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S T E P H E N H O U L G A T E

KANT,

NIETZSCHE AND THE THING IN

ITSELF

l

Many

philosophers today, particularly, but not exclusively in France,

understand Nietzsche to have developed a

coiiception

of

life

and a style of

writing and thinking which go beyond and indeed

put

out of order the

traditional categories

of

philosophy.

l

The

philosophical concept that

is

often

considered to have been most consistently discredited by Nietzsche is one

that is usually associated

with

Kant, namely the concept of the

thing

in itself.

Indeed, for Jacques Derrida, one of the points of

Nietzsche's

spurring

style is to c ll intö question the concept of anything in itself , be it a thing,

truth or woman.

2

The purpose of the present essay is to

examine whether

Nietzsche does in

fact

succeed in twisting

free

of the concept of the thing in

itself, or

whether,

in his

very discrediting

of

Kant's concept, Nietzsche does

not

remain

ensnared in what is still a largely Kantian perspective.

The first task is to examine the nature of Kant's project and to try to

establish what he means by the concept of the thing in itself. Kant's aim in

th e Cri t ique of Pure Reason is to try to put an end to what he sees

äs

th e

random groping (bloßes Herumtappen}

(B^y)

3

of

traditional metaphysics,

and

to

establish metaphysics äs

a

rigorous science which

is able to

make

definite

progress by following an agreed and tested path. He tries to achieve

this

aim by

examining

the limits of pure reason and by determining whether

reason is capable of genuine metaphysical knowledge. Unlike Nietzsche, Kant

does not intend to eliminate all dogmatic philosophy in

favour

of relative,

perspectival Interpretation, but, rather,

to

replace blind dogmatism with

1

See J. Derrida, Spurs, French-English edition, English

translation

by Barbara Harlow (Chi-

cago, 1979),

p. 83.

See also

the collection of

essays

entitled

he

N ew

Nietzsche, edited

by

D. Allison

(New York,

1977).

Somc of the

transladons

of

diese

and

other

works

cited

in the

text have been amcnded where necessary.

2

Derrida, pp 55,101. S ee also D Krcll, Postponementf.

W oma n , Stnsual i ty a n d Dea tb i n

Nietzsche

(Bloomington, 1986),

pp.

4

f.

3

T T h i

an d subsequent

translations

of Kant's First Critique aoe taken frora I m m a n u t l K a n t s

Cr i t iqu t of Pure Reasoa, translated

b y N

Kenap Smith (New York, 1965).

Unauthenticated

Download Date | 5 31 16 8:21 AM


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116

Stephan Höidgäte

dogmatic, but

self-crit ical

rational fcnowledge that understands its owi* powers,

capabilities and limits.

4

Metaphysicäl

judgements, for

Kant, are

examples of what he eaHs syn-

thetic a

pr ior i

jüdgetnents which are universal

and

necessäry, yef wtiich

increase (or,

at

least,

purport to

increase) our knowledge

of the

worid, riather

than

just

explain the meaning of the terms involved in the jüdgetnents* The

task

of the Cri t ique

o Pure

Reason — to determine whether

metaphysics^can

be

established äs

a

säence

— can only be fulfiljed,

therefpre,

if

Kant

establishes

whether and how synthetic a prior i judgetiients in generat are possible,

How

then is

it possible to have synthetic priori ktlowledge?

This

can

only

be

possible, Kant teils

us, if synthetic

dpriori

judgements lay dowh the

necessary

conditions

for any human experience. Thus, for .example, if k is a

necessary

condition

of our

being

able to

experience events that

we

undexstand

objects

to be situated

within a causal

chain,

then

we will know priori that

all th e events we experience must have cäuses. Simüarly, if it is a necessary

condition of our being able to experience objects that we

intuit

them in space

and

time,

then we will kiiow

priori

that all the objects we intuit m us

t

be

determined accörding to the mäthetnatical relations which dbtain in space

and

time. Kant's specific

arguments

in favour

of this

conclusion

do not

concern us

here,

but there is öne

feature

of Kant's

thinking

about this matter

which is of great importance for our considerätiöh of

Kä.rit's

Hngering hold

over Nietzsche.

-

Kant adheres to the empiricist doctiirie that 1̂1 knowledge

derived

from

objects

is

a

poster iori and

thus

at

best only

contingently true for us. The only

knowledge

that can be

a

priori and so necessarily tr\ie for us, therefojre, is

that which is not derived from objects, but which has its

squtoe

i j i us.

If intuition

must conforrri

to

(sich

r i ch t en

n a c h }

the cöristitiiitiQA of the objects,

I dp

tiot

ee how we could know

anything

of the

latter

priori [...] Nothing

in a

priori

knowledge -can be asciribed

tp objects save

what the

thiaking

subject deriyes

from

itself

(aus s ich

se lbs t

h e r n i m m t } .

(B

xvii,

xxiii)

However, Kant also believes

that

what

has its source/in us caijno^be

true

of

objects or

things in themselves.

On B 65

£

he

expresses

Qartesian

douj?ts

and

säys simply that what has its source in the subject cannot be known to apply

necessarily to objects themselves. But

his

more commpn view

is

more

dpgmatic,

natiiely that what has its souree priori in the

subject

is definitely

n ot

true of things theinselyes,

w

for

no

determinatioris, whether

absolute or

relative, can be intuited prior to the existence. of the

things

to

which they

belong,

and

npne, therefpre,

can be

intuited a

priori*

9

(B

42)^

4

See B xxxv^xxxvii.

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3/43

Kant,

Nietzsche

and the

Thing

in itself 117

In

Kant's view,

the only way we

could

know

things

in

themselves would

be

through posteriori ernpirical

Intuition, that is if those objects

were present

and

given to

me

and if the

properties

of those

objects

could

migrate

hinüberwandem)

into my

faculty

of representation .

5

Wha t we

know

a pr iori ,

from

the

structure

of our own

minds,

therefore,

cannot

b y

definition

teil

us

about things

in

themselves. Gonsequently,

the priori form of

outer, spatial

Intuition, for example,

does

not represent any property öf things in

themselves,

nor

does

it

represent

them

in

their

relation to one another. That is to

say, space does

not

represent

any

determination

that attaches to the objects themselves, and which remains

even wKen

abstraction

has been made from all the subjective condhions of

Intuition.

Rather,

space

is

nothing b

t

the,form

of all

appearances

of

outer sense.

It

is the subjective condition of sensibility (B 42). In

fact,

Kant does not think

that

knowledge of

things

in

themselves

is

possible even

posteriori.

However,

the important

point

for our

purposes

is

that,

in

Kant's view, what

the subject

generates or determines priori out of itself never puts us in touch with the

intrinsic

nature of things, but is

always

only subjective. This view constitutes

an

axiom of Kant's thought that he never questions.

Since

the

priori forms of

Intuition

and the

priori

categories

of

thought

are the

universal, necessary

conditions of

ll human experience

for

Kant, they

guarantee

that

all

human beings understand

the world to

have

the

same

spatio-temporal and

causal structure (which

we

thus consider

to be

objec-

tive ). However,

the

priori

character of our categories and forms of

Intuition

also ensures that the structure which we perceive and understand the world

to

have

is

quite different from

tKe way the

world

may be in itself.

Here,

then, is Kant's

famous

distinction between things äs we know and perceive

them to be or äs they appear to us, and things

äs

we think them to be in

themselves.

There

has recently been some debate over the precise

meaning

of these

terms

amongst Kant scholars.

6

To my mind,

however, Kant's position

is unambiguous:

What we have meant to say is that all our Intuition is

nothing

but the

representation of appearance Erscheinung); that the things which we intuit

are not in

themselves what

we

intuit them

äs

being,

nor

their

relations so

constituted

in

themselves

äs

they appear

to us, and

that

if the

subject,

or

even only

the

subjective constifution

of the

senses

in general, be

removed,

5

See

L

Kant, P r o l t g p m e n a

to any

Future A f e ta p h y s i c s that Wil l

be

Ahle

to

P resent I t s e l f ä s

a

S c i e n c e

translated by P. G. Lucas (Manchester, 1953),

§9.

Kant believes that beings other

than

ourselves might gain

acccss to

things

in themselves

through

intellectual Intuition, but he

denies that

we have such a

faculty;

see B 308 f.

6

See, for example, P. Guyer, K an t and

tbe

C laims of

Knowkdge (Cambridge, 1987).

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4/43

118 Stephen

the

whole ccmsthution

and all

the rektions

of

objccts

in

spacc aacl

timc, nay

space and time

theimelves,

would vanish, (B 59)

Kant

goes

on to

claim

that

what

objects

m ay

be in

themselves, afld

fr

from

all this receptivity

of our seiisibility^ remains completely unknown to

us.

We

know

nothing but ouf mode of perceivipg them

( unsere

s ie

w a h r z u n e h m e n )

(B

59).

Things

in

themselves

are thus to be

thought

äs

quite

unlike the subjective

reptesentatioös

of tjiem which

we

pserceive. All

that we

can know is th e way that we are affected by objects ^- th e sensations that

objects

produce

in us

and the

a priori

form s of

intuidpn

and categories

in

terms

of

which we make sense of those

sensations.

Consequently, Kant

condudes, we

can

know a p r i o r i of thing^,only

what we

ourselves

put

into

them (was

w ir

se l bs t

i n s i e

l egen ) (B xviii).

As we shall

see,

Nietzsche launches a full-scale assäuk on

Kaiit's ciitical

project

and on the concept of the

thing

in itself.

Howeve% this

central

Kantian thesis that

we

know

a p r i o r i of

thing§

only

what we ourselves

put

into them is one which Nietzsche, in

my

view, never seriöüsly

chaUenges,

but one which he

ädheres

tö — ; '

albeit

in an

amended

form

·-*

tlbroüghöut

his philosophicaJ

career.

Nietzsche will

drop

the Kantian ideä of a p r i o r i

necessity,

and he

will

transform the relatively mijd idpa of

pütting

forms into

things

into the more radical, and characteristically

Nietzscheaii

coiiception of

vei l ing

>

falsifyingz.na Jmpostngfötms onto things. Höwever^ Nietzsche's

assertiöii

that human interpretations

and

evalusitioris

are

thrown

over things

like

a

dress

and

[are] altogether foreign

to

their iiature ( W e s e n )

and

even

to their

$kin

GS 58)

7

is undoubtedly a

direct

descendent öf Kaöt's

claim

that the

things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intüit

them äs

beiiig

(B

59). The central paradox öf Nfietzsche s philosophy

is

that

he

clings tb a

Version of Kant's idea that the

forms geüerated

by human

thought

and

perceptiön are quite different from the things they arö put into, whilst, at

the same

time, he

rejects

the

;

corresponding Kantian idea that the things into

which

we put those

forms

must be

thought

to

have

a nature and

cbnstitution

of their own - in t hemse l v es .

Kant's limitation of human knowledge to appeärances ( E r s c h e i n u n g e n )

leads to the conclusion that, from the Kantian point of

vieW

?

the claims and

aspirations

of

traditional

metaphysics

cannot

be met* for the whole

purpöse

of traditional metaphysics, according to Kant, was to

transcend

human sense

experience and seek the unconditiöned nature of things themselves, the very

7

TJiis and subsequent translatioos

of Die

Fröhl ich* W issen schaft ((££) are takeia ßcpra'Nietzsche,

The

G ay

S c i e n c e >

trähslated with

commentajcy

by W.

Kaufmann

(New York, 1974). Original

German passages

fromvialtof Nietzsche'«

works

cited

in

this essay

are taken from Nietzsche,

Sämtl iche

W e r ke . Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden. Hg. Von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino

Montinari (Berlin/Müncheri,

1986):

Unauthenticated



5/43

Kant,

Nietzsche and the

Thing

in

itself 119

nature which

he

argues

must remain

inaccessible

to us

if we

are to

have

any

synthetic a priori knowledge. Metaphysics ca n thus only be a science, for

Kant,

if it

renounces

its

cläim

to

divine insight into

the

things that

are

held

to transcend

human sense experience,

and if it limits

itself

to

being

the

science

of

the

a

priori

character

of the

experienced

world

and the

science

of the

a

priori

conditions of experience itself.

8

In this way, Kant anticipates another

important

theme

of Nietzsche's,

namely

that human beings are

limited

to

their

own

human perspective on

things,

to

what Nietzsche calls the

world

that concerns

u s

(die Wel t ,

d ie uns etwas

angeht) BGE

34).

9

Like Nietzsche,

Kant believes that other perspectives on the world than the human perspective

are possible and that the world may look very different frorn those perspec-

tives than from our point of view.

But, like

Nietzsche, Kant also believes

that

we,

äs

humans ,

are

restricted

to the

only perspective

we

know

— our

own. Where Nietzsche and Kant part Company, of course, is that Nietzsche

does not hold,

äs

Kant does, that human beings are confined within one

perspective whose structure is determinable a priori by reason, but that an

indefinite

multiplicity

of

changing

human

perspectives

is

available

to us if

we are prepared to experiment

10

From what we have said so far, two main reasons suggest themselves for

Kant's distinction between things äs they appear to us and things äs they are

in

themselves. First

of

all, there

is the

tension, which

we

mentioned above,

between

Kant's empiricism and his rationalist commitment to the idea of

synthetic a priori knowledge. Since

Kant believes that any knowledge we

could

have

of

things

in

themselves

would

have

to be

given through

a pos teriori^

empirical Intuition,

if it

were possible,

it is

obvious that

the

synthetic

a

priori

knowledge, which he

claims

lays down the necessary conditions of human

experience, cannot teil us about things themselves. Secondly, it is

clear

that

Kant's

distinction

between appearances and things in themselves is one that

he

inherited

from

the

'pld'

metaphysics (at

least,

äs

he understood it) whose

pretensions

he is

trying

to

curb.

Unlike

Nietzsche,

who

disputes

the

very

idea

of

determinate

things in themselves beyond human experience, Kant

retains

the

traditional

metaphysical

idea that things have

a

constitution

of

their

own beyond what we can know of them, although he considers that

constitution

to be

inaccessible

to us.

There

is,

however,

a

third

factor to be

taken into account when considering Kant's reasons

for

distinguishing

be-

tween appearances and

things

in themselves, a factor which has been implicit

8

For

Kant's views

on the

Old metaphysics

and on his own

metaphysics

of

experience ,

see

B xiv,

xixf.. 25-30,

826, 873-879.

9

This

and subsequent translations

of Jense its von

Cut und

Böse

BGE) are

taken

from Nietzsche,

Bejond Good an d

Evil,

translated

with

commentary

by W.

Kaufmann (New

York,

1966).

10

See

Kant,

B 42, 59 f. and 342 f. and Nietzsche, GS 143.

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6/43

120 StepMen

Houlgate

.

in what

häs beeil saicl so

far,

but whieh now needs to

be

madc explicit.That

is

Kant's adoption

of the

curipus

modern

notlon,

found in

the

writings

of

Descartes, Leibniz,

Locke,

Berkeley

and

ß;uuie^

that *- whether öuf Knowl-

edge

is a

priori

ör a posteriori — what we are cpnscious of are always

perceptiönSj

representatipns

or 'ideas' rathe£ than :things.

:

K^nt'$. acceptance

of this notion explains why, äs I suggested abbve> he believes

tfaat

not even

empiricalj

ap oster ionexpenence

can yield knowledg^ of thlngs kx

themselves.

"If we

treat

öuter

objects

äs thjngs in

themselves", Kant maintains,

"it is

quite

impossibl^

to understand

höw

we

coüld arriye

at a knowjedge of

their

reality

outside

us, since

we haye

to

rely

merely

on.the representation which

isinus"(A378).

n

· .

;

. . . · · v

'

Drawing attention to this

c

representationalist*

;

presupposition

in gilt s

theoretical philpsophy enables us

to

MgrjiHght a subtle complieation in his

epistemological

theory

which

I

have so

far glossed

oyerj

but

which will

be

reflected in Nietzsche's

thinking. A

priori knowledge, in

Kant's

view, is

wholly the

product

of the knowing subject and is *put into'

th4ögs.

A

posteriori

Sensation,

howeyer,

is

produced

by. objects

affecting

the

hrnman

mind in sorne

way.

12

posteriori Sensation is

thus

not simply the product of

the rnind's own activity, but reflects our perspective on, or reläiion to,

something

that is other

than

us. What is given in a relätion of ah object to

a subject are never, for.Kant,

a

the inner properties of the object in itself"

(B 67),

so

a posteriori

Sensation

does not

bring us any

closer

to the inner

constitution of

things themselves than

a

priori

Impwlecige döes, However,

sincei genuine knowledg^ is considered

by

Kant to be the indissoliible fusipn

öf Sensation and the a priori

forms

of

intuition

a$d tböught, Kant clearly

believes that thihgs .in themselves have some role to

:

play m determMng what

we

khow

—

namely, through

the

way thiey affect

u s .

±- even though their

intrinsic

natüre remains

forever

hidden

from

us.

This

dual perspective is retained by Nietzsche. In §118 of Dajbreak

y

fcK

example, Nietzsche Stresses *the relational side of

knowledge

the fäct that

we

are affected by

something other than

us

̂

in a

manner directly

reminiscent

of

Kant:

u

we understand nothing of

him

[our

neighbpur]

e^cep^the c h t i g e

in

us of

which

he

15

the

cäuse". Yet, in

the

very next, paragraph, Nietzsche

Stresses the subject s role in generating the fonös of ekperience by itself:

What then are our experiences? Much more that^ which W e put into them

(hineinlegen) thari that

which they iäüfeädy coritain

Or must

we

go so

fe r äs

to say: in themselves they contain npthing? To experieace is to invent? - .̂

(D-119)

13

11

See, alsp,

Prolegornenä,

§ 9. . . . · . > · · * .

.

12

'SeeB..33£

' . · . . .

..-

· ' · '

· . · / ' . ·

. . , · · · · - · · . · - .

13

Tys ajid subscqijient: traiislatäons

of

Morgenröte {Z>) are. taken f rpm

Nietzsche,

Dajbreak

t

translated by

R,

J.

Hollingclale,

with an

Introduction

by M.

;

Tahnet (Cambridge,

1982).

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7/43

Kant, Nietzsche and the Thing in itself 121

In § 483 of Dayhreak

under

the infhaence of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche goes

even fur ther and advances the startling

claim

that all we know are our own

organs. Nietzsche tnay turn his back on Kant's epistemology, therefore, and

reject

it

äs

self-contradictory, but it is clear that that epistemology

casts

a

lingering shadow over

Nietzsche's

thinking throughout

his

philosophical

career.

Having now given a brief sketch of Kant's overall

epistemological

posi-

tion,

it is time to

consider

the

Kantian concept

of the

thing

in

itself

in

more

detail,

before

we

turn

to the

paradoxes

of

Nietzsche's thinking. Kant's concept

of the thing in itself, the noumenon or the

transcendental object

— these

terms are in

efifect

interchangeable — has two different functions. On the

one

hand,

it permits Kant to draw a distinction between the

finite

objects

which

we experience and the unconditioned,

'infinite'

objects, such äs God

or the soul, which, he maintains, we do not experience. On the other hand,

it permits him to draw a distinction between the objects of experience äs we

experience them

and

those same objects considered äs they

are in themselves,

that is between two perspectives on the same objects, that of sense-experience

and that of

thought.

u

It is this second distinction that Kant primarily has in

mind

when discussing

the

thing

in

itself,

and we shall

therefore concentrate

on that.

Kant's

intention is not to

make metaphysical

claims

about things that

transcend our experience, but to use the concept of the thing in itself to limit

human knowledge to the sphere of the objects given to the senses. Kant's

starting-point

in the Critique

of

Pure

Reason is human experience. He believes

that we are restricted to

that,

and all his

judgements

are

made

from

within

that human perspective. He lays no claim to a God's eye view. From within

the

perspective

of

human experience, however, Kant makes

two

important

philosophical assertions about experience, nei ther of which is based on

experience, but both of which together constitute axiomatic presuppositions

of his

thinking.

The

first

is

that any

priori

knowledge

has its

source

in

,the

subject and is therefore only valid for us, and the second is that all h u m a n

perception is representational. On the basis of these assertions Kant makes

the

judgement,

from

within

experience, that

the

knowledge

we

have

o'f

objects

is limited and is oniy knowledge of things äs they appear to us.

See B xix, xxvü.

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8/43

122 Stephen

HpuJgate

A s a tpfrelate of

this,

however, Kant

rnaintains tfeät

we

must

assume that

there

is something —

ä s

it were, Out

there' — that

affects ou r

senses

and

thus underlies appearances, otherwise

we

shiould

be landed in fh e

stbsufd

contlusion that there can be äppearance (Erscheinung withputanything that

appears (B xxvif.). Unless, tbereföre, we are to move constantly iß a

ekele

(A 252), the word

appearance

must be taken to indicate a

rektipirtp

s o m t r i n g that

appears,

(It is

this

conclusiön that Nietzsche will

resist,

but to

which the logic of his vocabulary will constantly return him^

generating

the

most troubling

paradoxes of his philosophy.)

The concept of the thing in itself, the noumenon

or

the transcendental

object is thus what Kant

calls

a problenjätic concept (B 310). We do not

know that the objects we perceiye have a nature and constitution of thek

own

which would exist even

if we did

not,

but we

must thtnk

that

they do,

:

because

only in

this

way can we

make sense

of the

ideia

that pur perspective

on the

world is a limited one, and that is the main idea that Kant wants to stress.

The

concept

of a

noumenon

is thus a merely limiting concept (Gnn begriff)

3

the

functipn

of

which

is to

curb

the

pretensions of sensibility '{.:.]·

At the

same

time it is no

arbiträry

iüvention; it

is

bound up with the limitation of

sensibility. (B. 310 f.)

The concept of the thing in itself is not

therefore intended

to denote a

determinable non-sensübus object presented to som

mysterious

human fac-

ulty

of

intellectual

Intuition;

it

simply

contains

the

abstract

thought oif

the

objects

of experience

considered ä s

we

dp no t experience

them,

a

thought

which we

must entertain when

we

reflect

on the

fact that

our

experience

and

knowledge are limited. When we think of

things

äs they are in themselyes,

therefore, we m u s t

.not

think of Leibnizian monadic substaiices or of ideal

Platonic

Forms;

we

must

thirik simply of

what Locke would

refer tp äs we

know not

what .

15

The coftcept of the

transcendental object, Kant teils

us,

signifies nothing more

than

a spmething

T L (ein Etwas = x (A

250),

a

something

[...]

of

which,

a

A

s

it is in

itself,

we have no concept

whatsoever

(B

726). What things tnight be in themselves is thus of np positive theoretical

or cognitive iniportance

to

m e whatsoever.

In

themselves things

afe

nothing

to me (B 524). The

concept

of the

thing

in

itself

does,

of course, have

practical value

in

Kant's

view,

since

the idea that the

spätip-temporal objects

which we experience

are

not in

thernselves

in space

and

time allows us to

postulate a realm

of

being that corr^pletely transcends space

and

time,

and in

that

realm

we can find

'space'

for God and human freedom,

both

öf which

we must rationally believe in if we are to mako sense of hunian morality. (In

15

J.

Locke,

n Essay

Concerning

Huniatt Uriderstanding, edited» abiidged and

i^troduced

by

A. D.

Woozley

(Glasgow,

1964),

p. 34 ,

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9/43

Kant, Nietzsche and the

Thing

in itself 123

this

way, Kant

unifies the

two functions

of the

concept

of the thing in

itself

which I mentioned at the

beginning

of this section.) However, although we

may be able to

postulate

a realm of noumenal, non-spatial and

non-temporal

Objects',

the thought of things äs they

are

in themselves, which our recog-

nition of the

limits

of human knowledge

forces

upon us, is not the determinate

thought of such Objects'; it is simply the completely indeterminate thought

of something in general (A 253) underlying our experience.

Yet,

despite

the indeterminacy of Kant's

concept

of the

thing

in

itself,

we

can say something about what he means by the concept. First of all, and

perhaps

most importantly, the

thing

in

itself

is

construed

by

Kant

äs the

thing abstracted from all relation to us, that is äs the thing apart from any

relation to the outer senses (A 358). A thing in itself cannot be known

through

the way it

relates

to us,

therefore, because

it is

defined

by

Kant

äs

the

thing

considered in itself äs opposed to the thing considered in relation to

a human subject.

The

correlate

of

this view,

of

course,

is

that

all we can

know or

'represent'

are our relations to things

(äs

well äs the a priori forms

of

Intuition and thought in terms of which we

make

sense of those relations),

and that

the

things which

we do

experience

are

to

be

taken äs consisting

wholly of

relations

(B

341).

This

same distinction between what something is in itself and what it is

fo r us is

taken over

by

Schopenhauer

and

generalised into

the

idea that what

something is in itself lies beyond all relations, not just relations to a knowing

subject.

16

And, although

Nietzsche rejects the

idea that there

is

anything

in

itself, the Schopenhauerian view that whatever would be in itself could not

at the same

time

be relational is one that he never questions.

Kant does not go quite äs far äs Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, however.

Kant claims that things do not manifest their

intrinsic

nature in any cognitive

relation

to us, but he

leaves open

the

question whether things

in

themselves

might not be

related

to one

another.

At

least that

is

what seems

to be

implied

by his assertion

on B 59 that the relations of things to one another are not

so constituted in themselves

äs

they appear to us .

The second important point to make about the Kantian conception of

the thing in itself is that, despite his frequent reference to things and objects

in

themselves, Kant does

not construe the

inner nature

of

the things

we

experience

äs

necessarily separate from us. Whatever things are in themselves

cannot

be

known

and thus

remains completely

hidden

from

us.

But,

for

that

very reason, we cannot say whether what underlies appearances äs their

true

correlate

(B 45) is something disrinct

from

us or something that is identical

16

See A. Schopenhauer, Th e

World ä s iü

an d

R eprescn tation

translated by E. F. J. Payne in

2 vols. (New York, 1969),

I,

121,195,

245

(§§

24, 37,

51).

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10/43

124

Stephan

Houlgace

with

(or at

least inextricably

bound up with) our sub)£ctiykyC

The

very

fact that the inner

nature

of things elude

u

means that.it caflnot be thought

of äs

definitetyhaving the form of a subject or an object.

Its

Status, to borrow

Demda's

word,

is'^ndecidable'V

We are eotnpletely Ignorant

whether

it

(tbe ttanscendentaf

object] is to be

inet within

us or outsicle us, whether it W puld b6 at ofcce femoved iaith the

cessation of sensibility, or

whethei:

in the albsence of sensibility it would

still

remain,

(B 344

f.)

Cönsequently, we can assunie no fundamental ontological duality

between

mind and matter. Both may ultimately be one and the saine;

17

On the other

hand,

of

course,

we

cannot assume any fundamental

ontölogical homogeneity

either. All we can do, to paräphrase Wittgenstein, is remain silent about what

there

might be beyond what we can experience.

And

yet

the

third

point to be

noted

aböut

Kant*s

concept of the elusive

transcendental is that, notoriously, he does not remain silent about it* Kant

teils

us

quite clearly that the understanding

^cannot know

these noumena

through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think

them

only

under

the title of an u n k n o w n sömething (B 312),

and

that the transcendental

object

can be

thought neither

äs quantity

nor äs reality

nor

äs

substance,

etc. (because these concepts always require sensible

forms

in wfaich they

determine an

object)

(B 344). But, at

tlie

same time, he maintains that the

transcendental object

is

the cause

of

appearance

(B

344)*

However,

perhaps

Kaixt is not

violating

his own

prohibitions

to. quite the

degree

it seems.

Althoughj in his view, the pure concepts of the understanding can acquire

no meaning which might yield a concept of some object (B 186).unless they

are understood in terms of space and tiine, or *schematised

?

, they do;have a

purely

logical meaning of their own; That leaves open the possibility. of

thinkirtg

of a transcendental

cause

bf appearances

beyond space

and

time, even

if

it rules out the possibility of

knowing

o r e terminmg

precisely

what one might

mean

by

such

a

tränscen such äs cause or

essenee

in quot^tion-^markis

nd

Derrida's employment of concepts under erasure ) —

at

leä^t

in so far

äs

both Kant

and

Nietzsche

are

offering

us a

concept

with one

hand whilst

denying us the

possibility

of mäking determinate sense of the concept with

the other.

(Though,

of course, Kant's concept of a transcendental cause is

simply

underdetermined, wheteäs Nietzsche invariably employs such concepts

äs

e

cause

?

ironically.)

18

. · · · · · · - . - . .

17

See A

358

f., B 427

f.

18

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11/43

Ka nt, Nietzsche and the Thing in itself 125

Having thus

sketched

out

Kant's conception

of the

thing

in itself,

we

must nöw examine Nietzsche's critique of Kant's concept and try to determine

to what

extent

the

shadow

of

that concept still hangs over Nietzsche's

thinking. There are, of course,

many

other features of Kant's philosophy

than

the

ones

I

have

indicated

which

find

echoes

in

Nietzsche's philosophy.

One could

draw

parallels between Kant's understanding of the

way

in which

the mind is stimulated by Sensation to constitute the objects of experience

and

Nietzsche's

account of the way in

which

we are

stimulated

by

sensations

to determine causes for events in our dreams. One could also point to the

parallel between Kant's idea of transcendental illusion which we cannot avoid,

but can at least recognise äs illusion (B 353 f.), and Nietzsche's idea of language

äs that which we cannot escape from in our thinking, but can at least recognise

äs

mere

signs

b loße

Semiot ik)

W P

625).

19

To my mind, however, the most important parallel between Kant and

Nietzsche

is the one first

mentioned

in our

discussion, namely

the

parallel

between Kant's notion of

'putting

forms into things' and Nietzsche's notion

of 'imposing forms on to things'. Nietzsche is profoundly suspicious of

Kant's

whole

critical

entefprise,

but the idea that it is we who give objects

the forms which they appear to us to have is one that he endorses and

appropriates wholeheartedly (though not,

of coursCj

without

amending it to

his own ends).

When Kant says the understanding does not draw its laws from nature, it

prescribes them

to

nature , this

is wholly

true with regard

to the concept

o f

nature which

we are obliged to attach to

nature [...],

but

which

is the

summation of a

host

of

errors

of the

understanding.

HH

19)

20

In spite of occasional passages such

äs

the one

just

quoted, in which he

praises Kant, the

majority

of Nietzsche's comments about Kant, particularly

in his later

writings,

are in fact highly critical of the Kantian project. In one

passage from th e Nach laß , fo r example, Nietzsche points to what he sees äs

the contradictory nature of the Kantian project.

The sorc

spot

of Kant's

critical philosophy

has

gradually

become

visible

cven to dull eyes: Kant no longer has a right to his distinction

appearance ·

19

This

and

subscquent translations

of passages

from

the unpublished writings or

Nachlaß WP)

are taken

from Nietzsche,

Tbe Wil l to

P o w e r >

translated by W.

Kaufmann

and R. J. Hollingdale

(New

York,

1968).

20

This and

subsequent

translations of M e n s c h l i c h e s All fumenschliches H H ) are taken from

Nietzsche,

H um an ,

A ll t o o Human^

translated by R. J.

Hollingdale, introduced

by E. Heller

(Cambridge, 1986).

Unauthenticated



12/43

126

Stephen

HouJgace

and thing

m itself** — he faad

depriyed himself

of

.the ßght

to go on distinguishing in this old familiär way,

in

so fär

äs

he rejectecl äs

impermissible makihg inferences from phenomenä to

bjause

of pnenöraena

— in

accordance

wi th

hi s

conception öf

cäusality

and its purely inira-

phänomenal validity — which conception, ort the

othei

han553)

Nietzsche

highlights here what he Sees äs

a

vicioiis circle in

Kantus

thinkirig

tfaat yitiätes

Kant's whole

enteirprise.

In Nietzsche's

Yiew, Kant dtäw$

the

distinction between appearances and things in themselves in

order

tp

restrict

the legitimacy of the category of causality t » the sphere of human

experience,

that is to

'appearances';

and

yet

at the sanxe^time, by making

this distinction,

Kant

indicates

that we must consider appearances themselves

to have a

caüse

or

ground which lies beyond what

we can

experience.

In other

words, Kant

relies on the

distinctiori

between

ph'enomenal äppearaiice

and the underlying

cause

of

that appearance

in

order to deprive

himself of the

right

to

talk

of

any

causes other than phenomenal ones.

?1

From one point of view, Nietzsche appears to have put his finger directly

on a

central problem

of Kant's

critical philosophy: that Kant presupposes

what he dejiies, namely that there are causes beyond the sphere

of phenomenal

experience

to

which

causality is restricted.

;

However,

we should

remernber

that Kant only says that

we

must

t h ink öf

things

in

themselves

äs ihtelEgible

causes

of

appearances,

not

that

we can

know

t ha t

o r

know

h ow) they

caüse

appearances.

Kant insists that

we can

only make sense

of

causality

within the

phenomenal

realrn

of

space

and

time.,

Unschematised,

the

categories merely

have

logical .meaning: they only have real, deterrninate rneaning Sitifi} in

conjunction

with

sensibility S inn l i chke i t } (B

299). This

allows

us

to

infer,

I

suggested, that wheh Kant uses the term intelligible cause (B 592), ; the

word

cause

must be read, äs it Were, in quötatjoä-marks tp iadicate that it

does

not

mean what

it

means

in ordinary

experience.

Kant's position

is

thus

not quite

äs

straightforwardly

circular äs

Nietzsche

impHes, Nevertheless, Nietzsche

is

right

to see

Karit's

;

position äs

problematic.

The

question

we

need

to

address

to

Kant,

in riiy view, is

this: is

it actuaily

legitimate

to

use

a

concept, but to declare

in the

same breath that

one

does

not intend

that

concept to be

understood

in any

ordinary serise?

Furthermore,

is

it legitirnate to.leave the

sense

iri which such a

coricept

s

tö be understood

indeterminate

·— or, at least, insufficientiy deterrninate — or does not the

ordinary sense

of the

concept constantly reassert itself

in

the: absence

of any

deterrninate alternative? But, of course,

if

we can ask this question

about

Kant, can

we not

surely

ask

it about

Nietzsche hliöse.lf

even more, since

he

See J. T. Wücox, Truth

an j

Value in

Nitt^scbe

(Ann Arbor,

1^)74),

pp. 119 f:

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13/43

Kant, Nietzsche and the Thing in itself' , 127

specifically

teils us that one should use traditional philosophical concepts

only äs [,..] conventiohal

fictions for the

purpose

of

designation

and

com-

munication — not for explanation BGE 21 ? What we shall have to consider,

therefore, is the extent to which the

distinction

between

what is apparent

and what is real in itself reasserts itself in Nietzsche's thinking, even though

he

sets

it

äs

his

task

to challenge and undermine any

straightforward

concep-

tion of such distincrions.

Nietzsche's

attack on the Kantian concept of the

thing

in itself (and on

what

he

considers

to be

related

concepts

such äs

the beyond or the true

world )

is launched from a

variety

of different perspectives and involves the

employment

of Veveral

different arguments (which

it is not

m y intention

to

assess

here,

but simply to display).

22

In some passages Nietzsche

undertakes

a genealogical critique of the concept of the thing in itself, which is

to

say

that he tries to make us sceptical of the value of the concept by exposing its

psychological or historical origins. In § l of Human, All too Human, for

example,

Nietzsche claims that metaphysical philosophers have posited

a

realm of things in themselves

äs

the source of the more highly valued

thing[s]

(such

äs

reason, altruism and truth) in order to avoid the idea that

such

'more

highly valued things' might have their roots in their apparent

opposites (irrationality, selfishness and error). In § 5 of Human, All too

Human,

on

the

other hand,

Nietzsche

offers

a genealogical critique of the more general

idea

of a second real world , by tracing the

origin

of our belief in such a

world to the dreams of primordial man. In § 11 of the same text Nietzsche

then claims that human

language

is responsible fo r setting up a separate

world beside the other

world ;

and in

later

passages from the Nachlaß he

frequently blames physiological

weakness or

decadence

for our

metaphysical

misconceptions.

Besides

these

various genealogical criticßms of the idea of a beyond ,

Nietzsche also offers

a pragmatic

critique

of the

idea. Whatever

the

origin

of

our

idea

of a

beyond

m ay

be, he

teils

us, the

o n s e g u e n e s

of its

employment

are harmful

since

it insinuates that this world is of much less value than the

world

we do not see.

24

Nietzsche's genealogical

and

pragmatic criticisms often

do not

address

the concept of the thing in itself directly (though § l of Human

}

All too

Human does),

but are frequently targeted against the general idea of a realm

beyond the world of human

experiehce.

However, Nietzsche also

presenfs

22

On

Nietzsche's critique

of the

concept

of the

thing

in

itself,

see

Wilcox,

pp. 98—126, and

A.

Nehamas, Nietytbe: Life äs L i tcrature,

(Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp .

74—105.

23

See, for example, W P 579.

24

See

WP 586.

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14/43

128

Stephcn

Houtgate

dircct

criticisms

of the specific concept of the thing in itself which chaUenge

eh e very idca that anything

could

ever

be

sometfa ing n itstlf.

In

Niet&sche's

view,

it does not

make

any

seöSe

to

tälk

of

things

in

themselves becaiise,

if we

abstract things from

thcit relations to

other

thd ngs and

eonsider their iatriiiiSiG

nature ä lpne^ t her i we are not able to

understaiid

how things could act

upon

or

have an

effect

upon

the

world.

A n < J

if we are not

able

to

do

that,

then

we are not able to deterrnine the properties of things pr eveci to think of

thetn äs

things,

the

existence

of which

makes

a dif fefence

in

the world, at

all·

The prop erties of a thi iig are

e f f e c t i?

o n o t h e r

things :

if o ne fernoves other

things ,

t he n a thirjg

has

n o properties, i . e . , there is no thin g without

o ther

things,

i.

e.,

the re is no thing in itselP'.

W P

557)

Apart from showing that Nietzsche presupposes that

the

properties

of a

thing

are

its effects on öthef

thiijgS,

these lines mäke it clear that he understands

the term

thing

in

itself

to mean somethmg.

like

a thing

cOfisidered

by

itself , though, äs I pointed out äbove, it is not clear that Kant shares that

understanding of the te frn

;

Kafit's

point

is

simply that

the

thing

in

itself

is

the

thing considered

in abstraction from all relatiön to a

knowing

;subject,

not necessarily the

thing considered

in

abstraction from any relatiön

to

anything

whatsoeyer.

Nietzsche

preserits

criticisms of this more narrowly

defined

Kantian

position, too,

however.

In One

passage,

for exampie, he

rejects the concept of a 'thing abstracted from all relatiön to a ßübjec t because

he assumes

that

it is only for

subje ct ivi ty

and

through

subjective

Interpretation

that

there

are

such things

äs 'thirjgsV

T h a t things possess

a coristitütion

in

thefriselves

e i n e

B e s c h a f f e n h e i t

an

sich)

quite

apar t

from

interpretatiori an d subjectivity, is a

cjuite

idle

hypothesis:

i t presupposes that Interpretation and

subjectivity

are no t essential [*..]: th e

appare n t o b j e c t i v e character o f things: could it not be

merely

a difference.of

degree within th e

subjective?

W P 560)

It is clear, then, that the Kantian concept öf the thing in itself is one that

Nietzsche firmly rejects,

eveh

if he is not äs

c are f u l

äs he might have beeri

to

disünguish

Kant* s position

from that

of

Schopenhauer

or

Plato.

Often, äs

I have indicated

?

Nietzsche sirnply launches a

general

attack againSt what he

considers

to be

central

metaphysical cpncepts such äs

the true

wöirld ,

reality

or

essenee , concepts which

are not particularly

Kantian. However,

certaia expressions make it clear that he f requen t ly

has

Kant very

much

in

mind even

when he is

rnaking

his

cnticisrns

of such

concepts.

In § 54 of the

Gay S t i eme , fo r exampie, we read the

follpwing

l inesi

W h a t is "appearance"

Schein)

fo r

rn e

now?

Certainfy n o t

the oppösite o f

some essence

Wesen):

w ha t could I

say

äbout

a£y

essence

except

t;p

n^me

th e

attfibutes

öf its äppeararice Certainly n o t z dead mask tha t

one

could

place

p n

an

u n k n p w n

o r remoye from it

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15/43

Kant, Nietzsche

and the

Thing

in itself 29

Strictly

speaking,

the

Opposition Nietzsche

is

dismantling here

is not a

Kantian

one since Kant does not talk of the contrast between Schein and Wes en ,

but

of

that

between Erscheinung and D ing an s ich (indeed Kant is very careful to

keep

the

concepts

of

Sche in

and Erscheinung separate).

25

However, Nietzsche's

reference to an unknown x firmly suggests that Kant's distinction is being

rejected

along

with

all other apparently 'essentialist' positions.

In a

passage from

the Nachlaß

Nietzsche attacks what

he sees

äs

the

metaphysician's blind

faith

in the rational proposition that if A exists, then

the opposite concept B must also

exist

(IFP579). Once.again, no direct

reference

to Kant is made, but Kant is surely amongst the unnamed meta-

physicians that Nietzsche is thinking of. After all, is not Kant's belief that

it follows naturally

from

the concept of an appearance in general: that

something which is in itself not appearance must correspond to it (A 251)

exactly

the

kind

of

'metaphysicaP assumption that Nietzsche

is

criticising?

It is true that Kant only claims that we must t h mk of things äs they are in

themselves, and refrains from asserting dogmatically that there must actually

b e things in

themselves. Nevertheless,

the

rational inference from

the

concept

of

appearance

to the

concept

of

that which underlies appearance

is one

that

Kant does

not call into

question. Indeed, äs

we

have seen,

he

believes that

the word appearance must

be

taken

to

indicate

a

relation

to

something

that grounds the appearance unless [...] we are to move constantly in a

circle

(A

252).

But

is not this

circle

just

what Nietzsche,

at

least

in

certain passages,

is

inviting

us to embrace by

doing away

with the ideä of a

thing

or world in

itself?

We possess no categories by which we can distinguish a true

from

an

apparent

world , Nietzsche teils us:

There

might only be an apparent world

e i n e scheinbare

elt\

but not just o ur

apparent

world.

(IFP 583)

This

delib-

erately

paradoxical and bewildering idea thatltnere could

just

be appearance

or

illusion without anything which appears

or

underlies

the

appearance

is

encountered most

forcefully

in a famous

passage

from

Beyo n d Go o d

an d E v iL

What forces us at all to suppose that there is an essential Opposition of

true

and false ? Is it not sufficient to assume degrees of

apparentness

(Stufen d e r Scheinbar keif) and, äs it were, lighter and darker shadows and

shades

of appearance —

different values ,

to use the language of painters?

W hy couldn't the world that concems u s — be a fiction? A nd if somebody

asked,

ic

but to a fiction there surely belongs an author? — couldn't one

answer simply: w h y > Doesn't this belongs perhaps belong to the fiction,*

too? (34)

The challenge

which Nietzsche

addresses to our

ordinary understanding

in

this passage is profound. But can we really

make

any sense of the claim that

25

SeeB69f.

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16/43

130

Stepheö Hoülgatc

the "world that concerra us" might be made up of nothing othe* thaji

"degrees of apparentness"? Has not Nietasche täken leave of logic?

Fottunately, perhaps, Nietzsche elsewhere

seems

to recover his Jogical

sense

and

acknowledge

thaC if he

wishes

|o reject the

eoticespt

of the 'thiftg in

itself or of a

true

wprlci,

he

ought

togical ly

tp

reject

the

concept

of

mere

appcarance

or

of an apparent world

äs

well. If one side of the Opposition

between appearance

and

reality

in

itself is

to be rejected, theci the whole

Opposition must be rejected

becaüse

these terms are contraries

that cannot

be made sehse of in Isolation from one another. Nietzsche proclaims H is

'libetation* from the Opposition between the appajcent and the true world

most

clearly and boldly in Twi l i gh t

o f

th e

Idols .

We have

abolish^d the true

world:

\rfiat world

remained

over? The apparerit

world, pertaps? ... But no W i t b the true world m h $v e abolisbed th e

ap p ar en t

(scheinbare)

w o r l d

äs

well ™

:

· ' ' · . · .

It seems, therefore, that Nietzsche does

not

after

all

want

to Jeave

m s spinning

around in a circle of üngrounded appearances arid illusions, but that he wänts

to

displace

the

very

Opposition of appearance and reality

indtself

upon ̂ h|ch

in his

view,

Kant's

philosophy — · and indeed

the

whole:

traditiön of

Western

philosophy sinee Plato ·» ·

is based. What it

means

to

think

"beyond

appearance

and

reality"

(or indeed "beyond gopd and evif^^may

.npt

yet be completely

clear, but we

know that that

at

least

is

Nietzsche's

äim. , · . ;

Yet doubts linger that things might not be quite äs simple äs that (if k is

appropriate

to cäll What we

have just

described äs Nietzsche's

v

aim

'simple').

In the passage

from

B e yond G o o d a n d

Evil which; we quoted above,

Nietzsche

queried the Yery

Opposition between "true" arid

"false", but

theri

asked:

w

ls

it not

sufficient

to ässume degrees of apparentness [...]?" (34)i Does this not

suggest that

beyond

the

pppositions

pf

Karitian

and Platpnic ipetaphysics —

at least, beyond the ojpposition pf "true

??

and "false" - ̂ We

cpntinue

to whirl

around in a dizzying

Spiral ö f a g p e a r a n c e s ? ^ i m i [ a a % ^

of the

G a y c i e n c e ^

after having rejected

the

idea

that

"appearance'

?

(Schein)

is the

opposite

öf

some essence, Nietzsche writes:

Appearance is for me,

that which

lives^arid is efjFective and goes so far in its

self-mockery that/it mäkes me fael that this is appearance and

will-o

?

-the-

wisp and a dance of

spirits

and nothingmöre [,.,].

Does

not this

suggest

that Nietzsche

abolishes

the

Opposition

between

essence and appearance by collapsing both into ^- appedränc^.

26

S ee Nietzsche,

Tmligbt

o f t h e

Uo l s \T h e Anti-Christ translated

and

introduced

by R. J.

Hollingdale

(HarmonidswPitfe,

1908),

"How

th e *Real

World*

at

last

Beeame a Myth".

Traosiation modified. See

also Derrida,

pp.

71^83.

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Kant Nietzsche and the

"Thing

in itseif 131

If this

is so, is not

Nietzsche

in danger of doing

just

what he

accused

Kant

of doing, namely depriving

himself

of the right to a distinction

whüst

relying on that very distinction?

It

is true

that

one must not

automatically

assume that the

postanetaphysical

"appearance" Nietzsche

delights

in is simply

identical with the "appearance" he is trying to twist free of. But does not

bis

retention

of

words such

äs

Schein, Scheinbarkeit

and

e r s c h e i n e n

and his

seeming

wülingness to court

paradox,

at

least raise doubts that

he may not

have

twisted free of

metaphysics

and Kant äs much

äs

some might like to think?

In one very simple respect Nietzsche clearly does not twist

free

of Kant.

We

have seen that

whatever

problems there

may be

with Nietzsche's retention

of

words like

Sch ein, Scheinbarkeit and erscheinen, he

rejects

the

concept

of the

thing in itself

unequivocally.

However, äs I

indicated

above,

Nietzsche does

not challenge

Kant's

basic conception of what the expression "thing in itself"

means^ he simply denies that

anything actually

corresponds to the

term.

Although

Nietzsche does

not always

mean

exactly the same

thing

by the

term

"thing

in itself" äs Kant, he agrees with Kant that what we are to understand

by that term is something which

cannot

be known by us.

The

biggest

fable

of all is the

fable

of

knowledge.

One would

like

to know

what things-in-themselves are;

but

behold, there

are no

things-in-themselves

But even supposing there were an in-itself, an

unconditioned

thing

(ein

An-

s ich,

ein U nbedingtes), it would for

that

very reason be

unknowable Something

unconditioned

cannot

be known;

otherwise

it would not be unconditioned

Corning to know,

however,

is always "placing oneself in a

conditional

relation to

something"

(W P 555).

Indeed, Nietzsche fiirther agrees with Kant that, since what something might

be in itself could never be made manifest to us, it could not be of any concern

to us. Not

only

do

'things'

have

ho

constitution

of

their

own —

in

them selves

in

Nietzsche's view; such

an

intrinsic

or

essential constitution would

be a

matter

of

utter

indifference to us

even

if 'things' did

have one.

There is also another respect in which Nietzsche does not twist

free

of

Kant. Although Nietzsche

abolishes

the idea of the thing in itself, we have

seen that he clings to a version of the corresponding Kantian

idea

that "we

can

know

a priori

of

things

only what we

ourselves

put into them

(was wir

selbst

in sie legen) (B

xviii).

Despite the multiplicity of his perspectives on

life

Nietzsche's

understanding

of

human

consciousness

is

dominated

by one

recurring

idea: that "it is the human intellect that has made appearance

(Erscheinung)

appear and transported its erroneous basic conceptions into

things (seine i rr tüm l ichen G rundauffassungen

in die D in& e

hineingetragen^

HH16).

Unauthenticated



18/43

132

Stcphen Hottlga|e

The

problem that

we

must addre&s»

thercfore, is

tMs; to what exteat

Niet2sche*s

evident retention of one-side of Kant's pMosopfakljl dichotomy

~

the idea that we äs knowing

sübjects

put

our

own

forms

into things ' - * .

cause hko

to

fall back into tbe other side

of

that dichotoiny, which

he

clearfy

wants to reject — th e idea that wljat we put our

forms

and

categories

iiito

has

a hidden

constitution

of

its own?

And

how

is

Nietzsche's

appärent

claim

tha t

he

ciisplaces

and

frees

y

himself

from

th e

fundamental

oppositions of

philosophy to be reconciled with

his

ädherence to what is still, despite

undeniable

differences

from Kant, a basically Kantiäij

episteiiiology?

These points require consideration

because,

despite

his insistence

that

he

rejects

the

concept

of the

thing

in itself,

Niet^sche's

talk of imposing

forms

on to

things constantly

and

inevitably invites

the

question: what

does

Nietzsche think that

the

things,

on to

which

we

impose

our forms

and

categories,

are

in

themse lves* Furthermore,

in

many passages,

Nietzsche

actually

employs the very terminology .of the "m

itself

(an sich) which he cläims to

have

put out of order. ;

In

§ 111 of

Th e G ay Science, för example,

he

declares that

the

desire to

treat what is similar äs what is equal is an

illogical

desire, ^rid he gives äs his

reason

for

saying

this th e simple

Statement "för

nothing is

really

equal

>J

(denn

e s

giebf

a n

sich nichts

Gle iches ) .

Then,

in a passage

fröm

the

Nach laß ,

Nietzsche again seeins to employ

th e

words

an

sich

in a

llteräl

aiid

straightfoirward way:

whatis that function that must

:

be much older an d

ipust

ha,ye

been

at

work

much earlier, that mäkes cases idehticai

and simüat

which

are in

themselves

dissimilar. (we lche an sich ungleiche Fälle ausgleicht und verahnlichf)J

The lingering presence of Kant' s "in

itself

is not always marked by the

use of the specific phrase an s i c h >

however»

Sometimes, äs m the

early

text,

O n Tru th

and

Lie

in an

Ex tra -m ora l Sense ,

it is marked by a comtiaent to the

effect

that nature

is for us "an

inaccessible and

indeiBiiable

x".

27

At other

times,

it is ma;rked by

such

comments

äs:

w e

a r e

none

of

u s

that

which

we

appear to be (erscheinen)

in

accördarice with the states for which ajpne we

have consciousness and w o f d s ( Z ? 115), or:

Actions

are

never what

they

appear

to us to be

(Das,

als was s ie

uns e r s c h e i n e n ) ^ .

W e

have expend^d so much

läböiir on

leanühg that

external things are not

äs they appear

to us to be —

very

welll the

case

is the same

with

the

inqer

world

Moral actioris are in reality

(in Wah rhe i t) ^something

other than that'

e twas Änderet) —

more

we

cannot

say: and all actions are essentiajly

uiaknown.

( D

116)

' .

27

See KSA l, p. 880.

Unauthenticated



19/43


20/43

134 Stäben

Hottlgate

— Status of thc vocabulary

;

pf

his

adversaties ?

2

*

Althpugb I agjree

witfe

Danto

that

Nietzsche

i

forced to employ a

realistic vocäbulary

by the nature

of his philosophical project, Boyle> in my view, ha correctly

Menrified

the

w ay

in

which

Nietzsche wisbes that

*realj ti


21/43

Kant,

Nietzsche and the Thing in itself 135

The fictions and interpretations of human consciousness are thus not so

much

measured against what

is

real

by

Nietzsche,

bat

radier against other

fictions and interpretations, other probabilities and

conjectures

made from

within the only perspective that our thought and Sensation

allows

us. What

we experience is merely phenomenal appearance, though

appearance, thought

of in this

new way

and

transfigured

by the abolition

of all

oppositions,

never comes to the point of referring itself back to any

ultimate

foundation,

nor

to any central

focus

of

Interpretation,

nor to

anything

in itself : rather, it always refers to a further appearance. Eve-

rything is a mask. Any mask once uncovered uncovers another

mask.

Becoming

is

simply

the indefinite

play

of

interpretations,

an indefinite

shifting of masks.

30

When

Nietzsche

employs

the

concept

of the in itself , to

talk

of

op-

posites

that

do not

exist

in

themselves d i e nicht

an sich

exist ieren)

WP 552),

we must thus not read him

äs

claiming that

in

itself th e world

is

without

oppositions

— a

posiüon that assumes that there

is a

world

in

itself. Rather,

we must read

him äs maintaining

that

the

central

oppositions

with which

we

th