OVERSIGHTANDOVERSIGHTANDOVERSIGHTANDACCOUNTABILITYMODELACCOUNTABILITYMODELACCOUNTABILITYMODEL
OVERSIGHTAND
ACCOUNTABILITYMODELASSERTINGPARLIAMENT’SOVERSIGHTROLEINENHANCINGDEMOCRACY
PreFaCe By the PresIdInG OFFICers 5
Foreword by Co-Chairpersons 6
Chapter 1: Introduction 9
1.1 ConstitutionalpreceptsguidingthevisionandmissionofParliament
1.2 Constitutionalrequirementformechanismsonoversight
1.3 CompositionandmandatesofParliament
1.4 Mandatesoffocusgroups
Chapter 2: the role of Parliament in relation to oversight and
accountability as mandated by the Constitution 15
2.1 Definingoversight
2.2 Definingaccountability
2.3 ConstitutionalprovisionsexpressingpowersandfunctionsofParliamenton
oversightandaccountability
Chapter 3: Institutional characteristics of oversight and
accountability and existing mechanisms utilised by Parliament 29
3.1 Currentmechanismsforoversightandaccountability
3.2 Toolsforoversightandaccountability
Chapter 4: new mechanisms for oversight and accountability 43
4.1 Newmechanisms
4.2 Maximisingcurrentmechanisms
4.3 Generalrecommendations
CONTENTS OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 2
Chapter 5: Procedure for amending money bills 57
5.1 TermsofreferenceofBudgetFocusGroup
5.2 Recommendations
Chapter 6: Co-ordination amongst the spheres of government on oversight 59
6.1 Co-operativegovernment
6.2 Valuesandprinciplesguidinginstitutionaloversight
6.3 Introducingtheparliamentaryoversightcycleasaguideforoversightprocesses
Chapter 7: Increasing the capacity of committees and members 65
7.1 Training
7.2 Additionalsupport
Chapter 8: Best Practice Guide 69
8.1 BestPracticeGuide(BPG)
Chapter 9: Projects Focus Group [Constitutional Landscape Governing Oversight] 71
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Auditofbodiesperformingpublicfunctions
9.3 Constitutionallandscaping
9.4 Reviewoftherules
Chapter 10: Conclusion 75
References
Annexures
Acknowledgments
CONTENTSOVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 3
MrMJMahlangu,MP MrMVSisulu,MP
PreFaCe By the PresIdInG OFFICers
ThedevelopmentoftheOversightandAccountabilityModelwasinformedbyParliament’sstrategic
visionofbuildinganeffectivepeople’sParliamentthatisresponsivetotheneedsofthepeopleandthat
isdrivenbyadesireforabetterqualityoflifeforallthepeopleofSouthAfrica.TheModelisoneofthe
toolsParliamentwillusetostrengthenitsoversightovertheexecutiveandorgansofstate.
DuringthefirstParliament(1994-1999)andthesecondParliament(1999-2004),ourfocuswason
repealingapartheid legislationandpassingnew laws in linewith the imperativesofademocratic
institution.Whilstundertakingthisprocess,Parliamentpassedcloseto1000piecesoflegislation.
Nowourfocushastochangefrompassinglegislationtooversight,includingassessingtheimpactof
thelawspassedsince1994.TheOversightModelhasbeendevelopedtoequipuswithanimproved
standardoperatingproceduretoenhancethecapacityofParliamenttodischargeitsduties.
ThisModelisaproductofrobustmulti-partydiscussions,andconsultations,aswellasintensiveresearch,
bothnationallyandinternationally.Ouraimwastobringtothetablebestpracticearoundissuesof
oversightandaccountabilityfromavarietyofsources.Parliament’scritical roleofensuringthatour
governmentremainsaccountabletothepeoplewillbeenhancedwhenallinthesecorridorsadoptthe
valuesandprinciplesoutlinedintheOversightModel.
M V sisulu, MP MJ Mahlangu, MP
SpeakeroftheNationalAssembly ChairpersonoftheNationalCouncilofProvinces
MrMJMahlangu,MP MrMVSisulu,MP
FOREwORD OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Foreword by Co-Chairpersons
TheConstitutiongivesParliamentspecificresponsibilitiesinrespectofoversightovertheExecutive.In
termsofsections42(3)and55(2)oftheConstitution,thefunctionsoftheNationalAssemblyinclude
scrutinyandoversightofexecutiveactionprovidingformechanismstoensurethatexecutiveorgans
ofstateinthenationalsphereofgovernmentareaccountabletoitandtomaintainoversightofthe
exerciseofnationalexecutiveauthorityandanyorganofstate.TheconstitutionalmandateoftheNCOP
asenshrinedinsection42(4)providesthattheNationalCouncilofProvincesrepresentstheprovinces
toensurethatprovincialinterestsaretakenintoaccountinthenationalsphereofgovernment.Itdoes
thismainlybyparticipatinginthenationallegislativeprocessandbyprovidinganationalforumfor
publicconsiderationofissuesaffectingtheprovinces.Intermsofsection92(2)membersofthecabinet
areaccountablecollectivelyand individuallytoParliamentfortheexerciseoftheirpowersandthe
performanceoftheirfunctions.
AsParliamenthadnotyetput inplacesufficientmechanismsandprocedurestofulfil itsoversight
functionsandtoholdgovernmentdepartmentsandorgansofstateaccountable,itengagedtheservices
ofaconsultantatthebeginningof1999toresearchParliament’soversightfunctions,toidentifyareas
inwhichParliamentisrequiredtoexerciseoversight,toassessexistingparliamentarymechanismsand
procedurestoholdtheExecutiveaccountableandtomakerecommendationstoimprovetheefficiency
andeffectivenessofparliamentaryoversight.ThereportoftheconsultantwassubmittedtoParliament
inJuly1999.TheJointRulesCommitteeestablishedanadhocJointSubcommitteeonOversightand
AccountabilitytoconsiderthereportandmakerecommendationstotheJointRulesCommitteeonits
findings.
Thesubcommitteeheldanumberofmeetingsandinterviewedkeyparliamentaryrole-playersbefore
presentingtheJointRulesCommitteewithitsfinalreportin2002.TheJointRulesCommitteeapproved
therecommendationscontainedinthereportandrequestedthatanimplementationplanbeconsidered
inrespectoftherecommendations.In2003,itwasdecidedtosetupaTaskTeamonOversightand
AccountabilityconsistingofmembersofbothHousestoleadtheimplementationofthesubcommittee’s
proposals.TheHouseChairpersonintheNationalAssemblyandtheHouseChairpersonintheNational
CouncilofProvincesresponsibleforoversightweretaskedwithdrivingtheprocess.
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FOREwORDOVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Thetaskteamestablishedthreefocusgroups,namelybudgetprocesses,projectsandcommittees.The
overarchingobjectivewastodevelopamodelforParliament’soversightfunctionthatwasbothinline
withthenewstrategicvisionandthatwouldproducetheresultantrealignmentofresourcestofulfil
Parliament’smandatewithgreaterefficiencyandeffectiveness.
Thereportofthetaskteam,whichsubsequentlybecameknownastheOversightandAccountability
Model,wasadoptedinprinciplebytheJointRulesCommitteeon19March2008.TheModelwas
adoptedon17February2009bytheNationalAssemblyandon19March2009bytheNationalCouncil
ofProvinces.
TheModelistheoutcomeofcontributionsbyformercolleagueswhowereinstrumentalinfacilitating
andgivingguidancetothetechnicalteamsovertheyears.TheprocessofdevelopingtheModelbegan
undertheguidanceofMrNNhleko,theHouseChairpersondealingwithoversightandaccountability
issuesintheNationalAssemblyandMrTSSetona,theHouseChairpersonintheNationalCouncilof
Provincesdealingwithoversightandaccountabilitymatters. Itwasthereaftertakenforwardbythe
NationalAssemblyHouseChairpersondealingwithInternationalRelationsandOversight,MrKOBapela,
whotogetherwithMrTSetonajointlyledtheTaskTeamuntiltheModelwasadoptedbytheJointRules
Committee.Whenthemodelwasreferredtocommittees,MrSetonacontinuedwithhisresponsibilities
ontheNCOPside,working jointlywiththeNAHouseChairpersonsforCommitteesandOversight,
MrGQMDoidgeandlaterwithMrACNel.WiththecomingintobeingofthefourthParliamentthe
responsibilityforthepublicationandimplementationoftheModelwastransferredintheNCOPtoMsN
MMagadlaandthereaftertoMrRJTau,HouseChairpersonforCommitteesandOversightintheNCOP
andonthesideoftheNationalAssembly,toMrBapela(NA),whenhebecametheHouseChairperson
forCommittees,Oversight&ICT.
C t Frolick, MP r J tau, MPHouseChairperson:Committees,OversightandICT HouseChairperson:CommitteesandOversight
NationalAssembly NationalCouncilofProvinces
Page 7
CHAPTER 1 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 8
111IntroductionIntroductionIntroduction
CHAPTER 1OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 9
CHAPTER 1: IntrOdUCtIOn
1.1 Constitutional precepts guiding the vision and mission of Parliament
Parliament’sstrategicvisionistobuildaneffectivepeople’sParliamentthatisresponsiveto
theneedsofthepeople,andthatisdrivenbytheidealofrealisingabetterqualityoflifefor
allthepeopleofSouthAfricaanditsmissionistorepresentandactasavoiceofthepeoplein
fulfillingParliament’sconstitutionalfunctionsofpassinglawsandoverseeingexecutiveaction.
BasedonthevisionandmissionofParliamentandtheconstitutionalrequirementsParliament
herebydevelopsmechanismstoguideitsworkonoversightintheformofanoversightmodel.
Historically,the1994electionsusheredinanewdemocraticorderinSouthAfrica.Theextraordinary
participationbySouthAfricansshowedthatwedesiredanendtothedivisionsofthepastanda
movetowardsestablishingasocietybasedondemocraticvalues,socialjusticeandfundamental
humanrights.Theprocessofnegotiations,whichprecededthe1994elections,resultedinthe
draftingofanewConstitution,asadoptedon8May1996bytheConstitutionalAssembly.
ThemandateofParliamentisachievedthroughpassinglegislation,overseeinggovernment
action,andfacilitatingpublicparticipationandinternationalparticipation.TheroleofParliament
includesthepromotionofthevaluesofhumandignity,equality,non-racialism,non-sexism,the
supremacyoftheConstitution,universaladultsuffrageandamulti-partysystemofdemocratic
government.Itupholdsourcitizens’politicalrights,thebasicvaluesandprinciplesgoverning
public administration, and oversees the implementation of constitutional imperatives.
Much of Parliament’s focus in the first decade of democracy was on ensuring the
transformation of South Africa’s legislative landscape, in line with the country’s first
democraticConstitution,Act108of1996. In thisprocess,Parliament’soversight function
received lessattention,andwascompoundedfurtherbytherealitythattheConstitution
dealswithParliament’slegislativeauthorityinmoredetailcomparedtoitsoversightrole.
Ingivingcredenceto its increasingly importantoversight role,Parliament’snewstrategic
vision,namelytobuildaneffectivepeople’sParliament“... that isdrivenbytheidealof
CHAPTER 1 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 10
realisingabetterqualityoflifeforallthepeopleofSouthAfrica”,underpinnedthemannerinwhich
theorganisationbeganengagingontheneedtoinstitutionalisepublicparticipationasanintegralpart
ofitsoversightfunction.Themotivationforpoliticaldelegationstoundertakethemanagementofthe
legislativeandoversightprogrammeofParliamentdemandscapacity,competenceandcollectiveaction.
1.2 Constitutional requirement for mechanisms on oversight
Againstthisbackdrop,andinthecontextofsections42(3)and55(2)oftheConstitution,aswellas
variousprovisionsthatimplyoversightfunctionsoftheNationalCouncilofProvinces,Parliamentthrough
theJointRulesCommitteeestablishedaTaskTeamonOversightandAccountabilitycomprisingmembers
ofbothHousesofParliament,whichstudiedthemandatesrelatingtooversightemanatingfromthe
Constitution.Thetaskteamestablishedthreefocusgroups,thatof,theProjectsFocusGroup,theBudget
andtheCommittees.TheobjectivewastodevelopanoversightmodelforParliamentinlinewiththe
ConstitutionandParliament’snewstrategicvision,togetherwiththerealignmentofresourcestofulfilits
mandatewithgreaterefficiency.
Themodel’sprimaryobjectiveistoprovidetheframeworkthatdescribeshowParliamentconducts
oversight.Itseekstoimproveexistingtoolsofparliamentaryoversight,streamlinecomponentsofthe
newoversightmodelwithexistingcomponents,andenhanceParliament’scapacitytofulfilitsoversight
functioninlinewithParliament’snewstrategicdirection.
Furthermore,therationalefortheOversightandAccountabilityModelwastoscrutiniseexistingpractices
and/ormechanismsusedasaprototype,somethingtobemeasuredorstandardised,andthereafter
interrogateandofferalternativesthatcouldbeutilisedinthefuture.Anoversightandaccountability
modelmustthereforecomprisethemostimportant,features,whichinclude-
• thevaluesandprinciplesbywhichParliamentconductsoversight;
• themechanismorframeworktoconductoversight;and
• theprocessesandresourcesrequiredforconductingoversight.
Themodelisnotdogmaticandwilladaptfromtimetotimedependingonthecontextandcircumstances.
CHAPTER 1OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 11
1.3 Composition and mandates of Parliament
ParliamentconsistsoftwoHouses,namelytheNationalAssembly(NA)andtheNationalCouncilof
Provinces(NCOP).Section42(3)oftheConstitutionprovidesthattheNationalAssemblyiselectedto
representthepeopleandtoensuregovernmentbythepeopleundertheConstitution.Itdoesthisby
choosingthepresident,byprovidinganationalforumforpublicconsiderationof issues,bypassing
legislation and by scrutinising and overseeing executive action. The Assembly is further required
in terms of section 55(2) to provide mechanisms to ensure that all executive organs of state in
thenationalsphereofgovernmentareaccountabletoit;andtomaintainoversightoftheexercise
ofnationalexecutiveauthority, includingtheimplementationof legislation,andanyorganofstate.
TheNationalCouncilofProvincesrepresentstheprovincestoensurethattheprovincialinterestsare
takenintoaccountinthenationalsphereofgovernmentasstatedinsection42(4)oftheConstitution.
TheCouncildoesthismainlybyparticipatinginthenationallegislativeprocessandbyprovidinganational
forumforpublicconsiderationofissuesaffectingtheprovinces.TheCouncil’sroleistoexerciseoversight
overthenationalaspectsofprovincialandlocalgovernment.Itcontributestoeffectivegovernmentby
ensuringthatprovincialandlocalconcernsarerecognisedinnationalpolicymakingandthatprovincial,
localandnationalgovernmentsworktogethereffectively.
Inaddition,Parliament-
• facilitatespublicparticipation,involvementandtransparency;
• facilitatesco-operativegovernment;
• facilitatesinternationalparticipation;and
• representstheinterestsofthepeople.
Basedonthesemandates, theConstitutionfurther requiresParliament todevelopmechanismsfor
oversight.
1.4 Mandates of focus groups
1.4.1 Projects Focus Group [Constitutional Landscape Governing Oversight]
Thetermsofreferenceofthisgroupwereto-
• conductconstitutionallandscaping;
CHAPTER 1 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 12
• conductanauditofbodiesperformingpublicfunctions;
• analysetheoversightroleofinstitutionssupportingdemocracy;and
• reviewrulesonoversight.
1.4.2 Committees Focus Group
Thetermsofreferenceofthisgroupwereto-
• draftthebestpracticeguideinrespectofoversightpracticesofcommittees;
• draftguidelinesforportfolioandselectcommitteestoallowforjointplanningandoversight
work;
• draftguidelinesonjointplanningonprotocolsforstructuredcommunicationbetweenthetwo
HousesofParliament;
• draftrecommendationsforcapacitydevelopmentofcommittees;and
• draftrecommendationsonappropriaterecord-keepingsystemsandmonitoringmechanisms
intheCommitteeSection.
1.4.3 Budget Focus Group
Thetermsofreferenceofthisgroupwereto-
• developprocedurefortheamendmentofmoneybills;and
• draftlegislationontheamendmentofmoneybills.
CHAPTER 1OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 13
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CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 00
222
THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO OVERSIGHT THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO OVERSIGHT THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAND ACCOUNTABILITY AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAND ACCOUNTABILITY AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION
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CHAPTER 2OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
CHAPTER 2: the rOLe OF ParLIaMent In reLatIOn tO OVersIGht and aCCOUntaBILIty as Mandated By the COnstItUtIOn
2.1 defining oversight
TheconventionalWestminsterviewonoversight,asinheritedbymanyformerBritishcolonies,
isoftenratheradversarialandinsomeinstancesoversightisprofessedtobethepurviewof
oppositionpoliticiansandnotthelegislatureasaninstitution.Theemphasisisplacedonthe
oversightroleoflegislatures,especiallyasitrelatestoensuringgovernmentcompliancewith
approvedpublicspending.Thetaskteamadoptedthefollowingdefinitionofoversight:
IntheSouthAfricancontext,oversightisaconstitutionallymandatedfunctionoflegislative
organsofstatetoscrutiniseandoverseeexecutiveactionandanyorganofstate.
Itfollowsthatoversightentailstheinformalandformal,watchful,strategicandstructured
scrutinyexercisedbylegislaturesinrespectoftheimplementationoflaws,theapplicationof
thebudget,andthestrictobservanceofstatutesandtheConstitution.Inaddition,andmost
importantly,itentailsoverseeingtheeffectivemanagementofgovernmentdepartmentsby
individualmembersofCabinetinpursuitofimprovedservicedeliveryfortheachievementof
abetterqualityoflifeforallcitizens.
IntermsoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionandtheJointRules,Parliamenthaspowerto
conductoversightofallorgansofstate,includingthoseatprovincialandlocalgovernmentlevel.
TheappropriatemechanismforParliamenttoconductoversightoftheseorgansofstate
wouldbethroughparliamentarycommittees.Inconductingoversight,thecommitteewould
eitherrequestabriefingfromtheorganofstateorvisittheorganofstateforfact-finding,
dependingonthepurposeoftheoversight.Thecommitteeswouldhavetoconsiderthe
appropriatemeansforconductingoversighttocoverallorgansofstate.
Oneofthemostimportantaspectsoftheoversightfunctionistheconsiderationbycommittees
ofannualreportsoforgansofstateandtheAuditor-General’sreports.
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CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
2.1.1 Functions of oversight
Theconceptofoversightcontainsmanyaspectswhichincludepolitical,administrative,financial,ethical,
legalandstrategicelements.Thefunctionsofoversightare:
• Todetectandpreventabuse,arbitrarybehaviourorillegalandunconstitutionalconductonthe
partofthegovernmentandpublicagencies.Atthecoreofthisfunctionistheprotectionofthe
rightsandlibertiesofcitizens.
• Toholdthegovernmenttoaccountinrespectofhowthetaxpayers’moneyisused.It
detectswastewithinthemachineryofgovernmentandpublicagencies.Thusitcan
improvetheefficiency,economyandeffectivenessofgovernmentoperations.
• ToensurethatpoliciesannouncedbygovernmentandauthorisedbyParliamentare
actuallydelivered.Thisfunctionincludesmonitoringtheachievementofgoalssetby
legislationandthegovernment’sownprogrammes.
• Toimprovethetransparencyofgovernmentoperationsandenhancepublictrustin
thegovernment,whichisitselfaconditionofeffectivepolicydelivery.
2.2 defining accountability
Accountabilitycanbebroadlydefinedas-
asocialrelationshipwhereanactor(anindividualoranagency)feelsanobligationtoexplainandjustify
hisorherconducttosomesignificantother(theaccountabilityforum,accountee,specificpersonor
agency).
Ghutto.S
Accountabilityisthehallmarkofmoderndemocraticgovernance.Democracyremainsclichédifthose
inpowercannotbeheldaccountable inpublic for theiractsoromissions, for theirdecisions, their
expenditureorpolicies.Historically,theconceptofaccountabilitywascloselylinkedtoaccountingin
thefinancialsense.Ithashowevermovedfarbeyonditsoriginsandhasbecomeasymbolofgood
governancebothinthepublicandprivatesectors.Accountabilityreferstoinstitutionalisedpracticesof
givingaccountofhowassignedresponsibilitiesarecarriedout.
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CHAPTER 2OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
2.2.1 Functions of accountability
Thefunctionsofaccountabilityincludethefollowing:
• Toenhancetheintegrityofpublicgovernanceinordertosafeguardgovernmentagainst
corruption,nepotism,abuseofpowerandotherformsofinappropriatebehaviour.
• Asaninstitutionalarrangement,toeffectdemocraticcontrol.
• Toimproveperformance,whichwillfosterinstitutionallearningandservicedelivery.
• Inregardtotransparency,responsivenessandanswerability,toassurepublicconfidence
ingovernmentandbridgethegapbetweenthegovernedandthegovernmentandensure
publicconfidenceingovernment.
• Toenablethepublictojudgetheperformanceofthegovernmentbythegovernmentgiving
accountinpublic.
Notwithstandingthefactthatsection55oftheConstitutionenablestheNationalAssemblytomaintain
oversight over all organs of state and section 92 which enables Parliament to hold the Cabinet
accountableoperationally,organsofstateatnationallevelandMinistersandtheirdepartmentsare
generallyheldtoaccountbyParliament.Atnationallevel,thereisdirectaccountabilitytoParliamentby
nationaldepartments,nationalpublicentitiesandnationalbodiessuchascommissions.
TheNationalAssemblydoeshoweverhavetherighttocallorgansofstateatprovincialandlocallevelto
account,butdoesnotdosooperationallyunlessthereareissuesofpublicimportance,nationalinterest
andsharedcompetencies.AccountabilitytoParliamentbyorgansofstateatprovincialandlocallevel
mustbeconductedthroughobservanceoftheIntergovernmentalFrameworkRelationsActandthe
principlesofco-operativegovernment.
WhennationaldepartmentsaccounttoParliamentbymeanswhichincludethesubmissionofreports,for
exampleannualreportsetc,Parliamentneedstobeinformedofthecompletepictureoftheperformance
ofthefunctionsreportedon.Theconsiderationoftheannualreportofthedepartmentalonemaynot
givethecompletepictureoftheperformanceofthefunctions.Thisissobecausenationaldepartments
havepublicentitiesthatareagenciesofimplementationoftheirfunctions,andtheiractivitiesmaynot
bereportedintheannualreportofthenationaldepartment.
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CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Inconductingoversightandaccountability,theprinciplesofco-operativegovernmentandintergovernmental
relationsmustbetakenintoconsideration,includingtheseparationofpowersandtheneedforallspheres
ofgovernmentandallorgansofstatetoexercisetheirpowersandperformtheirfunctionsinamannerthat
doesnotencroachonthegeographical,functionalorinstitutionalintegrityofgovernmentinanothersphere.
Theillustration(Figure1)belowdepictsthelinkagesincreatingefficiencyandensuringco-ordination
onco-operativegovernmentwhichultimatelyleadtooversightandaccountabilityatnational,provincial
andlocallevelsofgovernment.
Figure 1
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CHAPTER 2OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
2.3 Constitutional provisions expressing powers and functions of Parliament on
oversight and accountability
Therelevantconstitutionalprovisionsthatreferdirectlyandindirectlytooversightand
accountabilityarethefollowing:
Section41(2)
AnActofParliamentmustestablishorprovideforstructuresand
institutionstopromoteandfacilitateintergovernmentalrelations
andmustprovideforappropriatemechanismsandproceduresto
facilitatesettlementofintergovernmentaldisputes.
Section42(3)&(4)
(3)TheNationalAssemblyiselectedtorepresentthepeopleand
toensuregovernmentbythepeopleundertheConstitution.It
doesthisbychoosingthePresident,byprovidinganationalforum
forpublicconsiderationofissues,bypassinglegislationandby
scrutinisingandoverseeingexecutiveaction.
(4)TheNationalCouncilofProvincesrepresentstheprovinces
toensurethatprovincialinterestsaretakenintoaccountinthe
nationalsphereofgovernment.Itdoesthismainlybyparticipating
inthenationallegislativeprocessandbyprovidinganationalforum
forpublicconsiderationofissuesaffectingprovinces.
Section55(2)
TheNationalAssemblymustprovideformechanisms–
(a)toensurethatallexecutiveorgansofstateinthenational
sphereofgovernmentareaccountabletoit;and
(b)tomaintainoversightof-
(i)theexerciseofnationalexecutiveauthority,includingthe
implementationoflegislation;and
(ii)anyorganofstate.
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CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Section56
TheNationalAssemblyoranyofitscommitteesmay-
(a)summonanypersontoappearbeforeittogiveevidenceon
oathoraffirmation,ortoproducedocuments;
(b)requireanypersonorinstitutiontoreporttoit;
(c)compel,intermsofnationallegislationortherulesandorders,
anypersonorinstitutiontocomplywithasummonsorrequirement
intermsofparagraph(a)or(b);and
(d)receivepetitions,representationsorsubmissionsfromany
interestedpersonsorinstitutions.
Section66(2)
TheNationalCouncilofProvincesmayrequireaCabinet
member,aDeputyMinisteroranofficialinthenational
executiveoraprovincialexecutivetoattendameetingofthe
CounciloracommitteeoftheCouncil.
Section67
Notmorethan10part-timerepresentativesdesignatedby
organisedlocalgovernmentrepresentingthedifferentcategories
ofmunicipalitiesmayparticipateintheproceedingsoftheNational
CouncilofProvinceswhennecessary,butmaynotvote.
Section69
TheNationalCouncilofProvincesoranyofitscommitteesmay–
(a)summonanypersontoappearbeforeittogiveevidenceon
oathoraffirmation,ortoproducedocuments;
(b)requireanypersonorinstitutiontoreporttoit;
(c)compel,intermsofnationallegislationortherulesandorders,
anypersonorinstitutiontocomplywithasummonsorrequirement
intermsofparagraph(a)or(b);and
(d)receivepetitions,representationsorsubmissionsfromany
interestedpersonsorinstitutions.
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CHAPTER 2OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Section70(1)
TheNationalCouncilofProvincesmay–
(a) determineandcontrolitsinternalarrangements,proceedings
andprocedures;and
(b) makerulesandordersconcerningitsbusiness,withdueregard
torepresentativeandparticipatorydemocracy,accountability,
transparencyandpublicinvolvement.
Section89
(1)TheNationalAssembly,byaresolutionadoptedwitha
supportingvoteofatleasttwothirdsofitsmembers,mayremove
thePresidentfromofficeonlyonthegroundsof–
(a)aseriousviolationoftheConstitutionorthelaw;
(b)seriousmisconduct;or
(c)inabilitytoperformthefunctionsofoffice.
(2)AnyonewhohasbeenremovedfromtheofficeofPresidentin
termsofsubsection(1)(a)or(b)maynotreceiveanybenefitsof
thatoffice,andmaynotserveinanypublicoffice.
Section92
(2)MembersoftheCabinetareaccountablecollectivelyand
individuallytoParliamentfortheexerciseoftheirpowersandthe
performanceoftheirfunctions.
(3)MembersoftheCabinetmust…provideParliamentwithfull
andregularreportsconcerningmattersundertheircontrol.
Section93(2)
DeputyMinisters…areaccountabletoParliamentfortheexercise
oftheirpowersandtheperformanceoftheirfunctions.
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CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Section100(2)
Ifthenationalexecutiveintervenesinaprovincebyassuming
responsibilityfortherelevantobligationwhichthatprovincecannot
ordoesnotfulfil,thenationalexecutivemustsubmitawritten
noticeoftheinterventiontotheNationalCouncilofProvinceswithin
14daysaftertheinterventionbegan.Theinterventionmustendif
theCouncildisapprovestheinterventionwithin180daysafterthe
interventionbeganorbytheendofthatperiodhasnotapproved
theintervention.TheCouncilmust,whiletheinterventioncontinues,
reviewtheinterventionregularlyandmaymakeanyappropriate
recommendationstothenationalexecutive.
Section102
(1)IftheNationalAssembly,byavotesupportedbyamajority
ofitsmembers,passesamotionofnoconfidenceintheCabinet
excludingthePresident,thePresidentmustreconstitutethe
Cabinet.
(2)IftheNationalAssembly,byavotesupportedbyamajorityof
itsmembers,passesamotionofnoconfidenceinthePresident,the
PresidentandtheothermembersoftheCabinetandanyDeputy
Ministersmustresign.
Section114(2)
Aprovinciallegislaturemustprovideformechanisms–
(a)toensurethatallprovincialexecutiveorgansofstateinthe
provinceareaccountabletoit;and
(b)tomaintainoversightof-
(i)theexerciseofprovincialexecutiveauthorityintheprovince,
includingtheimplementationoflegislation;and
(ii)anyprovincialorganofstate.
Section125(4)
Anydisputeconcerningtheadministrativecapacityofaprovincein
regardtoanyfunctionmustbereferredtotheNationalCouncilof
Provincesforresolutionwithin30daysofthedateofthereferralto
theCouncil.
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CHAPTER 2OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Section133(2)&(3)
(2)MembersoftheExecutiveCouncilofaprovinceareaccountable
collectivelyandindividuallytotheprovinciallegislatureforthe
exerciseoftheirpowersandtheperformanceoftheirfunctions.
(3)MembersoftheExecutiveCouncilofaprovincemust
providetheprovinciallegislaturewithfullandregularreports
concerningmattersundertheircontrol.
Section139(2)
Ifaprovincialexecutiveintervenesinamunicipalitywhichcannotor
doesnotfulfilanexecutiveobligationbyassumingresponsibilityfor
therelevantobligationinthatmunicipality,theprovincialexecutive
mustsubmitawrittennoticeoftheinterventiontotheCabinet
memberresponsibleforlocalgovernmentaffairsandtherelevant
provinciallegislatureandtheNationalCouncilofProvinceswithin14
daysaftertheinterventionbegan.
TheinterventionmustendiftheCabinetmemberresponsiblefor
localgovernmentaffairsdisapprovestheinterventionwithin28
daysaftertheinterventionbeganorbytheendofthatperiodhas
notapprovedtheintervention,oriftheCouncildisapprovesthe
interventionwithin180daysaftertheinterventionbeganorbythe
endofthatperiodhasnotapprovedtheintervention.TheCouncil
must,whiletheinterventioncontinues,reviewtheintervention
regularlyandmaymakeanyappropriaterecommendationstothe
provincialexecutive.
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CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Section139(3)
Whentherelevantprovincialexecutiveintervenesinamunicipality
whichcannotordoesnotfulfilanexecutiveobligationby
dissolvingtheMunicipalCouncil,theprovincialexecutivemust
immediatelysubmitawrittennoticeofthedissolutiontothe
Cabinetmemberresponsibleforlocalgovernmentaffairsandthe
relevantprovinciallegislatureandtheNationalCouncilofProvinces.
Thedissolutiontakeseffect14daysfromthedateofreceiptofthe
noticebytheCouncilunlesssetasidebythatCabinetmemberor
theCouncilbeforetheexpiryofthose14days.
Section139(6)
Ifaprovincialexecutiveintervenesinamunicipalityinterms
ofsubsection(4)or(5),itmustsubmitawrittennoticeofthe
interventionto–
(a) theCabinetmemberresponsibleforlocalgovernmentaffairs;
and
(b) therelevantprovinciallegislatureandtheNationalCouncilof
Provinceswithinsevendaysaftertheinterventionbegan.
Section146(6)
AlawmadeintermsofanActofParliamentoraprovincialActcan
prevailonlyifthatlawhasbeenapprovedbytheNationalCouncilof
Provinces.
Section154(1)
Thenationalgovernmentandprovincialgovernments,bylegislative
andothermeasures,mustsupportandstrengthenthecapacityof
municipalitiestomanagetheirownaffairs,toexercisetheirpowers
andtoperformtheirfunctions.
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CHAPTER 2OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Section155(6)
Eachprovincialgovernmentmustestablishmunicipalitiesinits
provinceinamannerconsistentwiththeapplicablenational
legislationand,bylegislativeorothermeasures,must-
(a)provideforthemonitoringandsupportoflocalgovernmentin
theprovince;and
(b)promotethedevelopmentoflocalgovernmentcapacityto
enablemunicipalitiestoperformtheirfunctionsandmanagetheir
ownaffairs.
Section155(7)
Thenationalgovernment,subjecttosection44,andthe
provincialgovernmentshavethelegislativeandexecutive
authoritytoseetotheeffectiveperformancebymunicipalities
oftheirfunctionsinrespectofmatterslistedinSchedules4and
5,byregulatingtheexercisebymunicipalitiesoftheirexecutive
authority.
Section194(1)
ThePublicProtector,theAuditor-Generaloramemberofa
CommissionestablishedbythisChaptermayberemovedfrom
officeonlyon–
(a) thegroundofmisconduct,incapacityorincompetence;
(b) afindingtothateffectbyacommitteeoftheNational
Assembly;and
(c) theadoptionbytheAssemblyofaresolutioncallingforthat
person’sremovalfromoffice.
Section199(8)
Togiveeffecttotheprinciplesoftransparencyandaccountability,
multi-partyparliamentarycommitteesmusthaveoversightofall
securityservicesinamannerdeterminedbynationallegislationor
therulesandordersofParliament.
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CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Section201(3)&(4)
(3)Whenthedefenceforceisemployedinco-operationwith
thepoliceservice;indefenceoftheRepublicorinfulfilmentof
aninternationalobligation,thePresidentmustinformParliament
promptlyandinappropriatedetail.
(4)IfParliamentdoesnotsitduringthefirstsevendaysafter
thedefenceforceisemployedasenvisagedinsubsection(2),
thePresidentmustprovidetherequiredinformationtothe
appropriateoversightcommittee.
Section203
(1)ThePresidentasheadofthenationalexecutivemaydeclarea
stateofnationaldefence,andmustinformParliamentpromptlyand
inappropriatedetailof-
(a)thereasonsforthedeclaration;
(b)anyplacewherethedefenceforceisbeingemployed;and
(c)thenumberofpeopleinvolved.
(2)IfParliamentisnotsittingwhenastateofnationaldefence
isdeclared,thePresidentmustsummonParliamenttoan
extraordinarysittingwithinsevendaysofthedeclaration.
(3)Adeclarationofastateofnationaldefencelapsesunlessitis
approvedbyParliamentwithinsevendaysofthedeclaration.
Section206(9)
Aprovinciallegislaturemayrequiretheprovincialcommissionerof
theprovincetoappearbeforeitoranyofitscommitteestoanswer
questions.
Section210
Nationallegislationmustregulatetheobjects,powersandfunctions
oftheintelligenceservices,includinganyintelligencedivisionofthe
defenceforceorpoliceservice,andmustprovidefor-
(a)theco-ordinationofallintelligenceservices;and
(b)civilianmonitoringoftheactivitiesofthoseservicesbyan
inspectorappointedbythePresident,asheadofthenational
executive,andapprovedbyaresolutionadoptedbytheNational
Assemblywithasupportingvoteofatleasttwothirdsofits
members.
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CHAPTER 2OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Section216(3)&(4)
(3)Adecisiontostopthetransferoffundsduetoaprovince….
maybeenforcedimmediately,butwilllapseretrospectivelyunless
Parliamentapprovesit.
(4)Parliamentmayrenewadecisiontostopthetransferoffunds
fornomorethan120daysatatime.
Section231(2),(3)&(4)
(2)AninternationalagreementbindstheRepubliconlyafterithas
beenapprovedbyresolutioninboththeNationalAssemblyandthe
NationalCouncilofProvinces,unlessitisanagreementreferredto
insubsection(3).
(3)Aninternationalagreementofatechnical,administrativeor
executivenature,oranagreementwhichdoesnotrequireeither
ratificationoraccession,enteredintobythenationalexecutive,
bindstheRepublicwithoutapprovalbytheNationalAssembly
andtheNationalCouncilofProvinces,butmustbetabledinthe
AssemblyandtheCouncilwithinareasonabletime.
(4)AnyinternationalagreementbecomeslawintheRepublicwhen
itisenactedintolawbynationallegislation;butaself-executing
provisionofanagreementthathasbeenapprovedbyParliamentis
lawintheRepublicunlessitisinconsistentwiththeConstitutionor
anActofParliament.
Inthecontextoftheconstitutionallymandatedprovisionsofaccountabilityandoversightaslistedabove,
thechaptersbelowdetailtheexistingprocessesundertakenbytheSouthAfricanParliamenttofulfilits
constitutionaloversightandaccountabilityobligations.Thefocusisalsoplacedonthegapsincurrent
rulespertainingtooversight,andsomemechanismsarerecommendedtoaddressthesechallenges.
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CHAPTER 2 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 00
333
INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OVERSIGHT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OVERSIGHT AND INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXISTING MECHANISMS UTILISED BY ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXISTING MECHANISMS UTILISED BY ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXISTING MECHANISMS UTILISED BY PARLIAMENTPARLIAMENTPARLIAMENT
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CHAPTER 3OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
CHAPTER 3: InstItUtIOnaL CharaCterIstICs OF OVersIGht and aCCOUntaBILIty and eXIstInG MeChanIsMs UtILIsed By ParLIaMent
3.1 Current mechanisms for oversight and accountability
Parliamenthasestablishedmechanismstofulfilitsoversightandaccountabilitymandates
intermsoftheConstitutionandundertherulesestablishedbythetwoHouses,individually
and jointly. Committees can interact with civil society organisations, organised business,
expertsandprofessionalbodiesasawayofenhancingaccountabilityandcancallMinisters
anddepartmentalheadstoaccountonanyissuerelatingtoanymatteroverwhichthey
areeffectingaccountabilitywithin theambit of theprovisionsof sections56and69of
the Constitution and legislation. Current practices andoversightmechanisms include the
committeesofParliament(withtheirassociatedpractices)andplenaryprocessesaslisted
below.
3.1.1 Practices of committees to effect oversight and accountability
ThemandatesofthecommitteesareprovidedforintherulesofeachHouseandtheJoint
Rules.Committeesofferasettingwhichfacilitatesdetailedscrutinyoflegislation,oversight
ofgovernmentactivitiesandinteractionwiththepublicandexternalfactors.Consideration
of committee reports is necessary because committees work as intermediary bodies
betweeninterestgroupsandgovernmentandareanentrypointforcitizenstothework
ofParliament.Inaddition,theworkofcommitteesincludestudyvisitsthatentailphysical
inspections,conversingwithpeople,assessingtheimpactofdeliveryanddevelopingreports
foradoptionbycommitteeswhichcontainrecommendationsfortheHousestoconsider.In
exercisingoversight,committeesoftenobtainfirst-handknowledgefrompeopleengagedin
thedirectimplementationofspecificprogrammesand/orwhoaredirectlyresponsiblefor
servicedelivery.Inordertoevaluatetheworkofgovernmentfromabroaderperspective,
committeesmayinviteexpertsfromoutsidegovernmenttoprovidebackgroundknowledge
andanalysisonrelevantissues.
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CHAPTER 3 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
reports and mandates of committees
ParliamentarycommitteesareestablishedasinstrumentsoftheHousesintermsoftheConstitution,
legislation,theJointRules,RulesoftheNCOP,RulesoftheNA,andresolutionsoftheHousestofacilitate
oversightandthemonitoringoftheExecutive,andforthispurposetheyareprovidedwithprocedural,
administrativeandlogisticalsupport-theyareregardedastheengineroomsofParliament.
Parliamentary committees have various tools of oversight as listed above, including departmental
briefingsessions,annualanddepartmentalbudgetanalyses,callsforsubmissionsandpetitionsfrom
thepublic,theconsiderationofstrategicplansandannualreports,andpublichearings.
Whilstcommitteeshaveestablishedwaysofconductingtheiroversightfunctions,theirbusinessgenerally
runsparalleltogovernment’spoliticalcycle,unlesstherearespecific“adhoc”oversightfunctionsthatare
required.Inprogrammingtheiroversightactivities,theywouldthusactinaresponsive/reactivemanner.
AcommitteeconductsitsbusinessonbehalfoftheHouseandmustthereforereportbacktotheHouseon
mattersreferredtoitforconsiderationandreport.Acommitteemayalsoreportonanyothermatterwithin
thescopeofitsmandatethatitconsidersnecessaryintermsofNARule137(2)andNCOPRule102(2).
WhenacommitteereportsitsrecommendationstotheHouseforformalconsiderationandtheHouse
adoptstheCommitteereport,itgivestherecommendationstheforceofaformalHouseresolution
pursuanttoitsconstitutionalfunctionofconductingoversight.TheHousethenalsomonitorsexecutive
compliancewiththeserecommendations.
the following types of committee reports are presented to the house:
1. Legislation(intermsofsections74,75,76or77oftheConstitution);
2. Studytours;
3. Oversightactivitiesofcommittees,includingresponsestoannualreportsandfinancial
statementsofdepartments;
4. Internationalagreements;
5. Privatemembers’legislativeproposals;
6. Budgetvotes;
7. Petitions;
8. Statutoryprovisions(forexamplethefillingofvacanciesinastatutorybody);
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CHAPTER 3OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
9. Annualreportsofcommitteeactivitiesandperformanceagainsttheirstrategicplans;
10. AnymatterreferredtocommitteesforconsiderationandreportintermsofNARule137and
NCOPRule102.
OnceareporthasbeenadoptedbytheHouse,theSpeakercommunicatestherecommendationsof
theHousetotherelevantMinisterandcopiestherelevantHouseChairperson,portfoliocommittee
ChairpersonandDirector-General.TheSpeakeralsorequeststheMinistertodirecthisorherresponses
totheSpeakerforformaltabling.
TheSecretarytoParliamentcommunicateswiththeDirector-GeneralinthePresidencyonallresolutions.
Portfolio committees of the na and select committees of the nCOP
ThemandateofoversightresideswiththeNAandtheNCOPandthroughtheirrespectiverules,the
NAestablishesportfoliocommitteesandtheNCOPestablishesselectcommittees.Portfoliocommittees
mirrorportfoliosingovernmentwhilstselectcommitteesmirrortheclustersingovernment.Dueto
thefactthatcommitteesconducttheirbusinessonbehalfoftheirrespectiveHouses,theyreporttothe
relevantHouseindividuallyandseparatelyonmattersreferredtothemtoensurethateachHousemay
makeanydecisionsitdeemsnecessary.
Joint committees
JointcommitteesarecommitteesthatareestablishedintermsoftheJointRulesandhavesimilarpowers
toportfoliocommitteesandselectcommittees,exceptthattheyhavespecificmandatesrelatingto
transversalissues,suchaswomen,children,youthanddisability.
ad hoc committees
Whennecessary,Parliamentestablishesadhoccommitteestoassistinitsinvestigationoftransversal
issues.
Joint standing committees
Parliament, in accordance with the Constitution, legislation and the rules, can establish standing
committees.TwojointstandingcommitteescurrentlyexistinParliamentthroughlegislation,namelythe
JointStandingCommitteeonIntelligenceandtheJointStandingCommitteeonDefence.
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CHAPTER 3 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
specialised committees
TheNARulesandthePublicAuditAct(No25of2004)establishtheCommitteeontheAuditor-General
withamandatetomaintainoversightovertheAuditor-Generalandperformfunctionsintermsofthe
PublicAuditAct.TheJointCommitteeonEthicsandMembers’InterestsisestablishedbytheJointRules
(Rule121)toimplementtheCodeofConductforAssemblyandpermanentCouncilmembersand
developstandardsofethicalconductforAssemblyandCouncilmembers.TheCommitteeonPublic
AccountsisestablishedbytheNARules(Rule204)andistaskedwithconsideringfinancialstatementsof
allexecutiveorgansofstateandconstitutionalinstitutions,anyauditreportsissuedonthosestatements
aswellasanyreportsissuedbytheAuditor-Generalontheaffairsofanyexecutiveorganofstateor
otherpublicbodiesoranyotherfinancialstatementsorreportsreferredtothecommitteeintermsof
therules.
3.1.2 Plenary processes for effecting oversight and accountability
Budget Votes
Budget votes occur when the Minister of Finance announces the budget projections for the next
financialyear,aswellasthebudgetvotesofeachMinister(department).IntheBudgettheMinisterof
Financesetsouthowmuchmoneythegovernmentwillspendinthefollowingyear.Parliamentmust
approvetheBudget.SubsequenttothepresentationoftheBudgetbytheMinisterofFinance,each
parliamentarycommitteehashearingswiththegovernmentdepartmentoverwhichthatcommittee
exercisesoversightandcanalsocheckwhetherthedepartmentkeptthepromisesofthepreviousyear
andspenttaxpayers’moneyproperly.ThebudgetvotesaredebatedintheNationalAssemblyandthe
NationalCouncilofProvincesoncecommitteeshavefinisheddiscussingthedifferentbudgetvotes.
Questions
Section92of the Constitution stipulates thatmembers of the Cabinet are accountable collectively
andindividuallytoParliamentfortheexerciseoftheirpowersandtheperformanceoftheirfunctions.
Theprocedureofputtingquestionsto theExecutive isoneof theways inwhichParliamentholds
theExecutivetoaccount.QuestionscanbeputfororalorwrittenreplytothePresident,theDeputy
PresidentandtheCabinetMinistersonmattersforwhichtheyareresponsible.Questiontimeaffords
membersofParliamenttheopportunitytoquestionmembersoftheExecutiveonservicedelivery,policy
andotherexecutiveactiononbehalfofboththeirpoliticalpartiesandtheelectorate.
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CHAPTER 3OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Members’ statementsThisistheprocesswherebymembersofParliamentareaffordedtheopportunitytomakestatementsonanymatterintheHouse.
statements by Cabinet membersMinistersmaymakefactualorpolicystatementsinrelationtogovernmentpolicy,executiveactionandothersimilarmattersofwhichtheAssemblyshouldbeinformed.TheMinisteraskstheSpeakerfortheopportunitytomakesuchastatement,whichshouldnotbelongerthan20minutes. notices of motionMotionsareoneofthemechanismsavailabletomembersofallpoliticalpartieswhichcanbeusedtohelpfulfiltheiroversightresponsibilitiesinParliamentbybringingissuestoParliamentfordebate.Noticemustbegivenofamotionunlessitisbywayofanamendmenttoadraftresolution,raisingapointoforderoraquestionofprivilege,thepostponementordischargeoforgivingprecedencetoanorderfortheday,referringabilltoacommittee,theproposalofadraftresolutiononthereportofacommitteeimmediatelyafteradebateonthereporthasbeenconcluded,orinregardtowhichnoticeisdispensedwithbytheunanimousconcurrenceofallthememberspresent.NoticemustbegivenofeverymotionsinceinprincipletheHousemustbeinformedinadvanceofanysubstantivemotionsothatmembersandpartieshavetimetopreparetodebateit.NoticesofmotionarethereforeavitaltoolwhichcanbeusedbymemberstobringmattersofpoliticalimportancebeforeParliamentfordebateoradecision. Motions without noticeMotionswhichrequirenoticemaybemovedwithoutnoticeprovidednosinglememberpresentobjects.ItisthereforecommonpracticeforpartiestobeconsultedbeforetheHousemeetswhenseekingtomoveamotionwithoutnotice,andtoinformthepresidingofficeroftheintentiontodoso.Motionswithoutnoticearemovedwhenthepresidingofficercallsforanyformalmotions,usuallynearthebeginningoftheday’ssitting.ThismediumallowsforconsultationbetweenpartiestoobtainconsensusonissuesthatmustbebroughttotheattentionoftheHouse. Plenary debatesPlenarydebatesareafurthermeanstobringimportantinformationtotheattentionoftheExecutiveregardingspecificgovernmentprogrammesand legislation required to improveservicedelivery. In
plenarydebates,certainmechanismsforconductingoversightareused.Theseincludequestiontime,theconsiderationofcommitteereports,showcasing,scrutinisinganddebatingtheimplementationofpolicyandbudgetvotes,members’statementsandquestionsbymembersofParliament,whichdraw
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CHAPTER 3 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
theattentionoftheExecutivetotheconcernsofmembers’constituents.
3.1.3 Use of activities and reports from state institutions supporting constitutional democracy to enhance Parliament’s oversight functions
TheseinstitutionshaveparticularmandatesasprovidedforintheConstitutionandbywayofadditionalActsofParliamentthatprescribetheirfunctionsandpowers.TheinstitutionsareindependentandsubjectonlytotheConstitutionandthelaw,andtheymustbeimpartialandmustexercisetheirpowersandperformtheirfunctionswithoutfear,favourorprejudice.Intermsofsection181(3)oftheConstitutionotherorgansofstate, through legislativemeasures,havetoassistandprotect theaforementionedinstitutionstoensuretheirindependence,impartiality,dignityandeffectiveness.
Intermsofsection181(5)theseinstitutionsareaccountabletotheNationalAssemblyandmustreportontheiractivitiesandtheperformanceoftheirfunctionstotheAssemblyatleastonceayear.Theinstitutionsare:• TheAuditor-General(AG);• TheCommissionforGenderEquality(CGE);• ThePublicProtector(PP);• TheElectoralCommission(EC);• TheSouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission(SAHRC);and• TheCommissionforthePromotionandProtectionoftheRightsofCultural,Religiousand LinguisticCommunities(CRLRightsCommission).Thetaskteamconsideredtheviewsandconcernsraisedbystateinstitutionssupportingconstitutionaldemocracyduringtheinterviewsandintheirsubmissions.Weaknesseswereidentifiedinthecurrentparliamentarymechanisms.However,concomitanttotheworkconductedbythetaskteam,Parliamentestablished the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions. Thecommittee’smandatewasbroaderthanthatofthetaskteamandasaresultitwasagreedthatdirectionwouldbeobtainedfromtheoutcomesofthatprocess.It is recommended that Parliament develop clear mechanisms to enable the reporting by stateinstitutionssupportingconstitutionaldemocracyontheiractivitiesandtheperformanceoftheirfunctions
asprescribedintheConstitutionandrelatedActsofParliament.
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CHAPTER 3OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
ThesecondrecommendationisforParliamenttoputinplaceprocessesinordertoallowthereportsto
bereferredtocommitteesforconsideration,oversight,andreportingbackonissuestoplenarysessions.
3.1.4 Other statutory institutions supporting democracy
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)
TheFFCisanadvisorybodyandhasamandatetomakerecommendationsonfinancialandfiscalmatters
toParliament,theprovinciallegislatures,andanyotherinstitutionsofgovernmentwhennecessary.
TheFFCisseparatefromgovernmentandisthereforeabletoperformimpartialchecksandbalances
betweenthethreelevelsofgovernment.Itfacilitatesco-operativegovernmentonintergovernmental
fiscalmatters.Atleast10monthsbeforethestartofeachfinancialyear,theCommissionmustsubmit
recommendationsforthatfinancialyeartobothHousesofParliamentandtheprovinciallegislatures,
withparticularregardto:
• Anequitabledivisionofrevenueraisednationally,amongstthenational,provincialandlocal
spheresofgovernment;
• Thedeterminationoftheequitableshareofeachprovincewhenrevenueisdividedbetween
thenineprovinces;and
• Anyotherallocationstoprovinces,localgovernmentormunicipalitiesfromthenational
government’sshareofthatrevenue,andanyconditionsonwhichthoseallocationsshouldbe
made.
national youth Commission (nyC)
TheNationalYouthCommissionisastatutorybodyofgovernmentestablishedthroughtheNational
YouthCommissionAct,No19of1996.TheCommissionconsistsoffivefull-timemembers,fivepart-
timemembersandninecommissioners,nominatedbyPremiersofeachprovinceandappointedat
nationallevel.TheNationalYouthPolicyhasbeendesignedtoaddressthemajorneeds,challengesand
opportunitiesofyoungmenandwomen.
Pan south african Language Board (Pansalb)
ThepurposeofthePanSouthAfricanLanguageBoardistopromotemultilingualisminSouthAfricaby:
• creatingtheconditionsforthedevelopmentandequaluseofallofficiallanguages;
• fosteringrespectforandencouragingtheuseofotherlanguagesinthecountry;and
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CHAPTER 3 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
• encouragingthebestuseofthecountry’slinguisticresourcestoenableSouthAfricanstofree themselves from all forms of linguistic discrimination, domination and division, and to enablethemtoexerciseappropriatelinguisticchoicesfortheirownwell–being,aswellasfor
nationaldevelopment.
Public service Commission (PsC)
ThePSCderivesitsmandatefromsections195and196oftheConstitution.ThePSCistaskedand
empowered,amongstothers,toinvestigate,monitorandevaluatetheorganisationandadministration
of thepublicservice.Thismandatealsoentails theevaluationofachievements,or lack thereof,of
governmentprogrammes.ThePSCalsohasanobligationtopromotemeasuresthatwillensureeffective
andefficientperformancewithinthepublicserviceandtopromotebasicvaluesandprinciplesofpublic
administration,assetoutintheConstitution,throughoutthepublicservice.
Independent Communications authority of south africa (Icasa)
TheIndependentCommunicationsAuthorityofSouthAfricaderivesitsmandatefromseveralstatutes:
TheIndependentCommunicationsAuthorityofSouthAfricaActof2005,theIndependentBroadcasting
AuthorityAct,theBroadcastingActandtheSouthAfricanTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority
ActandtheIcasaAmendmentAct.TheElectronicCommunicationsActsubstantiallyamendedtheIBA
Actof1993andtheBroadcastingActof1999.TheAuthorityregulatesthetelecommunicationsand
broadcastingindustriesinthepublicinterest.Itskeyfunctionsareto:
• makeregulationsandpoliciesthatgovernbroadcastingandtelecommunications;• issuelicencestoprovidersoftelecommunicationsservicesandbroadcasters;• monitortheenvironmentandenforcecompliancewithrules,regulationsandpolicies;• hearanddecideondisputesandcomplaintsbroughtbyindustryormembersofthepublic againstlicensees• plan,controlandmanagethefrequencyspectrum;and• protectconsumersfromunfairbusinesspractices,poorqualityservicesandharmfulorinferior products.
Organs of stateAn“organofstate”isdefinedinsection239oftheConstitutionas–(a) anydepartmentofstateoradministrationinthenational,provincialorlocalsphereof
government;or
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CHAPTER 3OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
(b) anyotherfunctionaryorinstitution–
(i) exercisingapowerorperformingafunctionintermsoftheConstitutionoraprovincial
constitution;or
(ii) exercisingapublicpowerorperformingapublicfunctionintermsofanylegislation,butdoes
notincludeacourtorajudicialofficer….
Section239dividesorgansofstateessentiallyintotwocategories.Thefirstcategoryisdescriptivein
termsofwhichorgansofstatearedefinedasanydepartmentofstateoradministrationinthenational,
provincialorlocalsphereofgovernment.Thiscategoryis,webelieve,selfdefining.Forexample,in
its interpretationof thisfirstcategory, theCorderReport(1999:13) includedbodiesrepresented in
Cabinetascomprising“nationalexecutiveauthority”,whereaccountabilityisvestedatthepoliticallevel
viathedoctrineofministerialresponsibility(section92(2)).Theterms“anydepartmentofstateor
administration”canfurtherbetracedtothePublicServiceAct(No103of1994),whichrefersspecifically
tonationalandprovincial“departments”,andotherdepartments.Finally, the inclusionof theterm
“local” inthiscategory insection239mustalso logically includemunicipalities,astheseconstitute
administrativebodiesoperatinginthelocalsphereofgovernment.
Thesecondcategoryinsection239issubdivided,andfocusesontheconductoractivityoftheorganof
stateandontheempoweringprovisions.Thesetwosubcategoriesare:
• section239(b)(i):anyotherfunctionaryorinstitutionexercisingapowerorperforminga
functionintermsoftheConstitutionoranyprovincialconstitution;and
• section239(b)(ii):anyotherfunctionaryorinstitutionexercisingapublicpowerorperforming
apublicfunctionintermsofanylegislation,butdoesnotincludeacourtorajudicialofficer.
Iftheinstitutionorfunctionaryisexercisingapowerorperformingafunctionintermsofthe
Constitutionoraprovincialconstitution,thenitisanorganofstate.Thenatureofthepower
exercisedorthefunctionperformedisirrelevant.Inthiscategory,thesourceofthepoweris
thedeterminingcriterion.
AllorgansofstateinthenationalsphereofgovernmentmustaccounttotheNationalAssemblyand
theydothismainlybywayofthesubmissionofannualreports.Aspersection55(2)(b)(ii),theAssembly
haspowertoconductoversightoverallorgansofstate.
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CHAPTER 3 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
There is an increasing number of listed organs of state, of which only national organs
of state are required to submit their annual reports to Parliament as part of their
accountability to Parliament, based on sections 55(2)(a) and 69(b) of the Constitution in
thattheexecutiveorgansofstateinthenationalsphereofgovernmentaccounttoParliament.
Otherpublicbodiesandinstitutionslistedasnationalorgansofstateincludeinstitutionssuchasuniversities
andbusinessunitsorsubsidiariesofothernationalorgansofstate.Theseinstitutionsdonothavetotable
theirannualreportsinParliamentbecausetheiractivitiesarereportedonintheannualreportsofthe
mainpublicentitiestheybelongto.Forexample,IntersitePropertyManagementServices(Pty)Ltdisa
subsidiaryoftheSARailCommuterCorporationLtdandshouldbereportedonintheannualreportof
theSARailCommuterCorporationLtd.
InformationinrelationtopublicbodiesascommissionedfromtheHumanSciencesResearchCouncil
(HSRC)Reportwillbeusedasthemainsourcetoestablishwhichinstitutionsarerequiredtoreportto
Parliament.Inthisregard,Parliamentwillknowwhichinstitutionsaresupposedtotableannualreports
asrequiredbythePublicFinanceManagementActandrelatedlegislation.
ItisimportantwhendepartmentsorpublicentitiesatnationallevelaccounttoParliamentthroughthe
NationalAssemblyandwhenprovincesreporttotheNationalCouncilofProvincesthatbothHouses
areinformedofthecompletescopeofthefunctionthatthedepartmentorpublicentityisreportingon.
It isthereforerecommendedthattheperformanceoftheseotherpublicbodiesandinstitutionsbe
includedinthereportstoParliament.Ifnot,Parliamentcan,intermsofsections56(b)and69(b)ofthe
Constitution,requireoftheentitytoreporttoitinorderthatParliamenthasthecompletepictureofthe
functionreportedon.Inthisregard,themandateoftheNationalAssemblybyvirtueofsection55(2)
(b)(ii)entitlesittoexerciseoversightoverallorgansofstate.Alistofallorgansofstate,publicbodies
andinstitutionsareattachedheretoforreferencepurposestoassistportfolioandselectcommitteesto
identifywhichinstitutionsarerequiredtoreportandbeaccountabletothem.
3.2 tools for oversight and accountability
CurrentlySouthAfricahasdesignedthefollowingtoolsinrelationtooversightandaccountability.For
easeofreference,thesetoolshavebeensplitintofourcategories:Category1liststoolsofestablished
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CHAPTER 3OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
legislationand long-termplans; Category2 contains tools relating toannual,monthlyandweekly
activities;Category3listsfinancialinstruments;andCategory4relatestoissuesarisingfrominstitutions
supportingconstitutionaldemocracy.
Category 1:
• ConstitutionoftheRepublic
• Legislation
• GovernmentProgrammeofAction[5-yearplan].
Category 2:
• State-of-the-NationAddress
• Questions(writtenandoral)
• President
• DeputyPresident
• Ministers
• Members’statements
• Ministerialstatements
• DebatesintheHouse
• Mattersfromconstituencywork
• Privatemember’sbills
• Individualmember’soversight
• Committeereportsonlegislationandoversightactivities
• Committeereportsoninternationalagreements
• Departmentalstrategicplans
• Departmentalcurrentandpastannualperformanceplans
• Annualreports(includingannualfinancialstatements,statementsonprogramme
performanceandhumanresourceinformation)
• Performancecontracts
• Departmentalcompliancewithparliamentarycommitteerecommendations.
Category 3:
• BudgetSpeech
• EstimatesofNationalExpenditure(ENE)
• DivisionofRevenueBill
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CHAPTER 3 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
• EstimatesofNationalRevenue
• BudgetReview
• Ministers’budgetvotespeeches
• Departmentalbudgetvotes
• TreasuryRegulationsrelatingtostrategicplanning
• ReportsoftheAuditor-General(includingperformancereports)
• Treasuryreports(monthlyandquarterlyreports)
• AuditReports(Scopa)
• Medium-TermBudgetPolicyStatement(MTBPS)
• AdjustedEstimatesofNationalExpenditure
• IntergovernmentalFiscalRelationsreport
• PublicFinanceManagementAct(PFMA)
• Financialstatements(monthlyfinancialreportsandquarterlyperformancereports)
• StatisticsSouthAfricareports.
Category 4:
• Reportsoninvestigatedmattersofrelevancebyinstitutionssupportingconstitutionaldemocracy
(ISDs)andotherstatutoryinstitutionssupportingdemocracyforconsiderationby
Parliament.
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NEW MECHANISMS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY NEW MECHANISMS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY NEW MECHANISMS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHTAND OVERSIGHTAND OVERSIGHT
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CHAPTER 4: neW MeChanIsMs FOr OVersIGht and aCCOUntaBILIty
4.1 new mechanisms
The previous sections outlined the current parliamentary oversight and accountability
mechanismsandpractices.Thesectionsbelowhighlightpotentialmechanismstofurther
strengthenoversightandaccountability:
4.1.1 Institutional mechanisms
Notwithstandingtheexistingrulesonconferral,itisproposedthatwherecommitteesare
clusteredforoversightandotherlegislativework,theyshouldbeabletoreportjointlyon
mattersthataretransversalandfortheHousetoadoptsuchaclusterreport.
Reports and matters arising from the same delegations representing Parliament at
organisations, such as the Commonwealth ParliamentaryAssociation, Inter-Parliamentary
Union, Pan African Parliament, SADC Parliamentary Forum, Africa Caribbean and Pacific-
EuropeanUnion JointParliamentaryAssemblyandothers, shouldalsobe tabledandbe
programmedforconsiderationbytherelevantcommitteesand,wherenecessary,shouldbe
debatedintherelevantHouses.
Itisrecommendedthattherulesbeamendedtofacilitatethereferralofmattersarisingfrom
reportsofinternationalbodiestowhichParliamentisaffiliatedtocommitteesforconsideration,
wherenecessary,andfordebateintherelevantHouses.
It is recommended that sectoral parliaments such as the Women’s Parliament, Youth
Parliament,People’sAssemblyandothersuchassembliesshouldbeformallyrecognised
intherulesandthatprovisionbemadefortheirprocedures,powersandfunctionsandfor
theformalisationofrecommendationstobesubmittedtotherelevantcommittees,where
necessary,andtotherelevantHousesforconsideration.
ParliamentcurrentlyattendstospecialpetitionsthroughtheCommitteeonPrivateMembers’
LegislataiveProposalsandSpecialPetitions.Howevergeneralpetitions,representationsand
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submissionsasspecifiedinsections56and69oftheConstitutionarenotadequatelyaddressedthrough
institutionalisedmechanisms.
Sections 56 and 69 require Parliament or its committees to accept petitions, representations or
submissionsfromanyinterestedpersonsorinstitutions.Itisthereforerecommendedthatmechanisms
beputinplacetofacilitatetheprocessing,referralandguidanceonattendingtopetitions,representations
and submissions. Best practices have already been established in various provinces, including the
establishmentofpetitionsofficesandinsomeinstancesbudgetcommitteestoassistthoseoffices.
Theeffectivenessof theseoffices canbe investigatedbyParliament in theprocessof developing
mechanisms.
It isproposedthatrulesbeamendedanddevelopedtoaccommodateSub-PlenarySessionsofthe
NationalAssemblywhichwillpurporttoprovideanextendedavenueforthedebateandconsideration
ofissuesreferredtoitbytheHousewhichareofnationalconcern.Itisfurtherproposedthatresolutions
reachedand issuesarising fromthesesessionsbe tabled in theHouse forfinalconsideration. It is
recommended that consideration be afforded to the development of mediums for deliberation,
engagementanddebatesonbroaderandcomplexissuesintraditionalSouthAfricanchannelswhich
includeLekgotleng,InkundleniandBosberaad.ThiswillleadtoamoveawayfromtheWestminster
systemandplacegreaterimpetusonthetransformationofParliamentintheSouthAfricancontext.
4.1.2 Joint Parliamentary Oversight and Government assurance Committee
In identifying mechanisms for Parliament to effect its oversight role, a gap was identified which
necessitatedthatconsiderationbegiventotheestablishmentofaJointParliamentaryOversightand
GovernmentAssuranceCommittee.Thecommitteeshouldhavesomepowersgoverningtheworkand
functionofcommitteesofParliament.
Itsmainpurposeandmandatewillbetoconsideranddealwithbroader,transversalandcross-cutting
issues.Itwillfurthermorepursueallassurances,undertakingsandcommitmentsgivenbyMinisters
on the floor of the House(s) and the extent to which these assurances etc have been fulfilled.
TheInter-ParliamentaryUnionpresentedastudywhichwasacompendiumofparliamentarypractice
asitappliestooversight.ltelaboratedonabroadrangeoftoolsthatparliamentshaveattheirdisposal
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ormaywanttodevelop.Itacknowledgedthatparliamentscanestablishageneraloversightcommittee
whichco-ordinatestheoversightworkofotherpermanentcommittees.Anoversightcommitteecan
recommendthatotherpermanentcommitteesinvestigatespecificproblemsthatithasidentified.Other
permanentcommitteescanalsobringmattersbeforethegeneraloversightcommittee.
Itisrecommendedthattherulesbedevelopedtoaccommodateandfurthermoreexpressthefunctions,
powersandobjectivesoftheproposedcommittee.Therecommendedcommitteewillbeoneofthe
subcommitteesoftheJointRulesCommitteechairedjointlybydesignatedHouseChairpersonsandits
membershipwillbebasedontheissuesbeforeitwithintheclusterormulti-clustergroupofportfolio
andselectcommittees,andthereforeitwillhavearotationalmembership.Secretarialsupportwillbe
providedbytheOversightAdvisorySectionandtheTablestaffofbothHouses.
4.1.3 treaties, Conventions and Protocols - Compliance including oversight on
development aid
An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by
resolution in both Houses, unless it is an agreement of a technical, administrative or
executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession,
in which case the agreement must be tabled in the Houses within a reasonable time.
The recommendation is thatParliamentought tobe robustandproactive in thenegotiations that
are conducted relating to international agreements prior to the signing of these agreements, as
well as in relation to oversight on allocations per programme and expenditure from overseas
development aid (ODA) extended to the Republic. A mechanism needs to be established
to ensure that Parliament engages with the stakeholders involved in the negotiation teams.
It is further recommended that there ought to be a mechanism to oversee compliance with
international agreements and that this matter should form part of the programme of Parliament
foreffectingoversightandaccountability.Rule306oftheNARulesstipulateswhentheAssembly’s
approval is sought for an international agreement in terms of section 231(2) of the Constitution,
theagreementmust be submitted to the Speakerwith anexplanatorymemorandum. TheNCOP
rules donot stipulate that the agreement should be submitted to theNCOPwith an explanatory
memorandumintheinstancewheremattersofprovincialinterestsareaddressedintheagreement.
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Itisrecommendedthatwhenamatterofprovincialinterestisaddressedintheagreement,theNCOP
shouldbeprovidedwiththeagreementandanexplanatorymemorandumandfurtherthattherulesof
theNAandtheNCOPbedevelopedtoenablethepresentationofreportstoParliamentbytheExecutive
priortotheirpresentationtointernationalbodiestoenableParliamenttoassessthecomplianceaspects
inthereports.
4.1.4 Oversight advisory section
Indevelopingtheoversightmodel,theneedwasidentifiedforsupportservicesrelatingtothemonitoring
andtrackingofissuesbetweenParliamentandtheExecutive,andonallotherrelatedmatterswithin
Parliament’sbroadermandate.AnOversightandAdvisorySectionoughttobecreatedinresponseto
theneedidentified.Itsmainfunctionswillbetoprovideadvice,technicalsupport,co-ordination,and
trackingandmonitoringmechanismsonissuesarisingfromoversightandaccountabilityactivitiesof
membersofParliamentandthecommitteestowhichtheybelong.Theworkofthissectionshouldalso
includethearchivingofrelevantinformationtofacilitatetheretentionofinstitutionalmemory.
TheforeseenobjectivesoftheOversightAdvisorySectionencompassthefollowing:
• Providinginformationandadvisorysupporttoparliamentaryoversightactivitiesasan
informationmanagementsection;
• TrackingandmonitoringExecutivecomplianceinrespectofissues,thatindividualMPsraised
flowingfromconstituencywork;
• Assistingwithtracking,monitoringandfollowingupissuesraisedthroughtheParliamentary
DemocracyOffices;
• Ensuringamoreco-ordinated,integratedandholisticapproachtoparliamentaryoversight;
• Assistingwithco-ordinatingalloversight-relatedinformationgatheredthroughParliament’s
publicparticipationactivities;
• Analysingsubstantivereportsbyinstitutionssupportingconstitutionaldemocracytoadvisethe
Housesonissuesforreferraltocommitteesforconsiderationandreport;
• AssistingwithmonitoringandtrackingExecutivecompliancewithHouseresolutions;
• Assistingwithmonitoring and tracking of government assurances and commitments that
emanatefromtheflooroftheHouses;and
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• Monitoring and analysing debates, discussions and comments made by the public and
participants in thesectoralparliamentswithaviewtoadvising theHouseson issues for
consideration.
IntheestablishmentoftheOversightandAdvisorySection,thefollowingsubdivisionscanbecreated:
• FinancialScrutinyUnit,whichwilldevelopsystemsforthescrutinyoffinances,forinstance:
theplanningcyclewhichwillincludeaspectsonperformanceandexpendituretargets
fordepartmentsandspendingreviews;
• thebudgetcyclewhichwillincludeaspectsofhowgovernmentmakesitsassessmentonthe
stateoftheeconomyandhowitplanstoraiserevenuethefollowingyear;
• theestimatescyclewhichistheprocessbywhichdepartments’resourcesandcashfortheyear
isapproved;and
• thereportingcyclewhichinvolvesthereportingbydepartmentsthroughreports.
ThiswillassistthecommitteesresponsibleforFinanceandtheportfoliocommitteestoenhancetheir
oversightactivitiesandtrackingofissuesthatareaddressedinmonthlyreportstoParliamentandthose
thatwouldhavebeenraisedbytheCommitteeonPublicAccounts.
• TrackingandMonitoringUnit,whichwilladdressdecisionsintheHouse(s)andatcommittee
level, as well as issues emanating from the floor of the House(s) and from committee
reportsthatgettabledintheHouse(s).
• AdvisoryUnit,whichwillidentifyissuesfromsectoralparliaments,otherassemblies,international
bodiesandcompliancewithinternationalprotocols,treatiesandconventionsaswellas
petitions.
ItisthereforerecommendedthatParliamentmustspeedilyestablishthissectionwithfullresources,
capacityandpersonnelfortheefficientfulfilmentoftheobjectivesofoversightandaccountability.
4.1.5 reserve Bank
TheSouthAfricanReserveBankAct(No90of1989)regulatestheSouthAfricanReserveBank.Section
37oftheActrequirestheMinisterofFinanceinthecaseofnon-compliancebytheBankwiththeAct
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oranyregulationundertheActtogivenoticetotheboardofdirectorsoftheBankofnon-compliance
andtherequirementofcompliancewithinaspecifiedtime.Intheeventthatthenon-complianceis
sustained,theMinistercanapplytoadivisionoftheHighCourttocompelcompliance.Whilstsection
224(2)oftheConstitutionstipulatesthattheReserveBankisindependent,asanorganofstate,itis
accountabletoParliamentintermsofsections55and69.Theexerciseofitspowersandfunctionsand
conditionsattachedtoitmustbedeterminedbyanActofParliamentinaccordancewithsection225.In
thisregard,itisrecommendedthattheReserveBankActof1989shouldbereviewedandrevisedfor
purposesofaligningtheactwiththeConstitutioninorderthatParliamentmayexerciseoversightoverit.
4.1.6 Issues from constituency work
Inthecourseoftheirconstituencydebates,issuesofconcerntothepublicarebroughttotheattention
ofmembersofParliament.Theseissues,onceintroducedinParliament,canbeformallychannelled
throughtheparliamentaryprocessesforexecutiveresponses.
4.1.7 appointments to institutions supporting constitutional democracy and other
specialised institutions which fall under the mandate of Parliament
TheproceduralaspectsofappointmentstoChapter9institutionsandspecialisedinstitutionsareassigned
tocommittees.Afterconsideringthematter,thecommitteesreporttheirrecommendationstoParliament
foradecision.Theweaknessisthelackofco-ordinationinhandlingtheseveryimportantappointments,
andthereforemechanismsintherulesareneededtoassistParliamenttogiveeffecttothisimportant
mandate.
Itisrecommendedthatanadhoccommitteebesetuptoreceiveandhearthepresentationonthe
AuditofStatutesandmakerecommendationsthat itdeemsnecessarytothepresidingofficersfor
consideration.
4.1.8 Public participation
Theneedtohavepublicparticipationisrequiredinsection42oftheConstitution.Thetaskteamconsidered
thematterofhow thepublic canengage through involvementandparticipation inparliamentary
processes.AmidsttheresearchconductedbythetaskteamandtherecentConstitutionalCourtcaseson
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publicparticipation,thetaskteamidentifiedthattheneedforpublicparticipationandinvolvementcannot
merelybeaddressedinachapterofthemodelbutoughttobeincludedinaseparatemodelonpublic
participation,whichwillbeinterlinkedwiththeOversightandAccountabilityModel.Research,ideasand
bestpracticewillbeprovidedtothenecessaryprocessthatwillbeestablishedforthedevelopmentof
themodel.
4.1.9 sanctioning non-compliance by the executive
ItisrecommendedthatParliamentdeveloprulestoassistitfurtherinsanctioningCabinetmembersfor
non-complianceafterallestablishedexistingavenuesandprotocolshavebeenexhausted,forexample
namingtheCabinetmemberbytheSpeakeroftheNationalAssemblyortheChairpersonoftheCouncil
basedonafullexplanation.
4.2 Maximising current mechanisms
4.2.1 reporting by committees to the houses
Amechanismforevaluatingannualreportsfromgovernmentdepartmentsdoesexist.Thisisoneofthe
proceduresthroughwhichMinistersareheldtoaccount.Ministers,astheexecutiveauthorityintermsof
section65ofthePublicFinanceManagementAct(PFMA)havetotableannualreportsofdepartments
andpublicentitiesforwhichtheyareresponsiblewithinsixmonthsaftertheendofthefinancialyear
(30September).TheSpeakerimmediatelyrefersallannualreportstotherelevantportfoliocommittee
andtheCommitteeonPublicAccountsforconsiderationandreport.Latesubmissionsrequireawritten
explanationbytheMinisterprovidingreasonsforthedelay.TheCommitteeonPublicAccountsreviews
theauditedfinancial statementsand theaudit reportsof theAuditor-Generaland indicates to the
relevantportfoliocommitteewhichspecificissuestheyshouldbeawareofwithregardtooversight.The
committeehastoevaluatethoroughlythetechnicalqualityandtheperformanceinformationpresented
intheannualreport.
Membersshouldhaveaclearunderstandingoftheportfoliooverwhichtheyareconductingoversight
andwhatitistheywanttoachieve(improveservicedelivery).Therearedifferentphaseswhichleadup
tothefinalreporting,namely:
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• Oversightpreparationphase:Thisstartssixtoeightweekspriorto30Septembereachyear.Membersneedtohaveaccesstoandinterrogatedocumentswhichincludecurrentandpreviousannualreportsforcomparisonpurposes,strategicplansandEstimatesofNationalExpenditureofrelatedyears,State-of-the-NationAddress,BudgetSpeech,budgetvotespeeches,divisionofrevenueinformationandrelatedpolicydocuments,quarterlyperformancereports,previousoversightreportsandHouseresolutions.
• Oversighthearingphase:IdeallyduringthelasttwoweeksofOctobereachyear,publichearingsareconductedtogainclarity/inputintotheareasthatshouldbeaddressedintheannualreport.
• Oversightreport-writingphase:AreportforeachoftheentitiesreviewedmustbetabledintheHouse(bythesecondweekinNovember).Thereportshouldcontaincommentswith regard tocompliance,spendingpatterns,ageneralinformationsectionintheannualreport,reportedperformance,keyissuesofthepreviousyearandrecommendations.
Itisrecommendedthatasystemfortrackingresolutionsuntilthematterhasbeendealtwithoranadequateresponsehasbeenreceivedmustbeinstituted.AneedtostrengthenParliament’smechanismsforevaluatingannualreportswasidentifiedasit isacriticalmechanismthroughwhichMinistersareheldtoaccountandisdealtwithin3.1.1above.HoweverthereisaneedtoimproveonmechanismsthatwouldensurethatthereisreportingonresponsesbytheExecutiveonresolutionsadoptedbyParliament.Itisrecommendedthatthecurrentsystembeimprovedinthefollowingmanner:
• Wherearesponseisrequired,theHouseresolutionwithitsdateofadoptionmustbeappended totheOrderPaperuntilsuchresponsehasbeenreceived.TheMinister’sformalresponsemust beaddressedtotheSpeakerorChairpersonoftheCouncil.• IfnoresponseisreceivedwithinareasonabletimeorwithintheperiodspecifiedbytheHouse resolution,theHouseChairpersonshouldnotifiytheSpeakerorChairperson,whoshould thenwritetotheMinisterrequestingcompliancewithin14daysorawrittenexplanationofthe delay.
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• Intheeventofsustainednon-compliancebytheMinister,awrittencomplaintbytheSpeaker
or Chairperson may be sent to the Leader of Government Business, and in exceptional
circumstancestheMinistermaybecalledtoaccountintheHouse(e.g.duringquestiontime).
• Quarterly reports andanannual report on resolutions (by category) and compliancewith
outcomes shouldbemadeavailable to theHouses. These reports couldbeused to feed
informationintothetrackingandmonitoringmechanism.
Thisprocessdoesnotprecludethecommitteefrommonitoringexecutivecomplianceaspartof its
continuousoversightfunction.
4.2.2 debates initiated by Presiding Officers
NCOPRule84andNARule103respectivelyenablememberstorequesttheChairpersonoftheCouncil
andtheSpeakerinwritingtoallowamatterofpublicimportancetobediscussedintheindividual
Houses.ItisrecommendedthattherulesmustbeexpandedtoenabletheSpeakerandtheChairperson
oftheNCOPtoinitiatedebatesintheHouses.
4.2.3 developing specialisation for certain parliamentary committees
ThecommitteesysteminSouthAfricahasdrawnmuchguidancefromtheWestminstersystem,ashas
otherjurisdictions.However,manyjurisdictionshavetaperedtheWestminsterapproachtoaccommodate
variationsinthestructureofcommitteesbasedontheirspecificneedsandtheneedforspecialisation.
Theneedforfundamentalchangeinthecurrentmannerinwhichcommitteesexerciseoversightis
necessitatedbythefactthatSouthAfricahaspioneeredmandatoryoversightbyParliamentthroughthe
Constitution.
TheInter-ParliamentaryUnionisoftheviewthattheexistenceofspecialisedcommitteesaddsvalue
toparliamentaryworkbecausethesecommitteescanworksimultaneouslytoaddressproblemsfrom
differentangles.
Parliament should consider strongly resourcing, capacitating and developing the specialisation
of committees that are dealing with broad issues that cut across departments and ministries
inallspheresasthishasanimpactonsocietyandthenurturingofourdemocraticobjectives.This
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consideration is motivated by the type, quantity and duration of work, complexity of issues and
the need for the development of specialisation as is the case in other parliaments in theworld.
TheprogrammingofParliamentshouldprioritisereportsfortablingwhicharisefromtheworkdoneandconductedbythesecommitteesonallareasoftheirfocusforconsiderationanddecision-makingwithintheambitofenhancingoversight.Thesecommitteesoughttobegiventherighttoconsiderandinitiatedebateonsomeoftheissuestheyfindtobeofnationalconsideration,asidentifiedintheprocessoftheiroversightwork.Furthermore,thesecommitteesmustprovideannualreportswhichmustbepublishedintheAnnouncements,TablingsandCommitteeReportsdocumentaswellastabledinParliamenttoallowothercommitteestoidentifyissuesthatwillhelptheminenhancingoversightandeffectingaccountability.
ItishighlyrecommendedthatParliamentprioritisethedevelopmentofcriteriatoidentifyonanongoingbasiswhichcommitteesqualifyforstrengthenedresourcing,capacityanddevelopmentbasedonthebroadnessoftheirmandates.
4.2.4 appointment of ad hoc committees
ThecurrentsysteminParliamentofappointingadhoccommitteestoinvestigateamatterofpublicinterestiseffective.However,weneedtoensurethatissuesofpublicinterest,astheyariseandaremadeknowntoParliament,areinvestigatedthroughtheappointmentofadhoccommittees.ThiswillenhanceParliament’sroleonoversightandensurecompliancewiththeConstitutionwherewearebecomingresponsivetotheneedsofthepeopleasoutlinedinthevisionandmissionstatementofParliament.Inaddition,Parliamentought,whenitdeemsitnecessary,tobeproactiveinappointingadhoccommitteestoaddressissuesofpublicinterest.4.2.5 accountability and oversight in relation to the executive
NARule117andNCOPRule249providefortheExecutivetoreplytoaquestionforwrittenreplywithin10workingdaysofthedayforwhichthequestionwassetdownforwrittenreply.ShouldtheExecutivefailtodoso,thequestionmay,uponrequestofthememberofParliamentinwhosenamethequestionstands,beputtotheCabinetmemberintheHousefororalreplyontherelevantquestionday.NARule115(3)providesthataquestionfororalreplymaynotstandovermorethanonce.Thisisgenerallyassumedtobeaperiodof14days.Itisstillamootpointastowhathappenstoaquestionstandingover
morethanonceastherearesuchinstances,andnosanctionsinthisregardexist.
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ThereisaconstitutionalobligationontheExecutivetoaccounttoParliament(section92(2)and(3)of
theConstitution).InMarch2003,theNARulesCommitteedecidedthattheSpeakershouldwriteto
CabinetmembersandtheLeaderofGovernmentBusinesswithregardtomembersoftheCabinetnot
complyingwiththeirconstitutionalobligationsasthereisnocompulsiononamemberoftheCabinetto
respondtoaquestionotherthantheoptionofmembers’statements,motionsorarequestforadebate
onerrantmembersoftheCabinet.
ItisrecommendedthatNARule117andNCOPRule249,whichprovideatimeframefortheExecutive
torespondtoaquestionfororalreply,beamendedtoextendthetimeframeforaresponseto21days.
NotwithstandingtherightofParliamenttopassamotionofnoconfidenceinthePresidentorinthe
CabinetexcludingthePresident(Section102ofConstitution)andtheexistingmechanismsforholding
theExecutivetoaccount,itisrecommendedthatParliamentutilisetheJointParliamentaryOversight
andGovernmentAssuranceCommitteetoimplementeffectivemeasurestoensurecompliancebythe
ExecutiveintheeventthatallexistingavenuesofelicitingaresponsefromtheExecutivehavebeen
exhausted.
4.2.6 Individual member oversight
AmidstthemultifacetedandmultidimensionalworkofmembersofParliamentliestheroleofmembers
toeffectindividualoversight.Thisroleiscurrentlyperformedthroughquestions,members’statements,
motionswithoutnotice,noticesofmotion,motionsontheOrderPaper,debatesintheHouses,member-
initiateddebates,constituencywork,interventionsmadebymembers,privatemembers’legislative
proposalsandtheprocessingofbills.
PoliticalpartieshaveconstituencyofficesfromwhichthepubliccanobtaininformationonnewBillsor
discussissuesofconcernwithmembersofParliament.EachpartyrepresentedinParliamentisallocated
fundstodevelopitsownmethodofconstituentoutreach.EachmemberofParliamentisassignedby
theirpoliticalpartytoperformconstituencywork.Notwithstandingthis,membersarenotprecludedfrom
performingworkinotherconstituencies.Constituencyworkaffordsmembersthegreatestopportunity
toconductindividualoversight.Itconstitutestheclosestlevelofinteractionbetweenmembersand
thepublic,andprovidesthebestplatformfromwhichmemberscanfamiliarisethemselveswiththe
issuesconfrontingtheirconstituents.Throughthisinteraction,amembermayaddressmattersoflocal,
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provincialandnationalconcern.However,itisimportantthat,inexercisingtheiroversightrole,members
takecarenottoencroachonthejurisdictionofprovincialandlocalpoliticalrepresentativesbutrather
adheretotheprinciplesofco-operativegovernment.
Interventionsmadebyindividualmembersisoneofthemoreeffectiveformsofindividualoversight
asitempowersmemberstointeractdirectlywithdepartmentsandotherorgansofstateatnational,
provincialandlocalgovernmentlevel.MembershaveadutytoalertParliamenttoanyissueofconcern
identifiedduringsuchoversightinterventions.
Inpractice,departmentsestablishstructurestoprocessconcernsraisedbymembersofParliament,such
asdepartmentalparliamentaryliaisonofficers.TheseliaisonofficersareaccountabletotheDirector:
MinisterialServiceswithineachdepartment.Theirkeyfunctionistofacilitatecommunicationbetween
theministry,thedepartmentandmembersofParliament.Concernsraisedbymembersarereferredto
seniorofficialswithindepartments,withtheveiledthreatthatshouldthedepartmentnotrespondina
satisfactorymanner,thematterwillbebroughttotheHouseformallyattheriskofgreatembarrassment
to the department, and ultimately the Minister. If the member’s informal communication with a
departmentdoesnotyieldsatisfactoryresults,heorshehasdiscretiontocommunicateformallywith
therelevantMinistertoprovidehimorherwiththeopportunitytorectifythematterbeforeplacingit
formallybeforetheHouse.Theobservanceofthisprotocolallowsfortheservicesnottobedisrupted.Itis
recommendedthatintheinterestsofensuringgreatercommunicationonissuesarisingfrommembers’
individualoversightworkministriesdevelopguidelinesformembers’interactionandengagementwith
Ministersonissuesofpublicconcern.
4.3 General recommendations
• Parliamentshouldstrengthenanddevelopitscurrentrulestoaccommodatenewandold
mechanismsasproposedinthismodelinordertoenhanceitsoversightrole.
• Intheeventthatthenewmechanismsaboveareagreedto,therulesneedtoberealignedto
accommodatethenewmechanisms.
• It isrecommendedthattheJointRulesbeamendedtoreferto“PersonswithDisabilities”
insteadof“DisabledPersons”.
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CHAPTER 5 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 00
555
PROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT OF MONEY BILLSPROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT OF MONEY BILLSPROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT OF MONEY BILLS
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CHAPTER 5OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
CHAPTER 5: PrOCedUre FOr aMendInG MOney BILLs
5.1 terms of reference of Budget Focus Group
TheBudgetFocusGroupwasmandatedtodevelopprocedureforamendingmoneybillsand
todraftlegislationtoamendmoneybills.Thesemandateshavebeencompleted.
Theclassificationcriteriaguidingtheabovetermsfocusedonthefollowing:
• TheroleofParliamentinamendingmoneybills.Thisisagainstthebackdropin
whichtheintroductionofmoneybills isthesoleresponsibilityoftheMinisterof
Finance.TheExecutiveplaysamajorroleinthebudgetaryprocess,butthepointof
concernisthatintermsofsection77(3)oftheConstitution,anActofParliamentmust
provideforaproceduretoamendmoneybillsbeforeParliament.Themandatefrom
theJointRulesCommitteetotheBudgetProcessesFocusGroupwastodevelopa
draftbillprovidingforaproceduretoamendmoneybills.
Thefindingsofthefocusgrouptookcognisanceof-
• presentationsbyNationalTreasury;
• reportsofMsAFolscher;and
• ananalysisofthebudgetcycle.
5.2 recommendations
Thebill in draft format, as submitted,must be tabled in Parliament and referred to the
appropriatecommitteeandmustfollowthenormalparliamentaryprocess.
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Page 00
666
CO-ORDINATION AMONGST THE SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATION AMONGST THE SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATION AMONGST THE SPHERES OF GOVERNMENT ON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHTON OVERSIGHT
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CHAPTER 6OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
CHAPTER 6: CO-OrdInatIOn aMOnGst the sPheres OF GOVernMent On OVersIGht
6.1 Co-operative government
Thethreespheresofgovernmentmustconducttheiroversightandlegislativeworkwith
dueregardtoChapter3oftheConstitution,theIntergovernmentalRelationsFramework
(IGRF)andotherrelevantlegislationtoachievetheobjectivesofco-operativegovernment
andtheseparationofpowers.
TheNA,NCOP,provinciallegislaturesandmunicipalcouncilseachconducttheirfunctionswith
referencetoco-operativegovernmentasrequiredintheConstitutionandtheIntergovernmental
RelationsFrameworkAct(No13of2005).Therearehoweverfrequentmisunderstandingsin
relationtotheparametersofoversightconductedbytheNA,NCOP,provinciallegislaturesand
municipalcouncilsduetotheunco-ordinatedwayinwhichallthesebodiescarryouttheir
functions.Thischapterprovidesclarityontheroleofeachofthesefunctionalbodiesfound
intheConstitutionandlegislation.Muchdebateisstillrequiredonmechanisms/protocolsto
facilitategreaterco-operationandco-ordinationbetweenthethreespheresofgovernment.
The Constitution requires co-operative government between the three spheres of
government.Inthisregard,theparliamentaryoversightprocess,asitrelatestointeractions
withthepeopleandthegovernment,mustseektoadheretothevaluesofco-operative
government.National,provincialandlocalspheresofgovernmentmustseektopromote
theobjectivesoftheIntergovernmentalRelationsFrameworkAct,whichincludecoherent
government,theeffectiveprovisionofservices,monitoringtheimplementationofpolicyand
legislationandtherealisationofnationalpriorities.Theymustthereforetakeintoaccount
thecircumstances,materialinterestsandbudgetsofothergovernmentsandorgansofstate
inothergovernmentswhenexercisingtheirstatutorypowersorperformingtheirstatutory
functions.Inaddition,theremustbeconsultationswithotherorgansofstateinaccordance
withformalproceduresemanatingfromapplicablelegislationandacceptedconventionsas
agreedwithorgansofstateoralternativelyconsultinginthemostsuitablemanner.Actions
mustalsobeco-ordinatedwhenimplementingpolicyorlegislationaffectingthematerial
interestsofotherspheresofgovernment.
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6.2 Values and principles guiding institutional oversight
Thismodel’s primaryobjective is toprovidea framework that describeshowParliament conducts
oversight.Itseekstoimproveexistingtoolsofparliamentaryoversight,streamlinecomponentsofthe
newoversightmodelwithexistingcomponentsandenhanceParliament’scapacitytofulfilitsoversight
functioninlinewithParliament’snewstrategicdirection.
AnoversightmodelmustthereforeconsistofthreeelementsasindicatedinFigure3below:
• ThevaluesandprinciplesbywhichParliamentconductsoversight;
• Themechanismorframeworktoconductoversight;and
• Theprocessesandresourcesrequiredforconductingoversight.
Constitutionally,theNAandtheNCOPhavetheprerogativetodesigntheirowninternalarrangements,
proceedings and procedures in terms of sections 57 and 70 of the Constitution. To this end, the
ConstitutionexplicitlystatesthatinmakingrulesandordersconcerningitsbusinessbothHousesare
compelledtotakeintoaccountrepresentativeandparticipatorydemocracy,accountability,transparency
andpublicinvolvement.Inadditiontothesevalues,section195(1)alsostipulatesbasicvaluesand
principlesgoverningpublicadministrationineverysphereofgovernment.Addedtotheabovementioned
valuesareahighstandardofprofessionalethics,theefficient,economicandeffectiveuseofresources,
development-orientatedness,impartiality,fairness,equity,andresponsiveness.Thesevaluesarecaptured
andsummarisedinParliament’sstrategythatwasadoptedbybothHousesinMarch2005,asfollows:
• Constitutionality:Democraticvalues(ofhumandignity,equality&freedom),socialjusticeand
fundamentalhumanrights;
• People-centredness:Respect,integrityandservicedelivery;
• Co-operativegovernment:Co-operatingwithotherspheresofgovernment;and
• Goodgovernance:Accountabilityandtransparency,valueformoney,customerfocusand
servicequality.
6.3 Introducing the parliamentary oversight cycle as a guide for oversight processes
Parliamentaryprocessestoensurethatinstitutionalmechanismsareeffectivelyundertakenareprescribed
within the parliamentary oversight cycle. The parliamentary oversight cycle takes into cognisance
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Month Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Petitions
Constituency Work
Study Tours & Site Visits
ISD Submissions
Civil Society submissions
Strat Plans
Departmental Briefings
Pres Speech
Ministerial speeches
• media briefing
• budget speeches
Ministerial statements
Mtbps
Legislation /Policy
Assessment of Impact of
Legislation
Youth Parliament
Women’s Parliament
People’s Assembly
Annual Reports
CHAPTER 6OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
theMedium-TermExpenditure Framework cycleof theExecutive, theMedium-TermBudgetPolicy
Statement,theDivisionofRevenueAct,theannualAppropriationBillandlegislationraisingrevenue.
Annual reports, reports fromtheAuditor-General, resolutionsof theCommitteeonPublicAccounts,
committeereports,quarterlyandmonthlyreportsofNationalTreasuryareconsideredamidstthecycle
andperformancebytheExecutiveismeasuredbyacomparisonbetweentheseandtheMedium-erm
BudgetPolicyStatement,theDivisionofRevenueAct,theAppropriationBill,andlegislationraising
revenue.Ministers are accountable for the policy that underlies their budgetswhereas accounting
officersaccountforexpendingthebudget.
Figure 2belowillustratestheoversightcycleonanannualbasis:
TheoversightcyclerequiresParliamenttotakealong-termviewofoversightinordertoensureeffective
oversightofsustainabledelivery.Theparliamentaryoversightcycleprovidesameansthroughwhich
Parliamentcanmonitorgovernmentdeliveryintermsoflong-termcommitments,ratherthanfocusing
exclusivelyonannualcommitments,annualplanningandperformanceassessments.Thecyclethus
providesforcontinuityinParliament’soversightactivitiesfromyeartoyear.
CHAPTER 6 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
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Figure 3
CHAPTER 6OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
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CHAPTER 7 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
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INCREASING THE CAPACITY OF COMMITTEES AND MEMBERSINCREASING THE CAPACITY OF COMMITTEES AND MEMBERSINCREASING THE CAPACITY OF COMMITTEES AND MEMBERS
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CHAPTER 7OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
CHAPTER 7: InCreasInG the CaPaCIty OF COMMIttees and MeMBers
Thebestpracticesintheworldaresuchthatmembersofparliamentareadequatelysupported
byinstitutionstoenablethemtoperformtheirmandates.Insomeinstances,itincludesa
dedicatedsecretaryandresearcherinadditiontothatwhichisofferedtothecommitteesto
whichtheybelong.Committeesinsomeparliamentsalsohavededicatedroomsandthey
canmeetasoftenandaslongaspossible,whichtranslatesintobetterperformanceinthe
executionoftheirmandates.ThereforeitisbeingproposedthatParliamentshouldinitslifetime
progressivelyconsiderstronglyachievingonthisworldstandarddependingontheavailability
ofspaceandtheexpansionprogrammeofParliament’sinfrastructure.
7.1 training
TrainingshouldtakeplacebasedontheConstitution,rulesandrelevantpracticesinParliament
aswellasthepublicrepresentativeroleofmemberstoconductoversightandpasslegislation.
Trainingshouldbesplitintermsoftheoversightmandatesandmakinglaws.Thepersonal
developmentofmembersshouldbedealtwithinternallyinaccordancewiththeindividual
member’sinterests.
Otherareasoftrainingincludeformalacademicprogrammes,aswellas informaltraining
programmessuchasseminarsandconferences.Members’trainingshouldincorporatethe
followingcorecompetencies:
• AffirmingtheunderstandingoftheConstitution
• Affirmingtheunderstandingofallstatutesandlaws
• Proceduraltraining
• Speedreading
• Computerliteracy
• UseandapplicationoftheBestPracticeGuide
• UseandapplicationoftheOversightandAccountabilityModel
• Budgetanalysis
• Speechwriting
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CHAPTER 7 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
• Publicspeakinganddebatingskills
• Policyanalysisandengagement
• Generalknowledgeofcurrentnewsandhistoricalissues(domesticandglobal)
• Methodsofwork
• Standardoperatingprocedures
• Theseparationofpowersdoctrine
• Legislativeprocesses
• RulesofParliament
• Protocolskillsandethics
• Commitmenttoworkethicandobligations
• Skillsondevelopingpetitionstoassistthepublic
• Conformingtoethicalstandardsexpectedfromcitizens.
7.2. additional support
Membersoughttohaveadditionalsupportthattheycanaccessorutiliseinthecourseoftheirworkin
theformof:
• Content/subjectadvisersforeachcommittee;
• Dedicatedresearchersforeachcommittee;
• Apanelofexperts;
• Tertiaryinstitutions;
• Researchinstitutions;
• Civilsociety;
• Increasedcapacityforpublichearings;
• Increasedutilisationoffacilitiesandresources,forinstance,libraries,theinternetand
referencingfacilities.
Supportstafftocommitteesshouldbetrainedandcapacitatedonthefollowing:
• TheConstitutionandthelaw-makingprocess;
• Areasofspecialisation;
• Reportingandminute-takingskills;
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CHAPTER 7OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
• Generalproficiencyoflanguageuse;
• Communicationskills;
• Goodbehaviouralskills;
• Generaldiscipline;
• Parliamentaryprotocol,skillsandbasicethicalstandards.
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CHAPTER 8 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 00
888
BEST PRACTICE GUIDEBEST PRACTICE GUIDEBEST PRACTICE GUIDE
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CHAPTER 8OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
CHAPTER 8: Best PraCtICe GUIde
8.1 Best Practice Guide (BPG)
The purpose of the BPG is to capture in a single document the best practices that
have emanated from the work conducted by committees since the advent of
democracy to allow for user-friendly access to and guidelines for committees.
The BPG will include aspects on scrutinising government’s financial management and
parliamentary scrutiny of the same in the planning cycle, budget cycle, estimates cycle,
reportingcycle,efficiencyprogramme, theprivatefinance initiativeand initiativeswithan
impactonfinancialmanagementandfinancialscrutiny,includingcapabilityreviews,financial
managementreviews,regulatoryimpactassessmentsandallgovernment’saccounts.
TheBPGisbeingreviewedandwillberenamedtheManualforParliamentaryCommittees.
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CHAPTER 9 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 00
999
PROJECTS FOCUS GROUP PROJECTS FOCUS GROUP PROJECTS FOCUS GROUP [CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE GOVERNING OVERSIGHT][CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE GOVERNING OVERSIGHT][CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE GOVERNING OVERSIGHT]
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CHAPTER 9OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
CHAPTER 9: PrOJeCts FOCUs GrOUP [CONSTITUTIONALLANDSCAPEGOVERNINGOVERSIGHT]
9.1 Introduction
The Projects Focus Group had several mandates elaborated on in Chapter 1 above. The
mandatesandoutcomesofthespecificprojectsarediscussedbelow.
Thegroup,withoutexplicitlystatingitsclassificationcriteria,placeditsprimaryfocus,asnoted
aptlybyTiscornia,on:
• Theobjectandaimsofthesystem:Inlaw,modelsarebuiltaroundcomplexactivities
(precedents searching, contraposition of arguments, decision-making, legislative
planning,etc),ormodelsarebuiltaroundtheproductsoftheseactivities,suchas
legaldocuments(statutes,judicialdecisions,administrative,etc);and
• Themethod,thatistextualmodesbasedonlinguisticaspects,thedeductivemodels
oflegalknowledgeandreasoning.
Thesourcedocumentssupportinganunderstandingofaccountabilityandoversightutilisedby
thisgroupcomprisedthefollowing:
• ConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica;
• Primaryandsecondarydocumentationtodefineoversightandaccountability;and
• Rulesof(theSouthAfrican)Parliament.
9.2 audit of bodies performing public functions
Theobjectivesofthisauditwereto-
• determinethe“scope”oftheoversightandaccountabilityroleoftheNational
Assembly(inparticular),andtopresentParliamentwithanelectronicdatabasethat
capturesrelevantinformation;and
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CHAPTER 9 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
• capture information on relevant fields including full identification (i.e. contact details
of bodies), bodies exercising powers and performing functions in terms of section
239 of the Constitution, bodies receiving state funding, the legal relationship of
bodies to Parliament and the government, as well as line function departments
responsibleforbodies.
Thisprojecthasbeencompletedandthefinalreportisattachedhereto.
9.3 Constitutional landscaping
Parliament,throughtheJointRulesCommittee,wasrequiredtocompileadocumentlandscapingthe
constitutionalprovisionsdealingwiththeinterrelatedthemesofoversight,accountability,transparency
andresponsiveness,andoutlineinternationaltrends.
The Corder Report and the ad hoc Joint Subcommittee on Oversight and Accountability’s final
report map out and landscape, to a great extent, some of the constitutional provisions relating
to the interrelated themes of oversight, accountability, transparency and responsiveness. The NA
TablepublishedanAuditofStatutes,2004:GuidetoParliament’sobligationsundertheConstitution
and legislation, which maps out statutes mandating oversight. The landscaping document
thereforeprovidesaperspectiveontheseprovisions,without repeatingthemappingexercise.This
perspective can be discussed and refined for use pursuant to Parliament’s constitutional functions
relating to the interrelated themes of oversight, accountability, transparency and responsiveness.
Thisprojecthasbeencompletedandthefinalreportisattachedhereto.
9.4 review of the rules
Themodelisproposingdefiniteproposalsontherulesthatneedtobeestablishedandamendedtoeffect
changeinorderforthemodeltofinditsexpressionwithintherulesoftheNA,theNCOPandtheJointRules.
Itisrecommendedthatareviewofrulesbeconductedsubsequenttotheadoptionofthemodel.Itis
proposedthattheJointSubcommitteeonReviewoftheJointRulesmustattendtothereviewofthe
rulesoncethemodelisadopted.
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CHAPTER 9OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
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CHAPTER 10 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 00
101010101010
CONCLUSIONCONCLUSIONCONCLUSIONCONCLUSIONCONCLUSIONCONCLUSION
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CHAPTER 10OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
CHAPTER 10: COnCLUsIOn
The true test of democracy is considered the extent to which Parliament can ensure
that government remains accountable to the people by maintaining oversight of
government’s actions. Whether Parliament is indeed successful in effectively holding
the Executive accountable will ultimately depend on the extent to which committees
and individual members of Parliament actively exercise their oversight role.
Whilst anappropriate legal frameworkandadequate resources constitute criticalelements
foreffectiveparliamentaryoversightandaccountability,itisequallyimportantthatindividual
members,aswellasmembersof theExecutive,understand the rationale foraccountable
governmentandthepurposeitserves.Effectiveoversightrequiresthepoliticalwillonthepart
oftheindividualmembersofParliamenttoutilisetheoversightmechanismsandthearrayof
toolsattheirdisposaloptimally.
Conceptualmodelsarebydefinitionsimplified, ideal-type frameworks. Thisdocumentand
theaccompanyingproposedmodelstrivetopresentaframeworkwithinwhichParliament’s
oversightrolecanbestructured,soastoenhanceParliament’soversightcapacity,aswellas
bringcurrentpracticesinlinewithParliament’sstrategicpath.Thismodelwillbeaprocessthat
canenrichitselfbyadaptingtoasituationthatpermeatesfromoneparliamenttoanother.
Two critical factors for ensuring the success of thismodel is, firstly, the need to integrate
Parliament’spublicparticipationfunctionwithinitsoveralloversightmechanismand,secondly,
toprovidetheappropriatecapacity,especiallyhumanresources,tocommitteesandmembers
foritsexecution.Itisvitalthatallpublicparticipationprocessesbecomeinputstotheworkof
appropriatecommittees.
DetailedoversightpracticesalignedwiththisframeworkarecapturedintheBestPracticeGuide
onoversight currently being finalised.However, given the complex nature of Parliament’s
activitiesandthedynamicenvironmentinwhichitoperates,wewishtoechothesentiments
oftheadhocJointSubcommitteeonOversightandAccountabilitythatParliamentshouldadopt
apolicyrequiringeachnewparliamenttoassessandreviewitsoversightcapabilities,including
itsoversightmodel,atleastonceduringitsfive-yearlifespan.
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CHAPTER 10 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Inordertoimplementtheproposedmodeldecisionsarerequiredonthefollowingaspects:
• Theimmediateneedtoincreasetheresearch(andcontentspecialist)capacityofcommittees,
whichiscurrentlyunderway.
• Theimplementationofsystemstocaptureandmanageinformationwithin
committees.
• Thedevelopmentofapublicparticipationmodeltoensurethatinputsreceivedthroughpublic
participationactivitiesarechannelledtoappropriatecommittees.
• Changesinparliamentarypolicy/rulestoaccommodatethecreationofanOversightAdvisory
Sectionwithrecommendedtermsofreference.
• ContinuouscapacitydevelopmentofmembersofParliamentandsupportstafftocommittees
intermsofinformationandcommunicationstechnology,budgetingpracticesandotherskills
requiredtoenhancetheiroversightcapacity.
• OfficesofmembersofParliamentshouldalsobeaffordedadditionalhumanresourcesand
upgradedintermsoftechnologycapacity.
• TrainingofstaffinlinewiththeBestPracticeGuide.
• Theadoptionofaprocedureforexecutivecompliance.
• DedicatedcommitteeroomsneedtobeconsideredwhenParliamentexpandsitsinfrastructure.
• Parliamentcanatalaterstageconsiderthedevelopmentoffurtherlegislationrelatingto
oversight,whichwillincludeothercommitteesthatarecurrentlyregulatedbytherulesin
relationtooversightasisthecasewiththeJointStandingCommitteeonIntelligenceandthe
JointStandingCommitteeonDefence.
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CHAPTER 10OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
Page 78
REFERENCES OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
List of sources consulted
• NationalAssemblyTable.(2004)AuditofStatutes.
• NationalCouncilofProvinces.(2005)NCOPMembers’Handbook.
• ISDinterviewsreport.
• Jenkins,FS.(2005)Constitutionallandscapeoftheconstitutionalprovisionsdealingwiththe
interrelatedthemesofoversight,accountability,transparencyandresponsivenessin
respectofParliament’sfunctions(Draft1).
• Nhleko,N.(2005)OversightandAccountability:StatementofDefinition.
• Committeeworkstructureproposal.
• HSRC.(2005)Auditofpublicfundedbodies(Draft2).
• ConstitutionalExpertsInterviewReport.
• NationalTreasury.(2005)GuidelinesforLegislativeOversightthroughAnnualReports.
• DevelopmentBankofSouthernAfrica,www.dbsa.org
• GautengProvincialLegislature(GPL).(2002)ProgrammeEvaluationandBudget
Analysis:AnOversightParadigmfortheGautengLegislaturep77.
• ToolsforParliamentaryOversight.(2007)Acomparativestudyof88nationalparliaments.
• InformationServicesSection,ResearchUnit,ParliamentofSouthAfrica(2006).TheStrategic
ImperativesforSouthAfricaassetoutinthe2006StateoftheNationAddress:AnOversight
ToolforMembersandCommitteesofParliament,CapeTown,ParliamentofSouthAfrica.
• DuitlwilengB.(2005)TrendsandtendenciesintheSouthAfricanpublicmanagementand
administrationinthepost1994period,unpublishedpaper,UniversityoftheWesternCape.
• GuttoSetal.(2007)StudycommissionedbyParliament,Astudyonenhancingthestatus,role,
imageandpositioningoftheParliamentoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica.
• ConstitutionoftheRepublicofSouthAfrica,Act108of1996.
• JointRulesofParliament.
• RulesoftheNationalAssembly.
• RulesoftheNationalCouncilofProvinces.
• http://www.parliament.gov.za
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REFERENCESOVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
• Parliament’ssubmissiontotheIndependentCommissionfortheRemunerationofPublic
Office-Bearers.(2006),ProposalsonaComprehensiveStructurefortheRemunerationof
ParliamentaryPublicOffice-Bearers.
• TiscorniaD.(2000)TheMeaningofModelinHandlingLegalInformation.
AssistanceinthedraftingandinputwasobtainedfromtheHonMrKOBapela,MP;theHonMrGQM
Doidge,MP;theHonMrNMNene(MP),theHonMrTSSetona,MP;MrMBCoetzee(DeputySecretary
toParliament);MrMKMansura(SecretarytotheNationalAssembly);MrPLebeko(ClerkofthePapers);
taskteammembersandManagingforExcellence(Pty)Ltd.
anneXUres
1. Auditofbodiesperformingpublicfunctions(seewww.parliament.gov.za)
2. Constitutionallandscaping(seewww.parliament.gov.za)
tasK teaM MeMBers
• hon Mr O Bapela – Co-Chairperson;Convenor:ProjectsFocusGroup
• hon Mr G doidge – Co-Convenor:CommitteesFocusGroup
• hon Mr nM nene – Convenor:BudgetsFocusGroup
• hon Mr t setona – Co-Chairperson;Co-Convenor:CommitteesFocusGroup
• hon Ms s Botha – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr y Carrim – MemberofParliament
• hon Ms F Chohan – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr I davidson – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr r davies – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr M ellis – MemberofParliament
• hon Ms J Fubbs – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr d Gibson – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr Mt Goniwe – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr a harding – MemberofParliament
• hon Ms B hogan – MemberofParliament
• hon Ms s Kalyan – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr aC nel – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr n nhleko – MemberofParliament
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODELACkNOwLEDGMENTS
• hon Ms LL Mabe – MemberofParliament
• hon adv ZL Madasa – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr G Madikiza – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr MJ Mahlangu – MemberofParliament
• hon adv tM Masutha – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr Ms Manie – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr Jh vd Merwe – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr BJ Mkhaliphi – MemberofParliament
• hon Kgoshi ML Mokoena – MemberofParliament
• hon dr CP Mulder – MemberofParliament
• hon Ms Mn Oliphant – MemberofParliament
• hon dr PJ rabie – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr t ralane – MemberofParliament
• hon Ms s seaton – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr Ka sinclair – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr a Watson – MemberofParliament
• hon Mr VV Windvoël – MemberofParliament
• hon dr GG Woods – MemberofParliament
ACkNOwLEDGMENTSOVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
PrOJeCt teaM
• Mr M Coetzee – ProjectSponsor,DeputySecretarytoParliament
• Mrs n Keswa – Coordinator:CommitteesFocusGroup
• Mr K Mansura – Coordinator:ProjectsFocusGroup
• adv L Matyolo-dube –Coordinator:BudgetFocusGroup
• Mr G Kunnath – Manager:ProjectManagementOffice
• Ms a dowling – ProjectManager
• Ms C Malan – ProjectCoordinator
• adv Z adhikarie – TeamMember
• Ms s ally – TeamMember
• Ms J Borien – TeamMember
• dr L Gabriel – TeamMember
• Mr K hahndiek – TeamMember
• adv F Jenkins – TeamMember
• Mr B Jephthah – TeamMember
• Mr PM Lebeko – TeamMember
• Managing for excellence – TeamMember
• Ms Z Mene – TeamMember
• Mr M Philander – TeamMember
• Mr M skolo – TeamMember
• Mr M tshaiviti – TeamMember
• Mr r yako – TeamMember
ACkNOwLEDGMENTS OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
OVersIGht
and
aCCOUntaBILIty MOdeL
ASSERTINGPARLIAMENT’SOVERSIGHTROLEINENHANCINGDEMOCRACY
PUBLISHED BY: PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICADESIGN & LAYOUT: LAZOLA ZANTSI
PUBLISHED BY: PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
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