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“Harmonious Society”Rise of the New China

John P. Geis II, Colonel, USAFBlaine Holt, Colonel, USAF

C ’ Hu Jintao calls his vision for leading China intothe twenty-rst century Harmonious Society(( , hè xié shè huì).From the recent dynastic periods to today, China’s prolic history of lostglobal prominence, subjugation to colonial/imperial powers, civil war, theclosed communist era, and the opening of China in 1978 must beunderstood through the lens of contemporary Chinese politics. PresidentHu has cast himself as China’s champion. His ideals of checking Westernpower and mitigating foreign inuences in a rising China resonate withinChina today. Te question becomes whether China’s ambitions will remain

regional or will they extend to surpassing the United States as the de factosuperpower to meet these ends in the 2030 time frame.Harmonious Societyis describedby Hu as a “scientic development con

cept” 1 which shifts China’s primary focus from a purely economic growthmodel to a more balanced, Confucian-style approach aimed at maintaining growth while addressing daunting social issues such as the widegap between rich and poor, widespread environmental degradation, andgovernment and corporate corruption.2 Te post–Mao Zedong China,beginning with Deng Xiaoping in 1978, remains authoritarian but has

Col John P. Geis II is currently director, Center for Strategy and echnology, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.His ying career has involved F-111 ghters and special operations AC-130 gunships. He has worked inbudgeting and planning, and for two years directed modernization efforts for all USAF Special Forces.Colonel Geis holds masters degrees in political science from the University of Wisconsin, political sciencefrom Auburn University, and strategic studies from Air University, and a PhD in political science from theUniversity of Wisconsin.

Col Blaine Holt is currently deployed as wing commander of the 376th AEW at Bishkek, KyrgyzRepublic. His military education includes the Joint Forces Staff College, Air War College, and BelgiumRoyal Superior College of Defense. His dissertation, A European Military Airlift Capacity , written anddefended in Dutch, was published in 2000 by the Belgium Royal College of Defense Press. It was awarded“with distinction” designation and is a part of the college’s library.

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John P. Geis II and Blaine Holt

continued to build on policies promoting openness and integration withthe international community. Harmonious Societyis designed to fostermore democratic and nancial opportunity for citizens, allowing for some

participation in government while maintaining rm, centralized control.Te plan seeks to harness China’s economic affluence, using it to increaseinuence on the world stage.

Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao—representing the second,third, and fourth generations of leaders after Mao Zedong in the ChineseCommunist Party (CCP)—embarked on incremental reforms to maximizeChina’s economic potential while retaining strict authoritarian control.

ogether these leaders, the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, and

Central Committee represent modern Chinese politics. Teir reforms haveenabled China to experience explosive economic growth over the past 30years, which in the eyes of many allows them to retain the “Mandate ofHeaven.” Yet, as witnessed at iananmen Square in 1989, the leadership willreact harshly to dissent from its people to retain that mandate.

As a result of the People’s 17th Communist Party Congress (CPC) inlate 2007, Hu’s position is secure until 2012. He consolidated power bygarnering seats for his allies on key committees, to include the PolitburoStanding Committee, while retiring older government officials with strongloyalties to previous generations. However, the new leaders placed in politburo and central committee positions represent the rising fth generation.Tis generation will be pivotal in executing Hu’s strategy and in guidingChina’s path in the near and midterm. Issues such as the aiwan question,corruption and rule of law, environmental protection, resource procurement, and internal dissent represent the challenges facing this rising classof leaders as underscored by President Hu’s address at the 17th CPC.3

China is a rising power, and this must be considered as future policy iscrafted. Although an unforeseen event, such as a natural disaster or internaldiscord, could slow China’s rise, it is clear that its vibrant economic affluence

will translate into regional and global inuence in the future. It is reasonable to predict that China’s globalization-fueled economic growth will continue, which in turn, will present future Chinese politicians with an arrayof options to move the country’s strategic direction.4 If the rhetoric emanating from the 17th CPC is to be believed, China will translate its affluenceinto peaceful regional leadership; however, the ongoing construction of a

globally capable military whose capabilities extend beyond those of nationaldefense can lead to a different postulation about actual intent. If Chinese

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“Harmonious Society”

political intent is to match and eventually supplant the United States asthe dominant global power, it will have the ability to do so. Hu’s visionof a “harmonious society” is a modern plan whose outcome subordinates

foreign interests to its own, making it the “kingdom with no boundaries,”as was thought in the eighteenth-century Qing Dynasty. It is clear that theUnited States must place a high priority on its US-Sino strategy and beprepared for the challenge a rising China is sure to present.

Contemporary Politics in China

After Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China’s

new leader and set out to craft a new Chinese strategy. Purged and forcedto work in a labor camp during the Cultural Revolution before comingback into favor and rising as Mao’s successor, Deng understood rsthandthe failure of the revolution with its isolationist posture and set a course toopen China to the global market system. He concluded that while foreignencroachment was at the root of the “Bad Century,”5 it was essential toopen China up to economic opportunity. Tis belief was a major departurefrom Mao’s philosophy and set China on the path toward the politicalsituation of today.

Although credited with leading China’s resurging wealth in the modernera through his “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” strategy, Deng

was also responsible for giving orders that would enable the People’sLiberation Army (PLA) to crack down on political dissidents at the massacre in iananmen Square in 1989. Publicly, Deng praised the PLAfor responding to the crisis with decisiveness, but privately, he reshuffledseveral key leadership positions which would ultimately position JiangZemin as his successor in 1992.6 China’s leaders demonstrated at iananmenthat reforms which support China’s meteoric economic growth remainofficial policy, but the power elite will, in all cases, attempt to retaincentral control.

In a discussion with a Japanese delegation, Deng explained China’sMarxism and socialism in uniquely Chinese terms, making the linkage between the Bad Century and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: “ o adhere to Marxism and to integrate it with Chinese realities—inother words, to seek truth from facts, as advocated by Comrade Mao Ze

dong—it is crucial for us to adhere to Marxism and socialism. For morethan a century after the Opium War, China was subjected to aggression



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and humiliation. It is because the Chinese people embraced Marxismand kept to the road leading from new-democracy to socialism that theirrevolution was victorious.”7 Going forward, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics can thus be interpreted as rmly held power by the elite partymembers without the shackles of ideological denitions of Marxism andsocialism. In this construct, challenges to the lack of congruency betweenChina’s open market reforms and its failure to improve human rights andfreedom are unsuccessful. Yet, for the West, it is hard to label China asfully communist, given its economic policies—this is where the phrase“with Chinese Characteristics” becomes useful to its leaders.

Te party power structure solidied in the transition from Deng to

Jiang. Deng ran the party and nation from the position of chairman ofthe central military commission and paramount leader. Te presidency

was reestablished as the leader of the party and the nation with Jiang’sinstallation in 1993. Te premier is the secondary leadership role. Tethree top governmental or party bodies are the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, and Central Committee. Teir members are selectedevery ve years at the CPC in a closed process, not visible outside of theparty’s elite.8

In the Jiang and Hu administrations, this process and the associatedparty structures, as shown in gure 1, have stabilized. It was common inMao’s and Deng’s era for outgoing senior officials to be investigated andimprisoned to discredit criticism of incoming leaders. Constitutional reforms stabilizing government structures now allow for peaceful exits fromgovernment and logical successions with the party elite. For example, Hugained 10 years of experience on the Politburo Standing Committee beforerising to be president.9

Institutionalizing key positions and power structures enables partyfactions to compete in a stable system and supports long-term planningthat has been a Chinese cultural characteristic. Te recent 17th CPC reafrmed this stability. Although President Hu was able to meet his goal ofplacing younger protégés on the Politburo Standing Committee, he wasnot allowed to trim the number of positions on the committee from nineto seven (see g. 1)10 for the purpose of retiring more members whosesupport came from the previous president Jiang.11 Although the resultant

personnel changes seem to indicate that Hu will have power limited bythose with close ties to Jiang Zemin, the failure to select Jiang Mianheng,



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son of Jiang Zemin, may well signal that Jiang’s inuence is rapidly dissipating, leaving Hu with a consolidated position.12

Figure 1. Organizational structure of China’s government

President Hu made pledges to increase democratic opportunities forcitizens. He said, “People’s democracy is the lifeblood of socialism.”13 Inthe coming years the CCP will work to offer “socialist democracy” whereurban and rural areas can have a role in electing deputies to the people’scongress.14 It is also envisioned that the public will gain access to hearingsthat shape some facets of public policy.15 Whether or not these reformscome into reality remains to be seen, but the tenor of Hu’s address is indicative that measured democratic participation will come into existence.

Dr. David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international

affairs at George Washington University, cites that the rationale for theCCP to expand participation may be found in the International Department of the CCP’s analysis of Eastern European implosions and collapses.16 Tis analysis concluded these implosions were caused by:

• poorly developed economies, cut off from international markets andtechnologies,

• ruling parties that were divorced from their populaces—no grassrootslevel,



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• collaboration between the Catholic Church and unions in the Polishcase,

• external subversion by the United States and United Kingdom, and• loss of control over security services which had overly repressive policies.17

According to Shambaugh, the Chinese also conducted in-depth analyses ofthe former Soviet Union, North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam.18 Tey attributethe demise of many authoritarian systems, such as those in Central Asia, tothe inuence of American NGOs, assessing that they fomented revolutionin these countries. Te International Department of the CCP recognizes

Singapore as a model worthy of close examination. It admires how Singapore’sruling People’s Action Party (PAP) has been able to remain low key but maintain total control. In Singapore, the ruling body never relinquishes power,but the façade exists of a government that involves population participationcoupled with an open-market, prosperous economy.19 It may be a model for“Democracy with Chinese Characteristics,” but its track record on humanrights and freedom is far more liberal than China’s current model, and thegap between rich and poor is not so profound. It is clear that the Chinese

are interested in learning lessons from other governmental systems and innding replicable models for adaptation in China to support Hu’s call forsocialist democracy.

In the global political environment, Dr. Nancy ucker, professor of historyat Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, sees China’s increasing involvement in world institutions as a trend that will continue intothe foreseeable future.20 China’s experience with regional organizations, suchas APEC and ASEAN, or on the global level at the United Nations and theUN Security Council is indicative of a strategy to inuence regional andglobal issues. As China increases its engagement internationally, Dr. uckerenvisions an increase in conicting priorities with other nation-states, butthat China culturally would prefer not to have the top position in these organizations but rather would prefer to be the “number two.”21 Tis is reinforced bya 3,000-year-old term that Deng Xiaoping brought back in guiding futureChinese leaders. It is “tao guang yang hui,” which translates to “hide brightness, nourish obscurity.” Dr. Larry Wortzel, director of Asian Studies forTe Heritage Foundation, explained the translation of Deng’s meaning to

congressional leaders as, “Put your brightness in your quiver behind yourback and then nourish your capabilities secretly.”22 Deng’s intent was to



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bide time in bringing back China’s prominence—create the impression ofChina’s gradual awakening and opening; in essence, a gradient of reform—apolitical strategy that is still intact today.

Deng, Jiang, and Hu: Gradual Reform

From 1978 to today, from Deng to Hu, China’s strategic course hasbeen additive, each leader’s course building on the previous, each newevolution more ambitious. It reects a gradient of incremental steps, beginning with the “24 Character Strategy” set in motion by Deng.

Te 24 Character Strategy refers to 24 Chinese characters which are andtranslate to:

Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities andbide our time; be good at maintaining a low prole; and never claim leadership.23

It compliments his call to “hide brightness, nourish obscurity.” Bothideas guide leaders to commit to the long-term outlook in charting China’scourse without invoking conict among global actors.

Deng himself was responsible for the most signicant deviation of thestrategy to date: the massacre at iananmen Square. China came under

the spotlight from the world community as well as the Chinese themselves, who to that point had revered his leadership in the transition fromMao. “Xiaoping,” with different syllabic emphasis translates in Englishas “small bottles.” Te protest, made globally visible by Mike Chinoyof CNN reporting from the square, was thousands of Chinese smashingsmall bottles to the ground in solidarity for the victims—a practice whichcontinued on college campuses for many anniversaries after the massacre.24

A major consequence of the massacre was altered political succession, with the reins of power being passed on to Jiang Zemin, mayor of Shanghaiand party chief, rather than the disgraced Zhao Ziyang, general secretary.

Although Deng followed through by cracking down on the protests, heheld the inner circle responsible for letting the situation get out of control.In a larger sense, the lesson from iananmen for Deng and those whocame after him was to articulate clearly to the populace not to confuseopen markets with open (democratic) society.

President Jiang remained true to Deng’s reforms and maxim “it is gloriousto be rich” by introducing his vision called the “Tree Represents,” which

calls for advancement in economic development, cultural development, andpolitical consensus. Te drive to pursue national wealth aggressively continued



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while greatly increasing investment in the PLA and opening up very limiteddemocratic opportunity at local levels to make the CCP attractive to moreChinese. Deng’s vision was focused on the densely populated eastern coastal

region. Although foreign investment soared, corruption and scandal followed, with the rural areas not beneting as much from his strategy. Teprosperity gap widened sharply. Tese were key challenges to be addressed

when President Hu Jintao took office in 2002.Hu’s “scientic development concept,” also known asHarmonious Society ,

calls for economic prosperity as in Deng’s and Jiang’s visions. However, Huseeks to control growth while focusing on the social issues that have grownsince China’s opening of its markets. His approach runs congruent with

Confucian analects. Confucian philosophy emphasized personal andgovernmental morality, justice, and social correctness.25 At the 17th CPC,Hu reiterated in his address that democratic opportunities would expand,

wealth and prosperity would increase in the rural and western regions, the ruleof law would be supported, environmental issues would be addressed, andcorruption would be controlled.26 History, philosophy, Deng’s foundation,and the lessons learned at iananmen, serve as linkages for Hu and the newruling elite to make these pronouncements about China’s strategic direction.

What remains unchanged from Jiang’s administration is defensespending, which increased in March 2007 by 17.8 percent, making it thelargest defense budget China has ever had on a per capita basis.27 Ratherthan face the “too little, too late” plight of its original opening to the

West over a century ago, China is working to build a world-class military which will present its leaders with options it has not had since the MingDynasty. Te gradient from Deng to Hu discernibly follows a denitetrend, or “trajectory”—a trajectory whose future path may be somewhatpredictable.

What’s next for China

China’s trajectory is a steep curve. In the key economic metric, exports,China surpassed the United States in 2007, becoming the second largestexporter and is forecast by the World rade Organization (W O) to passGermany in the next few years.28 China now ranks second behind theUnited States in oil consumption at 7.88 million barrels per day.29 TeCongressional Research Service (CRS) references Global Insight’s estimate

that China’s economy will overtake the US economy by 2013.30

GlobalInsight predicts that in 2025 the Chinese economy will be 59 percent



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larger than the United States’.31 Success in this area correlates with Chinesepolitics and the reform gradient established by Deng and expanded onby Jiang and Hu. Senior director for East Asian Affairs at the National

Security Council, Dennis Wilder, plotted the trajectory and China’s current position on the curve (g. 2).32 Continuing on this trajectory tothe “Rising China” quadrant entails meeting challenges that could knockChina off this curve and move it in a different direction.33 Internal discord, natural disasters, world recession/depression, or a crisis in aiwan areexamples of “wildcard” events that could alter the course. Chinese leadersare sure to have prepared contingency plans for the setbacks that can beforeseen, but unforeseen events will test them. Depending on which wild

card or combination thereof, the effect could be as benign as China’s 2030expectations taking many more years or as volatile as internal power disintegration or engagement in global conict. In any case, to maintain itscurrent Rising China trajectory, Chinese politicians will have to meet allof the challenges, wildcard or not. Moving into the Rising China quadrant by 2030 may yield more growth and freedom in China, but it does

Figure 2. China’s trajectory toward free-market democracy

not necessarily mean that the United States and other nations will notconfront serious challenges in the Rising China environment in terms ofcommerce, defense, and global politics.

China’s course also depends on the rising fth generation of leaders

continuing to advance Hu’s Harmonious Societyreforms. From the 17thCPC, the new selections to the Politburo Standing Committee include



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two potential successors to Hu in 2012. Tey are his protégés, Xi Jinping(Shanghai party chief) and Li Keqiang (Liaoning party chief).34 Apartfrom successors, it is clear that many of the new fth-generation leadershave risen under Hu’s mentoring. Te fth generation is also called the“lost generation,” because many did not have formal schooling opportunitiesduring the Cultural Revolution; yet, most of those rising in the politicalranks recaptured college educations and postgraduate degrees when Chinaopened in 1978.35 Tey meet another Hu criterion for selecting emergingleaders in that they are all in their late forties to early fties—very youngby Chinese standards. Age is a factor for top-tier leaders. Te turnoverrate for the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo, Central Com

mittee, and the Central Military Commission will remain at 60 percentand higher per congress for the foreseeable future.36 Dr. Li Cheng of theBrookings Institution conducted an analysis of the 103 highest-ranking,fth-generation leaders. Common characteristics include:

• All had humble, hardship experiences during their formative years.

• A majority have postgraduate degrees (80 percent).

• Very few have technocratic governmental backgrounds (17 percent).37

• Many are lawyers with foreign study experience in social sciences.

• Almost half aretuanpai (Communist Youth League) members (48.5percent).38

Both potential successors, Xi and Li, weretuanpai members. Although Xi has emerged from the 17th CPC as the frontrunner, their performanceover the next ve years will determine which will be selected at the 18thCPC as the new president. Dr. Li refers to this process as the new, “inner-Party democracy.”39 Promotion results from the 17th CPC make it clearthat President Hu’s inuence and Harmonious Societyor another parallelstrategy will be China’s path for at least the next two decades. Te fthgeneration of leaders from Hu’stuanpai students will form the leadershipelement in China for the foreseeable future.

Te philosophy that these leaders will take forward is a broad form of theconcept of Harmonious Society .40 At the CPC, Hu took this Harmonious

Society beyond the domestic and regional context in expanding the conceptto “Harmonious World” for the purpose of shaping the world environment



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in which China will operate. Hu’s overarching doctrine in foreign affairs isthe 53-year-old Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence , which was the initialframework to reach a peace accord with India following the Chinese occupation of ibet.41 oday the principles as publicly stated to be China’suniversal approach to foreign relations are:

• Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,

• Mutual nonaggression,

• Mutual noninterference with each other’s internal affairs,

• Equality and mutual benet, and

• Peaceful coexistence.42

Hu said, “We will pursue an independent foreign policy of peace andunswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and a win-winstrategy of opening up. We will develop friendship and cooperation withall other countries on the basis of theFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistenceand push for the building of a harmonious world of lasting peace andcommon prosperity.”43

Tis platform is consistent with the current Chinese trajectory, the reformsof the past three generations of leaders, and Chinese culture. aken at facevalue, the Harmonious World concept is congruent with China’s increasing interest in global institutions and politics. Te principals of “peacefulcoexistence” and “equality and mutual benet” are welcome to the globalcommunity and tie to Deng’s and Hu’s strategies.

However, the unprecedented buildup of China’s military and activism inforums like the UN Security Council or, most recently, the Six-Party alkson North Korea nuclear proliferation do not seem to correlate to the veprinciples, but these actions make sense culturally from Sun zu’s writingsand the pursuit of outcome through indirect means.44 China is globallyengaged today, and there are reasons to suspect that it is pursuing someof its national objectives via indirect means. Tus, as China continues onits current trajectory toward increased military and economic power, the

expectation that it will be satised as a regional power or merely as a peerto the United States should not be depended on for planning.



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The Road Ahead: Potential Disruptionsto China’s Current Path

What then is China’s vector in a political sense for the future? Te challengeson the horizon for China’s leaders are complex and multifaceted. PresidentHu and his successors’ decisions in building theHarmonious Society , andperhaps Harmonious World , will inuence how China’s leaders, structure,processes, and political system will evolve, both domestically and internationally. External entities—not just foreign powers but also inuentialbodies such as multigovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and multinational corporations (MNC)—will shape

political activity and decisions and not always favorably to the party’spower elite.

Chinese Leadership Structure and Processes

From the selections to the Politburo Standing Committee and otherkey posts lled during the 17th CPC, President Hu has consolidated astrong base. Hu not only selected his successors, he had a large hand indeveloping them as leaders through thetuanpai program as well. Te topfth-generation leaders, with Xi and Li leading the class, are the productsof Hu’s investment in the tuanpai many years ago. Te likelihood thatthis generation will remain devoted to and build on Harmonious Societyis strong.

However, Hu’s remarks at the 17th CPC could become a source ofpotential instability. If, from these statements, there is a sincere initiativeundertaken to allow a small number of regionally elected candidates toparticipate on national-level committees or at the CPC itself, it couldbe a very small reform that evolves in the coming decades into a majorshift in the composition of top Chinese officials. Depending on the voicefrom nontraditional players in the government and how they are receivedor tolerated, the concepts of Harmonious Societycould be revised in thedecades that follow. Deng was not able to envision the resulting unrest andsocial dissidence resulting from market reforms and economic openness.Hu recognizes a need to allow for a measured amount of voice and partici

pation among the population; however, doing so could result in outcomesthat no one can foresee.



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Domestic Politics

President Hu has discussed challenges such as widening prosperity gaps,rule of law, and corruption mitigation openly at many public forums,including the 17th CPC. His government and those that follow will seekto champion these to keep domestic politics stable. Te economy seemsto be the clock they are working against. Te rural areas have expectationsof increased prosperity as envisioned inHarmonious Society , and thedeveloped urban areas have expectations of more wealth. Te current economicdownturn, however, may threaten both. In the rst three months of 2009,China’s growth rate has slipped to 6.1 percent.45 Despite this decrease ingrowth and the concomitant dislocation of nearly 20 million workers, all

indications are that unless the economy turns sharply worse, China willlikely manage to economically muddle through.46 Should the economyenter a sharper downturn or the global crisis deepen into a depression,some level of disenfranchisement is to be expected. Further, during thisperiod of relative economic stagnation, China will be more vulnerable tothe effects of major natural disasters, pandemics, and environmental crises.

Any of these, on top of the extant economic challenges, may alter theruling elite’s ability to stay the course.

International PoliticsChina is reinvesting a large part of its wealth into global inuence, making

international politics a priority. Its access in Africa now includes 44 of thecontinent’s 53 states. Te rationale for this may be driven by the need forresources, but the by-product from investing in African infrastructure, regardless of any ideological chasms, is improved global inuence. Its efforts inestablishing groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) orparticipating in preexisting bodies such as the UN, APEC, or ASEAN willcontinue to be vehicles of choice for China to exert itself globally.

Te United States is not the only variable for which China’s politiciansmust plan. In addition to instability in Africa—a problem most imperialpowers have contended with at one time or another—Russia, India, and

Japan are neighbors that t more into the competitor rather than partnercategory. Historically, China had regrettable experiences with all thesecountries, and its leaders will likely remain suspicious in any bilateral ormultilateral effort.

Te Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistenceas Chinese ideals would betested if China decides that aiwan must be taken back with force or if it



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should decide that it needs to garner natural resources by blocking othernations’ access in areas such as the contested Spratly Islands. Tese arepotential sources of conict Chinese leaders will seek to avoid if they are

to realize their global goals, but short-term crises could evolve in ways thatforce them to abandon long-term strategy temporarily.

External Entities

An outgrowth of globalization and China’s prosperity is the tremendousrise of per capita wealth and, therefore, the inuence of external entitiescontributing to this success. o make their operating environments morestable and conducive to greater corporate success, multinational corporations

have invested in social corporate responsibility (SCR) programs, boostinglocal communities’ infrastructure, education, and environments in muchthe same way NGOs target their programs. NGOs operate similarlyfor their own objectives, but whether SCR or NGO money is beinginvested, the long-term effects are inuences Chinese leaders will becautious of due to the history of the “bad century.” As stated earlier, theChinese conclusion was that the Central Asian states fell due to subtle inuences from the NGOs. Future leaders in China will be cautious as theseefforts ourish but may nd it impossible to reverse those that meet with

widespread approval among the populace.Guiding the Harmonious Societyto 2030 will not be easy for Chinese

leaders. Te planning variable that will likely remain constant is that theranking elite of the Communist Party will be in power well beyond the2030 time frame. No other constants exist. Just like the surprise iananmenpresented to Chinese leaders in 1989, they should be preparing today forhow the Chinese political system will adjust to an environment that iscertain to be dynamic and volatile. Instead of a smooth trajectory to theRising China quadrant, these factors could alter the path to somethingmore closely resembling gure 3.

Policy Implications

Tere is a wide range of thought from experts focused on studyingChina. However, given reform progress and economic trends experiencedby China since Deng Xiaoping, there is broad consensus that at a mini

mum, China will rise to peer status in the international political systemover the next 20 years.47 Knowledge of Chinese culture, its history of



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Figure 3: One potential Chinese trajectory toward 2030 -

foreign relations, and its rapid rise through the Deng, Jiang, and Hu erasis essential in designing a vision from which policies can be crafted. China’spolitical power is centralized, but the political elite’s activities traverse everyelement of Chinese society whether diplomatic, informational, military, economic, or cultural. Early Chinese philosophy, still in practice today, espousesindirect action, meeting goals in quiet ways, or creating contradictions toconfuse or deceive as methods in achieving objectives. In the political arena,US policy makers should consider the following strategies.

Invest in Regional Alliances and Access

Chinese leaders may seek to weaken US inuence in Asia, and globally, by eroding the strength of our partnerships. Terefore, we need toincrease resources to enable our country teams to increase investment inrelationships with traditional regional allies in addition to making inroads

with countries where we have not had robust relations. US relations withIndia, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam mustimprove between now and 2030. Te United States would do well tostrengthen its role and the roles of its allies in APEC and ASEAN. USengagement must be constructive and adaptive with regard to the widerange of cultural diversity perspectives in the region. It is also important

to increase efforts in monitoring how China conducts diplomacy with thesame actors, watching for opportunities that may arise.



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Increase US-China Bilateral Opportunities

Before China ascends to peer status, the United States should pursue actionsto partner with the Chinese wherever mutual interests converge. Te Six-Partyalks on North Korea are an ongoing example of constructive collaboration

with the Chinese. Shaping the opinions of the fth generation of leaders andbeyond will be important as China passes critical growth milestones. China’smajor investments in Africa represent an opportunity for collaboration. Spaceprograms may represent another area where relations could be enhanced ordeepened. Dr. David Shambaugh recommends a “ rack II” approach, promoting unofficial contacts among nongovernmental actors aimed atadvancing diplomatic efforts to enhance the policy dialogue between

nations.48

He also advocates for a reorganized China effort in the executivebranch at the NSC and State Department to ensure China policy is notcontradictory with other efforts in the region.49

Provide More Options through Military Investment

China’s politicians are investing aggressively in disruptive technologies thathave the potential to give it an asymmetric advantage if left unmatched. Tespace and cyber domains will become vulnerabilities in the near term, given

recent demonstrations of an antisatellite (ASA ) and cyber-attack capability.Te United States needs to pursue leadership in developing directed-energy,nano, and robotic weapons and the countering technologies for our forces thatmay face them. Covert weapons programs should also be pursued to ensurethe United States maintains its military advantage. Tis strategy strengthensUS credibility with regional alliances and commitments and ensures decisionmakers are never option limited, should conict with China manifest itself.

America should increase its engagement with China and regional partnersand cultivate an understanding of China’s culture and history but shouldalways retain the capability to approach the relationship from a position ofstrength and leadership. Given that China’s current and follow-on generations of political leaders are established and that Chinese policy with regardto these investments is unlikely to change, the United States must match thedevelopmental timelines with acquiring the right weaponry.

Conclusions

China and its political leaders have been managing change at avoracious pace since Deng Xiaoping led the nation on its new course of



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economic growth and openness. Chinese leaders’ inclination to promoteeconomic liberalization while retaining authoritarian control does notseem sustainable in the years ahead when accounting for informationproliferation; a rising, expectant, middle class; and an increasing needfor resources. Perhaps the political leadership’s best acknowledgementof this can be found in the 17th CPC statements by President Hu. Heopenly embraces democracy with tractable plans to open up the government, targets the rule of law and corruption as areas for action, andcommits to focus on rural areas to halt the growing income disparity.Tis alone establishes direction for the Chinese government that canbe anticipated and for which the United States should plan.

US policy makers must weigh Chinese history, culture, and experiencebefore assessing its intent with regard to regional or global politics. TeUnited States has insufficient power to halt China’s rise, nor should itnecessarily seek to do so, but a comprehensive plan on how to pursue theUS-Sino relationship must be designed, resourced, and executed with theChina of 2030 in mind. Te current leaders , ever mindful of China’s history

with foreigners and a perspective aligned with Confucius and Sun zu,have dened their paths, and so we must now dene our own.

Notes

1. Hu Jintao, “Scientic Outlook Development” (lecture, Yale University, 24 April 2006). Hu’ sdenition is found in these quotes: “China will pursue a scientic outlook on development that makeseconomic and social development people-oriented, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable; We will

work to strike a proper balance between urban and rural development, development among regions,economic and social development, development of man and nature, and domestic development andopening wider to the outside world; It is also rooted in the cultural heritages of the Chinese nation.”

2. Arthur Waley, trans. and ed.,Te Analects of Confucius(New York: Vintage Books, 1989). Becauseof the teachings of Confucius, the population will generally defer to the authorities unless the legitimacyof the regime is called into question. o call this legitimacy into question requires rulers to show that theyare manifestly unjust or demonstrate that they cannot paternally lead the society. Should the government fail to lead justly or fail in its ability to lead its people, then the “Mandate of Heaven” is lost, andit becomes not only the right but the duty of every Confucian to oppose the incumbent administration.Te central government’s actions in these matters are in keeping with this cultural backdrop. Addressingissues of corruption and the environment are in keeping with just rule.

3. Ibid.4. Even in the midst of the current economic downturn, China’s GDP is still growing at an

impressive rate. Te International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections, updated in January 2009,

suggest that despite the global recession, China’ s economy will still grow by 6.7 percent in2009 and 8.0 percent in 2010. IMF, World Economic Outlook Update: An Update of the Key



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WEO Projections, 28 January 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/update/01/pdf/0109.pdf.

5. Te “Bad Century” is the roughly 100-year period between the colonial victories in theOpium Wars and the beginnings of the Communist Revolution in the 1940s. China still regardsthis period of subjugation to the rule of the rest of the world as a time of humiliation. Te contrastof this period with a prosperous “Harmonious Society” resonates within the Chinese people.

6. It is important to note that the Confucian “Mandate of Heaven” remains intact should agovernment survive a rebellion. Deng Xiaoping’s actions in this situation are consistent with thecultural underpinnings of the Chinese government.

7. Deng Xiaoping, “Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (speech, Sino-Japanese RelationsConference, Beijing, 30 June 1984).

8. Carlos Pascual, “What Should We Expect of the 17th Party Congress?” ranscript fromChanges in China’s Political Landscape: Te 17th Party Congress and Beyond Symposium, John L.Tornton China Center, 12–13 April 2007 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007), 6,

http://www.brookings.edu/events/2007/0412china.aspx.9. Ibid., 27, 35.10. Figure 1 indicates the numbers in each partition of the government and where the highest

level of national power was centered. Te “bull’s eye” indicates from where the leader ran the government with an arrow pointing to a dual-role chairmanship. In the case of Jiang, his presidency endedin 2002 but he remained chairman of the CMC until 2004.

11. Joseph Kahn, “Politburo Reshuffle is a Sign for China,”International Herald ribune Asia-Pacic , 22 October 2007.

12. In fact, three days after the close of the 17th CPC, press reports circulated suggesting JiangMianheng had been arrested. For details, see “CCP’s Highest Hierarchy Possesses ape of Jiang

Mianheng Leaking Secrets to Zhou Zhengyi,”BBC Monitoring Asia Pacic , 24 October 2007, http:// www.hkhkhk.com/engpro/messages/2346.html. Tese reports appear to have been exaggerated, and Jiang Mianheng remains a vice president of the Chinese National Academy of Sciences. Nonetheless,his non-selection to the Politburo Standing Committee, as some had believed likely, suggests that Hu

Jintao has sufficiently consolidated his grip on power that it can be said he is truly in charge of theChinese governmental apparatus.

13. Hu, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for NewVictories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All , Report to the Seventeenth NationalCongress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, 15 October 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm.

14. Ibid.15. Ibid.16. David Shambaugh, “Chinese Discourse about Democracy,” ranscript from Changes in

China’s Political Landscape , 177–83.17. Ibid. In each case, the Chinese conclusion is that the ruling body failed to take either direct

or indirect action to counter the threat, whether that meant expanding economic opportunity,allowing limited democratic voices to counter subversion, or holding tight control on securityservices and their policies toward the populace.

18. Ibid.19. Ibid., 183–84.20. Dr. Nancy Bernkopf ucker (professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University,

Washington, DC), interview by the author, 26 September 2007.21. Ibid.



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22. House, China’s Strategic Intentions and Goals: Hearings before the Committee on ArmedServices , 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2000, 13.

23. Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007(Washington,DC: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2007), 6.

24. Mike Chinoy, China Live: wo Decades in the Heart of the Dragon(Atlanta: urnerPublishing, 1997), 306.

25. John Pomfret, Chinese Lessons: Five Classmates and the Story of the New China(New York:Henry Holt Publishing, 2006), 128.

26. Hu, Hold High the Great Banner .27. Annual Report to Congress , 25.28. “W O: China Outpaces U.S. in Exports,” China Daily (Beijing), 16 April 2007, www

.chinadaily.com.cn/chinagate/doc/2007-04/16/content_851758.htm. While the China Dailypredicted China would pass Germany in 2008, the W O’s 2008 report strongly suggests thisdid not happen, as exports and imports in the EU grew at nearly the same pace as China’s. None

theless, the long-term trends still suggest China will pass Germany in the near future. W O,International rade Statistics 2008 (Geneva: W O, 2008).29. CIA, Te World Factbook , https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

rankorder/2174rank.html. [URL cited no longer operable; also updated gure in text]30. CRS, Is China a Treat to the U.S. Economy?(Washington, DC: CRS, 23 January 2007),

15. Tis prediction, however, is among the earliest crossing points the authors could nd. A survey of several other sources, including interviews with various brokerage houses and projectionsby the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, yielded a median projection of thecrossing point between the Chinese and US economies in the early 2020s. Regardless, it appearsChina’s economy will almost certainly pass the US economy within the next 20 years.

31. Ibid.

32. Dennis Wilder (senior director for East Asian Affairs, National Security Council, Te White House, Washington, DC), interview by the author, 25 September 2007.

33. Ibid.34. Jayshree Bajoria, “Unveiling China’s Political Future,”Council on Foreign Relations.org ,

updated 22 October 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/14477/deciding_chinas_political_future.html.

35. Pascual, “What Should We Expect of the 17th Party Congress?” 15–21.36. Ibid., 14.37. Tis attribute differs from the third and fourth generations, who are predominantly

technocrats.38. Ibid., 17. Hu Jintao was head of this organization during their membership.39. Ibid., 21.40. Hu, Hold High the Great Banner .41. Nancy B. ucker, ed., China Condential(West Sussex, NY: Columbia University Press,

2001), 225–26, 519.42. Ibid.43. Xinhua, “Hu Jintao, op CPC Leaders Meet the Press”China Daily , 22 October 2007,

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/22/content_6196354.htm.44. Ralph Sawyer,Te ao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China

(New York: Basic Books, 2007), 323–31, 354–55.45. Keith Bradsher, “China’s Economic Growth Slows in First Quarter,”New York imes , 16

April 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/business/global/16yuan.html?hpw. As thisarticle goes to press, recent estimates for second-quarter growth in China are hovering around



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7.9 percent. See Joe McDonald, “China’s Economic Growth Accelerates amid Stimulus,” JakartaPost , 19 August 2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/07/16/china039s-economic-growth-accelerates-amid-stimulus.html. Mr. McDonald reports for the Associated Press,Beijing office.

46. Christer Ljungwall,Perspectives on Economic Growth and Stability in China(Stockholm:Swedish Institute for International Affairs, 2009).

47. Statement is drawn from multiple interviews of a cross-section of China subject-matterexperts, including senior representatives from the political, military, diplomatic, academia, corporate, NGO, and think tank areas; Washington, DC, and Singapore City, Singapore; 20–27September 2007 and 6–7 October 2007.

48. David Shambaugh, “Facing Reality in China Policy,”Foreign Affairs80, no. 1 (Winter2001): 60–62.

49. Ibid., 63.
