Receipt of Bulk Liquids
W.V.PETER HUNT
DIRECTOR & PRINCIPAL CONSULTANT,WHAMCORP PTY LTD
www.whamcorp.com.au
BOARD MEMBER & PAST PRESIDENT,AUSTRALASIAN INSTITUTE OFDANGEROUS GOODS CONSULTANTS
www.aidgc.com
2Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Independent systems?
3
4 HOUR POWER OUTAGE TWO BLOCKS AWAY AFFECTS BOTH ISPs
Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Not independent
A 5-million US gallon (19 million litre) aboveground storage tank overflowed into a secondary containment dike during transfer from a ship.The gasoline spray aerosolized, forming a large vapour cloud, which ignited after reaching an ignition source in the wastewater treatment area of the facility.
4Whamcorp Pty Ltd
CAPECO, PUERTO RICO, 2009
5Whamcorp Pty Ltd
TANK GAUGING AT CAPECO
11
Before and after transfer
Used by operator
Used by supervisor
Whamcorp Pty Ltd
“SIDE GAUGE” – dip visible, transmitted to computer
12Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Monitoring volume during transfer
• Before and after transfers, manual dip and strapping (gauging) table for volume.
• Side gauge used by operators, also transmitted to computer
• Computer indicated the values for the liquid depth, the total volume based on the strapping table, and the flow rate into or out of the tank as it graphed values over time and calculated fill rate
• If computer unavailable, start time and table used to estimate fill time
13Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Normal safeguards not installed
14
AOPS
Whamcorp Pty Ltd
CATNAP(CHEAPEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY NARROWLY AVOIDING PROSECUTION)
“The CSB found that CAPECO purchased the least effective level-measurement system and employed an inadequate maintenance program to care for that system.”
• Float and Tape Gauges Prone to Failure
• Poor Float and Tape Gauge Maintenance
• “Practices were contrary to the recommended practices in API Manual of Petroleum Measurement Standards “
15Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Transfer operation
• Shipment of more than 11.5 million US gallons (44 million litres) of unleaded gasoline, expected to take 24 hours.
• No tank available for full load, so pump to 4 small tanks and remainder to top up another
• Operators adjusting flow rates by tank valves and manually calculating fill times based on hourly level check (normal practice due to transmitter problems). Valve to one tank was closed as gauge observed to be stuck
16Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Hourly level check
At the 11 p.m. walk-around, the tank farm operator observed the side gauge on Tank 409 during his hourly check.
The operator called the level into the supervisor who calculated once again that the tank should be full at 1 a.m.
17Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Operator’s midnight check
Before reaching the tank, the operator: • Observed a vapour cloud and a strong smell
of gasoline. • Contacted the dock operator to halt the
flow of gasoline to the tank.• Notified the other operator and supervisor
to meet at the edge of the terminal.
18Whamcorp Pty Ltd
From edge of terminal
Supervisor and operators:
• Observed a white fog approximately 3 feet (about 1 metre) above ground
• But could not hear or see gasoline overflowing from the vents on Tank 409 due to lack of lighting and the topography.
Approaching the fog, they noticed the air cool as the fog condensed on their hands, despite the 26°C temperature.
19Whamcorp Pty Ltd
What to do?
Noting the potential danger, the supervisor:
• sent one operator to the security gate,
• while the supervisor and another operator drove to a high vantage point, attempting to find the source of the leak and developing vapour cloud.
20Whamcorp Pty Ltd
21Whamcorp Pty Ltd
SYSTEMIC FAILURES (1)
• a history of poorly maintaining terminal operations;
• an inherent financial pressure to fill the tanks within the COPECO planning department’s stipulated time, at odds with safety;
• a failure to learn from previous overfill incidents at the facility;
• a lack of preventive maintenance for the malfunctioning float and tape device, automatic tank gauge transmitters;
23Whamcorp Pty Ltd
SYSTEMIC FAILURES (2)
• an unreliable computer for calculating tank fill times;
• a lack of overfill prevention safeguards as an independent alarm;
• a lack of formal procedures for tank-filling operations (operators & managers);
• an insufficient mechanical integrity program for safety critical equipment;
• poor adherence to human factors principles for safety critical equipment.
READ THE CSB REPORT24
Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Instruments–CAPECO 2009
25Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Instruments– Buncefield 2005
26Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Root Causes – CAPECO 2009
27Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Root Causes – Buncefield 2005
28Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Case study 1 – Road tanker
A flammable solvent storage tank was overfilled during unloading of a road tanker. An ultrasonic level transmitter was reading erratically during filling and the vessel was overfilled.
The independent hardwired high level interlock failed to operate.
The overfilled liquid was retained in the bund, fortunately not igniting.
33Whamcorp Pty Ltd
CS1 - Cause
The high level switch had been pulled out for testing and not put back, due to a mix-up and lack of robust permit to work sign-off
34Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Case study 2 - blending
A PLC started the pump, opened the inlet valve and transferred liquid until the required weight (from weigh cell), then stopping the pump.An independent high level switch (LSH) shuts the inlet valve and stops the pump.
After an overfill, weigh cell found faulty but LSH was working OK and had been tested to schedule.
35Whamcorp Pty Ltd
CS2 - Cause
Operators took samples from manhole and left the cover in place but unbolted.
LSH was mounted above level of manhole, so liquid overflowed before reaching LSH
36Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Case study 3 – Storage tank
LSH interlock was based on the DCS control system. Both the level transmitter and LSH set up to close the inlet actuated valve via the software. The level transmitter gave trouble for months. During one fill, erroneous readings of the level transmitter caused the inlet valve to shut. Operators visually checked the tank and found adequate space for the road tanker’s contents. The actuated inlet valve was put in manual mode from the DCS and opened.Filling was completed without any overfill.
37Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Case study 3 – next time!
The actuated valve was not returned to automatic mode. The next time the vessel was filled, the level transmitter again gave trouble and overfilling occurred. The high level switch did alarm at the control room but did not close the valve. The control room operator believing that the valve would close automatically did not initially take action. Approximately 2,000L of flammable solvent spilled but did not ignite.
38Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Case Study 3 - Lessons
• Overfill protection systems to be fully independent of the basic process control systems (BPCS) as required by standards such as IEC61511. Typically this would involve the interlock being hardwired or using an independent safety logic solver to be independent of the BPCS.
• Change control procedures to cover temporary software / control system changes in addition to equipment and process changes.
39Whamcorp Pty Ltd
But we have double walled tanks!
Double containment tanks are becoming increasingly popular both:
• On relatively small scale at industrial premises and commercial premises (such as for back up generators etc.), and
• Much larger double containment “cup” type tanks found in some European oil terminals.
46Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Typical small scale double walled tanks!
47
Typical double-walled tank used for acids and other corrosive liquids. Inner polyethylene tank (shown red) and outer tank.
Whamcorp Pty Ltd
1,000 US Gallon tank (detail)
48
INNER TANKFILLED TO TOP = 1,082 US Gal
(4,096 L)
OUTER TANKFILLED TO TOP = 1,110 US Gal
(4,202 L)
Whamcorp Pty Ltd
What is a double wall tank designed for?
These double containment tanks typically provide 110% containment of the tank volume to contain leaks from the inner tank
They provide only limited protection against overfilling.
i.e. if a tank is already full and further liquid is added there is only limited extra capacity in the annular space between the outer and inner tanks
49Whamcorp Pty Ltd
References
US CSB Final Investigation Report – CAPECO
US CSB video “Filling Blind”
CCPS Process Safety Beacon; Sep 2004, Sep 2006, Sep 2009, Oct 2009, Feb 2016
Loss Prevention Bulletin No 247, Feb 2016
Kletz, Trevor, “What Went Wrong”, 5th ed, Elsevier
Mostia, W.L. “Prevent Tank Farm Overfill Hazards”http://www.putmanmedia.com/assets/ct_sot_levelflow.pdf/
53Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Are there any questions
54Whamcorp Pty Ltd
Top Related