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E p o k a U n i v e r s i t y
5 / 1 7 / 2 0 1 2
Roland Tarushi
Could European Union achieve
the common foreign and
security policy ?
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I. Acknowledgements... 3II. Abstract..... 4
III. Theoretical Background.................................................................................5IV. Preface...........6V. European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical
Overview... 8
- European Defense Community .......8
- The Origins of the Pact on European Political
Cooperation...9
- The Birth of the European Council....10
- Troubled Relations with the US and the World in the 1970s.11
VI. CFSP as a pillar of the EU12VII. The EU foreign policy machinery14
-The Policy Unit...15
-The Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)15
-Establishment of EEAS.....15
-The Role of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy after Lisbon Treaty ....16
VIII. The European Neighborhood Policy: Assessing the EUs Policy toward theRegion...17
IX. EU Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality ?..............18X. Conclusions...19
XI. Bibliography......20
Contents
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This paper is the result of a hard work and a collaborative research
project that depended at every stage on support from my
supervisor professor, Niuton ulleti, to whom I am grateful.
Furthermore, I want to attribute my diploma thesis to all my
professors, whose contribute on my accumulated knowledge is
fundamental. I express my gratitude and appreciation for their
efforts to make the students progress ,be prepared and succeed in
the post university graduation stage.
Acknowledgements
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This paper aims to examine the European Union foreign policy and security policy. It is a
wide and controversial topic as the most questioned function of EU is foreign policy but also
it is a very important one. I will use qualitative research methods by making text analysis ofprimary sources as: Treaties, Conventions or EU Commissions decision ,and also text
analysis of secondary sources as: books, journals or web articles.
I want to quote former Spanish Minister of foreign affairs, Ana Palacio, who in 2003 wrote
In the recent history of the CFSP, we have had to choose between the C and the P: if
consensus enabled us to reach a Common decision, the result could hardly be considered a
real and effectivePolicy, but if we wanted a realPolicy, it could not be Common.(Palacio,
2003) This paradoxical foreign policy has even been commented by ex External Relations
Commissioner Chris Patten who referred to CFSP as a misconstructed sentence, with too
many adjectives but no verb. And it is true that EU foreign policy has been judgmental and
opinionated, but not executive.
One of the main purposes of the inter-Governmental Conference which led to the signature
of the draft Amsterdam Treaty was to make common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
more effective and to equip the Union better for its role in international politics. Is it
achieved ? Is the role of High Representative of foreign affairs and security policy
consolidated ?
After disintegration of former Yugoslavia , it was necessary an immediate reform. Theunexpected and drastic course of events were an alert to the European Union to act, not just
react after occurrence. The Yugoslav crisis was an apparent indication of weak and
uncoordinated policy of European Union, as an International Governmental Organization.
How can EU be more effective incase of disputes or crisis inside European countries ?
The Amsterdam Treaty aims to overcome contradictions between the particularly ambitious
objectives of the CFSP and the means available to the Union for achieving those objectives,
which did not live up to expectations or provide adequately for the matters at stake.
(Europa.eu)
Will the EU in a near future, as a number of intellectuals think it should, have its own seat on
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? And how realistic can it be after the open
disagreements of the Europeans over the Iraq war?
Abstract
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Politics is dynamic, and its always in motion. There happen many events in the world and
they definitely need an explanation . In social sciences is difficult to make everyone agree tosame concepts and same endpoints but political scientists seemed to have accepted widely
six levels of analysis: Individual decision making, role of decision maker, governmental
structure, characteristics of society, international relations and world system.
In world politics there are three main theories: Realism , Liberalism and Radicalism.
Realism: Main focus of realism is state security and power as primary realists such as E.H.
Carr and Hans Morgenthau stated that states are self-interested, power-seeking rational
actors. Realist are also opponents of idealism, by considering power as the main influential
tool.
Realists believe that political realism is governed by objectives laws which are based in
human nature. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Theodore Roosevelt are considered as
founding fathers . Realism has an competitive nature.
We can mention Otto von Bismarck as a representor of Realpolitik.
Liberalism: Is based on equality ,liberty and democracy.
Liberalism consists on freedom of the individuals, on a fair and free elections and capitalism.
Nature of liberalism is collaborative and accepts states and international organizations asmain actors. International Organizations play a monitoring role and helps on consolidation
of democracy.
An early liberal messenger, we can mention John Locke but the main ideologists developer
are Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant.
Radicalism: Is focused on denoting social structures.
By its economic and socio-politics perspectives, radicalism main concern is a common
property owned by working class. Radicalism is mostly related with class struggle. The
political ideology that radicalists offer is communism, which opposes the liberal democratic
principles. Main developers of this theory are Karl Marx and Engels.
Regarding the topic, the theory which vindicates the case, is realism , as EU foreign policy
decision making is based on unanimous decisions, and every state as the veto power.
External sovereignty is the core element of a state, since Realism is based on power.
Theoretical Background
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In a time when American power is lessening and China showing itself still indecisive and
hesitant about its global role, the European Union evidently has the possibility to exercisegreat influence in world affairs. Soft and hard power, are the main elements which compose
a global power, and economically EU can challenge US, because European Unions member
states combined GDP and its foreign investments are both comparable to those of the United
States, in addition its population is 50% larger.
It has the largest total development aid budget in the world, and it has 27 votes in the United
Nations, including two permanent seats on the Security Council. It has even demonstrated a
capacity for united military action abroad. Some observers thus suggest that the EU has
already achieved superpower status. (Thomas, 2011, p. 45)
Nevertheless, there are other academicians who are profoundly skeptical about foreign policy
as a functional area of EU policy-making. For example, they refer to the EUs failure toattain a cohesive position on the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the recognition of Kosovo
in 2008, or the Libyan no-fly zone in 2011 as evidence of insuperable divergences in the
member states foreignpolicy preferences. According to David Allen the EU cannot have a
real foreign policy unless it becomes a state: A European foreign policy could only be
achieved by creating central institutions within a European Union capable of identifying,
selecting, and implementing a coherent set of objectives that could be legitimized as being in
the European interest. (Allen, 1998, p. 67)
There was a hope that the EUs Lisbon Treaty, which was lawful valid in 2009, would get to
the bottom of this problem by creating a non-rotating President of the European Council anda newly-empowered High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy supported
by a new External Action Service. Although severe doubts persist, despite these institutional
innovations.
Former Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, himself a strong promoter of EU unity in
world affairs, conveys the following joke: President Barack Obama discovers with interest
that Europe now has a phone number. Hes told that,responding at last to Henry Kissingers
famous taunt (When I want tocall Europe what number do I ring? the European Union has
assigned a President named Herman Van Rompuy from Belgium and given him a 24/7 phone
line. So, Obama makes his mind up to try out Europesphone number. Henry will be tickled.
But the president forgets about the time difference and gets an answering machine: GoodEvening, youve reached the European Union, Herman Van Rompuy speaking. We are
closed for tonight. Please select from the following options. Press one for the French view,
two for the German view, three for the British view, four for the Polish view, five for the
Italian view, six for the Romanian view. Obama hangs up in disappointment (Cohen,
March 8 2010, p. 13)
Preface
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This saga exhibits the most fundamental challenge that the EU confronts as it works to
convert its vast resources into a common attitude to foreign policy decades of integration
have transformed Europesnation states into member states but not into a unitedsuper-
state.
So, despite the fact that the EU instantly has more vigorous mechanisms for diplomacy, and
the revised Treaty on European Union re-binds member states to pursue common policies,they still frequently scuffle to come to an agreement. Comprehending the European Unions
actual position in world affairs thus requires, absorbing the process by which member states
pursue (and often reach) agreements on common foreign policies.
Therefore the research question that drives this paper is: How do EU member states
overcome their contradictory inclinations and reach agreement on common policies
regarding issues and actors beyond their collective external border? By realizing the evident
significance of this question, it is surprising how diminutive consideration it has received in
the existing scholarly literature. Instead, most work on EU foreign policy has focused on
explaining the evolution of the EUs foreign policy competence andprocedures, examining
its impact on foreign policy formation and culture at the member state level, and most often,on assessing the effectiveness or normative consistency of the EUs international actions .
(Tonra, 2001, p. 10)
A practical intent of establishing the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 1999,
was to tackle challenges in the field of security by removing various police and military
missions in alerting troubled crisis areas.A more consolidated CSDP, meant a more
influential EU, so it raised EUs hope for playing a more important role in external affairs.
However, the majority of CSDP missions are still on a small scale. Strategic disagreements
among EU partners persist on issues of UN legality, NATO neutrality and the geographicdeployment of missions. This lack of consensus is due to a lack of common ideas, values and
practices regarding the use of police and military force in Europe. In short: there is no
common strategic culture. (Margas, June 2010, p. 5)
Lets analyze and try to answer the questions that can pop out by these paraphrase and strive
to understand if European Unionsmember states can have the foreign policy in same line.
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European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview
I want to quote Walter Hallstein, who back in 1962 said : One reason for creating the
European Community [was] to enable Europe to play its full part in world affairs.. . . [It is]
vital for the Community to be able to speak with one voice and to act as one in economic
relations with the rest of the world. (Hallstein, 1962, p. 39) Nevertheless, the early
European Community did not possess a consistent foreign policy in a strict sense. The
European Economic Community (EEC) treaty did, however, contain important provisions in
the field of external relations that evolved and became increasingly substantive as the years
went by. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive view of the evolution of
European foreign policy (EFP) in its various forms and stages. The chronological description
presented here links the different actions and decisions taken by the EEC with the external
and domestic events facing the member states at that time. (Bindi, 2010, p. 168)
The European Defense Community
Throughout the negotiations for the Schuman Plan (1950), which was the initiator of the
agreement to set up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), concerns emerged
about a probable German rearmament. German disarmament after World War II formed a
variety of power vacuum in the nucleus of Europe, which was radically accentuated after the
Korean War. The United States of America proposed creating an integrated operational
structure within the subject of the Atlantic alliance within which a German army could
partake under direct American control. This pact came to be North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
The French government opposed this plan and recommended as an alternative the so-called
Pleven Plan (1950), named after French prime minister Ren Pleven. The Pleven Plan
intended to create an European army that would be in charge under European ministry of
defense. This army would be made of soldiers from the participating countries. It included all
the members of the North Atlantic alliance, plus Germany.
The EDC also involved a certain degree of economic integration, indispensable regarding
that military integration in different demanded the standardization of industrial-war
capabilities.
While the German rearmament remained a discussing issue, English foreign secretary,
Anthony Eden came up with a new initiative. This initiative benefited from U.S. support.
In1954, several agreements were signed allowing for Germanys membership in NATO,
Italian and German membership in the Brussels Pact, the creation of the Western European
Union (WEU), Germanys assurance that it would not engage in the creation of atomic arms,
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and a British agreement to station two British divisions in Germany. The question of
European defense thus became a transatlantic issue and a taboo in Europe for decades to
come. (Bindi, 2010, p. 186)
The Origins of the Pact on European Political Cooperation
On July 10, 1969,during a press conference Pompidou acquainted with his ideas for the
prospect of Europe in what is commonly known as Pompidous Triptique. These ideas were
approved in the summit which took place in Hague on December 1-2, 1969. They contained
three principles: completion, deepening, and enlargement.
More particularly, the Triptique required completion of the Common Market by January 1,
1970, with specific concentration to the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
through the resources of the Community; the deepening of the Community, especially in thefield of economic and monetary policy; and enlargement to include Great Britain and other
countries, with the condition that the Community would adopt a common position before
negotiations.
The Hague Summit Declaration mentioned the establishment of the Common Market as the
way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world.(The Hague
Summit Declaration, December 2, 1969, point 3.)
Showing consideration for deepening, Etienne Davignon, former political director of then
Belgian Foreign Ministry, was responsible for studying probable future steps down the path
of European integration. The Davignon Report, approved 27, 1970, in Luxembourg by theforeign ministers on October, was of a great essence to policymaking and European foreign
policy. It settled on the principle of regular meetings between the European Economic
Community foreign ministers, meetings of the heads of state and government, and
consultations on subject of foreign policy amid member states.
The report brought out the so-called European Political Cooperation (EPC), which
institutionalized the attitude of consultation on all major questions of foreign policy. The
member states could suggest any subject for political consultation. And if the work of the
foreign ministers would had an effect on the activities of the European Community the
European Commission would be consulted and every six months meetings would be held
between ministers and the members of the Political Affairs Committee of the European
Parliament.
The consequent Copenhagen Report of July 23, 1973, detailed the EPCs role and
mechanisms. According to the report, the EPC established a new procedure in international
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relations and an original European contribution to the technique of arriving at a concerted
action.(Europa.eu, 2012)
It resulted in an institutional framework which deals with problems of international politics,
is distinct and additional to the activities of the institutions of the Community which are
based on the juridical commitments undertaken by the member States in the Treaty of
Rome.(Ibid.)
The Copenhagen Report ascertained that the ministers of foreign affairs were required to
meet four times a year and whenever they felt it was needed. It stressed the role of the
Political Committee as the body entrusted with the preparation of the ministerial meetings
and created the Group of Correspondentsand the system of European telex (COREU). The
Copenhagen Report also emphasized the importance of subcommittees and working groups.
The first ones were to deal with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Asia. They established the principle that
ambassadors accredited to countries other than members of the EEC could consult with each
other.
The Birth of the European Council
In 1974 an additional key actor in European foreign policy was established: the European
Council. On April 2, 1974, Pompidou died. Valry Giscard dEstaing was elected president
on May 19, 1974. In Germany, there was a switch of chancellors, Helmut Schmidt had
replaced Willy Brand. Giscard dEstaing although he was not really a supporter of
supranational institutions, because he was persuaded that process of European construction
needed a restore, he came up with the adage lEurope est ma priorit. Tagging along Jean
Monnets advice, on September 14, 1974, GiscarddEstaing arranged an appointment with
the other heads of government and with the (French) president of the European Commission,
Franois-Xavier Ortoli. The result was the agreement to organize such meetings every three
or four months.
At the ensuing Paris summit in December 1974 the European Council was founded under the
slogan The Summits are dead, vive les Conseils Europens! TheEuropean Council was
composed of heads of state or government and their foreign ministers, with the participation
of the president of the European Commission. They were to meet three times a year, and anyother time deemed necessary, within the framework of European Political Cooperation.
Moreover in 1974 the initial meeting of what was later called Gymnich formulawas held
at Gymnich Castle in Germanys Rhineland region. The formula referred to the unofficial
gatherings of the foreign ministers to consult on matters of foreign policy.
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Troubled Relations with the United States and the World in the 1970s
On the beginning of the 1970s, international community started pushing pressure in the
EEC to engage further in international affairs. Several events in the world, such the Arab-
Israeli wars, the oil crises, the war on Vietnam were all outsider occurrences pushing the
Europeans together. Afterward, the incursion of Afghanistan by Soviets, the Iranian
revolution terminating with hostage crisis (1980) putted emphasis on the need for a common
European response. Further happenings affecting the EPC included the establishment of
military law in Poland, the Argentinean invasion of the Falklands, and the Israeli offensive
on Lebanon.
In the 1970, transatlantic relations became tense. Previously, up to the end of the Kennedy
administration, there was a support from United States to the European integration process.
But in the late 1960s, things started to alter. EEC was perceived as an economic competitor
and was blamed for the deficit that the United States experienced in its balance of payments.
U.S. comportment in relation to the EEC became rather contradictory. The United States
was adamant that Europe had to contribute more to NATO costs while the U.S. president,
Richard Nixon, confirmed the principle of American leadership over the organization. In the
same way, Secretary of State and the famous diplomat, Henry Kissinger called 1973 the
year of Europe. Yet United States had the idea that essentially Europes interests were and
could only be regional, while the United States had global responsibilities and interests.
In return, the EEC foreign ministers, adopted in Copenhagen on December 14, 1973 a
Declaration on European Identity. Its purpose was to define and make comprehensible the
EECs relations and responsibilities to the other parts of the world and their role in world
affairs. The Nine affirmed and stated that European Unification is not directed against
anyone, nor is it inspired by a desire for power. Quite the opposite, the Nine were persuaded
that from their union will benefit the whole international community. The Nine intend to
play an active role in world affairs and thus to contribute to ensuring that international
relations have [a] more just basis. In pursuit of these objectives the Nine should
progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy. (Declaration on
European Identity, December 14, 1974)
AT last, Europes relations with Asia in between 1970s and 1980s were meant to be lesscomplex. China, in 1975 became the foremost socialist country to recognize the EEC, and in
1978 a first agreement was signed, pursued in 1985 by an agreement on trade and economic
cooperation. In 1978, a co-operation agreement was also signed with ASEAN.
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CFSP as a pillar of the EU
Earlier, in August 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a source of division among EEC
member, in particular between Prime Minister Thatchers government in the UnitedKingdom and the others, which led to disputes over concerns of security, majority voting,
and how to integrate foreign policy into the Community.
The Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992 and entered in force on 1 November 1993,
established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the European Union.
Ultimately, the European Political Cooperation was replaced by the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, which represented the second pillar of the new three-pillared EU.
The CFSP was to safeguard the common values, the fundamental interests, and the
independence of the Union; to strengthen its security and its member states in all ways; topreserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international cooperation; to
develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, as spelled out in article J.1.2 of the TEU. Articles J.1.3 and J.3
stipulated that such objectives were to be pursued through systematic cooperation between
member states and by joint actions. (Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) -
Overview)
Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar was meant to unify actions of member states,
under the belief of spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity,avoiding any act of contrary to
the interest of the Union or to decrease its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international
relations. Beside that, member states had to inform and consult with each other and set
common positionsin order to be consistent with their national policies.
In addition, they were also to synchronize in international organizations and international
conferences. The WEU was required to be strongly associated with the CFSP, acting as a
link to NATO, and the CFSP was finally allowed to address the previously taboo question of
defense, with the probability of steadily moving on the way to a common defense system.
The Presidency was to represent the EU in CFSP matters. Overseas, there had to be
cooperation between member state diplomatic missions and European Commissiondelegations, also the European Parliament was to be consulted. The general guidelines
concerning the CFSP were to be defined by the European Council, to which the TEU granted
the proper status of EU institution, and implemented by the Council, both acting on the basis
of unanimity, as stipulated by the article. (Smith, 2006, p. 120)
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At the European Council on June 2627, 1992, before the implementation of the TEU, the
Lisbon Report specified what areas would be of interest to the EU (the so-called Lisbon
goals). These areas were defined geographically, as, for example, central and eastern
Europe (including Eurasia); the Balkans; Maghreb and the Middle East; transatlantic
relations (the United States and Canada); the North-South dimension (Africa, Latin America,
the Caribbean, and Asia); and Japan. They were also defined with respect to horizontal issues
such as security issues (the CSCE process and the policy of disarmament and arms control in
Europe, including confidence building measures); nuclear and nonproliferation issues; and
the economic aspect of security, in particular control of the transfer of military technology to
third countries and control of arm exports. (Blanke, 2012, p. 135)
In addition, eight joint actions were engaged in during November 1993 and May 1995. These
proceedings took account of observing elections in Russia and South Africa, supporting
measures to develop stability and peace in the central and eastern European countries
(CEECs) and the Middle East, granting humanitarian aid to Bosnia, promoting the indefiniteextension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), controlling the export of dual-use (civil and
military) goods, and strengthening the review process of the anti-personnel landmines.
Throughout the same phase, fourteen common positions were also adopted, mostly
concerning economic sanctions against third parties.
The articles of the treaty concerning the common commercial policy were adjusted in the
TEU. It had turned out to be vital to clarify the proper trade policy affairs and the new CFSP.
Besides that, new article 228a of the TEU denoted that in case that the CFSP generated a
need for sanctions, the Council would decide this based on qualified majority voting (QMV)
on a proposal from the Commission. The new diction of the EU commercial policy enhanced
the European Parliaments power of acquiesce regarding all accords in the subject of external
trade. As specified in article 228 of the TEU, this area concerned policy areas comprised by
the co-decision making procedure in domestic affairs, as well as in matters probable to have
budgetary implications of a great consequence for the Community.
As a final point but not less important, the new treaty took the steps and the created
conditions needed to finally establish an economic and monetary union by 1997, or 1999.
Moreover, in response to qualms about wrongdoings and crimes from the East after the fall
of the Berlin Wall, the Maastricht Treaty established funds of cooperation among memberstates in the field of internal security. This cooperation became depended on the jurisdiction
of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).
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The EU foreign policy machinery
Since the beginning we mentioned the paradox of EU foreign policy and its impossible to
avoid discussing of highly complicated EU external relations machinery, due to the existence
of uncommon systems or pillars for various aspects of external policy (foreign and security
policy, trade, development etc). At some point the 1990s and early 2000 there was astrengthening of the institutional system in Brussels that included the creation of the position
of High Representative for the CFSP, a political and security committee plus a military staff
and committee. Extra attempts were made to deepen the machinery in the constitutional
treaty, but the treaty is in abeyance after the double refusal by French and Dutch voters in
2005. Even so, some of the stipulations in the treaty are probable to re-emerge, including the
posture of an EU foreign minister and an EU diplomatic service. The feedbacks of member
states to these initiative are assorted. Foreign and security policy remains a very sensitive
area.
Actually, as a matter of fact bureaucracies consume much time on domestic power struggles.
Concerning EU foreign policy there are persistent turf wars within and between the
Commission and the Council. There are strives inside Commission over who should control
which directorate generals (DGs) and budget lines. Commission and the Council were
competing for authority, command and influence. Simultaneously, the member states make
their altering moves, episodically supporting the EU institutions and sometimes have a
preference to plough their own crease. The major member states have been unwilling to
concede the Commission increased authority vis--vis what they regard as to be foreign and
security policy. Nevertheless, it is up to the definition of foreign policy. The Commission is
vastly in the heading position relating to trade policy, enlargement and development policy;
but it is the Council, that directs the politicalsecurity issue on behalf of the member states.
Although is not always obvious where the dividing line rests, and this has ongoing turf warsamong the Commission and the Council which are damaging to the aim of a more coherent
foreign policy.
There was a thwarting case when the Commission actually took the Council to court over
who had right authority to implement a program aimed at averting the proliferation of small
arms in West Africa (21 February 2005, Case C-91/05).
Nowadays, The European Council is composed of the heads of state and government of the
twenty-seven member states, is the utmost decision-making body in the EU but it pays out
modest time on external affairs. It dedicates most of its time to discussing and negotiatingchallenging issues such as the budget or new treaties and, as regards foreign policy, it
frequently rubber-stamps verdicts and announcements that have been prepared at lower
levels. One of the critiques to the European Council is that it misuses the time on other issues
rather than debating strategic issues. It comes to an agreement that Common Strategies
towards countries such as Russia and China are lacking to have a real exchange of views on
the strategy.
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The Policy Unit
A further innovation made at Amsterdam Treaty was the establishment of a Policy Planning
and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), which are normally recognized as the Policy Unit,
composed mainly of representatives from the member states, together with Commission and
Council representatives, with a mandate to provide policy advice to Mr Solana. The fearlyhead of the Policy Unit, Christoph Heusgen, turned out to be Angela Merkels foreign policy
adviser in November 2005.
The Policy Unit is made up by eight divided taskforces: European Security and Defense
Policy, Western Balkans/Central Europe; Early Warning/Conflict Prevention/Terrorism;
Horizontal Questions; Latin America; Russia/Ukraine/Transatlantic/Baltic States; Asia;
Mediterranean/Middle East/Africa; and Administration/Security and Situation Centre/Crisis
Cell.
The Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)
The Policy Unit also managed the setting up of a Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), whichconnected the (civilian) Policy Unit and the military Situation Centre. The SITCEN was set
off on 1 January 2003, to correspond with the launch of the EUs police mission (EUPM) in
Bosnia. It has employed intelligence officers to make possible information exchange with
member states and put protected secure communications networks into place. It merges early
warning, situation monitoring and assessment; supplies conveniences for a crisis taskforce;
and functions as an operational point of contact for the SG/HR. Its tasks contains risk
assessment, ad hoc intelligence briefings, and urgent reports in the wake of terrorist attacks
outside the EU. Reports are given out to members of the PSC and the EUMC. The SITCEN
has a low number of staff who collect information from diverse sources including the EUs
Satellite Imaging Centre at Torrejon, Spain. Not only collecting information, but also there is
an outflow of information from the SITCEN to the member states.
Establishment of the European External Action Service
In turn to permit in a mutual way, both the High Representative and, in some respects, the
President of the European Council, to completely exercise their obligations and
responsibilities in foreign policy, the Treaty, as did already the Constitutional Treaty (Art.
III-296 TCE), provides for the establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS)
(Art. 27.3 TEU). The Council approved a decision establishing on 10 July 2010 this EEAS,
which is to be set up by December 2010 for the first anniversary of the entry into force of theTreaty of Lisbon. (Council) Current High Representative Catherine Ashton explained that
Europe needs to shape up to defend better our interests and values in a world of growing
complexity and fundamental power shifts.(Ashton, 2010)
EEAS headquarters will be established in Brussels, the European capital,and its staff will
mainly be by contribution of personnel coming from the Commission, the General
Secretariat of the Council and the Diplomatic services of the Member States .
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The EEAS was set out to be a functionally autonomous body of the European Union [. . .]
under the authority of the High Representative with the necessary legal capacityto perform
its tasks (Arts. 1.2, 3). It shall both support the High Representative and assist the
President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission
in the exercise of their respective mandates and functions (Art. 2). (Blanke, 2012, p. 159)
This configuration in arrangement with the Union delegations abroad will make the EEAS atrue diplomatic service of the Union inclusive, central as well as an externalcomponent.
The Role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy after Treaty of Lisbon
The role of the High Representative for the CFSP should be strengthened, that was
indubitable, when it was re estimated by the Convention on the Future of Europe and
afterward during the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon. There were three principal
objectives of an enhanced role for the High Representative: first,greater i ndependence from
the Counci l and f rom the Presidency in formation of poli cy proposals; second, a higher
international profi le for the post and its occupant; and third, unitary representation of the
Unionto replace the complex rules under which the European Commission represented the
Union in some areas of competence and the Presidency or High Representative in others. The
changes contained in the Treaty of Lisbon reflect all of these three ambitions. (Blanke, 2012,
p. 195)
Once it had into force it created a post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and as cited
in paragraph 1 the Minister was empowered to conduct the Unions common foreign and
security policy. Thisaccountabilityalthough it was to be performed within the mandate ofthe Council of Ministerswould have been a innovative concept for an individual operating
within and representing an international organization, and considering that only States
presently appoint ministers for foreign affairs, the title was comprehended as implying
aspirations of statehood for the European Union.
In reviewing the position of the High Representative and of the establishment EEAS under
the Treaty of Lisbon as well it is important to recall that the Member States have
communicated their willpower regarding their own powers to accomplish independent
foreign policy and to preserve separate representation in other States and in international
organizations.
It must be emphasized that although the Foreign Affairs Council is now presided over by the
High Representative, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the
supporting Working Groups within the Council will persist to be chaired by the rotating
Presidenciesso sooner than an item get hold of the level of the Council main decisions and
compromises may already have been forged under national influence.
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The European Neighborhood Policy:Assessing the EUs Policy
toward the Region
European neighborhood policy is basically a regional foreign policy with the aim of
developing privileged relations with the new neighbors of the enlarged EU. The purpose of
the ENP towards neighboring countries is strengthening stability, security and well-being for
all concerned. It intends to avoid the coming out of new dividing lines among the enlarged
EU and its neighbors and to offer them the chance to be involved in different EU activities,
through greater political, economic, security, and cultural co-operation.
The understanding of privileged relations in initial statements wasquite demanding. The
Commissions president, Romano Prodi, said that the ENP countries would share
everything but the institutions.
Almost sixteen ENP target countries, more or less are separated into four geographic areas:
the southern Mediterranean (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria) the eastern
Mediterranean (the Palestinian Territory, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon) eastern Europe
(Ukraine, and Belarus, Moldova) and since 2004, the southern Caucasus (Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Georgia). While Russia, at first involved in the blueprints, is not included the in
ENP.
The instruments used have distinct names but they are quite alike. European Commission,
prepare country reports which assess the political, institutional, and economic situation in a
country and, followed by tailor-made ENP Action Plans set up for every state.
Even though in principle they are bilateral, they essentially display the strong asymmetry that
characterizes relations between the EU and its neighbors.
To conclude this part, I would say that this part of the research indicates the positive
approach to the research question. We must highlight that when it comes to neighborhood
policy, EU members are more unified in their decisiveness.
Kosovo case best describe this feature of European Union foreign policy. The cohesive
reaction of each member state and of EU as an entire body toward Serbian aggression toward
Kosovo, is a sign that EU common foreign policy can work out, but is it the only case ?
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EU Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?
The key point of this question is to acquaint with the fact that foreign policy of the European
Union has evolved and expanded in scope over the years, it remains an unusual institution; it
is neither a nation-state nor an accurate intergovernmental organization. EU foreign policy
have been adjusted it still cannot be assessed according to the terms of a national foreign
policy. I assume that EU foreign policy is in an inconsistent condition, and it has come to
mean and the terms on which it can be assessed.
What I want to bring out is to appraise its efficiency and its capability to distribute results for
its member states and Europes population. As a final point, this part discusses the degree to
which foreign policy was an actor for establishing the EU domestically and abroad as an
independent actor in world affairs.
The Nature of the European Unions Foreign Policy
Within Europe, exist three different views on the possibility and desirability of a European
foreign policy. The most rough critics claim that there is no such thing as a European foreign
policy, that there never will be, and what is more, there never should be. A more soft and
nuanced view presume that Europes foreign policy is not imperative, but it should if the
states of Europe want to comprehend their foreign policy objectives.
To end with the remaining point of view, whose contributors believe that a European foreign
policy does exist but that Europes leaders often withstandusing the term for fear that it will
alarm their publics or reduce their influence. On this patterns of analysis, the key to
recognizing and figuring out the European foreign policy is to go ahead of the brief
definition of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) to cover all of the broader policy areas in which the EU operates
at the international level.
We are knowledgeable about considering foreign policy broadly as the strategy or approach
chosen by a national government to attain its aspirations and purposes in relation to external
entities. On this condition, the EU evidently has a foreign policy. The perplexity comes when
taking into account that the most studies of foreign policy focus on the decision making
process itself as part of the explanation. As Chris Hill put it, Foreign policy analysis
enquires into the motives and other sources of behavior of the international actors,
particularly states. It does this by giving a good deal of attention to decision-making. . . . In
doing so it tests the rather plausible hypothesis that the outputs of foreign policy are to some
degree determined by the nature of the decision-making process.
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Conclusions
The EUs deficient in institutional consistency is demonstrated in its failure to give birth to a
unified foreign policy actor. Yet, the EU is not a nation-state, and the achievements or
malfunction of its foreign policy should not be assessed by the same standards.
Certainly, if we estimate the EU foreign policy in contrast to the standard of
intergovernmental organizations, it is obvious that the EU has reached certain level of
success.
We can definitely assume that the most successful EU foreign policy, even though it is not
considered as such, has been enlargement. The EU has been confirmed on its capabilities to
attract former neighbors. But still, enlargement is a card that cannot be played perpetually. It
is costly, not only financially but also institutionally and culturally.
Another sphere where the EU could prove remarkably successful is in its commercial policy.
In this field the EU evidently acts effectively as the unquestionable agent of its member
states, which as a result now put little effort into performing independent commercial
policies. The principal economic partners, counting the United States and China, recognize
the EU as the interlocutor in this area and basically have renounced the divide and conquer
strategies. But this does not mean that there are no quarrels in commercial policy among the
EU and its partners.
Notwithstanding these decisive successes, the EUs record on foreign policy is
unequivocally a mixed one. In some particular areas that one might regard as significant and
vital for Europe and for specific member countries, the EU has not been very effective. This
is basically because the EU has no real mechanism for unraveling internal disputes.
As a result, if there is no compromise, no consensus, there is no policy. We can refer to some
cases, from very prominent issues such as disputes over U.S. policy in Iraq to profound
divergences over Russias intentions, to less interestedbut embarrassing issues such as the
disability to come up with a common position for the Durban Review Conference against
racism. Even in Georgian crisis in August 2008, EU did not have the capacity to guarantee its
enforcement and as a consequence achieved much less than what was necessary.
EU states sometimes are using their membership in the EU as a megaphone for national
foreign policy, according on ability to influence the EU machinery and to generate consensus
on their matters with the other states. Not even large states make maneuvers, even small
states have used the megaphone, though in different wayslarge states by forcing
consensus, small states by penetrating the EU institutions, especially through the Presidency.
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