Page | 49Philippine National Bank vs. Asuncion, 60 SCRA 321G.R. No. L-46095 November 23, 1977PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, FABAR INCORPORATED, JOSE MA. BARREDO, CARMEN B. BORROMEO and TOMAS L. BORROMEO,respondents.Nestor L. Kalaw, Carlos R. Cruz & Rolando S. Santos for petitioner,Conrado B. Enriquez for private respondents.MAKASIAR,J.:Philippine National Bank (hereafter referred to as the petitioner), on January 16, 1963, granted in favor of respondent Fabar Incorporated various credit accommodations and advances in the form of a discounting line, overdraft line, temporary overdraft line and letters of credit covering the importation of machinery and equipment. Petitioner likewise made advances by way of insurance premiums covering the chattels subject matter of a mortgage securing the aforementioned credit accommodations. Said credit accommodations had an outstanding balance of P8,449,169.98 as of May 13, 1977.All of the above credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of Jose Ma. Barredo, Carmen B. Borromeo and Tomas L. Borromeo (private respondents herein) and Manuel H. Barredo- For failure of private respondents to pay their obligations notwithstanding repeated demands, petitioner instituted a case for collection against all private respondents and Manuel H. Barredo in a complaint dated October 31, 1972, and which was filed before the sala of the Honorable Elias B. Asuncion, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XII (hereafter referred to as the respondent Court).On May 19, 1975, before the case could be decided, Manuel H. Barredo died. In a Manifestation dated June 6, 1975, counsel for private respondents informed the respondent Court of said death.Subsequently, respondent Court issued an Order of dismissal dated November 29, 1976, which is hereinbelow quoted as follows:In view of the death of defendant Manuel Barredo, the Court hereby dismisses this case since the present suit is for a money claim which does not survive the death of said defendant.Pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor ...the claim of plaintiff may be filed with the estate proceedings of the decedent.Petitioner thereupon filed a Motion dated December 14, 1976 praying for the reconsideration of respondent Court's Order dismissing the case as against all the defendants, contending that the dismissal should only be as against the deceased defendant Manuel H. Barredo.In an order dated January 26, 1977, respondent Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of meritorious grounds.Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.Petitioner, in its lone assignment of error, alleged that the respondent Court erred in dismissing the case against all the defendants, instead of dismissing the case only as against the deceased defendant and thereafter proceeding with the hearing as against the other defendants, private respondents herein.Petitioner's contention is well taken. Respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was erroneous.A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the solidary debtor. In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court, which is the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court said, in the case ofManila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama, et al. (107 Phil. 891) that:It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 (of theOldRules of Court) provides the procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision making compliance with such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court jurisdiction to 'take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allow the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter. Said provision gives the creditor the night to "proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. "The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, as was made apparent in the aforequoted decision. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.As correctly argued by petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner has no choice but to proceed against the estate of Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this provision diminishes the Bank's right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantiveMoreover, no less than the New Constitution of the Philippines, in Section 5, Article X, provides that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED MODIFYING THE APPEALED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT COURT DATED NOVEMBER 29, 1976 AND JANUARY 26, 1977 IN THE SENSE THAT AS AGAINST THE DECEASED MANUEL H. BARREDO, THE CASE IS DISMISSED, BUT AS AGAINST ALL THE OTHER SOLIDARY DEBTORS, THE CASE IS REMANDED TO RESPONDENT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.NO COSTS.SO ORDERED.Teehankee (Chairman), Martin, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.Muoz-Palma, J., took no part.

Santero vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 153 SCRA 728

G.R. No. , 153 SCRA 728Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCDECISIONAugust 31, 1987G.R. No., ,vs., .,J.:This is a Petition forcertiorariwhich questions the order of the respondent court granting the Motion for Allowance filed by private respondents. Said order reads as follows:Acting on the Motion For Allowance dated June 30, 1982 filed by Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed Santero, thru their guardian, Anselma Diaz, the Opposition thereto dated July 8, 1982 filed by the oppositors, the Reply to Opposition dated July 12, 1982 filed by movant Anselma Diaz and the Rejoinder dated July 26, 1982 filed by the oppositors, the Court was constrained to examine the Motion For Allowance filed by the herein movant last year wherein the ground cited was for support which included educational expenses, clothing and medical necessities, which was granted and said minors were given an allowance prayed for in their motion.In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant Anselma Diaz only followed the precedent of the Court which granted a similar motion last year to be spent for the school expenses of her wards. In their opposition the oppositors contend that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from which said administrator derives the only income of the intestate estate of Pablo Santero, et al.In the Reply filed by the guardian-movant, she admitted some of her children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as soon as they are given the requested allowances. She cited Article 290 of the Civil Code providing that:Support is everything that is indispensable for substance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social position of the family.Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.'citing also Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which provides:Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the Court, such allowance as provided by law.'From the foregoing discussion alone, the Court cannot deviate from its duty to give the allowance sought by the wards, the fact that they need further education which should have been provided to them if their deceased father were alive.On the allegation that the funds from which the allowance would be derived are trust funds, the Court, time and again had emphasized that the estate of the Santeros is quite big and the amount to be released for allowances is indeed insignificant and which can easily be replaced from its general fund if the so-called trust fund is adjudicated to the oppositors.WHEREFORE, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed Santero are hereby granted an allowance of two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos each for tuition fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator who is ordered to reimburse to them the said amount after this order shall have become final to enable the oppositors to file their appeal bycertiorariif they so desire within the reglementary period.SO ORDERED.Bacoor, Cavite, July 28, 1982.ILDEFONSO M. BLEZAExecutive Judge(pp. 35-36, Rollo)It appears from the records that petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero and Winy Santero are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to their father Pablo. Pablo Santero in turn, who died on November 30, 1973 was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero who died in 1970 and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who died in 1976.Meanwhile before We could act on the instant petition private respondents filed another Motion for Allowance dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent court to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz praying that an order be granted directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo, to deliver the sum of P6,000.00 to each of the seven (7) children of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of Pablo Santero. The respondent Court granted the motion of the private respondents but oppositors (petitioners herein) asked the court to reconsider said Order.On September 10, 1985, an Amended Order was issued by respondent Court directing Anselma Diaz to submit her clarification or explanation as to the additional three (3) children of Anselma Diaz included in the motion. In compliance therewith Anselma Diaz filed her "Clarification" stating among others that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children as represented by the mother, Anselma Diaz were included in the motion for support and her first three (3) children who were then of age should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero under Art. 188, of the New Civil Code.On October 15, 1985, petitioners herein filed their Motion to Admit Supplemental Petition opposing the inclusion of three (3) more heirs. We denied that "Motion for Extension of Time to file their Supplemental Petition" as per Our Resolution dated October 23, 1985.On November 11, 1985, another Order was issued by the respondent court directing the administrator of the estate to get back the allowance of the three additional recipients or children of Anselma Diaz apparently based on the oppositors' (petitioners herein) "Urgent Motion to Direct the Administrator to Withhold Disbursement of Allowance to the Movants."The issues now being raised in this present Petition are:1. Whether or not respondent court acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the allowance to the respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel-P2,000.00 each despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the exception of Miguel.2. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance based on the allegations of the said respondents that the abovenamed wards are still schooling and they are in actual need of money to defray their school expenses for 1982-83 when the truth is that they are no longer schooling.3. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in granting the motion for allowance without conducting a hearing thereon, to determine the truth of allegations of the private respondents.Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed and one is married as provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners also allege that there was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school term 1982-83 because these wards have already attained majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They further allege that the administrator of the estate of Pablo Santero does not have sufficient funds to cover said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds now held by the administrator are derived.In this connection, the question of whether the private respondents are entitled to allowance or not concerns only the intestate estate of the late Pablo Santero and not the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti, parents of their late legitimate son Pablo Santero. The reason for this is Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states that "An illegitimate child has no right to inheritab intestatofrom the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child." The question of whether or not the petitioners and private respondents are entitled to inherit by right of representation from their grandparents more particularly from Simona Pamuti was settled by Us in the related case of "Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Felisa Pamuti-Jardin" (G.R. No. 66574-R) wherein We held that in view of the barrier present in said Art. 992, petitioners and private respondents are excluded from the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.The present petition obviously lacks merit.The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code reading as follows:Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance, according tothe social position of the family.Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted by respondent Court without hearing. The record shows that the "Motion for Allowance" dated June 30, 1982 contains a Notice of Hearing (p. 2, Annex "A") addressed to the lawyers for the petitioners and setting the hearing thereof on July 8, 1982 at 9:00 in the morning. Apparently a copy of said motion was duly received by the lawyer, Atty. Beltran as he filed an opposition thereto on the same date of hearing of the motion. Furthermore even the instant petition admits that the wards, (petitioners and private respondents as represented by their respective guardians) "have been granted allowances for school expenses for about 8 years now." The respondent court in granting the motion for allowance merely "followed the precedent of the court which granted a similar motion last year." (Annex "F") However in previous years (1979-1981) the "wards" (petitioners and private respondents) only received P1,500.00 each depending upon the availability of funds as granted by the court in several orders. (Annex 1 to Annex 4).WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.Padilla, J., took no part. Damsco vs. Lagui, 166 SCRA 214

G.R. No. 81381 September 30, 1988EFIGENIO S. DAMASCO,petitioner,vs.JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 59, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Del Prado, Diaz. Sy, Damasco Law Offices for petitioner.The Solicitor General for respondent.PADILLA,J.:In an Information dated 11 September 1987, but filed only on 17 September 1987 with the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 59, presided over by respondent Judge Hilario L. Laqui, petitioner Atty. Eugenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime ofgrave threatscommitted as follows:That on or about the 8th day of July 1987, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten one Rafael K. Sumadohat with the infliction upon his person of a wrong amounting to a crime, that is, by then and there uttering the following remarks, to wit:BAKIT MO AKO GINAGANITO? MAGBABAYAD KA ... PAPATAYIN KITA ... MAYROON AKONG BARIL, BABARILIN KITA, TAGADIYAN LANG AKO (Rollo, P. 13)Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, respondent judge found that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave threats but only of light threats. As a result, petitioner was convicted of the latter crime and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00 and the costs.Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of respondent Judge's decision, contending that he cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in grave threats charged in the information, as the lighter offense had already prescribed when the information was filed. Petitioner states that the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed only on 17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days. (Incidentally the affidavit complaint was filed with the Fiscal's Office only on 7 September 1987, or after the lapse of 61 days from 8 July 1987.1) Upon the other hand, the crime of light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two (2) months2which means sixty (60) days.3In denying petitioner's motion, the lower court held that:Just to disabuse the mind of the movant, let it be said that the Court is fully aware of the respective date of the commission of the offense and of the filing of the information. The Court holds on to the principle that the allegation in the information confers jurisdiction and that jurisdiction once acquired cannot be lost.Thus, since the Court acquired jurisdiction to try the case because the information was filed within the prescriptive period for the crime charged, which is Grave Threats, the same cannot be lost by prescription, if after trial what has been proven is merely light threats.4The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, recommends that the petition be given due course, stating that:Respondent Judge denied the "Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the Dispositive Portion of the Decision" apparently with the misimpression that what was being questioned was the court's jurisdiction over the offense charged, ratiocinating that jurisdiction, once acquired, cannot be lost. But such is not the case. True, the allegations in the Information confer jurisdiction upon the courts, and once acquired, such jurisdiction cannot be lost. However, this principle is not applicable in the case at bar. The jurisdiction of the lower court over the crime was never questioned. Rather, the legal dispute lies in whether or not it was proper for respondent Judge to still convict petitioner after finding him guilty of the lesser offense of light threats but which has already prescribed. Verily, the query should be answered in the negative for reasons heretofore discussed.5In the case ofFrancisco vs. Court of Appeals,6the Court held that where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accussing the defendant of the graver offense.Incidentally, in the case ofFelino Reyes vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the Philippines,7a Memorandum prepared by this ponente for the Court, entitled "An Examination of the Rule Which Holds That One Cannot Be Convicted Of A Lesser Offense Includible Within a Greater Offense, Where Prosecution For The Latter Was Commenced After Expiration Of Limitations Applicable To The Lesser Offense," discusses a possible attempt to depart from the rule laid down inFrancisco vs. CA,8by invoking the principle of presumption of regularity in the performance of official acts and duties, and by interpreting the phrase "prescription of a crime or offense" as merely "a bar to the commencement of a criminal action.9However, Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law.10Hence, while it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections which are grounds of a motion to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Codeextinguishes criminal liability. To apply the suggestion in the aforecited memorandum could contravene said Article 89, which is a part of substantive law.11This position is further strengthened by Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which added extinction of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash.Thus, as suggested by the cited memorandum, a departure from the ruling inFrancisco vs. CA,12can be done only "through an overhaul of some existing rules on criminal procedure to give prescription a limited meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the commencement of a criminal action and therefore, waivable.13But this will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged,such rules shall not however diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.14ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision is SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur. People vs. Lacson, 400 SCRA 261

G.R. No. 149453 May 28, 2002PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,vs.PANFILO M. LACSONRESOLUTIONBefore us is a petition for review oncertiorariseeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1of the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034.2The said Decision of the appellate court granted respondent Lacson's Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or the Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al." pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City.The following appear in the records of this case:(1) On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of theKuratong BalelengGang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day.3(2) On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a "rub-out" or summary execution and not a shootout.4(3) In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated, among others, that he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region Command (NCRC) and headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995at the gang's safe house in Superville Subdivision, Paraaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made to board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they were shot to death by elements of ABRITFG.5(4) On May 26, 1995,SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the time they were killed in Commonwealth Avenue.6(5) On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter ofRemate,executed an affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG members were arrested in Superville Subdivision.7(6) On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel.8(7) Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation of the murder charges. The panel was headed by Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs Bienvenido Blancaflor. On October 20, 1995,the panel issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of probable cause.(8) Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review by a panel composed of Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa as head, and Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera as members. On November 20, 1995, the review panel reversed the Blancaflor resolution and found probable cause for the prosecution of multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) officers and personnel of ABRITFG.9(9) On November 2, 1995,the Ombudsman filed before theSandiganbayaneleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as principals.10The following appear to be the victims: Meleubren Sorronda in Crim. Case No. 23047; Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No. 23048; Carlito Alap-ap in Crim. Case No. 23049; Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case No. 23050; Ray Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23051; Joel Amora in Crim. Case No. 23052; Alex Neri in Crim. Case No. 23053; Rolando Siplon in Crim. Case No. 23054; Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055; Sherwin Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23056; and Pacifico Montero in Crim. Case No. 23057.(10) Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were filed against the same twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory. Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty.11(11) With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayanto hear the criminal cases as none of the "principal" accused in the Amended Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, theSandiganbayanordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court.12(12) The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the transfer. Pending resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249 took effect on February 23, 1997, amending R. A. No. 7975. In particular, the amendatory law deleted the word "principal" in Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayanto include all cases where at least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice or accessory, is a government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is made applicable to all cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet begun as of the date of its approval.13(13) In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,14respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of the amendment and contended that theSandiganbayanhad no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249.(14) Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.(15) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members.On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora,15Leonora Amora,16Nenita Alap-ap,17Imelda Montero,18Margarita Redillas,19Carmelita Elcamel20and Rolando Siplon21also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases.22(16) Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause.(17) The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22, 199923held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused.(18) During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as witness. On the other hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyer's League presented the affidavits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her affidavit.24(19) On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution25dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, as follows:"As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine above-cited, there is no more reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose them to an open and public accusation. It is time to writefinisto these cases and lay to rest the ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved--- the accused, the prosecution witnesses and the private complainants alike--- may get on with their lives.The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of People vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999) where the Supreme Court said that the general rule is that 'if the Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial', and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno 'is an exception to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist.'This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly make an exception to the general rule.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused or to hold them for trial. Accordingly, the Informations in the above-numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed."SO ORDERED."26(20) On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding theKuratong Balelengincident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. On April 17, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend the investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.27(21) On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-100933 and raffled to Branch 40, presided by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba.28(22) The plea for temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Pasamba in an Order29dated June 5, 2001,viz:"After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of the finding of the Quezon City RTC that no probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein and to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with theSandiganbayandoes not put the case in a different perspective since theSandiganbayanwas adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and remains to be the complainant in the present investigation initiated thru a letter of PNP Chief Mendoza dated March 27, 2001 (Exhibit "B") together with the sworn statements of witnesses Ramos and Yu (Exhibits "2" and "3" - supportive of the refiling of the case (Exhibit "9").xxx xxx xxxAbove considered, this Court finds petitioners have not preliminarily established that they have a right to be preserved pending hearing on the injunctive relief.WHEREFORE, the prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED."30(23) On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of theKuratong Balelenggang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25)other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.(24) On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari31against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines. The said petition was amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 in which the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed.32(25) The Second Amended Petition33dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 2001, alleged:"The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the questioned Order (Annex A) and the new Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 pending before respondent Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the grave abuse of discretion by respondent Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its issuance, the illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued, and the invalidity of the new Informations for Murder filed against petitioners and others, all in defiance of law and jurisprudence as shown by the following:(a) Respondent judge had ruled on the merits of the main prohibition actiona quorendering the same moot and academic by concluding that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 by the QC RTC was not final and executory, hence [i] the complaints therein can be reinvestigated, and [ii] petitioner's arraignment while the case had not yet been remanded to the QC RTC and while theSandiganbayanhad valid jurisdiction thereover [Criminal Cases No. 23047-2048] was void, notwithstanding that the only issue in the TRO application was the existence or lack of a valid complaint as defined in S1 and S3, Rule 110.(b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors could proceed to re-investigate and thereafter file new Informations on June 6, 2001 covering those offenses subject of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 on the basis of affidavits filed after said cases were dismissed on March 29, 1999, despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued.(c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a right to be preserved despite evidence showing the short cuts taken by respondent State prosecutors in re-investigating a dismissed case, in not complying with Rules in respect of its re-opening, and in insisting that a valid complaint was filed in clear violation of the Rules and case law thereon, and despite the fact that the petitioner had shown that an inextendible deadline of June 5, 2001 was given him to file his counter-affidavit without which his indictment for a non-bailable offense is assured because of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez's political schemes."34(26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however, filed a Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of the proceedings before the trial court.35(27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112.36(28) On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as "provisional dismissal," and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the respondent,viz:"In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject dismissal of [the] criminal cases was provisional in nature and that the cases presently sought to be prosecuted by the respondents are mere revival or re-opening of the dismissed cases. The present controversy, being one involving "provisional dismissal" and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said provision is couched in clear, simple and categorical words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after the issuance of the order without the case having been revived. It should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases, even if reckoned from the DOJ's issuance of subpoenas to petitioner, was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon City's Resolution, provisionally dismissing the criminal cases now sought to be revived. Applying the clear and categorical mandate of Section 8, Rule 117, supra, such efforts to revive the criminal cases are now definitely barred by the two-year prescriptive period provided therein.xxx xxx xxxWHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued against the conduct of further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, including the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner, PANFILO M. LACSON, is hereby made PERMANENT. Accordingly, with respect to said accused, the proceedings conducted by respondent State Prosecutors in respect of the said criminal cases are declared NULL AND VOID and the corresponding Informations, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, entitled 'People of the Philippines vs. Panfilo M. Lacson,et al."and filed before respondent Judge Maria Theresa L. Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, are hereby ordered DISMISSED.SO ORDERED."37The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of theKuratong Balelenggang. This rule which took effect on December 1, 2000 provides:"SEC. 8.Provisional dismissal.-A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived."Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts,viz:(1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely:a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalorab. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; andg. Rolando Siplon.From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3)38other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants.Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him.This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the effect that "records show that the prosecution and the private offended parties were notified of the hearing x x x."39It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnir's finding that only seven (7) of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance.Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule.If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not. Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against the respondent Lacson. Melo and Carpio,JJ.,take no part.SO ORDERED.St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 295 SCRA 494EN BANC[G.R. No. 130866.September 16, 1998]ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME,petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS MARTINEZ, COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS,respondents.D E C I S I O NREGALADO,J.:The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga.Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995.However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll.On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriatingP38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).[1]Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home.Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita.Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter she took over the management of the business.She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid.Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof.As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.[2]Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.[3]Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a volunteer and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home fromFebruary 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.[4]On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.[5]Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,[6]hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.[7]Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC.The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC.It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its promulgation.[8]Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only.[9]Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals.No appellate review has since then been provided for.Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC.[10]The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis.It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.[11]Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,[12]and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,[13]for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision.Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.[14]Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows:SEC. 9.Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs ofmandamus,prohibition,certiorari, habeas corpus,andquo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.[15]Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:SEC. 9.Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs ofmandamus,prohibition,certiorari, habeas corpus, andquo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court,[16]the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902,viz.:1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to theLabor Codeof the Philippinesand the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now provides except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. (Italics supplied)3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and terminology.As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P.No. 129 now grants exclusiveappellatejurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, those falling within theappellatejurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, x x x.This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC.[17]Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance withthe Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtin accordance with the Labor Code.This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within theappellatejurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein.In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review.This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.[18]In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech[19]from which we reproduce the following excerpts:The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its jurisdiction and powers.Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.Mr. President, the purpose of the law isto ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals.However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippinesand by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court arelabor cases.Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeksto eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court.(Emphases and corrections ours)x x xSenate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:xxx Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the peoples basic rights and additional task expressly vested on it now to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President.It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago.I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases.Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending.In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.xxxSurprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired:[20]Senator Roco.On page 2, line 5, after the line Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,add the phrase THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED.So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.The President.Is there any objection?(Silence)Hearing none, the amendment is approved.Senator Roco.On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted.This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.The President.Is there any objection?(Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.Senator Roco.There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.Senator Romulo.Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.The President.Is there any objection?(Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.(Italics supplied)xxxThereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third reading followed.[21]; Record of the Senate, Vol. V, No. 63, pp. 180-181.21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995,[22]inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC.The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been alapsus plumaebecause appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals;[23]whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings.On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court.A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions.[24]While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.Therefore,all referencesintheamended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement inSantiago vs. Vasquez, et al.[25]should be taken into account:One final observation.We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein.This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts.We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED,to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing,andPurisima, JJ.,concur.

Maceda vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique, petitioner,vs.HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME COURT; REASON. However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL; REASON. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?D E C I S I O NNOCON, J p:The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur. People vs. Gacott, Jr., G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995

G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NREGALADO,J.:Rebuffed by this Court through the annulment of his order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 of the courta quo, complemented with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a motion for reconsideration dated April 1, 1995, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated April 26, 1995.For reasons of his own but the purposes of which can easily be deduced, separate copies of the basic motion were furnished the Chief Justice, Judicial and Bar Council, Solicitor General, Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Court Administrator and his deputies, Secretary of Justice, and Ombudsman. Copies of the supplemental motion were also furnished by him to the same officials or entities and, additionally, to the individual members of this Court.In the judgment now sought to be reconsidered, the Second Division of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Abdulwahid A. Bidin, specified that the only issue to be resolved in this case was whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the motion to quash the aforementioned criminal case. We quote the pertinent portions of hisponencianot only for easy reference but to serve as a basis for determining whether the sanctions imposed were commensurate to the administrative offense, to wit:The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. . . .xxx xxx xxxObviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D. No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case ofAquino vs. Comelec(62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or ot