EL001 Pre-Pathway Module 2010Grammar and Vocabulary DevelopmentSession 12
Pattern grammarPrepositions
contrary provide supplied
imposed according explain
saw cared culminated
relied suffer deeply fond
doubted assumes described
disagree
PATTERN GRAMMAR
ANGUS MADDISON, who died on April 24th at the age of 83,
described himself as a chiffrephile—a lover of figures. Like many
men, he had his first serious crush at the age of 13. He read “How
to Pay for the War”, by John Maynard Keynes; it was the annex on
national income that most tickled his fancy. For the next 70 years
he pursued ever more elusive numbers, estimating GDP for a
growing range of countries over a lengthening span of time. In
1995 he published GDP estimates for 56 countries as far back as
1820. In 2001 his romantic adventures culminated in an
estimate for world output in the year 1AD: $105.4 billion at 1990
prices.
GDP is a modern term, but the urge to count the nation’s produce
and compare countries’ standards of living predates Adam Smith.
Maddison saw himself as heir to a tradition that began with
William Petty, the pioneer of “political arithmetick”, who in 1665
estimated the income of England and Wales at £40m. That
calculation was of pressing concern to Petty, who wanted to show
the king how to pay for the war against the Dutch. But why did
Maddison care about the GDP of the distant past?
He believed that the “pace and pattern” of economic activity had
deep historical roots. Economies, he thought, do not “take off”, as
if from nowhere. Even the industrial revolution was too gradual to
warrant the term revolution and too broad to be considered
merely industrial. Take, for example, the progress of maritime
technology. By 1773, John Harrison was claiming a £20,000 prize
from the British Parliament for inventing a seaworthy
chronometer. Captain James Cook had reached Australia’s east
coast, and thanks to sauerkraut and citrus juice, he had lost none
of his crew to scurvy.
Even scholars who believed there was a lot of economic progress
to measure before the 19th century doubted there was enough
data to measure it. Maddison made the most of whatever was
available. He drew on one scholar’s work on probate inventories in
17th and 18th century England, which showed that each
generation passed on more property, furniture and houselinen to
its descendants than the last. His economic portrait of Mughal
India was influenced by a 16th-century survey by Abu Fazl, vizier
to Emperor Akbar. His estimates of Japan’s population relied on
the annual register of religious affiliation, brought in after the
Portuguese were expelled and Christianity outlawed in 1587. One
of his students, Bart van Ark, now chief economist of the
Conference Board, says Maddison urged him to venture beyond
libraries and statistical offices. Even a painting in a museum
might provide some clue to a country’s standard of living
centuries before.
“There is room for two or three economic theorists in each
generation, not more,” wrote Colin Clark, one of Maddison’s
heroes. Every other economist, he added, should be content to
build knowledge by steadily laying “stone on stone”. Maddison laid
the foundations for many big thoughts. Ten days before his death
he was cited in a speech by Robert Zoellick, president of the
World Bank, declaring the end of the “third world”. Maddison’s
figures show that Asia accounted for more than half of world
output for 18 of the last 20 centuries. Its growing clout in the
world economy is, therefore, a “restoration” not a revolution.
Even as they foreshadow the rise of Asia, his numbers also help
explain the historical rise of Europe. His estimates of per head
GDP provide a useful empirical crosscheck for a grand thesis
proposed by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson
in 2005. They argued that European countries prospered after
1500 in so far as they imposed checks on monarchical power and
enjoyed access to the Atlantic Ocean, with its lucrative trade in
commodities and slaves. Maddison’s estimates also appear in
their work explaining why poor colonies became rich, and rich
colonies became poor. They conclude that sparsely populated
colonies benefited over the long run from the property rights that
European settlers brought with them. Richer, well-populated
colonies suffered from efforts to suck them dry.
Messrs Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson caution that Maddison’s
figures for the years before 1820 are “no more than educated
guesses”. Maddison freely conceded that the further back he
went, the more he had to rely on “clues and conjecture”. In an
intemperate article last year, Gregory Clark of the University of
California, Davis, described these numbers as “fictions, as real as
the relics peddled around Europe in the Middle Ages”. Credulous
economists demanded numbers, “however dubious their
provenance”, and Maddison supplied them.
Go figure
Quantification can create the illusion of precision. For example,
Maddison assumes that African GDP before 1820 remained more
or less at subsistence levels. If that is all that can be said, does it
add anything to put a number on it ($400-$425 per head)? But he
was not selling comforts to the credulous. He believed that
numbers sharpened debate. Quantification, he wrote, “is more
readily contestable and likely to be contested.” In disputing his
figures, scholars would be inspired to provide their own. Even
those who disagreed with his work would be influenced by it.
Given the length and depth of his career, it is tempting to say that
this intellectual influence is impossible to measure. But that would
be contrary to his faith in quantification. His curriculum vitae
counts 20 books and 130 articles, plus another 19 volumes that
he edited or co-authored. His work has been translated into 12
languages and two books have racked up more than 2,000
citations, according to Google Scholar. He supervised 13 doctoral
students, as well as co-founding the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre at the University of Groningen, which he
joined in 1978, and the Club des Chiffrephiles in 1990. But as
even Maddison admitted, “no sensible person would claim that
[quantification] can tell the whole story.” He was deeply fond of
numbers. And a large number were deeply fond of him.
GDP is a modern term, but the urge to count the nation’s produce
and compare countries’ standards of living predates Adam Smith.
Maddison saw himself as heir to a tradition that began with
William Petty, the pioneer of “political arithmetick”, who in 1665
estimated the income of England and Wales at £40m. That
calculation was of pressing concern to Petty, who wanted to show
the king how to pay for the war against the Dutch. But why did
Maddison care about the GDP of the distant past?
He believed that the “pace and pattern” of economic activity had
deep historical roots. Economies, he thought, do not “take off”, as
if from nowhere. Even the industrial revolution was too gradual to
warrant the term revolution and too broad to be considered
merely industrial. Take, for example, the progress of maritime
technology. By 1773, John Harrison was claiming a £20,000 prize
from the British Parliament for inventing a seaworthy
chronometer. Captain James Cook had reached Australia’s east
coast, and thanks to sauerkraut and citrus juice, he had lost none
of his crew to scurvy.
Even scholars who believed there was a lot of economic progress
to measure before the 19th century doubted there was enough
data to measure it. Maddison made the most of whatever was
available. He drew on one scholar’s work on probate inventories in
17th and 18th century England, which showed that each
generation passed on more property, furniture and houselinen to
its descendants than the last. His economic portrait of Mughal
India was influenced by a 16th-century survey by Abu Fazl, vizier
to Emperor Akbar. His estimates of Japan’s population relied on
the annual register of religious affiliation, brought in after the
Portuguese were expelled and Christianity outlawed in 1587. One
of his students, Bart van Ark, now chief economist of the
Conference Board, says Maddison urged him to venture beyond
libraries and statistical offices. Even a painting in a museum
might provide some clue to a country’s standard of living
centuries before.
“There is room for two or three economic theorists in each
generation, not more,” wrote Colin Clark, one of Maddison’s
heroes. Every other economist, he added, should be content to
build knowledge by steadily laying “stone on stone”. Maddison laid
the foundations for many big thoughts. Ten days before his death
he was cited in a speech by Robert Zoellick, president of the
World Bank, declaring the end of the “third world”. Maddison’s
figures show that Asia accounted for more than half of world
output for 18 of the last 20 centuries. Its growing clout in the
world economy is, therefore, a “restoration” not a revolution.
Even as they foreshadow the rise of Asia, his numbers also help
explain the historical rise of Europe. His estimates of per head
GDP provide a useful empirical crosscheck for a grand thesis
proposed by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson
in 2005. They argued that European countries prospered after
1500 in so far as they imposed checks on monarchical power and
enjoyed access to the Atlantic Ocean, with its lucrative trade in
commodities and slaves. Maddison’s estimates also appear in
their work explaining why poor colonies became rich, and rich
colonies became poor. They conclude that sparsely populated
colonies benefited over the long run from the property rights that
European settlers brought with them. Richer, well-populated
colonies suffered from efforts to suck them dry.
Messrs Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson caution that Maddison’s
figures for the years before 1820 are “no more than educated
guesses”. Maddison freely conceded that the further back he
went, the more he had to rely on “clues and conjecture”. In an
intemperate article last year, Gregory Clark of the University of
California, Davis, described these numbers as “fictions, as real as
the relics peddled around Europe in the Middle Ages”. Credulous
economists demanded numbers, “however dubious their
provenance”, and Maddison supplied them.
Go figure
Quantification can create the illusion of precision. For example,
Maddison assumes that African GDP before 1820 remained more
or less at subsistence levels. If that is all that can be said, does it
add anything to put a number on it ($400-$425 per head)? But he
was not selling comforts to the credulous. He believed that
numbers sharpened debate. Quantification, he wrote, “is more
readily contestable and likely to be contested.” In disputing his
figures, scholars would be inspired to provide their own. Even
those who disagreed with his work would be influenced by it.
Given the length and depth of his career, it is tempting to say that
this intellectual influence is impossible to measure. But that would
be contrary to his faith in quantification. His curriculum vitae
counts 20 books and 130 articles, plus another 19 volumes that
he edited or co-authored. His work has been translated into 12
languages and two books have racked up more than 2,000
citations, according to Google Scholar. He supervised 13 doctoral
students, as well as co-founding the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre at the University of Groningen, which he
joined in 1978, and the Club des Chiffrephiles in 1990. But as
even Maddison admitted, “no sensible person would claim that
[quantification] can tell the whole story.” He was deeply fond of
numbers. And a large number were deeply fond of him.
He believed that the “pace and pattern” of economic activity had
deep historical roots. Economies, he thought, do not “take off”, as
if from nowhere. Even the industrial revolution was too gradual to
warrant the term revolution and too broad to be considered
merely industrial. Take, for example, the progress of maritime
technology. By 1773, John Harrison was claiming a £20,000 prize
from the British Parliament for inventing a seaworthy
chronometer. Captain James Cook had reached Australia’s east
coast, and thanks to sauerkraut and citrus juice, he had lost none
of his crew to scurvy.
Even scholars who believed there was a lot of economic progress
to measure before the 19th century doubted there was enough
data to measure it. Maddison made the most of whatever was
available. He drew on one scholar’s work on probate inventories in
17th and 18th century England, which showed that each
generation passed on more property, furniture and houselinen to
its descendants than the last. His economic portrait of Mughal
India was influenced by a 16th-century survey by Abu Fazl, vizier
to Emperor Akbar. His estimates of Japan’s population relied on
the annual register of religious affiliation, brought in after the
Portuguese were expelled and Christianity outlawed in 1587. One
of his students, Bart van Ark, now chief economist of the
Conference Board, says Maddison urged him to venture beyond
libraries and statistical offices. Even a painting in a museum
might provide some clue to a country’s standard of living
centuries before.
“There is room for two or three economic theorists in each
generation, not more,” wrote Colin Clark, one of Maddison’s
heroes. Every other economist, he added, should be content to
build knowledge by steadily laying “stone on stone”. Maddison laid
the foundations for many big thoughts. Ten days before his death
he was cited in a speech by Robert Zoellick, president of the
World Bank, declaring the end of the “third world”. Maddison’s
figures show that Asia accounted for more than half of world
output for 18 of the last 20 centuries. Its growing clout in the
world economy is, therefore, a “restoration” not a revolution.
Even as they foreshadow the rise of Asia, his numbers also help
explain the historical rise of Europe. His estimates of per head
GDP provide a useful empirical crosscheck for a grand thesis
proposed by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson
in 2005. They argued that European countries prospered after
1500 in so far as they imposed checks on monarchical power and
enjoyed access to the Atlantic Ocean, with its lucrative trade in
commodities and slaves. Maddison’s estimates also appear in
their work explaining why poor colonies became rich, and rich
colonies became poor. They conclude that sparsely populated
colonies benefited over the long run from the property rights that
European settlers brought with them. Richer, well-populated
colonies suffered from efforts to suck them dry.
Messrs Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson caution that Maddison’s
figures for the years before 1820 are “no more than educated
guesses”. Maddison freely conceded that the further back he
went, the more he had to rely on “clues and conjecture”. In an
intemperate article last year, Gregory Clark of the University of
California, Davis, described these numbers as “fictions, as real as
the relics peddled around Europe in the Middle Ages”. Credulous
economists demanded numbers, “however dubious their
provenance”, and Maddison supplied them.
Go figure
Quantification can create the illusion of precision. For example,
Maddison assumes that African GDP before 1820 remained more
or less at subsistence levels. If that is all that can be said, does it
add anything to put a number on it ($400-$425 per head)? But he
was not selling comforts to the credulous. He believed that
numbers sharpened debate. Quantification, he wrote, “is more
readily contestable and likely to be contested.” In disputing his
figures, scholars would be inspired to provide their own. Even
those who disagreed with his work would be influenced by it.
Given the length and depth of his career, it is tempting to say that
this intellectual influence is impossible to measure. But that would
be contrary to his faith in quantification. His curriculum vitae
counts 20 books and 130 articles, plus another 19 volumes that
he edited or co-authored. His work has been translated into 12
languages and two books have racked up more than 2,000
citations, according to Google Scholar. He supervised 13 doctoral
students, as well as co-founding the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre at the University of Groningen, which he
joined in 1978, and the Club des Chiffrephiles in 1990. But as
even Maddison admitted, “no sensible person would claim that
[quantification] can tell the whole story.” He was deeply fond of
numbers. And a large number were deeply fond of him.
Even scholars who believed there was a lot of economic progress to
measure before the 19th century doubted there was enough data to
measure it. Maddison made the most of whatever was available. He drew
on one scholar’s work on probate inventories in 17th and 18th century
England, which showed that each generation passed on more property,
furniture and houselinen to its descendants than the last. His economic
portrait of Mughal India was influenced by a 16th-century survey by Abu
Fazl, vizier to Emperor Akbar. His estimates of Japan’s population relied
on the annual register of religious affiliation, brought in after the
Portuguese were expelled and Christianity outlawed in 1587. One of his
students, Bart van Ark, now chief economist of the Conference Board,
says Maddison urged him to venture beyond libraries and statistical
offices. Even a painting in a museum might provide some clue to a
country’s standard of living centuries before.
“There is room for two or three economic theorists in each
generation, not more,” wrote Colin Clark, one of Maddison’s
heroes. Every other economist, he added, should be content to
build knowledge by steadily laying “stone on stone”. Maddison laid
the foundations for many big thoughts. Ten days before his death
he was cited in a speech by Robert Zoellick, president of the
World Bank, declaring the end of the “third world”. Maddison’s
figures show that Asia accounted for more than half of world
output for 18 of the last 20 centuries. Its growing clout in the
world economy is, therefore, a “restoration” not a revolution.
Even as they foreshadow the rise of Asia, his numbers also help
explain the historical rise of Europe. His estimates of per head
GDP provide a useful empirical crosscheck for a grand thesis
proposed by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson
in 2005. They argued that European countries prospered after
1500 in so far as they imposed checks on monarchical power and
enjoyed access to the Atlantic Ocean, with its lucrative trade in
commodities and slaves. Maddison’s estimates also appear in
their work explaining why poor colonies became rich, and rich
colonies became poor. They conclude that sparsely populated
colonies benefited over the long run from the property rights that
European settlers brought with them. Richer, well-populated
colonies suffered from efforts to suck them dry.
Messrs Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson caution that Maddison’s
figures for the years before 1820 are “no more than educated
guesses”. Maddison freely conceded that the further back he
went, the more he had to rely on “clues and conjecture”. In an
intemperate article last year, Gregory Clark of the University of
California, Davis, described these numbers as “fictions, as real as
the relics peddled around Europe in the Middle Ages”. Credulous
economists demanded numbers, “however dubious their
provenance”, and Maddison supplied them.
Go figure
Quantification can create the illusion of precision. For example,
Maddison assumes that African GDP before 1820 remained more
or less at subsistence levels. If that is all that can be said, does it
add anything to put a number on it ($400-$425 per head)? But he
was not selling comforts to the credulous. He believed that
numbers sharpened debate. Quantification, he wrote, “is more
readily contestable and likely to be contested.” In disputing his
figures, scholars would be inspired to provide their own. Even
those who disagreed with his work would be influenced by it.
Given the length and depth of his career, it is tempting to say that
this intellectual influence is impossible to measure. But that would
be contrary to his faith in quantification. His curriculum vitae
counts 20 books and 130 articles, plus another 19 volumes that
he edited or co-authored. His work has been translated into 12
languages and two books have racked up more than 2,000
citations, according to Google Scholar. He supervised 13 doctoral
students, as well as co-founding the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre at the University of Groningen, which he
joined in 1978, and the Club des Chiffrephiles in 1990. But as
even Maddison admitted, “no sensible person would claim that
[quantification] can tell the whole story.” He was deeply fond of
numbers. And a large number were deeply fond of him.
“There is room for two or three economic theorists in each
generation, not more,” wrote Colin Clark, one of Maddison’s
heroes. Every other economist, he added, should be content to
build knowledge by steadily laying “stone on stone”. Maddison laid
the foundations for many big thoughts. Ten days before his death
he was cited in a speech by Robert Zoellick, president of the
World Bank, declaring the end of the “third world”. Maddison’s
figures show that Asia accounted for more than half of world
output for 18 of the last 20 centuries. Its growing clout in the
world economy is, therefore, a “restoration” not a revolution.
Even as they foreshadow the rise of Asia, his numbers also help
explain the historical rise of Europe. His estimates of per head
GDP provide a useful empirical crosscheck for a grand thesis
proposed by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson
in 2005. They argued that European countries prospered after
1500 in so far as they imposed checks on monarchical power and
enjoyed access to the Atlantic Ocean, with its lucrative trade in
commodities and slaves. Maddison’s estimates also appear in
their work explaining why poor colonies became rich, and rich
colonies became poor. They conclude that sparsely populated
colonies benefited over the long run from the property rights that
European settlers brought with them. Richer, well-populated
colonies suffered from efforts to suck them dry.
Messrs Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson caution that Maddison’s
figures for the years before 1820 are “no more than educated
guesses”. Maddison freely conceded that the further back he
went, the more he had to rely on “clues and conjecture”. In an
intemperate article last year, Gregory Clark of the University of
California, Davis, described these numbers as “fictions, as real as
the relics peddled around Europe in the Middle Ages”. Credulous
economists demanded numbers, “however dubious their
provenance”, and Maddison supplied them.
Go figure
Quantification can create the illusion of precision. For example,
Maddison assumes that African GDP before 1820 remained more
or less at subsistence levels. If that is all that can be said, does it
add anything to put a number on it ($400-$425 per head)? But he
was not selling comforts to the credulous. He believed that
numbers sharpened debate. Quantification, he wrote, “is more
readily contestable and likely to be contested.” In disputing his
figures, scholars would be inspired to provide their own. Even
those who disagreed with his work would be influenced by it.
Given the length and depth of his career, it is tempting to say that
this intellectual influence is impossible to measure. But that would
be contrary to his faith in quantification. His curriculum vitae
counts 20 books and 130 articles, plus another 19 volumes that
he edited or co-authored. His work has been translated into 12
languages and two books have racked up more than 2,000
citations, according to Google Scholar. He supervised 13 doctoral
students, as well as co-founding the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre at the University of Groningen, which he
joined in 1978, and the Club des Chiffrephiles in 1990. But as
even Maddison admitted, “no sensible person would claim that
[quantification] can tell the whole story.” He was deeply fond of
numbers. And a large number were deeply fond of him.
Even as they foreshadow the rise of Asia, his numbers also help
explain the historical rise of Europe. His estimates of per head
GDP provide a useful empirical crosscheck for a grand thesis
proposed by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson
in 2005. They argued that European countries prospered after
1500 in so far as they imposed checks on monarchical power and
enjoyed access to the Atlantic Ocean, with its lucrative trade in
commodities and slaves. Maddison’s estimates also appear in
their work explaining why poor colonies became rich, and rich
colonies became poor. They conclude that sparsely populated
colonies benefited over the long run from the property rights that
European settlers brought with them. Richer, well-populated
colonies suffered from efforts to suck them dry.
Messrs Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson caution that Maddison’s
figures for the years before 1820 are “no more than educated
guesses”. Maddison freely conceded that the further back he
went, the more he had to rely on “clues and conjecture”. In an
intemperate article last year, Gregory Clark of the University of
California, Davis, described these numbers as “fictions, as real as
the relics peddled around Europe in the Middle Ages”. Credulous
economists demanded numbers, “however dubious their
provenance”, and Maddison supplied them.
Go figure
Quantification can create the illusion of precision. For example,
Maddison assumes that African GDP before 1820 remained more
or less at subsistence levels. If that is all that can be said, does it
add anything to put a number on it ($400-$425 per head)? But he
was not selling comforts to the credulous. He believed that
numbers sharpened debate. Quantification, he wrote, “is more
readily contestable and likely to be contested.” In disputing his
figures, scholars would be inspired to provide their own. Even
those who disagreed with his work would be influenced by it.
Given the length and depth of his career, it is tempting to say that
this intellectual influence is impossible to measure. But that would
be contrary to his faith in quantification. His curriculum vitae
counts 20 books and 130 articles, plus another 19 volumes that
he edited or co-authored. His work has been translated into 12
languages and two books have racked up more than 2,000
citations, according to Google Scholar. He supervised 13 doctoral
students, as well as co-founding the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre at the University of Groningen, which he
joined in 1978, and the Club des Chiffrephiles in 1990. But as
even Maddison admitted, “no sensible person would claim that
[quantification] can tell the whole story.” He was deeply fond of
numbers. And a large number were deeply fond of him.
Messrs Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson caution that Maddison’s
figures for the years before 1820 are “no more than educated
guesses”. Maddison freely conceded that the further back he
went, the more he had to rely on “clues and conjecture”. In an
intemperate article last year, Gregory Clark of the University of
California, Davis, described these numbers as “fictions, as real as
the relics peddled around Europe in the Middle Ages”. Credulous
economists demanded numbers, “however dubious their
provenance”, and Maddison supplied them.
Go figure
Quantification can create the illusion of precision. For example,
Maddison assumes that African GDP before 1820 remained more
or less at subsistence levels. If that is all that can be said, does it
add anything to put a number on it ($400-$425 per head)? But he
was not selling comforts to the credulous. He believed that
numbers sharpened debate. Quantification, he wrote, “is more
readily contestable and likely to be contested.” In disputing his
figures, scholars would be inspired to provide their own. Even
those who disagreed with his work would be influenced by it.
Given the length and depth of his career, it is tempting to say that
this intellectual influence is impossible to measure. But that would
be contrary to his faith in quantification. His curriculum vitae
counts 20 books and 130 articles, plus another 19 volumes that
he edited or co-authored. His work has been translated into 12
languages and two books have racked up more than 2,000
citations, according to Google Scholar. He supervised 13 doctoral
students, as well as co-founding the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre at the University of Groningen, which he
joined in 1978, and the Club des Chiffrephiles in 1990. But as
even Maddison admitted, “no sensible person would claim that
[quantification] can tell the whole story.” He was deeply fond of
numbers. And a large number were deeply fond of him.
Go figure
Quantification can create the illusion of precision. For example,
Maddison assumes that African GDP before 1820 remained more
or less at subsistence levels. If that is all that can be said, does it
add anything to put a number on it ($400-$425 per head)? But he
was not selling comforts to the credulous. He believed that
numbers sharpened debate. Quantification, he wrote, “is more
readily contestable and likely to be contested.” In disputing his
figures, scholars would be inspired to provide their own. Even
those who disagreed with his work would be influenced by it.
Given the length and depth of his career, it is tempting to say that this
intellectual influence is impossible to measure. But that would be
contrary to his faith in quantification. His curriculum vitae counts 20
books and 130 articles, plus another 19 volumes that he edited or co-
authored. His work has been translated into 12 languages and two books
have racked up more than 2,000 citations, according to Google Scholar.
He supervised 13 doctoral students, as well as co-founding the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre at the University of Groningen, which he
joined in 1978, and the Club des Chiffrephiles in 1990. But as even
Maddison admitted, “no sensible person would claim that [quantification]
can tell the whole story.” He was deeply fond of numbers. And a large
number were deeply fond of him.
Given the length and depth of his career, it is tempting to say that this
intellectual influence is impossible to measure. But that would be
contrary to his faith in quantification. His curriculum vitae counts 20
books and 130 articles, plus another 19 volumes that he edited or co-
authored. His work has been translated into 12 languages and two books
have racked up more than 2,000 citations, according to Google Scholar.
He supervised 13 doctoral students, as well as co-founding the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre at the University of Groningen, which he
joined in 1978, and the Club des Chiffrephiles in 1990. But as even
Maddison admitted, “no sensible person would claim that [quantification]
can tell the whole story.” He was deeply fond of numbers. And a large
number were deeply fond of him.
PREPOSITIONS
What’s the fundamental difference between IN, AT, and ON?
PREPOSITIONS IN FIXED EXPRESSIONS
all timesfirst sight
the momentthe age of 15
breakfastlunchsea
arm’s lengththe same time
beginninghome
conclusioncontroldanger
favour ofgeneral
other wordscash
Germanthe news
pairsa loud voice
behalf ofaverage
a dietthe wholehorsebackthe phone
footyour ownpurposearrival
fire
AT
all timesfirst sight
the momentthe age of 15
breakfastlunchsea
arm’s lengththe same time
beginninghome
conclusioncontroldanger
favour ofgeneral
other wordscash
Germanthe news
pairsa loud voice
behalf ofaverage
a dietthe wholehorsebackthe phone
footyour ownpurposearrival
fire
AT IN
all timesfirst sight
the momentthe age of 15
breakfastlunchsea
arm’s lengththe same time
beginninghome
conclusioncontroldanger
favour ofgeneral
other wordscash
Germanthe news
pairsa loud voice
behalf ofaverage
a dietthe wholehorsebackthe phone
footyour ownpurposearrival
fire
AT IN ON
all timesfirst sight
the momentthe age of 15
breakfastlunchsea
arm’s lengththe same time
beginninghome
conclusioncontroldanger
favour ofgeneral
other wordscash
Germanthe news
pairsa loud voice
behalf ofaverage
a dietthe wholehorsebackthe phone
footyour ownpurposearrival
fire
AT
1.Did you feel differently about the UK ____________ of your stay here?2.Are you reading a book ____________? 3.Do you have a pet ____________?4.What was the most important thing in your life ____________ of 15?5.Did you talk to anyone ____________?6.Is there any object that you carry with you ____________?7.Is there anyone you know that you prefer to keep ____________?
AT
1.Did you feel differently about the UK at the beginning of your stay here?2.Are you reading a book at the moment? 3.Do you have a pet at home?4.What was the most important thing in your life at the age of 15?5.Did you talk to anyone at breakfast?6.Is there any object that you carry with you at all times7.Is there anyone you know that you prefer to keep at arm’s length?
IN
1.What’s the most expensive thing you’ve ever paid for ____________?2.Have you been following any stories ____________?3.Have you ever sworn ____________ in public?4.Do you know how to say please and thank you ____________? 5.How important is it for you to be ____________?6.Do you enjoy it in English classes when the teacher makes you work ____________?
IN
1.What’s the most expensive thing you’ve ever paid for cash?2.Have you been following any stories in the news?3.Have you ever sworn in a loud voice in public?4.Do you know how to say please and thank you in German? 5.How important is it for you to be in control?6.Do you enjoy it in English classes when the teacher makes you work pairs?
ON
•Do you ever come to university ____________?•What’s the longest amount of time you’ve ever spent ____________?•What’s the first thing you do ____________ in a new country?•Have you ever set something ____________ for fun?•How often do you see police ____________ in your country?•Would you be happy to go on holiday ____________?•____________, how much time do you spend on the phone each week?•Have you ever physically hurt another person ____________?
ON
•Do you ever come to university on foot?•What’s the longest amount of time you’ve ever spent on the phone?•What’s the first thing you do on arrival in a new country?•Have you ever set something on fire for fun?•How often do you see police on horseback in your country?•Would you be happy to go on holiday on your own?•On average, how much time do you spend on the phone each week?•Have you ever physically hurt another person on purpose?
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