HUMAN RIGHTS, REALPOLITIK, GEOPOLITICS, IDEOLOGY AND SOFT POWER IN THE 1970s
ECONOMIC DECLINE OF THE USSR, PEACE BROKERING, RIVALRY, NEW CHALLENGES IN AFRICA, THE NEAR EAST
AND CENTRAL ASIA
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991
ANDRÁS JOÓ PhDCORVINUS 2015
CARTER – RIGHTEOUSNESS IN FOREIGN POLICY
• CARTER BELIEVED IN THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
• HE WANTED THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PROMOTING UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
• UNITED STATES SHOULD AVOID MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
HUMAN RIGHTS, REALPOLITIK, DÉTENTE
• HUMAN RIGHTS, SIGNALED NOT ONLY BY THE HELSINKI ACCORDS BUT ALSO BY THE 1974 JACKSON–VANIK AMENDMENT THAT TIED US TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITH THE USSR TO MOSCOW’S TREATMENT OF ITS JEWISH CITIZENS
• THE WEST DID NOT ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SOVIET REGIME
• CONTRADICTION BLURRED IN THE KISSINGER YEARS
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
“RAISE YOUR VOICE, MR. PRESIDENT”• PRESIDENT FORD REFUSED TO RECEIVE SOVIET DISSIDENT
ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN IN THE WHITE HOUSE• ANDREI SAKHAROV, THE LEADING SOVIET DISSIDENT, HAD
ALREADY SENT THE PRESIDENT A LETTER ASKING HIM TO “RAISE YOUR VOICE” ON BEHALF OF THE OPPRESSED CITIZENS OF THE SOVIET UNION
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
CONTRADICTIONS
• PAUSE NEEDED FOR BOTH US AND USSR AFTER DECADES OF STRUGGLE AND RIVALRY
• IDEOLOGICAL ANTAGONISM REMAINED• COLD WAR PARADIGM• CONTAINMENT LONG-TERM STRATEGY• STABILITY, STATUS QUO – RHETORIC SLOGANS ONLY VALID IN
EUROPE• EARLY 1976, CUBAN AND SOVIET INTERVENTION, THE ARRIVAL OF
36,000 CUBAN SOLDIERS HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
JOÓ
AN INTERESTING OBSERVATION• ANDREW YOUNG, WHO SERVED AS
US AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS FROM 1977 TO 1979, EXPLAINED ONCE:
• “The problem with Jimmy Carter is that he is so righteous. He makes everybody else feel guilty.”
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
SOFT POWER• SOFT POWER‚ INVOLVES PUBLIC RELATIONS AND
PROPAGANDA• POTENTIALLY USEFUL AS A MEANS OF FURTHERING POLICY• REQUIRES SENSITIVE HANDLING IN AREAS WHERE
GOVERNMENT POWER IS FAR FROM ABSOLUTE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
INCREASING VALUE OF SOFT POWER VS A NEW TYPE OF HARD POWER
• 1970S WAS A WATERSHED IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY• TWO DIRECTIONS• REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA) – HIGH-TECH WINS
ATTITUDE• REVITALIZATION OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER AFTER
VIETNAM• COMPLEMENTED CARTER’S HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA AND A
MORE “ACTIVIST FOREIGN POLICY”
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
CONTRADICTIONS
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
CONTRADICTIONS
• CARTER LATER ABANDONED CAMPAIGN PLEDGES TO CUT DEFENSE SPENDING BY $7 BILLION
• INITIATED BUDGETARY INCREASES THAT IN HIS LAST YEAR AMOUNTED TO THE LARGEST IN HISTORY DURING PEACETIME
• ADMINISTRATION PROVIDING $2.3 BILLION IN MILITARY AID TO TEN NATIONS CITED BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL FOR SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (E.G. GUATEMALA, INDONESIA, EL SALVADOR MOROCCO, THE PHILIPPINES)
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
STRIVING TO BECOME AN HONEST PEACE BROKER
• CARTER’S ADMINISTRATION RENEGOTIATED THE SALT II TREATY WITH THE SOVIETS MANDATING A REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR MISSILES AND BOMBERS
• SECURED THE CAMP DAVID PEACE ACCORDS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
BREZHNEV’S DECLINE AND UNCERTAINTIES• EAGER TO SETTLE THE DETAILS OF THE SALT II ACCORD• NEW ADMINISTRATION VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE CZECH
DISSIDENT MOVEMENT CHARTER 77• CONVEYED “CONCERN” ABOUT THE SOVIET TREATMENT OF
DISSIDENTS • IN FEBRUARY, CARTER SENT AN OPEN LETTER TO SAKHAROV
“Human rights is a central concern of my Administration.”
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
“WHAT REALLY MATTERS … IS THE REST OF THE WORLD.”
“Berlin is secure, and Europe as a whole is well protected. What really matters at this point is the rest of the world.” (KENNEDY)• COLD IN EUROPE – HOT IN THE PERIPHERY• ONLY PROBLEM IN EUROPE: MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES• REGIONAL ISSUES BECOMING FOCAL• VITAL OR NON-VITAL FOR US INTERESTS?
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
HORN OF AFRICA PROBLEM
• ETHIOPIA, LONG A US ALLY ROCKED BY REVOLUTION IN 1974 AND VEERED IN AN ANTI-AMERICAN DIRECTION
• SOMALIA A BRIDGEHEAD OF THE SOVIETS• POURED MONEY THERE• MOHAMED SIAD BARRE GAVE SOVIETS ACCESS TO THE PORT
OF BERBERA• ETHIOPIA UNDER MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM SUDDENLY
SWEARING ALLEGIANCE TO MOSCOW
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
WAS THERE AN INORDINATE FEAR OF COMMUNISM?
• SHOULD US GIVE UP IDEALS TO CONTAIN THE SOVIETS EVERYWHERE AND WITH DICTATORS?
• NEW COUNTRIES IN THE CAMP?• SUDDEN CHANGES IN THE COURSE OF POLICY• CARTER PROMISED THE REDUCTION OF ARMS TRANSFERS• SOMALI LEADERS PLAYED A DOUBLE GAME• US INVOLVEMENT WAS TOO RISKY
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
A STRANGE SITUATION
• OGADEN• SLAUGHTERING OF CIVILIANS IN ETHIOPIA• VOLTE-FACE OF SOMALIA• US ENCOURAGED SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT AND FRANCE TO
SUPPORT THE SOMALIS• SIAD BARRE EJECTED SOVIET ADVISORS• CASTRO SENT TROOPS TO ETHIOPIA IN NOVEMBER 1977
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
A STRATEGIC DILEMMA• THE PRESIDENT, VANCE, AND BRZEZINSKI EXERTED PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS TO WITHDRAW
• CARTER ADMINISTRATION OFFERED HAVANA THE POSSIBILITY OF NORMALIZATION, WHICH WOULD HAVE MEANT LIFTING THE EMBARGO
• ARSENALS OF BOTH SUPERPOWERS GREW MORE LETHAL, AND AS WAR IN EUROPE BECAME MORE UNTHINKABLE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
A STRATEGIC DILEMMA
• AT THE PERIPHERY STAKES WERE LOWER, THE MASSIVE FIREPOWER OF THE SUPERPOWERS COERCIVE THREATS WERE INAPPROPRIATE
• GREAT POWER PRESTIGE AT STAKE• REGIONAL PROBLEMS VS GLOBAL CONCERNS• PROTECT PRESTIGE AND DERAIL ARMS LIMITATION TALKS• SOVIETS GOT ENTANGLED IN ETHIOPIA• ON THE GLOBAL LEVEL US PLAYED OUT THE CHINA CARD
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
SUCCESSFUL PEACE BROKERING
• NEAR EAST DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS WITHOUT THE SOVIETS• OIL PRICES BECAME A STRATEGIC ISSUE IN THE 1970s• CARTER DID NOT INTEND TO REMAIN SILENT CONCERNING
THE CAUSE OF THE PALESTINIANS• SADAT PROVED TO BE AN IDEAL PARTNER• ISREAL HAD AN INTEREST IN RAPPROCHEMENT• SOVIETS MARGINALIZED
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
IRAN FALLS OUT
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
AFGHANISTAN - “THERE’S NO GETTING AROUND IT.”
• “IF WE INTRODUCE TROOPS AND BEAT DOWN THE AFGHAN PEOPLE,” KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO WARNED HIS FELLOW SOVIET POLITBURO MEMBERS IN 1979, “THEN WE WILL BE ACCUSED OF AGGRESSION FOR SURE. THERE’S NO GETTING AROUND IT.”
• MARCH 10, 1979, INSURRECTION IN HERAT RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF SOVIET ADVISERS AND THEIR FAMILIES
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
AFGHANISTAN
• CIA DEVELOPED A PLAN TO FUNNEL COVERT AID THROUGH PAKISTAN TO AFGHAN REBELS
• PROGRAM UNDERWAY BY JULY 1979
• ON CHRISTMAS EVE, SOVIET TROOPS CROSSED THE BORDER
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
STAGNATION (ZASTOI)
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
SOVIET POWER AT ITS PINNACLE• SOVIET POWER REACHED ITS PINNACLE
IN THE 1970S• MILITARY EXPENDITURES, AFTER RAPID
INCREASES IN THE PREVIOUS DECADES, STABILIZED AT A HIGH LEVEL
• THREE-FOURTHS OF ALL THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF THE COUNTRY LOCATED WITHIN THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
SOVIET STRATEGIC INFERIORITY COMPLEX• RECENT EVIDENCE FROM ORAL HISTORY SOURCES SUPPORTS
THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OF THE 1960s AND 1970s SUFFERED FROM A STRATEGIC INFERIORITY COMPLEX
• DRIVE FOR PARITY WITH (OR EVEN SUPERIORITY OVER) THE UNITED STATES
• STILL ALL OF THE STRATEGIC MODELS DEVELOPED BY SOVIET MILITARY EXPERTS HAD A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER AND ASSUMED A FIRST STRIKE BY NATO
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu//nukevault/ebb285/#doc3HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
JOÓ
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/article02.html
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
DECLINE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY• CIA'S PREDICTIONS OF MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM GROWTH WERE
ACCURATELY HIGHLIGHTED THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM UNDERLYING DECLINING RATES OF SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH
• THE EROSION IN THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH LABOR AND CAPITAL WERE EMPLOYED
• 1984 CIA PAPER REPORTED:"our results suggest that, without a fundamental reform of the economic system or a combination of very favorable circumstances bringing back pre-1975 productivity relationships, the Soviets probably can do little to alter the economic growth trend..."
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
RSD-10 PIONEER (ракета средней дальности, РСД) – SS-20 (NATO CODENAME) A SYMBOLIC WEAPON
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
STRATEGIC MILITARY AND NAVAL BUILD-UP OF THE USSR
• BY THE END OF THE 1970s THE SOVIET MILITARY WOULD BEGIN TO SURPASS THE US IN NUMBERS OF BOTH MISSILES AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS• THE SOVIET NAVY BEGAN TO
BUILD A GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ITS HISTORY
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
OVEREXTENSION AND STAGNATION
• FROM THE MID-1970S TO THE MID-1980S THE SOVIET UNION LOST ITS DYNAMISM AND SENSE OF PURPOSE
• SOVIET IMPERIAL EXPANSION LED TO COSTLY OVEREXTENSION• POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WEAKENED• STAGNATION IN THE IDEOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL
SPHERES
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
EFFORTS TO REFORM THE SOVIET ECONOMY - SYSTEM OF NEW ECONOMIC STIMULI
• BEFORE 1973, THERE WAS A REFORM PERIOD LAUNCHED BY ALEXEI KOSYGIN
• BELIEVED THAT DECENTRALISATION, SEMI-PUBLIC COMPANIES, AND COOPERATIVES WERE KEYS TO CATCHING UP
• REFORMS INSPIRED BY EVSEI LIBERMAN REVITALIZED THE SOVIET ECONOMY DURING THE 1960s
• ECONOMY GREW MORE IN 1966–1970 THAN IT DID IN 1961–1965
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY
• MILITARY EXPENDITURES REMAINED HIGH• NOT BIGGEST ITEM IN THE SOVIET BUDGET• SUBSIDIES FOR FOOD, HOUSING…ETC.• FORMER HEAD OF THE SOVIET PLANNING AGENCY (GOSPLAN), NIKOLAI
BAIBAKOV, RECALLED:• “what we got for oil and gas” was $15 billion in 1976–80 and
$35 billion in 1981–85– OF THIS MONEY, THE SOVIETS SPENT, RESPECTIVELY, $14 BILLION AND $26.3 BILLION
TO BUY GRAIN TO FEED THE CATTLE ON COLLECTIVE FARMS AND TO PUT BREAD ON THE TABLES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE USSR
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
• 1975 - AGEING NATURE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP• FROM LEFT: MIKHAIL SUSLOV, VIKTOR GRISHIN, LEONID BREZHNEV, YURY ANDROPOV,
MIKHAIL ZIMYANIN, KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO AND ALEXEI KOSYGINHISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
DECLINE OF LEADERSHIP
• BREZHNEV WAS THE MAIN ARCHITECT OF DÉTENTE ON THE SOVIET SIDE
• AFTER 1975 BREZHNEV’S ILLNESS AND DEPENDENCE ON MEDICATION LED TO PROLONGED ABSENCES FROM THE POLITBURO
• ABSENCE OF A DYNAMIC LEADER• FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY WERE IN THE HANDS OF THE
“TROIKA”
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
“TROIKA”
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, KGB’S HEAD IURII ANDROPOV, MINISTER OF DEFENSE USTINOVTROIKA DID NOT ACT AS A DYNAMIC TEAM - AN UNEASY ALLIANCE OF AGING
FUNCTIONARIESHISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
ANDROPOV
• IURII ANDROPOV WAS APPOINTED COUNSELOR TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST AND PROMOTED TO AMBASSADOR IN 1954
• WITNESSED THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION• WARNED MOSCOW OF GROWING UNREST IN HUNGARY PRIOR TO THE
REVOLUTION • REQUESTED SOVIET TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO HUNGARY• SUCCEEDED MIKHAIL SUSLOV AS A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT IN 1962 • HEAD OF THE KGB IN 1967• IN 1973, HE ASSUMED A PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP IN THE POLITBURO
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
STATUS QUO OF THE THREE• RELUCTANT TO CHALLENGE EACH OTHER’S BUREAUCRATIC
TERRITORY• INCREASINGLY FICTITIOUS LEADERSHIP OF BREZHNEV• NO REAL CONCEPTUAL DEBATES ON FOREIGN-POLICY
STRATEGY AND TACTICS• OVERWHELMING INFLUENCE OF THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX• GROMYKO MAINLY INTERESTED IN GREAT POWER POLITICS
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
SOVIET MODEL IN DEEP CRISIS
• THE SOVIET MODEL HAD EXHAUSTED ITS INNOVATIVE POTENTIAL
• THE MODEL BEGAN TO LOSE ITS APPEAL WITHIN SOVIET SOCIETY, EVEN AMONG THE BUREAUCRATS
• MARXISM-LENINISM BECAME RITUALISTIC PUBLIC LANGUAGE– LENINISM “DIED A QUIET DEATH
SOMETIME DURING THE REIGN OF BREZHNEV.”
http://www.allrussias.com/essays/newthink_29.asp
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
SOVIET MODEL IN DEEP CRISIS• SOVIET CONSUMERS AND THE SOVIET STATE BECAME MORE DEPENDENT ON THE
CAPITALIST WORLD THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME IN ITS HISTORY (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF WORLD WAR 2)
• SOVIET PEOPLE EXPOSED TO ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF LIFE• CAREERS THAT INVOLVED TRIPS ABROAD BECAME SOCIALLY PRESTIGIOUS AND
PROFITABLE• DIPLOMATS, TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, “ADVISERS” IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES,
AND INTERPRETERS RECEIVED SALARIES IN SPECIAL “FOREIGN CURRENCY CHECKS”
• ENCOURAGED SOVIET BUREAUCRATS AND THE MILITARY TO LOBBY FOR “INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE” TO VARIOUS AFRICAN REGIMES
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
BACK TO THE FUTURE?
• THE CULTURAL CODE WAS CHANGING• REBIRTH OF NATIONALISM• GRADUAL AWAKENING OF THE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF
THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE (SOLZHENITSYN)• NATIONALIST THINKERS, ESTABLISHED WRITERS, JOURNALISTS,
AND PARTY IDEOLOGUES, REJECTED THE INTERNATIONALIST AND REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS OF MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY
• WAS IT POSSIBLE TO TAKE A NATIONALIST-IMPERIAL TURN?
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
REFORMING THE UNDERLYING SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
"Nixon goes to China" - REALPOLITIK THE CHINA CARD
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
WIDENING COOPERATION ON THE BASIS OF THE "SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE"
• ON FEBRUARY 28 1972, THE LAST DAY OF NIXON'S TRIP• US AND CHINA PLEDGED TO WORK TOWARD NORMALIZED
RELATIONS• TEMPORARILY SET ASIDE THE TESTY ISSUE OF AMERICAN
RECOGNITION OF TAIWAN• NIXON'S TRIP DID NOT IMMEDIATELY NORMALIZE RELATIONS
WITH CHINA• IT DID OPEN THE DOOR
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
FORMAL DIPLOMATIC TIES AND 'ONE-CHINA' POLICY
• PRESIDENT CARTER ASSUMED OFFICE IN 1977, ALMOST IMMEDIATELY SENT SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE TO CHINA TO RE-START NEGOTIATIONS ON NORMALIZATION
• IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION, PRESIDENT CARTER DISPATCHED NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI TO CHINA TO MEET WITH DENG XIAOPING IN 1978
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS• AFTER MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS, IN DECEMBER
1978 THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ THAT ESTABLISHED FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
• THE US RECOGNIZED THE PRC AS THE SOLE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND AFFIRMED THAT TAIWAN IS A PART OF CHINA– THE US ENDED OFFICIAL RELATIONS AND ITS
DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN– FORMAL EMBASSIES WERE ESTABLISHED IN
BEIJING AND WASHINGTON THE FOLLOWING YEAR
• JANUARY 1, 1979
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
CAMP DAVID
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
ROAD TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS• IN AUTUMN 1977, EGYPTIAN
PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO GO TO ISRAEL FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE
• 19 NOVEMBER 1977, SADAT ADDRESSED THE ISRAELI KNESSET CALLING FOR PEACE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
ROAD TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS
• UNITED STATES HOSTED SADAT IN WASHINGTON, WITH BOTH PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER AND CONGRESS HAILING THE EGYPTIAN LEADER AS A STATESMAN
• LED TO GREATER COOPERATION BY THE ISRAELIS
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
AT CAMP DAVID
• FOR TWO WEEKS IN SEPTEMBER 1978, SADAT, CARTER, AND ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER MENACHEM BEGIN HAMMERED OUT A FRAMEWORK
• BEGIN INSISTED THAT SADAT SEPARATE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE FROM THE PEACE TALKS
• ACRIMONY BETWEEN BEGIN AND SADAT• CARTER SHUTTLED BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS IN AN EFFORT
TO MODERATE THEIR POSITIONS
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS• ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1978, CARTER, SADAT, AND BEGIN ANNOUNCED THAT AN
AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED• STILL MANY DETAILS TO WORK OUT, AND CARTER AND HIS SECRETARY OF STATE, CYRUS
VANCE, MADE NUMEROUS TRIPS TO THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS
• GUARANTEES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT IN EXCHANGE FOR SADAT’S SIGNATURE
• ON 26 MARCH 1979, IN A WHITE HOUSE CEREMONY, SADAT AND BEGIN SHOOK HANDS AGAIN AND SIGNED A PERMANENT PEACE TREATY, NORMALIZING RELATIONS
• NOT UNTIL THE MID-1990S WOULD ANOTHER ARAB NATION, JORDAN, JOIN EGYPT IN NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:President_Carter%27s_Remarks_on_Joint_Statement_at_Camp_David_Summit_(September_17,_1978)_Jimmy_Carter.ogv
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
DECEPTIVE STABILITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
DECEPTIVE STABILITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
• ASSERTING THEIR “NATIONAL” CHARACTER AS DISTINCT FROM THE SOVIET MODEL, E.G. IN ROUMANIA
• HONECKER IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, EDWARD GIEREK IN POLAND, AND KÁDÁR IN HUNGARY HAD CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC AUTONOMY– GROWING IMBALANCES IN ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS
AMONG MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT– BARTER AND POLITICAL DEALS TOOK THE PLACE OF MUTUALLY
PROfiTABLE TRADEHISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A.
JOÓ
ECONOMIC PARADOX OF THE EASTERN BLOC
• COMECON WAS AN ONGOING FAILURE• MEMBERS BECAME INDIVIDUALLY DEPENDENT ON WESTERN
EUROPE• AUTONOMY IN MAKING ECONOMIC DEALS• SUBSIDIZING EAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES BY OFFERING
CHEAPER SOVIET OIL• SEARCH FOR INVESTMENTS, NEW TECHNOLOGY, AND
CONSUMER GOODS
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
POLAND• BETWEEN 1975 AND 1980,
POLAND’S HARD-CURRENCY DEBT TO THE WEST TRIPLED, FROM $7.4 BILLION TO OVER $21 BILLION
• POLAND’S CREDIT RATING COLLAPSED
• PURCHASE OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGIES DID NOT HEIGHTEN PRODUCTIVITY
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
THE POLISH PROBLEM
• POLAND HAD POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REPERCUSSIONS IN THE BORDERLANDS OF THE USSR
• KGB REPORTED: MASS STRIKES AT SOME PLANTS AND FACTORIES IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS WERE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE POLISH WORKERS’ MOVEMENT
• SOVIET AUTHORITIES SHUT THE BORDERS WITH POLAND AND ENDED TOURISM, STUDENT PROGRAMS
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
THE POLISH PROBLEM
• KREMLIN USED THE THREAT OF INVASION TO CONVINCE THE LEADER OF THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY, STANISŁAW KANIA AND GENERAL WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI TO CRACK DOWN ON SOLIDARITY
• IN DECEMBER 1980, WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THE KGB BEGAN A FULL-SCALE CAMPAIGN OF INTIMIDATION OF POLAND, INCLUDING LARGE-SCALE MILITARY EXERCISES
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
THE POLISH PROBLEM
• IN NOVEMBER 1981, MOSCOW MANAGED TO CONVINCE GENERAL JARUZELSKI TO INTRODUCE MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND TO SUPPRESS SOLIDARITY
• JARUZELSKI’S ACTION ON DECEMBER 13 REMOVED THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE WARSAW PACT
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
US-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS AND A NATIONAL RELIC
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
KÁDÁR, WESTERN RECOGNITION AND THE ECONOMY
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1945-1991 - A. JOÓ
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