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volume15,no.4 january2015

Non-Consequentialism

Demystified

Howard NyeUniversity of Alberta

David PlunkettDartmouth College

John Ku

© 2015 Nye,Plunkett,&KuThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/015004/>

1. Introduction1

Manymoraltheoriesholdthatwhatanagentmorallyoughttodoisdeterminedinpartbythegoodnessoftheoutcomesofthoseactionscurrentlyavailabletoher.However,somemoraltheoriesgofurtherandclaimthatwhatanagentmorallyoughttodoisdeterminedsole-ly by the goodness of the outcomes of her actions. Followingonestandardphilosophicalconvention,wewillcallthisstrongerthesisconsequentialism.2

It seemsquite clear thatbringing about goodoutcomes is onething that there ismoral reasontodo.Butwhy think thatpromot-ingthegoodistheonlythingthatmoralityprescribes?Onewayofdefendingthisthesisistoemploysubstantivenormativearguments,whichseektoshowthattheplausibilityofmoralreasonstodoother

1. This paper has benefited frommany conversations and fromwritten feed-backonmanypreviousdrafts.WewouldparticularlyliketothankLizAnder-son,DavidBraddon-Mitchell,JonathanDancy,StephenDarwall,TomDough-erty,AndyEgan,MylanEngel,RobertL.Frazier,AllanGibbard,BobGoodin,PaulHurley,NadeemHussain,FrankJackson,ChristineKorsgaard,IraLind-say,DustinLocke,TristramMcPherson,TimothyMichael,AlastairNorcross,Doug Portmore, Peter Railton, Ryan Robinson, Tamar Schapiro, Jeff Sebo,ScottShapiro,MichaelSmith,NicSouthwood,DavidVelleman,RalphWedg-wood,CarolineWest,and twoanonymousreaders forPhilosophers’ Imprint.EarlierversionsofthispaperwerepresentedattheUniversityofMichigan,EthicsDiscussionGroup(June2007),TheFirstAnnualRockyMountainEth-icsCongressattheUniversityofColoradoBoulder(August2008),andTheTwelfthAnnualOxfordGraduateConferenceinPhilosophyattheUniversityofOxford (November2008).Thanks toall thosewhoofferedus feedbackduringthosepresentations.

2. Whilethisdescriptionmaysuggestthatonlytheoriesthatemployanimpar-tialoragent-neutralkindofgoodnesscancountas“consequentialist”inoursense,itwillbecomeclearhowourargumentsextendtorelativizedversionsofconsequentialism(ofthekinddefendedbySen1983,Dreier1993,Smith2003,Louise2004,andPortmore2011).Thisuseof‘consequentialism’doesrestrictitsreferentto“direct”or“act-consequentialist”theories,accordingtowhichthemoralstatusofouractsisdeterminedexclusivelybythegoodnessoftheiroutcomes.Whilethesearethetheoriesonwhichwewillbefocusing,wewillalsohavesomethingtosayabout“indirectconsequentialist”theories,accordingtowhichthemoralstatusofouractsisdeterminedexclusivelybythegoodnessoftheoutcomesofsomethingelse(likeeveryone’sacceptingoractingonasetofrulesthatranksouractsincertainways).

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ableforamoraltheorytobeabletoexplainwhythereisreasonforustobemoralbyidentifyingthecontentofmoralitywithsomethingwhichgeneralfactsaboutthenatureofpracticalreasonsentailthereispracticalreasontodo.Thereseemstobeaninexorableconnectionbe-tweenthethoughtthatastateofaffairsisgoodandtheideathatthereis reason forus tobring itabout.While theremaybeotherequallyplausiblethoughtsaboutwhatthereispracticalreasontodo,liketheideathatthereisreasontopromoteone’sowninterestsorsatisfyone’sdesires,noneofthesethingscouldplausiblybeidentifiedwithwhatthereismoralreasontodo.Thus,theconsequentialistviewthatmoral-ityprescribesthatwebringaboutgoodstatesofaffairsnotonlyseemssubstantivelyplausiblebutoffersanexplanationofwhythereisrea-sontobemoral.Wewillcallthisthe“top-down”strategyofarguinginfavorofconsequentialism.5

asking“Whyshouldwetakemoralreasonstobegenuinepracticalreasons?”andthequestion‘Whybemoral?’asaskingeithertheforegoingor“Why,justbecausethemoralreasonsinfavorofdoingsomethingmorallyrequireustodoit,shouldwethinkthereisdecisivepracticalreasontodoit?”

5. Anumberofprominentadvocatesofconsequentialismemploysomeversionofthetop-downstrategy.Forexample,considerthecaseofSidgwick(1907).SinceSidgwickwasconcernednotmerelywithwhatthereismoralreasontodobutwithwhatthereispracticalreasontodo(seeBk.I,ch.iii),wecanreadhisargumentforthe“maximofBenevolence”inBk.III,ch.xiii,asholdingthat,justasitseemsself-evidentthatthereispracticalreasontoaimatone’sowngreatestgood,“thegoodofoneindividualisofnomoreimportance,fromthepointofview(ifImaysayso)oftheUniverse,thanthegoodofanyother….AndasarationalbeingIamboundtoaimatgoodgenerally…notmerelyataparticularpartofit.”So,Sidgwicksuggestsinhisconcludingchapter,ifourmoralreasons(or, inhisterminology,ourother-directedor“social”du-ties)exclusivelyfavorpromotingthe“universalGood”,practicalreasonwillendorsemoralreasons(evenifitalsothreatenstocontradictitselfbygivinganequallystrongendorsementofconflictingconsiderationsofself-interest).Similar(ifmore“instrumentalist”)argumentsaregivenbySmart(1956,353),Singer(1979,10–13and212–220),andRailton(1986,189–190and202–204).Thelogicallystrongestversionofthetop-downstrategydefendsateleologi-calconceptionofpracticalreasons[TCR],accordingtowhichallreasonstoactmustbereasonstobringaboutoutcomesthataregood(fromsomeper-spective,evenifnotfromanimpartialperspective).Forasustainedargumentalong these lines, seePortmore 2011 (althoughPortmoredoesnot puthisfavored version of TCR or consequentialism in terms of reasons to bringaboutgoodoutcomes, itwillbecomeclear fromouraccountofevaluative

thingsdoesnotwithstandreflectivescrutiny.3Manysuchargumentsbegin by observing that it is overwhelmingly plausible that therearemoralreasonstodowhatisgoodforothersandtoavoiddoingwhat isbad for them.Thesearguments concede that it is initiallyplausiblethattherearemoralreasonstodootherthings,likekeepourpromisesandrespect theautonomyofothers,evenwhenthisdoes not bring about the best overall consequences. Further, it isinitiallyplausiblethatreasonsnottoharmothersarestrongerthanreasonstobenefitthem,andthatreasonstobenefitourlovedonesarestrongerthanreasonstobenefitstrangers.Suchconsiderationsdo initially count against consequentialism. But, proponents oftheseconsequentialistargumentscontend,therearegoodreasonstodoubtthattheplausibilityofthesedistinctreasonsandweightingprinciplescanwithstandourgettingcleareraboutwhatexactlytheycouldamountto.Ifthisiscorrect,ourplausiblemoralreasonsofbe-neficenceandnon-malfeasancearebestseenasinstancesofmoralreasonstobringabouttheoverallbestoutcomes,whichexhaustthecontentofmorality.Wewillcallthisthe“bottom-up”strategyofar-guinginfavorofconsequentialism.

Asecondwayofdefendingtheconsequentialistthesis,oftenpur-suedintandemwiththebottom-upstrategy,istomaintainthatconse-quentialismenjoysakindofgeneraltheoreticaladvantagethatstems,not from the failure of non-consequentialist considerations towith-standscrutiny,butfromgeneralreflectionsonthenatureofmoralityand reasons to act.While it is controversialwhether there isneces-sarilyreasonforeveryonetobemoral,itseemsclearthatmoralityissomethingimportant,inthesensethatthereisstrongpracticalreasonformostpeopletobemoralmostofthetime.4Itthereforeseemsdesir-

3. SeeforinstanceSidgwick1907(esp.Bk.III,ch.xi,andBk.IV,ch.ii–iii);Ben-nett1966,1981,1995;Nielsen1972;Kagan1989;andNorcross2003.

4. Aswewillusethephrases,“practicalreasonstodoA”(orjust“reasonstodoA”withnofurthermodifier)areconsiderationsthatcountinfavorofdoing A inthemostgeneralnormativesense,while“moralreasonstodoA”arecon-siderationsthatcontributetoA’sdeonticstatusasmorallypermissible,right,orgoodtodo.Wecanunderstandthequestion‘Whycareaboutmorality?’as



cannot be a sufficient justificationof it, else slaveholderswouldbejustifiedinbelievingthatskincolorhasintrinsicmoralsignificance.7

Butwhileitseemsimplausibleintheabstractthatskincolorhasintrinsicmoralrelevance,itactuallyseems—atleastattheoutsetofinquiry—plausible in theabstract that inflictingharm is intrinsicallyworsethanfailingtoprovideaidandthatsettingouttoharmsomeoneisintrinsicallyworsethanharmingherasaforeseenconsequenceofone’sconduct. Indeed, the intrinsicmoral relevanceof these factorsseems—again,attheoutsetofinquiry—nolessdirectlyplausiblethantheideathatthereisageneralmoralrequirementtobenefitothersorpromotethegood.Ofcourse,ifKagancanshowthatthedirectplausi-bilityoftheintrinsicrelevanceofthedoing/allowingandintending/foreseeingdistinctionscannotwithstandcarefulclarification,hewillhavemadeacompellingcaseagainstnon-consequentialistconstraints,andsomeofhisargumentsthat“bringouttheproblemsandunpalat-ableimplicationsofadopting”themreallydotendinthisdirection.8 ButwhyshouldweagreewiththelegitimacyofKagan’sdemandthatproponents of constraints provide an independent justification forwhyweshouldacceptthembeyondtheirdirectplausibilityeven ifthisplausibility withstands the careful clarification of their content andhow theyapply tovarious cases?Nowhere inhisbookdoesKaganprovideasimilar,direct-plausibility-independentjustificationofmor-alreasonstopromotethegood,oranyreasontodoubtthat,ifsuchajustificationcouldbeprovided,plausibility-independentjustificationsofothermoralfactorscouldbejustaseasilyprovided.9

7. SeeespeciallyKagan1989,11–15,111–127,and165–182.

8. Wehaveinmindespeciallyhisexplorationsoftheimplicationsofthedoing/allowingdistinction fordecisionmakingunder risk (87–91); thepossibil-ity that thewayswedrawthedistinctionsaregerrymandered functionsof,and thuscannot justify,our intuitionsaboutparticularcases (101–106and138–144);andtheparticulardifficultyofconstructingaplausiblestoryaboutthemoralstatusofinterruptingaidinprogress(106–111).

9. Beyond,of course, simplyprovidingsome reasons to think thatno factorsother thanpromoting the good are genuinely relevantbecause their appar-entrelevancecannotsurvivecriticalscrutiny.Butthisdoesnotsupporttheasymmetricrequirementthatwemustprovideindependentjustificationsof

In thispaperweargue thatcloserattention towhy thereare rea-sonstopromotegoodoutcomesshowsthetop-downstrategytobeunsound.Wearguethattherearereasonstopromotegoodstatesbe-cause theseare states it isfitting todesire,desiringa state involvesmotivationtopromoteit,anditisageneralconceptualtruththattherearereasonstodowhatitisfittingtobemotivatedtodo.But,wecon-tend,thereiseveryreasontothinkthatsomefittingmotivesaimsim-plyatdoingoromittingcertainthings,ratherthanpromotingcertainstatesofaffairs.Indeed,wearguethatanact’smoralstatusconsistsinthefittingnessof feelingsofobligationtoperformoravoidperform-ingit,whichmotivesareinthefirstinstancedirectedattheactratherthanthestatesitbringsabout.Thus,weargue,thesameconnectionbetweenfittingmotivesandreasonstoactthatexplainswhytherearereasonstopromotethegooddirectlyexplainswhytherearereasonstobemoral,whether or notbeingmoralconsistsinpromotingthegood.

Webelieve that theunsoundnessof the top-downstrategy is im-portant,notonlybecauseexplicitusesof thestrategyhavebeen in-fluential, but because many consequentialist arguments that looklargelybottom-upgainsomeoftheirforcebytacitlyrelyinguponthetop-downstrategy.For instance,manyofShellyKagan’s(1989)argu-mentsagainstnon-consequentialistconstraintsondoingorintendingharmseektoshowthattheycannotbeclarifiedinwaysthatcomportwiththeintuitionsofthosewhoappealtothem.6ButKagangoesontoarguethatproponentsoftheseconstraintsfaceamoreimportantproblem,namelythatofjustifyingthemorexplaining whysuchfactorsasdoingorintendingharmshouldbesoimportant.Kagandoesnotpresenttheallegedneedtoindependentlyjustifynon-consequential-istconstraintsasembodyinganygrandiosetheoryabout thenatureofpracticalreasons;hesupportsitbyarguingthatthemerefactthatamoraltheoryfitsourintuitionsaboutwhattodoinparticularcases

judgmentswhywethinkTCRandevenrelativizedconsequentialismcanberoughlyputintheseterms).

6. SeeespeciallyKagan1989,87–111and128–165.



moral reasons against any acts save those that fail tominimize theextent towhichundesirable thingshappen in theworld. (ThekindofconcernthatNozickandSchefflerareexpressingissometimesre-ferred toas the “paradoxofdeontology”.)To takeone last example,AlastairNorcross(2003)offersseveralcompellingargumentsthatthedirectplausibilityofanintrinsicmoraldifferencebetweensomethinglikedoingandallowingharmornegativerightsagainstinterferenceandpositiverightstoaidcannotwithstandscrutiny.Buthegoesontoclaimthat,evenconcedingtheunchallengedplausibilityoftheviewthatnegativerightsareweightierthanpositiverights,“wealsoneedanexplanationof…why[negativerightsare]strongerthan[positiverights]”.10YetNorcrossdoesnotseemtothinkthatweneedanysimilarexplanationofwhywemorallyought topromote thegoodormini-mizeharm,evidentlybecauseheismystifiedbymoralreasonstodoanythingotherthanpromotethegood.

Why,then,aresomanyphilosophersmystifiedbytheideaofmoralreasonstodoanythingotherthanpromotethegood?Wethinkthatitisatacitsensethatmoralreasonstopromotethegoodaresupportedbythetop-downstrategy’sassertionthatmoralityshouldprovideuswithgenuinereasonstoact,andthatthepromotionofgoodoutcomesistheonlysufficientlymoral-lookingthingthathasacleartheoreticalpurchaseonourreasonsforaction.

Ouraiminthispaperistoshowthatthetop-downstrategyfails,butthatitismotivatedbygenuineconnectionsamongethicalevaluations,fittingmotives,andreasonstoact.Someauthorshaveheldthat theveryconceptofagoodstateofaffairsemployedbyconsequentialists

10.Norcross2003,457–458.LikeKagan,Scheffler, andmanyothers,Norcrossspeaksofanintrinsicmoraldistinctionbetweennegativeandpositiverightsashavingagreatdealof“intuitivesupport”,whichisunfortunatelyambigu-ousbetween (i)ourhaving intuitionsabout cases thatwouldbe capturedbythedistinction,and(ii)itsbeingplausibleintheabstractthatthereisanintrinsicmoral distinctionof this kind.But context suggests thatNorcrossintendsii(perhapsinadditiontoi);forinstance,heconcedestheplausibilityofaclaimthe content of whichassertstherelativepriorityoftherights,namely,“Myrightnottobepoisoneddoesseemstrongerthanmyright,ifany,tobegiventhefoodIneedtosurvive”(457).

WhatmakesKagan’s inability to find successful plausibility-inde-pendentargumentsinfavorofnon-consequentialistconstraintslookmore like an argument for consequentialism than a skeptical chal-lengetoourjustificationforholdinganymoralbeliefs?Itis,wethink,thefollowingcommonbackgroundassumption:

Mystification:Itisclearandobviousthatthereismoralreasontobringaboutthegood,butmysterioushowtherecouldbemoralreasontodoanythingelse.

We think that quite a few arguments against non-consequentialistprinciplestacitlyrelyonthemystificationassumption.PhillipPettit’s(1991)confidentpronouncementthatallmoraltheoriesmuststartbyspecifyingwhatisgoodandthenexhaustthemselvesbysayinghowweshouldrelatetothegoodwouldseementirelyquestion-beggingwereitnotthatthegoodseemedtohaveakindofunparalleledmoralrelevance.Similarly,thesuggestionofSamuelScheffler(1994,follow-ingRobertNozick1974)thatthereisan“apparentairofirrationalitysurrounding the claim that someactsare soobjectionable thatoneoughtnottoperformthemevenifthismeansthatmoreequallyweightyactsoftheverysamekindorothercomparablyobjectionableeventsensue” (82) clearly seems topresuppose the incomprehensibility of

non-consequentialistconstraintseven if their plausibility withstood scrutinybutnosimilarindependentjustificationsofmoralreasonstopromotethegood.Kagan is right that his stated aim of engagingwith non-consequentialistswhomheseesasalreadycommittedtomoralreasonstopromotethegoodrelieves him of the need to provide an independent justification of thesereasons (17–19). But he iswrong to think that the ad hominemnature ofhisargumentsentitleshimtousetheinabilityofhisopponentstoprovideplausibility-independent justifications of non-consequentialist constraintsas an argument against them without providing plausibility-independentjustificationsofmoralreasonstopromotethegood.Thisisbecause(a)thedemandforsuchjustificationsmaybeentirelyillegitimate,and(b)evenifitislegitimate,wehavenoplausibility-independentreasontothinkthatitwillbemoredifficulttogivetheseexaltedjustificationsfornon-consequentialistconstraintsthanitwillbetogivethemformoralreasonstopromotethegood,onceweseewhatonearththesejustificationsareandhowtheycanbegivenforanything.



outcomesandnon-moralreasonsmoregenerally,likeindirectconse-quentialismandcontractualism.12

Ifourargumentissuccessful,webelievethatitremovesanimpor-tant sourceof support for consequentialism.Since,aswehave indi-cated,manybottom-upargumentsforconsequentialismseemtorelytacitlyonthetop-downstrategy,wethinkitseliminationsignificantlyweakensthebottom-upcaseforconsequentialismaswell.Attheveryleast,we think that it forces consequentialists todemonstratemoredirectlywhynon-consequentialistprinciplesareimplausiblewithout12. Whatismostcentraltoourargumentistheexistenceofthefollowingconnec-

tionsbetweenethicalcategories,fittingattitudes,andreasonstoact:

(1) If something (e. g. stateS or actA) falls under an ethical category (e. g.goodnessormoral wrongness),thenitisfittingtohaveacertainmotivationtowardsit(e. g.topromoteSoravoidperformingA),and

(2)Ifamotivation(e. g.topromoteSoravoidperformingA)isfitting,thenthereisreasontoactasitwouldmotivateustoact(e. g.toactuallypro-moteSoravoidperformingA).

Inordertoarguethattheseconnectionsexist,wedefendparticular explana-tionsastowhytheyexist,namely:

(1*)Something’sfallingunderanethicalcategory(e. g.S’sbeinggoodorA’sbeingwrong) can be analyzed as its beingfitting tohaveparticularmo-tivationally ladenattitudestowards it (likedesires thatSor feelingsofobligationnottoperformA),and

(2*)What it is for there to be reasontoperformanact(e. g. topromoteSoravoidperformingA)isfortheacttoconstituteorachievesomethingthatitisfittingtobemotivatedtodoorachieve.

Webelieve thatmuchof our argumentwould remain sound if alternativeexplanationsof (1)and (2)werecorrect—for instance, if thefittingnessofattitudeswereexplainedbytheinstantiationofethicalcategories,orthefit-tingnessofmotiveswereexplainedbyreasonstoact.Butweargueinfavorofourparticularexplanations(1*)and(2*)becausewebelievethattheyarethebestexplanationsofconnections(1)and(2),andtheexplanationsmostcon-ducivetoourargument.Innotes21,34,and52weexplainhowourargumentcouldbemadetoworkifoneweretoinsistonexplanationsofconnections(1)and(2)otherthanthosewedefend.Wearegratefultotwoanonymousreaders forPhilosophers’ Imprint forpointingoutandencouragingus todis-cusswaysinwhichourmainargumentmostcentrallydependson(1)and(2),andcanremainsoundevenif(1*)and(2*)aremistaken.

is either incoherentordevoidof the theoretically independent con-nectiontopracticalreasonspresupposedbythetop-downstrategy.11 Against these authorswe showhowconsequentialists’ talkof goodstatesis intelligible,andhowthereis indeedadeeptheoreticalcon-nectionbetween good states and reasons to act. Butwe argue that,unfortunately for the top-downstrategy,onceoneunderstandswhy thisconnectionholds,itbecomesequallyclearhowtherecanberea-sons—indeedmoral reasons—to do things other than bring aboutgoodstates.

Insection2wevindicatetheintelligibilityandnormativeforceofgoodstatesofaffairsbyanalyzingthemasstatesitisfittingtodesire,andinsection3wedefendaconceptualconnectionbetweenthefit-tingnessofamotiveandtheexistenceofreasonstoperformtheactsitmotivates.Butwhilesomeofourmotivesarestate-directed,ormotivestobringaboutcertainstatesofaffairs,wecontendthatwehaveothermotivesthatareact-directed,whichare, inthefirst instance,motivessimplytodocertainthings.Insection4weshowhow,inthesamewaythefittingnessofstate-directedmotivesgeneratesreasonstopromotethegood,thefittingnessofact-directedmotivesgeneratesreasonstodootherthingsthatmaynotpromotethegood.Moreover,weargueinsection5 thatanact’smoralstatusconsists in thefittingnessofaparticularkindofact-directedmotive,namelyafeelingofobligationtoperformoravoidperformingit.Thismeansthatthesameconnectionbetweenfittingmotives and reasons to act that explainswhy therearereasonstopromotethegoodequallyexplainstheconnectionbe-tweenanact’smoralstatusandreasons fororagainstperforming itquiteindependentlyofwhethertheactpromotesthegood.This,wecontend,demystifieshowtherecouldbemoralreasonstodoanythingotherthanpromotethegood.Weconcludeinsection6byexamininghowourargumentmaybeextendedtounderminethemotivationsforothertheoriesthatviewmoralconsiderationsassubordinatetogood

11. SeeespeciallyTaurek(1977,304–306),Foot(1985,202–209),andThomson(1994,12–14).



Incontrast topragmaticreasons,considerations likethefact thata stateofaffairswould involvechildrenbeinghappydonot simplycountinfavorofgettingyourselftodesireit—theymakeadesireforitfittingorappropriate.Thesefittingness reasonstodesireastatethatconstituteitsbeingfittingtodesireitaretheonesthatconstituteitsgoodness.Ananalysisoftheconceptgoodstatesofaffairsintotheconcept reasons for desire should thus be in terms of fittingness,ratherthanpragmatic,reasons.15Ofcourse,iftheconceptofafitting-nessreasontodesireastatejustwasthatofaconsiderationthatbearsonwhether thestate isgood, thissortofanalysiswouldbecircular.Wethink,however,thatthedistinctionbetweenjudgmentsaboutfit-tingnessasopposedtopragmaticreasonsforattitudescanbemadesenseofwithout invokingethical concepts likegoodness.16Whileafullaccountof thedistinction isbeyondthescopeof thispaper,wethinkitcanbeusefullycharacterizedbynotingthatitischaracteristicof judgments about the existenceof pragmatic reasons tohave atti-tudesthattheyarenotcapableofdirectlyguidingusintohavingthoseattitudeswithoutfirstmotivatingustodothingstomakeitthecasethatwehavethem.Todesireanoddnumberofhairsonyourheadinresponsetothereasonsyoutakethedemon’sthreattoprovide,youmustfirstdosomething likeconditionyourself, takedrugs,orselec-tivelyattendtocertainthingswiththeaimofdevelopingthedesire.Judgmentsabout theexistenceoffittingness reasons foranattitude,however,doseemcapableofdirectlyguidingusintohavingitwithouthavingtofirstmotivateustodoanythingtogetourselvestohaveit.For instance, judgingthat it isfittingorappropriatetodesireknowl-edge for itsownsake—asyoumightconcludeuponcontemplating

reasonsto desire itatall.Butwhateverwewanttocallthem,theimportantthingistodistinguishthesekindsofreasonsfromthereasonstodesirethestatethat(allagree)areconnectedtothegoodnessofthestate..

15. In thispaper,we followonestandardconvention in the literatureandusesmallcapstodesignateconcepts.

16. Forrecentdiscussionsofattemptstomakesenseofthedistinctionwithoutin-vokingethicalcategories,see,forinstance,DanielssonandOlson2007,Lang2008,Way2012,andSchroeder2012.

assumingattheoutsetthatmoralreasonstopromotethegoodhaveauniquelyobviousrationalsanctionanddemandingthat,becausenon-consequentialistprinciplesdonotdirectustopromotethegood,wemustgiveaspecialkindofjustificationforthem.

2. Good Outcomes and Fitting Attitudes

Tounderstandwhythegoodnessofastateofaffairsguaranteestheex-istenceofreasonstobringitabout,wemustbeginbyclarifyingwhatitistojudgethatastateofaffairsisgood.Suchajudgmentdoesnotseemsimplytodescribethestate.Rather, italsoseemsto involveanormative claim that recommends thestateor speaks in its favor. Inparticular,itseemstobeaclaimtotheeffectthatthestateofaffairsisdesirable,orsuchthatweshoulddesirethatitobtains.Putintermsofreasons,itlookslikewemightanalyzethejudgmentthatstateofaffairsSisgoodasonetotheeffectthattherearesufficientreasonstodesirethatSobtains.13

Whilewethinkthatthiskindofanalysisbestcapturesthecontentandnormativeforceofjudgmentsaboutgoodstatesofaffairs,itneedsclarificationand refinement concerningboth thekind of reasons andthekind of desiresitinvolves.Beginningwiththefirstissue,thereareclearlysomekindsof reasons todesireastate thatareof thewrong kindforconstitutingitsgoodness.Suppose,forinstance,thatanevildemoncrediblythreatenstoharmyourlovedonesifyoudonotdesirethattherebeanoddnumberofhairsonyourhead.Thefactthatthedemonhasmadethisthreatseemstobeastrongpragmatic reasontodesire,oratleasttogetyourselftodesire,thatyouhaveanoddnum-berofhairs.However,thiswouldnottherebymakeitgoodthatyouhaveanoddnumberofhairs.14

13. WheresufficientreasonstohaveattitudeAarereasonsthatmakeonejusti-fied(inasensewewillclarifybelow),all-things-considered,inhavingA.Forexamplesofthisbasickindofanalysis,seeEwing1939,Gibbard1990,Ander-son1993,andScanlon1998.

14. SeeRabinowiczandRønnow-Rasmussen2004,followingCrisp2000.Some,likeGibbard(1990,36),Parfit(2001,27),Portmore(2011,59),andWay(2012)insistthatthesepragmaticreasonsto get oneselftodesiresomethingarenot



adesireforit.18SincethefittingnessreasonsJonesshareswithSmithincludeonlybasicreasonsofbeneficencetocareaboutbothchildren,equallyunintensifiedbypersonalrelationshipstoeither,shecouldnottrulyclaimthatthisdevelopmentwasgoodintalkingtoSmith.

Judgments thatastate isgoodthusseemtobe judgments thatadesireforthestateissupportedbythefittingnessreasonsoneshareswiththegrouponemeanstobetalkingorthinkingtogetherwith.Inthinking aboutwhat she shouldwant, it is possible for the judge’sgroup to shrink toherself alone. It is alsopossible for the judge toaddressorthinkonbehalfofthewidestgroupofagentswithwhomshe sharesfittingness reasons todesire states.We think that this isthekindof context inwhich thinkingaboutbasicmoral reasonsofbeneficence—towhichallmoralityreduces,onsomeconsequential-istviews—takesplace.Tojudgeinthiscontextthatonestateisbetterthananotheristojudgethatthefittingnessreasonsoneshareswithallmoralagentsfavorpreferringit.19

Thisanalysisofjudgmentsaboutgoodstatesasjudgmentsaboutoursharedfittingnessreasonsfordesirecandefendtalkaboutmor-allygoodstatesfromthechargesofincoherenceorcontentlessnesslevelledbyTaurek,Foot,andThomson.Inaskingsomeonetoagreethatitwouldbebetteriffiveotherssurvivedinsteadofher,wearenot,asTaurek(1977,305)suggested,claimingthatsheshould,allthingsconsidered,preferthesurvivalofthefive.Wearemerelyaskinghertoagreethatthefittingnessreasonsshe shares with the five(andtherestofus)favorpreferringtheirsurvival.Moreover,toclaiminauniversal

18. Tosaythataresponseissupportedonbalancebyasetofreasonsistosaythatthereisnoalternativeresponsethatthosereasonsfavormorestrongly.

19. This contextualist account thus provides a solution to “the PartialityChal-lenge”astohowwecananalyzejudgmentsaboutgoodstatesasjudgmentsaboutfittingattitudes if Jonescan judge itfitting forher toprefer that thekidneybetransplantedintoherchildwithoutthinking(incertaincontexts)thatthisstateisbetter(Ewing1939,19,andBlanshard1961,287–288).Theso-lutionissimilartoSuikkanen’s(2009),butitismoreflexibleinthatitmakessenseofnon-relativizedevaluativejudgmentsinnon-fully-impartialcontexts,anditavoidstheobjectionsraisedbyZimmerman(2011,458–460)aboutcir-cularityandindeterminacy.

Nozick’s(1974,42–45)experiencemachine—seemslikeitcandirectlycauseyoutodesireknowledgeintrinsically.

Ifweare toanalyze judgments about a state’s goodnessas judg-ments that there are sufficientfittingness reasons todesire it, thereremainsaquestionastowhosereasonsthesearesupposedtobe.Forinstance, if both Jones’s child andSmith’s child aredyingof kidneyfailure,andthereisonlyonekidneyavailablefortransplant,itseemsfittingfor Jonestodesire thestateof itsbeingtransplanted intoherchild,butfittingforSmithtodesireanalternativestateofthekidneybeingtransplantedintoherchild.

We think that the answer as towhosefittingness reasonsone istalkingaboutwhenoneclaimsthatastateisgoodisacontextualistone,theessentialsofwhichhavebeensuggestedbyFoot(1985),Hur-ka(1987),Lewis(1989),andGibbard(1998).Clearly,whensomeonejudgesastateofaffairsgood,sheordinarilytakestheretobefitting-nessreasonsforhertodesireit;themainquestioniswhoelse’sfitting-nessreasonssheismakingacommitmentabout.17Judgmentsthatastateisgooddon’talwaysseemtocommitthejudgetothinkingthateveryonehasmostfittingnessreasontodesireit.SurelyJonescouldtrulysaytoherpartnerthattheirchild’sbeingmovedaheadofSmith’schildonthekidneywaitinglistwasagoodthingwithoutbeingcom-mittedtothinkingthatitwouldbefittingforSmithtodesireit.WhenJonesspeakstoherpartneraboutthisbeingagooddevelopment,sheseemstomeanthatthe fittingness reasons they sharesupport,onbalance,

17. Incertaincontexts,suchasthoseofgivingadvice,onemightcallstatesgoodthat onedoesnot takeoneself tohavefittingness reason todesire. For in-stance,inadvisingarivalinacompetition,onemightrefertostatesthattendtowardsherwinningas“good”,althoughonetakesittobeunfittingforonetodesirethemoneself.Onepossibilityisthat,ingivingsuchadvice,theadvisortakesonthefalsepresuppositionthatthereisreasonforhertosharetheadvi-see’saims,and,giventhis,theadvisordoesinfacttaketheretobefittingnessreasonsforhertodesirethestatesshecalls“good”.Butanotherpossibilityisthat,althoughthejudgeisalmostalwayspartoftheaudienceshemeanstobeaddressingwithtalkaboutgoodness,thisfailstobetrueinspecialcases.Sincethejudgeisclearlypartoftheaudienceinthecontextswewillbecon-sidering,itwillnotmatterforourpurposeswhichaccountiscorrect.



Havingclarifiedthekindofreasonsinvolvedinouranalysis,wenowturntothekindofattitudethatjudgmentsofastate’sgoodnesstakethemtobereasonsfor.Wecharacterizedtheseroughlyasreasonstodesirethatthestateobtains,butthismightseemtoonarrow.Itcanbe awkward to speak of someone desiring states that currently ob-tain,thatobtainedinthepast,orthatareimpossibleforhertobringabout,althoughshecanofcoursejudge(andjudgetruly)thatcurrent,past,andinfeasiblestatesaregood.Itislessawkwardtosaythatwearegladthatcertainpastandpresentstatesobtainandthatwehope or wishthatcertaininfeasiblestateswill,andthethoughtthattheseresponsesarefittingseemstobewhatisinvolvedinthinkingthemgood.Whatbeingglad,hoping,andwishingthatastateobtainshaveincommonwithdesiringthat itdoesisthattheyare“pro-attitudes”thatinvolveanattractiontothestate,whichincludesmotivationtobringitaboutifonecan,tendenciestofinditappealingorpleasurabletothinkabout,andtendenciestodirectone’sattentiontowardsitandwaysitmightberealized.22

Whilesomephilosophersliketospeakofeverymotivationandpro-attitudeasdirectedatastateofaffairs,wedonotthinkthatthisisright.Considerthecontrastinvolvedinthefollowingpairsofattitudes:

1.wantingtoyellatsomeoneinafitofangervs.wantingittobe true thatonehasyelledathimsohedoesn’twalkalloveryou,

2.anaversiontokillingsomeonevs.anaversiontotherebeingkillingsintheworld,and

3.wantingtoexercisenowvs.wantingtheworldtobesuchthatoneexercisesnow.

A’sperspective”,whichmightberatherunclear(seee. g.Schroeder2007andPortmore 2011, 62). By taking the concept of afittingness reason tobe ex-planatorilypriortothatofagoodstate,weavoidsuchproblematicrelianceonunexplainednotionsofperspective-relativegoodness.

22. Forthissortofcharacterizationofpro-attitudes,particularlyinthecontextofdesire,seeDarwall1983,40–41;Scanlon1998,39;andPortmore2011,64–65.

contextthatstateS isgoodisnotsimplytosay,asFoot(1985,202–204)andThomson(1994,12–14)suggest,thatShassomeparticularpropertythatonethinksweshouldpromote.Itistomakeasubstan-tive claimaboutwhatpreferencesamongstatesare favoredby thefittingnessreasonsweallshare,whichcanbemeaningfullydebated.20 Withoutsuchafittingattitudeanalysis,itwouldbeunclearwhattalkaboutmorallygoodstatescouldamountto,butwiththeanalysis itbecomesclearhowthis talk isofapiecewithourother judgmentsaboutgoodstates.21

20.Wethinkmanymajordebates innormativeethicsconcernwhat theserea-sonsforpreferencesupport,includingquestionsofwhatwell-beingconsistsinorwhichstatesweshouldpreferoutofconcernforagivenindividual(Dar-wall2002);whetherweshouldsometimespreferlessergainsforsomeindi-viduals togreatergains forother individuals in thenameofequality(Tem-kin2003),priority(Parfit1997),orsufficiency(Crisp2006);andwhetherweshouldprefermore individuals toexist simplybecause therewillbemorewell-beingintheworld(Singer1979).

Thissaid,thereisawayinwhichweagreewithsomeofFoot’s(1985,204–206)argumentthatmoralreasonstopromotemorallygoodstatesmustcomefromwithin,ratherthanoutsideof,morality,andthatthismakestroubleforwhatwearecallingthetop-downstrategyofarguingforconsequentialism.But,aswewillargueinthenextsection,goodstateshaveadirectconnectiontopractical reasons,whichholds independentlyofanygeneralconnectionbetweenmoralityandpracticalreasons.Wethinkthisisexactlythesortofconnectionthatthetop-downstrategypresupposes,anditdoesnot,paceFoot,relyonanythoughtsaboutwhatwouldbemorallyvirtuous.

21. Thisisonereasonwhy,althoughitistheexistenceofaconnectionbetweenS’sgoodnessandtherebeingfittingnessreasonstodesireSthatismostcen-traltoourargument,wethinkourparticularexplanationofthisconnectionismostgermanetoourargument.Suppose,forinstance,thatfittingnessrea-sonstodesireScouldnotbeunderstoodindependentlyofS’sgoodness(say,becausewhatexplainedR’sstatusasafittingnessasopposedtoapragmaticreasontodesireSwasthatRbearsonS’sgoodness).Wecouldstillgivesome-thingliketheforegoingcontextualistaccountofjudgmentsaboutS’sgood-ness,butitwouldhavetobemorelikethefollowing:(i)thejudgmentthatSisgood,whenmadeincontextX,hasasitscontentthepropositionthatS is good relative to X,(ii)S’sbeinggoodrelativetoXentailsthatthefittingnessreasonssharedbytheagentsaddressedincontextXsupportonbalancede-siringX,and(iii)thejudgmentthatR isafittingnessreasonforagentAtodesireS istruejustincaseRbearsonS’sbeinggoodrelativetoXA,whereXA is something like “A’s perspective.”.Whilewe think thatourbasic argu-ment couldbemadeusing this alternative contextualist account, itwouldhavetotakeasbasicandunanalyzedtheideaof“goodnessrelativetoagent



things (like take inhibition-loweringoranger-enhancingpills) inor-dertocausehimselftoyellattheassociate.

Thus,itseemsthatmotivationstobringaboutstatesplaytheroleofgeneratingmotivationstodothingsthatarerepresentedasbring-ingthemabout,whilethesemotivationstodothings(whichmayormaynotbegeneratedbymotivestobringaboutstates)playtheroleofgeneratingmotivestodomorespecificthingsthatarerepresentedaswaysofdoingthemoregeneralthing.Whilestate-directedmotivesplaytheroleofrelatingourintentionalactionstostatesoftheworld,act-directedmotivesplaytheroleofrelatingourmorespecificorlocalintentionalactionstoourmoregeneralorglobalintentionalactions.25 Consequently, we think that we can understand the distinction be-tweenact-directedandstate-directedmotivesintermsofthefollow-ingfunctionaldifferences:

Misanact-directed motivedirectedtowardsactAiffM plays the role of combining with representations that<φ-ingis(orisnot)partofawayofdoingA>26 toexplainφ-ing,27while

25. For a sustained discussion of how particular kinds of act-directed mo-tives—namelyplansorintentions—dothis,seeBratman1987.

26.Bya“representationthat<φ-ingis(orisnot)partofawayofdoingA>”,wemeansomethingabitbroaderthanarepresentationthatφ-ingactuallycon-stitutesdoingA.Forinstance,anact-directedmotivetoyellatsomeonewillmotivateyounotonlytodothingsthatyouthinkwillconstituteyelling,buttodothingslikestormingintotheroomnextdoorwhereyouthinksheislocatedinordertoyellather.Whileyoupresumablydon’trepresentstorm-ing into the roomaspartof theactof yelling itself, theway inwhich theact-directedmotivetoyellgivesrisetothismotivationseemsimportantlydif-ferentfromthewayinwhichastate-directedmotivetobringitaboutthatyouyellcangiverisetothemotivationtotakeanger-inducingpillssoastocauseyourselftoyell.WhatwehaveinmindhereissomethinglikeageneralizationofthewayanintentiontoAgivesrisetomoreparticular“intentionsinaction”,orintentionstoφandtherebydoA(asopposedtosimplythewayadesireforSgivesrisetointentionstodoA andtherebybringaboutS,evenifSisastateinvolvingone’sperformingcertainintentionalactions).Forareviewofliteratureonintentioninaction,seeWilsonandShpall2012.

27.Whilewespeakofact-directedmotivestodoAcombiningwithrepresenta-tionsthatφ-ingisawayofdoingAtoexplainφ-ing,onemightworrywhether

Intuitively,thesecondattitudeineachpairdoes takeastateofaffairs(one’shavingyelled,therebeingkillings,one’sexercisingnow)asitsobject.But thefirstattitude ineachpair looksdifferent; it seems totakeaparticularact(yelling,killingsomeone,exercising)asitsobject.

Sosaysintuition,butwhynotsimplytreatthefirstattitudeineachpairasadisguisedmotivetobringaboutastateofaffairs,like“myyell-ingathimnow”or“myexercisingnow”?23Wethinkthatstate-directedandact-directedmotivesactuallyplayratherdistinctfunctionalroles,which explain different aspects of cognition and behavior. A state-directedmotive tobring it about that onedoesA nowwill explainbothmoreandlessthananact-directedmotivetodoA.Forinstance,ameekpersonaversetoconfrontationmighthaveastrongstate-direct-edmotivetobringitaboutthatheyellsatabullytogetthebullytostopbullyinghim,butbeunabletosummonanyact-directedmotiva-tiontoyellatthebully.Insuchacasethestate-directedmotivewillnotbyitselfmotivatethemeekpersontoyell,butitwillmotivatehimtodothingsthathehopeswillcausehimtoyell,likeingestsubstancesthat he hopeswill lower his inhibitions, direct his attention to con-siderations thatmightmakehimangry,or takeanger-inducingpillsifhehasthemreadytohand.24Ontheotherhand,acustomerwhoisangrywithanonlinesalesassociatemighthaveastrongact-directedmotivetoyellattheassociatebutthinktheangerisunwarrantedandhavenostate-directedmotivetobringitaboutthatheyellsattheas-sociate.While the act-directedmotivewillmotivate yelling and thevarioussub-actionsthatthecustomertakestobewaysofyelling(likemovinghisfingersinwayshetakestobethetypingofangrymessagestheassociatewillsee—whichmightnotworkiftheInternetconnec-tionhasgonedown),itwillnotbyitselfmotivatethecustomertodo

23. SeePortmore2011,56.

24.Of course, underhappier circumstances, themeekperson’smotivation tobring it about that he yells would directly engender a motivation to yell, whichwouldmotivateyelling.Whatweillustrateisthecausalworkthatthemotivetobringitaboutthatoneyellscandoevenwhenitfailstogiverisetoamotivationtoyell (whichservesouraimof illustratingtheirdifferentfunctionalroles).



M isastate-directed motivedirected towardsstateS iffMplaystheroleofcombiningwithrepresentationsthat<A-ingwillbringabout(orprevent)S>toexplainact-di-rectedmotivestodo(oravoiddoing)A.

Wewill call pro-attitudes that are in thefirst instanceattractions tostates,whichincludestate-directedmotivestobringthemaboutifonecan,state-directed pro-attitudes.Wewillcallpro-attitudesthatareinthefirstinstanceattractionstoperformingparticularacts,whichincludeact-directedmotivestoperformthem,act-directed pro-attitudes.

Havingclarifiedthismuch,wecanstateourproposedanalysisoftheconceptgoodstateofaffairs:

Fitting Attitude Analysis of Good States:Tojudgethatstateof affairs S is good is to judge that thefittingnessreasons one shareswith a contextually specified set ofagents,Gx, support on balance a state-directed pro-atti-tudetowardsS.28

ofbothcognitivelylesssophisticatedandcognitivelymoresophisticatedin-dividualsmaydependholisticallyonthenetworksofbeliefstheyhappentohave and be largely amatter of degree (150–155).Webelieve that similarargumentscanbemadetosupportattributionsofrepresentationsoftherel-evant kind of constitution to allmotive-capable human children and non-humananimals;wesuspectthatrepresentationsofthesortofconstitutionwehaveinmindareimplicitnotonlyinthegeneralpsychologyoflearning,butinparticularinthefunctionalrolesthathierarchicalactionschemasareinvokedtoexplain(seeforinstanceCooperandShallice2000andGraftonandHamilton2007).

WearegratefultoananonymousreaderforPhilosophers’ Imprintforraisingtheseissuesandpointingoutotherproblemswithouraccountofthedistinc-tionbetweenact-directedandstate-directedmotivesinanearlierdraft.

28.Thisanalysisleavesopenasecondwayinwhichthetruthconditionsofjudg-mentsaboutgoodstatesdependoncontext,namelyuponwhichalternativestothestatearerelevant.SupposethatoneofthreemutuallyexclusivethingsmighthappentotheJones’schild:(n)shereceivesnokidneytransplantanddiessoon,(t)shereceivesatransplantbutmusttakeanti-rejectiondrugsandmayhaveashorter-than-averagelife,or(b)amedicalbreakthroughoccurswhichrestoresherownkidneys’functioning,ensuringafullynormallife.Inacontextwhere(n)wastherelevantalternativeto(t),theJonesescouldtrulyjudgethat(t)isgood,butinacontextwhere(b)wastherelevantalternative

thisissointhecaseofbasicactions,oractionsonecanperformdirectlyandwithoutperforminganyotherintentionalaction.TheanalysiscouldbesaidtoapplytobasicactionsbecauseifAisabasicaction,thenanact-directedmotive todoA combineswith a representation that <doingA is awayofdoingA>tocauseonetodoA.While thismightappearartificial, thissortofapplicationoftheaccountmightplausiblyexplainwhyindividualsfailtoperformbasicactionsthattheywanttoperformiftheydon’tknowthattheycanperformthem(e. g.ifyouwanttomoveyourarm,whichhasbeenpara-lyzed,andunbeknownsttoyouyourbasicabilitytomoveyourarmhasjustbeenrestored,youmaynotmoveyourarm,becauseyoufailtorepresenttoyourselfthatmovingyourarmisawayofmovingyourarm).Alternatively,onemightsaythattheanalysiswegiveinthetextiscorrectsolongasAisanon-basicaction,butthatifAisabasicaction,thefunctionalroleofamotivetodoAissimplytocauseonetodoA,allonitsownandwithoutanyrepre-sentations.Eitherway,wethinkthatwewillhavenomoredifficultyaccount-ingformotivestoperformbasicactionsthanthosewhorejectact-directedmotivesandinsistthatallmotivesaremotivestobringaboutsomestateS, whichplaytheroleofcombiningwithrepresentationsthatφ-ingwillbringaboutStoexplainφ-ing.ProponentsofthisteleologicaltheoryofmotivationmusttreatmotivestobringitaboutthatyouperformbasicactionAaseither(i)combiningwitharepresentationthatyourperformingAwillbringitaboutthatyouperformA,whichmightseemartificial,or(ii)unlikeothermotivesinthattheyarecapableofcausingonetodoAallbythemselvesandwithoutanyadditionalrepresentationalstates.

Anotherworryonemighthaveaboutourclaimthatact-directedmotivestodoAcombinewithrepresentationsthatφ-ingisawayofdoingA toex-plainφ-ing is thatsuchrepresentationsmightseemtoocognitivelysophis-ticatedtobenecessary foran individual tohaveact-directedmotives(andstate-directedmotives—sinceouranalysis explains these in termsof theirtendenciestogiverisetoact-directedmotives).Younghumanchildrenandmanynon-humananimalsaresurelycapableofmotivationstodothings,buttheymightseemtolacktheconceptofoneaction’sconstitutingawayofper-forminganother.Webelieve,however,thatwefacenomoredifficultyherethanproponentsofteleologicaltheoriesofmotivation,sinceitseemsjustasproblematictoattributetheconceptofanact’scausingorbringingaboutastateofaffairstomanymotive-capablechildrenandnon-humananimals.Toexplainhowwecanattributesuchrepresentationsofconstitutionandcausa-tiontotheseindividuals,wecanarguethat(i)therepresentationsareimplicitorde re,(ii)therequiredconceptsofconstitutionandcausationneednotbeascognitivelysophisticatedasours,or(iii)weoverestimatethedifferencesbetweenourconceptualizationofconstitutionandcausationandtheirs(per-hapsbecauseweconfuseourthoughtsaboutconstitutionandcausationwithmeta-cognitive reflectionoraccess toour thoughtsaboutconstitutionandcausation). For example, Dretske (1988) argues that discriminative instru-mentalconditioninginvolvesimplicitrepresentationsoftherelevantkindofcausation(109–122),observationallearninginvolvesexplicitrepresentationsofsuchcausation(137–150),anddifferencesinthethinkingaboutcausation



if someonewere to label as “good” precisely those stateswe thinkbad,we think shewould be perfectly intelligible as thinking themgoodsolongasshethoughtitwasfittingtodesirethesestates.Thatsaid,thisfairlystrongclaim—thatjudgmentsthatitisfittingtohavepro-attitudestowardsastateexhaust thecontentof judgmentsthatitisgood—couldactuallybeweakenedforourpurposeshere.30Allwewillrelyonbelowistheclaimthatjudgmentsabouttherelevantfittingnessreasonsareentailedbyorpartofthecontentofjudgmentsthatastateisgood.

3. Fitting Attitudes and Reasons to Act

Wehavethusarguedthattojudgeastategoodistojudgethattherearefittingnessreasonsthatonbalancefavorourhavingapro-attitudetowardsit.Sinceajudgment’struthentailsthetruthofitsanalysans,thismeansthatitisaconceptualtruththatastateofaffairsisgoodiffthere are fittingness reasons that on balance favor our having a pro-attitude towards it.31Wewill now argue that this analysis, togetherwithgeneralfactsabouttherelationshipbetweenfittingattitudesandreasonstoact,explainswhyastate’sgoodnessentailstheexistenceofreasonstobringitabout.

Thebasicideahereisthatwhatthereisreasonforustodoisdeter-minedbywhataimsthereisreasonforustohave(together,ofcourse,with descriptive facts aboutwhatwill achieve these aims), and the

30.Onemight,forinstance,thinkthatjudgmentsaboutwhat’sgoodinvolvecer-tainsubstantiveplatitudesornormativepresuppositionsaboutthesortsofthings that can count. See Foot 1959, 85, anddiscussionbyGibbard 2003,142–178.

31. Compare:ifjudgingsomeonetobeabacheloramountstojudginghimtobeamalewhoisn’tinaromanticrelationshipbutinapositiontoenterone,thenit’saconceptualtruththatsomeoneisabacheloriffhe’samalewhoisn’tinaromanticrelationshipbutinapositiontoenterone.Becauseanalysesofonekindofjudgmentintoanotherinthiswaysupportanalyticrelationshipsbe-tweenthefactsthejudgmentsrepresent,wewillslideratherfreelybetweentalkingaboutwhatitistomakeacertainkindofjudgment(“tojudgeastategoodistojudgeitfittingtohaveapro-attitudetowardsit”)andtalkingabouttheanalyticrelationshipsbetweenthefactstheyrepresent(“it’saconceptualtruththatastateisgoodiffit’sfittingtohaveapro-attitudetowardsit”).

Webelievethatthisanalysishasanumberofimportantstrengths.Thefirst is itsabilitytoexplainthediversityofconceptuallycoherent(ifoftenbadlymistaken)viewsthatpeoplecanhaveaboutwhatstatesaregood,rangingfromthejudgmentthatthepreservationofnaturalbeautyisgoodtothejudgmentthatarace’sstaying“pure”isgood.Ouranalysisexplainswhatiscommontoallsuchjudgments,namelythatthosewhomakethemthinkweshouldhavepro-attitudestowardsthestatesinquestion.Asecondstrengthofouranalysisisitsabilitytocap-turethenormativeandmotivationalforceofjudgmentsaboutwhichstatesaregood.TocallstateSgoodistorecommendSorspeakinS’sfavor,whichwethinkisbestcapturedbytheclaimthatitisfittingforustohavepro-attitudestowardsS.Theanalysisalsoexplainstheabil-ityofjudgmentsthatstatesaregoodtomotivateustopursuethemasaspecialcaseof theabilityof judgmentsthatattitudesarefittingtodirectlyguideusintohavingthem.29

Toappreciatehowcentralthesefeaturesaretojudgmentsaboutgoodoutcomes,supposethatsomeoneusedtheword‘good’tolabelall those stateswe call good, but took this to haveno significanceforwhat itwasappropriate todesireandconsequentlyhadnopro-pensitytodesirethestates inquestion.Wesuspect that thepersonwouldnotreallymeangoodwhenshesaid‘good’.Ontheotherhand,

to(t),theycouldtrulyjudgethat(t)isbad.Ouranalysisisconsistentwiththis,solongaswhichstatesitisfittingforeachagenttohavenon-comparative pro-attitudes(likedesire,gladness,andhope)towardsdependsuponwhichalternativestatesarerelevantinthecontextofjudgment.Whatispresumablyfoundationalarecontext-independentfactsaboutwhichcomparativepro-atti-tudesorpreferencesamongstatesitisfittingforeachagenttohave(e. g.theJonesesshouldprefer(b)to(t)and(t)to(n)),anditisfittingforanagenttohaveanon-comparativepro-attitudetowardsastatejustincaseitisfittingforhertopreferittotherelevantalternatives(seeGibbard1998).WearegratefultoDougPortmoreforsuggestingthisexampleandencouragingustodiscussthisissue.

29.Otherplausibleexamplesof thisgeneralpropensityof judgments thatatti-tudesarefittingincludetheabilitiesofjudgmentsthatbeliefsarewarrantedbyourevidence,thatitisappropriatetobeangryatsomeone,andthatweshould (in a non-pragmatic sense) intend to do certain things to directlygenerate thosebeliefs, feelingsofanger,and intentions(seeGibbard1990,36–76;andScanlon1998,18–22).



fitting tobemovedtobring S aboutwhenonecanwithoutactuallycountinginfavorofbringing S aboutwhenonecan.32

Itisintuitivethatwhatthereisreasontodoisdeterminedbywhataimsthereisreasontohave.Wethinkthatthebesttheoreticalexpla-nationofMAPisthat,becausepracticalreasoninggovernsouractionsbymeansofgoverningourmotives,theprocessofdeterminingwhataimstohave—andthuswhattodo—isessentiallyaprocessofdeter-miningwhatintrinsicmotivestohave.AsMichaelBratman(1987,54)has suggested, becauseourpractical reasoning controls our actionsbycontrollingourintentionstoperformthem,reasonstoperformanactionjustarereasonstointendtoperformit(forarelatedidea,seeScanlon1998,20–21).ButitmustbeclarifiedthatreasonstodoAareidenticaltofittingnessreasonstointendtodoA.AsKavka’s(1983)toxinpuzzleillustrates,merelypragmaticreasonstointendtodosomething(likethereasontointend—orgetoneselftointend—todrinkatoxinconstitutedbythefactthatareliablemind-readerwillpayyouifyouintendthis)neednotbereasonstoactuallydoit.

Moreover, in lightof the role intentionsplay in realizing theob-jectsofourdesiresandotherpro-attitudes,therearesimilarreasonstothinkthat,becausereasonultimatelygovernsourintentionsbygov-erningtheseattitudes,thefittingnessofintentionsisitselfdeterminedbythefittingnessoftheseothermotives.AsBratmanargues,theroleofintentionsisnottosupplyanutterlynewsourceofmotivationthatconflictswith themotives involved inourpro- (and con-) attitudes(likedesiresforstatesofaffairs),buttohelpcognitivelylimitedagentslikeusrealizetheobjectsofthesemotivesovertime.Thisroleofin-tentionsentailsthattheirnormativeassessmentmustbetiedcloselytothatofthepro-attitudestheyserve.

AlthoughBratmanoftenspeaksasthoughpracticalreasoningmustsimply take our intrinsic pro-attitudes as given, it seems clear that

32.WCPandMAPcloselyresembleJohnSkorupski’sprinciplesFDFandFDD,theconjunctionofwhichhereferredtoasthe“Feeling/DispositionPrinci-ple”(1999,38,63,131,and174n24)andmorerecentlyasthe“BridgePrinciple”(2010,265–267).

questionofwhataims there is reason tohave is identical to thatofwhatitisfittingtobemotivatedtodo.Sincepro-attitudeslikedesiringorhopingthatstateSobtainsinvolvemotivationtobringSabout(ifonecan),thefittingnessoftheseattitudesentailsthefittingnessofthismotivation,whichentailstheexistenceofreasonstobringSabout(ifonecan).

Thefirstpartofthisconnectionbetweenfittingattitudesandrea-sonstoactcanbestatedasa

Warrant Composition Principle [WCP]:LetPbeapsychicstate that involves psychic statePʹ as an essential com-ponent.IfRisafittingnessreasontobeinP,thenRisafittingnessreasontobeinPʹ.

WCPsimplystatesthatifthereisreasontobeinapsychicstate,thennecessarily there is reason to be in all that the state essentially in-volves.Forinstance,ifoneacknowledgesourclaimthatpartofwhatitistodesireorhopethatSobtainsistobemotivatedtobringSaboutifonecan,itwouldseemincoherenttoholdthataconsideration(likeS’sinvolvinghappychildren)countsinfavorofhopingordesiringthatS obtainsbutdoesnotcountinfavorofbeingmotivatedtobringSaboutifonecan.Sincehavingthemotivationissimplypartofwhatitistohave thepro-attitude, a consideration cannotmake thepro-attitudefittingwithoutmakingthemotivationfittingaswell.

The secondpartof this connectionbetweenfittingattitudesandreasonstoactistherelationshipbetweenwhatitisfittingtobemoti-vatedtodoandwhatthereisreasontodo,whichwestateasa

Motivations-Actions Principle [MAP]: Let φ-ing be an ac-tion. If R is a fittingness reason to be motivated to φ, then R is a reason to actually φ.

JustastheconsiderationthatSwouldmakechildrenhappycan’tmakeitfittingtodesireSwithoutmakingitfittingtobemovedtobringS aboutwhenonecan,sotooitseemsthisconsiderationcan’tmakeit



ItisimportanttoclarifythatneitherMAPnorthisexplanationofitmakeswhat there is reason forus tododependentuponwhatat-titudesormotivesweactuallyhappentohave.Theideaisthatwhatthereisreasonforanagenttodoiswhatwouldservetheobjectsoffittingintrinsicmotives,bywhichwemeantheintrinsicmotivesthatitwould be fitting forhertohave,whether she has them or not.Onthisview,ifaconsideration(likeapolicy’sbenefittingtheworse-off)isafittingnessreasonforanagenttobemotivatedtodosomething(likevoteforthepolicyifshecan),thenitisareasonfortheagenttodothisregardlessofwhethersheeverhasorcomestohaveanyactualmotivationtodoit.35

mightinsist,forinstance,thatwecannotdistinguishbetweenfittingnessandnon-fittingnessreasonsformotivationsandintentionswithoutappealingtofactsaboutwhichconsiderationsarereasonstoperformtheactsthatthesemotivesandintentionswouldinclineustoperform.WhilewethinkthatourbasicargumentcouldbemadeusingthisalternativeexplanationofMAP,itmightnotfitaswellwithourclaimsabouttherelationshipbetweenfittingmotivesandethicalcategories,orourclaimstobegivingadeeperexplana-tionof the connectionbetweenethical categoriesand reasons toact.Onecouldnotholdthatwhatthereisreasontodobyitselfexplainsthefitting-nessofallmotivationalattitudes,sincebothfittingandunfittingmotivationalattitudes(e.g.wantingSoutoffittingcareforsomeoneandwantingSoutofunfittingaestheticappreciationforS)caninclineustoperformthesameacts.Onemighthold that something’s instantiatinganethical category (likeS’sbeinggood)jointlyexplainsthefittingnessofpro-orcon-attitudestowardsit(likedesiresforS)andreasonstoactincertainways(liketobringaboutS).Wethinkthatwecouldstillusethisaccounttoarguethattheconnectionbetweengoodstatesandreasonstoactshouldbeseenasaspecialcaseoftheconnectionbetweenethicalcategories,fittingmotives,andreasonstoact.Butitwouldweakenthesenseinwhichwewouldbeexplaining—asopposedtoappealingto—therelationshipbetweenethicalcategoriesandreasonstoact.Inpartbecauseofthis,therewouldseemtobemoreroomonthissortof“jointexplanation”picturetoholdthatastate’sgoodnessexplainsboththefittingnessofdesiresforitandreasonstobringitabout,buttodenythattheinstantiationofotherethicalcategoriesexplainsreasonstoactinadditiontothefittingnessofcertainmotivationalstates.

35. Thepointoftheappealstohowactionsandintentionsaregovernedbyrea-sonissimplytoestablishthat,because(intheabsenceofsomethinggoingwrong—aswhenwedotherightthingforthewrongreasons)wecanonlyrespondtogenuinenormativereasonstoactandintendbyourmotivesfirstrespondingtotheseconsiderations,fittingnessreasonstobemotivatedtodosomethingarefittingnessreasonstointendtodoitandpracticalreasonsto

we can assess them as reasonable or unreasonable by determiningthroughphilosophicalreasoningwhethertheyarefittingorunfitting.33

Moreover,aswehaveseen,itischaracteristicofthesefittingnessas-sessments that they directly guide our attitudes. For instance, onemightstartoutwithamuchstrongerintrinsicdesireforone’sco-na-tionalstobebenefittedbut,asaresultofreflectiononjustwhatco-na-tionalityamountsto,cometoregardthispreferenceasarbitrary.Thisjudgmentthatone’spreferenceisunfittingtendsdirectlytochangeit,andtoalterone’s intentions fromservingtheoldaimofbenefittingone’sco-nationalsmoretoservingthenewaimofbenefittingaliensjustasmuch.

Thus, because reason governs motives other than intentionsthroughdeterminationsoftheirfittingness,andintentionsaresimplyameansofachievingtheobjectsofthesemotives,fittingnessreasonsfor intention are identical tofittingness reasons for theseothermo-tives.Theroleof intentions isprimarily toenableus tosettle inad-vancewhatfuturecoursesofactionwillbestachievetheendsthatitisfittingtobemostmotivatedtoachieve,andtopickfromamongthemanycoursesofactionthatoftenhaveequallygoodprospectsofdo-ingthis.Togetherwiththeaboveobservationthatreasongovernsouractionsthroughdeterminationsofthefittingnessoftheintentionsthatleadustoperformthem,thisentailsthat,becausereasonultimatelygovernsourintentionsandactionsbydeterminingthefittingnessofthemotivestheyseektoserve,fittingnessreasonstobemotivatedtodosomethingareidenticaltofittingnessreasonstointendtodoitandpracticalreasonstodoit.34

33.WhileBratmanoftenspeaksasthoughourintrinsicdesiresorpro-attitudesarethemselvesnormativereasonsforintentionandaction,hemakesitclearthatheactuallywishestoremainneutralbetweenthisviewandtheviewthatourintrinsicdesirescanbeassessedasreasonableorunreasonable(1987,22).

34.Aswiththeconnectionbetweenastate’sgoodnessandthefittingnessofpro-attitudestowardsit,whatismostcentraltoourargumentistheexistenceoftheconnectionassertedbyWCPandMAPbetweenthefittingnessofmotiva-tionalattitudesandreasonstoact,ratherthanourparticularexplanationofwhytheseprinciplesarecorrect.Supposewewerewrongaboutthefitting-nessofmotivationalstatesbeingexplanatorilypriortoreasonstoact.One



4. Rejecting the Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons

Recallthatthetop-downstrategyofarguingforconsequentialismcon-tendsthatmoralityshouldgiveusreasonstoact,thatthereclearlyarereasonstobringaboutgoodstatesofaffairs,butthatitisunclearhowtherecouldbereasonstodoanythingelsethatlooksmoral.Wehavesofarofferedanexplanationoftheclearreasonstobringaboutthegood thatmotivate the top-downstrategyasa special instanceof ageneralconnectionbetweenfittingattitudesandreasonstoactastheywouldmotivateus.Butinthissectionandthenextwewillunderminethetop-downstrategybyshowinghowthissamegeneralconnectionbetweenfittingattitudesandreasonstoactmakesitequallyclearhowtherecouldbereasons—andindeedmoralreasons—todothingsoth-erthanpromotethegood.

Thelogicallystrongestversionofthetop-downstrategyholdsthatmoralreasonstoactmustbereasonstobringaboutgoodoutcomesbecauseall reasonstoactarereasonstobringaboutgoodoutcomes.This view that all practical reasonsmust be reasons to bring aboutgoodoutcomesisknownasthe teleological conception of practical reasons [TCR].Ofcourse,itcertainlyseemsthattherearereasonsforeachofustodothingslikeavoidourownpainorhelpourownchildrenthatarenotproportionatetothebadnessofourpainorourchildren’sdis-tressassessed from an impartial perspective.Thatis,althoughtheremightseemtobestrongerreasonstoavoidourpainandhelpourchildrenthan toalleviate thepainandhelp thechildrenofothers,wecouldnot trulysay to thoseothers thatourpainorourchildren’sdistressisworsethantheirs.But,aswehaveseen,incontexts(liketalkingtoourpartners)whereourinterlocutorsshareourfittingnessreasonstohaveastrongeraversiontoourpainorourchildren’sdistressthantothatofothers,itseemsthatwecantrulyclaimthatdevelopmentsthatmitigatetheformerarebetterthanthosethatmitigatethelatter.

TCR can thus accommodatepractical reasons todo things otherthanpromotetheimpartialgoodbyholdingthatthepracticalreasonsthereare foranagent toactmustbe reasons topromoteoutcomes

Having thus argued in favor of our fitting attitude analysis of goodstates,WCP,andMAP,wecanusethemtogivethefollowingexplana-tionofwhy,ifastateofaffairsisgood,thereisreasontobringitabout:

1.Ifstateofaffairs S isgood,thentherearefittingnessreasonsforustohaveapro-attitudetowards S [fromthefittingat-titudeanalysisofgoodstates].

2. If therearefittingness reasons forus tohaveapro-attitudetowardsS, then therearefittingness reasons forus tobemotivatedtobring S aboutifwecan36[fromWCPandthefactthatpro-attitudestowardsSessentiallyinvolvemotiva-tiontobring S aboutifonecan].

3.IftherearefittingnessreasonsforustobemotivatedtobringSaboutifwecan,thentherearereasonstobring S aboutifwecan[fromMAP].

∴If S isgood,thentherearereasonstobring S aboutifwecan.

doit.TheunderlyingideaisthatifRisagenuinenormativereasonforustorespondinwayW,and(absentsomethinggoingwrong)wecanonlyhaveW inresponsetoRbyhaving(andbecausewehave)W*inresponsetoR,thenRisareasontoW*,anditsstatusassuchexplainsitsstatusasareasontoW.

36.Atleastsolongasitwouldstillbefittingtohaveapro-attitudetowardsSifyouactuallybroughtSabout.Perhapsitisconceptuallycoherenttothinkthattherearestatesthatwouldnotbefitpro-attitudesifyoudidanythingtobringthemabout.Onemight think itfitting todesire the existenceof anaturalenvironment,butthatitwouldbeunfittingtodesireitsexistenceifitweredamaged and then restored, on account of its losing its naturalness. Evenhere,therewouldbecaseswhereyoucouldbringabouttheenvironment’sexistencewithoutdestroyingitsstatusasfittinglydesired—e.g.byprevent-ingothers fromdestroying it or just refraining fromdestroying it yourself.Alternatively,onemightthinkitfittingtodesiresomestate,butthatitwouldbewrongtotrytobringitabout,andconsequentlythatitwouldbeunfittingtohaveapro-attitude towards it (quaproductofwrongdoing)once itwasbroughtabout.Evenhere,wearenotsurewhetherweshouldsaythattherewouldbenoreasontobringaboutthestate,orwhethertherewouldstillbesomereasontodoso,whichissimplyoutweighedbythefeaturesthatwouldmakeitcompletelyunfittingtohavepro-attitudestowardsitonceitexisted.



Wethink,moreover,thatmanyoftheattitudeswecommonlyhaveinvolve intrinsicact-directedmotives.Consideremotions likeanger,guilt,shame,admiration,contempt,grief,andaestheticappreciation.Plausibly, these emotions essentially involve, respectively, intrinsicmotivationtopunishorholdtheobjectofourangeraccountable,in-trinsicmotivationtomakeamendsfortheobjectofourguilt,intrinsicmotivationtowithdrawandremovetheobjectofourshame,intrinsicmotivationtoemulatetheobjectofouradmiration, intrinsicmotiva-tiontoavoidandbehaveunliketheobjectofourcontempt,intrinsicmotivationtohonortheobjectofourgrief,andintrinsicmotivationtoengagewith(e. g.tocreate,perform,watch,orlistento)theobjectofourappreciation.37

These attitudes that involve intrinsic act-directedmotivations of-tenseemfittingorappropriate,andthereisnoreasonintheabstracttobeanymoreskepticalthattheyaresometimesfittingthanthereistobeskepticalthatstate-directedpro-attitudesaresometimesfitting.38 Whentheseattitudesarefitting,thesametwoprinciplesthatexplainwhytherearereasonstobringaboutgoodstatesofaffairswillentailthatthereareintrinsicreasonstoactastheymotivateus,quiteinde-pendentlyofwhetherourdoingsowillbringaboutgoodstates.Sincetheseattitudesessentiallyinvolveintrinsicact-directedmotives,WCPentailsthatanyfittingnessreasontohavethemisequallyafittingnessreasontohavetheact-directedmotivestheyinvolve.Moreover,MAPimpliesthatthesefittingnessreasonstohavetheintrinsicact-directedmotivesareactuallyintrinsicreasonstoperform(oravoidperforming)theactstheyaredirectedtowards(oragainst).

37. SeeforinstanceGibbard1990,Anderson1993,Velleman2002,andDarwall2002,2006.

38. Itwould,moreover,beself-defeatingforteleologiststorejecttheideaoffit-tingnessreasonsandacknowledgeonlypragmaticreasonsforattitudes.Thisisbecausetheirownaccountoftherelationshipbetweenreasonsforstate-directedmotives and reasons to actmust be in termsof fittingness ratherthanpragmaticreasonsformotives(elsethepragmaticreasontointrinsicallydesire that your lovedonesbeharmedconstitutedbyademon’s threat toharmthemunlessyouformthisintrinsicdesirewouldcount—absurdly—asanintrinsicreasontoactuallyharmthem).

thatshecantrulyjudgegood.Aswehaveseeninthelasttwosections,whatdeterminesbothwhatstatesanagentcanjudgegoodandherreasonstopromotesuchstatesarethefittingnessreasonsthereareforhertohavepro-attitudestowardsthem.SotheclearestwaytoputTCRisasthethesisthatallreasonsforanagenttoactarereasonsforhertobringaboutstatesofaffairsthattherearefittingnessreasonsforhertohavepro-attitudestowards.

PerhapsthemostnaturalwayofmotivatingTCRistoargue,aswehaveinsupportofMAP,thatreasonstoactarereasonstobringabouttheobjectsoffittingmotives,andthentosimplyassumethatallmo-tives(andthusallmotivesthatcanbefitting)arestate-directed.ThusDouglasPortmoreclaims,“Ifouractionsarethemeansbywhichweaffectthewaytheworldgoes,andifourintentionalactionsnecessar-ilyaimatmakingtheworldgoacertainway,thenitisonlynaturaltosupposethatwhatwehavemostreasontodoisdeterminedbywhichwaywehavemostreasontowanttheworldtogo”(2011,56).Inclaim-ingthat“ourintentionalactionsnecessarilyaimatmakingtheworldgoacertainway”,Portmoreseemstobeassumingthatallmotivesonwhichweactaimatbringingaboutcertainstatesofaffairs.

WehavearguedthatPortmoreisrightthatintentionalactionsaimatachievingtheobjectsofourmotives,andthatwhatwehavemostreasontodo isdeterminedbywhatwehavemostreasontobemo-tivated to do. Butwehave also argued that Portmore’s apparent as-sumptionthatallmotivesaimatstatesofaffairsismistaken.Wesup-poseonecould,asPortmoresays,“intendtorunmerelyforthesakeofbringingitaboutthatoneruns”(2011,56).Butthatwouldbebizarre.Incaseswhereyourunjustbecauseyoufeellikerunning,youhaveanact-directed intrinsicmotive to run,andyou formanact-directedintentiontodothis.Ordinarily,youdonotseektomakeit thecasethattheworldcontainsinstancesofyourrunning(orinstancesofyourrunningnow)unlessyouhaveulteriorreasonstoensurethis(likeyourbeingpaidforhowmuchrunningtimeyoulog)andyoufindyourselfwithoutanyact-directedmotivationtorun.



act.Buttheexistenceandfittingnessofpro-attitudestowardsstatesofaffairsinwhichweactasfittingact-directedmotiveswouldinclineus(e. g.inwhichwemakeamendstoourrivalorattendhisfuneral)are ex-plained by, and thus cannot supplantthefittingnessoftheseact-directedmotivesandthebasicact-directedreasonstheygenerate.39

PortmorehasarguedthatTCRshouldbeacceptedbecauseitprovidesamaximallyplausibleandunifiedaccountoftherelationshipbetweenwhichoutcomeswehavemost reason toprefer andwhich actswehavemost reason toperform.Thereclearlyaresome cases inwhichthereismorereasonforustoperformactaithanactajbecausethereismorefittingnessreasonforustoprefertheoutcomeofai(callthisoi)totheoutcomeofaj(callthisoj).Forinstance,ourstrongerreasonstoin-vestinamutualfundthatwilldeliverahigherreturnthanitsalterna-tivesclearlystemfromourstrongerreasonstoprefertheoutcomeofinvestinginthefirsttothatofinvestinginthesecond.Thereareother

39. InresponsetoAnderson’s“expressivetheory”ofpracticalreasonsthatoneshould act only in ways that adequately express one’s rational attitudes(which bears close similarities to our explanation of the relationship be-tweenfittingmotivesandreasonstoact),Portmore(2011,80)correctlyob-servesthattheteleologistcanpointtodesiresforstates(likethatofone’scurrent actions adequately expressingone’s rational attitudes) thatwouldmotivatethesameactsasAnderson’stheory.Moreover,itisplausiblethatthesedesires arefitting. ButPortmore seemsquitewrong to suggest thatthefittingnessofdesiresforthesestatesexplainsourreasonstoactasourfittingact-directedmotivesdictate.Ourreasonstoactasfittingact-directedmotivesdictatearenomoreinneedofthefittingnessofadesirethatweactasourfittingmotivesdirect thanour reasons toactasfittingstate-directed motives(e. g.topromotesomeone’shappiness)areinneedofthefittingnessofthisgeneraldesire.InbothcasestheconnectionbetweenthefittingnessofthemotiveandthereasonstoactoutofitareexplainedbyWCPandMAPdirectly,andwithouttheneedofthefittingnessofsomegeneraldesiretoactasthereisreasontoact(i. e.toactasfittingmotivesdirect).Thefittingnessofadesiretopromotesomeone’shappiness[DH]andthestate-directedrea-sonsitgeneratestopromoteherhappiness(togetherwiththefactthatitisfittingtodesirethatwefeelanddowhatisreasonable)explainandarenotexplainedbythefittingnessofdesiringthestateofaffairsinwhichoneactsonDH.Intheexactsameway,thefittingnessofanact-directedmotivationtomake amends [MA] and the act-directed reasons it generates tomakeamendsexplainandarenotexplainedbythefittingnessofdesiringthestateofaffairsinwhichoneactsonMA.

Forinstance,suppose(asseemsplausible)thatthefactthatyourconducthasharmedsomeonemakesforthefittingnessoffeeling(i. e.isafittingnessreasontofeel)guiltforwhatyouhavedone.Sinceguiltessentiallyinvolvesintrinsicmotivationtomakeamends,WCPentailsthatthisfactisequallyafittingnessreasontobeintrinsicallymotivat-edtomakeamends,andMAPentailsthatthisfittingnessreasontobeintrinsicallymotivatedtomakeamendsisactuallyanintrinsicreasontomakeamendsforwhatyouhavedone.Similarly,supposethefactthatapaintingwould lookacertainwayorapieceofmusicwouldsoundacertainwaymakes for thefittingnessofaestheticallyappre-ciating thepotentialpaintingormusic. Sinceaesthetic appreciationessentiallyinvolvesintrinsicmotivationtoengagewithitsobject(forinstanceby composingorperforming it),WCPentails that this factisequallyafittingnessreasontobeintrinsicallymotivatedtoengagewiththepaintingormusic,andgiventhis,MAPentails that it isanintrinsicreasontoactuallyengagewiththepaintingormusic(e. g.toactuallycomposeorperformit).Theseact-directed reasonstoactasfit-tingintrinsicact-directedmotivesdictateneednomoresanctionfromfittingstate-directedmotivesthanstate-directed reasonstoactasfittingintrinsicstate-directedmotives(likethattopromotesomeone’shappi-ness)dictateneedsanctionfromfittingact-directedmotives.

Ofcoursetherearetimeswhenweacknowledgethatanact-direct-edmotivewouldbefitting,butfindourselveswithout it.Wemightfeelnoguiltforhavingharmedourrivalorfeelnogriefathispassing,yetrecognizethatitwouldbefittingtofeelsomesuchguiltorgrief.Inthesecasesitisnatural,anditseemsfitting,forustodesirethestateofourhavingtheseact-directedmotivesoratleastthatofourrespond-ingtotheact-directedreasonsconstitutedbythefactors(e. g.thatwehaveharmedourrivalorthathehaspassedaway)thatmakefortheirfittingness.Moreover,incasesinwhichwehaveandactfromwhatweregardasfittingact-directedmotives,itisnaturalandevidentlyfittingtobegladthatwehaveandactfromthem.Thisisaspecialcaseofthegeneralfactthatitisnaturalandevidentlyfittingtohavepro-attitudestowardsourfeelingandactingasitisfittingandreasonabletofeeland



Incaseswhereallreasonstoperformaiandajarestate-directed,(FM)willtaketheparticularform

(FP)onehasmorefittingnessreasontopreferoioveroj.

Incaseswheresomereasonstoperformaiorajareact-directed,theinstanceof(FM)thatexplains(RA)willnottaketheform(FP),butitwillexplain(RA)justaswell.OurexplanationthusgoesdeeperthanTCR’s.Bydrawingonconsiderationsofhowpracticalreasoninggov-ernsmotivation,intention,andaction,itexplainswhy it isthatfittingstate-directedpreferencesaccountforourpracticalreasonswhentheydo. But this same explanation also explainswhy fitting state-direct-edmotives do not—although their fitting act-directed counterpartsdo—accountforourpracticalreasonsinothercases.40

40.We think that this constitutes adirect response to thebroadunificationistargumentPortmore(2011,81–82)givesin§3.4.4,“IndefenseofTCRonthewhole”.In§3.4.1–3hegivesamorespecificunificationistargument.Thisar-gumentfirstdefendsthebiconditionalthatonehasmorereasontoperformaithanajiffonehasmorereasontopreferoitooj.ItthenarguesthatTCR’sexplanationofthebiconditional(thatgreaterreasonstopreferoitoojalwaysexplaingreaterreasonstoperformaioveraj)issuperiortoitsthreepossiblerivals.First,itcan’tbethatgreaterreasonstoperformaioverajalwaysexplaingreater reasons topreferoi tooj,becausesomecases (e. g. themutual fundcase)don’tfit thispattern.Second,Portmoreargues that itwouldbeunac-ceptablydisunifiedtoholdthatsometimesgreaterreasonstopreferoi tooj explaingreaterreasonstoperformaioverajbutsometimesviceversa.Third,Portmorearguesthathecan’tseehowtherecouldbesomethirdfactorthatalwayssimultaneouslyexplainsbothgreaterreasonstoperformaioverajandgreaterreasonstopreferoioveroj.

We strongly suspect that Portmore’s biconditional is false. If you couldsavefiveindividualsbykillingone(say,bypushingtheoneintothepathofatrolleyabouttokillthefive),weareinclinedtothinkthatyoushouldmorestronglypreferthatthefivelive,morestronglypreferthattheoneispushed,andthusmorestronglypreferthatyoupushhim,eventhoughyoushouldnotpushhim.Itmightseemstrangeatfirsttothinkthatweshouldhopethatwewillactasweshouldnotact.Butitisactuallyafamiliarphenomenonthatweshouldhopethatwewillhavemotivesthatitisunfittingtohave(e. g.unwar-rantedanger towardsone if that is theonlywaytopreventanevildemonfromkillingfive).If,aswehaveargued,whatthereisreasontodojustisamatterofwhatitisfittingtobemotivatedtodo,itshouldbenomoresurpris-ingforittobereasonabletohopethatwewilldowhatitisunreasonabletodo(e. g.unreasonablykilloneindividualifthatistheonlywaytosavefive).Whileitisplausiblethatweshouldintrinsicallyvalueouractingreasonably,

caseswhereourreasonstoperformaioverajdonotseemtostemfromourreasonstopreferoitooj.Forinstance,whenbreakingapromisetodo A willbringaboutslightlygreaterbenefitsthandoingA,themerefactthatwehavepromisedtodo A canseemtobeastrongerintrinsicreasoninfavorofdoingAthantheadditionalbenefitsarereasonstoomitA.Hereourapparentlystrongerreasonstokeepthepromisedonotseemtobegeneratedbyreasonstopreferthestateinwhichwekeepit;ratherourreasonstopreferthisstateseemtobegeneratedbythefactthatitinvolvesourdoingwhatthereisgreaterreasonforustodo.But,Portmoreargues,proponentsofTCRcanre-describeourap-parentintrinsicreasonstokeeppromisesasreasonstobringaboutthestateofaffairsinwhichwekeepourpromises(orourcurrentprom-ises),andholdthatthesereasonsdostemfromourreasonstopreferthestateofourkeepingourpromises.Althoughthismayconflictwithinitialappearances,Portmorearguesthatweshouldacceptitbecauseit provides amoreunified account of the relationshipbetweenourreasonsforpreferenceandourreasonsforaction.

But our account of the relationship between fittingmotives andreasonstoactoffersapictureofhowreasonsforpreferencerelatetoreasonsforactionthatisjustasunifiedasTCR’sassertionthatallrea-sonstoactareexplainedbyourreasonstoprefertheiroutcomes.WCPandMAPofferasystematicconceptualaccountofhowthefittingnessofmotivesexplainstheexistenceofreasonstoactastheywouldmoti-vateus.Becausefittingintrinsicmotivescomeintwovarieties—state-directedandact-directed—thisunifiedexplanationentailsthattherewill be intrinsic state-directed reasons corresponding to the formerandintrinsicact-directedreasonscorrespondingtothelatter.Onthisview,whenever

(RA)onehasmorereasontoperformaithantoperformaj ,

thisisbecause

(FM)onehasmorefittingness reason tobemotivated to per-formaithantoperformaj.



functionthatmakesthestrengthofherpreferenceforeachgambleafunctionofthestrengthofherpreferenceforitspossibleoutcomes.42 Thebasicideaofhowtomakerationaldecisionsunderconditionsofriskistoperformtheact(orpickfromamongthesetofacts)withthehighestexpectedutility,whichisobtainedbymultiplyingone’sdegreeofpreferenceforeachoftheact’spossibleoutcomesbytheprobabilitythattheoutcomewillobtainifoneperformstheact.43

Since decision theorizing is donewith such heavily teleologicallanguage,onemightbetemptedtothinkthatourbasicprinciplesforhowtomakerationaldecisionswouldhavetobeabandonedorsub-stantiallyrevisedifTCRwererejected.Butwethinkthisisanillusion.Oneway to understanddecision theory is as a theory ofwhat it isreasonabletodoinlightofone’sevidence,assuming thatone’saimsand expectations are reasonable.Another (perhapsmore common)wayistounderstanditasatheoryofwhattodogivenone’saimsandexpectationsifoneistoretainakindofminimal,instrumentalratio-nality.44Eitherway,thetheoryshouldbeentirelynon-committalastothekindsofaimsit isreasonabletohave,andinparticularwhethertheyarestate-directedoract-directed.

Apart fromcommon labelling conventions,wedonot think thatthere isanything in the frameworkof standarddecision theory thatsupports the assumption that the decision maker’s ultimate aims,whicharetakenasgivenorassumedtobereasonable,mustbestate-directed as opposed to act-directed motives. What the frameworkdoesisunderstandactsasgambles{(S1, D1),(S2, D2),…,(Sn, Dn)}thatassociateeachstateof theworldSiwith themotivationally relevant

42. ThemainclassicresultsareduetoRamsey1926,vonNeumannandMorgen-stern1944,andSavage1954.

43. Thisprinciplehasbeenputinteleologicaltermssinceitsfirstclearformula-tionbyArnauldandNicole: “Inorder to judgeofwhatweought todo inordertoobtainagoodandtoavoidanevil, it isnecessarytoconsidernotonlythegoodandevilinthemselves,butalsotheprobabilityoftheirhappen-ingandnothappening,andtoregardgeometricallytheproportionwhichallthesethingshave,takentogether”(1662,367).

44. SeeDarwall1983,Broome1991,Gibbard1998,andJoyce1999.

SomemaythinkthatTCRreceivessupport fromdecisiontheory,orthetheoryofhowitisrationaltopursuegivenaimsinlightofgivenexpectationsabout statesof theworld.41Thebasicquestionofdeci-siontheoryisusuallyputasoneofhowtochoosefromasetofactsthatcanberepresentedasfunctionsfrompossiblestatesoftheworldtooutcomesthatthedecisionmakervalues,orgamblesoftheform{(S1, O1), (S2, O2),…, (Sn, On)},whichassociateeachpossible stateof theworldSiwithanoutcomeOithatwillobtainiftheactisperformedandSi obtains. If thedecisionmaker’spreferencesamonggamblesobeycertain rationality constraints, they can be represented by a utility

thevalueofthis,evenfromourownperspectives,shouldbeabsolutelytrivialcomparedtothatofsomeone’slife(letalonefourlives).Tolookmorefondlyuponone’sfollowingthedictatesofreasonthanuponone(orcertainlyfour)other individuals’ survivingwouldbemonstrouslynarcissistic. (The exam-plesPortmoreusestosupportthebiconditionalappearill-chosen;ashead-mits[115n76],itispre-theoreticallyplausiblethatoneshouldmorestronglypreferone’schildrenlivingthanstrangersliving,andtheKantianideathatoneshouldnotlietoamurderertosavehisvictimsisdistractinglyabsurd.)

Still, ifPortmore’sbiconditionaldid turnout tobe true,webelieveouraccount would give, as he demands, a principled “explanation as to whysometimesreasonsforactingareexplanatorilypriorandothertimesreasonsfordesiringareexplanatorilyprior”(2011,81).Ourexplanationofhowact-directed reasons for actionexplain thefittingnessofpro-attitudes towardsthestateofouractingonthemdoesrelyuponthesubstantiveviewthatitisfittingtopreferstatesinwhichonedoeswhatonehasmostreasontodo.BecausetheproponentofTCRdoesnotseemtoneedsuchanadditionalsub-stantiveviewtoexplainPortmore’sbiconditional,therewouldbeacasethatTCR’sexplanationissimpler.ButthissimplicitywouldhavetobeweighedagainstTCR’scosts.Wehavearguedthattherearegoodfunctionalistreasonstobelievethatwehaveact-directedasopposedtomerelystate-directedmo-tivesandgoodnormative reasons to think that theyare sometimesfitting.Wehavealsoarguedthattheveryprinciples(WCPandMAP)thatvindicatewhattruththere is inTCR’sorderofexplanationentail that thefittingnessof act-directedmotives generates act-directed practical reasons.Moreover,thereareseriousworriesaboutthenarcissisticcharacterofsomeagent-rela-tivereasonswhentheyarecastasstate-directed.Againstallthis,wedonotbelievethatthegreatersimplicityofTCRwouldbemuchofabenefit.

41. For instance, Pettit assumes that the plausibility of non-consequentialistviewscanbedispelledbythefollowingdecision-theoreticreasoning:“Ifoneoptionhas[betterpossibleoutcomesthanallalternativeoptions]suchthatitrepresentsabettergamblethan[thosealternatives]…,thensurelythatisthebestoptionformetotake”(1991,239).



plausibilityofstandarddecisiontheoryinnowaycountsagainsttheexistenceofirreduciblyact-directedpracticalreasons.46

5. Practical Reasons to Be Moral, Whether or Not Morality Promotes the Good

Wehavethusarguedthatthesameprinciplesthatexplainwhytherearereasonstopromotegoodoutcomes,oractasfittingstate-motivesdictate,equallyexplainhowtherecanbereasonstodootherthings,whichfittingact-directedmotivesdictate.This issufficient todefeatthelogicallystrongestversionofthetop-downstrategyofarguingforconsequentialism,whichholds,on thebasisofTCR, thatmoral rea-sonsmustbereasonstopromotegoodoutcomesbecauseallpracticalreasonsare reasons topromotegoodoutcomes.Ourexplanationofhowreasonstoactasfittingact-directedmotivesdictatearegenerated

46.We take this to be a slightlymore detailed explanation ofwhy, asHurley(1997, 123–124) claims, act-directed goals are consistent with a maximiz-ingconceptionofpractical rationality.Onecould summarize theplausiblegeneralmaximizingprincipleasinstructingustoperformtheactsthathavethegreatestexpecteddegreeofsupportbyreasons(ifweassumeouraimsare reasonable); or thegreatest expectationof realizing theobjectsofourintrinsicmotives,weightedby their strengths (if formulatedas aprinciplethat takesour aims as “given”). It is important to clarify that themaximiz-ingprinciplesounderstooddoesnotsaythatweshouldeachhaveonlyoneintrinsicsuper-aimtodosomethinglike“maximizetheexpectedreasonormotivesupportofmyactions”.Anact’sdegreeofexpectedreasonssupportisnotsomenewthingthatagentsaresupposedtocareaboutoverandabovethefittingaimsthatitcanbeexpectedtoachieve;itissimplyasummaryofhowitisrationaltotradeofftheact’sexpectationsofachievingthosefittingaimsinlightoftheirimportanceanditslikelihoodofachievingthem.

Wetakeoneofthemainlessonsoftheconsequentializingprojectofau-thors like Portmore to be that, if sufficient relativization is allowed in thedescriptionsofstatesofaffairs,foranysetofaimsthatincludesintrinsicact-directedmotives,thereisasetofpurelystate-directedintrinsicaimsthatwillmotivate the same conduct in the same circumstances. The reasonwhy itmatterswhetheranorderingofgamblesrepresentsintrinsicmotivesthatareact-directedorpurelystate-directedisthatthestate-directedmotivesmaynotbeasfittingastheact-directedones.Forexample,aswewillsuggestbelow,itseemsplausiblethatitisfittingtofeelmorestronglyobligatednottokillsomeonethantopreventfiveothersfromdying.Butitseemsunfittinglynar-cissistictomorestronglydesireastateofaffairsinwhichfivedieandyoukillnoonethanastateinwhichonlyonediesandyoukillsomeone.

descriptionDithatwillbetrueoftheactifSiobtains.Incaseswhereallone’sintrinsicmotivesfororagainstperformingtheactarestate-directed, these act-descriptionswill include only the outcomes thattheactwillbringabout if thestateobtains.But incaseswhereonehasintrinsicact-directedmotivesthatmight(dependingonthestateoftheworld)favorordisfavortheact,thesedescriptionswillincludepropertiesoftheact(likeis a keeping of a promise, is a killing of an inno-cent)otherthantheoutcomesitbringsabout.Wecanthusunderstandthe standard results of decision theory as tellingus that if thedeci-sionmaker’schoicesamongacts(i. e.gambles)obeycertainrationalityconstraints,theycanberepresentedwitha“utilityfunction”thatrep-resentsthestrengthofhermotivationstoperformvariousacts,wherethestrengthofhermotivationstoperformanactwhenitspropertiesareuncertainisafunctionofthestrengthsofhermotivationstoper-formitifitspropertieswereknownwithcertainty.45Wethinkthatthisframeworkactuallyenablesustoseemoreclearlytheplausibleideaembodiedintheprincipleofmaximizingexpectedutility,namely:themoreaverseyouare(orshouldbe)toperforminganactwithcertainproperties,thelesswillingyoushouldbetoperformanactifthereisarisk that itwillhavethoseproperties,andthegreater theexpecta-tionyouwillneedofitshavingpropertiesthat(should)inclineyoutoperformitinorderforittoberationalforyoutotakethisrisk.Sincethisistheprinciplethatmakesthestandardtheoryofrationaldecisionmakingplausible,anditappliesjustaseasilytocaseswheresomeofthedecisionmaker’sultimateaimsareact-directed,wethinkthatthe

45. Notethat,underconditionsofrisk,therepresentationswithwhichtheagent’sact-directedandstate-directedmotiveswillbecombiningtoexplainactsandact-directedmotiveswillbe degrees of belief or credencethatactswillbepartsofwaysofperformingotheractsandthatactswillbringaboutstatesofaffairs.Onethereforeshouldnottakeouraccountsofact-directedandstate-directedmotivesinsection2toberestrictedtorepresentationsthatareflat-outbeliefs,or to thesortsofexplanationsofactionsandact-directedmotives thatareproducedbythemotivescombiningwithflat-outbeliefs.



bereasonstoperformitthatarebothpracticalanddistinctivelymoral.Thatsaid,wewillshowinthenextsectionhowouraccountofmoralreasonscanhelpdefendtheplausibilityofnon-consequentialistmoralreasons,forinstanceagainstconcernsaboutnarcissism.

Justas there isawidediversityof states thatpeoplecancoherentlyjudgetobegood,thereisawidediversityofactsthatpeoplecanco-herently—ifinmanycasesquitefalsely—judgetobemorallywrongoropposedbymoralreasons.Theseincludesuchplausiblywrongfulactsas inflictingharms,defectingincollectiveactionproblems,andfailingtorespectautonomy,butalsoallmannerofapparentlymiscel-laneousacts,includingsexualpractices,druguse,swearing,“playingGod”,andsoon(quiteindependent,inmanycases,oftheirperceivedconsequences).

We think that theonly thing thatunifies thecontentofall thesejudgments is that thosewhomake them think thatwe should feelobligatednot toperformtheacts inquestion.Feelingsofobligationare,asRichardBrandt(1959,117–118)observed,whatyouhavewhenyouseesomeoneintroubleandfeellikeyou“justcan’t”leaveher.J.S.Mill(1863)describedthefeelingasan“internalsanctionofduty…afeelinginourownmind…attendantonviolationofduty,whichinproperlycultivatedmoralnaturesrises,inthemoreseriouscases,intoshrinking from it as an impossibility”, and “amass of feelingwhichmustbebrokenthroughinordertodowhatviolatesourstandardofright”.Thephenomenologyoffeelingobligatednottodosomethingissimilartothatoffeelingguiltforhavingdoneit,butwhereasguiltisretrospective,feelingobligatednottodosomethinginvolvesakindofprospectiveguilt-tingedaversiontodoingit.48

48. Itisimportant,however,toemphasizethatfeelingobligatednottodosome-thinginvolvesanaversiontodoing it,nottotheprospectoffeelingguiltforhavingdoneit.Ifyousawsomeoneinneedofhelpbuthadonhandapillthatwouldpreventyoufromfeelingguiltforfailingtohelpher,yourfeelingthatyou“justcan’t”leaveher(unlikeanaversiontofeelingguilt)wouldmotivateyoutohelpherandgeneratenomotivationatalltotakethepill.

One might worry that feeling obligated not to do something involvesjudgingthatitwouldbewrongtodoit,inwhichcaseitwouldbecircularto

inthesamewayasreasonstopromotegoodoutcomesshoulddemys-tifyhow therecouldbepractical reasons todoanythingother thanpromotegoodoutcomes.

Butjustbecausetherecanbepracticalreasonstoactasfittingact-directedmotivesdictatedoesn’tmeanthattherearemoralreasonstodoso.Manyact-directedreasons,liketorunforthesakeofrunningortoperformorcreateanartwork,seemtohavelittletodowithmorality.OurargumentagainstTCRthusleavesopenaversionofthetop-downstrategy which maintains that, although there may be act-directedpracticalreasons,theycannotbemoralreasons.Aproponentofthistop-downargumentforconsequentialismmightholdthattobemoral,areasonmustbesufficientlyselfless,disinterested,orimpartial,andthattheonlypracticalreasonsthathavethesepropertiesarereasonstobringaboutimpartiallygoodoutcomes,orstatesthatitisfittingforallmoralagentstohavepro-attitudestowards.47

In this sectionweargue that this logicallyweakerversionof thetop-downstrategyisalsounsound.Weshowhowthesamekindsofconsiderationsthatsupportunderstandingastate’sstatusasgoodintermsofthefittingnessofpro-attitudestowardsitsupportunderstand-inganact’smoralstatusintermsofthefittingnessoffeelingobligatedtoperformoravoidperformingit.But,giventheprinciplesconnectingfittingmotivestopracticalreasonsthatwedefendedinsection3,thissupports adirect connectionbetweenan act’smoral status and rea-sonsfororagainstperformingit,whichholdsquiteindependentlyofwhethertheactpromotesthegood.Ouraccountofmoralreasonsislogicallyconsistentwiththeconsequentialistviewthatallmoralrea-sonsarereasonstopromotethegood.Ourprimaryaiminthissectionissimplytoextendourargumentagainstthetop-downstrategytothelogicallyweakervarietybyshowingthatwedonotneedtheideaofanact’spromotingtheimpartialgoodtomakesenseofhowtherecan

47. AlthoughmostconsequentialistsseemtoembraceTCR,theideathatlegiti-matelymoral reasonsmust favorpromoting those stateswe shouldpreferfromanimpartialperspectiveplaysacentralroleintheargumentsforconse-quentialismofsuchauthorsasR.M.Hare(1963,ch.6–7),Singer(1979,10–13),andRailton(1986,189–190).



Thissupportsthefollowinganalysesofourconceptsofmoralrea-sonsandmoralwrongness:

Fitting Attitude Analysis of Moral Reasons: To judgethatRisamoralreasonforagentXtoφistojudgethatRisafittingnessreasonforXtofeelobligatedtoφ,and

Fitting Attitude Analysis of Moral Wrongness:TojudgethatitismorallywrongforXtoψistojudgethatitis,onbalance,fittingforXtofeelobligatednottoψ.50

50.Ofcourse,wecanthinkitperfectlyfittingforsomeonetoexperiencenofeel-ingsofobligationtorefrainfromdoingthingswethinkwrongifsheisalreadysufficientlymotivatednot todothem. Inmostcaseswewouldneverevenconsiderdoingthingsthatwouldkillothers,andifwedo,careforthoseoth-ersandfearofpunishmentarealmostalwayssufficientdeterrents.Althoughwethinkitwouldbewrongforustokillinsuchcases,wesurelydonotthinkitinappropriatethatweexperiencenofeelingsofobligationtorefrainfromdoingso.Moreover,thereisasenseinwhichwecanthinkitfittingonbal-ancetofeelobligatedtodothingsthatwedonotthinkitwrongtofailtodo.Itseemsperfectlyfittingforsomeonewhogoesaboveandbeyondwhatmoral-ityrequires—say,bygettingkilledtosaveayoungerstrangerfromdeath—tofeelobligatedtodowhatshedoes.

Toclarifyourproposal,itisimportanttonotefirstthattalkoffeelingemo-tions,liketalkofdesiringorpreferring,isambiguousbetweenanoccurrentandadispositional sense.Occurrent feelings andpreferences exert causalpressureonone’sbehavior at themoment, and (at least typically) involvephenomenalexperiences,whiledispositionalfeelingsandpreferencesmere-lyhavethedispositiontobecomeoccurrentincertaincircumstances.Thusonecandispositionally feelobligatednot topushone’s friendsoutofwin-dowsinthesamewayonecandispositionallyfeelangeratone’sfatherevenwhileoneisenjoyinghiscompanyandexperiencingnonegativeemotions.Second,itisimportanttonotethataresponse’sbeing“fittingonbalance”isambiguousbetween (i) the response’sbeingmandatory, in that there isnoalternativeresponsethatisasstronglysupportedbyfittingnessreasons,or(ii)theresponse’sbeingjustified,inthatthereisnoalternativeresponsethatismorestronglysupportedbyfittingnessreasons.

Inmoredetail,then,ourproposalisthattothinkitmorallywrongforXtoψistothinkthatitismandatoryforXtohaveatleastadispositionalfeelingofobligationnottoψ(andmandatoryforXtohaveanoccurrentfeelingofob-ligationnottoψ onlyifXisnotalreadysufficientlymotivatednottoψ).Thesenseinwhichonecanjudgeit“fittingonbalance”forXtofeelobligatedtoφ whenonetakesX’sφ-ingtobesupererogatoryisthatonethinksX’sfeelingofobligationisjustifiedbutnotmandatory.

Thus,forreasonssimilartothosethatfavoranalyzingjudgmentsthat states are good as judgments about the fittingness of pro-atti-tudes towards them,we think that thecontentandnormative forceof judgments that acts arewrongor opposedbymoral reasons arebestcapturedbyanalyzingthemasjudgmentsaboutthefittingnessof feelingobligatednot to perform them. For instance,what seemsdistinctiveaboutviewingthefactthatdoing A willsavesomeone’slifeasamoral reasontodo A isone’stakingthisconsiderationtocountinfavoroffeelingobligatedtodoA.49Similarly,whatseemsdistinctiveaboutthinkingthatthefactthatdoing A wouldkillsomeonemakesitmorallywrongorforbidden(asopposedtojustunreasonable)todo A seemstobeone’stakingthisconsiderationtomakeit,onbalance,fit-tingforyoutofeelobligatednottodoA.

trytoexplainjudgmentsaboutwrongnessintermsofjudgmentsaboutthefittingnessoffeelingsofobligation.Butthefactthatwecanrecalcitrantlyfeelobligatednottodothingsthatwejudgeperfectlypermissibleseemstoshowthat the feelingneednot involvethe judgment.For instance,agaypersonraisedinahomophobicculturemightbefullyconfidentthatitispermissibletohavesexualrelationshipswithpeopleofthesamesex,butstillhavelinger-ingfeelingsofobligationnottodoso.(Thisisaninstanceofthegeneralob-jectionfromrecalcitrantemotionstothe“judgmentalist”viewthatemotionsinvolveethicalorevaluativejudgments—seeGibbard1990andD’ArmsandJacobson2003.)

49. Thebestalternativeproposalaboutwhatisdistinctiveaboutviewingthisasamoralreasonispresumablythatit involvesone’stakingittobeareasonthatonehassimplybecauseone’sactwillpromotethewell-beingofthein-dividualinquestion.Butitissurelycoherenttothinkthattherearedistinctlymoralreasonstodothingsotherthanpromotewell-being:withsomeplau-sibilityonecanthinkthereareintrinsicmoralreasonstorespectautonomyandkeeppromises,andweknowonly toowellwhatsomeone is thinkingwhenshetakestheallegedfactthatanactis“unnatural”,“againsttradition”,or“againstGod’swill”asanintrinsicmoralreasonagainstdoingit.Moreover,althoughmanyofusaredecentenoughtoacceptasubstantiveprincipleofbeneficenceaccordingtowhichthereisintrinsicmoralreasontopromotethewell-beingofeveryindividualcapableofwell-being,itis,sadly,coherenttothinkotherwise.Theviewthatthereareindividualswhosewell-beingthereisnointrinsicmoralreasontopromote(althoughperhapsstillsomeintrinsicnon-moralreasontopromote)hasbeencoherentlyentertained,forinstance,bysomewhotakeexaltedviewsofthemoralrelevanceofsuchfactorsasret-ribution,autonomy,promise-keeping,supernaturalwills,andgroup-loyalty.



Giventhesefittingattitudeanalysesofmoralconcepts,theexactsameconnectionbetweenfittingmotivesandreasonstoact thatexplainswhytherearereasonstopromotethegoodequallyexplainsadirectconceptualconnectionbetweenanact’smoralstatusandtheexistenceofpracticalreasonsfororagainstperformingit.Thereisthusnoneedfor the link betweenmorality and practical reasons to bemediatedby the linkbetweengoodoutcomesandpractical reasons, and con-sequentlynoneedformoralconsiderationstobereasonstopromotethegoodinorderforustoseehowtheycanbegenuinereasonstoact.Sinceajudgment’struthentailsthetruthofitsanalysans,itis,accord-ingtoourfittingattitudeanalysesofmoraljudgments,aconceptualtruththat(i)R isamoralreasonforXtoφiffR isafittingnessreasonforXtofeelobligatedtoφ,and(ii)X’sψ-ingismorallywrongiffitis fittingforXtofeelobligatednottoψ.52Since,aswenoted,feelingob-ligatedtoφ essentiallyinvolvesmotivationtoφ(andfeelingobligated

problems. Inmorerecentwork,Gibbard(2008)hasproposedtodoessen-tiallythesamething.

52. Aswiththeconnectionbetweengoodstatesandfittingpro-attitudes,whatismostcentraltoourargumentistheexistenceoftheseconnectionsbetweenanact’smoralstatusandfittingnessreasonstofeelobligatedtoperformoravoidperformingit,ratherthantheparticularexplanationofthisconnectionpro-videdbyourfittingattitudeanalysesofmoraljudgments.Wedobelievethatourbasicargumentcouldbemadetoworkwithanalternativeexplanationofthisconnection,forinstancethatwhatmakesaconsiderationafittingnessasopposedtoanon-fittingnessreasontofeelobligatedtoφisthatitisinfactamoralreasontoφ.Wesuspect,however,thatsuchanexplanationofthecon-nectionbetweenmoralityandfittingattitudesmightbemorenaturallypairedwithanexplanationofMAPaccordingtowhichanact’smoralstatusjointlyexplainsboth(a)thefittingnessoffeelingsofobligationtoperformoravoidperformingit,and(b)theexistenceofpracticalreasonstoperformoravoidperformingit.Forreasonsweobservedinnote34,thispurportedexplanationofMAPwouldseemtogiveopponentsofourargumentmoreroomtoholdthatanact’smoralstatusdetermines(a)withoutnecessarilydetermining(b).Becausewesuspect thatourfittingattitudeanalysisofacts’moralstatusesis theexplanationoftheconnectionbetweenmoralityandfittingattitudesthatismostnaturallypairedwithourexplanationofMAP,wesuspectthatitwillbetheleastvulnerabletoopponents’attemptstoarguethatMAPholdsinthecaseoffittingmotivestobringaboutstatesbutfailstoholdinthecaseoffittingfeelingsofobligationtodothingsthatmaynotbringaboutstatestowardswhichitisfittingtohavepro-attitudes.

Justasjudgmentsaboutthegoodnessofstateshavethecentralnor-mative feature of guiding pro-attitudes towards them, moral judg-mentsseemtohavethecentralnormativepropertyofguidingfeelingsofobligation.Thesefittingattitudeanalysesofmoraljudgmentscanexplaintheirabilitytogeneratemotivationtoactoutoffeelingsofob-ligationasaspecialcaseoftheabilityofjudgmentsthatattitudesarefittingtodirectlyguideusintohavingthem.

Toappreciate thecentralityof thisattitude-guiding roleofmoraljudgments,supposethatsomeoneweretolabelas“morallywrong”allthosethingswewouldcallmorallywrong,buttookthistohavenosig-nificanceforwhatitwasappropriatetofeelobligatedtodoandconse-quentlyhadnopropensitytofeelobligatednottoperformtheactsinquestion.Itseemsthatby‘morallywrong’shewouldnotreallymeanmorallywrong.Ontheotherhand,ifsomeoneweretolabelas“mor-allywrong” precisely those thingswe think permissible, shewouldstillseemperfectlyintelligibleasthinkingthatthosethingsaremor-allywrongsolongasshethoughtitwasfittingtofeelobligatednottoperformthem.Thatsaid,asinthecaseofourfittingattitudeanalysisofgoodstates,wewillnot relyon thisstrongclaimthat judgmentsabout thefittingnessof feelingsofobligationexhaust thecontentofmoraljudgments.Allwerequireistheclaimthatjudgmentsabouttheexistenceoffittingnessreasonsforfeelingsofobligationareentailedbyorpart ofthecontentofmoraljudgments.51

51. ThisanalysisofmoralconceptsisdefendedatgreaterlengthbyNye(2009).Therehavebeenpreviousproposalsabouthowtoanalyzemoraljudgmentsasjudgmentsaboutthefittingnessofcertainattitudes,mostnotablythepro-posalofGibbard(1990,44–45,126–150).Gibbardbeganbyanalyzingjudg-mentsthatX’sψ-ingismorallyblameworthyasjudgmentsthatitisfittingforX tofeelguiltforψ-ingandfittingforotherstofeelangeratXforψ-ing.Gibbardthenproposed thatweanalyze judgments thatX’sψ-ing ismorallywrongas judgments thatX’sψ-ingwouldbemorallyblameworthyabsentexcuse.Whileweagree that there isa conceptual connectionbetweenwrongnessandblameworthiness,Gibbard’s1990analysisoffersnowayofinterpretingconflicting normative judgments about excuses, and does not explain therole of normative judgments in guiding prospective behavior.We believethatadoptingtheanalysisofmoralwrongnessdefendedbyNye(2009)to-getherwithGibbard’sanalysisofmoralblameworthinesscanovercomethese



isnotinpain.AbsentspecialobligationstoeitherLeslieorGertrude,thereisnostrongerreasontofeelobligatedtobring it about thatLes-lie isnot inpainthantobring it about thatGertrudeisnot inpain.53 ButitisplausiblethatthefactthatyouractwillcauseLesliepainisastrongerreasontofeelobligatednot to perform itthanyourreasonstofeelobligatedtobringitaboutthatGertrudeisnotinpain.Iftheonlyway tobring itabout thatGertrude is sparedequalorevenslightlygreaterpainistoinflictsignificantpainonLeslie,itisplausiblethatyoushouldstillfeelmoststronglyobligatednottoinflictpainonLes-lie.Iftheseplausiblethoughtsaretrue,theconnectionbetweenfittingattitudesandreasons toactentails that,allelseheldequal, there isstrongeract-directedpracticalreasonagainstinflictingpainonothersthansimplybringingitaboutthatothersarenotinpain.

Infact,itfollowsfromthefittingattitudeanalysesofmoralconceptsthat,inacertainsense,allmoralreasonsareactuallyact-directed.Allfeelingsofobligationarefeelingsofobligationtoperformoromitacts, andessentially involvemotivations to perform or omit them, so theirfittingnessalwaysmakesforpracticalreasonsthatareinsomesenseact-directed.Itistruethatonecanfeelobligatedtoperformanactin virtueofitshavingthepropertyofbringingaboutacertainstateofaf-fairs.Plausibly,therearebasicmoralreasonsofbeneficencethatcountinfavoroffeelingobligatedtoperformactssimplyinvirtueoftheirbringingaboutthewell-beingofothers.Butthesereasonsarestillfun-damentally act-directed, in that theyultimatelyderive fromthefitting-nessofattitudestowardsacts,eventhoughtheyareintrinsicreasonstobringaboutstatessimplybecauseofwhatthosestatesinvolve.54

53.Moreover, there doesnot seem to be any stronger intrinsic reason to feelobligatedtobringitabout thatthereislesspain-inflictingintheworld,lesspain-inflictingdonebyoneself,or lesspain-inflictingdonebyoneselfnow.Aswewillexplainbelow,thesesuggestionsseemmuchmorevulnerabletochargesofobjectionablenarcissismthantheideathatthereisstrongerintrin-sicreasontofeelobligatednotto inflictpain.

54. Inthesameway,instrumentalreasonstoperformactssoastobringaboutgoodstatesofaffairsmaybefundamentally state-directed,inthattheyultimate-lyderivefromthefittingnessofattitudestowardsstates,eventhoughtheyarereasonstoperformacts.Indeed,evenintrinsicreasonstoperformactscould

nottoψ essentiallyinvolvesmotivationnottoψ),itfollowsfrom(i)and(ii)togetherwiththeWarrantCompositionPrinciplethat(i′)ifR isamoralreasontoφ,thenRisafittingnessreasontobemotivatedtoφ, and (ii′) ifψ-ing ismorallywrong, then it isfitting tobemoti-vatednottoψ.Moreover,itfollowsfrom(i′)and(ii′)togetherwiththeMotivations-ActionsPrinciplethat(i*)ifRisamoralreasontoφ,thenRisagenuinepracticalreasontoφ,and(ii*)ifψ-ingismorallywrong,thentherearegenuinepracticalreasonsnottoψ.

Forinstance,suppose(asseemsoverwhelminglyplausible)thatthefactthatanactwillcausesomeonepainisanintrinsicmoralreasonnottoperformit—which,absentfactorslikeitspreventingevenmoreegregiousharmstoothers,willmakeitwrongtoperformit.Giventhefittingattitudeanalysesofmoralconcepts,thisentailsthatthefactthatanactwillcausesomeonepainisareasontofeelintrinsicallyobligat-ednottoperformtheact(i. e.tofeelobligatednottoperformtheactsimplyonaccountofitsbeingacausingofherpain)—which,absentother factors,willmake it,onbalance,fitting tohave this feelingofobligation.Sincefeelingintrinsicallyobligatednottocausesomeonepaininvolvesintrinsicmotivationnottocauseherpain,WCPentailsthatthefactthatyouractwouldcausesomeonepainisequallyafit-tingness reason tobe intrinsicallymotivatednot toperform theact.Finally,MAPentailsthatthisfittingnessreasontobeintrinsicallymo-tivatednottocauseherpainisactuallyanintrinsicpracticalreasonnottocauseherpain.

Thus,thereisnoneedtothinkthatamoralreasonagainstdoingsomethingmustbeareasonagainstbringingaboutasub-optimalout-comeinordertoseehowitcanbeagenuinepracticalreasonagainstdoingit.Themerefactthattheconsiderationcountsmorallyagainstanactdirectlyentails that it isafittingness reason to feelobligatednottodoit,whichentailsthatitisapracticalreasonagainstdoingit.There is no reason in the abstractwhy these reasons cannot be en-tirelyact-directed:itisplausibletothinkthatthefactthatyouractwillcauseLesliepainisareasontofeelobligatednot to perform that act,asopposedtosimplyareasontofeelobligatedtobringitaboutthatshe



anact’smoralstatusandreasonsfororagainstperformingit,whichholdsquiteindependentlyofwhethermoralitydirectsustopromotethegood.Soonceweunderstandwhygoodstatesareconnectedtopracticalreasons,wecanseethatmoralityhastheexactsamekindofdirecttheoreticalconnectiontopracticalreasons,anddoesnotneedtoborrowitspracticalforcefromgoodstatesbyprescribingthatwepromotethem.

Ifourargumentissound,webelievethatitunderminesthecasefor preferring relativized versions of consequentialism like Port-more’s to non-consequentialism, as this case relies almost exclu-sivelyontheteleologicalconceptionofpracticalreasons.Moreover,wethinkourexplanationofhowmoralitycouldgiveusentirelyact- directed practical reasons helps us understand the strength of thecase forpreferringnon-consequentialism to relativizedconsequen-tialism.Therelativizedconsequentialistmusthold thatwearenotallowed,forinstance,toperformonemurdertopreventfivemurders,becauseitisfittingforustopreferthestateofournotmurderingtothestateoffourmorelivesbeingsaved.Whileitseemsappropriatetobesomewhatspeciallyconcernedaboutone’sownmoralcharac-ter,itseemsmonstrouslynarcissistictolookmorefondlyuponthestate of not being amurderer oneself thanon the survival of fourindividuals.Thenon-consequentialist,unlike the relativizedconse-quentialist,canholdthatitisfittingtovaluethesurvivaloffourin-dividualsmorethanone’sownmoralpurity,butthatwhatstatesitisfittingtovaluedoesn’talwayssettlewhattodo.Wearesimplynotpermittedtosavethefivebyperformingamurderourselves,becauseit isfittingto feelmuchmorestronglyobligatednot tokill thantomerelyfailtosave.This,webelieve,isamuchmoreplausiblewayofunderstandingagent-centeredconstraints.

Asweindicatedabove,thereisstillabottom-upcasetobemadeagainst the initialplausibilityofnon-consequentialist ideas,soevenifwe are successful in dispatching the top-down strategy, impartial

Sowhateverconsiderationsturnouttobemoralreasons,theyareconceptuallyguaranteedtobefittingnessreasonstofeelobligatedtoperformoromitacts,andconsequentlygenuinepracticalreasonstoperformoromitthem.Aswehaveseen,thesepracticalreasonsgener-atedbythefittingnessofact-directedmotivesarejustasbasicas,andneednosanctionfrom,thestate-directedreasonsgeneratedbythefit-tingnessofstate-directedmotiveswhichconstitutethegoodnessandbadnessofstatesofaffairs.Soevenifwerejecttheconsequentialistthesisthatallmoralreasonsmustbereasonstopromotethegood,itshouldbejustasclearwhythereispracticalreasontobemoralaswhythereispracticalreasontopromotethegood.This,webelieve,shoulddemystifynotonlyhowtherecanbegenuinepracticalreasontodothingsotherthanpromotegoodoutcomes,buthowsomeoftheserea-sonscanbegenuinelymoral.

6. Conclusion

We have thus argued that, because there is nomystery about howtherecouldbereasonstodothingsotherthanpromotethegoodthatarebothpracticalandmoral,thetop-downstrategyofarguingforcon-sequentialism fails. The deep theoretical connection between goodstates and reasons topromote them is a special instanceof amoregeneralconnectionbetweenfittingattitudesandreasonstoactastheywouldmotivateus.Anotherinstanceofthisconnectionisthatbetween

bestate-directed,iftheywereultimatelygeneratedbytheintrinsicdesirabil-ityofthestateoftheirbeingperformed(thisisessentiallyhowproponentsof relativized consequentialism portray reasons to observe agent-centeredconstraints).RisanintrinsicreasontorespondinwayW(e. g.todesirethatLeslieisnotinpain,bringitaboutthatsheisnotinpain,feelobligatednottocauseherpain,oromitcausingherpain)ifRcountsinfavorofWsimplyinvirtueofdescribingwhatW’sobject is initself(e. g.Leslie’snotbeinginpainortheactofcausingherpain)andindependentofthisobject’srelationtoanythingelse.Butthe“simplyinvirtue”hereindicatesonlythatthereisnofurthernormative factorthatmakesitthecasethatRcountsinfavorofW.ItisconsistentwithR’sbeinganintrinsicreasontoWthatthereissomefurtherconceptual explanationofhowRcomestocountinfavorofW,suchasbyR’scountinginthefirstinstanceinfavoroffeelingobligatedtodowhateverwillbringaboutthestateofLeslie’snotbeinginpain,and(givenWCPandMAP)R’sconsequentlycountinginfavorofbringingitaboutthatsheisnotinpain.



bythefactthateveryonewould(atleastundertherightconditions)havestrongestnon-moralreasonstoagreetotheiradoption.57

Ifwearerightaboutmorality’sdirectconnection topractical rea-sons,itmakesnomoresensetotakethispragmaticdesignstanceto-wardswhatshouldcountasmorallyrightthanitwouldtotakeitto-wardswhatshouldcountasnon-morallygoodorreasonable.Wehaveargued thatnon-moral considerations aregenuinepractical reasonsbecause theymake for thefittingnessofnon-moralmotives.But,aswehaveargued,moralreasonsareconsiderationsthatmakeforthefittingnessoffeelingsofobligation,whichareguaranteedtobepracti-calreasonsbythesamegeneralconnectionbetweenfittingmotivesandreasonstoact.ToparaphraseFrankena(1963,98),itwouldgivemorality toodespotic a role in our practical lives to insist that non-moralmotivescanbefittingonlyiftheyare“madefor”orachievewhatthereismoralreasontoachieve.Butifwearerightthatthefittingnessofmoralmotivesisjustasdirectlyconnectedtopracticalreasonsasthatofournon-moralmotives,itseemstogivemoralitytooservilearoletoinsist(asFrankenaevidentlydid)thatmoralmotivesarefittingonlyiftheyare“madefor”orachievewhatthereisnon-moralreasontoachieve.

57. SeeHarsanyi1953;Brandt1988;Gibbard2008,parts II–III;andParfit2011,ch. 15–17.Of course, there are versions of contractualismwhichhold thatmoralprinciplesarejustifiedjustincasenoonecouldreasonablyrejectthem,wheremoralconsiderationscandeterminewhatitisreasonabletoreject.AsMcGinn1999,Kamm2002,andHooker2002argue,Scanlon1998slipsintosuchaview inderiving substantivemoral conclusions fromhisversionofcontractualism,andRawls1971(esp.sec.4)seemedtoslipintosuchaviewinecumenicallymotivatingtheveilofignoranceasanepistemicdeviceforpurgingourselvesofbiases.But,asMcGinn,Kamm,Hooker,andParfitnote,bypresupposingthemoralreasonsthedeviceofagreementissupposedtoexplain,theseversionsofcontractualismmakethedeviceredundantandsuf-ferfromviciouscircularity.

Becausethedesignstancesofindirectconsequentialismandcontractual-ismaresosimilar,itisnotsurprisingthatsomanyindirectconsequentialistshavesupportedtheirviewsbyappealingtocontractualistideas.Indeed,con-siderationsofferedbyGibbard2008andPogge 1995 strongly suggest thatanygenuinelynon-redundantversionofcontractualismwillbeaformofin-directconsequentialism.

consequentialismwillnotbeleftunmotivated.55But,asweexplained,manyargumentsthatseemlargelybottom-uptacitlyrelyonthetop-downstrategyindemandingaspecialkindofjustificationformoralreasonsthatdonotdirectustopromotethegood.Assuch,wethinkthe elimination of the top-down strategy significantly weakens theoverallcaseforconsequentialism.Butthemostsalutaryeffectofourargumentonthecaseforimpartialconsequentialismmightbetoforceitsproponentstodistillthepotentiallypowerfulbottom-upelementsfromtheunsuccessfultop-downones,andtoexplainmoreclearlywhyweshouldthinktheplausibilityofnon-consequentialistideascannotsurvivereflectivescrutiny.

Finally,wethinkthatourargumenthasthepotentialtounderminetheoriesotherthandirectconsequentialismthatrelyontheideathat,inordertobepracticallyrelevant,moralitymustachieveendsthatwehavenon-moralreasonstocareabout.Althoughindirectconsequen-tialistsdonotthinkmoralrequirementsmustdirectustopromotethegood,theystilltakea“designstance”towardsmoralitybyholdingthat,inordertobejustified,asystemofmoralrequirementsmustpromotethegoodmorethananyothersystemsocietycouldadopt.56

Non-redundant forms of contractualism take a similar designstancetowardsmoralitybyholdingthatmoralprinciplesarejustified

55. These non-consequentialist ideas are exactly the ones relativized conse-quentialists seek to preserve by “consequentializing” them, so their beingundermined would support impartial consequentialism over both non-consequentialism and relativized consequentialism.While Portmore (2011,103–111)providesinteresting“bottom-up”argumentsagainstcertain(“victim-focused”)versionsofnon-consequentialism,heexplicitlyacknowledgesthatthattheseargumentsdonotworkagainstallversionsofnon-consequential-ism.Ourpointinthelastparagraphsuggests,moreover,thatifyouwanttobe“agent-focused”aboutagent-centeredconstraints,itisbettertotreatthemasact-directedconsiderationsthatmakeitfittingforagentstobemoremo-tivatedtoomitcertainactsthanasstate-directedconsiderationsthatmakeitfittingforagentstobemore“concernedabout”theirperformingthem.

56.SeeforinstanceBrandt1967(esp.114)andHooker2000(esp.ch.1).



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