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Global Governors and Local Governance:
The Transnational Campaign for Integrated Watershed Management in
Ecuadorian Municipalities1
Craig M. Kauffman, Ph.D. Candidate, The George Washington [email protected]
Paper Presented at the 52nd Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal,
Canada, March 16-19, 2011
Abstract
This paper examines how a transnational network advocating norms and policies associated withIntegrated Watershed Management (IWM) altered subnational governance structures within
Ecuador, resulting in de facto decentralization. The paper traces the network connections behind
campaigns to establish IWM reforms in six Ecuadorian local governments. The pathways ofinfluence involve direct interaction between transnational and local actors, with relatively littleinvolvement by the state, and thus differ from most studies of transnational campaigns. I argue
that characteristics of the campaigns three subnational targets (local politicians private
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that characteristics of the campaigns three subnational targets (local politicians private
Introduction: Transnational Actors and De Facto Decentralization
Since 2000 a number of Ecuadorian local governments have implemented Integrated
Watershed Management (IWM) reforms to manage natural resources in an environmentally
sustainable yet socially and economically beneficial way. This paper analyzes how a
transnational network of actors advocating IWM norms and policies altered subnational
governance structures within Ecuador. Coalitions of these global governorsenvironmental
activists, technical experts, and members of donor agencies and inter-governmental organizations
(IGOs)developed alliances directly with local governments and civil society to construct new
policies and institutions for managing water-related natural resources in a more integrated and
sustainable way. When successfully implemented these new policies and institutions
significantly altered subnational governance models. They changed local production practices,
altered local socio-political relations, and constituted new powers for local governments
consistent with political and fiscal decentralization.
This paper analyzes transnational campaigns to establish IWM reforms in five
2
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(local politicians, private landowners, and water user groups) were not vulnerable to the kind of
coercion by external actors described in most models of how TANs affect policy change. As a
result, resistance to IWM reform was not overcome through pressure from above and below,
but rather from beside as IWM advocates persuaded the three targeted groups to exert coercive
pressure on each other.
Ecuadors IWM reforms provide an interesting lens for analyzing changes in local
governance because they constitute a form of de facto decentralization. The specific reforms
analyzed in this paper include the creation of two institutions: (1) a stable, local financing
mechanism to fund watershed management activities, and (2) a participatory decision-making
structure to design and manage these activities at the local level. I argue that these reforms
constitute fiscal and political decentralization, respectively. There are many definitions of
decentralization, but most stress the process by which local governments gain the autonomy to
make policy decisions (political decentralization) and control revenue and expenditures (fiscal
decentralization) in at least one policy area.3 The institutions and responsibilities for local
watershed management approximate those that were to be transferred under Ecuadors 1997
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Transnational Advocacy Coalitions Going Local
The process by which transnational advocacy coalitions take norms and policy agendas
developed at the international level and attempt to implement them at the subnational level
remains relatively under-analyzed. Subnational actors are more often analyzed in terms of their
role in bringing local issues to a global discourse through a process Tarrow (2005) calls
externalization (della Porta et al. 2006; Martin 2010; Andonova et al. 2009). To the extent the
causal arrow is reversed, studies typically analyze transnational campaigns seeking policy
change at the national rather than subnational level. Here, the targets are national politicians
who set state policy regarding human rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lutz and Sikkink 2001;
Hawkins 2002), intellectual property (Deere 2009; Drahos 2007), the environment (Khagram
2002; Conca 2006; Andonova 2008), democratization (Riker 2002; Carothers 2004; Buxton
2006), and various other issues.
There are three common models for describing the pathways by which transnational
advocacy networks pressure national leaders, and thus influence normative and policy change
within a state. The cascade model comes from regime theory and argues that policies reflected
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states to adopt policy reform. States are still the main targets and source of coercive pressure.
Local governments are largely ignored.
There are relatively few studies on transnational campaigns seeking policy change at the
subnational level. Notable exceptions include those that study the Agenda 21 campaign related
to sustainable development that emerged from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (Bulkeley and Betsill
2003; Barrett and Usui 2002; Evans and Theobald 2003; Bulkeley and Kern 2006). The
sustainable cities literature in particular examines local governments and their role as both
campaign targets and activists in networks of local governments advocating environmentally
sustainable policies (Bulkeley 2010; Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Toly 2008; Haughton and
Hunter 1994). These and other recent studies ascribing a greater role to subnational actors have
called for a multilevel approach to analyzing global governance, one that recognizes the complex
interactions among actors at the subnational, national, and transnational levels (Betsill and
Bulkeley 2006; Martin 2010).
This paper differs from existing studies in two ways. First, studies of campaigns
targeting local governments focus overwhelmingly on large urban areas in highly industrialized
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relative lack of state involvement, either as target or activist. Instead, these cases suggest a
model characterized by direct interaction among transnational and subnational actors.
Integrated Watershed Management & Ecosystem Services
The consolidation of sustainable development as a dominant international norm during
the 1990s brought to prominence a particular approach to watershed management called
Integrated Watershed Management (IWM), also known as Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM) when the focus is more directly on a watersheds water resources.5
IWM
is defined as the process of coordinating conservation, management and development of water,
land and related natural resources across sectors within a given watershed in order to maximize
the resultant economic and social benefits in an equitable manner while ensuring the
sustainability of related ecosystems.6
The IWM approach is integrated in that water is seen as integrated within the larger
ecosystem, and thus requires a holistic approach that recognizes the interaction between water
resources and other components of the ecosystem, including vegetation, soil, and biodiversity
(ECE 2004; Gregersen et al. 2007). Water is typically framed in terms of ecosystem services,
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(Clleri 2009). These ecosystem services link the conservation and sustainable use of forests and
pramos with the quantity and quality of water available to communities down stream. Given
this ecosystem approach, watershed management activities are framed in terms of protecting and
recuperating the ecosystem services within watersheds (Garzn 2009; Cordero 2008; Ravnborg
et al. 2007). To achieve an equitable balance among the competing uses of watershed resources,
IWM calls for all stakeholders to be included in decision making through a participatory process
(Jaspers 2003; Gleick 1998).
Local IWM Reforms in Ecuador: Measuring Success
The IWM reforms analyzed here involve the creation of new policies and institutions to
implement the IWM approach. In particular, I analyze two institutional reforms. The first
involves the creation of a local financing mechanism designed to provide stable funding for the
protection and recuperation of ecosystem services provided within a watershed. While these
mechanisms are often referred to as payment for ecosystem services (PES), most are not
strictly PES systems.8 Rather, they cover a broad array of instruments for protecting and
regulating watershed ecosystem services. These financing mechanisms vary in terms of the
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IWM activities, which are therefore not dependent on the vagaries of outside donors. Third, the
financing mechanisms are controlled and managed by local actors.
The second institutional reform is the creation of a local, participatory mechanism that
includes multiple stakeholders in the watershed management decision-making process. Examples
include watershed councils and management committees (Lpez et al. 2007; Lloret 2007;
Dourojeanni et al. 2002). The particular design and structure of the participatory mechanism
varies from case to case, but at a minimum each provides a forum for multiple stakeholders to
jointly identify problems, set priorities, and oversee watershed management activities.
To measure the success of IWM reforms I developed an index of 15 indicators
representing four qualities associated with good governance: consensus, inclusiveness,
effectiveness, and sustainability (see Appendix 1). These measurements are consistent not only
with those found in other studies of watershed management (Sabatier 2005; Pea and Solanes
2003; Ostrom 1999), but also with indicators used by scholars studying local governance in
general. Effectiveness is at the core of most definitions of good governance (Grindle 2007;
World Bank 2007; Crook and Manor 1998). Consensus and inclusiveness capture the elements
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successful, two cases (Ibarra and Pastaza) were relatively unsuccessful, and the results in Zamora
were mixed.
The Transnational IWM Network: Forming Coalitions in Ecuador
Ecuador is a good place to study IWM reforms because it is the site of two pioneering
reform models in Latin America. While Costa Rica pioneered a national level PES program in
1997 (Pagiola 2006), two of the first voluntary, decentralized mechanisms for protecting
watershed ecosystem services emerged in Ecuador (Albn and Wunder 2005). In 2000, the
municipality of Pimampiro launched its PES program to protect the watershed where its drinking
water originates.9
The same year, the Fund for the Conservation of Watersheds (FONAG) was
established in Quito to finance and manage conservation and ecologically sustainable
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directly, FONAG invests donations from water consumers in a trust fund used to finance a
variety of projects to protect and restore watershed resources.
The six cases analyzed in this paper constitute attempts to replicate the Pimampiro and
FONAG models throughout Ecuador. A separate transnational advocacy coalition was
established around each model with the goal of replicating that model through a series of
campaigns. The two coalitions emerged from separate strands of the transnational IWM network,
one linked to the Global Water Partnership and the other linked to the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO). I argue that the pattern of network coalitions explains the variation in
which IWM reform model was pursued in a given area.
The emergence of the transnational IWM network as part of the larger sustainable
development movement has been well documented elsewhere (Conca 2006, 2007; Rahaman and
Varis 2005; Tern 2005). Efforts to craft an international consensus on the IWM approach
occurred through a series of international conferences, most notably the 1992 International
Conference on Water and Environment in Dublin, the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro, the 2000 and 2003 World Water Forums, and the 2002
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transnational network emerged and reached into Ecuador, where it promoted its IWM agenda
with significant effect. Three major IGOsthe World Bank, UNDP, and FAOserved as nodes
for the transnational IWM network. Out of these, two distinct advocacy networks emerged in
Ecuador, each promoting an alternative IWM model.
The GWP Network
The Global Water Partnership (GWP) was created in 1996 as a joint initiative of the
World Bank, the UNDP, and the Swedish International Development Agency to institutionalize a
global water governance regime based on the principles and action plans developed in Dublin
and Rio de Janeiro. GWPs activities initially focused on establishing regional Technical
Advisory Committees as start engines for raising awareness of water resources management in
each region (GWP 2010). The GWPs South American Technical Advisory Committee
(SAMTAC) was initially a project of the UNs Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (CEPAL, for the Spanish acronym). A number of water experts based in CEPALs
Division of Natural Resources and Infrastructure served as SAMTAC members. These CEPAL
expertsmost notably, Axel Dourojeanni, Miguel Solanes, and Humberto Peawere
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a strategic alliance with CEPAL to promote its development policies, including integrated
watershed management, throughout Latin America.13
During the 1990s, Ecuadorian development activists were influenced by the ideas
emerging from CEPAL due to their membership in the epistemic community of water experts
(Haas 1992). For example, writings by Dourojeanni framing IWM as a way to minimize water
conflicts attracted the attention of experts in rural development organizations like CESA and
IEDECA, whose work was complicated by severe water conflicts in Ecuadors mountain region
(Cabezas 2010).14
As a result, local development organizations shifted their focus from technical
improvements of water delivery systems toward a holistic approach that incorporated the social
component of resource management and linked the conservation of watershed resources to
improved irrigation and production (Chontasi 2009; Cruz 2009). This shift in worldview and
strategy led local development NGOs to advocate IWM reforms throughout the Andean region.
Two key brokers illustrate the various connections between the GWP network and
Ecuadorian institutions involved in IWM reform. One is Pablo Lloret, an Ecuadorian water
expert who became FONAGs Technical Secretary and a president of GWP-SAMTAC (GWP
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of the Technical University of Loja (UTPL), the institution in charge of coordinating GWPs
Ecuadorian network. Lpez is also a founder of Arcoiris, a local environmental NGO that, along
with UTPL, has been promoting FONAG-style water funds throughout southern Ecuador. As
both an environmental activist and technical expert Lpez is emblematic of GWPs influence
with both Ecuadors environmental advocacy network and its network of development experts.
Coalition to Create FONAG and Replicate the Model
The coalition to develop FONAG and similar trust funds for protecting watershed
ecosystems in Ecuador emerged from the merging of three trends: (1) the rise of ecosystem
services as part of the IWM agenda described above; (2) the international environmental agenda
to promote national parks and protected areas; and (3) the rise of Ecuadors environmental
movement around the conservation of national parks.17
The environmental movement in Ecuador developed around a conservationist agenda
closely linked to the creation of national parks, an agenda that was strongly pushed by
transnational environmental actors. During the 1970s a number of IGOs (e.g., World Bank,
FAO, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources - IUCN)
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environmental NGO, Fundacin Natura (Nature Foundation), founded in 1978. Fundacin
Natura grew rapidly due to large grants from USAID and money from debt-for-nature swaps
engineered by WWF (Meyer 1993; Echavarria 2010). During the 1990s the growing interest in
conservation throughout Ecuador and a desire to access resources from external NGOs and donor
agencies led to an explosion of local environmental NGOs (Ortiz Crespo 1998).
The idea to create FONAG can be traced to Juan Black, a long-time Ecuadorian
conservationist. Black was the first conservation officer in the Galapagos Islands and later
directed Fundacin Antisana (FUNAN), a local NGO created to protect the Cayambe-Coca and
Antisana ecological reserves (Morton 2004). In 1992 Black became director of TNCs Latin
American regional office, based in Quito, working on the USAID-funded Sustainable Use of
Biological Resources (SUBIR) program. At the time, Ecuadorian conservationists and their
transnational allies were concerned with how to fund the parks system in Ecuador. Like many
developing countries, Ecuadors government devoted few resources to conserving protected
areas. It was Black who first developed the idea that the Cayambe-Coca and Antisana ecological
reserves should be compensated for the water they funnel to Quito (Echavarria 2010).
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watersheds had been established (Echavarria 2010). In this way concepts related to IWM and
ecosystem services coalesced with Ecuadors movement to fund the national parks system.
Troya, Jervis and Echavarra designed the proposal for FONAG drawing on ideas from
national-level programs in other countries as well as publications by ecosystem services scholars
like Robert Costanza.18
In 1998 TNC, Fundacin Antisana, and USAID presented the proposal,
which received strong political support in Quito, largely because the transnational environmental
network reached far into the municipal government (Troya and Curtis 1998; Arias 2009). Then-
mayor Roque Sevilla was an environmental activist who had served as Director of WWF and
President of Fundacin Natura. With Sevilla providing the political will, FONAG was created in
2000, with the municipal water company, EMAAP-Q, taking a strong leadership role.
The intention to replicate the FONAG model throughout Ecuador was present from the
beginning, and TNC began organizing campaigns almost immediately (Troya and Curtis 1998;
Echavarria 2010). They first promoted FONAG through a series of publications and
conferences, including through CAMAREN and the Water Resources Forum. TNC enlisted the
support of USAID, which began funding experts from TNC, FONAG and universities like UTPL
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A second transnational advocacy coalition promoting IWM reforms in Ecuador
developed out of FAOs Community Forestry Development program (DFC, for its Spanish
acronym). Beginning in the 1970s the focus on sustainable and human development led
FAO to adopt new goals, such as poverty reduction and environmental sustainability (Prez-
Foguet et al. 2005). Community level forestry management became a basic component of
FAOs poverty reduction strategy and seen as essential to an integrated approach to natural
resource management (Tllez 2008). This sparked a rapid diffusion of projects based on
community forestry development with the goal of satisfying the material and non-material
needs of men and women farmers through improved management of water, soils, animals, and
vegetation (Kenny-Jordon et al. 1999).
The statement of principles regarding forests at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit recognized
the importance of forests for socio-economic development and called for international
cooperation to promote sustainable forestry in developing countries (UNCED 1992b).
Community forestry development programs were prioritized as the best way to implement
Agenda 21s action plan for sustainable agriculture and rural development (Espinoza et al. 1999).
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Since FAO was one of the major nodes around which the transnational IWM network
formed (Conca 2006), it is not surprising that Ecuadors pioneering PES scheme grew out of
FAOs DFC program.21
The PES program was originally proposed as part of the forest
management plan developed through DFC for the watershed providing water to the city of
Pimampiro (Albn and Wunder 2005). In 1997 several Ecuadorian DFC technicians founded the
local NGO CEDERENA (the Ecological Corporation for the Development of Renewable Natural
Resources) to facilitate community management of natural resources and ecosystem services
(Echavarria et al. 2004). In 1999, while working with Pimampiro landowners on a forest
management plan, CEDERENA experts identified a number of alternatives for the sustainable
use of forests, including PES. They included this innovative element after reading about Costa
Ricas PES system (CEDERENA 2002; Aazco 2011). After gaining the support of rural
landowners and city-dwellers, the Municipality of Pimampiro launched its PES program in 2000.
With support from FAO, the Inter-American Foundation, and CEDERENA, the municipality set
up a watershed management fund financed by a drinking water tax. Since then, money from the
fund has been paid to the watersheds landowners to compensate them for protecting the
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Local IWM Campaigns: Targets, Power, and Pathways of Influence
During the 2000s coalitions organized around TNC and CEDERENA each launched
campaigns to replicate their respective IWM models in different Ecuadorian cantons. The IWM
campaigns were like all transnational advocacy campaigns in that IWM advocates constituted
social entrepreneurs promoting new norms, in this case regarding natural resource management.
They targeted individuals engaging in bad behaviors (e.g., deforestation, burning pramos to
expand agriculture, and contamination of streams) and pressured them to change. However, there
were important differences between the sources of pressure and pathways of influence available
to IWM advocates and those described by the models commonly cited in the TAN literature.
Each local IWM campaign targeted three groups of subnational actors: local politicians
(the mayor and council members), landowners (individuals and communities living in the
watersheds catchment area), and users (water consumers, such as households, irrigation
councils, hydro-electric companies, and other businesses). These targets were not vulnerable to
the same sorts of external pressure described in models where campaign targets are leaders of
states, megacities, or international companies. Local governments in Ecuador are not well
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consequences since the goal of IWM reforms was to develop local sources of financing rather
than rely on external donations. As a result, IWM campaigns relied much more on persuasion
through the use of ideational power rather than coercion.
According to Deere (2009), ideational power is exercised when actors seek to influence,
alter, or build: (a) expertise, knowhow, and institutional capabilities, and (b) beliefs,
understandings, and discourse. IWM advocates exercised ideational power through three
mechanisms: network construction, strategic framing, and capacity building.22
Network
construction occurred through the creation of knowledge communitiesthe training of
watershed management experts and community promoters within local government and
community organizations. These local promoters served as important brokers between the
transnational IWM network and targeted groups.
Strategic framing was used to influence the discourse surrounding the issue of watershed
management and produce the motivation among targeted actors to support the reform process.
This involved identifying a problem and assigning blame (diagnostic framing), offering IWM
reforms as the most credible solution (prognostic framing), and creating a sense of urgency and a
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Through these mechanisms IWM advocates influenced how local governments
understood their environmental management obligations and options; altered perceptions of the
political climate and actors room to maneuver within it; shaped local perceptions regarding the
state of ecosystem services and the value of these services for production and socio-economic
development; and persuaded local actors of the importance of establishing IWM reforms. In
short, they created the motivation and capacity to reform.
Pressure from Beside: the Clockmaker Model.
In the cascade, boomerang, and spiral models, coercive pressure is placed on resistant
targets from above, through IGOs and more powerful states. Once a political space is opened
up, pressure is also exerted from below, since the targets are national-level leaders. But in
Ecuadors local IWM reforms the transnational coalition did not appeal to outside actors to
pressure recalcitrant targets since there was little vulnerability to such pressure. Rather, when
faced with resistance they attempted to persuade each of the targeted groups to pressure the
others. IWM advocates attempted to persuade local governments to pressure resistant landowners
and water users, for example, through the enforcement of ordinances and threats to expropriate
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exerted pressure, the clock (IWM reform process) ran. If one of the cogs stopped working, the
reform process broke down. In this metaphor the transnational advocacy coalition was like a
clockmaker that synchronized the cogs and wound the clock by creating the motivation and
capacity to participate in reforms through the mechanisms associated with ideational power.
Figure 2: Clockmaker Model of IWM Reform
Winding the Clock: A Process Model of Local IWM Campaigns
Like other examples of global governance, the transnational campaigns to establish local
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Richard Sarango, an IWM advocate in El Chaco, summed up the process quite succinctly
by saying, first you have to have the commitment of the technical experts to address this issue
[watershed management]. Later, you then convince the politicians. And then after this you work
to convince the people (Sarango 2010, my translation). As in the boomerang and spiral models,
transnational IWM advocates need domestic support. The first step, then, is to activate local
coalitions by creating alliances with local technical experts and environmental activists who
become the heart of each local IWM campaign. Once the local coalition is established, the next
step is to lobby local politicians since they serve as gatekeepers. However, the people
(landowners and water users) are the main targets since it is their behavior that IWM advocates
seek to change.
Phase 1: Local Coalition Activation
The first stage involves the decision to promote IWM reforms in a particular watershed
and the activation of a local coalition to pursue that goal. This happens through network
connections between local actors, who identify problems regarding natural resource use in a
particular area, and the transnational IWM network, which offers solutions based on IWM
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In each case, local actors identified problems related
to natural resource management in their respective
watersheds. In Tungurahua, Celica, and Ibarra, which
are located in the drought-plagued Andean highlands,
locals became concerned with access to and conflicts
over water. In the Amazon cantons of El Chaco and
Zamora, where water is plentiful, local concerns
related to the protection of neighboring ecological
reserves. In Pastaza, also in the Amazon region, local
landowners observed with alarm the effects of
deforestation and water contamination, including
reduced access to water in the city.24
In each case it was external IWM advocates who recommended specific IWM reforms as
a solution to these locally identified problems. In Tungurahua it was GTZs Project for
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based on IWM concepts. GTZ also facilitated the transfer of IWM concepts to Ibarra, albeit in
an indirect way. In the 1990s, PROFAFOR began working with the local community of Zuleta
to protect the pramos providing much of the water for the city of Ibarra. The wife of
PROFAFORs president is Doris Cordero, a Costa Rican expert on PES systems who worked for
GTZ on PROMACH in Tungurahua. Based on Corderos experience, PROFAFOR developed a
proposal to establish a PES program in Ibarra.
Efforts to establish a FONAG-style water fund in Zamora began in 2001 when Arturo
Jimenez, then-Director of the local conservation NGO Arcoiris, attended a conference on
FONAG hosted by TNC. It was there that Jimenez learned about financing mechanisms for
watershed management and decided to pursue something similar in Zamora (Jimenez 2010).
Over the following years Arcoiris, with support from TNC and FONAG, organized various local
actors, particularly technical experts within local universities and the municipal government, to
develop a coordinated strategy for pursuing IWM reforms. It was CEDERENA, and specifically
PES expert Robert Yaguache, who introduced the PES model to El Chaco and Celica as a
solution to their water-related problems. CEDERENA was looking for places to replicate its
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issues, organized social groups around these issues, and trained local community promoters who
later became IWM coalition members. The two most successful cases, Tungurahua and Celica,
illustrate this network construction process well. During the 1980s and 1990s programs such as
CAREs Project for the Sustainable Use of Andean Lands (PROMUSTA), IEDECAs
Conservation of Natural Resources and Irrigation in the Ambato Watershed (CORICAM), and
GTZs PROMACH organized landowners and water users and trained community promoters to
advance sustainable natural resource management techniques. A similar process occurred in
Celica during the 1990s through the Dry Forest Project (Proyecto Bosque Seco), which emerged
from FAOs DFC program and was implemented by the Dutch development organization SNV.
This network construction process occurred to a lesser extent in Zamora through the
Podocarpus Program and related programs sponsored by TNC, the Dutch government, and local
NGOs to protect Podocarpus National Park, much of which falls within Zamoras borders. El
Chaco also experienced a flurry of activity by TNC, GTZ, and Ecuadorian NGOs working to
protect the surrounding Condor Bioreserve. The two less-successful campaigns in Pastaza and
Ibarra are notable for their lack of previous community organizing around natural resource
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highly trained technical experts existed in the four more successful cases. In Pastaza, the
municipal government created its Department of Sustainable Development as the IWM coalition
was forming. Efforts to establish an EMU failed, and the department only partially focused on
environmental management. Ibarras municipal government created an EMU in 1999, but for
reasons described below only addressed contamination and not natural resource management.
It is important to emphasize that in each case the transnational IWM coalition included
actors that were both local and external to the watersheds in question. The influence of
transnational IWM coalitions on local governance should not be construed as external actors
imposing outside ideas on local actors in a hierarchical, unidirectional manner. The transnational
networks connecting coalition members constitute political spaces in which differently situated
actors negotiatethe social, cultural, and political meanings of their joint enterprise (Keck and
Sikkink 1998). While power dynamics certainly influence these negotiations, recent studies (and
the cases analyzed here) show that local actors from the global South are not powerless against
their northern counterparts; they appropriate global ideologies in distinct ways and alter the
normative underpinnings of campaigns in ways that shape strategies, goals, and outcomes (Fox
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council members, since they served as gatekeepers. The proposed IWM reforms involved
institutional changes that entailed local government ordinances, resources, and enforcement, all
of which required the support of local authorities. Transnational IWM advocates used their
network connections with environmental experts in municipal government EMUs to approach
local politicians and persuade them to place IWM reforms on their agenda.
In addition to framing IWM reforms as the best solution to a locally defined problem, a
key action by IWM advocates was to persuade local governments they had the power to manage
watershed resources. This was necessary because national environmental and decentralization
legislation was ambiguous and contradictory, creating confusion about the responsibilities of
different levels of government. While municipal governments were clearly responsible for
providing potable water and sanitation services in urban areas, their ability to engage in natural
resource management in rural areas was far from clear. IWM advocates strategically interpreted
passages of national legislation to frame IWM reforms as something that local governments not
only should do, but legally could do.25
The most illustrative example comes from Article 163 of the Municipal Organic Law,
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passages as justification for creating local financing and decision-making mechanisms for
integrated watershed management. By strategically interpreting national legislation as
empowering local governments to manage natural resources, and providing local governments
the motivation and capacity to do so, the IWM coalition facilitated de facto decentralization.
Break Point 1: Local Governments as Gatekeepers (e.g. Ibarra)
The first breaking point comes if the local government does not place the issue of IWM
reform on its agenda. Of the six cases analyzed, Ibarra provides the only example, and illustrates
the importance of strategically framing watershed management as a power of local government.
Ibarras municipal government created an Environmental Control and Management Unit
(ECMU) in 1999, spurred by a desire to manage natural resources in a decentralized fashion
(Trujillo 2010). In the end, however, the ECMU did not address natural resource management,
but rather focused on brown issues related to urban contamination. This is because Ecuadors
Ministry of Environment convinced the municipality that natural resource management was
outside their jurisdiction. Explaining the reason not to develop the capacity for natural resource
management, then-ECMU director Rosario Trujillo said natural resources were not within the
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An opening came in 2003 through the municipal water company, EMAPA-I. The new
director, Alvaro Castillo, was a water expert trained in IWM concepts. He created an
environmental management unit within EMAPA-I, recognizing the need to protect the
watersheds that provide the companys water. It was with EMAPA-I that PROFAFOR
developed its proposal for a PES program. However, Ibarras mayor and municipal council
members chose not to move forward with the proposal, and the campaign to establish IWM
reforms effectively died (Cordero 2009; Villalba 2009, 2010).
Phase 3A: Agenda Setting and Mobilization Within Society
Once IWM advocates got the go-ahead from local authorities, the next step was typically
to approach landowners since changing their behavior was a primary goal of the campaign.
Water user groups were the third target since they (along with landowners) were asked to
collaborate by contributing to the financing mechanism, participating in decision-making bodies,
and changing the way they use natural resources. The targeting of these groups was not a linear
process; IWM advocates worked with both groups simultaneously, but they often began with
landowners. When faced with resistance among landowners, the coalition typically focused on
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politicians fears by mobilizing in support of the reforms. IWM advocates facilitated this process
by conducting surveys to demonstrate landowners and users willingness to participate and pay.
Resistance among landowners came from the fact that IWM norms conflicted with
dominant local norms supporting the exploitation of natural resources to expand agricultural
production in order to reduce poverty. The idea that farmers should not expand the agricultural
frontier through deforestation, should remove their animals from the watershed, and should
change traditional production practices often bred fierce resistance. Overcoming this resistance
involved strategically framing watershed management as an integral part of the economic
production cycle, and therefore directly linked to poverty reduction. This was best illustrated in
Tungurahua, where IWM advocates linked the protection of watersheds to sufficient water for
irrigation, which would expand production, which in turn would reduce poverty through
improved marketing and sales. The results of this framing strategy are reflected in the words of a
local farmer, who said we have to work to improve the pramos because it is gold; it is what
makes the markets function. If there are improvements in my products, I can provide better
education for my children. Ill have money to go to the doctor (my translation). It was no
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advocates were more successful in mobilizing support among social actors when they employed
a frame displacement strategy that redefined the hegemonic production frame to include IWM,
rather than a counterframing strategy, such as one that countered the production frame with an
alternative conservation frame.26
Break Point 2A: Failure of Social Mobilization (e.g. Pastaza)
This phase may be the most vulnerable point in the process. Even if political support is
there, the reforms cannot meaningfully move forward without social support. There is little even
local governments can do if landowners refuse to participate. Municipal governments technically
have the authority to confiscate land for conservation, forcing owners to sell at market value, but
mayors are reluctant to do this for fear of public backlash. Therefore, the main tactic has been to
mobilize social groups to pressure landowners and strengthen political support. But society may
also reject reforms, not wanting to pay an environmental tax to finance management efforts.
Gaining this social support requires an extensive and sustained education campaign that uses
strategic framing to motivate people and that mobilizes them into action by organizing events,
providing information, and building capacity through training and organization. This process is
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regular contact either with landowners or society as a whole. A German intern was the only one
who regularly visited landowners, and the few outreach efforts among water users were carried
out by two U.S. Peace Corps volunteers (Garzn and Mancheno 2008; Bare 2009). The implicit
message was that the campaign was something being pushed by foreigners, without the active
support of local actors (Bare 2009). The combination of political will but a lack of social support
resulted in empty paper reforms. The local government passed an ordinance calling for
regulations on watershed resource use, the creation of a water fund, and a participatory decision-
making body to govern watershed management. But without the mobilization of social pressure
to advance these reforms they were never implemented. The IWM coalition soon disbanded.
Phase 3B: Making Rules
Institutionalizing new norms in the rules and procedures of key organizations is an
important part of the norm diffusion process (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink
1998). Once IWM coalitions succeeded in putting IWM reform on the local governments
agenda it worked with local authorities to institutionalize IWM norms through new rules,
procedures and institutions. This involved drafting ordinances to regulate land use practices as
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often included in the process of gathering information and identifying needs, and less frequently
in the process of designing ordinances, financing mechanisms, and participatory decision-making
bodies. Key activities in this phase include providing information on local ecosystem services,
demographics, economic activity, and experiences with IWM reform in other cantons; providing
legal advice; and supporting particular kinds of expertise, such as valuing ecosystem services and
other elements of reform design and implementation.
Break Point 2B: Rejection of Rules (e.g Tungurahuas 2002 PES Proposal)
Even if an IWM coalition succeeds in placing IWM reform on the agenda of both local
authorities and social groups, the proposed rules may be rejected, particularly when they are
developed without the involvement of local communities and are insensitive to local cultural
conditions. This happened in Tungurahua in 2002. GTZ originally proposed a PES-style
watershed management fund in Tungurahua in 2001 to be financed by a tax on water
consumption (GTZ 2001). Prefect Fernando Naranjo supported the proposal at the provincial
meeting of the Water Resources Forum in December 2001, saying an integrated approach to
watershed management and the promotion of a payment for ecosystem services program was a
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cultural traditions (Moreta 2009). The public outcry spooked the provincial government, which
quickly declared they would never accept a PES system.
Such rejection could easily spell the end of an IWM campaign. However, in
Tungurahuas case IWM advocates persevered and continued to promote an integrated approach
to watershed management sustained through a local financing mechanism. Reverting to phase 2,
they worked for five years to organize the provincial government, community and indigenous
organizations, water councils, and businesses through a more participatory process. This was
facilitated by the creation of a Water Parliament that served as a focal point for mobilizing
resources and activities and a space for stakeholders to debate and develop ideas. This Water
Parliament was part of a broader series of institutional changes within the provincial government
that were inspired by GTZs success in fostering a participatory, integrated model for governing
natural resources in the cantons of Cevallos, Tisaleo, Quero, and Mocha (Cruz 2009; Metais and
Cruz 2003; HGPT 2006).27
A turning point came in 2006 when indigenous organizations representing communities
in the pramos agreed to work with GTZ to develop their own proposal for a water fund. While
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groups produced a series of proposals, GTZ served as an important broker, negotiating the
support of other stakeholders. In the end the financing mechanism was modeled on FONAG due
in part to technical support provided by TNC and FONAG. In 2007, the Fund for the
Management of Pramos and Fight Against Poverty was established as a trust fund with
voluntary contributions from the provincial government, indigenous groups (landowners), the
municipal water company, and two hydroelectric companies (user groups).
The Tungurahua case illustrates the importance of creating institutions through which
multiple stakeholders can collaborate in the rule-making phase. These linking institutions serve
as a focal point for mobilizing resources and social will, a structure for maintaining the
participation of stakeholders, and a space where local actors can tweak reform models to be more
appropriate to local circumstances. One practical implication is that IWM advocates should
worry less about which IWM reform design they propose in a given locality. While proposing
options is an important role for IWM advocates, the more important roles are building local
capacity (training locals to have expertise in these issues) and providing spaces in which
stakeholders can meet and modify a proposed model to better suit local needs and norms.
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animals and human activity from catchment areas, conserving forested land, and recuperating
damaged areas. Often this happened through agreements to compensate landowners for altering
their production practices. Compensation came through the financing mechanism and could
include cash or, more commonly, in-kind benefits such as technical assistance to expand
alternate production activities and community development projects. Key activities in this phase
were providing information, technical and capacity assistance, and financing.
Break Point 3: Breakdown in Trust (e.g. Zamora)
Feedback effects mean that new problems may arise as the implementation process
creates issues that raise new challenges for rules (Avant et al. 2010). Perceptions of favoritism,
the failure to fulfill promises, and other problems with implementation can undermine trust in the
IWM coalition and the reform process in general. The case of Zamora illustrates this all too
well. Like Pastaza, attempts to mobilize support for an environmental tax among water users in
Zamora were relatively weak between 2005 and 2009 when the reforms were being designed and
implemented. The coalition member in charge of the socialization campaign lived in a
neighboring province and only came to Zamora once or twice a month, so there was little
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demonstrating a level of norm internalization, they refused to work with the NGO Arcoiris,
which had led the local IWM campaign. As a result, the implementation process stalled, and by
2010 IWM advocates were trying to reestablish a workable coalition.
The breakdown in Zamora illustrates the inter-dependence of each of the three targeted
groups and demonstrates the delicate balancing act required, as described in the Clockmaker
Model. IWM advocates cannot focus on one targeted group at the expense of others. Successful
implementation requires mutual pressure to be exerted among each of the three targeted groups
simultaneously. The local government must pressure landowners to change natural resource use;
landowners must pressure water users for compensation; and water users must demand improved
services from local authorities. If IWM advocates have not synchronized each of these cogs in
the mechanism by the implementation phase, the reform process will likely break down.
Phase 5: Consolidation
This stage refers to the ability of the institutions created through the reform process to
adapt and address new issues as they arise, to deepen the level of institutionalization, to widen
the level of participation, and to expand watershed management activities. When successful it
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This phase is analogous to the internalization and habituation stages described in the
norm diffusion and democratization literatures (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Rustow 1970).
IWM reforms may still be reversed and face a number of challenges, including participation
fatigue, changes in local government administrations, challenges by rival coalitions advocating
alternative norms and practices, as well as conflicts among stakeholders and governors.
However, over time, as institutions mature and stakeholders become accustomed to new rules,
policies, and practices, IWM reforms come to be accepted as the most appropriate strategy for
natural resource management. The three more successful cases analyzed in this paper
Tungurahua, Celica, and El Chacohave only just begun this consolidation phase.
Conclusion
The cases analyzed here show how global governors advocating a global agenda related
to Integrated Watershed Management significantly altered local governance structures within
Ecuador. The benefits of IWM reforms should not be overstated. Nevertheless, when
successfully implemented the participatory and financing mechanisms changed how local
governments and civil society interact and provided local actors with greater autonomy to control
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The targets of subnational campaigns, particularly in the developing world, often lack the
connections with the global system that make them vulnerable to the pressures exerted by
transnational coalitions against targets operating at higher levels. As a result, transnational
actors must rely more on ideational rather than coercive forms of power. When faced with
resistance, transnational actors must look to local actors who can exploit targeted actors local
vulnerabilities. In the case of local IWM reforms this means persuading local actors to engage in
a mutually enforcing circle of pressure from beside rather than from above or below.
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Appendix 1: Index of Indicators Measuring Success of IWM Reforms
Governance
ConceptIndicator Tungurahua Celica El Chaco Zamora Ibarra Pastaza
Consensus
General consensus among local authorities, water users and landowners on broadprinciples and goals for watershed management (reflected in statements by group
representatives and surveys).
1 1 1 1 0 0
ConsensusGeneral consensus among local authorities, water users and landowners on specific
projects and work plans (reflected in work plans developed with broad socialparticipation and endorsed by members of all three groups)
1 1 0.5 0.5 0 0
ConsensusCompensation for conservation agreements between local authorities and landowners
exist for at least 20% of landowners in the prioritized areas of the watershed. Thisincludes sales of land for conservation.
1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0
EffectivenessDevelopment of a relatively comprehensive watershed management plan with specific
projects (reflecting planning capacity)1 1 1 1 0.5 0
EffectivenessA local financing mechanism was established with an initial capital investment (i.e. the
basic structure was established and has funds)1 1 1 1 0 0
EffectivenessImplementation of the watershed management plan has begun, according to timetable
set forth in plan.1 1 1 0.5 0 0
Effectiveness Abatement or prevention of point or non-point sources of pollution (e.g. fencing offstreams, restricting animal presence)
1 1 1 1 1 0.5
Effectiveness Restoration of vegetation, reforestation, and decline in deforestation in critical areas 1 1 1 1 1 0.5
Effectiveness A monitoring system exists with capacity to sanction violators 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0
Inclusiveness
A participatory mechanism was created to link various actors (e.g. local authorities,landowners, user groups) for decision-making on watershed management; an attempt
is made to involve representatives of affected groups (whether or not all choose to
participate).
1 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
InclusivenessMembers of local government, user groups, and landowners collaborate on key
decision-making processes1 0.5 0 0 0 0
InclusivenessMembers of local government, user groups, and landowners share responsibility for
implementing watershed management projects1 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0
SustainabilityLocal actors (e.g. water users) make regular contributions to the local financing
mechanism
1 1 1 0 0 0
SustainabilityLocal government ordinance allows regulation of watersheds (e.g. fencing off streams,
prohibition on deforestation, etc).0 1 1 1 0 1
SustainabilityEnvironmental management is well institutionalized (e.g.institutional mechanisms
exist for planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of watershed
management projects, facilitated by trained technical experts).
1 1 1 0.5 0 0.5
Total Score 13.5 13 12 8.5 4.5 2.5
Scoring rules: 0 = absence of criteria; 1 = presence of criteria; 0.5 = criteria is only weakly present, technically exists but not put into practice, or was present at
one time but not sustained.
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