Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Ganga Action Plan(GAP): TheChallenge of ‘Regulatory Quality’
Basu Roy, Sharanya
University College Cork, Ireland
25 April 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81148/
MPRA Paper No. 81148, posted 07 Sep 2017 01:56 UTC
Ganga Action Plan(GAP): The Challenge of ‘Regulatory Quality’
Sharanya Basu Roy1
Abstract: The largest river basin of India, the Ganges (locally referred as Ganga) is one of the most
important river systems in the world. It is home to almost one tenth of the world’s population. Billions of litres of sewage, industrial waste, thousands of animal and human corpses are also released into the
river every day. Consequently, the Ganga Action Plan (GAP) was launched in 1985 for pollution
abatement as a Federal and state sponsored scheme and till date, three phases have been
implemented. Even after establishing numerous institutional arrangements under the GAP and investing
billions of dollars there has been no major improvement in the Ganges river water quality, in fact it has
further deteriorated. Clearly governmental intervention through pollution control policies, specifically
regulation has failed miserably. Therefore, an attempt has been made to analyse empirically, the legal
and institutional framework of the GAP using the transdisciplinary method ‘economic analysis of law’. The results reveal that the chief underlying reason for ineffective GAP regulations is lack of a well-
defined legal basis
Introduction
The Ganges is the fourth largest river basin2 in the world and is home to half a billion people3 which is
projected to increase to over one billion by the year 20304. This river basin provides more than one-third
of India’s surface water and over forty per cent of the country’s GDP is generated in this region.
Ironically, this region is also home to more than 200 million people living below the poverty line5.
Apart from this river’s economic and social importance, river Ganges holds religious significance in India.
Regarded sacred by the Hindus, ritual bathing in the Ganges is an important aspect of this religion and
ashes of the cremated are often spread over the waters6.
Unfortunately, the Ganges is also amongst the world’s most polluted rivers. Nearly 1.3 billion litres of sewage per day, runoff from 6 million tons of fertilisers, 9000 tons of pesticides utilised in agriculture
within the river basin, 260 million litres of industrial and solid waste, including thousands of animal
carcasses and human corpses are released into the river every day. This eventually led to an erosion of
1 PhD candidate, School of Law, University College Cork (UCC), Ireland
I would like to thank my PhD supervisor Professor Owen McIntyre for his critical feedback on this paper and
without whose support this work would not have been possible 2 covering an area of 861,404 square kilometers 3 It supports 29 Tier-1 cities, 23 Tier- 23 cities and 48 towns in India (The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) classifies
centres (city/towns/ village) into 6 tiers based on population (as per 2011 census). Tier 1 corresponds to cities with
a population of 1, 00,000 and above. Centres with a population of 50,000 to 99,999 are classified as Tier 2
(https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/100MCA0711_5.pdf ) 4 A. Markandya and M.N Murty, ‘Cost–benefit analysis of cleaning the Ganges: some emerging environment and
development issues’ (2004) null Environment and Development Economics 61 5 World Bank, ‘The National Ganga River Basin Project’ (2015) < http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/03/23/india-the-national-ganga-river-basin-project> accessed
12 April 2016 6 Ibid 4
the river water quality. In fact, by the 1970s, over 600 kilometers of the river had deteriorated. As
Ganges water is used directly for drinking, religious bathing and other household purposes by people
living along the river, it also poses a considerable public health threat7.
Post-Independence Environmental quality
After India’s independence in 1947 the federal policies concentrated solely towards heavy industrialization and later in the 1960s the focus shifted to agricultural policies. But during this entire
period, the lack of policies and regulations for environmental quality encouraged ecologically
unfavourable industrial and agricultural practices.
It was in 1974, that the Water (Prevention and Control of pollution) Act 8 was introduced to set up
pollution control boards at the Federal and state level to prevent and control water pollution. It was
joined by the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act in 1981. Later in 1986, the comprehensive
Environment (Protection) Act was enacted9. This Act is an ‘umbrella’ legislation intended to provide framework for coordinating all the federal government activities under the previous environmental laws
such as, the Water and the Air Act.
As water is a state subject in India, ideally state legislative assemblies should adopt a legislative
framework for water management. But, despite national water policies being adopted on three different
occasions (the first one dating back to 1987) by the Ministry of Water Resources, it did not result in
water management legislative framework being adopted by the states. Instead, in practice the process
has remained entirely driven by the Executive10. Although this provides more flexibility in adapting to
new circumstances, it also bypasses the various safeguards that the ‘constitutionally established process
for the adoption of legislation provides’11.
In the 1980s the water quality deteriorated further with a policy shift towards promoting privatization.
This led to the Ministry of Environment and Forests’ (MoEF) establishment to assist the Department of
Environment (DOE)12. Despite MoEF’s efficient monitoring system, lack of enforcement capabilities at
7 Markandya and Murty (n 4) 62 8 in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 2528 of the Indian Constitution [ Article 252(1) gives the general power to the
States to make Laws for matters regarding which the Parliament has no power to make laws except as provided in
the Articles 249 and 250 which should be regulated in such states by Parliament by law. If resolutions are passed
by all the House of legislatures by those states, it would be lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that
matter accordingly. Any Act so passed would apply to any other states by which it is adopted afterwards by
resolution passed in that behalf by the House or the two Houses of that state] 9 Under Article 253 10 If parliamentarians belong to the majority in the Parliament, then the Legislature is usually controlled by the
Executive 11 Philippe Cullet, ‘Water regulation and public participation in the Indian context’ in Mara Tignino and Komlan Sangabana (eds), Public Participation and Water Resources Management- Where do we stand in International Law?
(Paris: UNESCO, 2015) 12 The Department of Environment was established in 1981 to evaluate the environmental aspects of development
projects, monitor air and water quality, promote environmental research and coordinate activities between the
federal, state and local governments. But the DOE was criticized for its small financial and political base. As a result
in 1985 the MoEF was established which had the same functions as the DOE. The DOE then served as an advisory
the Central (Federal) and state levels and ineffective coordination amongst Ministries at the planning
stage of the projects deterred satisfactory control of environmental pollution (Economic Survey of India,
1998-99)13.
Ganga Action Plan (GAP)
The GAP was formulated in 1985 on the basis of a survey conducted by the Central Pollution Control
Board (CPCB)14 for gauging the extent of Ganges water pollution. The objective of this massive river
program (an approximate investment of 300 million US dollars) was to control pollution in the Ganges
and its tributaries. GAP was introduced with the objective to restore the entire river water’s quality to ‘Class B’ or the ‘Bathing Class’15 (Table1 in appendix). For this purpose, the CPCB requires the industries
to treat wastewater before discharging into the river. But the corresponding effluent standards set up
by the CPCB has been adopted from the ISI (Indian Standards Institution, now known as Bureau of Indian
Standards) which are completely arbitrary as they were framed without any scientific rationale16.
GAP was launched in phases namely, Phase I, Phase II and Namami Gange (referred to as Phase III here).
The initial objective of this river action plan included establishing sewage treatment plants at major
urban centers, refurbishing existing sewage pumping and treatment stations and installing wastewater
sub-pumping stations. In 2009 when Ganges was declared as the ‘National River’, the GAP was
relaunched with the objective to implement a river basin approach instead17.
GAP Phase I
1.1 Legal Framework
The GAP’s implementation wing, CGA was set up under the DOE. It’s responsibilities included improving
the river water quality of the Ganga and its tributaries to acceptable standards through mobilizing
efforts of State Governments, local bodies, voluntary agencies and other organizations18.
body which had few enforcement powers ( S. Managi and P.R. Jena, ‘Environmental productivity and Kuznets curve in India’ (2008) 65(2) Ecological Economics 432 ) 13 G. Mythili and S. Mukherjee, ‘Examining Environmental Kuznets Curve for river effluents in India’ (2011) 13(3) Environment, Development and Sustainability 627 14 The CPCB is a statutory organization under the MoEF providing technical services under the Environment
(Protection) Act 1986. It was established in 1974 under the Water (Prevention and Control of pollution) Act. CPCB
has also been delegated with the functions and power under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981 15 V. Tare, B. Bose and S.K Gupta, ‘Suggestions for a Modified Approach Towards Implementation and Assessment of Ganga Action Plan and Other Similar River Action Plans in India’ (2003) 38(4) Water Quality Resource Journal Canada 607 16 For further details refers to: D.S Bhargava, ‘Why the Ganga (Ganges) Could Not be Cleaned’ (1992) 19(2) Environmental Conservation 170 17 River Basin Approach is an integrated water resources management approach. This concept involves promoting
changes in practices which are considered fundamental to improved management of the river water. For instance,
in the case of river Ganga, apart from managing industrial and sewage discharge, efforts would be made for
conservation of aquatic life and biodiversity, promoting tourism and shipping in the river basin, restoration and
conservation of wetlands etc. 18 The Gazette of India(16 February, 1985)
A few months later into GAP’s implementation, M.C Mehta, an activist advocate, social worker and a
renowned Supreme Court lawyer filed a petition19 against the public authorities responsible for the
GAP20. It claimed that despite the strides made in the legal code with respect to GAP, the government
authorities failed to take effective steps to prevent Ganges river pollution. The Court ordered the
Central (Federal) Government, Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPCB) and the District Magistrate,
Kanpur to restrain leather tanneries and Kanpur’s municipal corporation from dumping industrial and
domestic effluents in river Ganga. The Court bifurcated the petition into two parts. The first one dealt
with Kanpur tanneries and the second one with the Municipal Corporation. These are the most
significant water pollution litigation in the history of Indian environmental law. Eighty-nine respondents
were named in the petition; which apart from the seventy-five tanneries of the Jajmau district (Kanpur)
also included the Union of India, Chair of the CPCB, Chair of the UPCB and the ISI21.
This case was treated as a representative action by the Court. Therefore, when this petition came up for
preliminary hearing, notice was given to all the industrialists, municipal corporations and the town
municipal councils having jurisdiction over which the Ganga flows by publishing a summary of the
petition in the newspapers in circulation in Northern India. The defendants were also instructed to
appear before the Court and to explain the reasons for not issuing those directions as requested by the
petitioner and for allowing trade effluents and sewage into river Ganga without treating them
appropriately before discharging into the river. Following this, a large number of industrialists and local
bodies (Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika) filed counter-affidavits explaining steps taken by them for treating
the effluents/sewage before discharging into the river22.
The Supreme Court (SC) directed tanneries (thirty, in number) which failed to the minimum steps
required for primary treatment of industrial effluents to shut down as the pollution of river Ganges
outweighs the inconvenience that may be faced by the management and labour employed in these
polluting tanneries. The Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika (local government) was instructed to relocate the
dairies outside the cities, which released an enormous amount of waste into the river. Further, the local
bodies were also ordered to build sufficient amount of urinals to prevent people from defecating in the
open land near the river. In addition, the Central Government was instructed to introduce weekly
classes and sensitize children on the importance of the protection and improvement of the natural
environment across all educational institutions 23.
It is worth noticing that this case was filed under Article 32, in the absence of the CGA legislation. This
clearly points towards a weak legal basis of the GAP from the very beginning.
19 Filed a petition under Article 32.
Article 32(i) of the Indian Constitution allows an aggrieved person to move the Supreme Court for a legal remedy in
case of an alleged infringement of his fundamental rights. In such a scenario the Court protects his/her
fundamental rights with the aid ‘writs’. However, clause (4) mentions an exception. If the President proclaims an emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution the provision for guaranteed remedy of fundamental rights is
suspended 20 M.C. Mehta vs Union Of India & Ors [1988] AIR 1115 21 A.K Singhal, ‘Some Legal Cases on Ganga River Pollution’ (2012) 4(2) Researcher 61 22 Auburn University, The Enviro-Litigators: Environmental Law and Activism in India (2015) 23 M.C Mehta v Union of India (n 20 )
1.2 Institutional Structure
The CGA was under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and the Government of India was
represented by the Ministers of Finance, Planning and Urban Development, Water Resources and
Environment and Forests. The three states through which river Ganga flows were represented by their
respective Chief Minsters24. The CGA’s implementing agency was the Central Steering Committee which
had the Secretary of the MoEF as the Chairman and other secretaries of the relevant central ministries
as its members. The CGA’s executing agencies were the respective State Public Health Engineering
Departments who had many experiences of implementing similar schemes. Implementation of the
programs under the GAP included preparing city based schemes and conducting extensive review of
progress every five years25.
As water is a state property in India, the state is responsible for the protection of its water resources.
However, since the Ganges is an inter-state river the Central Government also has a concurrent
responsibility towards its maintenance. This resulted in a dispute between the states and the Centre
(Federal) regarding sharing of the GAP’s cost. Therefore, to ensure the state’s coordination in GAP Phase I’s implementation, the Central government decided to bear the entire implementation cost except the
maintenance cost26. GAP Phase I was launched with an estimated budget of 37 million US Dollars (at the
current exchange rate).
1.3 Outcomes/Difficulties
There was a clear lack of planning in the first phase of GAP. For instance, schemes were prepared
without an appropriate survey of the locations, including the routes along which the intercepting sewer
would be laid. In addition, an actual outflow of the estimated sewage was estimated incorrectly which
resulted in installing more sophisticated systems than required. This further resulted in implementation
delays and cost escalations. Also, the plan did not concentrate on treatment and resource recovery
system. For instance, there was no emphasis on maintenance and proper operation of the assets and
requirement of trained personnel for this purpose. In addition, maintenance required annual recurring
expenditure, but there were no provisions made for this in the annual budget27.
GAP Phase II
GAP Phase II was launched in stages between 1993 and 1996. Apart from including other cities and
towns along the Ganges (which were not included earlier in GAP I), pollution abatement programmes for
its tributaries (like Yamuna, Gomati and Damodar) which discharged directly into the river were also
integrated in the second phase of GAP. Later in 1995, under the National River Conservation Plan (NRCP)
river action plans for other major rivers (for instance, Godavri, Krishna, Mahanadi, Mandakini etc.) were
24 Before 1998, the state of Uttarakhand was merged with the state of Uttar Pradesh. In the year 2000, Jharkhand
was carved out of the state of Bihar. 25 Nilay Chaudhuri, ‘Cleaning of the river Ganga: Planning,Methodology and Progressive Implementation’ (Managing Water Resources for Large Cities and Towns - Report of Beijing Water Conference ,1996) 26 Ibid 399 27 Ibid 399
also launched. In 1996, GAP Phase II and NRCP were merged28 as a centrally sponsored single scheme.
Under the NRCP, the CGA was renamed as National River Conservation Authority (NRCA) which covered
all programs supported by the National River Conservation Directorate (NRCD)29 under the MoEF.
2.1 Legal Framework
Though GAP Phase II was launched after making modifications in GAP Phase I’s blueprint, it was unable
to improve the water quality of the Indian rivers. This is evidenced by the fact that in 1998, Gopeshwar
Nath Chaturvedi, a social activist filed a petition30 against the Government of India31, the State
Government of Uttar Pradesh and municipal bodies (local government) of Mathura and Vrindavan for
failing to clean up river Yamuna under GAP Phase II. It is an ongoing case, where he claimed that despite
the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam (local water body) investing millions of rupees (64 million USD at the
current exchange rates) in Mathura and Vrindavan32 it has failed to clean up the river. In fact, the
directions issued by the Supreme Court in the Mehta cases33 regarding setting up sewage treatment
plants by the local government were not followed out even after more than ten years. With regards to
this ongoing case the High Court of Allahabad instructed34 the MoEF to present a detailed account of
the implementation of the GAP and which departments are liable for its failure, as till then no
Department or Authority was able to validate it35.
This indicates that the GAP not only had a loose and vague legal framework (as even after GAP phase II’s implementation, Chaturvedi filed a case under Article 22636 in the absence of NRCA legislation ) but it
also lacked clarity about the roles of the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of GAP
and its institutional structure37.
2.2 Institutional Structure
The Chairman of GAP Phase II’s Steering Committee was the Secretary of the MoEF. Other members of
the Committee included the chief secretaries of the states through which river Ganga flows, secretaries
28 Ministry of Environment and Forests(MoEF), Regeneration and Development (2003) 29 NRCD is the implementing agency for Centrally sponsored schemes of NRCP and National Plan for Conservation
of Aquatic ecosystem(NPCA) 30 Gopeshwar Nath Chaturvedi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (No. 1644 of 1998) 31 under Article 32 32 Cities in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Mathura city has a lot of small scale saree (Indian traditional female
garment) dying units which discharge highly toxic untreated waste in the river. 33 M.C Mehta v Union of India (n 20 ) 34 Order dated 6 May 1998 35 Gopeshwar Nath Chaturvedi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [1998] WRIT 1644 36 Article 226 of the Indian Constitution allows an aggrieved person to move the High Court for a legal remedy in
case of an alleged infringement of his fundamental rights. In such a scenario the Court protects his/her
fundamental rights with the aid ‘writs’. The jurisdiction of the High Court when compared to the Supreme Court
with regards to writ petition is wider and provides greater constitutional rights. 37 Indian Institutes of Technology, SWOT Analysis of Ganga Action Plan (2011)
of the concerned Central (Federal) ministries, Chairman of CPCB, Directorate General Health services,
Directorate General Indian Council of Medical Research(ICMR) and other experts38.
At the state level, the state governments and its agencies were assigned with the responsibility to
prepare and execute projects related to the treatment of municipal wastes. The Urban Development
Department in the state of Uttar Pradesh was the nodal department for this purpose. Under it’s supervision, the other state government agencies were assigned with the preparation and execution of
individual schemes. An inter-departmental committee was formulated as well, convened by the
secretary of the inter-departmental committee39.
GAP Phase II’s monitoring mechanism included a multi-tier monitoring system. At the state level, it
included a monthly progress review by the implementing agency apart from regular monitoring by a
team of engineers. At the Federal (Central) level frequent site visits were conducted by the NRCD and
quarterly progress reviews were done by the Steering and the Monitoring Committees40.
Despite the GAP having an elaborate institutional structure, its leadership and staff lacked commitment
and vision towards cleaning river Ganges. Although monitoring and reviewing of the river action plan
were conducted regularly, the problems identified were never addressed and even if they were, the
decisions taken then were never enforced. Also, officials responsible for implementing the GAP at the
lowest tier were not kept well informed regarding the next course of action to be taken41.
2.3 Outcomes/Difficulties
GAP Phase II has been criticised for lack of planning and implementation. For instance, cities/towns
facing a shortage of electricity supply relied on increased supply of electricity for operating the sewage
treatment plants42. In addition, the selection of towns and cities were inconsistent as the funds were
allocated on the basis of imprecise estimate of sewage load43.
GAP Phase II also encountered administrative incompatibilities. As decision making powers were under
the district magistrates and commissioners and cleaning the sewers were under the jurisdiction of the
municipal authorities, it led to conflict of interest between the two. Further, the state governments
were reluctant to cooperate with other states or the Central government if they had different political
parties in power44. Despite multiple agencies being entangled with GAP, there was no single
38 Rakesh K Jaiswal, ‘Ganga Action Plan: A critical analysis’ (2007) < http://www.ecofriends.org/main/eganga/images/Critical%20analysis%20of%20GAP.pdf> accessed 13 February
2016 39 Ibid 5 40 Ibid 6 41 Ibid 4 42 Venkatesh Upadhyay, ‘Ganga at Varanasi: Lessons from Environmental Abuse’ (2009) 44(37) Economic and Political Weekly 64 43 Priyam Das and Kenneth R. Tamminga, ‘The Ganges and the GAP: An Assessment of Efforts to Clean a Sacred River’ (2012) 4(8) Sustainability 1647 44 Ibid 65
coordinating body with corresponding powers to give directions45. Another major shortcoming was that
the local government institutions were not consulted during the GAP’s formulation, to assess their
readiness for taking upon the responsibilities in a timely fashion. As a result, due to lack of necessary
human resources and on-site knowledge and training the local governments were unable to ensure
efficient implementation and monitoring46.
Although GAP on paper professed to be a ‘people’s program’, participation was supported mainly for
political expediency misusing the religious sentiments of the Hindus. ‘People’s participation’ was only
limited to infrequent ‘ghat47’ clean ups. Though the local governments/ Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGO’s) were expected to promote public participation but they did not receive any
financial support from the government for the same48.
Namami Gange/Phase III
The Mission Clean Ganga was an initiative launched by the National Ganga River Basin Authority
(NGRBA)49 from 2009 to 2014. With the change of party in the Central (Federal) Government in 2014,
‘Namami Gange’, an integrated conservation mission replaced Mission Clean Ganga. It is launched with
a changed approach for wastewater management, solid waste management, industrial pollution and
river front development.
3.1 Legal Framework
The NGRBA was constituted50 in 2009. Apart from this, the MoEF and the CPCB/ State Pollution Control
Boards (SPCBs) have also been entrusted with the responsibility to administer the legislation under the
Environment Act51.
The jurisdiction of the authority was extended to states through which River Ganga and its tributaries
flow. In addition, the State Governments of Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar, Jharkhand and West
Bengal (WB) were also authorized to constitute a State Ganga River Conservation Authority (SGRCA)
45 Praveen Singh, ‘Bridging the Ganga Action Plan: Monitoring failure at Kanpur’ (2006) 41(7) Economic and Political Weekly 590 46 Das and Tamminga (n 43) 1648 47 River front steps leading to the banks of river Ganges 48 Das and Tamminga (n 43) 1666 49 The NGRBA started the Mission Clean Ganga when it was established in 2009 as a nodal agency for the Ministry
of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation (when the Central Government changed in 2014,
the GAP’s responsibility was transferred from the MoEF to the Ministry of Water). The NGRBA’s functions included inter-sector coordination for planning under the GAP and effective abatement of pollution of the river Ganges. 50 In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3(1) of the Environment (Protection) Act 198650 to the Central
(Federal) Government. Section 3(1) of the Environment (Protection) Act 1986 bestows the Central(Federal)
Government with the power to take all necessary measures for the purpose of protecting and improving the
environmental quality and preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution. 51 National Ganga River Basin Authority Ministry of Environment and Forests(MoEF), Volume II Environmental and
Social Management Framework (ESMF) (2010)
under the Chairmanship of the Chief Ministers. Consequently, the Central Government (Federal)52 set up
the SGRCAs53.
As in several other countries, India’s constitutional articles on environment were adopted in response to
commitments entered into international conferences/conventions. The first provision for environment
in law was made through the Forty-Second Amendment to the Indian Constitution. This Amendment
was passed in 1976, in response to the Stockholm Declaration adopted by the International Conference
on Human Environment in 197254.
The Environment (Protection) Act 1986
The Environment (Protection) Act 1986 was formulated55 to lay down a general legislative framework for
environmental protection and to account for the uncovered gaps in areas of major environmental
hazards. It provides an umbrella legislative measure with a single focus towards protection of the
environment56. Objects of legislation includes co-ordination of the activities of the regulatory agencies
for the purpose of environmental protection, creation of authorities with adequate powers, regulation
of handling hazardous substances and discharge of environmental pollutants, provision for deterrent
punishments and accidents threatening the environment. This Act clearly extends to control water
pollution as section 2(a) defines the environment as including water and interrelationships existing
between water and human beings, plants, animals and other living beings57.
This Act provides concentration of power in the hands of the Central Government58,59. For instance,
issuing direct written orders, including orders to shut down or regulate any industry, operation or
process or stop the supply of water, electricity or other services. These powers might be exercised by
the Central Government or through its agencies and occasionally in its promotion towards development
52 In exercise of the powers conferred by 3(3) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. Section 3(3) of the
Environment (Protection) Act 1986 provides the Central(Federal) Government to constitute an
authority/authorities by such name/names as specified in the order (as published in the Official Gazette) for the
purpose of this Act. 53 The Uttarakhand State Ganga River Conservation Authority was constituted on 14th May 2010. The Uttar Pradesh
State Ganga River Conservation Authority was established on 30th September 2009. On 8th February, 2010 the
Bihar State Ganga River Conservation Authority was set up. In the state of Jharkhand and West Bengal, their
respective Ganga River Conservation Authorities were set up on 30th September 2009. 54 Kelly D. Alley, ‘Legal Activism and Pollution Prevention’ [2009] Georgetown International Environmental Law
Review 1 55 Under provisions of Article 253 in the Constitution. This article provides power to the Parliament to make any
law for the whole or any part of India for implementing any agreement, treaty or conventions with other
country/countries or any decision made at any international conferences/seminars, association or body. 56 S.R Wate,’An Overview of Policies Impacting Water Quality and Governance in India’ (2012) 28(2) International Journal of Water Resources Development 265 57 Kumar Abhijeet, ‘Governing water pollution effectively: A comparative study of Legal frameworks and their implementation in India and Sweden’ (Master’s Degree, Royal Institute of Technology(KTH) Sweden, 2013) 58 Section 3(1) of the Environment Protection Act states explicitly, ‘take all such measures as it deems necessary or
expedient for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of the environment and preventing, controlling
and abating environmental pollution’ 59 Shodhganga, ‘Environmental Protection and Ecological Development- Constitutional Imperatives and Legislative
Frameworks’ (2011)
this power also might be exploited by overlooking critical environmental considerations when approving
projects60.
Though the rule-making powers under this Act are exhaustive and they might reach wide and varied
dimensions61 but it has not been invoked even in the most deserving cases. It has turned out to be at
best a paper meant to alleviate the feeling of the environmental hazards62.
3.2 Institutional Structure
The NGRBA chaired by the Prime Minister, is the governing body of Namami Gange. Its members
comprise of Government of India ministers and Chief Ministers of the five basin states (Uttarakhand, UP,
Jharkhand, Bihar and WB). Its implementation wing is the National Mission for Clean Ganga (NMCG)63,
chaired by the Minister, MoEF64.The NGRBA has five wings for efficient discharge of its duties, namely,
Information and Communication wing, Environmental Monitoring and Impact Assessment wing,
Investigation wing, Research and Development Wing and the Policy, Planning and Advocacy Wing65.
At the state level, the SGRCAs are responsible for program implementation through its implementation
wing, State Program Management Group (SPMG)66. At the national level, the Program Management
Group (PMG) is responsible for ensuring effective implementation of the overall NGRBA program67
Unlike GAP Phase I and II in the third phase, provision has been made for post-implementation
management of the assets created. This includes submitting a Detailed Project Report (DPR) containing a
plan for operation and maintenance of assets created under the NGRBA program68.
One of the important functions of the NGRBA includes preparing and implementing the Ganga River
Basin Environment Management Plan (GRBEMP). In 2010, the responsibility for preparing the GRBEMP
was given to the consortium of the seven Indian Institute of Technology69 (IIT’s) by the MoEF. This Plan
identified seven important missions for a focused intervention as follows: Mission Aviral Dhara
(Continuous flow), Mission Nirmal Dhara (Unpolluted flow), Mission Ecological Restoration, Mission
60 Peggy Rodgers Kalas, ‘Environmental Justice in India’ (2000) 97(1) Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the
Law 97 61 It allows the Central Government to make rules in respect of all or any of the matters referred to in Section 3 of
this Act, which also includes specific matters. For instance, maximum allowable concentration limits of various
environmental pollutants, prohibition and restrictions on handling of hazardous substances and restrictions with
respect to location of industries (n 59 ) 62 Philippe Cullet, Suhas Paranjape et al.’ Water Conflicts in India: Towards a New Legal and Institutional
Framework’ (Forum for Policy Dialogue on Water Conflicts in India, Pune 2012) 63 a registered society under the Societies Registration Act 1860 64 National Mission for Clean Ganga website http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/nmcg-ad-05062014.pdf
accessed 8th March 2016 65 Indian Institute of Technology, ‘Implementation of Ganga River Basin Management Plan: Recommendations on Legal and Institutional Aspects’ (2013) 66 The state of Jharkhand does not have an implementation wing as a relatively small stretch of Ganga passes
through this state. Instead it is provided with a dedicated cell within the Urban Development Department. 67 Ministry of Environment and Forests(MoEF), ‘NGRBA Programme Framework’ (2011) 68 Ibid 10 69 IIT Bombay, Delhi, Guwahati, Kanpur, Kharagpur, Madras and Roorkee
Geological safeguarding, Mission Disaster Management, Mission Sustainable agriculture and Mission
Environmental Knowledge Building and sensitization. Based on these findings, action plans are being
formulated under NRGB to counter harmful anthropogenic activities and promote helpful activities70.
Though multiple institutions/agencies were set up for cleaning the Ganges, but overlapping and
conflicting jurisdictions of government agencies could be traced to the underlying cause of institutional
failure of the Mission Clean Ganga. This led to many disputes regarding decision-making and
implementation of GAP, as discussed later71.
4. Literature Review
Government intervention is necessary in the resolution of pollution problems. Lack of government
restraints in terms of pollution, permits individuals and firms to pollute as much as they want, because
market imperfections allows them to not internalise the cost imposed upon others through their
polluting activities72. To correct for these market imperfections, the government can intervene only
through its agencies namely the executive, administrative, legislative and judicial bodies73. Therefore,
one of its major tools to control pollution includes the regulatory mechanism.
In the global context there exists quite a number of case studies74 which tries to examine the effect of
formal regulatory quality on river pollution.
70 Consortium of seven Indian Institute of Technology’s(IIT’s),’Ganga River Basin Environment Management Plan’(2013) 71 Indian Institute of Technology, ‘Implementation of Ganga River Basin Management Plan: Recommendations on Legal and Institutional Aspects’ (2013) 72 Market imperfections in pollution usually result when pollution imposes a negative externality, which further
leads to market failure. Negative externality occurs when a product or decision of an individual or group of
individuals imposes a cost on another group of individuals or the society, as a whole. For instance, if an individual
buys an energy inefficient car he would use it as much as he wants without internalising the costs imposed by him
on the society through pollution (increased health expenditure). In such cases, the government intervenes ( by
levying fines on that individual, imposing automobile or energy taxes) to prevent market failure. 73 James E. Krier, ‘The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A conceptual Overview’ [1970-71] 18 UCLA L. Rev.
429 74 Case studies on China includes: Wang Xi and Xu Zhengxian, ‘Legal Control of Water Pollution in Huai River Valley,
China: A Case Study’ (Conference Paper for Sixth International Conference on Environmental Compliance and enforcement, San Jose, Costa Rica, April 2002)< http://www.inece.org/conf/proceedings2/25-Legal%20Control.pdf
> date accessed on 17 June 2016 ; Yao Qi and Xin Zhou, ‘Water Pollution Control in China: Review Of Laws,
Regulations And Policies And Their Implementation’ (2009) 4 Institute for Global Environmental Strategies(IGES) <
http://pub.iges.or.jp/modules/envirolib/upload/2775/attach/policy%20review_water%20pollution%20control_chi
na.pdf > accessed on 17 June 2016.
A comparative case study of the regulatory framework of the water sector between UK and China can be found in:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), ‘OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform in China’ (ISBN 978-92-64-05939-9, 2009)
Case study on US which examines water pollution and its control from the twentieth century: Jouni Paavola,
‘Interstate Water Pollution Problems and Elusive Federal Water Pollution Policy in the United States, 1900-1948’ (2006) 12(4) Environment and History 435
In the Indian context, very few studies have been conducted to comprehend the influence of regulatory
quality on river pollution. One of the papers conducted an econometric analysis to identify the effect of
informal regulation of pollution on ten important Indian rivers using poll percentage as a proxy for
informal regulation (informal pressure on industrial firms). The results revealed that informal regulation
has a significant favourable effect on water pollution in India75.
Another study assessed India’s environmental regulations using a difference-in-differences approach76.
A city level dataset for air pollution, water pollution, environmental regulations and infant mortality was
constructed for a systematic evaluation of the environmental regulations. The study demonstrates that
air pollution regulations in India are more effective than water pollution regulations. Substantial decline
in air pollution are a result of higher demand for air quality which ensures effective enforcement of air
pollution regulations. This further establishes that strong public support permits environmental
regulations to succeed in weak institutional settings77.
Further, one of the papers analyses the impact of a particular piece of judicially mandated
environmental legislation in the city of Kanpur, situated on the banks of the river Ganga (or Ganges)
using a reduced form model. The legislative piece evaluated in this study was an order of India’s Supreme Court (SC) from 1987 which instructed the Kanpur tanneries to treat sewage before
discharging into the rivers. The results obtained demonstrate that the SC order issued has been effective
in reducing the Ganges water pollution substantially along with a decline in infant neo natal mortality78.
One of the studies also attempted to analyse theoretically the prevailing legal and institutional measures
that affect the state of Indian rivers. Some of the relevant Acts and their relevant provisions evaluated
includes the Interstate River Water Disputes Act 1956, River Boards Act 1956 and State Irrigation and
Drainage Acts. This study concludes that the regulatory and institutional framework is inadequate for
resolution of water conflicts for interstate rivers79.
Comparative analysis of water pollution and its regulatory quality in Japan, United States, United Kingdom,
Netherlands, France and Sweden: Jean-Phillippe Barde, Gardner M. Brown Jr. and Pierre Frédéric Teniere Buchot,
‘Water Pollution Control Policies Are Getting Results’ (1979) 8(4) Ambio 152 75 Biswanath Goldar and Nandini Banerjee, ‘Impact of informal regulation of pollution on water quality in rivers in
India’ (2004) 73(2) Journal of Environmental Management 117 76 Difference-in- differences is a statistical technique used in Econometrics and quantitative research in the social
sciences that attempts to mimic an experimental research design using observational study data. 77 Michael Greenstone and Rema Hanna, ‘Environmental Regulations, Air and Water Pollution, and Infant Mortality
in India’ (2011) 17210 The National Bureau of Economic Research(NBER) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17210.pdf > accessed on 13 June 2016 78 Quy-Toan Do, Shareen Joshi and Samuel Stolper, ‘Environmental Policy, River Pollution, and Infant Health:
Evidence from Mehta vs. Union of India’ (2016) International Growth Centre(IGC) < http://www.theigc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Joshi-et-al-2016-Working-paper.pdf > accessed on 13 June 2016 79 Himanshu Thakkar, ‘Rivers: Legal and Institutional Issues in India’ [2012] South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers
and People < http://sandrp.in/rivers/Rivers_Legal_and_Institutional_Issues_in_India.pdf > accessed on 13 June
2016
A few studies have also evaluated the formal regulatory quality of the GAP theoretically, criticising it on
the following grounds:
1. Failure of implementation, monitoring and lack of planning80
2. Lack of support from the Government81
3. Exploiting the religious sentiments of the Hindus82
Though a lot of papers have tried to analyse empirically the formal regulatory quality of India for
river pollution, none of them have attempted to do so specifically for the Ganga Action Plan (GAP).
Moreover, it should be noted that the few existing previous studies on GAP take a theoretical or
qualitative approach and there exists virtually no study which attempts to analyse the formal
regulatory quality of the GAP using an empirical or quantitative approach. In this context, this study
extends the literature in this direction by analysing the formal regulatory quality of the GAP using an
econometric approach.
5. Methodology and data description
The methodology adopted in this study includes doctrinal legal research83 and economic analysis of law.
The latter would comprise using quantitative or econometric methods to analyse the regulatory quality
of the GAP. The models employed in this study are ad hoc models where the variables have been
selected after a thorough review of the existing literature. The concept of regulatory quality (RQ), rule of
law (RL) and government effectiveness (GE) is based on the annual Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) report developed by the World Bank since 1996 for over 200 countries. Though the WGI is a
composite governance indicator which reports on six broad measures of governance including RQ, RL
and GE, for the purpose of this study only the environmental governance component of the measures
has been developed84.
5.1 Theoretical model
Economic Analysis of Law (EAL)
The ‘marrying’ of Law and Economics is not new, it dates back to the early 1960s when Ronald Coase’s article on social cost85 and Guido Calabresi’s article on torts86 was published. Though economic methods
in legal analysis were used well before the 1960’s, but the earlier applications of EAL were limited to the
80 Praveen Singh (n 45 ) ; Priyam Das and Kennith R. Tamminga (n 43 ); Ashok Das and Priyam Das, ‘Institutional Change for Environmental Challenges: Lessons from gaps in the GAP’ in K.R.Gupta (Ed), Encyclopedia of
Environment (Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2005); Upadhyay (n 42 ) 81 Upadhyay (n 42 ) 82 Ibid 66 and Das and Tamminga (n 43) 83 For a detailed study refer to: Richard A. Posner, ‘The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship’ (1981) 90 The Yale Law Journal 1113; Ashish Kumar Singhal and Ikramuddin Malik, ‘Doctrinal and socio-legal methods of research:
merits and demerits’ (2012) 2(7) Educational Research Journal < http://resjournals.com/journals/educational-
research-journal/EDU%202012/EDU%202012%20JULY/Singhal%20and%20Malik.pdf> accessed on 1 February 2016 84 Worldwide Governance Indicators(WGI), World Bank 85 R.H. Coase, ‘The problem of social cost’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and Economics 1 86 Guido Calabresi, ‘Some Thoughts on Risk distribution and the Law of Torts’ (1961) 70(4) The Yale Law Journal 499
areas of law where economics was centrally important in understanding the concepts (competition law,
common law, public utilities). It was in 1960’s that Coase87 and Calabresi88 made the initial attempts to
employ economic analysis in areas of Law where Economics had never been utilised to acquire
quantitative and qualitative insights into the operation of the legal system. Since then this methodology
has been extended and applied to virtually all fields of Law, including family law, environmental law,
legal procedure, human rights, conflict of laws, judicial behavior and so on89. EAL contributes to legal
analysis by emphasising the unintended or undesirable consequences of the existing or proposed laws90.
It is quite well established from the EAL literature that quantitative study of the legal system can be
fruitful91.
Within EAL, there are two approaches, normative and positive analysis. This research would concentrate
on the latter. Positive analysis employs mathematical models and empirical tools to postulate the
existing relationship between various variables along with explanations and predictions of the effect of
changes in the variable on others. This aids in determining the effect of legal rules on the various
phenomena that the law is required to deal with. For instance, positive economic analysis of law can
deal with and quantify how crime is influenced by different methods of punishments, enforcement
efforts, effect of alternative liability rules on the rate of accidents etc.92
Although economic analysis when applied to Environmental Law has its limitations but it also offers a
robust theoretical framework for systemizing questions of the concerned Law and policy93.
5.2 Analytical Method
Econometric methods, particularly regression has been used to analyse the formal regulatory quality of
the GAP. Econometrics is a branch of Economics which facilitates sifting through complex data to
identify and extract simple relationships. Conducting a quantitative analysis, sheds light on issues that
either cannot be or usually are not answered by qualitative methods and in addition, permits re-
87 Coase (n 85) 88 Calabresi (n 86 ) 89 John E. Velntzas, Kyriaki K. Savvidou and Georgia K. Broni, ‘Economic Analysis of Environmental Law: Pollutions Control and Nuisance Law’ ( International Conference on Applied Economics, 2009) <
http://kastoria.teikoz.gr/icoae2/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/articles/2011/10/066-2009.pdf > accessed on 26
June 2016 90 Richard A. Posner, ‘Values and Consequences: An introduction to Economic Analysis of Law’ (2000) John M.Olin Law and Economics Working paper Number 53 2D < http://www.law.uchicago.edu/publications> accessed 30th
December 2015 91 Richard A. Posner, ‘The Economic Approach to Law’ (1974-1975) 53 Tex. L. Rev. 757 92 Eli Salzberger, ‘The Economic Analysis of Law - The Dominant Methodology for Legal Research?!’ (University of Haifa Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1044382, 2007) <
http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/he/Journals/din_udvarim/pabN/d/%D7%A2%D7%9C%D7%99%20%D7%96%D7%9C%D7
%A6%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%92%D7%A8%20-%20The%20Economic%20Analysis%20of%20Law%20-
%20The%20Dominant%20Methodology%20fo.pdf > accessed on 28 June 2016
93 James Krier and Richard B. Stewart, ‘Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental Law: The Example of Common Law Rules’ (1980) 1 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 13
examination of the questions addressed earlier by qualitative methods. In short, quantitative analysis
proposes a valuable addition to qualitative techniques in assessing environmental regulations94.
This study involves analyzing the regulatory quality of GAP at the level of Indian states with the aid of
two Econometric models, as discussed below. Both the models have been estimated using panel model
analysis over the time period, 2006 to 2014 for the four Indian states namely, Uttarakhand, UP, Bihar
and WB through which the Ganges flows.
5.3 First Model
Model Description
The first model of this study tries to determine the impact of regulatory quality, rule of law and
government effectiveness of the GAP on Ganges river pollution. In this model at time ‘t’ and in state ‘i’, Ganges water pollution (waterpoll) is expressed as a function of regulatory quality (RQ), government
effectiveness (GE), rule of law (RL), per capita Net State Domestic Product (PCNSDP),
industrialisation(Indst) and population(Pop). The model is expressed as follows: 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡= β0+β1RQ𝑖𝑡+β2GE𝑖𝑡+β3RL𝑖𝑡+β4PCNSDP𝑖𝑡+β5Indst𝑖𝑡+β6Pop𝑖𝑡+u𝑖𝑡
where u is the error term
The aim of the model formulated is to establish a correlation between the concept of ‘regulatory quality’ and the results in terms of pollution abatement. The coefficients of the β′s helps quantify the exact
relationship between the dependent variable (waterpoll) and the independent variables (RQ, GE, RL,
PCNSDP, Indst, Pop)
Variable Description
’Regulation’ has been defined as statutory law by Cento Veljanovski95. Regulatory quality (RQ) on the
other hand, is defined by the World Bank as the ability of the government to formulate and implement
effective policies and regulations for the protection of the environment96. Therefore, for the purpose of
this study RQ is defined as the ability of the government (State/Central) to formulate and implement
effective environmental statutory law for GAP. RQ is included in the model as most of the studies
analysing the GAP theoretically, have concluded that failure of implementation is a major cause of
concern97,98. Similarly, studies on China where water pollution is a rising concern have also indicated that
despite the existence of a comprehensive system of environmental law, lack of implementation is an
underlying reason for the inefficient regulatory quality99. To capture RQ for the GAP, stringency of
94 Ronald B. Mitchell, ‘A Quantitative Approach to Evaluating International Environmental Regimes’ in Arild Underal and Oran R. Young(eds.), Regime Consequences: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies (Springer
2004) 95 Cento Veljanovski, ‘The Economics of Law’ [2006] Institute of Economics Affair Hobart Paper No. 157 96 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), World Bank 97 Singh (n 45 ) 98 Das and Tamminga (n 43 ) 99 Qi and Zhou (n 74 )
environmental statutory law was initially considered as a proxy100. But later due to data limitations,
number of Civil or Criminal judgements for environmental cases resolved per year (CivC+CrimC) by the
Supreme Court of India and the National Green Tribunal (NGT) has been taken as a proxy.
Government Effectiveness (GE) gauges the credibility of the government’s commitment to
environmental policies. More often than not, the mere existence of institutional solutions does not
always translate to desirable environmental outcomes especially in the presence of lack of institutional
capacity101. To capture GE, the financial capacity of the institutions functioning under the GAP is
considered. To be precise, investment in effluent treatment plants per year (IETP) under the GAP is
chosen as a proxy.
Rule of Law (RL) measures the quality of environmental policing. Along with the existence of a
comprehensive environmental law framework, continuous supervision and severe punishment and
prosecution is required for an effective water management framework102. In the case of the GAP,
initially the number of inspectors and the level of fine levied on industries were considered as a proxy
for the RL variable. But later, due to data unavailability, the number of trainings conducted every year
for inspectors at the state level for maintaining the Ganges water quality (No.T) under the Ganga Action
Plan (GAP) is taken as a proxy for RL.
Industrialisation (Indst) is measured as the proportion of the absolute size of the manufacturing sector
(registered and unregistered sectors) to Net State Domestic Product (NSDP).
Population (Pop) is measured by the number of people living in a state during a given period of time.
Population data was inconsistent, as census in India is conducted decennially therefore, the dataset was
extrapolated from the projected population of the Indian states.
Per capita Net State Domestic Product (PCNSDP) has been used to capture the volume of economic
activity of the states. NSDP is the measure of all the goods and services produced within the boundaries
of the state during a given period of time. Therefore, PCNSDP is the ratio of NSDP at constant prices for
the base year 2004-05 to the corresponding population of the state.
The dependent variable (DV) in this model, Ganges water pollution (waterpoll) is gauged by Biochemical
Oxygen Demand (BOD). The BOD refers to the amount of oxygen that would be consumed if all the
organics in one litre of river water were oxidized by bacteria and protozoa. Microorganisms such as
bacteria are responsible for decomposing organic waste. When organic matter such as dead plants,
leaves, manure, sewage, etc. is present in a water supply the bacteria begins the process of breaking
down this waste. When this happens, much of the available dissolved oxygen in the water is consumed
by aerobic bacteria, robbing other aquatic organisms of the oxygen they need to survive. BOD is a
100 At times due to data unavailability, proxy variables are considered. A proxy or proxy variable is a variable that in
itself is not important in the model but serves in place of the variable for which data is not available or is
immeasurable. In order for a variable to be a good proxy, it must be closely related with the variable of interest by
some theory or logic. 101 Jouni Paavola (n 74 ) 102 Wang Xi and Xu Zhengxian (n 74 )
measure of the oxygen used by microorganisms to decompose this waste. Therefore, a higher BOD is
indicative of higher water/ river pollution (For the data sources of the variables, refer to Table 2 in the
Appendix)
Therefore, the estimating equation for the first model after including the proxies can be expressed as
follows, where log has been taken for IETP, PCNSDP and Pop: 𝐵𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡= β0+β1(CivC + CrimC)𝑖𝑡+β2𝑙𝑛IETP𝑖𝑡+β3No. T𝑖𝑡+β4𝑙𝑛PCNSDP𝑖𝑡+β5Indst𝑖𝑡+β6𝑙𝑛Pop𝑖𝑡+u𝑖𝑡
where u is the error term
5.4 Second Model
Model Description
The second model is formulated to comprehend the impact of the GAP’s regulatory quality on the
decision making of the institutions/public. In this model, regulatory quality (RQ) is taken as the
dependant variable (DV). The independent variables (IVs) include environmental expenditure by the
local government (LGEE), water pollution of the Ganges (waterpoll), number of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGO’s) (NNGO) and Population (Pop). The model is expressed as follows: 𝑅𝑄𝑖𝑡= β0+β1LGEE𝑖𝑡+β2waterpoll𝑖𝑡+β3NNGO𝑖𝑡+β4Pop𝑖𝑡 + u𝑖𝑡
where u is the error term
Variable description
The dependent variable (DV), regulatory quality (RQ) in the second model has been defined the same as
in the first model and therefore its proxy is the same as in the previous model. Among the independent
variables (IVs), the proxy for Ganges water pollution (waterpoll) is also the same as in the previous
model. Population (Pop) has also been considered in this model as an IV.
Local environmental expenditure is a key aspect of a state’s environmental policy, regulatory framework
and institutional framework, as development and implementation of most policies require public
expenditures of some kind. Increased local environmental expenditure contributes to better
environmental management at the state level along with supplementing other policy tools, such as
legislation and regulation103. Therefore, local government environmental expenditure (LGEE) has been
included in this model. The investment made by the states under the NRCP for GAP has been considered
as a proxy for this variable.
Another IV considered is the number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO). NGO’s or civil society organisations recently have started playing an important role in environmental management especially
in the developing world in the following ways: (1) through conducting public awareness programs as the
103 The World Bank, ‘Public Environmental Expenditure Reviews (PEERS) Experience and Emerging Practice’ (7,
2003)
public is more likely to believe the NGOs than the government (2) most participants in these
organisations tend to be highly committed to protecting the environment (3) the activism of these
organisations helps improve the regulatory quality (4) apart from these organisations generally lacking a
larger political agenda towards protecting the environment, they also take on responsibilities which
would otherwise need to be undertaken by the over-strained and under-funded environmental
protection agencies104. For this study, the number of NGO’s working at the state level has been included
(For the data sources of the variables, refer to Table 2 in the Appendix).
Therefore, the estimating equation for the second model (including the proxies) is as follows, where log
has been taken for Pop, LGEE and NNGO: (𝐶𝑖𝑣𝐶 + 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝐶)𝑖𝑡= β0+β1𝑙𝑛NNGO𝑖𝑡+β2BOD𝑖𝑡+β3𝑙𝑛LGEE𝑖𝑡+β4𝑙𝑛Pop𝑖𝑡 + u𝑖𝑡
where u is the error term
6.Results and Discussions
6.1 Model 1 results
Originally the equation is examined to determine whether Random Effects Model (REM) or Fixed Effects
Model (FEM) should be used by conducting the Hausman Test. The test ruled in favour of using REM
model. But in the REM estimation results, first order autocorrelation was detected and therefore those
results have not been used to draw inferences. Instead, the model is re-estimated using the Feasible
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) Method to correct for autocorrelation. FGLS method allows estimation
in the presence of first order autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity or cross-sectional correlation across
panels105.
The REM and FGLS results for the first model are as follows:
Panel Model Estimation Results (Model 1, 2006-2014)
Independent Variables (IVs) REM (Model 1) FGLS Model (Model 1) CivC + CrimC𝑖𝑡 -0.103 -0.10 No. T𝑖𝑡 0.00 0.00 𝑙𝑛IETP𝑖𝑡 0.157 0.15 𝑙𝑛PCNSDP𝑖𝑡 -0.018 -0.01 𝑙𝑛Pop𝑖𝑡 0.772*** 0.77*** Indst𝑖𝑡 16.871*** 16.871***
Hausman Test H0 : REM preferred
P-value = 0.5775
Multicollinearity Test
104 Jonathan Schwartz, ‘Environmental NGO’s in China: Roles and Limits’ (2004) 77(1) Pacific Affairs 28 105 Sayantan Ghosh Dastidar, ‘Essays on Public Education Expenditure, Trade Openness and Economic Growth of
India’ (Doctor of Philosophy, University of Dundee, 2015)
Mean VIF = 2.18
Ramsey RESET Test H0 : Model has no omitted variables
P-value = 0.6889
Breusch Pagan Test H0 : Constant Variance
P-value = 0.260
Woolridge Test for autocorrelation H0 : No first order autocorrelation
P-value = 0.0975
Note: Dependent Variable is BOD𝑖𝑡 . Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are used for REM. According to VIF
estimate our model does not suffer from multicollinearity problem as the value of the mean VIF is less than 10.
***, ** , * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.
The results indicate that population affects BOD significantly and there exists a positive relationship
between the two. This implies that growth in population leads to an increase in Ganges water pollution.
In this study, the model predicted that a one percent increase in population would lead to 0.008 per
cent increase in the Ganga water pollution levels. Some other studies also attempted to estimate the
relationship between population growth and pollution levels using mathematical models106 or
theoretically107 and concluded the same. The growing population in India contributes towards a rise in
the demand of per capita availability of water (domestic water usage), consequently leading to an
increase in the per capita wastewater generation. In such a scenario, current and future fresh water
demand could be met if efficient wastewater management system exists. But in major cities of India
although an estimated 38,254 milllion litres of sewage (MLD) is generated per year from domestic
usages, the sewage treatment capacity is only 11,786 MLD thereby leaving gap of more than 20,000
MLD in sewage treatment capacity. In fact, even the existing wastewater treatment facilities do not
function efficiently and remain closed for most of the year due to improper design, poor maintenance,
frequent electricity break downs and lack of technical personnel108. Therefore, with a growing
population in India the water pollution levels in the Ganges are rising and would continue to rise if the
sewage treatment facilities are not improved.
Along with population, the results verified that industrialisation also contributes significantly to Ganges
water pollution. According to this model, every unit increase in industrialisation leads to 16.871 units
increase in the Ganges water pollution levels. Many studies have acknowledged the existing relation
106 B. Dubey and A.S. Narayanan, ‘Modelling effects of industrialization, population and pollution on a
renewable resource’ (2010) 11 Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications 2833 107 Dewaram A. Nagdeve, ‘Population Growth and Environmental Degradation in India’ (Population Association of
America 2007 Annual Meeting, New York, March 2007) 108 R. Kaur, S.P. Wani, A.K. Singh and K.Lal, ‘Wastewater Production and Treatment Use in India’ [2012] Country Report India <
http://www.ais.unwater.org/ais/pluginfile.php/356/mod_page/content/111/CountryReport_India.pdf > accessed
3 September 2016
between the two109 and have also attempted to analyse the environmental costs imposed by
industrialisation in India110. Despite a fast paced growth of industrialisation in India, only 60 per cent of
industrial wastewater is treated before releasing into the water bodies. In addition, according to
UNESCO the industrial water use productivity of India is the lowest and is only 1/30th of that of Japan
and Republic of Korea111. Currently with India being the most attractive destination in the world for
investments in manufacturing and pollution intensive industries owing to its large domestic consumer
base along with cheap labour, this trend represents a serious challenge. The country is already losing 10
per cent of its GDP due to environmental degradation and with an absence of effective pollution
abatement program in place India’s ecosystems seem to be in threat112.
The results also imply that the existing regulatory quality does not seem to affect the Ganges water
quality significantly. Firstly, though the Indian judicial system is efficient in passing effective judgements
with regards to prevention of Ganga water pollution113 but with the given amount of cases working their
way through the system most of the environmental cases are still ongoing or pending. For instance, the
Chaturvedi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh114 was filed in 1998 against the state government for failing to
clean up the Yamuna river but it is still an ongoing case. Moreover, up until 2013 there were more than
31 million open cases in the Supreme Court (SC) of India115. Though in 2010, the National Green
Tribunal (NGT) was established to aid the SC in resolving environmental disputes but despite being
efficient it is facing its own set of problems. Inspite of disposing 82 per cent of the pending cases116 by
2014, in 2015 the SC’s Green Bench dumped 300 more cases on the NGT, some of them pending since
the last 14 years117. The NGT apart from facing staff shortage118 also faces opposition from the MoEF and
other Central government bodies. In 2013, for instance the MoEF complained against the NGT before
the SC claiming that though the Tribunal does not have the powers to act ‘suo moto’119 in environmental
cases it has been doing so beyond its remit. The SC supported the NGT declaring that ‘the [environment
and forests] department is taking all-out efforts to ensure that the NGT does not function effectively so
109 Shailender Singh, Pooja Jain and Abhay Kumar, ‘Impact of Industrialisation on Environmental Pollution’ (2009) 135(9) The Indian Forester 110 Rajarshi Majumdar (2009), ‘Environmental Costs of Industrialisation: A Study of Durgapur Region in West
Bengal’ [2010] Rabindra Bharati University Journal of Economics 111 Kaur et.al (n 108 ) 2 112 T. Rajaram and Ashutosh Das, ‘Water pollution by industrial effluents in India: Discharge scenarios and case for participatory ecosystem specific local regulation’ (2008) 40 Futures 56 113 For reference, n 23 114 Gopeshwar Nath Chaturvedi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (n 35) 115 Tom Lasseter, ‘India’s Stagnant Courts Resist Reform’ Bloomberg BusinessWeek (England, January 8 2015) 116 Press trust of India 117 Utkarsh Anand, ‘Projects stuck, Supreme Court transfers 300 cases to NGT, govt bodies’ The Indian Express
(New Delhi, 21 October 2015) 118 Explained in detail in model 2 results 119 This term is generally used in Indian legal parlance. If a court takes ‘suo moto’ action, it means starting a legal process on its own.
that the court may be compelled to pass an order for restoration of jurisdiction of the High Courts and
other courts in matters which are presently dealt with by NGT’120.
Secondly, there are no provisions made for following up the directions issued with regards to
environmental cases. This is evidenced by the fact that in Chaturvedi v State of Uttar Pradesh121, one of
the filed claims against the state government were that the directions passed earlier by the SC in the
Mehta cases122 were not followed out by the State or the Central government even after a span of more
than ten years and further no action was taken against them regarding this123.
Thirdly, the legal basis of the GAP is characterised by overlapping responsibilities across multiple
agencies with limited written guidance. Also due to the legislation not clearly providing a dedicated
funding authority, it often leads to disputes regarding financing the project across all levels of
government. In addition, there is an absence of widespread public support for implementation of water
pollution regulations in India124.
It is worth to be noted that government effectiveness (IETP) and rule of law (No.T) of the GAP do not
seem to affect the water quality significantly. This could possibly be due to the fact that institutional
solutions and investment does not always translate into effective river action plans. Lack of political
will125, absence of cooperation amongst the state and central governments126 and inefficient
institutional capacity in terms of availability of trained personnel could be a contributing reason. In
short, existence of institutional arrangements is a necessary but not a sufficient condition127 for
successful water pollution abatement programs.
6.2 Model 2 Estimation Results
In the second model, initially the Hausmann test was conducted to determine whether REM or FEM
should be used. The test ruled in favour of REM. But as first-order correlation was detected in REM, the
model was re-estimated using FGLS.
Panel Model Estimation Results (Model 2, 2006-2014)
Independent Variables (IVs) REM (Model 2) FGLS Model (Model 2) 𝑙𝑛Pop𝑖𝑡 -0.698*** -0.600*** 𝑙𝑛LGEE𝑖𝑡 0.1865 0.134 𝑙𝑛NNGO𝑖𝑡 0.704*** 0.413** BOD𝑖𝑡 -0.121 -0.123
Hausman Test
120 Nitin Sethi, ‘NGT does not have powers to act suo motu: government’ The Hindu (New Delhi, September 11,
2013) 121 Gopeshwar Nath Chaturvedi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (n 35 ) 122 M.C. Mehta vs Union Of India & Ors [1988] AIR 1115 (n 20 ) 123 Gopeshwar Nath Chaturvedi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (n 35 ) 124 Greenstone and Henna (n 77 ) 125 Paavola (n 74 ) 126 Qi and Zhou (n 74) 127 Paavola (n 74 ) 436
H0 : REM preferred
P-value = 0.333
Multicollinearity Test
Mean VIF = 2.45
Ramsey RESET Test H0 : Model has no omitted
variables
P-value = 0.252
Breusch Pagan Test H0 : Constant Variance
P-value = 0.0044
Woolridge Test for
autocorrelation H0 : No first order autocorrelation
P-value = 0.015
Note: Dependent Variable is CivC + CrimC𝑖𝑡 . Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are used for REM.
According to VIF estimate our model does not suffer from multicollinearity problem as the value of the mean VIF is
less than 10. ***, ** , * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.
The FGLS results demonstrate that a rising population (Pop) affects the regulatory quality (RQ)
significantly and negatively. This implies that with everything else constant a one percent increase in
population leads to 0.006 per cent weakening of the regulatory quality in India. Population growth,
along with the resulting lower per capita resource availability puts pressure on the existing natural
resources thereby resulting in their over-exploitation. This is evident from the results of our first model
which demonstrate that a rising population results in deterioration of the Ganges water quality. The
NGT though effective in resolving environmental disputes already faces a shortage of resources to have
a strict environmental vigilance across India. In addition, with the increasing population resulting in
rising water pollution levels the resource crunch of the NGT has worsened further. Two years into NGT’s functioning, six judges had quit citing ‘shortage of resources’ as the reason. Several of the judiciary members were not provided accommodation by the government in the city of the NGT’s operation. In
fact, initially for the first two years the court was run out of a guesthouse till before the intervention of
the SC. Also, the cases filed in the NGT’s of other cities than New Delhi (the Indian capital) were also run
out of makeshift offices128. In 2014 the southern bench of the NGT which handled cases of four states
apart from facing staff shortage, also had to operate from a building which lacked even basic facilities
such as, adequate chambers for advocates, common visitor’s halls, library, storage for important documents and sufficient washrooms129,130. Sadly, the staff shortage of the Indian judiciary is not limited
to the NGT, India has only eighteen judges for every one million people as against thirty-five to forty in
128 Nitin Sethi, ‘Green tribunal in red as two more judges quit’ The Times of India (New Delhi, 6 July 2012) 129 The Hindu, ‘’ Not enough space at Green Tribunal office’’ (9 November 2014) 130 Gargi Verma, ‘’ National Green Tribunal’s Pune bench faces staff crunch’’ The Golden Sparrow (13 May 2016)
other developing nations and around fifty in the developed nations131. Even if this shortage of judges is
accounted for, there would not be enough courtrooms to accommodate them all (there exists a
shortage of 3,989 court rooms across the country)132. Judicial infrastructure has clearly not kept pace
with the rate of litigation in India. Along with this, the current rate of population and the consequent
declining levels of environmental quality is further weakening the existing environmental regulatory
quality.
The local government environmental expenditure (LGEE) on the other hand, does not translate into an
improvement in the regulatory quality (RQ) of the GAP. This further implies that the mere existence of
institutions and investments through them does not necessarily lead to better environmental quality
supporting the earlier results in Model 1. Lack of implementation might be a reason for this. The
underlying reasons for failure of implementation are far beyond existence of inefficient institutions133.
The second model results also indicate that existence of environmental NGO’s (NNGO) has led to an
improvement in the regulatory quality of the GAP. In India NGO’s have played a critical role in social,
health and environmental issues. Public participation in environmental management has recently been
encouraged by the legislation, providing greater powers to the NGO’s and other civil society organisations to contribute significantly towards environmental protection. Quite a few studies of river
action plans have demonstrated that public awareness campaigns in the long term can go a long way
towards promoting pollution abatement134. In fact, in India one of the campaigns specifically for the
Ganges, ‘Swatcha Ganga’ (Clean Ganges) run by the Sankat Mochan Foundation (SMF) contributed
significantly in improving the regulatory quality of the GAP. Under GAP-I, in Varanasi (UP) only three
sewage plants were constructed which were inadequate for treating the city’s waste. But due to erratic
electricity supply these plants were unable to function continuously. Further, during the rainy season
when water levels rose in the Ganges it submerged the sewage plants and they could not be operated.
To resolve this, in the mid 1990’s the SMF approached the University of California, Berkeley for a partnership to look for an alternative solution for this issue, as the University had developed an
affordable ‘advanced integrated wastewater pond system’(AIWPS) which treated sewage naturally without using electricity at all. In 1997, the SMF proposed the Varanasi city government to set up the
AIWPS, who in turn claimed135 funds from the GAP for the same. But the state and the federal
governments refused to comply with the city government’s request which resulted in Varanasi’s leaders
131 PTI, ‘India has 18 judges per ten lakh people: Law Ministry’ The Indian Express (New Delhi, 4 August 2016) 132 Maneesh Chibber, ‘’Do we need more judges? CJI Thakur’s plea to the government raises key questions’’ The
Indian Express (1 May 2016) 133 Explained in detail in the conclusion 134 Qi and Zhuo (n 74) 135 As per the 74th Amendment. The 74th Amendment was enacted in 1992 when it was realised that the state local
bodies have become weak and ineffective due to failure for holding regular elections, prolonged suppression and
inadequate delegation of powers and functions. Therefore, provisions relating to urban local bodies were
incorporated into the Constitution. One of the provisions included ‘grants-in-aid to the Municipalities from the
consolidated funds of the State’ and ‘devolution by the State Legislature of powers and responsibilities upon the
Municipalities with respect to preparation of plans for economic development and social justice, and for the
implementation of development schemes as may be required to enable them to function as institutions of self-
government’
filing a PIL for alleged breach of the 74th Amendment. For eleven years, this case was pending. During
this time, the SMF gained international support from the likes of USAID, Asia Foundation and US-AEP,
for this issue and also promoted it domestically. Finally, in 2008 the Federal government formally agreed
to support the AIWPS system in Varanasi136.
Conclusion
India’s ill-fated GAP was launched thirty years ago, but the Ganges water quality has deteriorated
further. This study was conducted to analyse the existing formal environmental regulatory quality of the
GAP using two models. The first model attempted to comprehend the existing relationship of GAP’s regulatory quality, rule of law and government effectiveness on the Ganges river pollution. The results
revealed that neither of these seem to have made any significant contribution towards improving the
river water quality. With around 22 million cases pending in the Indian courts and six million of those
lasting longer than five years, one cannot really expect GAP’s formal regulatory quality to have deterred
Ganges water pollution. In addition, there is a lack of government support in terms of finances to the
Judiciary which adds on to the weakening regulatory quality. In 2016, for instance, only 0.2 per cent of
the government budget was allocated to the Ministry of Law and Justice, one of the lowest proportions
in the world137. Further, the mere existence of institutions and investment through them does not
necessarily translates into successful river action plans is substantiated by the fact that even
government effectiveness and rule of law of the GAP do not seem to have any impact on the Ganges
river water quality.
The second model in this study was formulated to understand the role of GAP’s regulatory quality in decision making of institutions or public at large. The NGO’s or civil society organisations seem to affect
the regulatory quality of the GAP significantly and positively. Of late, in India the NGO’s have contributed considerably towards environmental management through conducting public awareness
programs, promoting the issues internationally to gain more funding, working at the ground level to get
a better understanding of the obstacles faced by GAP and also find viable solutions. Though in this
model as well, the local government environmental expenditure does not seem to affect the regulatory
quality in any way.
Through both the results, it could be concluded that the existing institutions under the GAP do not
seem to be working efficiently due to implementation failure. But the underlying causes for
implementation failure are not limited to inefficient institutions. Along with an indistinct legislative
basis for the GAP, absence of heavy penalties/fines for not meeting targets on time, non-existent system
for a follow up of the directions issued by the environmental courts, lack of legal powers of the
environmental courts, lack of personnel training at the ground level for the GAP, inefficient monitoring
systems, involvement of multiple agencies for the same work and planning the GAP without a thorough
136 Jennifer S. Schiff, ‘Silencing the Opposition: The State v. Civil Society in India’s Ganges River Basin’ [2014] International Studies Perspectives 229 137 Vidhi Doshi, ‘India’s long wait for justice: 27m court cases trapped in legal logjam’ The Guardian ( India, 5 May
2016)
field investigation contributes towards it. Also the effluent standards of the wastewater discharged into
the river is completely arbitrary and framed without any scientific rationale.
Policy implications
The legal basis of the GAP is weak and provides limited guidance characterised by overlapping
responsibilities across multiple agencies. Therefore, the need of the hour is to formulate a well-defined
legal basis for GAP which clearly outlines the responsibilities of each agency involved, along with
indicating the Ministries responsible for the implementation of the GAP. In case of failure of
implementation of the GAP, the legislative basis should also include strict penalties/fines to be imposed
on the Ministries or the government bodies responsible for it. Further to ensure effective regulatory
quality results in lowering the Ganga water pollution, along with giving greater legal powers to the
NGT138 there is also an urgent need to make provisions for following up of the directions issued by the
Judiciary, as more often than not the state governments/ Central government/pollution control boards
fails to comply with them.
This study also found that NGO’s seem to have a greater impact in reducing Ganga water pollution. In the existing GAP though NGO’s have been included on paper but they have not been allocated funds nor
were they included while formulation of the GAP. Given the Ganga water quality is reducing at an
unprecedented rate, in a country like India with wide geographical, demographical and income
differences it is extremely important to understand that the hurdles faced by different regions cannot
have the same solutions. For instance, the SMF functioning in the state of UP identified that cities like
Kanpur were facing shortage of electricity and were therefore unable to operate the sewage treatment
plants. The SMF along with the local municipality also helped the city come up with a viable solution for
this. To understand the problems at the ground level, the NGO’s are the best option available as they usually do not have any bigger political motives. Therefore, there is a need to grant considerable
amount of economic and legal power to NGO’s and regional water authorities as well. Also, as the
Ganges river is a religious river for the Hindus the GAP needs to be implemented without hurting the
sentiments of the people. There is a greater need to conduct more public awareness programs
especially in the rural areas to educate people regarding the dire consequences faced by their ‘beloved river’. And as people are more likely to believe the NGO’s than the government, involving them at the
ground level is the only viable option available.
138 The NGT’s success rate in terms of solving environmental disputes is really high (in a span of four years has
disposed of 82 per cent of the cases) but because it does not have the powers to act ‘suo moto’(term mostly used in India when a higher authority takes an action on an important issue without consulting any minister/ministries
and that decision holds) in environmental cases the Ministries do not pay any attention to its orders.
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Appendix
Table 1: Water Quality Criteria in India
Designated best use Class of water Criteria
Drinking water source without
conventional treatment but
after disinfection
A Total Coliforms organism MPN/100 ml shall be
50 or less
pH between 6.5 and 8.5
Dissolved oxygen 6mg/l or more
Biochemical Oxygen Demand 5 days 20⁰C 2mg/l or less
Outdoor bathing(Organised) B Total Coliforms Organism MPN/100ml shall be
500 or less
pH between 6.5 and 8.5
Dissolved oxygen 4mg/l or more
Biochemical Oxygen Demand 5 days 20⁰C 3mg/l or less
Drinking water source after
conventional treatment and
disinfection
C Total Coliforms Organism MPN/100 ml shall be
5000 or less
pH between 6 to 9
Dissolved Oxygen 4mg/l or more
Biochemical Oxygen Demand 5 days 20⁰C 3mg/l or less
Propagation of Wild life and
Fisheries
D pH between 6.5 to 8.5
Dissolved Oxygen 4mg/l or more
Free Ammonia (as N) 1.2 mg/l or less
Irrigation, Industrial Cooling,
Controlled Waste disposal
E pH between 6.0 to 8.5
Electricity conductivity at 25⁰C micro mhos/cm Max.2250
Sodium absorption ratio Max.26
Below E Not meeting A, B, C, D, E criteria
Source: CPCB website (http://www.cpcb.nic.in/Water_Quality_Criteria.php)
Table 2: Data sources for Model 1
Table 3: Data sources for Model 2
Variable Data Sources CivC + CrimC𝑖𝑡 (RQ) (2006-2010) Supreme Court of India
(2010-2014) National Green Tribunal’s(NGT) BOD𝑖𝑡 (waterpoll) CPCB, MoEF and ENVIS CPCB Pop𝑖𝑡
Census of India
LGEE𝑖𝑡 MoEF , Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation
NNGO𝑖𝑡 National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog), Government of India
Variable Data Sources CivC + CrimC𝑖𝑡 (RQ)
(2006-2010) Supreme Court of India
(2010-2014) National Green Tribunal’s(NGT)
No. T𝑖𝑡 (RL)
Ministry of Drinking water and sanitation
IETP𝑖𝑡 (GE) NGRBA, NMCG, CPCB, National Institute for Public Finance and Policy, Swachh
Bharat Mission and Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation PCNSDP𝑖𝑡 Reserve Bank of India(RBI) Pop𝑖𝑡
Census of India
Indst𝑖𝑡 Reserve Bank of India(RBI) BOD𝑖𝑡 (waterpoll) CPCB, MoEF and ENVIS CPCB
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