Ready for the Leap of Faith?Author(s): Jonathan DeanSource: The Brookings Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), p. 2Published by: Brookings Institution PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20080564 .
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LETTERS
A Nuclear-Free World: Is It Plausible?
Whether one finds Michael MccGwire's goal of a nuclear
free world overly ambitious or
politically plausible, numerous
assumptions in his article
("Eliminate or Marginalize? Nuclear Weapons in U.S.
Foreign Policy," spring issue)
require further examination.
Two relate to vertical and
horizontal proliferation.
First, it may well be true
that "today's rather reassuring low-salience nuclear world"
will "inevitably" lead to a high-salience world if
Washington does not push for a world with no nuclear
weapons. But it is unclear
why this should be so. It seems
possible, perhaps even likely, that the nuclear weapons states
will gradually reduce their
nuclear arsenals still further
during the next few decades,
although stopping well short of zero. Certainly, this appears
today a far more likely prospect than a return to the enormous
Cold War nuclear arsenals that
MccGwire so rightly fears.
Second, the assertion that
"we will certainly face a world
of many nuclear states" if the
West does not change its
nuclear policies ignores a
variety of domestic, regional, and international disincentives
to proliferation, as well as a
host of other incentives that
fuel nuclear ambitions,
including bureaucratic rivalries, domestic impulses, and regional
dynamics. Without denying a link of some kind between the nuclear policies of the
nuclear weapon states and
the "Nth country" problem, MccGwire nonetheless relies
heavily?far too heavily, in my mind?on the influence that
the nuclear force postures of
the nuclear weapons states exert
on would-be proliferators.
Mitchell Reiss, Woodrow
Wilson International Center
Ready for the Leap of Faith? Michael MccGwire ("Elimi
nate or Marginalize?" spring
issue) makes a strong case for
the advantages to this country and the other nuclear weapon states of completely eliminating nuclear weapons, but his article
leaves me agnostic as to the
feasibility of this course during the 20- to 30-year period
MccGwire foresees.
Short of a nuclear catastro
phe, it is highly improbable that the governments of the nuclear
weapon states, especially the
United States, which would
have to take the lead in this
enterprise, will be willing in the
next two decades to take the
leap of faith in the future that
is required for a firm commit
ment to elimination. The main
reason for this caution is the
belief, which MccGwire him
self seems to share, at least in
part, that war, especially clashes
among the major powers, are
endemic and ineradicable.
Instead of asking these states
to commit themselves now
to completely eliminating their
weapons, we should seek to
persuade them to reduce their
nuclear arsenals to a low equal level (perhaps 200 warheads
each), folding the threshold nuclear states into this regime.
Weapons and fissile material
in these residual nuclear forces
would be separated from deliv
ery systems and stored on the
territory of the owner state
with protection against attack
by concealed weapons. This
approach makes residual arsenals
unusable for surprise attack but
does not require nuclear
weapon states to wholly
relinquish what to them is their
nuclear lifeline. A precondition would be vigorous improve ment of the nonproliferation
regime, as well as an increas
ingly effective worldwide
peacekeeping system composed of the United Nations and a network of regional security
organizations. If this system of a largely
denuclearized world works
for a generation, then it will
be time to urge eliminating all
nuclear weapons. We need to
articulate and support this final
stage of nuclear arms control
with just as much vigor as we
argue the case for elimination.
Jonathan Dean, Union
of Concerned Scientists
The Door Is Open H Michael MccGwire's recent
article ("Eliminate or Marginal ize?" spring issue) spotlighted the historic opportunity the
world has now to capitalize on recent positive changes in the international system and
reduce the risks that nuclear
weapons pose to the United
States and all other nations.
The collapse of the Soviet
Union swept away the bipolar
animosity of the Cold War and opened the door to more
cooperative relationships
among the great powers in
many areas, including arms
control and disarmament.
To build and strengthen this
emerging cooperative security
environment, the international
community should examine se
riously the question of whether
nuclear weapons can safely and securely be eliminated.
MccGwire argues correctly that the current situation, in which nuclear weapons are
relatively unimportant in world
affairs, could devolve into a
dangerous new era of prolifera tion and regional arms races
unless the international
community moves quickly to embrace the goal of a
nuclear-free world. Shifting from a world of multiple nuclear powers and nuclear
aspirants to a world without
nuclear weapons will require that formidable political,
technical, and diplomatic obstacles be overcome. But the
United States can significantly affect whether the world rises
to meet these challenges or
watches idly as the risk of a nu
clear exchange escalates rapidly. The United States should
take the critical first step in this disarmament process
by declaring clearly its own
commitment to the goal of
eliminating nuclear weapons.
Only when the United States
formally adopts the goal of
a nuclear-free world will the
necessary resources and high
2 THE BROOKINGS REVIEW
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