Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation
Michaelle Browers
Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies, Volume 5, Issue 1, Winter 2012, pp.25-46 (Article)
Published by ICAS PressDOI: 10.1353/isl.2012.0022
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Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Winter 2012 ∙ Vol. V ∙ No. 1
25
Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon’s
Last Najafi Generation
M I C H A E L L E B R O W E R S
Dept. of Political Science, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA
ABSTRACT: This article reflects on what Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah represented during his lifetime and the significance of his
death for Lebanese politics and society. I argue that Fadlallah’s
death signals the passing of a generation of uniquely independent
and authoritative Shi‘i cleric-intellectuals trained in Najaf.
Fadlallah’s ability to think independently was not only revealed in
the realm of politics (where his typically subtle stance on wilayat al-
faqih was but one example), but also in his role as a modern
mujtahid and the broader societal role he often played. Further, it is
the second and third aspects – rather than any of the explicitly
political stances Fadlallah took – that were so key in Fadlallah’s
continuing relevance and significance for Shi‘i and Lebanese
politics.
KEYWORDS: Lebanon; Fadlallah, Muhammad Husayn;
Hizbullah; Arab Shi‘a; wilayat al-faqih.
شيء يسدها ال ثلمة اإلسالم في لمث الفقيه المؤمن مات إذا
The death of a faithful scholar causes a void in Islam that
nothing can fill.1
The death of Lebanon’s most prominent Shi‘i cleric, Muhammad
Husayn Fadlallah on 4 July 2010 was mourned not only by his
followers and admirers. Various analysts of Lebanese politics also
articulated a sense that something had been lost with this figure’s
passing. According to the Economist,
Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation Michaelle Browers
26
No one of his stature can now gently counter Hizbullah’s
claim to represent all Lebanese Shias or question its fealty to
Iran. And there is one less ayatollah to challenge Ali
Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in his claim to lead all the
world’s Shias. (Economist 2010)
Departing from the common media trope of Fadlallah as Hizbullah’s
‘spiritual guide’, David Schenker (2010) of the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy declared that, as the ‘the most credible moral, political,
and theological alternative to Hezbollah’, Fadlallah ‘stood as the last
bulwark against near total Iranian hegemony in Lebanon’. While one
must question whether Hizbullah has ever been able to claim to
represent all of Lebanon’s Shi‘a or whether Khamenei ever had the
stature to substantiate the claim to lead all the Shi‘a – or even whether
he has attempted to do so for many years – it is striking to hear voices,
even from those corners which had maligned Fadlallah as the oracle of
terror during his life, declaring the moment ‘bittersweet’.
The notion of a now unchecked Iranian hegemony is belied by the
fact that there is not one but a plurality of potential alternatives to
Fadlallah. It does seem to be the case that the two most prominent
jurisprudential references remaining after Fadlallah’s death are
Khamenei and ‘Ali Sistani, which would seem to offer very different
choices for Lebanon’s Shi‘a. The former would seem to carry with it an
affirmation of wilayat al-faqih and Iran’s hand in Lebanon; the latter
would involve emulating a cleric who has not only shown limited
political engagement but who has declined to speak about the wide
range of modern issues undertaken by Fadlallah. Khamenei and Sistani
are perhaps the most prominent Shi‘i maraji ‘ but not the only
possibilities being discussed. As Hilal Khashan (2010: 438) noted,
‘Fadlallah’s passing away leaves Lebanese Shi‘as without an indigenous
marja‘ ’. Other Lebanese clerics’ names have been mentioned as
‘successors’ of sorts, including two of Fadlallah’s former students,
Husayn Khashan and ‘Afif Nabulsi, the latter of whom is on good
terms with Hizbullah. However, neither of these figures yet has the
necessary religious credentials to be considered a marja‘. Inquiries to
Fadlallah’s office have led to two other suggestions from outside
Lebanon: Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, the second most senior cleric in
Iraq after Sistani, and Muhammad Ibrahim JannÁti, an Iranian
ayatollah who overlapped with Fadlallah in Najaf, where they were both
students. Fadlallah’s passing also leaves behind more practical questions
Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Winter 2012 ∙ Vol. V ∙ No. 1
27
regarding who would carry on this figure’s vast networks in Lebanon
and elsewhere. Two of Fadlallah’s sons, ‘Ali and Ja‘far, have taken over
much of the responsibility for Fadlallah’s office and charities
(Fadlallah’s brother, Muhammad Baqir Fadlallah, is general director of
Mabarrat), but both are yet young and neither has sufficiently
progressed in their studies to hold much socio-religious authority. ‘Ali
is currently giving the Friday sermons at the Hasanayn mosque where
his father used to preach (and where he often filled in when his father
was ill). Bayynat.org, the official website created by Fadlallah’s office in
1997, continues to circulate sermons and fatwas from the late cleric and
now includes statements by, and reports on, the activities of ‘Ali
Fadlallah; email inquiries sent through the website are still answered,
usually through reiteration of one of the late cleric’s past statements or
rulings.
It may well be an indication of both the singularity of Fadlallah and
the lack of available clerics in the Lebanese sphere capable of fulfilling a
comparable role that, shortly after Fadlallah’s death, his office
announced on their website that it was permissible for those who
emulated Fadlallah to continue to do so as long as a living religious
authority deemed it permissible. A subsequent statement on 9 July 2010
(bayynat.org) affirmed that it is also permissible for those who have
never emulated Fadlallah during his lifetime to start emulating him
under the same circumstances. In response to inquiries as to whether or
how Fadlallah is to be followed when new issues arise, the office
clarified that new issues must be referred to a living religious authority
while at the same time affirming that Fadlallah comprehensively
covered modern issues so that, at least in the short term, his opinions
might suffice (see ‘Inquiries on Emulation’).
However, the aim of this article is more to examine the nature of the
‘vacuum’ Fadlallah leaves behind than to speculate over what might fill
that space – that is, to examine the wider significance of the loss of this
public intellectual for Lebanese politics and society. This requires
assessing what Fadlallah represented and contributed during his
lifetime, as well as attempting to delineate the complex matter of
Fadlallah’s relationship to Hizbullah. Rather than viewing Fadlallah as
a lost bulwark against Iranian hegemony, I argue more broadly that
Fadlallah’s death marks the passing of a generation of independent Shi‘i
cleric-intellectuals that he so well represented. Fadlallah’s ability to
think independently was not only revealed on occasion in the realm of
politics (where his typically subtle stance against wilayat al-faqih, which
Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation Michaelle Browers
28
places Lebanese Shi‘a under the authority of Iran, was but one example),
but also apparent in his role as a modern mujtahid (a religious authority
who was able to generate a large and rich body of rulings, which
demonstrated clarity of language, pragmatism, and adaptability to the
conditions of modern society) and the broader societal role he often
played (e.g., his ability to transcend the realm of Shi‘ism, which allowed
him to facilitate dialogue and champion coexistence among Lebanon’s
sects). Further, it is the second and third aspects – rather than any of
the explicitly political stances Fadlallah took – that were so key in
Fadlallah’s continuing relevance and significance for Shi‘i and Lebanese
politics.
‘Spiritual Guide’ or ‘Bulwark’?
Fadlallah is all too commonly characterized in the Western media and
by many Western academic analyses as the ‘spiritual guide’, ‘spiritual
leader’, or even ‘spokesperson’ for Hizbullah.2
While it is undeniable
that Fadlallah has been an important figure, even a direct teacher, and
likely even the marja‘ taqlid for many members of Hizbullah, Fadlallah
has long denied that he has had any operational or official role in the
group and is explicit about his desire to remain independent and above
the organizational framework of any party. An issue of al-‘Ahd dated 10
Muharram 1405 (6 October 1984) offers perhaps the first of what would
become many occasions upon which Fadlallah would be quoted as
denying he is a leader of Hizbullah or any other group. Certainly,
distance from the existing political party affiliation allows him to draw
from a wider range of followers, including those who do not subscribe
to the policies of Hizbullah or ‘Amal. Fadlallah has further denied that
Islam has any such thing as a ‘murshid ruhi’.
At the same time, Fadlallah’s writings and sermons have inspired,
added substance to, and justified many of the actions and policies of
Hizbullah, particularly throughout the 1980s when he was a regular
contributor to Hizbullah’s official mouthpiece, the same weekly
newspaper in which he offered that early denial of affiliation: al-‘Ahd.3
However, the oft-repeated trope of Fadlallah as spiritual guide of
Hizbullah both oversimplifies and misunderstands the cleric’s complex
relationship with that organization.
First of all, Hizbullah officially advocates emulation of another
religious authority. The organization adheres to the institution of
wilayat al-faqih, as defined by the Ruhollah Khomeini. Hizbullah
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29
recognized Khomeini as the official marja‘ al-taqlid (religious-legal
authority of emulation) of the Islamic Republic. As such, from the
beginning Hizbullah paid homage and allegiance to Khomeini.
Hizbullah’s 1985 ‘Open Letter’ proclaims: ‘Our behavior is dictated to
us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political
conception defined by the leading jurist (wilayat al-faqih)’ and ‘We obey
the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih who
fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini.’ After
Khomeini’s death, the same allegiance and respect was accorded to ‘Ali
Khamenei, his officially chosen successor.4
Hizbullah’s deputy secretary
general, Naim Qassem (2005: 51), notes in his recent book that ‘the
decision of Jihad is tied to al-wali al-faqih…who determines the rules
and restrictions of confrontation (qarar al-jihad murtabit bil-wali l-
faqih…alladhi yuhaddid qawa‘id al-muwajaha wa dawabitaha)’. However,
Qassem distinguishes between referring to (or consulting with) the
marja‘ and emulating him, in order to suggest that in terms of the
private matters of ‘ibadat (ritual practices) and mu‘amalat (daily
dealings) members of Hizbullah may refer to or consult with another
marja‘ – and many members of Hizbullah certainly do look to
Fadlallah on various issues. However, when it comes to the public
domain of political matters, Qassem is clear that the only marja‘ to
emulate is Khamenei, who determines political and legal obligations.
Further, while Fadlallah has remained widely respected and was the
highest ranking Shi‘i religious figure in Lebanon until his death, his
relations with Hizbullah have often been strained. The rift widened
after Fadlallah objected to Hizbullah’s decision to support ‘Ali
Khamenei to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini as Iran’s Supreme Leader in
1989. However, it would be a mistake to interpret Fadlallah’s
independence from both Iran and Hizbullah as hostility to either. Most
of his agreements with both entities have been quiet and subtle, and his
sermons and statements regularly praise and defend the Islamic
Republic. So, on some occasions it is apparent that Fadlallah is able to
provide a sort of direct check upon the policies and positions of
Hizbullah, while on other occasions he seems to lend support to or
provide justification for Hizbullah’s actions and opinions. More
typically, however, Fadlallah seems to have positioned himself outside
(or above) the sphere of Hizbullah politics in order to play an entirely
different role in Lebanese society. Fadlallah has always cultivated a sense
that he was ‘above’ party and politics. In his own words:
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30
Regarding Hezbollah, it is known that the generation that
represents Hezbollah, is a generation that has been brought
up on my thoughts before the eighties, whether in Lebanon
or in Iraq, as it is the case with respect to Hezb Addaa’wah Al-
Islamia as well as other parties in Iraq. That is because I was
born in Iraq and I lived there for many years, and thus many
Iraqi Muslims benefited from my books and thoughts. The
Lebanese Muslim youths have also benefited from my
knowledge before Hezbollah was founded. And when
Hezbollah was founded I was not a part of it and I used to
tell them: ‚I am not a part of you because I do not engage in
party politics. But, when you ask my opinion on some
positions, I support them if I agree with them, otherwise I do
not support them‛. (Fadlallah 2007)
Several examples of Fadlallah acting independently of, and in ways
that countered, Hizbullah’s decisions and stances are analyzed below.
However, I first want to draw attention to something that Fadlallah
subtly identifies as two features that distinguish his thinking from that
of Hizbullah: generational difference and the difference made by his
experience in Najaf.
The Najafi Generation
Certainly, Fadlallah emerges from a political generation5
distinct from
that of the current Hizbullah generation. Fadlallah’s generation was
formed in the hawza of Najaf, in a period marked a confrontation
between the ‘ulama of Najaf, with its traditional education and strict
hierarchical structure, and communists, whose call was prevailing
throughout the Middle East. Fadlallah describes a kind of intellectual
terrorism (irhab) in this period toward anything Islamic (in Sharaf al-
Din 1996: 110). It was against this trend that Muhammad Mahdi Shams
al-Din (1935-2001), who went on to head Lebanon’s Higher Islamic Shi‘i
Council after Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance, began to insist that the very
purpose of ijtihad (independent reasoning) is to apply Islamic theory to
all spheres of human life (1990: 49). It was also against this trend that
Fadlallah began to preach that the jurist who removes himself from
contemporary politics risks losing his function as a marja‘ (authority)
in other realms of life (Hasani 1993: 103), and that inspiration could be
drawn from Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (1963-1980) and his engagement
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with social, economic, and political philosophy. This generation’s most
prominent figures graduated from the reformist schools set up by
Muntada al-Nashr (Bahadili 1993) and were present in Iraq during the
formation of the first revolutionary Shi‘i Islamist party, Hizb al-Da‘wah
al-Islamiyyah (around 1957 or 1958). Fadlallah, as well as Shams al-Din,
was born in Najaf and they remained there until the ages of 31 and 33,
respectively. Mallat (1993) has captured the ‘Shi‘i internationalism’ of
this moment between the mid-1940s and the 1970s, when Najaf stood as
the most respected center of learning for Shi‘a. These generations are
discussed and compared at greater length in Browers 2011. Suffice it to
say here that there are important differences between the generation of
Fadlallah, Shams al-Din, Sadr and others and that of the generation
created along with Hizbullah. Although the past and present secretary
generals of Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Abbas al-Musawi (1952-1992) and
Hasan Nasrallah (b. 1960), each studied in Najaf, their time at the
hawzah was cut short by Iraqi government repression.6
Despite their
role in creating the Da‘wah party, the Najafi generation’s first concern
was always with the task of formulating a Shi‘i Islamist worldview
against competing (secular) ideologies and to make this ideology
relevant to the exigencies of modern society. Whereas Shams al-Din and
Fadlallah were still studying at the hawzah of Najaf in their early
thirties, Nasrallah seems to have entered into party work immediately
upon his return from Najaf, first with ‘Amal and then with Hizbullah
after it was established. By the age of 32 Nasrallah had been elected
secretary general of Hizbullah. The generation which emerged with the
creation of Hizbullah has always displayed a preference for direct
action over intellectual work and more of a penchant for pragmatic,
even strategic, political thinking.
Despite the shrinking pool of intellectual-activist clerics from
Fadlallah’s generation and Hizbullah’s seeming domination of Shi‘i
politics in Lebanon, the country has always contained multiple points
of reference for Shi‘i religious authority, or marja‘iyyah (a marja‘ is a
senior religious authority with a following, and his office is known as
the marja‘iyyah). As Rula Jurdi Abisaab (2009: 218) has noted, ‘the
power of the ‘ulama relies on how many followers they can attract and,
in turn, how much economic power they can generate’. Fadlallah
certainly wielded great authority by virtue of his close association with
Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, who he represented in Lebanon for
twenty-five years; his ability to offer modern interpretations on a wide
range of issues of concern to people’s daily lives; and his extensive
Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation Michaelle Browers
32
network of charitable, educational, and other services.7
However, the
emulators of a marja‘ (muqallidun) – that is lay the Shi‘a citizens of
Lebanon – possess some power as well by virtue of their ability to give
or withhold support. Of course, that power of the latter is diminished
when the field of alternative sources of authority shrinks – that is, with
the loss of Fadlallah.8
The remainder of this essay will provide various
examples meant to illustrate both the independence and singularity of
this thinker as he contributed toward the plurality of religious
authority in Lebanon’s religious, social and political spheres.
Fadlallah as a Point of Reference for al-Sahat al-Islamiyyah
The unique character of Fadlallah was clarified for me on 7 May 2009,
when I attended a live webcast discussion on ‘End of Life Issues in
Medical Care’ featuring Fadlallah and sponsored by the Medical Faculty
and Biomedical Ethics program of the American University of Beirut.
Fadlallah has given considerable attention to issues related to religion
and medicine/science in his writings, sermons, and fatwas. On this
occasion, Fadlallah maintained that, in general, doctors, patients, and
family members, do not have a right to end a human life, since no
person (only God) ‘owns’ a human life (la yamliku insan hayatu).
However, he argued that, in particular cases, the withholding or
removal of life support may be justified, for example, when a person is
brain-dead and the machine is the only thing keeping the body going.
The most interesting aspect of this discussion was hearing medical
students and faculty ask Fadlallah not only about general issues (on the
relationship between religion and medicine, for example), but also
about specific cases (if patient x is terminal . . . .). His answers sought to
join scientific principles (a faith in scientific progress and the
possibility of new discoveries) and religious principles (a faith in God’s
will being done) which resulted in a call for individuals to exercise
individual judgment while taking responsibility for ‘refraining from
harm’. There was very little in Fadlallah’s remarks that struck one as
particular to Islam (as opposed to Christianity) and nothing that struck
one as particularly Shi‘i (as opposed to Sunni). Rather, Fadlallah’s use
of generically religious, occasionally generically Islamic, language meant
that he came across as something akin to a religious humanist.9
Surprised by the fact that in such a sectarian country a prominent
religious figure (who is so clearly associated with one confessional
grouping) would be called on to address this difficult issue before such
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33
a diverse audience, I asked several attending medical faculty and
students what they thought of the discussion and what they thought of
the decision to invite Fadlallah to hold forth on this topic. The
response was generally positive: no one in the room was protesting this
invitation and all questions seemed to indicate a real desire to hear
Fadlallah’s perspective. One man stated that it was entirely natural that
Fadlallah would be asked to do this, since he writes widely on these
issues and draws from a variety of sources in formulating a very
modern and rational approach to these questions. When I asked
whether there might be a subsequent discussion with Sunni or
Christian thinkers, the man stated firmly that the medical school
invited Fadlallah as someone who has written much about the topic
from an ethical perspective, not as a representative of a sect.10
Rather than a ‘spiritual guide’ for one Islamic party, Fadlallah’s
influence expands over a wider Islamic arena (al-sahat al-islamiyyah) and,
as the above example attests, he has occasionally been sought out as an
ethical thinker, regardless of sect or religion. Although Fadlallah is
often attributed with playing a central role in the conceptualization of
the Islamic situation (al-halat al-Islamiyyah) associated with Hizbullah’s
society of resistance (mujtama‘ al-muqawamah),11
which viewed the state
of the Shi‘a community as a problematic to be overcome through the
establishment of a religious-political solidarity among Lebanon’s Shi‘a
in a way that both gives meaning to the individual and binds that
individual into responsibility for carrying out a collective project, he
also contributes toward the creation of an Islamic milieu that
transcends the narrow identity frames of Lebanese politics. This is
apparent in an August 2009 interview Joseph Alagha (2011: 246)
conducted with Fadlallah, when the cleric maintained that Lebanese
society was transforming from al-halat al-Islamiyyah to al-sahat al-
Islamiyyah and voiced his advocacy of latter.12
Fadlallah characterized
the former as ‘a transitory stage that has served its purpose’. In the first
stage, the aim was to unify the Shi‘a community and activists in the
wake of the Iranian revolution under the banner of an overarching
Islamic ideology through a top-down revolutionary process. In the early
1990s, Hizbullah shifted toward a more bottom-up strategy that
involved participation in the democratic system. According to
Fadlallah, this shift in strategy carried with it a different political ethic,
based on greater openness toward other communities. Alagha recounts
that Fadlallah explained that the concept of al-halat al-Islamiyyah,
Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation Michaelle Browers
34
was mainly concerned with establishing an Islamic state
where minorities, such as Christians and Jews, were treated as
ahl al-dhimma, that is, residents with limited rights and
required to pay a tax in lieu of alms giving (zakat). Ayatullah
Fadlallah clarified that in al-saha al-Islamiyya notions such as
the Islamic state and ahl al-dhimma are bygone ideological
constructs that do not exist anymore. According to him, al-
saha al-Islamiyya is a pluralistic Islamic cultural sphere where
the concept of citizenship (muwatana) reigns, where all
people have equal rights and duties, and where coexistence
and mutual respect is the main norm. (Alagha 2011: 246)
In fact, Fadlallah has long presented himself as the Shi‘i leader most
capable of facilitating dialogue among competing Shi‘i factions and of
leading the Shi‘i community into dialogue with other sects in Lebanon.
Fadlallah advocates taqrib (the mitigation of inter-Muslim differences)
and tawhid (in this case, meaning the unification of all Muslim
believers in the Islamic ummah). In the name of unity, Fadlallah has
deemed Islamic infighting sacrilegious and ardently called for dialogue
among competing Shi‘i factions and among Sunnis and Shi‘a. He has
championed cooperation and dialogue between Muslims and
Christians, attuned to points of convergence and common grounds
upon which all parties agree. He has further championed dialogue and
cooperation between Islamist and secular currents in Lebanon as well as
elsewhere (e.g., he authorized such cooperation within the Iraqi
opposition). Fadlallah argues there are ‘no taboos in dialogue’. Muslims
should follow the example of the Prophet in engaging in civil dialogue
even with polytheists, atheists and those who deny resurrection and/or
prophecy (Fadlallah 1996). Fadlallah sometimes even goes so far as
dropping the adjectives of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’ to speak of
unification of mankind in a universal community. He has often
asserted that he stands with every project that seeks to change reality ‘to
the benefit of Islam’ and stands on the side of oppressed people (al-
mustadafin) everywhere (see e.g. Fadlallah 1990).
Bayynat.org is full of statements and sermons from Fadlallah calling
for dialogue in the face of every conflict as well as accounts of his own
engagements in dialogue with religiously, politically, and ideologically
diverse actors. What is less clear is whether the role Fadlallah played in
regard to dialogue among Lebanese sects and factions was such that his
death will have a detrimental impact on Lebanese politics. While
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35
Hizbullah has also advocated taqrib and dialogue on many occasions, it
is certainly the case that Fadlallah and others of his generation (e.g.
Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din) give the call for dialogue across
divides and without limits and with greater emphasis in their writings
and speeches than those of Nasrallah’s generation. At least part of the
reason must lie in the fact that the latter is more directly embedded in
the everyday workings of a political and military struggle with sectarian
dimensions. For example, Nasrallah succeeded in aligning his party
with Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement with a 2006
Memorandum of Understanding (that has endured until now) and in
2008 managed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with Tripoli’s
Salafis (which was abrogated by the Salafis the next day). But his calls
for dialogue tend to be at the level of the party, not at a broader societal
level: as secretary general of Hizbullah, he hardly has the ability to rise
above political-strategic concerns such as defending his party and its
interests.
Further, Schaery-Eisenlohr (2008: 155) has astutely noted that
Fadlallah’s claim to transcend sect not only facilitates dialogue and
coexistence, but also ‘aims to break the hegemony and ownership other
sectarian groups, in particular Christians and Sunnis, have held’ over
public space in Lebanon. At the same time, it is also apparent that
Fadlallah’s redefinition of the very terms of coexistence involves the
rather radical reconfiguring of the meaning of Shi‘ism and its relation
to other religions and groups. He does this not only by challenging the
monopoly on power other groups might claim and not only by
supporting taqrib among Lebanon’s sects and challenging relations of
power among the groups, but also by, on occasion, overcoming and
reinterpreting various provocative and exclusionary aspects of Shi‘ism
itself.
In World of Our Youth, Fadlallah calls on young people to engage in
politics, counselling that when they find themselves inspired to play a
role in politics they must,
study the intellectual, political, and functional manifeso of
the party or the movement in question, with respect, on the
one hand, to determine the youth’s affiliation and
intellectual and doctrinal beliefs; and, on the other hand, to
his concern and involvement in the affairs of the ummah, on
the level where it realizes its main goals in staying the proper
course. (Fadlallah 1998b: 164-5)
Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation Michaelle Browers
36
Fadlallah calls on youth to judge carefully and to avoid affiliating out
of fear. But also interesting is what he does not at any point call for:
their joining of any particular party or group – or even specification
that the group or party they join need be Islamist in character.
A Critic of Wilayat al-Faqih
While Fadlallah supported Khomeini and the Islamic revolution in
Iran, he has never accepted Khamenei as the wali al-faqih or marja‘ for
all Shi‘a and his relationship to the concept wilayat al-faqih has always
contained tensions, particularly in light of his consistent insistence
upon the independence of clerical thinking (e.g., in J. Fadlallah, 1997:
35-37) and upon the plurality of guardian jurists (e.g., Fadlallah 2009a:
31–37). Fadlallah’s independence of the institution is apparent in the
fact that he personally followed Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, who was already
an established marja‘ with widespread social institutions when
Khomeini declared himself a marja‘. He also served as Khu’i ’s
representative in Lebanon until that cleric’s death in 1992. According to
Khashan (2010: 429), Fadlallah then briefly followed the teachings of
Muhammad Rida Gulpaygani until his death in December 1993. Not
approving of Tehran’s appointment of Muhsin Araki after Khomeini’s
death, Khashan maintains that Fadlallah then followed ‘Ali Sistani.13
After Araki died in December 1994, the Islamic Republic named
Khamenei the supreme leader, which again did not meet with
Fadlallah’s approval. Part of the issue lay in his disagreement with the
idea that the supreme guide could only be Iranian. Fadlallah
maintained that qualifications, without regard to nationality, should be
the determining factor in selecting a marja‘ (Hasani 2003: 153). Thus, in
1994, Fadlallah decided to claim marja‘ status for himself, despite the
exhortation of Ahmad Jannati, who flew to Beirut as Khamenei’s
personal envoy with the task of dissuading Fadlallah from declaring his
marja‘iyyah. As the highest ranking Arab marja‘, Fadlallah cultivates a
considerable following throughout the region. Many Shi‘a in Lebanon,
Syria and various Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Iraq, view him
and not Khamenei as the model for emulation (marja‘ al-taqlid). He has
offices in Syria, Iran, the U.K, Germany and the Ivory Coast (Maktab
Fadlallah 2003).
In his writings on wilayat al-faqih, Fadlallah tends to diminish or
relativize the theory’s importance rather than rejecting it outright. He
diminishes its importance at the level of practicality (1990). Fadlallah
Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Winter 2012 ∙ Vol. V ∙ No. 1
37
argues that all practicable routes toward the establishment of Islamic
government should be pursued, but the idea of governing according the
decisions of the mujutahid is not seen by him as very practical. Fadlallah
refers to wilayat al-faqih as a juridical theory (nazariyyah fiqhiyyah) not a
belief (‘aqidah). Further, in light of the fact of the silence of the faqih
and the fact of the multiplicity of fuqaha’, as well as the fact of the
inevitable contradiction of their decisions, Fadlallah deems the notion
of an absolute jurist is untenable. All jurists, no matter how wise,
remain fallible, like all other believers. While arguing in some of his
speeches and writings that Khomeini’s interpretation can be justified in
the interest of safeguarding the community (e.g. 2000b, esp. 163-5),
Fadlallah seems to prefer Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr’s notion of the
governance of the ummah by itself as opposed to absolute wilayah.
According to Fadlallah, the marja‘iyyah should not be tied to one
nation. He argues that that the Iranians have been monopolizing the
institution of marja‘iyyah for too long and suggests that wilayat al-faqih
should rotate among the most learned of the Shi‘a. He seems to
attribute to the faqih a role more like that of the Catholic pope, as he
argues for for strong involvement of the clergy in politics, but argues
that they should possess wide influence, not govern directly (Hasani
1993: 95-96). At the same time, he argues that while the authority of the
jurist is neither general nor absolute, in the event of a leadership
vacuum the jurist’s mandate may be imposed in the name of the public
interest (1994: 144). Thus, he at once localizes (or nationalizes) political
authority at the same time he renders the authority of the marja‘iyyah
transnational.
There have also been occasions when Fadlallah has taken the party to
task for claiming to hold a monopoly on truth. For example, Nasrallah
gave a speech prior to the 2005 election in which he declared it a taklif
al-shar‘i (an obligation based on Islamic law) for Shi‘a to vote for the
list Hizbullah endorsed.14
Fadlallah replied by using his 31 May 2005
column, ‘The Stance of the Week’, to vehemently criticize the use of
taklif shar‘i in the elections, arguing that such practices exploit Islamic
concepts for political purposes (Fadlallah 2005). According to
Fadlallah, God has granted each person an independent mind for which
we are each individually responsible. While an individual of religious
learning might be able to advise Muslims not to vote for corrupt
candidates, the individual must decide for his or herself which
candidate is corrupt and which is not.15
Here again we see a conflict between those Islamists who
Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation Michaelle Browers
38
appropriated the Iranian interpretation of the marja‘iyyah and wilayat
al-faqih and members of the Najafi school associated with the attempt
of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr to offer a modern interpretation of a
politically committed marja‘iyyah, which is not confined to any single
political structure or states (such as Iran), and a wilayah that holds
political leadership within the domain of the state, such that the
existence of many wilayah within the larger Islamic ummah is
legitimated.
A Mujtahid for his Times
Fadlallah’s life is replete with examples of what Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008:
76) identifies as his tendency to set ‘himself apart from Hizbullah and
ultimately from the Iranian religious elite’. According to Shaery-
Eisenlohr, one of the main ways Fadlallah creates ‘boundaries between
his followers and those of Hizbullah’ is by justifying and practicing ‘an
approach to religious tradition and history based on scientific and
rational methods’ against what he and his followers ‘have come to
identify as traditional Iranian approach to scholarship’. Fadlallah has
been central in developing an Islamist discourse to address many
contemporary issues. He is confortable addressing complex
contemporary matters with nuance and depth, but in a language
comprehensible to the modern individual, such as the challenges and
opportunities posed by such issues as secularism, pluralism, democracy,
scientific and technological progress, and cultural Westernization. My
sense is that Fadlallah’s reconsiderations of Islam’s relationship to
political and social life challenges the applicability of the best versions
of each conception. It is clear that he emphasizes individual
responsibility and allows for flexibility in synchronizing jurisprudence
with changing social norms. One of Fadlallah’s most oft-quoted phrases
from the Quran is verse 13:11: ‘Verily God does not change what is in a
people until they change what is in themselves.’ Fadlallah interprets this
not as a call to focus only on the self and let God take care of the rest (a
flight from politics to the self) but as an activist principle that at once
overturns the ‘materialist principle’ (al-qa‘idat al-madiyyah) of ‘change
reality and you will change yourself’ to ‘change yourself and you will
change reality and history’ (1985: 174-5), at the same time it refutes the
notion that human actions are governed by ‘unalterable or
predetermined laws (al-qawanin al-hatmiyyah)’ (1998a: 28).
One example that well illustrates this: Fadlallah has long taken a
Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Winter 2012 ∙ Vol. V ∙ No. 1
39
strictly scientific approach to determining the Islamic lunar calendar.
While most Muslim leaders – both Sunni and Shi‘i – rely upon actual
sight of the moon, Fadlallah reasoned that one could rely upon
accurate astronomical calculations to determine the beginning and end
of the lunar month (2006). As a result, he is able to announce in
advance the start and end of the month of Ramadan by consulting
observatory centres throughout the world. On at least two occasions,
1999 and 2002, Fadlallah declared the beginning of the Eid al-Fitr
celebration (marking the end of Ramadan) on a day that coincided with
that of the (Sunni) Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, but which was a day
before the declared Eid of Iran (and hence Hizbullah). This meant that
followers of Fadlallah, along with Lebanon’s Sunni’s were able to begin
feasting and celebrating a full day before the end of the month of
fasting for followers of Hizbullah. As Alagha (2011: 197, n. 36) notes,
this ‘split the Dahiya, Hizbullah’s main constituency in Beirut, between
Hizbullah’s adherents of the Iranian religious authority and Fadlallah’s
followers.’ While one might interpret this approach as a strategy to be
the first or set the tone for declaring the end of fasting (and certainly
Fadlallah’s announcements were always well publicized), it also reveals
his modernity, his desire to use science in order to facilitate regularity
and consistency. According to Fadlallah (2006), whether or not the
moon appears is based on the universal order and not human sight and
whether it is ‘possible’ to see the moon is more accurately determined
by Islamic astronomical calculations than by the naked eye of
individuals throughout the world. But the main reason a scientific
method is better, Fadlallah argues, is that it offers a way of unifying the
months and celebrations of Muslims.16
During his lifetime, Fadlallah voiced comparatively progressive
positions on the rights of women and youth, aimed in affirming their
agency. Among his many fatwas, or religious edicts, on family law, he
argued that women have the right to marry, the right to work, and even
the right to defend themselves from domestic violence. On
International Women’s Day in 2007, Fadlallah (2008a) further affirmed
women’s right to self-defence (womanhood seen as exemplifying the
oppressed and her rights entailing those of resistance).17
Fadlallah (1995)
argues for women’s right to fully participate in politics and even hold
leadership positions in an Islamic state. He also directly confronts the
view that women are deficient in comparison to men. Lara Deeb (2010)
has analyzed the ways in which Fadlallah’s jurisprudence in regard to
listening to music and temporary marriage reveals his attunement to
Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation Michaelle Browers
40
the needs of youth and has developed over time toward permitting
young people an expanded space for experimenting with different
choices.
Many of Fadlallah’s views seemed to adapt with the times. One
example that has been well researched by Morgan Clarke (2007a: 2008)
is Fadlallah’s views on issues related to reproduction, including
artificial insemination and cloning. Though Fadlallah opposed the use
of donor sperm, he has declared the permissibility of using donor eggs
for in vitro fertilization. Until recently this was on the condition that
the husband of the recipient married the egg donor, even if through the
institution of a temporary marriage. Now it seems Fadlallah has relaxed
even this requirement (2007b). This would permit anonymous
donations, as well as allow sisters to donate and receive eggs, a very
common scenario which was ruled out on the previous position as
Islamic law prohibits a man from marrying two (or more) sisters
simultaneously.
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah’s deference to science and reason,
relatively progressive views on the rights of women and youth, calls for
pluralistic and accountable governance, and commitment to dialogue
with those of different ideologies and faiths, has at times put him at
odds with both political hardliners and the religious establishment.
However, his ability to address the interests and concerns of a wide
sector of Lebanon’s Shi‘a, including women and youth, has also made
him one of Lebanon’s most influential public intellectuals prior to his
death.
Lebanon after Fadlallah
After the summer war of 2006, there were reports of a (temporary) thaw
in relations between Hizbullah and Fadlallah. According to the
International Crisis Group (2007: 7) report, out of a desire to preserve
the resistance in the face of attacks, Fadlallah toned down his public
criticism of Hizbullah and Hizbullah began giving greater coverage to
Fadlallah’s Friday sermons on its television station, al-Manar. As the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) dealing with the 2005 assassination
of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri got closer to issuing its first
indictments and speculation grew that members of Hizbullah would be
named, sectarian tensions grew. Initially there was a sense that, in the
great Lebanese tradition of compromise, a number of minor officials
from Hizbullah would be described as ‘rogue operators’ so that
Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Winter 2012 ∙ Vol. V ∙ No. 1
41
individuals, rather than the party, could be held to account. This offer
was allegedly made by Prime Minister Sa‘ad Hariri to Nasrallah shortly
after Fadlallah’s death. However, Nasrallah used a 9 August 2010 press
conference to attempt to implicate Israel, rather than Hizbullah, in the
assassination. By the end of October 2010, Nasrallah was warning that
‘whoever cooperates with the STL is working against the Resistance’. In
January 2011, Hizbullah members pulled out of government, thus
leading to a collapse.
One can only speculate as to whether this might have evolved
differently had Fadlallah still been alive. Many analysts have argued that
Hizbullah would probably have welcomed a negotiated solution that
left Hariri as prime minister with Lebanese government support for the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Even if indictments had been issued
against Hizbullah members, having the son of the assassinated former
leader still running a government in which Hizbullah and its allies were
participating would have at least achieved the Lebanese goal of
consensus politics. As it is, even though Hizbullah has installed a prime
minister of their choosing, so long as Sa‘ad Hariri and his Future
Movement remain excluded from government the harder it becomes for
Hizbullah to claim that it is working for the good of the republic as a
whole, rather than representing distinctly sectarian interests. The
rancour of Lebanese politics is high. In such a context one needs
leadership that champions dialogue, cooperation, and civility. Even
more essential may be the existence of voices from within Lebanon’s
Shi‘a community that can on occasion challenge Hizbullah with
Fadlallah’s unique combination of religious authority and intellectual
independence.18
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Notes
1 A hadith of Imam al-Sadiq, recorded in Muhammad ibn Ya‘qub Kulayni, al-Kafi I,
ch. ‘Loss of a Scholar’, 38, no. 2.
2 Saad-Ghorayb (2002: 6) lists numerous scholars making such claims, a compilation
which has been revised and expanded by Alagha (2006: 325, n. 122). At the same time, a
number of scholars, including Saad-Ghorayb and Alagha, challenge and complicate this
notion.
3 al-‘Ahd first appeared in 1984, but changed its name to al-Intiqad in 2001.
According to Alagha, the name change corresponded to a shift in orientation:
‘conveying a ‚secular‛ image by dropping the Qur’anic substantiation (5:56), on the
right side, and removing the portrait of Khumayni and Khamina’i, on the left side’
(2011: 197, n. 2).
4 However, Alagha (2010) acutely notes subtle shifts over time in Hizbullah’s
interpretation of and relationship to wilayat al-faqih.
5 By ‘generation’, I mean what sociologists refer to as a ‘political generation’. As
Braungart & Braungart (1991: 297, 299) argue: ‘an age group is transformed into a
political generation when a bond is created among its members based on their unique
growing-up experiences in society and a shared feeling that they have a mission to
perform by changing [or resisting change to] the political status quo.’ In the present
cases, age proved less significant in the formation of each political generation than it
did when the figures studied in Najaf and the circumstances under which they took up
political work.
6 Musawi seems to have arrived in Najaf from Lebanon in 1969. Nasrallah did not
arrive until 1976. However, both were expelled by 1979. See Stewart (2001) and Abisaab
(2006) for excellent discussions of the shift from Najaf to Qum as an intellectual centre
and the Lebanon’s development of its own hawzah system, respectively.
7 Fadlallah established both Jam‘iyyat Usrat al-Takhi (Society of Brethren Family) and
Jam‘iyyat al-Mabarat al-Khayriyyah (Charitable Philanthropic Society). The latter began
with funding from Khu’i and today operates not only in Lebanon but throughout the
world.
8 Abisaab (2009: 218) further argues that the muqallidun ‘far from being passive, have
Journal of Shi‘a Islamic Studies Winter 2012 ∙ Vol. V ∙ No. 1
45
manipulated the competition among the maraji‘ and demanded a greater involvement
of mujtahids in affairs pertaining to their livelihood and security, as well as having
resisted the imposition of one designated marja‘ by one center on all Shi‘ite emulators.’
Here, too, the ability of the emulators to do this is undermined with the loss of
Fadlallah. AMAL offers an alternative Shi‘i political reference. But the party has lost
considerable religious authority first with the death the Musa Sadr (d. 1978) and Nabih
Berri’s assumption of role as head of the party, and further with the death of
Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (d. 2001).
9 Husayni (2007) argues that Fadlallah is distinct for developing general principles
from the entire Qur’an rather than focusing only around 500 verses that deal explicitly
with jurisprudence.
10 Fadlallah’s Fiqh al-Shari‘a (2003) is a good example of the breadth and modernity
of his thinking. Fadlallah’s writings on matters such as human cloning and
reproductive issues is well covered by Clarke (2007a, 200b, 2008).
11 According to Harb & Leenders (2005: 191), ‘This hala groups the adherents
(multazimin) to two major religious references (marja‘iyyat): Fadlallah and Khamenei (or
his Lebanese delegate, Nasrallah).’
12 One must note, in this regard, that in 2001 al-Saha, a ‘traditional village’ consisting
of restaurants, cafés, terraces, shops, a wedding hall, a motel, a small museum, a library,
a children’s playground and prayer rooms, was established in Beirut’s southern suburb
of al-Dahiya, by al-Mabarrat, Fadlallah’s philanthropic organization. See Harb 2006.
13 It is hard to imagine Fadlallah’s (by then well-established) views on the centrality of
political activism would sit well with his emulation of Sistanti, who oscillates between
passive and activist positions, with a seeming preference for the former. That and the
fact that they are only separated by five years in age – along with the lack of any
corroborating evidence – leads me to question this claim.
14 The speech was broadcast on 25 May 2005, on al-Manar.
15 See also on Bayynat.org: Fadlallah’s (2008b) sermon on ‘The Independence of the
Mind in Islam’, sermon on ‘Responsibility in Islam’ (2004), and sermon on
‘Corruption on Earth is an Act of Man’ (2009b) where he states that responsibility for
political corruption ‘is on the shoulders of all those who sell their votes without even
studying the candidates’.
16 Bayynat.org has clarified that ‘the establishment of the beginnings of the lunar
months, such as the beginning of the month of Ramadan and the first day of Eid al-
Fitr, is not considered part of the new upcoming issues [which would require reference
to a living religious authority], and the emulators of His Eminence, Sayyed Fadlullah
(ra) out to follow his ruling on the issue.’ In other words, followers of Fadlallah should
continue to follow the scientific predictions of when it is ‘possible to see’ the moon
rather than worrying about whether the moon has actually been seen (‘Inquiries on
Emulation’).
17 El-Husseini (2008) demonstrates three aspects of Fadlallah’s lauding of Fatimah as
a role model distinguishes him from Iranian views. First, he views Fatima as a role
model not only for women, but for all Muslims. Second, where Khomeini praised
Fatimah for her virtue and modesty, Fadlallah emphasizes Fatimah’s actions,
particularly the way in which she ‘represents a political activist who used all available
opportunities without losing . . . any of her Muslim virtues (Fadlallah 2000a: 203). Third,
whereas women associated with Hizbullah, following the Iranian lead, tend to give
Lebanon’s Last Najafi Generation Michaelle Browers
46
greater emphasis to Zaynab in contemporary discourse, Fadlallah gives greater emphasis
to Fatimah (2000a: 275).
18 The author would like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for this
journal for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and the National Endowment
for the Humanities, which provided the author with a fellowship during 2010-2011,
when this article was first drafted. Any views, findings, conclusions, or
recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the
National Endowment for the Humanities. The use of the word ‘last’ in the title of this
article is not meant to suggest that this author precludes in any way the possibility of
Najaf’s resurgence as the centre of intellectual activity for a future generation of clerics.
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