MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS: DESERT SHIELD/STORM -
A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH
BY
LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARY A. MAIER United States Army
DISTRIf3UTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
USAWC CLASS OF 1993
u-s. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BRRRRCRS, PA 17013-5050
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER
The views expressed in rhis paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Departmtot of Defense or any of ita ageocies.
This doccaenr may not be released ~for open publication unrfl it hss been clesred by the Appropriate mil4rz.r-- l sndce or p3vtrnment l geacy.
MILIARY POLICE OPERATIONS: DESERT SHIELD/STORM A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT
Lieutenant Colonel Mary A. Maier United States Army
Lieutenant Colonel Martin W. Andresen Project Adviser
DISTRIBUTION STATEnEm A: Approved for pUbl%C td8SAAf distribution is UdillIitd.
U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013,
ABSTRACT
AUTHOR:
TITLE:
Mary A. Maier, LTC, USA
Military Police Operations: Desert Shield/Storm A Personal Experience Monograph
FORMAT:
DATE:
Individual Study Project
21 March 1993 PAGES: 32 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
On October 14,199O the first elements of the 759th Military Police Battalion deployed from Fort Carson, Colorado to Saudi Arabia as a part of Operation Desert Shield. Throughout the next six months the battalion tested military police doctrine in all four battlefield missions areas, battlefield circulation control, area security, enemy prisoner of war operations and law enforcament, as well as their own training. Although doctrine did not always work the way it was intended it served as an excellent basis and encouraged the ingenuity and flexibility of the individual soldiers in accomplishing the mission.
CONTENTS
TITLE PAGE
I. REDEPLOYMENT 1
II. PREDEPLOYMENT 2
The Order 2 TOE Equipment 2 MKS 19 4 Non TOE Equipment 5 Personnel 6 Capstone 7 Family Support a Rear Detachment 9
III. DEPLOYMENT 11
Advance Party 11 Unit Deployment 11
IV. DESERT SHIELD 12
The Mission 12 The National Guard 13 Base Camp Operations 16 Law and Order 16 Area Security 17 Training 18 Final Preparation for War 19
V. DESERT STORM 21
THE AIR CAMPAIGN 21 Convoy Escorts 22 Rear Area Security 23 Communications Check Points 24 Movement to Final Assembly Area 26
THE GROUND CAMPAIGN 27 The Plan 27 Execution 28 Post Hostilities 30 Movement to Port 32 Redeployment 32
VI. CONCLUSION 33
iii
REDEPLOYMENT
In July 1990 the 759th Military Police Battalion of which I
was the battalion commander, was preparing to redeploy to Fort
Carson, Colorado, from Fort Amador, Panama. The battalion had
deployed four months earlier to participate in Operation Promote
Liberty, the effort to assist in rebuilding the Panamanian
government after Operation Just Cause.
The battalion's mission was to provide law and order for
Panama City, as well as role models and to assist in the training
of the newly formed Panamanian National Police Department. The
fact that only weeks before every member of the police force had
been a member of Manuel Noriega's Panama Defense Force (PDF) had
not made this an easy mission.
The normal preparation for redeployment was taking place,
which included maintenance, cleaning and load planning. The
Military Police had been in high demand over the past several
years and as such, we felt it was important to redeploy to home
station with our equipment. Therefore, we had ordered sufficient
aircraft to move both personnel and equipment back to home
station in an expeditious manner. Approximately two weeks prior
to redeployment an officer from the FORSCOM (Forces Command) 53
called to inform us that the battalion's equipment would be
redeployed by ship in an effort to cut costs.
Needless to say, this was not welcome news, as it meant our
equipment would have to be driven to the opposite side of the
isthmus, cleaned again, and loaded onto boats. Most importantly,
no one from the unit would be allowed to remain with the
equipment on the return trip. Having had previous experience
with the transport of military equipment by ship and rail, I was
sure that the end result would be an increase in lost and damaged
equipment. Likewise, the unit would be without its equipment for
30 to 60 days. The last personnel element of the battalion
closed on Fort Carson on July 30, 1990. Since the unit's
equipment was not scheduled to arrive back at home station for
some time, the battalion was granted two weeks block leave.
PREDEPLOYMENT
THE ORDER
On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi Army invaded the neighboring
country of Kuwait and by August 4th had declared it the 19th
province of Iraq. A United States delegation led by Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney landed in Jihhad, Saudi Arabia, on August 5th
to brief King Fahd on a proposed plan for the United States to
assist the Saudi military in the defense of their northern
border, which the King readily accepted.
On August 8th the first troops began deployment to Saudi
Arabia, and by August 9th, FORSCOM had refined the troop list
enough to notify the 759th Military Police Battalion that we
would be deploying to participate in Operation Desert Shield as
subordinate unit of the 16th Military Police Brigade (ABN), XVIII
Airborne Corps.
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION EQUIPMENT (TOE)
The FORSCOM Provost Marshal and G-3 began requesting
2
availability dates for the battalion. Unfortunately, the
majority of our equipment remained somewhere between Panama and
Colorado, but no one was quite sure where. Numerous traces were
placed through the Division Transportation Office (DTO) at Fort
Carson which resulted in the discovery that our equipment was in
a warehouse in New Orleans, Louisiana. In short, it had been
misrouted after being off loaded from the ship.
Once the equipment was located it was loaded onto rail cars
and eight days later, on September 12th, it arrived at Fort
Carson. As expected, several pieces of equipment were missing or
damaged. Somewhere between Panama and Colorado a forklift had
driven its tines through the middle of two crates. One crate had
contained generators of which two were destroyed; the other crate
contained an entire company's Prescribed Load List (PLL). Many of
the parts had been damaged or destroyed along with the cabinets
used to store the parts.
A complete inventory was accomplished, and the required
equipment replacement and repair procedures were instituted. A
rail load date already had been established for September 21st,
so time was limited. This placed serious constraints on what
could be ordered that would arrive in time to be loaded.
Fortunately, the 43rd CSG (Corps Support Group), our peacetime
headquarters, also had been alerted for deployment with several
elements scheduled for departure at a later date. This enabled
equipment that came in after our load out to be loaded with
the other units for later distribution in country.
3
A certain amount of equipment cross leveling from the
division military police company, which had not been alerted for
deployment, to the corps military police company was necessary.
The drawback to this cross leveling is that the division company
receives much of its support from the DISCOM and/or forward
brigades and has limited organic equipment. The corps military
police company, however, is designed to operate as a single
entity and, as such, requires a higher density of equipment. As
it was not known whether the 4th Infantry Division (MECH) would
deploy at a later date, I considered it unwise to strip the
division company of its limited resources.
M.K 19's
In addition to the normal preparation for deployment the
Force Modernization Office called asking if we wished to field
the ME 19, a 40mm Grenade Machine Gun. This weapon effectively
would triple the firepower of the companies. It could fire 60
rounds per minute with a maximum effective range of 2,212 meters.
Doctrinally, the ME 19 was developed to replace the M60
Machine Gun in corps military police companies. However, it is
not a suitable weapon for fighting in built up areas. Still I
agreed to field the weapon as long as we could retain the M60s as
well. Since Fort Carson had no need for the additional M60s.
they agreed.
The earliest available date for the mobile training team
from Fort Benning, Georgia, was September 19th, which meant that
weapons qualification fell on the same day we were scheduled for
4
rail loading. However, after two days of classroom instruction,
we were able to pack all but ten weapons which were utilized for
qualification. Those ten weapons subsequently were packed with
E Company of the 52nd Engineer Company which deployed from Fort
Carson at a later date and were delivered to us in country.
Soldier morale was noticeably enhanced by the fielding of
the ME 19. It gave them the feeling that the Army thought they
were important enough to give them the very best in equipment.
The down side to fielding a new weapons system that close to a
deployment was that there were only three days for hands on
training leaving the soldiers less familiar with the system than
they would have liked. We overcame much of the lack of
familiarization with training once in country, though we could
not fire the weapon because of the limited amount of available
ammunition.
NON TOE EQUIPMENT
After preliminary contact with the 16th Military Police
Brigade we learned that the battalion would be located in the
most primitive of areas. So, planning for soldier welfare and
comfort became a high priority. As there was no indication how
long the tour would be, planning was based on a six month
rotation.
The S-l, utilizing the morale support fund, purchased items
directly related to entertainment. She also actively solicited
local agencies to provide games, books and video tapes.
Through the post contracting officer, the battalion S-4 was
5
able to purchase a portable latrine system that provided for
maximum sanitation with minimum equipment. This system later
proved invaluable for our three-person teams that were located in
very remote areas for up to 37 days. Based on the anticipated
location of the battalion, the 4th Infantry Division (MECH)
transferred a Mobile Kitchen Trailer (MKT) to the 984th Military
Police Company. Again, this greatly enhanced our ability to
provide hot sanitary food for the units. A TOE change was
initiated to accommodate this transfer.
Personnel
Since the battalion recently had returned from the Panama
deployment, many of the normal personnel problems did not exist
to any great extent. The unit was at 100% strength with
deployable personnel. However, since the division military
police company had not deployed to Panama, there were many
soldiers anxious to deploy to Saudi. Therefore, we were able to
take care of personal problems simply by swapping out soldiers.
An immediate concern for me, personally, was whether or not
the Department of the Army or some lower level agency would
question the presence of women in combat support units,
especially in key leadership positions. Indeed, I could envision
an attempt to replace me as battalion commander, particularly
since I had lived through the fiasco of females being deployed
and redeployed during Urgent Fury. However, this did not
happen. Certainly, Operation Just Cause had helped to solidify
personnel policy concerning women. Or, perhaps just as in World
6
War II, it was realized that the overall mission could not be
accomplished by men alone.
Other personnel problems involved TOE shortages. Over the
years battalion headquarters had been downsized to the point that
they did not have adequate personnel for a 24 hour operation in
the S-3 section. Thus, additional personnel were added to ensure
that capability. Additionally, the S-2 section, which normally
was maintained at below TOE strength, was brought up to full
strength.
Initial contact with the 16th Military Police Brigade
established the fact that the battalion would consist of the
984th MP Company from Fort Carson, the 132nd MP Company, South
Carolina National Guard, and the 210th and 211th MP Companies,
North Carolina National Guard. The 210th and 211th had deployed
30 days before the battalion headquarters so there was no contact
with those units prior to our arrival in country. The 132d MP
Company was scheduled to deploy three to seven days after the
battalion headquarters, so they at least had the opportunity to
visit the battalion headquarters.
Capstone
The 759th Military Police Battalion had two Capstone
missions, one involving a European scenario, the other involving
Southwest Asia. We were capstone-aligned under two different
Army Reserve Headquarters for these missions. The 984th MP
Company was capstone-aligned with another active component
battalion and brigade which also was deploying to Saudi.
7
However, for this deployment, the 984th deployed with and was
assigned to the 759th, its peacetime headquarters. None of the
National Guard companies were in our capstone trace; therefore,
we had never had any prior contact with them.
The battalion had not served previously with the 16th MP
Brigade. Thus, it was unfamiliar with the brigade's standard
operating procedures. The 16th MP Brigade Rear immediately sent
their Field Standard Operating Procedures (FSOP) and other
pertinent information so that we could conform to their reporting
procedures. However, the failure of the Capstone system resulted
in a steep learning curve at all levels.
Family Support
Since my assumption of command the battalion had deployed
large elements on four separate occasions. Accordingly,
battalion spouses had developed a strong core group responsible
for family support. Others had learned to depend on the Family
Support Group which we always tried to ensure had a good flow of
correct information.
As I was a single commander, the executive officer's (X0)
spouse previously had provided leadership for the Family Support
Group. However, I had received a new X0 while deployed to Panama.
Major Jose Vazequer. and his wife Nancy, arrived in the battalion
about 30 days prior to our redeployment from Panama. Although
new to the unit, she stepped in and did a superb job directing
the efforts of the Family Support Group.
The importance of a strong Family Support Group, especially
during real world deployments, cannot be over emphasized. It
provides a central information point that can be trusted if
properly utilized.
Likewise, a good Family Support Group cannot be created
after a deployment notification is received; rather, the lines of
communication must be open and working on a daily basis. It is
not easy to convince spouses to participate in family support
meetings and "chains of concern" during training exercises
because they do not feel the need. However, every spouse that
does participate, learns to trusts the "chain of concern" before
a major deployment.
My experience is that family support works best on a
decentralized basis. Spouses, as well a soldiers, tend to trust
the leadership of the squad, platoon, and company, far more than
the battalion headquarters. It is not necessary that the spouses
of the chain of command be in charge. However, it is important
for every level of the chain of command not only to tacitly
approve, but enthusiastically support, the organization and
administration of the family support program.
Rear Detachment
During the Panama deployment Fort Carson had established a
provisional battalion for the stay behind units in the 759th MP
Battalion. This allowed the administration of justice,
promotions, personnel administration, as well as the day-to-day
activities, to carry on within the battalion. The Assistant
Provost Marshall served as the battalion commander. It was an
9
efficient and effective system.
Unfortunately, the deployment order for Operation Desert
Shield came with the instruction that no provisional battalions
would be formed. Since all of the battalion headquarters in the
43d Corps Support Group other than the 4th Finance Battalion
(Provisional), were deploying, the decision was made to form one
large battalion of all of the units being left behind. This left
a provisional battalion with a limited staff greatly overtaxed.
To compound the problem, the battalion commander also had to fill
the shoes of the group commander for garrison administration.
This organizational structure made it even more important to
leave a strong rear detachment officer in charge. Fortunately,
the garrison military police company commander was an extremely
mature, disciplined, and dedicated young officer. I was able to
alleviate many of the traditional personnel problems caused by
stay behind personnel pending discharge by reassigning them
directly to the garrison company. Since rear detachment OICs
have no command authority, having a company commander in that
position enabled him to exercise command and control over problem
soldiers.
It is understandable that FORSCOM did not want a provisional
battalion springing up for every battalion leaving behind 20
soldiers. However, the provisional battalion concept is an
effective means of command and control when large elements of a
battalion are being left behind.
10
DEPLOYMENT
Advance Party
On October 14, 1990, a ten member advance party departed for
Daharan, Saudi Arabia, with the express mission of setting up an
operational and logistical framework for the battalion's follow
on elements and to make initial contact with the two military
police companies already in country that would be assigned to the
battalion.
when the advance party arrived at Nelis Air Force Base in
New Jersey, one of the members fell ill and was left behind in
the Fort Dix hospital. Fortunately, it was a minor problem
involving medication which was resolved the next day. Thus,, the
entire party was on the ground and functioning by October 16th.
I had served with the 16th MP Brigade (Abn) at Fort Bragg a
short 18 months prior, and had several personal contacts within
the brigade including the brigade commander with whom I
previously had served several times. This personal relationship
greatly aided the advanced party in their mission.
Unit Deployment
On October 29, 1990, the 984th Military Police Company
departed from Peterson Air Force Base aboard a commercial
aircraft and arrived in country two days later. The unit
initially was located in an area called Cement City, the central
receiving point for incoming units.
Cement City was a large tent city with centralized feeding,
bathing, and latrine facilities. Since many units moved in and
11
out daily, with no real controls, sanitation left a great deal to
be desired. Having heard the horror stories about the disease
and other problems associated with Cement City, the advanced
party was directed to make necessary arrangements to move our
units through as quickly as possible. The ultimate measure of
success would be to not even pass through this location upon
arrival.
As the 984th arrived, they moved to Cement City only long
enough to set up tents in our desert location and unload the
ships, a total of three days. On 5 November when the
Headquarters arrived, we moved directly to our desert location,
as did all of our follow on units.
DESERT SHIELD
The Mission
The battalion
headquarters arrived in
country at 3:00 AM, November
5th and was at the base camp
by 8:00 AM. The base camp was
located about one hour north
of the Daharan-Damamm enclave
at a place called Guardian
City. Guardian City was
merely a fenced portion of a flood plain in the middle of the
desert. The base was commanded by the commander of the 1Olst
Support Group from Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
12
At 8:00 AM that morning I had my first meeting with the
brigade commander who provided me with the battalion's mission
once we were operational. We were to provide law enforcement and
area security for an area running just north of the enclave to
the southern boundary of Marine Central Command. Additionally, I
was directed to attach one company to the 24th Division and
another to the 1Olst Division. Both units being attached were
National Guard companies which had been in country for several
weeks.
National Guard
The brigade commander also informed me that the two National
Guard company commanders had been in his office recently to say
that they did not think they were capable of handling the mission
of supporting the divisions. They did not believe that division
support was a proper mission for a corps military police company,
nor were they trained to accomplish it. The brigade commander
indicated that he had dealt with the problem at the time, but
thought it was something that I should know and on which I should
quickly focus my attention. Additionally, he informed me that my
last company would be arriving in two days.
I immediately set out to meet my new company commanders and
assess the situation. The 210th MP Company was only about 10
miles from Guardian City, at King Faad Air Base, along with the
1Olst Division. The 211th MP Company, however, was located about
250 miles from Damamm with the 24th Division. In conjunction
with selected members of the staff, I spent several days on the
13
road evaluating the training, maintenance and operational level
of the two companies. Although both units had minor training
deficiencies, they were performing quite well.
The majority of the units problems centered around personnel
and pay issues; there was no system to integrate the Reserve
Components into the active duty finance and personnel systems.
These problems plagued us throughout the deployment and caused
some morale problems within these units. Before another
reservist is again called to active duty, there should be a
program to integrate them into the SIDPERS and finance system.
On November 8th the 132nd MP Company arrived in country and
was collocated with the 984th and the battalion headquarters. It
was quite evident from the beginning that members of the 132nd
did not want to be in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, there were
discipline and morale problems almost immediately.
I was awakened their first night in country by the company
commander announcing that his driver had lost his weapon. He had
laid it down while shaving at 1 A.M. and then walked away leaving
the weapon behind. Although the weapon was recovered a couple of
hours later, the attitude of the company during the search was
not one of cooperation and teamwork. Unit personnel did not
understand why they had to be up in the middle of the night
looking for the weapon. They felt that the person who lost it
should be the only one involved in the search.
The company seemed to have little organization or
leadership. The Command Sergeant Major (CSM) began counseling
14
and working with the First Sergeant while I worked with the
company commander. The law and order mission was given to the
132nd as many of the guardsmen were law enforcement officers in
their civilian occupations. I had hoped they would be successful
at it, but it was quickly apparent that the leadership had no
concept of how to establish an UP station, shifts, or patrol
areas. They did not even have the capability to remote a radio
to the MP station and utilize a alternate company frequency to
monitor patrols.
The S-3 and the 132d training officer developed a training
plan to bring the unit up to speed. It became necessary to
monitor training very closely since even with the plan, the unit
seemed unable to progress beyond individual training. Collective
training seemed beyond their grasp. The soldiers and lower level
NCOs seemed to progress quickly and appeared eager to learn; the
leadership, however, was unable or unwilling to learn and
progress.
This company was without an assigned peacetime battalion
headquarters to supervise its training and had obviously been
having difficulty. Hopefully, this conflict pointed out the
weaknesses of the Capstone program. It is important for every
reserve and national guard unit to be affiliated with an active
unit somewhere in the chain of command. The active component
unit could assist in the planning and training of the unit. But
it must be more than one evaluator at summer camp; it must be a
relationship that reaches into the unit's day-to-day operations.
15
Base Camp Operation
The Executive Officer took charge of the staff and began to
set up the administration of the battalion and to oversee the
local purchase authority of the S-4. The day-to-day operations
rested in his hands.
The advanced party and the lead company had done an
excellent job of setting up the shell of a base camp. However,
there was still a great deal more to be accomplished to make the
place liveable let alone comfortable. The Command Sergeant
Major, CSM Forest Guess, took charge of the work details and
began building a home for us. He made use of the many talents of
the guardsmen in the areas of carpentry, electrical wiring, and
even swimming pool maintenance-he showed us how to heat our
shower water. Both the CSM and the X0 worked very hard to ensure
that everyone made the national guard companies feel like they
were part of the battalion.
Law and Order
The 132d MP Company assumed the law and order mission about
five days after they arrived in country. Although the mission
covered a fairly large area, there was limited activity. Since
everyone was working very hard, they had little time for criminal
activity. Traffic enforcement and accident investigation became
the primary tasks of the patrols.
There were only two major incidents that required military
police support. First, some members of the transportation unit at
Guardian City attempted to make liquor with the fluid used to
16
clean the brake lines of trucks. Needless to say, they didn't
get very high, but they did almost kill themselves. Six soldiers
were rushed to the hospital in critical condition.
Unfortunately, the commander of the unit decided not to report it
immediately to the Military Police. Instead, he felt that the
unit could handle it. We did not received word until the next
morning which made the investigation more difficult.
The other incident began with a scream coming from the water
purification unit located about 150 meters from our Tactical
Operation Center (TOC). Upon investigation we discover that a
soldier had bent over a moving auger to engage a gear, had caught
his shirt, and had been immediately jerked through the auger and
killed. The scream was from another soldier who had witnessed
the accident. Both of these incidents required initial
investigation by the MPs before being turned over to the Criminal
Investigation Division Command (CIDC).
Area Security
The 984th MP Company assumed the area secur ity miss ,ion. It
immediately set up patrol areas and began to contact the
different bases and base cluster commanders. It quickly became
evident that rear area operations training among the combat
support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units had been
ignored. Not only did the units not understand how to call the
military police for assistance if their base was attacked, but
most units did not have the organic communications equipment
necessary even to make such a call.
17
The battalion S-3 immediately began coordinating with units
to simulate enemy attacks and military police support. Such
exercises were excellent in detecting weaknesses not only in the
supported units, but with the military police as well. Although
the MFs practice area security a great deal, we seldom have the
opportunity to practice it in conjunction with a real unit.
Saddam Hussein's call for attacks on the Western Infidels
around the world served to heightened awareness about the
possibility of terrorist attacks. The soldiers charged with area
security took their mission very seriously and although there
were no actual attacks, the military police, in conjunction with
local authorities, were able to arrest several suspicious
individuals who were watching different U.S. units and drawing
diagrams of various locations.
Training
Each unit was responsible for developing an intense training
program based on guidance from the brigade commander and myself
and briefing the program within two weeks. Every attempt was
made to ensure that everyone realized that this was preparation
for the real thing and that success equalled survival.
By the week after Thanksgiving the training program was in
full swing with each unit concentrating on the areas in which
they were deficient. It was quite apparent that while the I
National Guard companies were well prepared in individual skills,
the level of collective skills varied greatly. It also became
apparent that the leadership of the company, ie, company
18
commander and First Sergeant, were key to the success and morale
of the company. While the 210th and 211th MP Companies quickly
trained to a level that would make any active duty company proud,
the 132d continued to flounder, despite intense supervision.
Final Preparation For War
On November 14th, the President of the United States
announced a further buildup of forces. This left little doubt in
most minds that'the U.S. was preparing to go on the offensive
unless Saddam Hussein left Kuwait. The only remaining questions
were when and how. Shortly after Christmas those questions were
answered with the issuance of the XVIII Airborne Corps Operations
Order.
Both the brigade and the battalion began planning movement
and the operation in earnest. The 759th was to move to King
19
Khalid Military City (KKMC) early in order to provide security
for the corps rear area. Additionally, the battalion would be
responsible for convoy escorts from KNMC to Log Base Charlie once
the air war began.
The 211th MP Company was to remain with the 24th Division.
This left us short the personnel necessary to complete the
mission so the brigade attached the 805th M P Company, a reserve
unit from North Carolina, to the battalion.
Military Police doctrine calls for the corps military police
battalion to provide a company to the divisions they support when
necessary. However, there is no definitive set of circumstances
or even suggestions as to what is appropriate use for those
units. The divisions made excellent use of the corps company
during Desert Shield by immediately incorporating them into their
scheme of operation. The difficulty came when the battalion
needed the company back for a corps mission. Naturally, the
divisions were reluctant to return the companies. It ultimately
came down to a fight between division commanders and the Military
Police brigade commander. As such, there was no doubt who lost
the battle.
Several times during Desert Shield/Storm when roads were
secured by corps and theater military police, division commanders
still wanted that additional company to assist in moving their
divisions. As the corps military police become more heavily
armed in the future, ie. MN 19s, I see division commanders
fighting even harder to have that additional company permanently
20
with when and under what circumstances a corps company will go to
the division and when it will be returned and incorporate those
circumstances into the doctrine.
Military police companies are designed to operate
independently and be mixed and matched with a battalion
headquarters. Still, having a reserve company attached as we
moved forward into our final positions prior to the beginning of
the war certainly increased the stress level for all concerned.
We had no idea about the level of discipline and training of the
unit, yet we would have to immediately depend upon them to
accomplish critical missions. Fortunately, the company was well
trained and the commander was very serious about his
responsibilities.
DESERT STORM
THE AIR CAMPAIGN
The battalion headquarters and four companies arrived at our
base camp location justoutside of KKWC on January 8, 1991. We
quickly set up camp and began operations. The 984th was assigned
the mission of security for the corps rear area. Five UHl
helicopters were attached to the company in order to increase its
mobility. The 132d was assigned the mission of providing
communications checkpoints from KKWC to Log Base Charlie in order
to track convoys and to provide additional security for the
convoys during movement. The 210th and 805th were to provide the
actual escorts for the convoys. Having been assigned their
missions, each company was to provide a brief back of their plan
21
of operation within 48 hours.
Convoy Escorts
Certainly the most difficult mission was providing convoy
escorts as there was no real timetable for movement. After the
first night of the air war convoys moved as soon as they were
loaded and lined up. This required extremely close coordination
with the Corps Support Command (COSCOM). Additionally, the
transportation units being escorted often did not have organic
communications equipment. This, coupled with the limited number
of military police vehicles available for each convoy, posed
serious security problems as there was no way for the convoy
commander to communicate an emergency to the escort. Luckily,
there were adequate hand held radios available through the
brigade headquarters. Although such equipment was of little value
for a tactical scenario over extended distances, they worked
extremely well for communications between the lead and trail
vehicles of the convoy and the military police. A short briefing
on how and when to utilize the radios prior to each convoy
departure alleviated most of the problems.
Communications problems in the CSS units is continuous both
in a base camp configuration and during movement. A solution to
the problem might be that as the Army draws down, we transfer
communications equipment from combat units standing down to the
CSS units and adjust their TOES accordingly. This should solve
the problem with minimal cost.
22
Rear Area Security
XVIII Airborne Corps rear area now stretched from Rafa to
RRMC, a distance of 160 miles. With only one company dedicated
to the defense of that sector, it was impossible to have the same
close coordination with each base cluster as we had in the
Dhahran area. The COSCOM Commander acted as the Rear Area
Commander and his operations center coordinated any support
necessary.
Timely ground response to the majority of the units in the
rear area would have been impossible because of the long
distances involved. However, the five DRl helicopters attached
to the battalion assisted in providing a quick response within
the Corps AOR.
Although the helicopters were equipped with M60 gun mounts,
the unit decided to develop new technology. With the assistance
of the pilots and crews, we mounted two MR 19s on a platform
inside the aircraft. This required bolting a wooden platform
inside the aircraft and then bolting the tripods onto the
platform. It was necessary to test for stress both to the
aircraft and to the platform, as well as balance the load.
In a very short time the guns were mounted and ready for
test firing. The MPs and pilots quickly discovered that although
the gunner could fire the weapon, they could not aim it quickly
enough to provide any degree of accuracy. Further testing
resulted in the gunner holding the weapon in a fixed position and
the crew chief directing the pilot, as to the direction of
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flight. The gunner could adjust fire up and down and together
with the pilot became accurate enough to knock down rows of 55
gallon drums on the firing range.
The other difficulty was reloading the weapon. Since the MK
19 tripod was fixed to the edge of the aircraft door frame, it
required the assistant gunner to literally lean out the door
while holding a 60 pound ammunition can and place it in the feed
box. Again, it became necessary to enlist the pilot's
assistance. He would slightly bank the aircraft thus tilting the
gun up; this allowed the assistant gunner to replace the empty
ammunition can with a minimum of difficulty.
Mounting the two Mk 19s in the aircraft significantly
enhanced the firepower of the platoons if they were ever required
to enter a hot landing zone. It also provided additional
protection for the aircraft while in flight. The crews were so
impressed with the system that they convinced the aviation
brigade commander to attempt to commandeer some MK 19s for their
own use.
Communications Check Points
Although this mission required less than two platoons, it
was perhaps the least attractive of the missions. It required
three-person MP teams to locate within radio range of each other
for the length of the convoy route, approximately 110 miles. The
checkpoints were to provide the location of each convoy as it
passed their location. This allowed us to track the progress of
each convoy and provide additional security for both the convoy
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and the MP escorts.
This was the first opportunity to test the concept of the
three-person team and their ability to survive on their own for a
period of time. It also was a test of the 132d UP Company's
ability to perform a mission in a tactical environment. It
quickly became apparent that the platoons had the mentality of
"gut out the mission, it will be over in a weekend or two weeks."
The company headquarters simply was satisfied to send the
platoons out on the mission and then forget them. They made no
provisions for the rotation of personnel or any effort to care
for them. There was a sense of equality within the unit;
everyone was on a first name basis and this appeared to
contribute to an "every man for himself" attitude.
Only with strong direction from the CSM did the 1st Sgt and
the company headquarters begin to think of ways to provide hot
meals to the soldiers, relieve them for showers, provide personal
hygiene items, and deliver their mail.
The communications checkpoints were a manpower intensive
operation. It was necessary to place a checkpoint every 10 to 12
miles as the unit was utilizing RT 524 radios that were over 30
years old. This is an age old problem for the Military Police
Corps. Doctrine calls for operations over extended areas using
communications equipment designed to operate over very limited
distances. Perhaps equipment modernization will alleviate the
problem.
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Movement To Final Assembly Areas
On February 8th the battalion began its movement to our
final assembly area, which was about 3 miles north of Rafa, and 8
miles south of the Iraqi border. In the days preceding movement
the companies had done a complete technical inspection of all
equipment, had test fired all weapons and had received a final
mass intelligence update.
Since some of the HHD 2 l/2-ton trucks needed some
additional maintenance, I decided that the assault command post
(CP) and two companies would move forward to Rafa. The remainder
of the headquarters and one company would move to the half way
point. This allowed last minute direct support maintenance to be
accomplished as well as saved several hundred miles of travel for
the S-4 and his fleet as they brought supplies forward from Log
Base Bravo (KKMC) to Rafa. Additionally, the 210th MP Company
was returned to the 1Olst Airborne Division.
The battalion was scheduled to operate in the area of the
6th Light French Division who's headquarters also was located
just north of Rafha. As soon as the battalion.TOC was
operational and secure, the brigade commander and myself went to
introduce ourselves to the French division commander and began
the process of coordination. One can only imagine the look of
surprise on the division commander's face as well as on his staff
when a female battalion commander walked inside of their TOC.
Interestingly enough, after the initial surprise the commander
and his chief of staff and operations officer sat down with us
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and began serious planning. There was never any indication that
they had any difficulty dealing with me as a female; they
accepted me as a professional officer and went about the mission
at hand.
Although we were never under the operational control of the
French, we worked very closely with them throughout the ground
campaign. Additionally, they provided logistical support to us
on many occasions, never once questioning if they would be repaid
by the United States. They were of the opinion that this was war
and they would do whatever was necessary to prosecute it.
THE GROUND WAR
The Plan
The plan called for the ground campaign to be kicked off by
the 6th Light French Division accompanied by a brigade of the
82nd Airborne Division crossing the border at 4:00 A.M. on
February 24th. They were to seize the Al Salman Air Base and the
surrounding area. They would be followed by the remainder of the
82nd which was tasked with clearing any pockets of resistance
bypassed by the French. The 503d Military Police Battalion (ABN)
was next in line. Its mission was to pick up prisoners of war
captured by the French and the 82d. We were next in the que with
the mission of securing the road from the border north to Al
Salman and then east to the 24th Infantry Division's western
boundary.
We carefully coordinated the handoff between the French and
the 82nd and the subsequent handoff to us. Additionally, the
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French were to provide daylight fire support for us. The Air
Force was to provide night fire support with Cl30 Specter Gun
Ships. The French were unable to provide night time fire support
as they lacked the capability to fly at night. There were only
two Specters available for all of XVIII Airborne Corps so we did
not anticipate that support would be available in a timely
manner.
In order to overcome the language barrier and incompatible
communications equipment we exchanged liaison teams with the
French Circulation Control Company. This enabled us to remain in
constant contact with the Division TOC.
Execution
A platoon of the 82nd MP Company and two of my teams crossed
the border 24 hours prior to G-Day and set up operations at the
Line of Departure (LD).
The evening prior to G-Day we lined up vehicles and made
last minute checks to ensure that every soldier was prepared to
accomplish the mission the next day. Although we were not
scheduled to cross the LD until H+24, we moved to the border at
H+14 based on the progress the French were making. At H+17 we
received the order to move. This put us in front of the two
brigades of the 82nd that were supposed to clear the pockets of
resistance left by the 6th Light Division.
Our movement was slowed considerably as we were forced to
clear a complex of bunkers that extended from the LD to our final
position, a distance of approximately 150 miles. The bunkers
2%
L
were about 3-5 km off the roadway and the ground in between was
littered with antipersonnel mines. Fortunately, they were small
enough that the worst damage was the loss of a tire or two.
Ten hours after beginning our movement we reached the
location we had chosen for the battalion headquarters. The
companies covered their respective areas of the roadway. Just as
we arrived a sandstorm began; visibility was reduced to
approximately 5 to 10 feet, and all movement stopped for about 4
hours until the storm ceased.
Needless to say, the storm destroyed the movement time
tables for follow on units; the 82nd was on the road and the fuel
trucks for the 24th ID (MECH) needed to get through. It became
essential to create a four lane road. We put nonessential
traffic on the dirt shoulders of the road with fuel and supply
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trucks allocated to the main road. By assigning three lanes
going east and one lane going west, we were able to clear the
roads in less than 6 hours.
Although we were collocated with a movement control team,
there was no prioritization after the first 36 hours. This
caused the military police numerous problems at key intersections
throughout the remainder of the 100 hours as well as during the
redeployment phase. Movement of this magnitude requires a clear
set of priorities, and a strict enforcement of the same. This
does not just happen; it requires practice.
Securing the roadway turned out to be a monumental task as
the Iraqis would leave their bunkers during daylight hours and
melt into the desert only to return to them at night. They did
this primarily because they had left food, clothing and other
supplies in the bunkers. This required the military police to
clear the bunkers at dawn every day and every day we took more
prisoners.
The forward combat units were taking such large numbers of
prisoners that the military police battalion tasked with the
enemy prisoner of war mission simply was overwhelmed. This left
the prisoners in the rear areas as a last priority which resulted
in a manpower intensive requirement to guard them.
Post Hostilities
A cease fire was declared after just 100 hours, and then
began, perhaps, the most intensive phase of the entire operation
for the 759th. Upon cessation of hostilities, our portion of the
roadway was extended another 60 miles, which stretched our
already thin assets even more. Additionally, we were facing an
overwhelming refugee problem. As if by magic hundreds of
Bedouins began to appear seeking food and fuel. Indeed, it became
a constant struggle for all of the units to retain their
preimeter integrity.
Throughout this period we sought assistance from Civil
Affairs personnel but to no avail. There appeared to be no plan
for providing assistance to refugees, to obtain language support,
or to treat wounded Kurdish refugees. Individual units provided
what support they could, and the hospital accepted all wounded
personnel. With the assistance of our combat medics the wounded
were treated. Excess food was distributed by individual units
while transportation units provided fuel.
It readily became apparent that XVIII Airborne Corps had not
developed any plan for post-hostility activities. We did not plan
to be an occupation army; therefore, we had not considered how to
address the problems encountered in Iraq until our forces were
redeployed. This lack of planning really surfaced after XVIII
Airborne Corps redeployed to the port area. Thousands of Iraqi
refugees crossed the border into the small town of Rafa, forcing
CENTCOM to deploy a battalion of military police from VII Corps
to handle the problem.
This situation necessitated not only the deployment of
troops to maintain order, but also an entire support structure in
order to care for the refugees. It also was necessary to utilize
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international organizations to rep.atriate the refugees. All of
these problems could have been alleviated with prior planning
about how to deal with refugees immediately upon the cessation of
hostilities.
Movement To Port
Thirty-seven days after we crossed the border into Iraq, the
759th received orders to redeploy to the port area. We were the
last unit to be moved out of the corps sector. As such, we had
the mission to police all roads for equipment that had been left
behind. Additionally, we were responsible for monitoring the
movement on the southern route through Riyadh back to Daharan.
MP teams would be located at each refuel stop to report each
convoy as it passed through the point. Because of the long
distances involved, it was necessary for the brigade to cross
level radio-teletype equipment from the other battalions.
Redeployment
Redeployment for the battalion was relatively simple as the
unit had done it several times in the past 18 months. All
National Guard and Reserve units were redeployed first and
finally, the long awaited day came for the 759th Military Police
Battalion to return to Fort Carson, Colorado.
CONCLUSION
Overall, Military Police doctrine worked adequately. With
only minor changes with respect to the attachment of corps
military police companies to divisions, it will continue to serve
us well in the future. Communications equipment continues to be
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a problem and one that will not be resolved in the near future
with the precipitous decline in the defense budget. The key to
success in the future is as it has been in the past-good soldiers
and good training. Without a doubt, military police need to
maintain close affiliation with combat service support units that
they will be supporting in the future.
I cannot say enough in the way of praise for the men and
women of the 759th Military Police Battalion. Every member of
the organization, with only minor exception, gave more than 100%
effort everyday. Every soldier that deployed with the unit
returned to Fort Carson after a tremendously successful
operation. That is the true measure of success-to bring everyone
home alive.
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