclusion,theCourtneednotdwellonPlaintiffs’alternative
argumentsregardingJohnRoeandJohnDoe’sattemptsatexhaustion,butinsteadmakesafewbriefpoints.
First,PlaintiffsarecorrectthatarebuffofaPlaintiff’sattempttofileagrievancefallssquarelywithinoneofthe“unavailability”exceptionsidentifiedinRoss.See136S.Ct.at1856(explaining that administrative remedies are unavailable when “prison administratorsthwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,misrepresentation,orintimidation”).Plaintiffsarealsocorrectthat,underthedoctrineof“‘vicariousexhaustion,’...thePLRA’sexhaustionrequirementissatisfiedaslongasatleastonememberof theproposedprisonerclasshasexhaustedapplicableremedies.”Barfield,2019WL3562021,at*7.
However, for thePLRA’sadministrativeexhaustion requirement tobe satisfiedbyvicariousexhaustion,oneormoreclassmembersmust“ha[ve]exhaustedhisadministrativeremedies with respect to each claim raised by the class.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added andinternalquotationmarksomitted).Here,Mr.Roehasonlystatedthathe“attemptedtogrieve[his]conditionsandtreatmentrelatedtoCOVID-19,”withoutanyfurtherspecificationastotheintendedcontentofhisclaims.(RoeDecl.¶2.)TheCourthaslittleinformationastothesubstanceofMr.Doe’spurportedadministrativefiling,ascounselhaveonlyrepresentedthathesubmittedan“initialgrievance”withoutanyexplanationofhisassertedclaims.BecausetheCourt cannotascertainwhetherMr.RoeandMr.Doe’sgrievancesencompassedeachclaim raised by the putative class, the Court is unable to apply the vicarious exhaustiondoctrineinthisinstance.
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C. YoungerAbstention
HavingconcludedthatjurisdictionoverPlaintiffs’claimsexists,theCourtwillnow
considerwhethertheYoungerabstentiondoctrineappliestothiscase.
Youngerv.Harris,401U.S.37,41(1971),recognized“thenationalpolicyforbidding
federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances.”Where it applies,Younger abstention ismandatory, and thus the federal
courtmay not retain jurisdiction andmust dismiss the claims governed byYounger.See
Juidicev.Vail,430U.S.327,348(1977).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Younger was driven in large part by two
considerations:(1)“thebasicdoctrineofequityjurisprudencethatcourtsofequityshould
notact,andparticularlyshouldnotacttorestrainacriminalprosecution,whenthemoving
partyhasanadequateremedyatlawandwillnotsufferirreparableinjuryifdeniedequitable
relief”; and (2) “thenotion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, . . . a
continuanceofthebeliefthattheNationalGovernmentwillfarebestiftheStatesandtheir
institutionsareleftfreetoperformtheirseparatefunctionsintheirseparateways.”Younger,
401U.S.at43-44.
DefendantsarguethatthisCourtmustabstainfromhearingPlaintiffs’claimsbecause
“Youngerabstentionisrequiredwhenthreeconditionsaremet:(1)thereisanongoingstate
proceeding;(2)animportantstateinterestisimplicatedinthatproceeding;and(3)thestate
proceedingaffordsthefederalplaintiffanadequateopportunityfor judicialreviewofthe
federal constitutional claims” (the “Middlesex conditions”). (Id. at16 (quotingDiamondD
Const.Corp.v.McGowan,282F.3d191,198(2dCir.2002)).)SeealsoMiddlesexCty.Ethics
Comm.v.GardenStateBarAss’n,457U.S.423,433-34(1982).
ButastheSupremeCourtexplainedinSprintComms.Inc.v.Jacobs,571U.S.69,81
(2013), the “three Middlesex conditions . . . [a]re not dispositive.” Rather, those three
conditions are, “instead,additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court
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before invoking Younger.” Id. The three Middlesex conditions are alone insufficient to
warrantYoungerabstentionbecauseif
[d]ivorcedfromtheirquasi-criminalcontext, thethreeMiddlesexconditionswouldextendYoungertovirtuallyallparallelstateandfederalproceedings,atleastwhereapartycouldidentifyaplausiblyimportantstateinterest....Thatresult is irreconcilable with our dominant instruction that, even in thepresenceofparallelstateproceedings,abstentionfromtheexerciseoffederaljurisdictionisthe“exception,nottherule.”
Id.at81-82(quotingHawaiiHousingAuth.v.Midkiff,467U.S.229,236(1984)).
Thus, Younger abstention does not apply to all situations in which theMiddlesex
conditionsaresatisfied,butratheritcanapplyonlyin“thethree‘exceptionalcircumstances’
identified”inNewOrleansPublicService,Inc.v.CouncilofCityofNewOrleans,491U.S.350,
373(1989)(“NOPSI”),“butnofurther.”SprintComms.,571U.S.at82.AsNOPSImadeclear,
undertheYoungerdoctrine,“federalcourtsshouldnotenjoinpendingstate”proceedings
whichare1)statecriminalprosecutions,2)certaincivilenforcementproceedings,or3)civil
proceedingsinvolvingcertainordersuniquelyinfurtheranceofthestatecourts’abilityto
performtheirjudicialfunctions.SeeNOPSI,491U.S.at368.Onlywherethoseprerequisites
are satisfied should federal courts use the Middlesex conditions to determine whether
abstentioniswarranted.SeeSprintComms.,571U.S.at78.
Defendants suggest that the exceptional circumstances permitting Younger
abstention exist here, and thus that the Court should proceed to consider whether the
Middlesex conditions require abstention. Specifically, Defendants argue that Younger
abstentionisproperbecausePlaintiffs’claims“implicatevariousstatejudicialordersand
mittimuses, impacting pending criminal pretrial matters, including detention and bond
orders,aswellas thestatemandamusactionbroughtby thesamecounsel.” (Defs.’Mem.
Supp.Mot.toDismissat1.)
PlaintiffsrespondthatYoungerabstention is“inapplicable”becausethiscase lacks
“the sine qua non of Younger abstention: a federal plaintiff seeking to enjoin a state
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proceeding.” (Pls.’Opp. at20-21.)Plaintiffs argue thatbecause they “havenotasked this
Courttoenjoinanyongoingstateproceeding,”butrather“haveaskedonlythattheCourt
enjoincertainactsoftheDefendants,aswellastodeclarethatDefendants’actsviolatethe
Constitution,” Younger abstention is wholly inapplicable here, and the Court need not
considertheMiddlesexconditions.(Id.at21.)Plaintiffsacknowledgethat“[a]samatterof
practicality,aruling fromthisCourtmaypreemptapendingstatecourtactionbyhaving
preclusiveeffectuponit.” (Id.)Buttheyarguethatsuch interferencewithapendingstate
courtproceedingdoesnot triggerYoungeranalysiswherethereliefrequestedwouldnot
enjoinastateproceeding.(Seeid.)
“Youngerabstention requires that . . . a federal courtmustabstain from enjoining
[certain]ongoingstate . . .proceedings.”Williamsv.Lambert,46F.3d1275,1282(2dCir.
1995)(emphasisadded);seealsoNOPSI,491U.S.at364(describingholdinginYoungeras
“that absent extraordinary circumstances federal courts should not enjoin pending state”
proceeding (emphasis added)); Sprint Comms., 571U.S. at 72 (“When there is a parallel,
pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state
prosecution.” (emphasis added)); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975)
(describingholdinginYoungeras“thatfederalinjunctionsagainst”stateproceedings“could
beissuedonlyunderextraordinarycircumstances”(emphasisadded)).
“Abstentionisnotinordersimplybecauseapendingstate-courtproceedinginvolves
the same subjectmatter.” Sprint Comms., 571 U.S. at 72 (citingNOPSI, 491 U.S. at 373).
“Parallel state-court proceedings do not detract from” the federal courts’ “virtually
unflagging”“obligationtohearanddecideacase”overwhichithasjurisdiction.Id.at77.
WhereYoungerabstentionisnotrequired,“thegeneralrulegoverns:Thependencyofan
actioninastatecourtisnobartoproceedingsconcerningthesamematterintheFederal
courthavingjurisdiction.”Id.at73(internalquotationandalterationsomitted).
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InSprintCommunications,Inc.v.Jacobs,theSupremeCourtconcludedthatYounger
abstentionwasnotwarrantedevenwheretherelevantstateandfederalproceedings“[e]ach
seek[]reviewof”anorderofthesamestateadministrativeboardand“each[action]presents
the” samequestion, 571U.S. at 72, because the case did not fallwithin any of the three
exceptionalcircumstancesoutlinedbyNOPSI,id.at80-82.Similarly,inWilliamsv.Lambert,
theSecondCircuitCourtofAppealsconcludedthatYoungerabstentionwasnotwarranted
becausetheplaintiff“hasnotaskedthatanystateproceedingbeenjoined.”46F.3dat1282.
Rather,ifgranted,theplaintiff’srequestedrelief“wouldhaveonlytheeffectofmootingher
counterclaim [in the stateproceeding] andof allowingher to initiate a separate case for
modificationof thesupportagreement.” Id.TheWilliamscourtconcludedthatsuchrelief
“doesnotpresenttheissuesofstateandfederalcomitywithwhichYoungerisconcerned.”
Id.
Plaintiffs here ask the Court to “grant the proposed Classes’ Petition for writs of
habeascorpusandgranttheproposedClasses’requestforaninjunctionagainstDefendants.”
(Pls.’ Mot. for TRO [Doc. # 15] at 39.) Specifically, Plaintiffs seek an order requiring
Defendantsto(1)identifyandreleaseallmembersofthemedicallyvulnerablesubclasses
“absent proof of judicially-recorded findings by clear and convincing evidence that the
individualposessuchaseriousriskofflightordangertoothersthatnootherconditionscan
mitigate”;(2)“providetheseindividualswitheducationalresourcesonCOVID-19,including
instructionsthattheyshouldself-isolate”;(3)submitaplantotheCourtoutliningcertain
further mitigation efforts and evaluations regarding class members remaining in DOC
custody;and(4)reportweeklyonthemedicallyvulnerablepopulationofpersonsinDOC
custody.(Id.at39-40.)
Nonetheless Defendants suggest that Younger should apply because the relief
Plaintiffs seekwould “implicate” stateordersor “impact[]” state criminalmatters. (Defs.’
Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) Similarly, during the May 4, 2020 oral argument on
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Defendants’MotiontoDismiss,DefendantssuggestedthatYoungerabstentionwasproper
becauseif thisCourtweretoexercise jurisdictionoverPlaintiffs’claims, itwould“thwart
and interferewithongoingprosecutions” andwould “knockout of thepicture” the state
judicialprocessbywhichindividualclassmembersmightotherwiseseeksimilarrelief.9But
PlaintiffsdonotaskthisCourttoorderthestatecourtstoacttoeffectuatethereleaseofthe
medically vulnerable subclasses. Rather, Plaintiffs ask this Court directly to order
Defendants—theGovernorandtheCommissionerofthestateDepartmentofCorrection—to
releasemembersofthemedicallyvulnerablesubclasses,withoutimposinganyrequirement
uponthestatecourtstoactinanyparticularway.
Where,ashere,parallelstateproceedingsmightbe“thwart[ed]”or“knock[ed]out”
bythefederalreliefsoughtsimplybecauseitwouldeliminatetheneedtoseekthatsame
reliefthroughastateprocess,Youngerabstentionisnotwarranted.SeeSprintComms.,571
U.S. at 72 (“[F]ederal courts are obligated to decide cases within the scope of federal
jurisdiction. Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding
involvesthesamesubjectmatter.”).Intheabsenceofanysuggestionthatifitweretogrant
the relief Plaintiffs seek, this Courtwould issue an injunction against any state court or
9 At oral argument, Defendants also described the relief Plaintiffs seek as
“effectively...enjoin[ing]thestatecourtproactively”byimposinga“mandatoryinjunctiontoracetoreviewpresentenced individualsandtoact if theyhadn’t insuchaway.”Butareviewof Plaintiffs’Motion forTemporaryRestrainingOrder,which seeks relief directlyfromthisCourtwithoutanysuggestionofinvolvementfromthestatecourts,makesclearthatDefendantsmischaracterizethereliefPlaintiffsseek.
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proceeding,10Youngerabstentionisinapplicable.11SeeHelmsRealtyCorpv.CityofNewYork,
320F.Supp.3d526,538(S.D.N.Y.2018)(“Themereexistenceofparallelandrelatedfederal
and state actions does not itself justify abstention. SincePlaintiff does not in the federal
actionseektoenjoinorotherwisesupervisethestatecourts,thelimitedYoungerabstention
isinapplicable.”).
10 Defendants’ position regarding precisely which state proceedings warrant
abstention lacks clarity. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss suggested that both the statemandamusaction,CCDLA,andindividualclassmembers’statecriminalproceedingsrequirethis Court to abstain under Younger. At oral argument, Defendants suggested that theirargument for abstention is “most clear” as to the state criminal proceedings of pre-adjudicationclassmembers,butarguedthatabstentionwasalsowarrantedastothestatecriminalproceedingsofpost-adjudicationclassmemberseventhough“thewatersarestillmurky” regarding whether all such proceedings remain “pending.” Because the CourtconcludesthatYoungerabstentionisnotapplicablehereinlightofthereliefPlaintiffsseek,itneednotdeterminewhetheranyofthoseproceedingsmightwarrantYoungerabstentionwerePlaintiffsseekingtoenjointhem.
11Defendants’argumentthatabstentionisrequiredunderO’Sheav.Littleton,414U.S.488 (1974), fails for similar reasons. Abstention is proper under O’Shea where federalplaintiffs“seekaninjunctionaimedatcontrollingorpreventingtheoccurrenceofspecificevents thatmight take place in the course of future state criminal trials,” producing “anongoingfederalauditofstatecriminalproceedingswhichwouldindirectlyaccomplishthekindofinterferencethatYoungerv.Harris...andrelatedcasessoughttoprevent.”414U.S.at500.DefendantsagainmischaracterizethereliefPlaintiffsseek,suggestingthatitwould“ambushscoresofstatejudgeswhoarestatutorilychargedwithreviewingindividualbaildecisions.” (Defs.’Mem.Supp.Mot. toDismissat20.)Butagain,Plaintiffsdonotask thisCourttoorderstatejudgestoactinanyparticularway,insteadseekingdirectrelieffromthisCourtagainstDefendants,whoarenotmembersof thestate judiciary.Because the reliefPlaintiffsseekwouldnotrequirethisCourttocontrol,prevent,orauditcurrentorfuturestatecourtproceedings,O’Sheaissimilarlyinapplicable.
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III. Conclusion
Fortheforegoingreasons,Defendants’MotiontoDismiss[Doc.#26]isDENIED.The
Courtwill proceed to consider Plaintiffs’Motion for TemporaryRestrainingOrder, as to
whichaseparateschedulewillbeissued.
ITISSOORDERED. /s/ JanetBondArterton,U.S.D.J.
DatedatNewHaven,Connecticutthis6thdayofMay2020.
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