National Security Strategy – United Kingdom
Presentation to the 20th Meeting of EU Director Generals for Civil Protection
Ljubljana 19-21 May 2008
Peter TallantireCabinet OfficeUnited Kingdom
Mutual learning opportunities
Exchange of best practices:
United Kingdom:‒ National Risk Method
The Netherlands:‒ National Safety and Security Strategy
The Role of the Cabinet OfficeThe Role of the Cabinet Office
The aim of the Cabinet Office is:
‒ To make government work better
The Cabinet Office Objectives:
‒ Supporting the Prime Minister‒ Supporting the Cabinet‒ Strengthening the Civil Service
Cabinet Office Groups / Secretariats:
‒ Security, Intelligence & Resilience, Civil Contingencies, Foreign & Defence Policy, European & Global Issues, Economic & Domestic, and Ceremonial
‒ Service Cabinet and its Committees‒ Broker agreement between Departments where policy
initiatives cannot otherwise be agreed
Security Challenges
NUCLEAR WEAPONS and other WMD Stockpile of nuclear weapons
No state currently has the intent or capability to pose a direct nuclear threat to the UK but risk might emerge in the future.
TRANS NATIONAL ORGANISED CRIMEfraud, illegal drugs trade, weapons, immigration and human trafficking
Threat to legitimate livelihoods, undermine & corrupt economies, societies
& governments ; cause or exacerbate state failures leading to civil war or violent conflict. Support of terrorist
networks?
GLOBAL INSTABILITY and CONFLICT and FAILED and FRAGILE STATES
Violent and serious conflict within states Difficult to predict shocks or conflicts.
TERRORISMCONTEST strategy in place
Serious and sustained threat from violent extremists. Threat levels published. Mass
casualty impact using CBRN technology and can include CNI targets.
STATE LED THREATS TO THE UKNo state or alliance has both the
intent and the capability to threaten the UK militarily
UK subject to high levels of covert non- military activity by foreign intelligence
organisations.
CIVIL EMERGENCIES Over half the COBR activations in
2007 Ability to respond to disruptive challenges
such as FMD, pan flu, fuel shortages, power failures and extreme weather.
DRIVERS OF INSECURITY
Climate change, competition for energy, poverty / inequality, globalisation & increasing interdependence of risks.
Working Together
STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY
STRUCTURES
• JOINT PARLIAMENTARY NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
• STRENGTHEN FORWARD PLANNING
• IMPROVE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON PRIORITIES THROUGH BETTER CONNECTIONS
• NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM
• PULISH NATIONAL RISK REGISTER
CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUALS & COMMUNITIES
Individuals have essential role to play:
•BEING VIGILANT AGAINST TERRORISM
•PLANNING FOR AND TAKING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN RESPONDING TO EMERGENCIES
•PLAYING PART IN TACKLING LONGER TERM CHALLENGES
•VOLUNTEERING & DIALOGUE TO ENSURE SHARED VALUES UPHELD
National Risk Assessment Matrix
• 5 Key
• 4
•Im
pac
t
• 3
• 2
H6, H25
H26, H38, T5
T10, T18, T26
T35, T46, T59
H4, H48, T3, T4
T13, T37, T39, T41
• 1
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5
• Likelihood
Very high
High
Medium
Low
T38, H41
5
4
3
2
1
1 2 3 4 5
=
Consequences• What are the generic consequences?• Reasonable worst case warning time?• Regional variation?• Military involvement?• Interdependency?
National Resilience Planning Assumptions
Risks• What risks should drive planning?• What is the reasonable worst case,
taken across those risks
plus
Functional Planning Assumptions
Essential Services Planning Assumptions
Planning Assumptions - Functional
Human Fatalities with Infectious Disease People with Illness Human Fatalities caused by Conventional Incidents Human Casualties caused by Conventional Incidents Biological Release Radiological Environmental Contamination Radiological Release Chemical Releases Debris / Rubble Major Flooding Influx of British Nationals Infected Animals Fire and Rescue Cover
Planning Assumptions - Essential Services
Water Supply Transport Oil and Fuel Gas Electricity Telecoms Health Financial Services
The Future – Continue Building Capability
Technical:‒ Mass fatalities‒ Humanitarian Assistance‒ CBRN (Model Response)‒ Telecomms resilience
Planning‒ Flu; and …
Human:‒ The Human Component of Resilience ‒ Crisis leadership capacity‒ Professionalism through standards
Raise the Bar Catastrophic Events:
‒ Wide Area Flooding‒ ‘Black Start’
Recovery Continue Learning the Lessons (Newton, Pitt, Anderson) CCA ‘6000-mile Service’ London Olympics 2012 New or more physical capabilities The human component
‒ New/more/different procedures‒ Horizontal Mutual Aid‒ Training – especially collective.
‘Reaching Out’:‒ Citizens and their families‒ Citizens in communities
National Security Strategy The Netherlands
The first results:National Risk AssessmentMass Evacuation Task
Dick SchoofDirector-general for Public Safety and SecurityMinistry of the Interior & Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands
Ljubljana, 19 - 21 May 2008
Short background Netherlands’ Security Strategy
National Security Strategy published May 2007
There is a need for a more coordinatedand integrated approach on National Security
More complex societyIncreased dependence on complex systemsDiffuse and changing threatsInterdependence dimension of threatsInternational dimension of threats
Focus: all-hazard approach
What is National Safety & Security?
Focus on 5 vital interests:- Territorial security- Physical security- Economical security- Ecological security- Social & political stability
Scope:(Potential) disruption of societythroughout the entire security chain
National threat progress report
(short & long term horizon scanning)
National risk assessment
Advice national capabilities
Horizon scanning
Risk
AssessmentTasks
Capabilities
(planning
assumptions)
National Security Strategy
Threat/risk analysis
What do we need to do? What do we
need to have?
Which threats do we face? And what is the impact?
Policy
arrangements
National Risk Assessment
2007-2008 priority is given to:
1. Climate change
2. Polarization and radicalization
3. Certainty of the energy supply
In total 13 risk scenarios
Very unlikely Unlikely Possible Likely Very likely
E
B
A
C
D
I
III
II
Impact
Likelihood
Risk Diagram
3 Risk categories
1. High impact and highly probable:
• Flu pandemic
• Oil crisis
2. High impact but unlikely:
• Malicious disruption of electricity
• Floods
3. Low impact but highly probable:
• Polarisation and radicalisation
• National black-out electricity
Overall analysis high impact risks:
• High impact criteria:
costs
disruption common life
psychological/social impact
• Shortage vital products and services
Management of vital products and services
• In critical phase: government cannot do it alone
Self help of citizens
Shared responsibilities • Government (Central, Regional, Local) • Private sector• Citizens Cooperation with non-profit and international organizations
Dilemma’s• How to activate the private sector without financial donations?• How to raise awareness of citizens without a real time threat?•Risk communications
Mass evacuation
2 scenario’s: coast and rivers
Conclusion:
• Coast: preventive evacuation is no option
• Rivers: preventive evacuation is possible
10 actions for the future
1. Itensify preparation flu pandemic
2. Review IEA mechanism (oil crisis)
3. National operational evacuation plan
4. National strategy distribution of shortage (securing, guarding, energy, (drinking) water)
5. Research solidness communication (C2000, cell broadcast)
6. National information system (Netcentric)
7. Continuity vital infrastructure
8. Increase self helpness citizens
9. Investigation capabilities civil-military cooperation
10. Broaden mass evacuation to CBRN and forest fires
In the near future
I. End of May reports:
National Risk Assessment + Mass Evacuation Task
Council of Ministers
Advice: all information is made public
II. Follow-up international conference on national safety & security
Questionnaire: to set up a network of people (government, science, private sector) interested in issues of particular aspects of national safety & security
Analysis outcomes questionnaire will follow before the Summer
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