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Scots Philosophical Association
University of St Andrews
Liberal Justice: Political and MetaphysicalAuthor(s): Richard Bellamy and Martin HollisSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 178 (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-19Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and theUniversity of St. Andrews
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The
Philosophical uarterly
ol.
5
No.
178
January
995
ISSN
o03 -8094
The
Philosophical
Quarterly
LIBERAL
JUSTICE:
POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL
BY
RICHARD
BELLAMY AND MARTIN
HOLLIS
The
God of the Old Testament
s
proclaimed
as a
just
God but
is
assur-
edly
no
liberal.
A
society
whose idea of
ustice
accords with
patriarchal
principles
of
political authority
s
an
unjust
society
by
the test
of
liberal
ideas about
freedom,
utonomy
nd the
equality
of
persons.
Such a dis-
pute betweenconceptionsof ustice sounds squarelymetaphysical,urn-
ing
on the
true character of a
just society,
f human nature
and,
per-
haps,
of
ajust
God. Nor
is it
meta-ethically
eutral:
f
patriarchy
ere
to
prevail,
just
society
would
oblige
citizens to lead a
particular
formof
good
and
upright
ife,
contrary
o the familiar iberal tenet that
ques-
tions of what is
right
can be
settled
without
prejudice
to
questions
of
what
is
good.
Yet
this
liberal tenet
is
not
disputed only by patriarchs
and
other
opponents
of
iberalism.
There are
competingconceptions
of
justice
within he liberal
camp,
and some of them nclude a
specific,
f
carefully ncomplete, ccount of a citizen s moral commitments.
Liberals
who
agree
with
J.S.
Mill
that the
only
freedom
worthy
f
the
name is thatof
pursuing
our own
good
in
our own
waymay
eem
bound
to
leave each
of us to
define
our own
good
for ourselves.
This familiar
conclusion does
not follow
imply,
however.
A liberal could stress
our
own
way ,
rather than our own
good ,
when
designing
a constitution
whose
primary
dea of
religious
toleration
was
to
allow a
variety
f
ways
to a
Christian
good (e.g.,
Locke).
A more
agnostic
iberal could tolerate
widerexperimentsn living, rovidedthatthey mbodya prescribed, f
secular,
notion of human
flourishing e.g.,
Mill).
A
liberal
with com-
munitarian
endencies
could let us choose ourown
good
without
etting
each of us choose his
or her
own
good (e.g.,
Rousseau).
This
may
be
to
approach
the limits
f
liberalism,
ut there are liberal
disciples
of
Rous-
?The
Editors
f
The
Philosophical uarterly,
995.
Published
y
Blackwell
ublishers,
08
Cowley
Road,
Oxford
X4
IJF,
UK
and
238
Main
Street,
ambridge,
A
02142,
USA.
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2
RICHARD
BELLAMY AND MARTIN
HOLLIS
seau
and,
in
general,
the line between the
right
nd the
good
has never
been
perspicuous.
Contemporary
liberals
usually
contend that modern
democratic
societies are so deeply plural that iberalismmust do without nycom-
prehensive
moral framework
f
a
distinctively
iberal
kind. Pluralism
forces
the issue. But
it
does so neitherbecause
it
is a
contingent
histori-
cal factwhicha democratic iberal should
recognize,
nor because liberal-
ism
implies
moral relativism
r
some such meta-ethical
ommitment.
The
point
is, rather,
hat a
liberal
society
which
permits
ree discussion
and
action
has
to
leave
radically onflicting
thical
viewpoints
n
play.
To restrict his
diversity y
the
use of state
power
would be
oppressive
(Rawls
1993
p.
37).
Hence,
it is
argued,
liberalism
annot
defend itself
by
appealing
to the inherent
superiority
f the liberal ideal without
becoming
illiberal.
The
only way
to
avoid
this
paradox
is to
provide
principles
of
ustice
which are neutral
in
the
political
sense that
all
involved
ccept
them
as
offering
air
terms f social
co-operation
when
viewed
fromwithin heir
respective omprehensive
doctrines.
Pluralism
involves a
compromise
between liberal
and illiberal
views,
which,
although
reached
in the
name of
ustice,
allows
illiberal
practices.
We
shall test
the
coherence of this
ine
later.)
Can one construct conception of ustice that eschewsmetaphysical
claims to
universal
truth,
or nstance about the nature
of
persons,
and
instead seeks
simply
o
provide
a fair nd stable
basis for
peaceful polit-
ical
co-existence?
The
attempt
has been made most
explicitly
n
the
recent
writings
fJohn
Rawls
notably
n
PPA
1985
[JF],
evised
n
Polit-
ical Liberalism
PL]
as
Lecture
1).
His idea of a
just
society
as a fair
system
f
co-operation
between
free and
equal
persons
is
finely
oised
(JFp.
238;
PL
pp.
9,
26).
Fairness
s a
procedural
notion,
falling
hair s-
breadth short of
implying
thick
conception
of
the
good.
Co-operation
involvesa notion of
proper
conduct Kantian
enough
to
prevent
free-
riding,yet
without
equiring
shared moral
purpose.
The
freedom
nvis-
aged
leaves room for
dispute
between
disciples
of
Locke
(the
moderns )
and
disciples
of Rousseau
(the ancients ).
Equality
con-
strains the
distribution
f
power
and resources
without
conceding
to
egalitarians.
Persons re
essentially
articipants
n
social
life,
equipped
with
capacity
or
sense of
ustice
and of the
good; yet
this
onception
does
not
call
for
a
metaphysical
octrine
of the nature
of the self. The
whole idea is framedto apply not universally r eternallybut to the
basic structure f a modern
political
democracy.
t starts romwithin
particular
political
tradition ,
oughly
he one which
emerged
in
West-
ern
Europe
from
the
wars
of
religion
and has
given
us
an
overlapping
consensus about
the
virtues
required
of citizens to base
the
construct
?The
Editors
f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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LIBERAL
TUSTICE:
POLITICAL AND
METAPHYSICAL
on
(JFp.
225;
PL
pp.
14-15).
The
revised
theory
of
justice
is thus
as
promised by
the title of
JF,
political,
not
metaphysical
JFp. 230;
PL
p.
10).
In thispaper,we addresstworelateddoubtsabout tryingoturnmeta-
physical
water
nto
political
wine.
First,
here are rival
non-metaphysical
theories
of
ustice
on
offer,
nd
in
weakening
his
conception
of the
self,
freedom
and
equality,
Rawls
may
have let
himself
be
fatally
queezed
between ibertarianwritersike
F.A.
Hayek
and left-of-centreiberals ike
Ronald Dworkin.
Second,
his
theory,
n
common with those of other
philosophical
liberals,
s
curiouslyunpolitical.
He
deliberately
xcludes
the
haggling
and
trading
of interests
nd the
contingencies
of
power,
characteristic f political agreements,from the rational deliberations
that
he
believes
ought
to
motivate
he
parties
n
a democratic
ociety
o
arrive
at his
two
principles
of
ustice.
He contrasts n
articulated
and
normative
overlapping
consensus on
principles
of
ustice
with
a
mere
modusvivendi chieved
through contingent
balance of
power;
and he
sees his
two
principles
as
removing
from the
political
agenda
certain
contentious
ssues,
such as who has the
vote
or what sortsof views
can
be
expressed.
This exclusion
of
politics
threatensto render
the
prin-
ciples
of
ustice
too abstract
nd
far
removed
from
people s
real circum-
stances to
yield
any practical
guidance
to free and
equal persons trying
to workout what counts as fair
co-operation
n
particular
political
con-
ditions.
To focus
these doubts we shall
begin
by
asking
whether
a
Rawlsian
type
of construct
an
be defended
against
libertarianswithout
falling
prey
to communitarians. his
enquiry
willbe conducted
in
the
next
two
sections under
the
headings
of Clubs and
Communities .
We shall
then
step
back to consider whetherthe
political
can
be
kept
clear of
metaphysics .We explore thisquestion in the third ection under the
heading
of
Commonwealths ,
understood as
fair
systems
f
co-oper-
ation between
free and
equal
persons,
conceived
in
a
republican
tra-
dition
updated by drawing
on our earlier comments on each
of the
other
headings.
This
discussion
will
bring
us to
the conclusion
that cit-
izenship
does indeed
involve
a
political
idea of
ustice,
where
political
obligations
re
prior
to
pre-political ights,
ut
one which
s,
as
our title
suggests,metaphysical
or all that.
n
the final
section we test
out this
thesisbyapplying t to questionsabout the positionof women and the
distribution f welfare
n
an illiberal culture.
?The Editors f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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4
RICHARD
BELLAMY AND MARTIN HOLLIS
I.
CLUBS
By clubs we mean free associations formedto mutual advantage in
pursuing
limited aims. Members observe the
rules
for instrumental
reasons. The rules
embody
a
system
f
co-operation
related
to the
pur-
pose
of
the
club.
But not all
clubs
treattheirmembers
equally
or
even
fairly.
Women,
for
nstance,
may
be banned from
the
library
n
a Lon-
don
club,
expected
to make the tea
in
a cricket lub or admitted t half-
price
to
a
dating
club. Rich and
powerful
members
may
fare
better han
others,
s
in
clubs for
andowners,
yachting
nthusiasts
nd
oil
barons.
Since
nothing
n
the basic idea of a club itself
ules out all manner
of
discrimination, e need a
particular
ortof club to serve as a model for
the liberal state.
So let us
specify
hat the members be
equal
and the
system
f co-
operation
fair.
Also,
since
they
annot
easily
eave,
we need to construe
their
freedom
n
some broader
sense,
which
may
nvolve resources
for
pursuing
their wn
good
and not
merely
n absence of formal bstacles.
Here
liberal
opinion
starts
o
divide,
with ibertarians
hinking
n
terms
of a mail-order
club,
so to
speak,
and social liberals
in
terms
of a
Christmasclub. In the mail-order tate,all are equally free to trade,
human relations are
severely
nstrumental,
veryone s penny
is worth
the same as
everyone
else s
penny
and it is no one s concern that all
have at least a
basic number
of
pennies.
Each
widow s
mite s worth he
same as each of the millionaire smillion. n the Christmas
lub
state,
ll
insure
themselves
gainst
some
future
ersonal
calamity
y contributing
according
to
their
means to some form
of
collective
welfare nd social
securityprovision,
drawing
on the common fund
according
to
need
rather han
contribution.
n this
view,
which
would
appear
to
be
Rawls ,
mutual
advantage
s secured
by
a
relationship
f
reciprocity.
For both versions
crucial
question
s
whether
he self-interested
art-
icipants
will
rationally
ccept
that
they
have
an
obligation
to abide
by
the
spirit
f the
rules.
f
they
do,
then
they
will
play
fair
ven
when
able
to
avoid
it. If
not,
then
free-riding
ill
destroy
he
system
f
co-oper-
ation,
as Hobbes insistedwhen
arguing
for
a
power
to
keep
all
in
awe .
All
participants
o better
f
all
play
fair
than f the
system
ails;
but
each
seems to do better till
by
undetected
cheating,
not
only
f others cheat
but also ifthey layfair.Wherethis hoice is truly ominantforrational,
self-interested
ndividuals,
the
club
is
doomed.
The
problem
is more
obvious for
the
mail-order
ersion,
where human relations re
explicitly
instrumental,
ut
also
besets the Christmas
club,
which
has
difficulty
explaining why
he
better
off hould
oin
in
the first
lace.
?The Editors f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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LIBERAL
JUSTICE:
POLITICAL
AND
METAPHYSICAL
5
The liberal club
would be
safe from
free-riders,
f
those
takingpart
were
Kantians.
The
problem
vanishes
among
rational
agents,
f
obedi-
ence to the
categorical
imperative
s
a
requirement
of
rationality.
et,
althoughthe Good Samaritanmayhave no reason to regret avingthe
life of a
stranger
who then
pinches
his
wallet,
t
is
hard to believe that
one should
rationally
e as
high-minded
bout
failures
of
mutual
trust
by
mail-order or even
in
the course of a mutual insurance
scheme.
Whereas
moral
obligations
may
be
unconditional,
obligations
of
prud-
ence seem to
be rendered void
by
reasonable
suspicion
of non-com-
pliance,
as
Hobbes
suggests.
Yet Hobbes own
remedy
s
not
as
dour
as
appears
from
remarks ike covenants without he sword are
but
words,
and of
no
strength
o secure a man at all
(ch.
xvii).
In his
reply
to
the
fool who
questionneth
whether
njustice
..
may
not sometimes tand
with hat
reason,
which
dictateth
o
everyman
is own
good ,
he
declares
that it s not
against
reason to honour covenants
of
mutual
trust,
nless
one
has reasonable
suspicion
that
the
other
party
will
not
(ch.
xv).
But
this conclusion is not
easy
to extract
with
as little
pparatus
as Hobbes
provides,
nd even his liberal admirers
usuallygive
themselves
more to
workwith.
The
snag,
as
diagnosed by
Rawls
(PL
pp.
16-17, 147-8),
is that a
societybuilt on nothingbut the mutual self-interestf rationalagents
issues
at best
in
a mere modusvivendi.
uch a
society
need
be
neither
fair,
depending
as
it
does
on a
contingent
distribution f
power,
nor
durable,
since it will
collapse
as soon as
it
suits one or more
of
the
parties
to
defect.
Accordingly
e now advocates a solution with moral
element,
njected
by basing
a
just
society
n an
overlapping
consensus
among
reasonable
agents
who
recognize
ties of
reciprocity .
Since
reciprocity
nvolves
discharging
ne s
obligations
even
when one
could
defect,
we are
being
offered
a
version of
the
Christmasclub
model
which ooks safe fromfree-riders.
This
manoeuvre
compares interestingly
ith
the role
of the veil of
ignorance
in
A
Theory f
Justice.
ehind the veil the demands
of self-
interest
generated
an
extensive
mutual insurance scheme
by
reasoning
uncannily
close to
Kantian. It
looked
as if
prudence pursued
in
ignor-
ance was
congruent
with
the Kantian
moral
point
of
view.
Even
so,
that
left
t unclear
why
rational
agent,
as
standardly
efined,
would
comply
withthe social
contract, f,
once the veil was
lifted,
efection
urnedout
to be dominant. By making more of a distinctionbetween rational
agents
and reasonable
agents
and
relyingheavily
on an
overlapping
consensus ,
Rawls makes
compliance
less
problematic.
Nevertheless,
reciprocity
s
something
of a
mystery
ngredient.
ts
effect s
to
populate
the
ust
society
with reasonable
agents
of a
neigh-
?The
Editors
f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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6
RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN
HOLLIS
bourly
sort. Yet this
would be a
sleight
of
hand
if
it
only
worked
by
doctoring
the
passions
so as to make
human
beings
more
sociable,
sym-
pathetic
to one
another,
or
prone
to the
pangs
of a bad
conscience than
originallynvisaged.So presumablyts role is to make reasonable agents
reflective and hence
able to
over-ride their own
preferences
as
expressed
in
their
current
utility ankings
of
outcomes:
when rational
choice
theory
bids rational
agents
to
defect,
reasonable
agents
some-
times refuse.
But
why?
The
obvious answer
might
seem to be
that we
are
being
offered robust
philosophical
psychology
r a
metaphysical
doctrine of the
self,
which ncludes a
Kantian
power
of
reason
to over-
ride
inclination,
renders
agents
less individualistic
nd more
sociable,
and
thus
grounds
a
distinction
between
reciprocity
nd even
super-
enlightened
self-interest.
Yet Rawls
squarely
refuses to
elaborate
any
such moral
ontology
or
metaphysics,
nsisting
hat no
political
view that
depends
on
these
deep
and
unresolved matters an
serve as a
public conception
of
ustice
in
a
constitutional emocratic
tate ,
and
remarking
hat we
must
apply
the
principle
of
toleration to
philosophy
itself
(JFpp.
231,
223;
PL
pp. 13-
14, 9-1o).
In
that
case, however,
he
puzzle
remains how
to
undermine
free-riding,
hen that s a
dominant
choice,
within
procedural
theory
ofrationalitynd ustice that tillkeeps the iberalityn liberalism.Recip-
rocitymay
ndeed hold
the
key,
but not as an ad
hoc
device.
The
generic problem
is
that,
f
prudence
is
construed
along
the
lines
of
standard rationalchoice
theory,
hen t
threatens o be
self-defeating.
The
putative
olution is to set the
hypothetical
n
pursuit
of
the
categ-
orical
by equipping
rational
agents
with a reflectiveness
which
leads
them to
overcome this featureof
prudence
to their
mutual
advantage.
Yet,
while
(expected)
utilities
remain a
given
element
in
the
stock of
common
knowledge
which
rational
agents
have of one
another
and are
an automatic link between
preference
and choice, there is
simply
no
way
for
reflectiveness o make a
difference.Hence we
need a
device for
distancing
rational
agents
from
their
preferences,
while
leaving
them
self-interested
n
the
pursuit
of theirown
good.
Rawls
failsto
solve this
difficulty.
he
imperative
o
co-operate,
n
his
view,
remains
hypothetical,
n
that
co-operationproceeds
on
terms hat
each
participantmay
reasonably ccept,
provided
that
veryone
lse
like-
wise
accepts
them
(JFp.
232;
PL
p.
16).
However,
there s
bound to
be
a problemofcompliance among rationalmaximizers, nce theyhave a
shrewd
dea of their
power
to
avoid
doing
their bit. This
is
explicit
n
David Gauthier s
versionof the
club,
for
example,
where rational
agents
know
their historical
and social
positions
and
yet
choose to
be con-
strained maximizers
who
play
fair
with other
constrained
maximizers
?The
Editors f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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LIBERAL
JUSTICE:
POLITICAL AND
METAPHYSICAL
7
even
when able to avoid it. That
may
sound
promising.
f it
pays
the
weak and the
strong
alike to
adopt
a
disposition
to
play
fair,
then
the
Hobbesian
problem
s
solved without he trouble nd
expense
of a fraud
squad. But the burden of this solution fallsveryheavilyon the idea
thatone can
choose
a
disposition
to
be
a
Kantian
among
Kantians
and,
presumably,
rat
among
rats.Since the choice is
prompted
by
self-inter-
est,
and the
disposition,being
conditional,
can
be
suspended
when it
suits,
we
fail
to see
why
a rational villain will not smile
and
smile and
stillbe
a
villain.
n
Rawls and
Gauthier
alike,
the social
contractneeds
to
bring
bout whatRousseau called
(I
8)
a
remarkable
hange
in
man ,
putting
justice
in
the
place
of instinct nd
leading
him to
consult
his
reason rather
han
study
his inclinations .Gauthier s
disposition
owards
enlightened
self-interests not to be trusted
ny
more than Rawlsian
reciprocity,
nless the self
s
transmuted
n
acquiring
t.
That
will
disappoint
those who
hope
that Kant can furnish
the
element
of
trustwhich
even a
mail-ordermarketneeds. But the Kantian
Rechtsstaat
s
not a
club,
even
though
it
seems
to
keep
the
liberality
n
liberalism
without
blending
the
right
and the
good. Despite
its
con-
tractarian
ir,
the
Rechtsstaat
irmly
resupposes
a
theory
of
morality
which is not
contractarian nd rational
agents
who are
categorically
moral in all theirpractical dealingswith one another. In undertaking
to
respect
one another s
autonomy,
hese
agents
are not
entering
con-
tractbut
simplyrecognizing
what their own
autonomy mplies.
It
may
look as
if
autonomy
s too schematic a notion to have
moral
content.
But there is no
mistaking
Kant s
view that someone
who
consults
only
self-interest,
owever
reflectively,
s
not a fit citizen of the Rechtsstaat.
Autonomous
agents keep promises
because
they
have
made
them,
and
regardless
of their
expected
utilities
when the time
comes. Pace
Rawls,
the
Rechtsstaat
mbodies a universal
onception ofjustice,
metaphysical
doctrineof the self and a refusal o
apply
the
principle
of tolerationto
philosophy
tself.
In
denying
that the
Rechtsstaat
s a
contract,
we
do not
deny
that
it
may
be a construct.Such
a
constructwould need
to be the work of
already
autonomous
agents,
however,
not their incentive
to become
autonomous. That
is to
build
a
specific principle
of
limited toleration
into
the
construct
nd hence a refusalto
compromise
between
liberal
and illiberal
views.
The
grounds
of this refusal
can
only
be moral
and
connectedwith metaphysical octrineof the self, ven ifthemorality
involved
s
carefully
chematic
rather
than
detailed.
The
Kantian
self
s
not
prior
to
all
the ends
which
constitute
t. That much
is
clear.
But a
new
difficulty
rises,
when
we ask
exactly
which
ends are
integral
to a
citizen of
the
Rechtsstaat.
hat is
the
cue for communitarians.
?The Editors f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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8
RICHARD BELLAMY AND
MARTIN HOLLIS
II. COMMUNITIES
Communitiesdiffer rom lubs in that, ather han ndividuals onstitut-
ing society
ordistinct
urposes
of
their
wn,
social
membership uppos-
edly
constitutes ndividual
identity.
Communitarians
regard
the club
model of
society
s an
impossible
attempt
o
pull
society
up
by
its own
bootstraps,
ince
it assumes what t seeks
to create: unless
there
s
already
a social
setting
which
provides
ndividualswith
roles and
standards,
he
notion of
individual
choice has no
meaning.
The
self-interested
gents
of much
liberal
theorizing
re ridiculed as
compulsive shoppers
in the
supermarket
of ends.
Lacking
either a
sense of
purpose
or a
shared
moralframework,uchdisencumbered ndividuals s the
participants
n
Rawls
original position
or Gauthier s
contractors ould not
establish
a
settledorder of
preferences
r
reach
stable
agreements
withothers.
Communitarians
contend,
therefore,
that
the
Kantian
Rechtsstaat
makes
sense
only
within
he context of
the
Hegelian
ethical state.
The
right
cannot be
separated
from the
good,
since
rules of
ustice
reflect
common
understandings
f
ends,
rather han
means,
which
explain why
certain
goods
are
important
nd
how
they
fit nto a
particular
pattern
of social relationships fwhichtheindividual s a part.Despite an estab-
lished
tradition of
neo-Hegelian
liberal
communitarianism, owever,
many
iberals have
been
uneasy
with this
way
of
thinking, egarding
t
as either
conservative,
ith small
c ,
or
downright
uthoritarian.
Contemporary ttempts
at communitarian
iberalism cannot
easily
escape
these criticisms.
Communitarian
liberals
can
be
divided
into
relativistsnd
rationalists,
ithMichael
Walzer s
Spheres fJusticerovid-
ing
an
example
of
the
first nd
Joseph
Raz s
Morality
f
Freedom n
instance
of
the second.
Walzer s
argument
s
communitarian
n
so far
as he
argues
(p.
7)
that distributions re
patterned
n accordance with
shared
conceptions
of
what the
goods
are and what
they
re for .
His
theory
s
liberal,
however,
n
contending
that we
ought
to show
equal
concern
and
respect
both
for the
different
nderstandings
of
ustice
found in
different
ocieties and for the
distributional riteria
ppropri-
ate to
different
oods
within
ocieties.
The
problem
withWalzer s thesis
is that the
relativism eed not
generate
the liberalism.
His contention
(p.
313)
that a
given
society
s
ust
if
ts substantive ife s
lived
... in a
wayfaithful o the shared understandingsof the members can legi-
timize
extremely
oercive
regimes.
Public
opinion may
be
misguided
or
unreliable.
People
are
often
misinformed,
rejudiced
or
self-deluded,
their
views
as
much the
product
of
socialization and
various
formsof
indoctrination s of
reasoned
argument.
Oppression
is
often
accepted
?The Editors f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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LIBERAL
JUSTICE:
POLITICAL
AND
METAPHYSICAL
9
by
the
oppressed
as
a
result of their
acquiescence
in
the
ideology
inflicted
on them.
Thus a shared
understanding
that
we
are
all,
for
instance,
miserable
sinners
can
underpin
a
substantive
ife
quite
con-
traryo a liberal idea ofjustice.
Moreover,
the relativist
rgument
provides
no basis
for
tolerating
plurality
f
views
either
within r
between
societies
-
something
Walzer
desires.
Complete agnosticism
bout
any
foundations
for truth r mor-
ality
eads
not to tolerance
but to
struggles
etween
opposed ideologies
in which
might
s
right.
f X
seeks to
impose
a
lifestyle
n
Y,
on the
grounds
that Ys
life will otherwise
ack
fulfilment,
hen
Y
can restrain
Xonly
by
appealing
to some
principle
transcending
heir
respective
ub-
jective
ideals.
The
equality
of
respect
desired
by
Walzer
mightemerge
naturally
where there is an
equitable
balance of
power.
Outside this
purely
contingent
situation,
however,
he needs
a
warrant
for it in an
objective
claim about
what
makes all human lives
worthy
f our
concern.
Rationalist
ommunitarians
eek
to
provide
such
a
justification y argu-
ing
that the
central
human
good
that
a
liberal
society
hould
uphold
is
the
capacity
for
utonomy.
A
communitarian
iberalism
must, herefore,
be
committed
to
maintaining
an
autonomy-supporting
nvironment
that secures those
conditions
necessary
to make
meaningful
choices
possible. This entailsnot merelyprotecting ach individual snegative
liberty
romdeliberate
coercion
by
others,
but also
providing
range
of
worthwhile
ptions.
The
danger
with this
thesis
from liberal
point
of
view
arises
from the classic
objection
to
all
positive
theories
of
liberty:
namely,
hat
they
ead to
the
paternalistic
mposition
f
a
particular ype
of behaviour
on
individuals,
n the
grounds
that freedom
requires
the
pursuit
of
certain
goals
necessary
o realize
their true
selves.
The
dif-
ficulty
rises
from
rying
o reconcile
the
requirements
f
the conditions
for
autonomy,
which
only
flourishes
n a certain
kind of social
set-up,
withthe
capacity
for
autonomy,
een as our
ability
o create our own
moral world.
Once
our
capacity
for
autonomy
becomes
itself
a
con-
ditioned
product,
then one can
no
longer appeal
to
it as
an inde-
pendent
standard
to
preventpaternalistic
nterferences
with
ndividual
liberty
see
Mendus).
As
Raz himself bserves
(p.
391),
for those
who
live
in
an
autonomy-supporting
nvironment
here s
no choice
but to
be autonomous .
This criticism
may
seem unfair.
Raz
does
after
ll contend
that
auto-
nomy presupposes what he calls competitivepluralism ,and we our-
selves
believe that
iberalism
annot divorce
tself
rom ll
metaphysical
and
moral
considerations.
n
our
view,
however,
Raz
goes
too far.
He
attempts
o make
the
metaphysics
o all
the work
n
producing
a well-
ordered
society.
As
a
result,
he
pluralism
which he allows
turns
out to
?The
Editors f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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10 RICHARD
BELLAMY AND
MARTIN
HOLLIS
be
narrower han at
first
ppears, consistingonly
in
putatively
worth-
while
options .
Crucial
to
his
thesis s
a
distinction
he
makes
between
self-interest nd
personal
well-being
analogous
to Mill s
famous
divisionbetween the lower and the higherpleasures.The first elates
primarily
o
our
biological requirements
nd
arouses
pleasure
which,
on Raz s
definition,
s
both insatiable and
non-diminishing.
he second
is
orientated towards
goals
or
pursuits
of
independent
value and
prod-
uces
happiness ,
which Raz
regards
as
a
satiable and
diminishing
mo-
tion.
He
argues
that,
whilst he
pursuit
of
self-interest
roduces
conflict,
striving
fter
personal well-being
oes not.
Consequently,
f
the
opport-
unities
available within
ociety
nly
enshrine sound moral
conceptions
then
people
will
naturally
choose
for
themselves
oals
which
ead to a
rough
coincidence in theirown lives of moral and
personal
concerns .
Social
harmony
will
follow,
n
which
by
being
teachers,
production
workers,
rivers,
ublic
servants,
oyal
friends
nd
family
eople,
loyal
to their
ommunities,
ature-loving
nd
so
on,
[people]
willbe
pursuing
theirown
goals, enhancing
their
own
well-being,
nd
also
serving
heir
communities,
nd
generally
iving
n
a
morallyworthyway
(p.
215).
This
ethical liberal
utopia,
in
which
(only slightly
o
amend a famous
phrase)
the
autonomy
of each is
the condition for the
autonomy
for
ll,
is wildlyoptimistic.Not only does it underestimatethe potential for
moral
conflict etween different
eatures
f
people s
lives even within
single
ethical
code,
it
greatly
verestimates he
degree
of
moral
agree-
ment that a
liberal
society
which
encourages diversity
nd
experimen-
tation
s
likely
o be able to
sustain. As we shall
argue
in
the
following
sections,
t
is
the
ob
of
politics,
lbeit
informed
by
liberal
morality,
o
conciliate and resolve
such
disputes.
To
avoid the sort of
difficulties e have raised
concerning
Raz s the-
ory,
Rawls
proposes
a
non-metaphysical olitical
liberalism
that
avoids
comprehensivemeta-ethical laims.Yet,we submit,Raz is correctto the
extent that such a
conception
cannot
in
itself be
entirely
neutral
between
conceptions
of
the
good.
At
the
very
east,
t
requires
an
attach-
ment to a
specific
set
of
political
virtues
which force us to
exchange
viewsratherthan
bullets and
agree
on
equitable
solutions and
compro-
mises.
How
deep
such
citizenly
thics need bite into our
personal
mor-
ality
orms
he
subject
of the next
section.
III. COMMONWEALTHS
The
members of
clubs and communes
lack the
qualities
required
of a
citizen
of
a
liberal
polity.
The former
re too detached and the
latter
too
involved.
The club
model cannot show
why
it is
instrumentally
?The Editors f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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LIBERAL
JUSTICE:
POLITICAL
AND
METAPHYSICAL 11
rational for
atomistic
ndividuals
o
adopt
the
impartial tandpointpre-
scribedwithin he liberal frameworknd thus
regulate
their ocial
inter-
action
in
ajust
manner.
n
any
case,
such an
abstract nd
general
frame-
work is only part of what is needed. By itself, t cannot motivate a
common concern
for
the
quality
of life or
guide
it towards set
of
poli-
cies.
Yet,
as
we shall
argue
below,
it
is
the
ability
o formulate nd mot-
ivatecommon concern and to translate t
into
policy
that
represents
he
true
task
of
politics
nd hence of
citizenship.
Clubs are
inherently polit-
ical.
Communities,
by
contrast,
re
unmistakably
olitical.
Communitar-
ians are
generally
neo-Aristotelians,
nd to accuse them of
lacking
a
conception
of
citizenship may
seem
perverse.
However,
their
civic
humanistversionof
citizenship
excludes
politics,
n the modern sense
of
negotiation
and
bargaining
in
(until
recently)
smoke-filled ooms.
For
communitarians,
olitics simply
nvolves
participation
n
the
public
life of the
community.
t
presupposes
a
pre-existing
ommunal
good,
a
tradition which
participants
re to
accept
as a
going
concern.
It
does
not start rom
debating
a
variety
f different
iewpoints
bout what that
good
might
be
so
as to
secure the
emergence
of
a
workable
ompromise.
Indeed,
the
communitarian
position
denies both the
pluralism
of
ends,
at least within a community, nd the public/privatedivide necessary
to make
sense
of such a
conception.
Yet
both,
we would
contend,
are
inescapable
features
f
modern life withwhich a
viable
formof liberal-
ism must come to terms.
A
liberalism
posited
upon
a
homogeneous
moral
communitymay
have been
possible
in
the
eighteenth
century,
but not
in
the
twenty-first.
The form of
citizenship
we associate with commonwealths stems
from
the civic
republican
tradition.
Deriving
from
Machiavelli rather
than
Aristotle,
t treats
political participationmerely
as
the condition
for
retaining
ur
liberty,
atherthan as essential to our self-realization.
According
to
this ine of
thinking,
ince
the
rights
nd
liberties vailable
to
us
depend upon
the
laws,
norms and
priorities
of
our
particular
society,
we shall
be free
only
to the extent thatwe share
in
determining
their haracter.
As
Rawls notes
(PL
pp.
205-6),
since this
conception
of
citizenship
nvolvesno
advance commitment o
any
specific
onception
of the
good,
civic
republicanism
s
compatible
with
a
pluralist
demo-
cratic iberalism.Yet
the schema
implies
an
unspecific
onception
of
the
good, since it is underpinnedbyobligations.For,ifthesearrangements
are
to
respect
fairly
he values and
demands
of all
members
of
society,
rather than
ust
those of
elites,
hen
we have
an
obligation
not
only
to
participate personally
n
collective
decision-making
ut
also
to
ensure
that others
do
too.
?The Editors
f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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12
RICHARD BELLAMY
AND MARTIN
HOLLIS
Our
conception
of
citizenship
ests n the
acceptance
of duties whose
discharge
s
a
precondition
for
the
political
life of the
commonwealth.
They enjoin equal
basic
respect
and concern for all others
n
this com-
monwealthof free and equal persons. The idea of respect looks to
Kant s notion
of
autonomy, ogether
with his thesis that to claim
auto-
nomy
for
oneself s to
recognize
that others have the same claim
to
be
treated s ends in
themselves.
ree
citizens
of the
kingdom
of ends
are
separate
and
equal persons,
n
a sense which
respects
both their ccess
to
public
life and their
right
to a
private
one.
The idea of concern
implies
an
equal
minimum
of
resources,
enough
to make
autonomy
real.
A
degree
of
material
ndependence
is needed for
public
and
priv-
ate life
alike,
to
give
citizens the time and means
to
play
their
public
part
and
literally
o close the door on othersforthe sake of
privacy.
These duties
provide
a substantive ccount
of the
preconditions
for
open-minded
discussion
among
free and
equal
persons, ncluding
con-
sideration
of
the social resources
necessary
for freedom
of
thought,
expression
and action. As
preconditions,
hey
need
to be
metaphysically
grounded
and defended
as
reflecting priori
otions
of
what s
due
to
individuals,
o that no citizen is treated
as less than a
person.
Then,
within this framework
f
enablements
and
constraints,
here will be
room forpoliticsof a practicalkind to deliberate and settle matters f
collective
oncern.
By putting
uties before
rights
nd
making
them
preconditions
f the
life of a
commonwealth,
we
hope
to
overcome
two familiar
problems
for
iberal
attempts
o accommodate
pluralism.
The first rises from he
charge
that iberals concede too much
if
they
thin down their
concep-
tion of
ustice
so as to
appeal
to all
points
of
view. There is a
danger
that
a
theory
f
ustice
thin
enough
to
appeal
to a
plurality
f
groups
will entail
tolerating
he intolerable.
Moreover,
t could be
decidedly
inegalitarian,prone
to
entrenching
nd
legitimating
atherthan chal-
lenging
the
prevailingdisparities
f
power
and wealth. Pluralism
com-
bined with
thin
theory
f
ustice may
mean
capitulation
to the
existing
distribution
f
power
in
society
and an
implicit
endorsement of
the
belief that
might
is
right.
The second
problem
arises because meta-
physicsprovides
no substitute
or
politics.
Our moral
obligationsprove
too narrow to determine to whom
our
duty
s owed or how it
is
to
be
discharged.Rights-based olitical
moralities xacerbate
this
difficulty
y
upholding negative perfect obligations of non-interference o firmly
that
they
cannot set about
explaining
why
we
should
as
opposed
to
merely
ould)
participate
within orms
f
collective
decision-making
nd
co-operation.
We
shall returnto this
point
in
the discussion of welfare
in
the next
section.
?The Editors f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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LIBERAL
JUSTICE:
POLITICAL
AND METAPHYSICAL
13
The first
roblem
has
surfaced
forcefully
n
recent criticisms
f liber-
alism
by
feminists
ho
have
remarked
how the
discourse
of
ustice
needs
to
be
supplemented
by
an awareness
of
the sources
of
oppression
(e.g.,
Young). It has also been central to criticisms f the Rawlsianproject
since
its
inception.
On the one
hand,
Rawls first
rinciple
of
ustice,
which
prescribes
maximal
equal
liberties
for
all,
has been
criticizedfor
being
too formal.
t fails
to
appreciate
that
udgements
about maximal
equal
liberty, eing
necessarily
ualitative
rather
than
quantitative
n
nature,
cannot
yield
definite resolutions
of conflictsbetween
liberties
(O Neill
1979/80).
On the other
hand,
his second
principle,
which
allows
inequalities,
provided
that
they
benefit
the worst
off,
has
been
attacked
for
failing
o
capture
the
importance
of
people s
relative
tand-
ing
fortheirevaluationof theirsense ofworth.Moreover,the division
between
state
and
civil
ociety, rivate
nd
public,
implied by
giving
he
first
rinciple
lexical
priority,
nderestimates
he
extent to which
the
equal
liberties
equire
a
substantial
ocial
and economic
empowerment.
These criticisms
an
be related to Rawls
attempt
o
draw
a distinction
between
the
right
nd the
good
so as to confine
the Rechtsstaat
o mat-
tersof
procedural
ustice,
while
eaving
ts
members
utonomy
o
pursue
their own
good
in
their own
way.
This classic
distinction
s
a
liberal
hallmark;but it has nevercome out cleanly.The snag is thatthereis
no
purely
rocedural
objection
to
treating
different
eople
or
groups
differently.
ny
objection
has to take the
form of
complaining
that a
particular
difference
s irrelevant
nd such
questions
of
relevance
are
moral
uestions,
even
if
they
do
not
thereby
ease
to
be
questions
of
justice.
For
example,
fairness etween
free
and
equal persons
rules
out
forms
f
the
subjection
of
women
for
which
some
religions
laim
moral
authority,
ven
though
the
religion
deals
fairly
etween
women
(and
fairly
etween
men).
The liberal
retort s that
no moral
authority
an
infringe
nyone s
autonomy
- a moral laim thatwomen are free and
equal
persons.
The liberal division
between
public
and
private
s
not one
between
ustice
and
morality
ut one
distinguishing
moral
commitments
which
the
commonwealth
makes
fromthose
where t stands
aside.
Rawls
retreat rom
metaphysical
o
a
political
theory
f
ustice
is a
partialrecognition
f
the
point.
Political is meant
to
avoid
metaphysics,
thus
etting
rgument
bout
the
merits f
public
policyproceed
without
having
to settle
questions
of
objectivity
n ethics. But
it is not
meant
to abolish all moral engagement. n a societymarkedbya reasonable
pluralism ,
there
are
overlapping
conceptions
of
the
good
with
nough
of a
liberal consensus
in the
overlap
to
allow
the
emergence
of
reason-
able
policies
like
those
mplied
by
the
Difference
rinciple.
The consen-
sus
is
morally
ommittal,
ven
if
the
warrant
s
only
consensus
itself.
?The
Editors f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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14
RICHARD BELLAMY AND MARTIN
HOLLIS
Can
a
political theory
f
ustice rely
on
its own
bootstraps?
Rawls s
ambivalent. Sometimes he
presents
the liberal
overlap
in
commun-
itarian
guise
as the historical
product
of the
Western democratic tra-
dition. We findthisprofoundlyunsatisfactory,rantedthattraditions
are not
rigid.
To
continue
the
example,
are
there
ways
of
treating
women
in
contemporary
ritainwhich are established
practices,
nd
so
acceptable
to an
evolving
tradition,but,
by
the test of a reasonable
pluralism,
unreasonable? For
instance,
sexual harassment and the
exclusion of women from all-male clubs are well-established
ractices,
and Britain has
lately
ncorporated
new traditions
which,
it has been
argued
in
a
local
government
ouncil
chamber,
nclude
an
established
practice
of female circumcision.
By
what test does a liberal deem these
practices
unreasonable ? Someone
mightperhaps reply
hatthecrux s
not
what is
in
fact
accepted
but whether a liberal view can be
got
to
prevail
n
a
power-game
where winners re
always
easonable and losers
always
nreasonable. But thatwould be a
desperate
move.
t would offer
a
way
of
making ustice political
which
recalls
Thrasymachos
ardonic
viewthat
ustice
is what uitsthe
strong.
The test f a reasonable
plural-
ism, therefore,
tillneeds a
metaphysical acking.
Accordingly,
awls now
argues
that an
attempt
o arrive t a
political
conception bystriking merelypragmaticbalance between thevarious
moral viewsfound within
ociety
would be
political
in
the
wrong
way
(PL
p.
40).
Instead,
he
presents
his
theory
f
ustice
as a
free-standing
view
derived
from the
fundamental dea
of
society
s
a fair
system
f
co-operation ,
n
the
hope
that this
dea,
with
ts ndex of
primary oods
arrived at from
within,
an be the focus of a
reasonable
overlapping
consensus . Yet without ome transcendental eason
why
liberal con-
vergence
should
occur,
this
must
surely
remain a
pious hope
-
parti-
cularly
s he
rejects
as
oppressive
any
state action
through
education
or
legislation
to
uphold
a
political morality.
In
arguing
for some
metaphysical
oundations
for
liberalism
we do
not
wish
to
run foul of
the
second familiar
problem
associated with
liberal
theory,
amely
that t is
anti-political.
Here we
agree
withRawls
that
metaphysics
must not swallow
up
the whole
of
morality.
he
polit-
ical realm
needs a
metaphysical
basis to define fairnessfor decision-
making procedures,
while
setting
only partial
conditions
on what
may
emerge
from
them.
Thus
who
gets
what,
when and
how,
remains an
issue wherespecificpoliciesare to be settledbythepushingand shoving
of different nterests nd
points
of view within
the basic constraints.
Whatever
olicy merges
from
due
process
of decision is to be deemed
reasonable.
Yet,
to make it
a
due
process ,
we
require
not
only
due
formality
bout
the
procedure
but
also
substantive
onditions for
polit-
?The Editors
f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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LIBERAL
JUSTICE:
POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL
15
ical debate between
free and
equal persons.
These conditions
could
be
said to enable
the
emergence
of a General
Will,
while also
constraining
its
scope.
From this
perspective,
the General
Will
is a
matter
not of
discovering he objective,antecedent truth bout the best policies but
of
constructing
olicies
which
are
reasonable
by
the test
of whether
they merged bypolitical horse-trading
ithout reach of the conditions
of
communicative
ction.
Here lies the basis
for
a
conception
of
liberal
ustice
and
citizenship
that
s
both
political
and
metaphysical.
t is
metaphysical
n
its connec-
tion with a
formof
Kantian
universalism.
However,
unlike
rights-based
theories,
which
attach to certain
putative
natural or
basic
properties
of the
individual,
our
duty-based rgument
does not idealize
any parti-cular formof
agency,
but is concerned
solely
withhow one should act
towards
others
(see
O Neill
1989
for
this
reading
of
Kant).
Moreover,
unlike Raz s ethical
liberalism,
t is directed
to
the
preconditions
of
political
communication rather
than to the detailed conduct
of social
life at
large.
It is
political
in
leaving
the
choice
of
specific
policies
for
what
is
owed to
whom to be determined
by
the
deliberative
process
itself.
IV. THE POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE DISTANCE
To illustrate the
merits of this
approach,
we offer two concrete
examples.
That such an exercise
s
possible
in
itself
ignals
an
advantage
over rival
conceptions
of
political ustice,
which
so often fail to
engage
critically
ith
the real world.
The
first
xample,
by way
of comment
on Rawls
Liberty
principle,
continues our remarks
bout what a reasonable
pluralism
is to make
of the
position
of women
in
a
society
marked
by
illiberal
practices.
n
so far as the question is whether to tolerate the intolerant,we echo
Milton s
Areopagitica:
I
cannot
raise
fugitive
nd cloistered
irtue,
nexercised
nd
unbreathed,
that
ever allies ut nd
seesher
dversary,
ut
links utofthe
race,
where
that
mmortal
arland
s to be
run
for,
otwithout
ust
nd
heat.
In
insisting
n
a
metaphysical
grounding
for
a
principle
of
equal
lib-
erties for
all,
we
bypass
the subversive
thought
that
unsexed,
risk-
inclined individuals
behind
a
veil
of
ignorance
might assign
some
women to drudgery nd gamble on not turning ut to be among them.
We
also
deny
that
the
Liberty rinciple
can be classed
as
a matter
where
a liberal can
agree
to
disagree
with the
intolerant,
by deploring
the
subjection
of women while
recognizing
the
right
of
the
oppressors
to
get
on with
t.
?The Editors
f The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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16 RICHARD BELLAMY
AND
MARTIN HOLLIS
But this does not
dispose
of
two
more awkward
spects
of the
prin-
ciple.
What
if
there are women who are content with ubservient oles
and
regard
a
liberal rescue
as
illegitimate aternalism?
ince this can
indeed be the case in a plural society,male authorscannotmerely ulk,
like
knights
expostulating
that the infuriateddamsel cannot
possibly
prefer
he
dragon
they
have slain to them. The
point
at
issue concerns
the status
of
preferences
n
a
liberal
theory.
n market
versions
of the
club,
where
the
customer
s
alwaysright,
here s no
scope
for
arguing
that
preferencesmay
be
contrary
o
real
interestsbecause
shaped
by
the
existing
distribution
f
power.
We see no need for a
metaphysical
liberalismto
let itself
be
cloistered
by
this
ine.
Nor,
we
might
add,
do
liberal women feminists.
Once the
preconditions
of
reasonable dis-
course include considerations f social
empowerment,
owever,
prefer-
ences cease to
be
simply given .
Those formed
after
he
dust and heat
have subsided are to
be
respected
and
they
can still
be for
a woman s
role of a sort
to
disappoint
a
feminist.
he
liberal
metaphysic
nsists n
equal
liberties or
all,
without
upposing
that
no one
could
then reflec-
tively
hoose
to
forgo
some of them. But
such
a
choice threatens
he
liberal trust
n
the
spread
of
enlightenment
nd
it
may
be
that t has
to
be
an
option
which
only
a
few are allowed.
In
the last resort iberals
cannot let theRechtsstaatade out unexercised and unbreathed.
Relatedly,
here
s
an awkward
uestion
about the
line
between
public
and
private
for a
theory
which
denies that
ustice
can
be
purely
a
pro-
cedural notion. In
homes,
as
in
markets,
cquiescence
is
not
always
o
be read
as consent.
Here we
endorse
the
proposition
that
the
personal
is the
political.
But that
does
not
give
the
plural, yet
iberal,
common-
wealth the
right
r
duty
o
regulatepervasively.
We
envisage
a
three-fold
grouping
of
issues,
into
those
where the
Liberty principle
must be
upheld,
those where it
definitely
orbids
intervention
nd
those
in
between,wherethe outcome is a matterfor
political
debate.
Examples
are domestic
violence,
adult
homosexuality
nd
varieties
f
pornography
respectively.
ut the
topic
is
too
complex
for
the
present
paper
and we
leave
it with
the
remark
that a distinctionbetween
public
and
private
remains as crucial for a liberalismwhose notion of
ustice
has a
moral
foundation
as it
is
difficult o
determine.
The
second
example
is
by
way
of comment on Rawls
Difference
rin-
ciple.
The
issue of welfare
distribution
as
been
at the
heart of recent
debates about liberal ustice. On the one hand, contractarianshave
sought
to
generate
abstract rules
of
ustice,
ranging
from Rawls two
principles
to
Nozick s historical
theory
of
just
transfer.On
the other
hand,
communitarianshave
attempted
to view welfare s a
social
good
that should
be
distributed
n
accord either
with
the norms of a
specific
?The Editors
f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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LIBERAL
JUSTICE:
POLITICAL AND METAPHYSICAL
17
culturalcontext or
with ome
view
of
human
flourishing.
ontractarian
theories fail for the two reasons
explored
in
?I.
They
cannot
explain
why
the well-favoured
ill be
moved
to
comply
with a
general
welfare
principle,once theyknowthemselves o be among those whowould do
better
by self-help.
Moreover,
they disagree
so
much about
even
the
abstract haracter
of an
impartial heory
f
ustice
thatnot
even
an
over-
lapping
consensus
on
the matter s
in
sight.
n
short,
hey
tand too far
back
from he
problem.
Yet,
f
contractarian heories re
under-determ-
ined,
communitarian
ones stand too close to
prevailingpractices
and
are
over-specific.
f the
debate about how resources
are
to be
distributed
could
be
resolved
by
appealing
to
communal
values,
t
could never have
arisen
in
the first
lace.Our
approach
brings
togethermetaphysical
nd
political,
ndividual-
istic and communitarianconsiderations. Libertarians
rgue
that there
can be
no
human
right
o
welfare,
n
the
grounds
that there can be
no
correlative
universal
duties on
anyone
to
help everyone
n
need.
This
argument
tems
from the
individualism t the
root of
the
club
model,
and can be countered
only
f
duties nclude
imperfect bligations,
which
are wider than correlative ndividual
rights
nd
prior
to them. Rawls
enthusiasm
n
PL
for
reciprocity,
s
distinct
from
mutual
self-interest,
mightdo the trick.But his theory emains too grounded in an individu-
alism of
nterests o
generate
a
general
social
duty.
Communitarians
an
do
this,
but
in
a form
oo
specific
o
particular
ommunities.
Moreover,
we see no
intrinsic
reason
why
the
communitarian
argument
should
relate
one
to other
members of
one s state
rather
than
ust
to
one s
family
r
ethnic
group,
unless states
have
(or
ought
to
have)
a
greater
degree
of
homogeneity
han
they urrently
manifest.
From our
perspective,
n
contrast,
he
denial
of
a
universal
bligation
to
help
othersfalls
foul
of
the
central moral
commitments f a
political
theory
fjustice.
The denial draws ts
plausibility
rom n
implicit ppeal
to a
model
of
idealized
independent agents.
These
paragons
of
self-
sufficiency pparently
suffernone of the
usual
human frailties nd
requirements,
uch
as the
propensity
o fall sick
and the need for
food,
that ead
ordinary
men
and women to call
on the
help
and
support
of
others at
various times
n
their
ives
particularly
n
childhood and old
age.
According
to our
duty-based
iew,
however,
principle
of
universal
indifference
ould never
be
adopted among
ordinarilyneedy
and vul-
nerable human beings.Ifwe are onlyto adopt principles ll can act on,
then we
must
necessarily eject
those that undermine
or
threatenthe
capacity
for
agency
of others.
Nevertheless,
he
duty
o establishedremains
an
imperfect bligation.
This
does not
imply
that we
have
no
duty
to
do
anything.
Rather,
the
?The Editors
f
The
Philosophical
uarterly,
995.
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8/9/2019 Liberal Justice, Political and Metaphysical (Bellamy)
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18 RICHARD
BELLAMY
AND MARTIN
HOLLIS
argument
reates a
requirement
o create welfare
rrangements
nd to
allocate
recipients
of
welfare
to
agents
and
agencies capable
of
supply-
ing
these needs. Institutional
ights
to welfare can
be
tailored to the
character nd conditionsofparticular ocieties. Such rights apturethe
more
special
obligations
to
help
others which most
of
us
feel
we
have
or
which,
so far as the
greater
ociety
s
concerned,
have
been
created
throughpolitical
commitments
f a
piecemeal
nature.
In
other
words,
a
metaphysics
which
makes sense of our moral
obligations
needs
to be
supplemented
by
more
specificpolitical
obligations.
need to
know,
for
example,
why
my
general
moral
obligation
to
help
others should be
fulfilled
y
giving
o
the
National
Health Service
ratherthan
to Oxfam
for
relief
n
the
Third
World. This seems
to us
to be the
only way
to
understand the
growth
f the welfare tate.
V. CONCLUSION
Metaphysics
s
necessary
o determine those minimum
tandards
of
ust
condutct hich iberals
nsist
re owed to all human
beings.
Politicsboth
enables us
to
appreciate
these basic
obligations
by
bringing
s into com-
municationwith
our
fellow-citizens,
nd makes
possiblepracticalagree-ments that
go
beyond
this bare minimum
by
providing
the extensive
public
services
necessary
to
the
functioning
f
a
well-orderedmodern
state.
Liberal
ustice
needs
to
be
both
metaphysical
nd
political.
Universityf
East
Anglia
REFERENCES
Gauthier,
D.
1986:
Morals
byAgreement
Oxford UP).
Hobbes,
T.
1651:
Leviathan,
d. RichardTuck
(Cambridge
UP,
1991).
Locke,
J.
1689:
A
Letter
oncerning
oleration,
d.
J.
Horton and
S. Mendus
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