CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITYDURING TIMES OF CRISIS
Choity Jones
BBus (IntBus/Marketing)
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Philosophy
School of Advertising, Marketing and Public Relations
QUT Business School
Queensland University of Technology
2020
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis i
Keywords
Apparel industry, attribution theory, corporate social responsibility, crisis
communication, crisis spillover, Situational Crisis Communication Theory, fast
fashion, public relations, Rana Plaza.
ii Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Abstract
A crisis is represented by an unpredictable event that poses a serious threat to
the image, profitability and long-term viability of organisations (Coombs, 2007a,
2007b; Janssen et al., 2015). It would be natural for organisations to distance
themselves from such risks (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c). This research, however, explored
organisational responses to a crisis that has moved beyond its focal crisis organisations
to affect industry, hereafter referred to as a crisis spillover (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c;
Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Desai, 2011, 2014).
Through the lens of the 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh, which
killed more than 1,100 garment workers and implicated global fast fashion
organisations, this study employed Coombs’ (2007b, 2015c) Situational Crisis
Communication Theory (SCCT) which draws on attribution theory (Weiner, 1985).
Based on the crisis type, SCCT adopts a two-step model that firstly evaluates factors
that could intensify or moderate the situation before prescribing responses to reduce
attributions of responsibility among stakeholders (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).
SCCT focuses on single organisational responses to a crisis rather than multiple
organisations affected by the same crisis and also adopts a cross-sectional view which
excludes long-term crisis responses. Coombs (2015c) has, however, recognised the
need to keep testing and examining SCCT for its alignment with changing
environmental factors, such as technology, and also meet evolving social expectations.
In this respect, an important link has been made between attribution theory, SCCT and
corporate social responsibility (CSR; Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Zhou & Ki, 2018a). The
latter describes organisationally shared economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic
values with society (Carroll, 1979, p. 500, 1991, p. 283; Carroll & Shabana, 2010, p.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis iii
89; Maon et al., 2009; Zhou & Ki, 2018a). Essentially, organisational CSR within the
crisis context could bring heightened attention from stakeholders and influence their
blame attribution process. When stakeholders’ social expectations are met, outcomes
are expected to be positive (Kim, 2014; Janssen et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2018; Zhou &
Ki, 2018a, 2018b). With CSR now being a standard activity of many of today’s
organisations, the effective uses of this construct within crisis settings have become
more complex and have required more evidence-based research outcomes (Zhou & Ki,
2018a). As such, this study distinguishes CSR into two categories: (1) explicit CSR,
which represents voluntary, non-binding CSR activity by organisations; and (2)
implicit CSR, which represents collective efforts with the involvement of legal or
mandatory requirements (Matten & Moon, 2008).
This dissertation corresponds with the study of Comyn and Franklin-Johnson
(2016) in that the authors focused on SCCT and CSR through the lens of the Rana
Plaza. Comyn and Franklin-Johnson (2016) provided valuable insights into the Rana
Plaza case through a one-year, post-crisis exploration by an inductive approach. Their
study argued that the burden of responsibility among organisations was not equally
shared during a crisis spillover, and also that organisations responded differently to a
crisis in a collective setting in comparison to individual organisations exposed to
similar reputational risks. Furthermore, Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) focused
solely on organisations with prior business links with the Rana Plaza factory, referred
to as Connected Organisations within the context of this study.
This dissertation differed from Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) study
through its deductive, longitudinal, four-year timeline from the crisis spillover
perspective. The timeline of this study was categorised into three different periods to
gradually explore short- and long-term developments within the data. This dissertation
iv Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
has further examined a second sample consisting of organisations that became
implicated through guilt by association (Desai, 2011; Yu et al., 2008, 2014).
Findings of the present study show that all organisations arrived at collective
rebuild responses or crisis spillover responses. Connected Organisations, however,
attempted to distance themselves from responsibility through concurrent bolstering or
diminishing responses. Such has been viewed as crisis detachment strategies for the
content of this study. Unconnected Organisations more readily assumed responsibility
for a crisis they were not immediately implicated by; however, by acknowledging the
Rana Plaza as a catalyst for change and industry reforms, the sample addressed
stakeholders’ post-crisis expectations through social impact.
This study made initial contributions at both a theoretical and practical level for
the context of a large-scale industrial accident affecting industry in the short- and long-
term. It has been found that crisis responsibility was not shared equally among
Connected and Unconnected Organisations, however that long-term CSR practises for
social impact in response to the crisis brought positive stakeholder attributions.
However, organisations accepting accommodative strategies in the short-term have
been found to bear the burden of reputational threats by prior research (Comyns &
Franklin-Johnson, 2016) which the findings of this study has supported.
As a practical implication, this dissertation provides organisations with
evidence-based guidelines to manage reputation in the short- and long-term following
a large-scale industrial accident. Larger organisations are expected and pressured to
lead peers to post-crisis industry reforms. Similarly, smaller organisations follow
successful CSR-leads of larger organisations to remain competitive within their
industry sphere.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis v
Table of Contents
Keywords .................................................................................................................................. i
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................v
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... viii
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... ix
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................................x
Statement of Original Authorship ........................................................................................... xi
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ xii
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................... 13
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................13
1.2 Background to research ................................................................................................13
1.3 Theoretical framework ..................................................................................................15
1.4 Research gaps ...............................................................................................................17
1.5 Fast fashion ...................................................................................................................19
1.6 Rana Plaza ....................................................................................................................19
1.7 Methodology .................................................................................................................21
1.8 Definition of key constructs and theory ........................................................................22 1.8.1 Attribution theory ...............................................................................................22 1.8.2 Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) ............................................23 1.8.3 Crisis communication .........................................................................................23 1.8.4 Crisis spillover ....................................................................................................23 1.8.5 Collective crisis ..................................................................................................24 1.8.6 Stakeholder pressures .........................................................................................24 1.8.7 Corporate social responsibility ...........................................................................25
1.9 Outline of thesis ............................................................................................................26
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................... 27
2.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................27
2.2 Crisis and crisis spillover ..............................................................................................27 2.2.1 Defining ‘crisis’ ..................................................................................................27 2.2.2 SCCT and attribution theory ..............................................................................28
2.3 Beyond the situational focus of crisis research .............................................................34 2.3.1 The difference between a collective crisis and the crisis spillover
phenomenon .......................................................................................................34 2.3.2 Crisis spillover ....................................................................................................36 2.3.3 Stakeholder pressures .........................................................................................40
2.4 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) ..........................................................................41 2.4.1 The link between CSR and crisis communication ..............................................41 2.4.2 Implicit and explicit CSR ...................................................................................45
2.5 Research questions........................................................................................................47
vi Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Chapter 3: Method and Research Design ........................................................ 50
3.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 50 3.1.1 Philosophical underpinnings .............................................................................. 50 3.1.2 Qualitative case study design ............................................................................. 51 3.1.3 Three principles of data collection ..................................................................... 52 3.1.4 Sample ............................................................................................................... 52 3.1.4.1 Selection criteria .............................................................................................. 53 3.1.5 Screening of organisational profiles .................................................................. 56
3.2 Data Collection ............................................................................................................ 57 3.2.1 Sampling of data ................................................................................................ 59 3.2.2 Data analysis ...................................................................................................... 60 3.2.3 The content analysis method .............................................................................. 61
3.3 Enhancement of the Research Design .......................................................................... 65 3.3.1 Credibility .......................................................................................................... 65 3.3.2 Dependability ..................................................................................................... 66 3.3.3 Confirmability .................................................................................................... 67 3.3.4 Transferability .................................................................................................... 68
3.4 Ethics considerations .................................................................................................... 68 3.4.1 QUT ethics clearance ID# 1700000515 ............................................................. 68
Chapter 4: Findings ........................................................................................... 71
4.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 71
4.2 Time Period 1: The immediate crisis response ............................................................ 72 4.2.1 Crisis response ................................................................................................... 72 4.2.1.1 Connected Organisations................................................................................. 73 4.2.1.2 Unconnected Organisations............................................................................. 77 4.2.2 Description of stakeholder pressures ................................................................. 80 4.2.3 Implicit and explicit CSR .................................................................................. 83 4.2.4 Summary ............................................................................................................ 86
4.3 Time Period 2: The short-term post-crisis response ..................................................... 88 4.3.1 Crisis response ................................................................................................... 88 4.3.2 Description of stakeholder pressures ................................................................. 94 4.3.3 Implicit and explicit CSR .................................................................................. 96 4.3.4 Summary .......................................................................................................... 102
4.4 Time Period 3: Long-term crisis response ................................................................. 104 4.4.1 Crisis response ................................................................................................. 104 4.4.2 Description of stakeholder pressures ............................................................... 109 4.4.3 Supply chain transparency ............................................................................... 112 4.4.4 Implicit and explicit CSR ................................................................................ 114 4.4.5 Summary .......................................................................................................... 120
4.5 Organisational response patterns and trends .............................................................. 121 4.5.1 Connected Organisations ................................................................................. 121 4.5.2 Unconnected Organisations: Geographical CSR trends .................................. 122 4.5.3 Summary .......................................................................................................... 126
Chapter 5: Discussion ...................................................................................... 127
5.1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 127
5.2 Research Question 1 ................................................................................................... 127 5.2.1 Connected Organisations ................................................................................. 128 5.2.2 Unconnected Organisations ............................................................................. 131
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis vii
5.2.3 Summary ..........................................................................................................133
5.3 Research Question 2 ...................................................................................................134 5.3.1 Connected Organisations ..................................................................................134 5.3.2 Unconnected Organisations ..............................................................................137 5.3.3 Summary ..........................................................................................................139
5.4 Research Question 3 ...................................................................................................141 5.4.1 Connected Organisations – Short and long-term CSR .....................................141 5.4.2 Unconnected Organisations – Short and long-term CSR .................................144 5.4.3 Summary ..........................................................................................................146
5.5 Limitations ..................................................................................................................148
5.6 Implications for theory ...............................................................................................150
5.7 Implications for practice .............................................................................................152
5.8 Directions for future research .....................................................................................153
References ............................................................................................................... 155
Appendices .............................................................................................................. 173
Appendix A ...........................................................................................................................173
Coombs’ (2007b) Original SCCT Primary and Secondary Crisis Response Strategies .......173
Appendix B ...........................................................................................................................174
Coombs’ (2007b, p. 173) Original SCCT Crisis Response Strategy Guidelines ..................174
Appendix C ...........................................................................................................................175
Organisational Profiles Pertinent to Sample Selection Criteria ............................................175
Appendix D ...........................................................................................................................176
Data Extracts of Organisational SCCT Responses in Time Period 1 ...................................176
Appendix E ...........................................................................................................................177
Impact of H&M’s commitment to The Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1 .....................177
Appendix F............................................................................................................................178
Data Extracts of SCCT Responses in Time Period 2 ............................................................178
Appendix G ...........................................................................................................................179
Data Extracts of Crisis Responses in Time Period 3.............................................................179
viii Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
List of Figures
Figure 2.1. Conceptual map of key constructs and time periods. .............................. 48
Figure 3.1. Connected Organisations and the regions of Unconnected Organisations. .............................................................................................. 55
Figure 3.2. Operationalisation of codes through NVivo. ........................................... 62
Figure 4.1. Coding reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources in Time Period 1, April-June 2014. .................................................................. 81
Figure 4.2. Coding reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources for Time Period 2, July 2013 – June 2014. ........................................................ 94
Figure 4.3. Patterns of crisis response strategies undertaken by Connected and Unconnected Organisations. ...................................................................... 105
Figure 4.4. Reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources for Time Period 3, July 2014 - June 2017. ................................................................ 110
Figure 4.5. Annual break-down of pressures facing the fashion industry in Time Period 3. ............................................................................................ 113
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis ix
List of Tables
Table 2.1 SCCT Crisis Response Strategies (Coombs, 2007b, p. 170) .................... 31
Table 3.1 Overview of Sample Groups and Their Organisational Profiles .............. 57
Table 3.2 Focus of data collection over three periods of time .................................. 58
Table 3.3 Example of Operationalisation of Codes .................................................. 64
Table 4.1 Evolution of Crisis Response Strategies in Time Period 1 ....................... 73
Table 4.2 Implicit/Explicit CSR in Time Period 1 .................................................... 84
Table 4.3 Overview of Crisis Response Strategies in Time Period 2 ....................... 90
Table 4.4 Rebuild Strategies: Victim Compensation by Implicit or Explicit CSR .............................................................................................................. 97
Table 4.5 Prevalent Strategy and Visibility of CSR for Connected and Unconnected Organisations in Time Period 2 ........................................... 101
Table 4.6 Long-Term crisis responses through conformity to the supply chain transparency pledge by Connected and Unconnected Organisations in Time Period 3 ............................................................................................. 107
Table 4.7 Trends for implicit and explicit CSR by Connected and Unconnected Organisations in Time Period 3 ........................................... 115
x Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
List of Abbreviations
BRAC Building resources across communities
CSR Corporate social responsibility
RMG Ready-made garment
SCCT Situational Crisis Communication Theory
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
UN United Nations
QUT Verified Signature
xii Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Acknowledgements
“When you’ve worked hard, and done well, and walked through that doorway of
opportunity, you do not slam it shut behind you. You reach back, and you give other
folks the same chances that helped you succeed.” -- Michelle Obama
I state this quote with the intention of expressing my sincere gratitude to my
supervisors, Associate Professor Amisha Mehta, Dr Bree Devin and Dr Amanda
Beatson. As I reflect over the past years, I can appreciate how your mentorship have
guided me to view the world around me in a way that I haven’t before. This journey
has, indeed, been a catalyst for growth on so many levels and I feel privileged to have
learned from you. Thank you for this opportunity and for keeping your faith in me.
At the core of my acknowledgements, I dedicate this work to my late Father,
Mesbah Uddin Ahmed. My greatest supporter whom did not get to see me reach the
finish line. I thank you, Pappa, for your guidance, for your sacrifices in life, and your
unconditional love. You live on in my heart and I will always strive to make you proud.
To my husband, Benjamin Jones. Thank you for being my constant rock. You
have kept me (somewhat) sane through this research journey. I could not have
accomplished this work without your continuous love, support and patience.
I further thank my Mum, my wonderful sisters, my cousin Tania and my long-
time friend Sabinor – although you’re all back home in Sweden, your encouragement
has remained close and the distance has been inconsequential. Last and certainly not
the least, my wonderful in-laws and friends in Australia, you know who you are, I am
fortunate to have each of you in my life. Thanks for always having my back.
A special thanks for Bill Wrigley for editing this thesis.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 13
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter provides an overview of this thesis together with the background
and justification of methodology undertaken for this research, followed by key theory,
constructs and the methods that have guided the study. The chapter concludes with an
outline of the structure of this thesis.
1.2 BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH
The past two decades has presented a boom in the global marketplace for
organisations through free-trade agreements and the internet (Avnet & Laufer, 2015).
Whilst the world is more connected than ever before, other risks have surfaced for
managers to be vigilant about events involving their industry environments. Even
though such development has also enabled stakeholders to become increasingly
interconnected on a global scale, organisations have been faced with an increased risk
of becoming collectively crisis-affiliated with events causing disruptions to their
industry environment (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Desai, 2011, 2014).
This study seeks explores the extent of responsibility that organisations are
willing to accept in their communication to stakeholders during an industry facing
crisis. Crisis responsibility refers to the amount of responsibility that stakeholders
attribute to the organisation in relation to a crisis event (Coombs, 1995, 2015c).
Organisational perception among stakeholders becomes vital following a crisis as this
could ultimately pose threats to sales, organisational image and reputation, and in the
worst case, their long-term viability (Coombs, 2007a, 2007b, 2015c).
14 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Prior research on attribution theory has suggested that individuals can attribute
responsibility to negative and unexpected events, which can result in emotional
reactions (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Weiner, 1985). Communication related to crisis
events can thereby play a particularly important role in this view, as it could influence
the blame attribution process among stakeholders (Coombs, 2007b; Comyns &
Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2014). Ultimately, this blame attribution
process can lead to a crisis that overflows its boundaries to affect an industry through
guilt by association, hereafter referred to as a crisis spillover.
An example of a high-profile crisis spillover was evident in the airline industry
in 2017 when passengers captured footage of a man being violently removed by airport
security from an overbooked flight (Laufer & Wang, 2018). Video recordings of the
incident went viral through news media and social media, which in turn caused issue
scrutiny of the wider airline industry’s tendency to overbook flights (Laufer & Wang,
2018). This focal crisis event essentially placed other airlines at risk of reputational
damage and highlights the importance for organisations to strategically manage
negative events that spill over and affect industry (Laufer & Wang, 2018). Authors
have claimed that the higher the industry similarity to the scandal attribute, the more
likely it is for the focal crisis to spill over and affect the industry (Laufer & Wang,
2018; Roehm & Tybout, 2006).
For organisations to recover from reputational damage from a crisis spillover, it
could be necessary to undertake short- and long-term corporate social responsibility
(CSR) to minimise the attribution of blame. As such, through the lens of the 2013 Rana
Plaza factory collapse, this study aimed to contribute to emerging crisis spillover
literature with a focus on the nexus between crisis and CSR. Crisis responses of two
sample groups were explored through Coombs’ (2007b, 2015c) Situational Crisis
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 15
Communication Theory (SCCT): (1) organisations collectively perceived as
responsible for the crisis event through business ties with Rana Plaza; and (2)
organisations that became crisis-affiliated as a result of stakeholder’s attributing
responsibility to them.
This was considered an important topic to study in a time when communication
has the power to influence public perception of the world (Desai 2011, 2014; Ihlen,
2010). The ease of accessibility to news media and social media in developed regions
may have contributed to the crisis spillover effect. Through continuous, evidence-
based research on various crisis situations, organisations can be provided with
pragmatic guidelines on predicted crisis-response strategies to minimise relevant
operational disruptions.
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Literature has commonly explored the field of crisis communication from the
perspective of single organisations responding to a crisis over shorter time periods than
the four year timeline of this study, for example, up to a year or two (Boutinot et al.,
2015; Claeys et al., 2010; Fredriksson 2014; Hasford & Farmer, 2016). Examples of
prior research topics have been Johnson & Johnson’s baby powder scandal in 2002
and Nike’s child labour revelations by media in the 90’s.
To date, there has been limited knowledge around a real-life crisis spillover and
how stakeholder pressure may influence organisational responses. Notable exceptions
are a handful of studies that have differentiated an individual and collective crisis (see,
e.g., Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Desai 2011, 2014; Laufer & Wang, 2018; Yu
et al., 2008). For example, crisis spillover researchers have put forward that a denial
statement issued in the light of a crisis spillover by an organisation may backfire if it
is not necessary (Laufer & Wang, 2018). The organisational denial could instead
16 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
influence stakeholders to believe there is reason for concern (Laufer & Wang, 2018;
Yu et al., 2008) and thereafter influence a crisis spillover.
This dissertation corresponds with the study of Comyns & Franklin-Johnson
(2016) which also explored attribution theory through a dual focus on post-crisis SCCT
responses and the CSR of organisations with prior business links with the Rana Plaza
factory, which were considered to be Connected Organisations within the context of
this study. Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) study was released during the process
of this dissertation and was thereby able to provide an inductive insight into crisis
responses for the duration of one year following the factory collapse. The authors
found that organisations responded differently within a collective setting than
individual organisations that responded to similar reputational risks; the collective
behaviour was further moderated by the crisis setting. The key differentiation between
the present study and Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) is the longer, four-year,
post-crisis exploration of both Connected and Unconnected Organisations through a
deductive approach, which aimed to provide more robust outcomes to extend their
claims. The present study further distinguished trends and patterns in the type of CSR
undertaken by the two sample groups, that is, for example, through an exploration of
explicit and explicit organisational CSR practises.
Yu et al. (2008) explored strategies to moderate attributions of responsibility for
organisations implicated by a crisis spillover through “preferential detachment” (Yu et
al., 2008, p. 453). This could be achieved through the reduction of linkage or similar
risky attributes to that of the focal crisis organisation/s (Yu et al., 2008). In the long-
term, this could lead to changed industry structures and may have been evident in the
data of the present study (Yu et al., 2008). Similarly, intermediaries in the
organisational social, legal, and economic environment, such as news media and
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 17
industry watchdogs, could mediate the effects of a crisis spilling over (Yu et al., 2008).
These were important factors to consider for the context of the present study, given its
multi-faceted focus and the industrial scrutiny that may be placed on the individual
organisational crisis responses.
Similarly, in the crisis context, Zhou and Ki (2018a) found that engagement in
CSR could be used as strategic efforts to reduce similarities with the focal crisis
organisation/s to weaken negative effects brought by the crisis spillover. Crisis
literature has recognised CSR as an important factor in crisis management (Janssen et
al., 2015; Laufer, 2015). Four important reactions can be brought by post-crisis CSR:
(1) increased stakeholders’ attention to the crisis; (2) influence over the crisis
attribution process; (3) raised expectations; (4) stakeholders’ evaluations of the crisis
are changed or influenced (Janssen et al., 2015; Laufer, 2015). The outcomes of these
reactions are ultimately linked with the perceived post-crisis responsibility among
stakeholders.
The importance in incorporating the CSR construct in examining the crisis
spillover phenomenon is recognised with the purpose of understanding the crisis
response of collective organisations that are directly linked with a crisis event against
organisations that have become crisis-affiliated through stakeholders’ guilt by
association, for example, the crisis spillover. The data of the present study provided
broader guidelines for organisations affected by an industry-facing crisis event.
1.4 RESEARCH GAPS
This chapter has so far provided an overview of the aims and rationale of this
study. It remains important to understand the effective ways to minimise damage from
a crisis (Coombs, 2015c). To do so, we must understand how different crisis situations
18 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
may cause harm to organisations (Coombs, 2015c). To date, there has been limited
understanding of the extent of responsibility that organisations assume in their
communication with stakeholders for a crisis for which they are not directly
responsible.
Previous crisis research has typically explored single organisations affected by
crisis situations from a short-term perspective (Boutinot et al., 2015; Claeys et al.,
2010; Fredriksson, 2014; Hasford & Farmer, 2016). Similarly, the Rana Plaza case has
previously been studied inductively through SCCT and CSR responses over a one-year
period for a single sample group1 (Comyns & Johnson-Franklin, 2016). As some time
had now passed since the Rana Plaza disaster, the opportunity existed to explore the
crisis spillover phenomenon through this case over a longer timeline, as the fashion
industry had not yet seemed to have suffered from a level of post-crisis scrutiny
(Comyns & Johnson-Franklin, 2016). In generating such theoretical and practical
contributions the following research questions (RQs) were explored:
(1) How does attribution theory explain organisational responses to a crisis
spillover?
(2) What SCCT strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations
employ in the short- and long-term?
This research aimed to contribute towards gaps in the literature by exploring a
longitudinal timeline for a crisis spillover that involved organisations that were directly
and indirectly implicated by an industry facing crisis, which is the crisis spillover. This
included the exploration of CSR-based responses that were motivated by stakeholder
1The use of a single sample group did not enable a comparative overview of the responses undertaken by those linked with the Rana Plaza factory and organisations that became crisis-affiliated through the crisis spillover.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 19
pressures as it was in the interest of this research to explore if the scale and scope of
the Rana Plaza crisis may have required organisations to make a social impact.
Through a focus on the fast fashion industry, this study aimed to make a
theoretical contribution to the nexus of CSR and crisis spillover literature. Moreover,
because the crisis spillover was explored from a macro perspective based on responses
from individual organisations within two sample groups, findings aimed to provide
practical guidelines for organisations undergoing the effects of future crisis spillovers.
1.5 FAST FASHION
Fast fashion is a contemporary reference to mass-produced clothing based on
catwalk trends and designs; these are sold relatively inexpensively in comparison to
the designer labels (Cashon & Swinney, 2011). The overall process from the catwalk
to the retailers occurs at a fast pace and retailers can often offer customers new product
lines as often as on a weekly basis (Cashon & Swinney, 2011). Examples of such fast
fashion organisations are H&M, Zara, and Mango. As a result of the fast fashion
movement, garment factories have been expected to produce greater product quantities
with a quick turnaround so as to not lose business opportunities. This has added
immense pressure on garment workers, including those working at Rana Plaza factory.
1.6 RANA PLAZA
The focus of the present study is on Rana Plaza, which was a Bangladeshi
garment factory that collapsed in 2013. It has been deemed as one of the most fatal
industrial accidents in modern history, killing more than 1,100 factory workers and
leaving more than 4,000 injured (Coomyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016). This was a
preventable disaster caused by the factory owner who knowingly placed workers at
20 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
risk despite a structural engineering report deeming the building unsafe (Wright, 2017,
Just-Style Apparel Sourcing Strategy – online news portal). Garment workers had
walked out of the factory in protest in the morning of the factory collapse; however,
they were forced back to continue their labour and the building collapsed shortly after
(Wright, 2017, Just-Style Apparel Sourcing Strategy – online news portal).
Through the lens of SCCT and CSR, Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016)
study has provided a valuable insight into the Rana Plaza case over the course of one
year following the factory collapse. Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) suggested
that organisations responded differently to a crisis in a collective setting in comparison
to individual organisations exposed to similar reputational risks. The authors explored
various channels of secondary data, including organisational CSR reports. They
concluded that the burden of responsibility among organisations is not equally shared
during a crisis spillover and some organisations ‘free ride’ under the efforts and
expenses of other implicated organisations (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016).
According to Coombs (2007b, p. 168), preventable crisis events such as the Rana
Plaza disaster go beyond severe reputational to threaten the organisation’s social
perception based on strong attributions of crisis responsibility among stakeholders. In
the Rana Plaza case, 31 international organisations with pre-existing or current links
to the factory at the time of the crisis were attributed immediate responsibility by
stakeholders. Attributions were extended beyond the 31 organisations that
manufactured garments in the factory as the broader fashion industry became crisis-
affiliated through guilt by association (Yu et al., 2008). The scale and scope of this
fatal crisis brought stakeholder pressures that influenced parts of the industry to
collectively accept responsibility for a crisis with which they were not directly linked
(Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016). Social expectations among stakeholders
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 21
required organisations to communicate collective and individual, CSR-based
responses to recover reputational damage caused by the crisis. The collective CSR
responses offered an opportunity to change prior industry practices perceived as
unethical by stakeholders.
Rana Plaza is a powerful case that has addressed educational trends for emerging
crisis spillover literature and CSR. With rising social concerns and expectations for
global organisations to operate ethically, the Rana Plaza crisis offers insights into how
CSR may be utilised strategically and pragmatically in the short- and long-term by
unpacking attribution theory and SCCT.
1.7 METHODOLOGY
This study employed a qualitative, case-study approach over a four-year, post-
crisis period with the purpose of capturing in-depth contextual conditions linked with
the selected case study. This timeline was structured into three periods to provide a
short- and long-term perspective to the crisis spillover phenomenon. Those refer to:
Time period 1: April to June 2013
Time period 2: July 2013 to June 2014
Time period 3: July 2014 to June 2017
Two sample groups were explored through the collection of evidence-based
secondary data of organisations that became directly and indirectly implicated in the
Rana Plaza crisis.
Secondary data, based on organisational and industry reports, and social and
news media were explored because these sources were critical in exploring the framing
of crisis events to stakeholders (Carroll 2004; Coombs 2007a, 2007b). The selected
22 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
design enhanced the exploration of smaller, individual organisational responses as
situated within the Rana Plaza case study to better describe the broader crisis spillover
(Yin, 2009). The longitudinal timeline additionally enabled an overview of how
individual organisations responded to the crisis to understand broader trends within
each sample group.
The unpacking of the RQs was accomplished through a deductive coding method
using NVivo which assisted in exploring the interaction between the case and its
context. This approach enables the building of intensity and depth to the data (Marshall
& Rossman, 2016; Yin, 2009). The deductive approach was also suitable in extending
existing theory and knowledge of the nexus between CSR and crisis communication
through the SCCT framework.
1.8 DEFINITION OF KEY CONSTRUCTS AND THEORY
This section provides brief definitions of key constructs and theories employed
by this study, which are further elaborated in Chapter 2.
1.8.1 Attribution theory
Attribution theory is defined as the cognitive process through which people are
driven to find causes to an event (Weiner, 1985, p. 548). Crisis responsibility
essentially derives from attribution theory and in the light of a crisis event,
organisations are expected to respond to their stakeholders in ways that influence
perceptions of crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 23
1.8.2 Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT)
Coombs’ (2007b) drew from attribution theory in the development of his
evidence-based situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) framework. The key
purpose of SCCT is to provide theoretical guidelines for organisations on how to
maximise their reputational protection and/or reputational recovery following a crisis
event (Coombs, 2007b). In a two-step process, SCCT firstly establishes the crisis type,
for example, the frame used to outline the crisis situation, followed by an evaluation
of factors that would intensify or moderate the situation (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).
More simply, SCCT prescribes appropriate crisis responses to moderate blame
attributions and predicts relevant outcomes.
1.8.3 Crisis communication
Crisis communication refers to communication responses undertaken by
organisations faced with different crisis situations; these could be released in the form
of actions and/or statements (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Verhoeven & Meer, 2014). The
purpose of crisis communication is to assist stakeholders to make sense of the crisis
and influence their attribution of blame. Coombs (2015c) stated that simple crisis
communication does not mean that the situation is improving, which highlights the
significance for organisations of having a good understanding of effective options
when faced with different crisis situations.
1.8.4 Crisis spillover
The definition of a crisis spillover is when a crisis moves beyond the frame of
one or more organisations that are directly linked with the events leading to the crisis
event to affect industry change. Organisations affected by the crisis spillover can often
24 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
have similar corporate characteristics to that of the focal crisis organisation (Desai,
2014; Yu et al., 2008) and can become affiliated with the crisis by stakeholders
ascribing guilt by association (Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008). Such cognitive processes
are particularly applicable to industry fields with prior histories of disruption (Desai,
2014) such as the fashion industry.
1.8.5 Collective crisis
This study differentiates the crisis spillover from a collective crisis, for which
the latter was explored in the study by Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016). Whilst the
collective crisis explores multiple organisations affected by the same event, it is
differentiated by a cohort of organisations directly affiliated with a crisis event.
The crisis spillover on the other hand includes other organisations operating in
the same industry environment as the focal crisis organisations, however by holding
similar organisational characteristics, the crisis spills over to affect them also.
1.8.6 Stakeholder pressures
Stakeholders refer to those who affect or are affected by the sample
organisations’ goals and operations, either through network links (Allen & Caillouet,
1994) or by any form of interest to the Connected or Unconnected Organisations.
For the context of this study, stakeholder pressures represent the post-crisis
pressures or influences placed on organisations involved in the crisis by external
stakeholders, such as consumers, industry watchdogs or non-government
organisations (NGOs). These stakeholders can exert pressures, such as calling for
reforms to industry practices, setting up new standards for the industry, and boycotting
suppliers.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 25
1.8.7 Corporate social responsibility
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to the economic, legal, ethical, and
discretionary [in later work referred to as philanthropic] expectations that society, for
example, stakeholders, has of organisations at a given point in time (Carroll, 1979, p.
500; Carroll & Shabana, 2010, p. 89). The construct derives from the ideology that
organisations hold a level of responsibility to society that falls beyond its profit-
making operations (Carroll & Shabana, 2010).
The purpose of CSR is for organisations to build an intangible, sustainable and
positive attribution with their stakeholders by addressing issues, such as economic
development, education or human rights issues (Janssen et al., 2014).
1.8.6.1 Implicit CSR
Implicit CSR refers to “values, norms, and rules that result in (mandatory and
customary) requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues and that define
proper obligations of corporate actors in collective rather than individual terms”
(Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409). For the context of this study, implicit CSR is
considered in relation to the post-crisis collective actions undertaken by organisations.
In addition, mandatory and customary requirements for organisations were observed
through commitments to The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety, the
Alliance for Bangladesh Workers Safety, and other long-term sustainability
requirements affecting supply chain management, such as the UN’s 2020 Sustainable
Development Goals.
1.8.6.2 Explicit CSR
Explicit CSR refers to voluntary corporate strategies and policies that “assume
and articulate responsibility for some societal interests” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p.
26 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
409). Examples of such corporate activities are disaster relief programs, partnerships
with governmental agencies or company codes of conduct. Explicit CSR is suggested
to be motivated by “the perceived expectations of different stakeholders of the
corporation” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409; Morsing et al., 2008). For the purpose of
this study, explicit CSR was observed through non-collective and voluntary
organisational initiatives to meet stakeholders’ social expectations.
1.9 OUTLINE OF THESIS
This dissertation is presented across five chapters. The present chapter has
outlined the research phenomenon being explored with the theoretical and practical
justification of this study. Crisis communication is an ever-evolving construct with
important linkages to SCCT and CSR. It is the intent of this research to explore this
nexus from the lens of the crisis spillover phenomenon.
Chapter Two links pertinent theory and constructs employed by this research and
acknowledges the research gaps for the undertaking of this study. Chapter Three
explores the philosophical underpinnings and outlines the qualitative method and
research design adopted by this study. Chapter Three further discusses how criteria to
evaluate the selected method and research design were addressed.
Chapter Four focuses on the findings of this study and is presented by three
different time periods to describe short- and long-term developments from the analysis
of the data.
Chapter Five outlines discussions around each of the three RQs asked by this
study. The chapter concludes with an overview of the limitations, implications for
theory and practice, limitations to the research design and finally directions for future
research.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 27
Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter presents the key constructs and theories that were employed for the
objectives of this research. The chapter first explores the crisis and crisis
communication constructs, followed by attribution theory and crisis communication
strategies, including Coombs’ (2007b) Situational Crisis Communication Theory
(SCCT), and lastly, the crisis spillover literature.
Next, the literature review looks at corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its
imperative linkage with the crisis communication field. This is followed by an
exploration of two different CSR types, implicit and explicit. The chapter concludes
with an overview of stakeholders’ roles within this study.
2.2 CRISIS AND CRISIS SPILLOVER
2.2.1 Defining ‘crisis’
Coombs (2007b) defined a crisis as “a sudden and unexpected event that
threatens to disrupt an organization’s operations and poses both a financial and
reputational threat. It is a negative event that can harm stakeholders physically,
emotionally and/or financially” (Coombs, 2007b p. 164). Each crisis situation is
different and therefore requires brings demands of customised communication
strategies; for example, organisations’ communication during a crisis does not reduce
their level of publicly perceived responsibility (Coombs 2015c; Ihlen 2010), making
crisis communication an important line of research (Coombs, 2015c).
Several scholars have conducted empirical studies on organisations undergoing
various crisis events (Coombs 2015; Coombs & Holladay, 2012; Yehya & Coombs
28 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
2017) as it remains imperative for crisis managers to understand how impulsive
responses may influence stakeholders’ crisis perception and blame attributions
(Coombs 2007b, 2015c; Coombs & Holladay, 2014; Park, 2017), which the
subsequent sections of this chapter explore further.
2.2.2 SCCT and attribution theory
There are types of crises that differ from those that are caused by organisations,
such as preventable situations caused by neglect and those that are not caused by
organisations, such as false rumours or natural disasters (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).
Attribution theory defines the cognitive process through which people are driven
to find the causal process leading to intended or unintended outcomes or end results of
events (Weiner, 1985) such as an organisational crisis. Attribution theory, however,
should not be mistaken for the justification of such outcomes or end results (Weiner,
2010), e.g. an organisational crisis caused by a natural disaster would be expected to
attribute little to no crisis responsibility to an organisation as the outcomes of the
disaster would likely be beyond the organisation’s control (Coombs, 2007b).
However, not all outcomes of events motivate individuals to search for causal
processes (Weiner, 2010), they rather need to be significant enough to cause emotion
within individuals (Weiner, 2010). Crisis events motivate individuals to adopt a
cognitive process of causal attribution (Coombs, 1995, 2007, 2007b, 2015c), for
example, a process to make sense of the actions and events leading to the crisis.
Stakeholders affected by the crisis may tend to undergo various negative
emotions, such as anger and frustration, and consider causal attributions which have
led to the crisis, including factors of blame. Many scholars have, therefore, explored
the negative emotional consequences among stakeholders when trust has been
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 29
compromised followed by appropriate rebuilding strategies (Coombs 2007a, 2007b;
Meyer et al., 1995; Weiner, 2010).
In this respect, Weiner (1985, 1991) developed attribution theory, which posits
that there are three main goals to public excuse-giving following a wrongdoing: (1)
causal locus, which explores if an internal or external locus of control caused the crisis,
with stakeholders attributing more responsibility in events with internal locus of
control; (2) controllability, which refers to whether the excuse given may or may not
influence the crisis situation; and (3) stability, that is, whether the cause of the crisis
remains in the organisational environment or is a temporary factor (Coombs, 1995;
Weiner, et al. 1991, p. 5).
The expected outcomes of public excuse-giving vary between different crisis
events, making crisis communication a complex and subjective construct to study.
Coombs (2007b), therefore, drew from attribution theory in his development of SCCT
(Coombs, 2007b, 2015c) with the rationale that “the attributions of responsibility and
emotions can serve as motivations for action” (Coombs, 2007b, p. 166). Attribution
theory thereby fits with SCCT as it can guide organisations in how and where people
place blame for crises (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c).
Authors have made early links between attribution theory and organisational
crises by finding that the unexpectedness and negativity could be key driving forces in
the processes of how individuals make and evaluate attributions of blame (Coombs,
2007a, 2007b). It would be in management’s best interests to appropriately manage
angry or upset stakeholder emotions to prevent reputational damage and impacts on
long-term operational viability (Coombs, 2007b).
For the context of this research, attribution theory was particularly important in
the exploration to how organisations responded to a crisis event based on their
30 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
stakeholders’ organisational perception and expectations. For example, once a crisis
has occurred and stakeholders are exposed to initial crisis-related information, they
can begin to form a view about the crisis type and form attributions of crisis
responsibility (Coombs, 1995).
Whilst organisations may be able to influence stakeholders’ attribution processes
through appropriate crisis responses, third-parties, such as infomediares or “media,
financial analysts, regulators, and consumer organizations” can do so at the same time
(Zavyalova, et al., 2012, p. 1079). For example, information infomediaries could be
reporting the crisis with conflicting messages and thereby interrupt stakeholders’
cognitive blame attribution processes (Zavyalova et al., 2012).
Lastly, crisis communication is a complex field as crisis events occur in different
contexts (Coombs, 2015). The continuous development of the crisis communication
literature is vital to ensure research is up-to-date with evolving demands of real-world
issues (Coombs, 2015c). Examples are the rapid development of telecommunications
and different social media platforms that may affect the process of attribution theory
among stakeholders. From an attribution theory perspective, Weiner (1985) stated the
analogy that “the warrior needs to know why he is winning battles so he can survive
the next one” (p. 549), which depicts the relevance of attribution theory in ongoing
crisis communication research for real-world application. One must understand the
factors behind success or failure to consider suitable responses during future events,
which this study aims to contribute to through the exploration of a real-life crisis case.
Coombs (2007b) developed SCCT which predicts reputational outcomes for
different crisis situations and prescribes response strategies, as outlined in Table 2.1.
The framework has frequently been used in crisis literature (Comyns & Franklin-
Johnson 2016; Kim, 2017; Ma, 2018; Ma & Zhan, 2016; Park, 2017) and can act as
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 31
evidence-based guidelines for organisations seeking to optimise reputational recovery
in the light of a crisis.
Table 2.1
SCCT Crisis Response Strategies (Coombs, 2007b, p. 170) Strategies Responses
(1) Deny strategies:
Purpose is to establish a crisis frame and eliminate connections between the organisation and the crisis. If the organization is not involved in a crisis, it will not suffer any damage from the event.
Attack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong with the organization. Denial: Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis. Scapegoat: Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the organization for the crisis.
(2) Diminish crisis response strategies:
Argues that a crisis is not as bad as people think or that the organization lacked control over the crisis. A diminished connection to the crisis will lessen negative attributions and decrease the harmful effects of the crisis.
Excuse: Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis. Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.
(3) Rebuild strategies:
A segue for generating new reputational assets. Rebuilding strategies attempts to improve the organization’s reputation by offering material and/or symbolic forms of aid to victims.
Compensation: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims. Apology: Crisis manager indicates that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness.
(4) Bolstering strategy:
Offers a minimal opportunity to develop reputational assets. Organisations may draw on positive stakeholder relationships to help protect the organizational reputation, praise stakeholders for their efforts during the crisis or draw sympathy from being a victim of the crisis.
Reminder: Tells stakeholders about the past good works of the organization. Ingratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good works by the organization. Victimhood: Crisis manager reminds stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis too.
32 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
This study adopted Coombs’ (2007) work, which was available when the data
analysis began and captures specific details about the individual crisis response
strategies (see Table 2.1).
Coombs’ (2015c) more recent work on SCCT includes instructional and risk
communication as part of the crisis response phase of crisis management. In doing so,
SCCT suggests that organisations firstly direct their communication to stakeholders to
ensure their safety, followed by an adjustment of communication as more crisis-related
information becomes available.
Coombs (2015c) suggest that organisations should be cautious with the denial
strategy (Coombs, 2015c). Once this is issued, a denial could be more problematic to
retract and could even cause a subsequent organisational crisis should it become public
that the organisation was culpable for the event (Coombs, 2015c). It would rather serve
the organisation’s perceived integrity better to indicate that it accepts a level of
responsibility as the outcome could otherwise result in a trust violation with
stakeholders (Coombs, 2015c). This thesis explored whether similar response patterns
applied to organisations that were implicated by a crisis spillover.
In cases where crisis responsibility is strong, or organisations are undergoing an
integrity-based, competence-based or long-term threat, SCCT proposes that
organisations offer stakeholders an apology, compensation or both to reduce anger,
anxiety, and the likelihood of negative word-of-mouth (Coombs, 2015c).
Applicable to this study is Coombs’ (2015c) argument that just because an
organisation communicates with stakeholders through words or actions during a crisis
does not necessarily mean that they are improving their circumstances. Suitable
response strategies must be considered to appropriately accommodate stakeholder
expectations and their attribution of crisis responsibility.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 33
Coombs (2015c) stated that the timing of the responses is paramount and should
be addressed from two aspects. First, the timing is the point in time that the initial
crisis-related communication is released by the organisation (Coombs, 2015c). This
particularly applies when possible information infomediaries report on the crisis before
the organisation as this would likely intensify the situation (Coombs, 2015c;
Zavyalova et al., 2012). Similar response patterns could emerge in the data for the
present study and would in such case provide further support for Coombs’ (2015c)
claim. Secondly, Coombs (2015c) referred to the term ‘stealing thunder’ in that the
organisation to first report on a crisis ahead of peers or media steals the thunder, which
is likely to be applicable to a crisis involving multiple organisations.
Ma and Zhan (2016) recently undertook a meta-analysis of SCCT. The authors
found that attributed responsibility was strongly associated with organisational
reputation, but also that organisational reputation was weakly associated with response
strategies that resembled SCCT (Ma & Zhan, 2016).
Ma and Zhan (2016) further found that organisational responses that only
addressed crisis responsibility did not fully alleviate reputational threats in the light of
a crisis. For a preventable crisis, a sole focus on the rebuild SCCT period was found
to have a greater advantage to mitigate attributions of responsibility than for
organisations to undertake responses through mismatched SCCT periods, for example,
by mixing denial with bolstering. Given that this study explored crisis responsibility,
its findings may support or challenge the claims by Ma and Zhan (2016).
Coombs (2016) acknowledged Ma and Zhan’s (2016) meta-analysis as a
measure to crystallise the strengths and weaknesses of SCCT to determine the way
forward for future research in the crisis communications field. Coombs (2016) has
supported that ongoing crisis communication research is required, covering different
34 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
settings. Among future directions of crisis communication research using SCCT,
Coombs (2016) highlighted a range of important areas that justified the undertaking of
this study. For example, whilst the exploration of the long-term effects of appropriate
and inappropriate crisis responses strategies may be challenging to undertake, Coombs
(2016) has indicated a need for such SCCT-related knowledge.
Coombs (2016) further suggested that research emphasis should move beyond
outcomes for reputation and strategies for reputational recovery to explore the value
of organisations instructing and adjusting their crisis information for stakeholders. It
was in the interest of the present study to explore such long-term data and contribute
towards the broader crisis communications field from a macro perspective.
2.3 BEYOND THE SITUATIONAL FOCUS OF CRISIS RESEARCH
This study explored existing research that has looked at the crisis phenomenon
involving the attribution of responsibility towards multiple organisations. Comyns &
Franklin-Johnson (2016) employed similar terminology in relation to a crisis spillover
as they referred to a ‘collective crisis’ whilst looking at SCCT and CSR.
This chapter followed Coombs’ (2016) suggestion by going beyond SCCT to
discuss Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) application of the framework to a non-
traditional crisis setting.
2.3.1 The difference between a collective crisis and the crisis spillover phenomenon
Some interesting insights from the perspective of a crisis spillover can be taken
from the study of Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016). The authors explored the Rana
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 35
Plaza case from the date of the building collapse from 24 April 2014 to 12 months
after the collapse for eight of the directly implicated organisations2.
This dissertation corresponds with Comyns & Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) study
but used a deductive approach to examine longitudinal data, that is, four years,
covering organisations that were linked with prior garment production at Rana Plaza
as well as organisations that became implicated through guilt by association with the
crisis, for example, the crisis spillover phenomenon. As with this thesis, Comyns &
Franklin-Johnson (2016) examined SCCT alongside CSR; unlike the present study,
they employed an inductive approach that focused on the first post-crisis year focusing
only on organisations that were associated with prior garment production at Rana
Plaza, for example, a collective crisis.
Comyn and Franklin-Johnson’s (2016) study was published during the process
of this thesis and was influential to the present study through short-term insights to the
Rana Plaza case from the collective crisis perspective. For example, the authors
proposed that “in a collective crisis, the burden of responsibility will not be equally
shared among organizations. Those companies who adopt accommodative strategies
accept the burden of responsibility and the burden of negative reputation” (Comyns &
Franklin-Johnson, 2016, p. 177). They further argued that organisations in a collective
setting can respond differently to a crisis than individual organisations exposed to
similar reputational risks. This suggests that outcomes to corporate reputation and
financial expenditures could be different for individual organisational crisis settings
2Out of the eight organisations explored by Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016), three of these organisations were also used in this study, namely, Benetton, Mango and Primark.
36 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
and may include some organisational ‘free riders’ during the crisis recovery process
(Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016).
Further research, such as the present study, is required to provide more
understanding of Comyn & Franklin-Johnson-Franklin’s (2016) findings, which the
present study aims to address. As such, the main emphasis of this dissertation explored
the dual focus of responsibility from the crisis and CSR perspectives, rather than
looking at post-crisis reputation. Moreover, trends and patterns in the type of CSR
undertaken by the two sample groups was examined to identify the application of
explicit and explicit CSR practises by organisations (Matten & Moon, 2008).
The next section discusses current knowledge around the crisis spillover
phenomenon and its meaning for the aims of this study.
2.3.2 Crisis spillover
A crisis spillover is defined as a crisis that moves beyond a single organisation
to affect industry change. This has been referred to in the literature by various terms,
such as ‘disruptions in the field’ (Desai, 2011, 2014) or ‘reputational spillover’
(Boutinot et al., 2015). The present study refers to the phenomenon as a crisis spillover
to address a crisis that has “overflowed the boundaries” (Yu et al., 2008, p. 452) to
affect industry. This is based on scholarly discussions of negative disruptions that can
spill over organisational boundaries (Desai, 2011; Zavyalova et al., 2012).
Peer-reviewed literature on the crisis spillover phenomenon has been emerging
(Boutinot et al., 2015; Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Desai, 2011; Yu et al.,
2008). It is an important field to study to provide guidance to organisations on how to
minimise reputational damage during disruptions that industries may face (Boutinot et
al., 2015), whether they are directly or indirectly linked with the focal crisis.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 37
To date, it is known that similar to crisis events, organisations of both small and
large sizes are susceptible to crisis spillovers, particularly as the global market place
can have a greater impact on small- to medium-sized businesses through free trade
agreements and the internet (Avnet & Laufer, 2015). Effectively, it has become
increasingly important for management to guide organisations through different global
crisis events with minimum disruption and reputational damage (Avnet & Laufer,
2015). Additionally, industrial accidents, particularly those involving fatalities, have
been known to attract increasing organisational scrutiny and blame attributions among
stakeholders (Coombs, 2007a, 2007b, 2015c; Desai, 2014). The intensity of such
scrutiny and attribution of crisis responsibility could be intensified by organisational
size and industry visibility, for example, through marketing efforts (Desai, 2014).
These factors are motivated the present study to explore crisis responses of both large
and small to medium-sized entities.
Organisations affected by the crisis spillover can often have similar corporate
characteristics to that of the focal crisis organisation (Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008) and
can become affiliated with the crisis by stakeholders ascribing guilt by association
(Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008). Such cognitive processes are particularly applicable to
industry fields with prior histories of disruption (Desai, 2014) such as the fashion
industry.
Desai (2011, p. 274, 2014) found that public relations responses provided by an
organisation implicated by a crisis spillover could sometimes carry a greater influence
than of those involved with the focal crisis. For example, Desai (2011) found that
organisations in fields “characterized by greater scrutiny of contested issues” were
more likely to try to create positive impressions of their field following a crisis
spillover (p. 274). Moreover, Zhou and Ki (2018b) found marketing strategies did not
38 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
always help organisations recover from a crisis spillover uniformly. Moreover,
organisations with larger advertising budgets prior to a crisis spillover, could suffer
more from reputational damage as a result of the crisis spillover (Zhou & Ki, 2018b)
if they were not able to live up to their social expectations.
Whilst the present study focused on responsibility rather than reputation, it
aimed to examine how organisational responses may have been influenced by positive
or negative reinforcement from stakeholders in the short- and long-term. Desai (2014)
argued that organisations must take into account the ongoing activities of other
organisations within the industry field to maximise the effects of any strategic
responses to stakeholders. This can be monitored through media coverage and the
organisation’s own experience of the industry climate, following which resources are
allocated for responses to take place (Desai, 2014). In doing so, the impact of crisis
communication responses could carry a great potential in influencing the crisis
attribution process, which is relevant to this study. Some have proposed collective
industry responses to overcome “crisis spillover” events. Whilst these can be a costly
and a challenging option to coordinate (Yu et al., 2008), if successfully implemented,
they can considerably influence positive cognitive attribution processes among
stakeholders (Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008).
Existing perceptions on specific industries could, however, also determine how
rapidly a crisis spills over, especially across those “characterized by prior scrutiny of
issues related to the disruptions” (Desai, 2011, p. 265), such as the fast fashion
industry. Disruptions in past performance history could set stakeholders to expect
negative performance-related issues and cause a crisis to become more intense and
rapidly spill over (Desai, 2011, p. 265; Yu et al., 2008). Desai (2011) further suggested
that blame can often be attributed to organisations where the crisis is internally induced
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 39
and could have been “prevented or controlled”, such as in the Rana Plaza case which
was caused by operator neglect (p. 267). Whilst Yu et al. (2008) limited their study to
the negative impacts of a crisis spillover, they suggested that the crisis spillover could
become positive through the creation of new business opportunities and the gaining of
portions of competitors’ market shares.
From a similar aspect, Desai (2011) argued that a crisis spillover can present the
opportunity for organisations to instigate incentives to create change across an industry
field. Desai (2011), however, added that some prior examples of real-life crisis
spillovers presented a failure to improve or transform the industry following a crisis
(Desai, 2011). This has generally been caused by the lack of theoretical comprehension
for appropriate actions during industry-wide disruptions (Desai, 2011). The
longitudinal timeline of the present study, therefore, presented an opportunity to re-
visit such prior scientific claims to review the long-term effects on the fast fashion
industry through the lens of the Rana Plaza case. There has been a need to expand
scholarly knowledge to explore the crisis spillover phenomenon within different
contexts (Desai, 2011, 2014; Yu et al., 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Due to the
emergent phase of crisis spillover research, challenges have remained for organisations
to successfully develop and implement relevant communication strategies that have
been empirically tested.
It has been acknowledged that crisis events typically spill over through issue
scrutiny by media and stakeholders (Desai, 2014; Jonsson et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2008;
Zavyalova et al., 2012) and pressures of accountability by stakeholders following a
crisis (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs & Holladay, 1996). As a part of this causal
process, stakeholders can attempt to find the reasons for the crisis event, as explained
by attribution theory (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c). Recent literature has further found that
40 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
organisations can be susceptible to reputational threats during a crisis event even when
they are not responsible for the crisis (Avnet & Laufer, 2015), which highlights the
importance of expanding knowledge on crisis spillovers and supports the rationale for
this study.
The external image of organisations ultimately can often lie in in the perception
of their stakeholders rather than internally within the organisation (Yu et al., 2008).
During a crisis, stakeholders can use the cognitive approach relevant to attribution
theory to assess the industry field where the organisation has failed to provide an
appropriate crisis response (Yu et al., 2008). The next section explores the role of
stakeholders in the context of this study and how they may impact on a crisis situation
to spill over its boundaries to affect industry.
2.3.3 Stakeholder pressures
Stakeholders are those who affect or are affected by the sample organisations’
goals and operations. This could be through network links (Allen & Caillouet, 1994)
or by any other form of interest to the organisations.
Stakeholders are key to organisational image and reputation given that their
perception and attributions contribute towards broader organisational perceptions
(Allen & Caillouet, 1994). The perceived crisis responsibility among stakeholders can
determine the reputational damage inflicted on an organisation (Coombs & Holladay,
2004; Comyns & Franklin, 2016; Shim & Yang, 2016; Weiner, 2010; Zhou & Ki,
2018b). This process ultimately makes public relations a powerful tool in influencing
the perception of crisis events to stakeholders (Ihlen 2010) – the development of
relevant strategies is expected to emerge in the data of this study to provide evidence-
based outcomes.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 41
2.4 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to the economic, legal, ethical, and
discretionary [in later work referred to as philanthropic] expectations that society, for
example stakeholders, has of organisations at a given point in time (Carroll, 1979, p.
500; Carroll & Shabana, 2010, p. 89). According to Zhou and Ki (2018a), a majority
of Fortune 500 organisations today have provided a dedicated space for their CSR or
sustainability achievements and practices available on their websites.
Although organisations are more commonly expected and encouraged by the
public to engage in CSR, it has also not been perceived well when organisations
communicate about relevant activities too loudly, also referred to as the ‘catch 22’ of
CSR (Bartlett, 2011; Morsing et al., 2008, p. 97). By engaging in CSR, however,
organisations can develop intangible organisational assets, gain a competitive
advantage through differentiation strategies, which can proactively reduce risks and
costs and create a win-win relationship with stakeholders (Carroll, 1979, 1991, 2015;
Carroll & Shabana, 2010; Ihlen et al., 2011).
2.4.1 The link between CSR and crisis communication
CSR is an interdisciplinary concept and has recently been identified as a key area
of emerging crisis management research (Laufer, 2015; Zhou & Ki, 2018a, 2018b). To
date, however, there has been emergent knowledge around the role and impact of CSR
within the crisis communication sphere. This is where stakeholder influences can
become an important factor for the aims of this study.
Some authors have argued that CSR-oriented organisations can mitigate
negative brand evaluation in stakeholders’ attributions of crisis responsibility (Kim,
2013). Others have argued the opposite, that CSR could negatively influence crisis
42 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
response strategies in times of a crisis (Janssen et al., 2015). For example, crisis and
CSR literature has found that organisations with established CSR practices would be
expected to go above and beyond stakeholder expectations to rectify the situation
(Janssen et al., 2015, p. 187).
It is, therefore, in the interests of this research to adopt a dual focus approach for
crisis responsibility and CSR to support or contest prior findings. From the perspective
of a crisis spillover, however, organisations may assume responsibility for a crisis they
are not directly linked with, for example, if there is a diffusion of responsibility across
industry.
It should also be noted that large-scale organisations such as H&M may be
scrutinised due to their ability to influence industry trends in relation to CSR
(Arvidsson, 2010). This is due to large organisations being more socially visible;
however, this can also bring a greater organisational scrutiny as well as social and
political pressures by stakeholders (Arvidsson, 2010). Similarly, Zhou and Ki (2016)
suggested that smaller organisations can have more flexibility in their responses due
to their reduced public visibility. It is likely that patterns supporting or contesting this
argument may be found from the analysis of the data in the present study to explore
whether some organisations are more scrutinised than others, particularly large-scale
organisations.
Given that the key aspects of SCCT are crisis responsibility and organisational
reputation (Coombs, 2007b; Zhou & Ki, 2018a, 2018b), a link to attribution theory
was found by Kim (2013) in that CSR can have an influence on SCCT responses during
a crisis. Some authors have suggested that when organisations feel the need to conform
to social and economic norms in their environment, they are least likely to be actively
resistant (Clemens et al., 2008). In doing so, CSR could further bring heightened
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 43
positive attention from stakeholders when social expectations are met (Janssen et al.,
2015; Kim, 2014; Lee et al., 2018, 2018a, 2018b).
Organisations that have an established CSR agenda are generally expected to
respond in certain ways (Kim, 2014, 2017) and their existing CSR practices can
become a ‘cognitive blueprint’ of how stakeholders expect them to respond during the
crisis (Janssen et al., 2015, p. 187). NGOs have been found to be more likely to report
on a crisis related to organisations with a strong CSR record (Janssen et al., 2015), a
pattern that may emerge from the analysis of the data of this study.
If organisational responses to CSR demands are not congruent with stakeholder
expectations, particularly where the organisations have built up an image as socially
responsible, then CSR could become a liability (Zhou & Ki, 2018b). The post-crisis
attribution process may not, therefore, always be straightforward or linear and it may
not be realistic for all stakeholders to simply accept CSR-based responses without
further consideration of complex situational factors (Kim, 2017). However, when a
crisis occurs, CSR may support crisis recovery and the concept can, therefore, have
double effects (Zhou & Ki, 2018b).
The duration of CSR activities may also have an impact on the attribution
process of crisis responsibility. According to Zhou & Ki, (2018b), a long-term
engagement in CSR can benefit organisational crisis recovery as opposed to scepticism
associated with short-term, CSR-based crisis responses. Again, with CSR becoming a
standard activity for many organisations of today, the effective uses of the construct
within crisis settings have become more complex and require more evidence-based
research outcomes (Zhou & Ki, 2018a, 2018b).
There are also different types of CSR that can influence stakeholders’ blame
attribution processes (Janssen et al., 2015; Kim, 2013). Matten and Moon (2008)
44 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
identified two different types of CSR: implicit CSR represents collective CSR that
comes with a legal or mandatory component, for example; and explicit CSR represents
individual and voluntary organisational CSR activities. Engagement in one of these
CSR types does not exclude the other.
One pattern that was expected to emerge from the analysis of this study’s data
was if Connected and Unconnected Organisations strategically assume responsibility,
either CSR category to remain congruent with societal demands and, therefore,
maintain a positive brand attribution among stakeholders (Clemens et al., 2008;
Coombs, 2007b).
Matten and Moon’s (2008) implicit and explicit CSR framework was
specifically selected for the present study due to its focus on collective and individual
execution and was, thereby, deemed suitable to explore from the crisis spillover
perspective. According to Matten and Moon (2008), CSR manifests the “social
imperatives and the social consequences of business success” (p. 405). So, from a post-
crisis perspective it was assumed that the collective and individual execution of CSR
activities may impact on the blame attribution process among stakeholders, depending
on their social expectations and prior perceptions of individual organisations as well
as the industry as a whole.
So, by looking at implicit and explicit CSR, valuable insights can be gathered of
how relevant responses could serve as a symbolic or strategic resource (Kim, 2017)
during times of crisis, for example, equivalent to the ceremonial responses of
stakeholders (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Symbolic CSR actions
can enable organisations to strategically tailor crisis responses to help stakeholders
perceive their genuine responsibility for a crisis (Kim, 2017), i.e. this could be utilized
as a strategy to secure organisational legitimacy (Kim, 2017). An example of CSR
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 45
being utilized as a symbolic resource would be for an organisation to assume
responsibility for a crisis that spills over to affect industry, not due to linkage with the
focal the crisis event but rather to show their intent on fixing an industry-wide problem.
Based on this rationale, implicit and explicit CSR types were incorporated into
this study and are explained further in the next section.
2.4.2 Implicit and explicit CSR
Implicit CSR refers to “values, norms, and rules that result in (mandatory and
customary) requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues and that define
proper obligations of corporate actors in collective rather than individual terms”
(Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409). In simple terms, this notion refers to value-based
corporate policies and practises (Thorne et al., 2017).
Whilst some implicit CSR activities may appear closely linked to explicit CSR
practises, implicit CSR is not undertaken as part of a calculated corporate strategy but
rather, reflects organisational CSR values (Thorne et al., 2017). For example,
organisations may not undertake implicit CSR as part of building a specific
organisational image. An example of implicit CSR in Australia would be workplace
health and safety which organisations are legally bound by for their employees and
stakeholders.
Explicit CSR refers to voluntary corporate strategies and policies that “assume
and articulate responsibility for some societal interests” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p.
409). Examples of explicit CSR are organisational contributions to disaster relief
within the community or enabling employees to have paid days off to volunteer.
Authors have suggested that explicit CSR are different from implicit CSR in that
the activities of explicit CSR are part of a deliberate and often calculated strategy
46 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
(Thorne et al., 2017). Thorne et al. (2017) found that organisations that undertook
voluntary CSR reporting, that is, explicit CSR, also often became a part of collective
CSR alliances, that is, implicit CSR.
From the above discussion, this study considered that implicit and explicit CSR
are not mutually exclusive, and organisations can simultaneously engage in both types
of CSR. However, there has been limited knowledge to back this assumption and this
study therefore aimed to examine relevant patterns through the analysed data.
Matten and Moon’s (2008) framework on implicit and explicit CSR has been
applied to other studies within the public relations and business management field
(Hiss, 2009; Morsing et al., 2008). The concepts of implicit and explicit CSR have
particularly been used to explore contextual differences in responsible corporate
behaviour, in particular in the European and American contexts (Hiss, 2009; Matten
& Moon, 2008; Morsing et al., 2008). These authors have argued that the American
business context has been dominated by an explicit CSR approach which is opposite
to the more common implicit CSR direction in the European region (Matten & Moon,
2008), which suggests trends of cultural inference.
Whilst the public relations discipline has made a range of valuable contributions
to scholarly discussions on the CSR topic, there has been consensus among authors
that more evidence-based crisis outcomes are needed to generate more robustness in
the crisis communication and CSR research field (Bartlett, 2011; Golob & Podnar,
2011).
As such, this study aimed to contribute towards the robustness of this field of
study through the industry-specific context of this study in addition to the currently
emerging knowledge of CSR outcomes within the crisis spillover context.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 47
2.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Crisis literature focusing on SCCT has traditionally had a short-term focus
(Coombs, 2007b, 2015c). Whilst Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) took a long-term
perspective within their study, the authors focused on collective organisations with
prior links to the Rana Plaza factory rather than looking at the effects of the crisis
spillover phenomenon. The timeline of active CSR activities may have an impact on
how stakeholder may attribute crisis responsibility. For example, crisis literature has
suggested that long-term threats may gain greater attention from stakeholders and
influence organisations to undertake a more victim-focused response by organisations
(Coombs, 2015c). As such, this research sought to take a multi-year focus to explore
a longer-term crisis and CSR responses of organisations beyond a collective cluster of
organisations, that is, the crisis spillover phenomenon.
In doing so, this study explored a dual focus of crisis responsibility by looking
at responsibility as a driver for crisis responses as well as a driver for social outcomes.
From the crisis spillover perspective, it is likely to be in the management’s best
interests to remain vigilant about current activities within their industry environment
(Desai, 2014, 2011) to maximise the effects of any strategic crisis response to
stakeholders. To achieve this, however, more theoretical knowledge on successful and
less successful outcomes is required for different crisis contexts.
48 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Time Period 1 Time Period 2 Time Period 3
Figure 1.1. Conceptual map of key constructs and time periods.
Based on the conceptual summary in Figure 2.1, this research explored the crisis
spillover phenomenon through the following RQs:
(1) How does attribution theory explain organisational responses to a crisis
spillover?
(2) What SCCT strategies do connected and Unconnected Organisations employ
in the short- and long-term?
(3) What CSR strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ
in the short- and long-term?
The gaps identified in the literature justified the aim of exploring short- and long-
term impacts of the Rana Plaza crisis spillover through a deductive approach. The
deductive approach was employed to test SCCT within the context of a crisis spillover
and to explore short- and long-term outcomes of CSR-based responses.
Crisis spillover to Unconnected Organisations from Connected Organisations
Single organisation undertaking: - SCCT/reputation - CSR
Multiple organisations undertaking: - SCCT/reputation - CSR
SCCT + CSR
Period where attribution of responsibility falls on organisations
Long-term crisis
responses
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 49
RQs 2 and 3 further provided an opportunity for this study to explore crisis
responses of individual organisations and thereafter zoom out to review broader trends
and triggers for each of the two sample groups.
50 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Chapter 3: Method and Research Design
3.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter describes the design adopted by this research to examine the RQs.
It is structured to first discuss the methodology and the research design of this study.
This is followed by an overview of the applicable procedures, sample and timeline,
including a justification for their use. Next, the methods for organising and analysing
the data is outlined. The chapter concludes by discussing the criteria used to analyse
the research design and an overview of the ethical considerations.
3.1.1 Philosophical underpinnings
This research is situated within the realism paradigm with the rationale of
creating a theoretical and practical application of a contemporary phenomenon (Guba
& Lincoln, 1994). Drawing on the critical realism ontology, which assumes that
“reality is real but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible” (Guba &
Lincoln, 1994, p. 109), data collection from multiple sources aimed to enable the
creation of a widely critical, albeit never perfect, understanding of that reality.
The epistemological perspective of this study posits that of critical realism,
which essentially suggests that individuals try to find the truth, but we never know it
completely. However, the search for the truth continues because of its usefulness to
those researching in specific fields (Easton, 2010) and more broadly, its usefulness to
science. Easton (2010) has argued that the world, however, exists independently of our
knowledge of it for which science must continue to be critical of its objects. Thus,
critical realism posits that to explain and understand social phenomena, it remains
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 51
important to continue to enquire and evaluate them critically (Eason, 2010; Sayer,
1992). 3.1.2 Qualitative case study design
A case study design was adopted for this study to build “intensity and depth” in
the exploration of the interaction between the Rana Plaza case and its crisis context
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016, p. 19). The ability to engage in rich data that analyses
sub-units situated within the case study, both individually and more broadly, can create
a powerful method to describe the research phenomena being studied (Yin, 2009).
The case study design has been a widely employed research strategy (Marshall
& Rossman, 2016) in various fields, including CSR (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen,
2009; Choi, 2012; Fuoli, 2012), public relations (An & Cheng, 2010) and the crisis
communication field (Boutinot et al., 2015: Carvalho et al., 2015). Emerging literature
has also used the case study design to illustrate the larger phenomenon of the crisis
spillover (Comyn & Franklin-Johnson, 2016). For example, Comyn & Franklin-
Johnson (2016) studied the Rana Plaza crisis spillover from a one-year, post-crisis
perspective.
The qualitative design enabled this study to gather voluminous data from a
multitude of organisations for the evaluation of events that were bound by one crisis
event over a set period of time (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2009). This method was justified
through literature in that it “stresses the importance of context, setting, [organisational]
participant frames and reference” (Marshall & Rossman, 2016, p. 101). For the context
of this study, the participants are from hereafter on referred to as organisations.
52 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
3.1.3 Three principles of data collection
To maximise the benefits from the data collection, three key principles (Yin,
2009) were applied for:
(1) the creation of multiple collection sources to enhance research credibility
(2) the creation of a case study database for recording all evidence as well as
observational and methodological notes to build research dependability
(3) further enhancement of dependability by keeping a chain of evidence
throughout the research process (Yin, 2009).
3.1.4 Sample
Data was gathered from two groups of samples: Connected and Unconnected
Organisations. The Connected Organisations referred to those that were linked to prior
garment production at the Rana Plaza factory. Being the focal crisis organisations, the
objective here was to explore their more immediate and traditionally studied crisis
responses for later comparison with those implicated in the crisis spillover. In doing
so, data were gathered to help identify nuances to help explore each of the three RQs.
Unconnected Organisations referred to those that did not produce garments at
Rana Plaza but became implicated by holding similar corporate attributes to those of
the focal crisis organisations (Zavyalova et al., 2012); for example, they were fast
fashion retailers with garment production in Bangladesh.
Unconnected Organisations became ‘guilty by association’ (Zavyalova et al.,
2012) through the laws of attribution theory. The perceived organisational
responsibility contributed to stakeholders associating the crisis with the broader fast
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 53
fashion industry based on the similarities in corporate characters among organisations
and the influential, crisis-framing perception of guilt.
The research data were collected in 2017. The selection of the organisations was
therefore determined by reviewing fast fashion organisations that were connected and
unconnected with the Rana Plaza crisis through industry reports and news media.
Additional filters were, however, applied to the final selection of Unconnected
Organisations, and these measures are discussed next.
3.1.4.1 Selection criteria
The selection criteria for suitable organisations involved:
(a) Private and public entities3 listed on global stock markets, both with gross
annual sales figures greater than AUD$100 million. It was assumed that such sales
figures brought certain social and economic expectations among shareholders and
consumers, including profitability matters, business conduct, perceived company
image and social responsibility.
(b) Western organisations (e.g., Europe, the Americas and Australia) that offer
clothing as a part of their product range, such as H&M, Primark and Cotton On.
(c) Organisations that had garment production sourced from factories based in
Bangladesh, that is, the scope of factories in Bangladesh for this criterion extended
beyond Rana Plaza.
It was taken into consideration that some private entities may not have publicly
disclosed annual sales figures4. Therefore, the selection of private entities with
3Benetton, Bestseller, C&A, Cotton On, Fruit of the Loom, Helly Hansen, Kmart Australia, Lindex, Mango, Primark, and Target Australia. 4Cotton On, C&A
54 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
undisclosed sales figures came with an assumption of financial returns greater than
AUD$100 million due to their broader global market presence and international media
coverage.
In addition, given that the crisis spilled over on a global industry scale, the
research incorporated geographical frames for Unconnected Organisations to cover
organisations from Australia, USA and parts of the Nordic region, that is, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark and Finland. Justification for selecting these regions was
determined by:
(1) Market size: USA was identified as the world’s largest garment importer
(World Trade Organisation, 2017) and was likely to be impacted by the
industry-facing global crisis.
(2) CSR agenda: literature identified a strong CSR agenda in the Nordic
region (cf. Ihlen, 2011; Janssen et al., 2015; Morsing et al., 2008;
Pedersen & Gwozdz, 2014). In extending such knowledge, the case study
enabled an analysis of real-life crisis responses and trends in
organisational approaches to implicit and explicit CSR across
geographical regions of the sample Unconnected to the crisis (Matten &
Moon, 2008).
Based on the selection criteria and the screening process of suitable
organisations, the research established two sample groups consisting of 16 fast
fashion5 organisations. These are outlined in Figure 3.1.
5‘Fast fashion’ is a contemporary term referring to fashion clothing moving fast from the catwalk to reasonably priced organisations resulting in costs that are significantly lower than what a fashion house would sell the garments for.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 55
Figure 2.1. Connected Organisations and the regions of Unconnected Organisations.
The characteristics held in common by the selected organisations were that they
all sold fashion garments as a part of their product range. Given that they all had
garment production in Bangladesh, they were all affected directly or indirectly by the
Rana Plaza crisis spillover.
This research selected three organisations from each of the geographical regions
as the Unconnected Organisations. An exception was made to include four countries
from the Nordic region, as the exclusion of Finland would have resulted in Scandinavia
rather than the Nordic region being analysed.
Connected organsationsOrganisations linked with prior garment production
at Rana Plaza.
1. Adler Modemärkte 2. Benetton 3. C&A4. Mango 5. Primark 6. Wal-Mart
Unconnected organsations
Organisations implicated through the effects of the
crisis spillover.
Australia1. Cotton On2. Kmart Australia3. Target Australia
Nordic Region1. Bestseller - Denmark2. H&M - Sweden3. Helly Hansen - Norway4. Lindex, (Stockmann Group) - Finland
USA1. Abercrombie & Fitch2. American Eagle Outfitters3. Fruit of the Loom
56 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
The Connected Organisations consisted of six organisations to capture a broader
set of data to identify possible trends and differences within the period. Geographical
frames were not applied to the Connected Organisations. Because the sample was
identified as focal crisis organisations due to their production linkage with Rana Plaza,
this study expected to find “traditional” crisis responses within this sample. For
example, single organisations responding to a crisis event, as opposed to Unconnected
Organisations that were implicated by the crisis spillover. The outcome of this method
was likely to provide a comparative overview of the response patterns between those
linked with the Rana Plaza crisis and those implicated through guilt by association.
3.1.5 Screening of organisational profiles
The first stage of the data collection screened organisational suitability against
the sample frame criteria. This step was completed by utilising the ‘Global Business
Browser’ database (formerly known as “OneSource”).
The “Global Business Browser” provided a way to extract global corporate
information, such as annual sales figures, or to confirm if individual organisations are
private companies, if they have a holding/parent company, and/or if they are listed as
a public company on a stock market.
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the sample frame criteria and the selected
organisations for this study. Holding companies are included in Table 3.1 as their
influence was sporadically identified in the data, in particular for Wesfarmers, ABF
and the Stockmann Group. It was important to note that whilst Target and Kmart were
essentially American organisations, the Australian chain of these stores were managed
by Wesfarmers Ltd.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 57
Table 3.1
Overview of Sample Groups and Their Organisational Profiles6
3.2 DATA COLLECTION
This research adopted an embedded, single-case study design containing
multiple units of analysis (Yin, 2009). The single-case study design was considered
appropriate given that this research involved a complex study of multiple organisations
from two different angles of the same crisis event. The outcomes of a single-case study
design assisted in capturing contextual conditions of a salient industrial accident (Yin,
2009) so as to assist other organisations impacted by similar situations in the future.
Additionally, the Rana Plaza case represented an extreme case and, therefore, was
identified as a rarity (Yin, 2009), and the multiple units of analysis within each of the
samples was gathered through various sources for data triangulation.
6Appendix C provides an overview of additional details for this table, such as the end of the fiscal year applicable to selected organisations.
Organisations Annual Sales Holding Company Private or Listed Entity
Region Prior business with Rana Plaza
Adler Modemärkte > AUD$100 million Steilmann Holding Ag Public Subsidiary Germany YesBenetton > AUD$100 million Edizione Srl Private Subsidiary Italy YesC&A > AUD$100 million n/a Private Parent Netherlands YesMango > AUD$100 million n/a Private Parent Spain YesPrimark > AUD$100 million Associated British Foods (ABF) Private Subsidiary UK/Ireland YesWal-Mart > AUD$100 million n/a Public Parent USA YesCotton On > AUD$100 million n/a Private Parent Australia NoKmart Australia > AUD$100 million Wesfarmers Ltd Private Subsidiary Australia NoTarget Australia > AUD$100 million Wesfarmers Ltd Private Subsidiary Australia NoBestseller > AUD$100 million n/a Private Subsidiary Denmark NoLindex > AUD$100 million Stockmann Group Private Subsidiary Finland NoHelly Hansen > AUD$100 million n/a Private Parent Norway NoH&M > AUD$100 million n/a Public Subsidiary Sweden NoAbercrombie & Fitch > AUD$100 million n/a Public Parent USA NoAmerican Eagle Outfitters > AUD$100 million n/a Public Parent USA NoFruit of the Loom > AUD$100 million Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Private Subsidiary USA No
58 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
A longitudinal timeline was employed over a four-year period to analyse three
different points in time, set out as follows:
Table 3.2
Focus of data collection over three periods of time
Time cluster Reference of dates Focus
Time Period 1 April to June 2013 Refers to primary crisis responses following the factory collapse.
The immediate crisis response may influence the crisis frame among stakeholders (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007b; Coombs et al., 2017).
Time Period 2 July 2013 to June 2014 Intermediate SCCT responses emerging from organisational commitment, or non-commitment to the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety7 (hereafter referred to as the Bangladesh Accord) or the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety’8 (hereafter referred to as The Alliance). The latter was implemented later in July 2013.
Time Period 3 July 2014 to June 2017 Explores if organisations undertook short-term CSR or continued with long-term/ongoing CSR activities in response to the Rana Plaza crisis.
7The Bangladesh Accord is a legally binding, union-affiliated industry initiative that resulted from the 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse. It served the purpose of improving workers’ safety across the ready-made-garment (RMG) factories in Bangladesh. This was initially a five-year initiative but was extended in June 2018 with 190 active signatories. 8The Alliance is legally arbitrated by its annual membership payment from its signatories. It ceased operations in December 2018 as per its five-year commitment after the Rana Plaza disaster.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 59
3.2.1 Sampling of data
A purposive sampling strategy was undertaken for the broader data collection
for both sample groups through selective keyword searches of the Rana Plaza crisis.
In doing so, the study was able to capture data units addressing crisis-related responses
and actions applicable to the pre-determined organisations and in order to explore the
RQs appropriately.
Data consisted of secondary data of communications media sourced from two
trusted research databases, ‘ProQuest’ and ‘Factiva’. The search term ‘Rana Plaza’
was used in both databases, which yielded 13,238 results from ProQuest and 14,555
results from Factiva.
Given the large volume of findings, results were reduced through a number of
measures. The date range of 24 April 2013 to 30 June 2017 was applied for this study.
Organisational names were thereafter added together with the ‘Rana Plaza’ search
term, for example “H&M and (Rana Plaza)”, or “H&M or (Rana Plaza)”. To maximise
results pertinent to this study, some additional searches to specifically address the
sample organisations were undertaken involving “H&M and Bangladesh”, “H&M or
Bangladesh”, “H&M and 2013”, and “H&M or 2013”. The remainder of the data
sources consisted of publicly available information such as annual reports,
CSR/sustainability reports, blog posts, media statements, press releases, social media,
website content, and lastly, audio from video sources were transcribed for the analysis.
Based on the above data sources and methods, the aggregated data for analysis
was reduced to 518 data units, such as news articles or organisational blog posts
addressing the Rana Plaza crisis.
60 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
A growing body of crisis communication research has recognised social media
as “critical variables or contexts” (Coombs et al., 2017, p. 160). As such, crisis
responses released through organisational social media channels, such as Facebook
and Twitter, were collected through the social media listening software “Social Studio
by Radian 6” which requires the set-up of an online account with login. Once the online
account was created, individual topic profiles were set up for each organisational
participant to enable the software to search for statements containing the key word
‘Bangladesh’ released by organisations from 24 April 2013 to 30 June 2017. This
method yielded 144 applicable data units extracted from the ‘Social Studio’ database.
Again, the data units referred to individual data samples; however, in this case these
referred to social media-based crisis responses by organisations. These were in
addition to the 518 units of data previously discussed. All data units were streamlined
to PDF format and then imported to the qualitative software, NVivo. In addition to the
PDF format, crisis-related audio retrieved from video content was transcribed for
coding purposes during this process.
3.2.2 Data analysis
The data were analysed through a qualitative approach. Content analysis is a
suitable method because it enables the systematic evaluation of communications
content (Elo & Helvi, 2007; Krippendorff, 2013), such as in the form of documents,
oral communication and graphics.
While content analysis may be conducted through either or both an inductive or
deductive approach, both approaches possess three main phases of preparing,
organising and reporting on the data (Elo & Helvi, 2007). This research employed a
deductive method given its use of existing frameworks and models (Elo & Helvi, 2007;
Marshall & Rossman, 2016).
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 61
NVivo was utilised due to its ability to support the organisation and analysis of
large volumes of text-rich and multimedia-based data derived from multiple sources.
The rationale for using a computerised software tool instead of completing manual
coding derived from the ability for NVivo to provide a transparent and objective
method of demonstrating the coding decisions previously discussed. The software
further enhances efficiencies in comparing nodes, the exploration of trends and
differences through computerised reports (Creswell, 2003).
3.2.3 The content analysis method
The data reduction process consisted of several stages. First, the data were
organised into the three time periods. Second, the data were categorised and coded into
nodes in NVivo. These are noted in detail in Figure 3.2. The coding process was guided
by existing theoretical knowledge for the development of key concepts and categories
alongside emergent themes. This was achieved by drawing from the SCCT framework
(Coombs, 2007b), Matten and Moon’s (2008) conceptual framework for implicit and
explicit CSR, and stakeholder pressures identified in the data.
The findings of the data codes in Figure 3.2 were later grouped into one of the
three time periods considered by this study. During this process, all data pieces were
reviewed from two perspectives: 1) the lens of SCCT; and 2) the lens of CSR. It should
be noted that an organisational response could be both SCCT and CSR. Coding
decisions were guided by the following approaches:
62 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
= key category = sub-category = variables
Figure 3.2. Operationalisation of codes through NVivo. ‘Stakeholder pressures’ is represented by individuals or organisations with an interest in one or more crisis affiliated organisations and/or the fast fashion industry.
SCCT involved deductive coding drawing from Coombs’ (2007b) SCCT
that reflected SCCT strategies to deny, diminish, rebuild and bolster. The
SCCT codes were not mutually exclusive; organisations’ SCCT responses
were coded based on the SCCT type and also the order of use within each
time period. This resulted in the ability to present any evolution in each
CSR
durin
g tim
es o
f cris
is
SCCT (Coombs 2007b)
Denial
Bolstering
Diminish
Rebuild
Non SCCT response Crisis spillover
No Statement
Refusal to collective responses/rebuild
organisation-to organisation
pressures
Long-term strategy
CSR (Matten & Moon 2008)
Implicit
Explicit
Crisis Response Date
2013 April - June July - September October - Dec
2014
January - March April - June July - September October - Dec2015
2016
2017
Stakeholder pressures
Consumers, NGO's, news media etc.
Organisations
Connected Organisations
C&A Wal-Mart Benetton
Mango Primark Adler Modemärkte
Unconnected Organisations
Cotton On Target Australia Kmart Australia Abercrombie & Fitch Fruit of the Loom
H&M Lindex Helly Hansen Bestseller American Eagle Outfitters
Organisational Regions
Australia
Nordic Region
USA
Rana Plaza Crisis Linkage
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 63
organisation’s crisis response strategy. This order was reflected in the
tables within each time period.
1. CSR: Matten and Moon’s (2008) theory of implicit and explicit CSR
guided the analysis in exploring relevant CSR communication employed
by the organisations. Codes were, again, not mutually exclusive given that
the organisations could have undertaken both implicit and explicit CSR.
For example, organisational conformity to the Bangladesh Accord and The
Alliance were implicit responses as they were undertaken collectively by
the organisations. Once committed to the industry initiatives [to meet
stakeholder expectations] the organisations were required to abide by
relevant policies and guidelines in their practises. Explicit responses on the
other hand referred to individual and voluntary CSR communication
through actions or statements, such as CSR/sustainability reports or
separate foundations to empower vulnerable factory workers.
A sample of the coding process is displayed in Table 3.3. Stakeholder pressures
were also coded. Whenever a stakeholder (e.g., consumer or NGO) indicated a
pressure argument, for example, that an organisation should accept responsibility or
meet new industry standards, the stakeholder was coded under a specific node. These
nodes were translated into the number of mentions of stakeholders that pressured the
organisations and also formed part of the analysis around their influence on short- and
long-term organisational responses. Finally, the data analysis undertook a range of
progressive stages to generate reliable findings (Marshall & Rossman, 2016;
Krippendorf, 2003). This involved a thorough review and re-review of the data to
enable the emergence of patterns and findings (Marshall & Rossman, 2016).
64 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Table 1.3
Example of Operationalisation of Codes
Concept Code Example
SCCT Denial Mango, the Spanish organisation, said it did not attend [RP
victim compensation summit in Geneva] as it had not
formalised commercial relations with Rana Plaza. It has
stated it had ordered only test samples before the disaster
(Smith & Dowling, 2013, 13 Oct).
SCCT Diminish / Denial
“Walmart is the one company that is showing an astonishing
lack of responsibility, considering that so much of their
product was being made at the Tazreen factory”, said
Samantha Maher, a campaign coordinator for the British arm
of the Clean Clothes Campaign, a European anti-sweatshop
group. Walmart has also been asked to contribute to the
planned Rana Plaza fund because production documents
were found in the building rubble indicating that a Canadian
contractor was producing jeans for Walmart in 2012 at the
Ether Tex factory inside the building. Walmart said that
unauthorized contractors were producing garments without
the company's knowledge (Greenhouse 2013, 25 Nov).
Crisis
spillover
response and
CSR
Spillover H&M did not have clothes made at the site and was the first
company to sign a safety agreement for Bangladeshi factories
after the disaster (The Financial Express, 2013, Nov 27).
SCCT and
CSR
Rebuild Only Primark has donated the highest amount of US$ 1.0
million directly to the fund while another $9 million would
be paid directly to the workers of the New Wave Bottoms, a
factory of the Rana Plaza (The Financial Express, 2014, Apr
17).
After making sense of the data, trends and differences were interpreted through the
attachment of meaning, inferences, theoretical explanations and conclusions guided by
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 65
the RQs. Finally, a search began for alternative understandings of the findings to
minimise potential researcher bias. This included observational and methodological
notes to detect any early researcher mistakes or personal biases against actual
organisational behaviour (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). In this process, an emergent
node on crisis spillover was added to capture recurring organisational responses
applicable to the crisis spillover. This included the Unconnected Organisations
responses to the Rana Plaza crisis by, for example, commitment to the Bangladesh
Accord or The Alliance that were both established as a result of the factory collapse.
3.3 ENHANCEMENT OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The single-case study design required careful investigation to reduce the
prospects of any misrepresented results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 1994). As such, this
section summarises the measures undertaken to enhance internal and external validity
in the form of credibility, dependability, confirmability and transferability. Each of
these criteria represented strategies undertaken in the research process to enhance the
trustworthiness of this study.
3.3.1 Credibility
Credibility refers to the truth of the data representation and interpretation from
the participant’s perspective (Yin, 2009). This is an important aspect to case study
research that generates exploratory and descriptive findings to research phenomena
through its organisations (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). A number of steps were
addressed to mitigate researcher bias in the present study through “subjective
judgement” during the collection of the data (Yin, 2009, p. 41), as follows:
The data was collected from multiple sources to reach data saturation (Marshall
& Rossman, 2016; Yin, 2009)
66 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Prolonged engagement with the data was undertaken for the completion of a
persistent observation, and to build scope and depth with the crisis spillover
phenomenon (Lincoln & Guba, 1985)
The collected data was reviewed and re-reviewed multiple times (Marshall &
Rossman 2016; Yin, 2009).
Credibility was further enhanced through the multiple units of analysis within
the single case study which represented media coverage of relevant organisations. The
findings were thereby able to provide a broader representation of the crisis spillover
phenomenon (Yin, 2009).
3.3.2 Dependability
Dependability refers to the degree of auditability and replicability should others
attempt to reconstruct the research with the same data within a similar setting (Lincoln
& Guba, 1985). This research employed a number of strategies to fulfil this criterion:
A case study database was implemented for the data collection and analysis
processes (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Yin 2009).
Data was explicitly sampled from publicly available sources, which enhanced
the retrievability of the content (Yin, 2009).
An audit trail of the data collection and analysis processes was maintained for
peer examination by an experienced research colleague to ensure that the same
conclusions were reached (Creswell 2003, Marshall & Rossman, 2016). A re-
evaluation of the coding was conducted where variances were detected.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 67
Where the same conclusions were not reached, a re-review of the data analysis
was undertaken to eliminate possible bias or coding errors. Where changes
were required, the units of data were re-categorised.
A thorough presentation of the data analysis process was provided (Yin, 2009)
to enhance replicability.
In addition, content analysis is considered a reliable method for replicability
(Krippendorff, 2013). Provided that the formula for specified research techniques are
followed, researchers at a different point in time, and possibly under different
circumstances, should achieve equivalent results within the context of same
phenomenon (Krippendorff, 2013). 3.3.3 Confirmability
Confirmability refers to objectivity in the degree to which research findings may
be confirmed or validated by others (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Whilst this may be
a challenging criterion for the fulfilment of exploratory and descriptive outcomes
derived from qualitative research, this research addressed a number of steps to fulfil
this criterion. These referred to the persistent data observation through prolonged
engagement procedures (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), and the reviewing and re-reviewing
of the sample (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Marshall & Rossman 2016).
Rich quotes referring to organisations were provided in the data to support the
establishment of emerging themes and conclusions derived from the data analysis (Yin
2009). The analysis also referred to theory and literature to support any claims. Lastly,
the research process and findings were audited by an independent peer examiner
experienced in qualitative methods (Creswell, 2003) for the fulfilment of this criterion.
68 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
3.3.4 Transferability
Transferability refers to the degree to which research findings can be generalised
to other contexts and settings (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Yin 2009), that is, external
validity (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2009). The challenge with transferability is that it can
could be subject to perception to the counterpart making the generalisation (Creswell,
2003). Given the industry-specific settings of this study, such endeavours were likely
to be challenging; however, it could be possible that the overall findings of the present
study could be transferable to other crisis spillover settings.
3.4 ETHICS CONSIDERATIONS
3.4.1 QUT ethics clearance ID# 1700000515
The principles and practise for ethical management of the research data were
carefully considered to maintain a high degree of research validity, trustworthiness and
participant safety and welfare for content extracted from social media. As such, an
ethics application for negligible/low-risk research was sought and approved by the
QUT Office of Research Ethics and Integrity with clearance ID #1700000515. The
approval included the collection of social media-based data through the social media
listening software, ‘Social Studio by Radian6’, and the Facebook and Twitter accounts
of the organisations.
Individuals of the community were not approached for participation in this study.
Identifiers for the organisations (e.g., organisation or retail name) were disclosed in
the reporting of the data. Whilst this could cause discomfort to organisations, such
likelihood remained minimal given that the data has remained publicly available since
2013.
Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis 69
The collected data were stored electronically (Marshall & Rossman, 2016) by
password protection on an institutional drive. The research findings are presented
throughout the thesis with additional dissemination through publication and
conferences.
Chapter 4: Findings 71
Chapter 4: Findings
4.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter outlines the short- and long-term responses to a crisis event that
spill over from their focal organisations, for example, Connected Organisations, to
affect industry, for example, the Unconnected Organisations. SCCT and CSR comes
into focus as these are addressed by organisations in efforts to minimise reputational
damage among stakeholders in response to the crisis spillover.
To enable a longitudinal exploration, the data were divided into three time
periods:
(1) The immediate crisis response: 24 April 2013 to June 2013.
(2) The short-term crisis response: 2013 July to 2014 June.
(3) The long-term crisis response: 2014 July to 2017 June.
Each of these time periods were examined for the SCCT responses employed by
the organisations. This is followed by findings on attribution theory and SCCT through
post-crisis pressures facing the organisations, and how such pressures may have
shaped subsequent strategic short- and long-term CSR responses.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the similarities and differences
between the strategic responses of the organisations within each sample group, as well
as an overview of the geographical response patterns within Unconnected
Organisations.
72 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
4.2 TIME PERIOD 1: THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS RESPONSE
This time period focused on the time frame of 24 April 2013 to 30 June 2013
and represented the immediate crisis response phase for the organisations.
The Rana Plaza factory collapse happened at approximately 09:00am in the
morning of 24 April 2013 and became a catalyst for change within the fast fashion
industry. Following the collapse, stakeholders quickly gathered forces to demand
organisations with garment production in Bangladesh to take collective responsibility
to protect vulnerable factory workers in developing regions.
In unpacking the trends and response patterns for Time Period 1, the data first
analysed the SCCT, crisis spillover and CSR responses undertaken by organisations to
enable a thorough exploration of subsequent stakeholder pressures that emerged in
later time periods through media’s portrayal of the crisis.
4.2.1 Crisis response
The analysis first explored the immediate crisis responses following the factory
collapse. This involved deductive coding drawing from Coomb’s (2007b) SCCT
framework. This is set out in Table 4.1.
The numbers in Table 4.1 represents the order in which organisations undertook
their response strategies. All organisations arrived at a rebuild strategy within this time
period; however, the overall pattern leading to the rebuild response differed. It is
important to note here that rebuild strategies coincidently became equivalent to CSR
actions. For example, actions of appointing an NGO in Bangladesh after the factory
collapse to assist with victims and their families was a rebuild strategy but also
depicted explicit CSR on behalf of the organisation.
Chapter 4: Findings 73
Table 2.1
Evolution of Crisis Response Strategies in Time Period 1
Response strategies
Organisation Bolstering Denial Diminish Rebuild No statement C
onne
cted
Adler n/a - linked to crisis in July 2013 (e.g., Time Period 2)
Benetton #2 #1 #3 #4
C&A #1 #2 #3 #4
Mango #3 #1 #2 #4
Primark #2 #1
Wal-Mart #3 #1 #2 #4
Unc
onne
cted
Abercrombie & Fitch #1 American Eagle Outfitters #1
Bestseller #1
Cotton On #2 #1
Fruit of the Loom #1 H&M #2 #1
Kmart Australia #2 #1
Helly Hansen #1
Lindex #1
Target Australia #2 #1 Total number of
responses 9 8 4 4 6
Note. #[number] = the order in which an organisation undertook its response strategies.
4.2.1.1 Connected Organisations
Only one organisation, Primark, offered an immediate rebuild strategy. The
broader pattern of connected organisation responses indicated that whilst they all
reached a rebuild strategy sooner or later, they initially attempted to remove or
diminish attributions of crisis responsibility by reminding stakeholders of their prior
activities or that contracts with the Rana Plaza factory were not viable at the time of
the collapse. The combination of denial and rebuild strategies were required to set the
74 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
record straight as the organisations with prior Rana Plaza linkage experienced severe
scrutiny and attributions of blame among stakeholders.
Wal-Mart initially issued a statement of denial which was followed by a
bolstering response to remind stakeholders of their ethical supply chain standards.
Wal-Mart sought to diminish their crisis responsibility by noting that the decision to
contract Rana Plaza was unauthorised.
Other statements were issued to diminish crisis responsibility as per the
following examples:
(1) the organisation had only ordered samples from a Rana Plaza based supplier, that
is, no actual sales orders had been placed for production. For example:
MANGO deeply regrets the tragedy that has occurred in Bangladesh and
would like to offer its heartfelt condolences to the families of the victims.
Furthermore, MANGO would like to clarify that the supplier Phantom was
not a supplier of the company, although they were planning to produce some
samples for various company lines, samples that still had not been
started. MANGO always conducts a social audit on all the suppliers it works
with before establishing any commercial relationship with them, in order to
verify the working conditions of its employees: the non-use of child labour,
the safety of the workplace, remuneration and hours, as indicated in the
company’s sustainability report:
http://www.mango.com/…/compa…/IN/empresa/rsc/memoria2011.pdf.
MANGO had not conducted a social audit because Phantom was not a
supplier of the company. Had the samples that Phantom was going to
produce for MANGO complied with the quality standards and the social
Chapter 4: Findings 75
audit been positive, said supplier would have produced an order of 25,000
garments for the company. Even so, notwithstanding the social audit, it
would have been impossible to detect the structural defects of the collapsed
building, since MANGO would not have been able to ascertain that the
owners of said had building had built three storeys more than is permitted.
(@Mango (28 April 2013) [Twitter])
(2) Garment production at Rana Plaza was unauthorised (e.g., through sub-
contracting). For example:
Benetton Group strongly reiterates that none of the manufacturers housed in the
collapsed building is a supplier to any of our Group’s organisations. We have
since established that one of our suppliers had occasionally subcontracted orders
to one of these Dhaka‐based manufacturers. Prior to the accident, that
manufacturer had already been permanently removed from the list of potential
direct or indirect suppliers. In fact, it had come to light that it no longer met the
stringent standards that would have made it eligible to even potentially work for
us. (@Benetton (30 April 2013) [Twitter])
Benetton later updated their statement to clarify that an Indian supplier had sub-
contracted a part of their order to the Rana Plaza factory without prior approval. Whilst
it has been recommended that organisations continue to update stakeholders during a
severe crisis event (Coombs, 2015c), Benetton’s mistake was to firstly issue a firm
denial statement (2015c) and then to later retract the denial. As previously predicted
by literature, Benetton thereby increased their susceptibility for blame attributions
among stakeholders (Coombs, 2015c).
76 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Primark’s response stood out in comparison to the other organisations in this
sample. They immediately accepted crisis responsibility with a rebuild strategy.
Although it was combined with bolstering, Primark spared no time in having impact
on the ground to assist victims and their families with food, supplies and short-term
funds.
An early media statement released by Primark signalled the development of
crisis spillover as they accepted immediate responsibility. In doing so, Primark spurred
attributions of crisis responsibility towards organisations not taking responsibility or
action. Primark stated:
Primark cannot speak for the other organisations involved – they will have to
make their own statement on the issue of compensation. However, the
company does of course stand by its earlier statement to compensate the
victims of this tragedy. A further comprehensive programme covering the
immediate and long-term needs of the survivors and the dependents of the
deceased is also being finalised. This programme will include medical and
occupational rehabilitation. This will be managed by international and local
NGOs. (Primark, 2013, May 10)
Primark’s statement signalled crisis spillover by indirectly placing organisation-
to-organisation pressures by indirectly shaming those not taking action. In doing so,
they started the process of ‘stealing thunder’ (Coombs, 2015c) by increasing blame
attributions towards other organisations. Competitors could essentially be triggered to
respond similarly to Primark for a positive organisation perception. Eventually,
however, all organisations arrived at a rebuild strategy, but with a combination of
diminish, denial or bolstering before or after the rebuild response.
Chapter 4: Findings 77
4.2.1.2 Unconnected Organisations
The evidence presented in Table 4.1 above identifies consistent patterns among
organisations affected by the crisis through the spillover phenomenon within the
corporate environment. A majority of organisations initially detached themselves from
the crisis through bolstering strategies to remind stakeholders of their prior and
ongoing work in CSR. For example, Australian organisations, Cotton On, Target
Australia and Kmart Australia undertook bolstering strategies by emphasising their
factory audits in sourcing regions as well as CSR-focused corporate policies:
Cotton On Group risk and loss prevention manager Jacqueline Hennessy
yesterday said the company had comprehensive safety checks in place for its
Bangladesh factories, including some conducted by an independent authority.
Cotton On had built long-standing relationships in Bangladesh and regularly
took factory workers aside to ask how they felt about their work sites, she said.
While the company did not think its ethical program was perfect, it was
committed to improving working conditions in Bangladesh and had started
trying to do so long before public pressure came to bear, she said. “We're doing
the best we can in terms of flying the flag and doing the right thing around
ethical concerns” Ms Hennessy said (Squires, 2013, Jun 26).
Similarly, Kmart Australia released the following bolstering statement through
news media:
“The Bangladesh factory collapse truly is a tragedy and our thoughts are with
those involved. At Kmart, we work closely with our suppliers, including those
in Bangladesh, and their factory team members to ensure they have an
understanding of the importance of safety. More importantly we made a
78 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
decision some months back not to engage with any new suppliers who have
factories above marketplaces, such as the garment factory reported in
Bangladesh, or in shared premises due to the possibility of accidents occurring
and safety concerns.” (Cooper 2013)
It is worth noting that Wesfarmers is the Australian holding company of both
Target Australia and Kmart Australia, which means that both organisations are under
the same management however crisis responses may still vary somewhat.
Kmart Australia was the primary buyer from Bangladesh and they immediately
travelled to Bangladesh to inspect their suppliers’ compliance and building safety in
response to the Rana Plaza crisis. Kmart Australia also released a media statement
admitting to not having checked structural building inspections in their prior factory
audits:
To be quite honest, the thing that we weren't checking in our audits was
building safety. I mean, we were doing all the other safety checks in regards
to employment mainly. We refuse to do business with anybody that even
considers to try to have a sweatshop or underage employees. But the one thing
that we weren't doing were building checks and after this building had
collapsed, I mean it touched me as much as it did every other Australian that
has seen this terrible disaster. And, you know, I'm being honest, I [Kmart
CEO, Guy Russo], my team did not check buildings. (Ryan, 2013)
Kmart’s statement suggested that they assumed risk control as an outcome of the
Rana Plaza disaster, for example, the crisis influenced Kmart to start auditing their
factory buildings to reduce similar risks.
Chapter 4: Findings 79
Whilst written statements were being issued in response to Rana Plaza, one
reporter noted that Australian organisations avoided answering crisis-related questions
on camera. This depicted a form of stakeholder pressure as answers were sought from
industry at the time. An example is depicted through this news media quote:
A string of Australian companies sells products that are made in Bangladesh:
Kmart, Target, BIG W and Cotton On are just a few. All say they insist on
strict guidelines on safety and worker's rights and conduct regular audits of
their Bangladeshi suppliers. But not a single one of these companies would
speak to us on camera to explain in detail just how these safe working
conditions are met. (Cooper, 2013)
In terms of responsibility, the news media statements described an industry-wide
issue with the potential to influence stakeholders to attribute guilt, which may have
ultimately contributed to the creation of a crisis spillover. The avoidance of
organisations that were narrated in the statement was likely to motivate stakeholders
to apply pressure to demand ethical supply chain practises by the fashion industry.
Moving on to the responses of other organisations in the sample, H&M, being
the single, largest apparel buyer in Bangladesh, engaged in bolstering strategies in
response to the significant industry pressures targeted at them. Such pressures were
targeted at H&M by stakeholders in the form of NGOs, which was predicted by the
literature discussed in Chapter 2. Other stakeholders who applied pressure were
industry watchdogs and consumers. Similar to other Unconnected Organisations, the
rationale for H&M’s bolstering responses was to remind stakeholders of their prior
CSR as the crisis spillover developed, and also to indirectly respond to stakeholder
pressures.
80 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Below is an example of stakeholder pressures where H&M’s agreeance to
stakeholder pressures is hailed, whilst identifying that the pressures against the large-
scale organisation motivated peers to undertake similar strategies:
Consumer and labour groups hailed the move by Sweden-based H&M, which
is the largest purchaser of garments from Bangladesh, as an important step
toward improving factory safety in Bangladesh, saying it would increase
pressure on other western organisations and apparel organisations to do
likewise. Within hours of H&M's statement Monday, C&A of the
Netherlands and two British organisations, Primark and Tesco, also joined in.
(Greenhouse, 2013, May 14)
Whilst it may have been a coincidence that other organisations followed H&M’s
response through pressure emerging from news media reporting that demanded ethical
supply chain practises in developing regions, the response may have also signalled the
urgency for industry peers to remain competitive with the industry giant. Further data
to support this claim is outlined in Appendix D and refers to direct or indirect media
statements released directly by the Unconnected Organisations.
4.2.2 Description of stakeholder pressures
During the data analysis, inferences of stakeholder pressures targeting the fast
fashion industry started to take shape, which are depicted in Figure 4.1. Stakeholders,
such as Clean Clothes Campaign, unions, industry watchdogs, and consumers
influenced various degrees of conformity to pressures among organisations as they
demanded an increase in ethical supply chain practices in the fashion industry.
Chapter 4: Findings 81
Figure 4.1. Coding reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources in Time Period 1, April-June 2014.
The coding references in Figure 4.1 refer to the number of times that references
to stakeholders appeared in the qualitative research data. Overall, the evidence
presented a period of intense industry scrutiny within Time Period 1. Figure 4.1 refers
to a total of 1,874 coding references to stakeholder pressures placed by stakeholders.
These refer to the number of times stakeholders appeared in the data through
stakeholders, news media, interviews and organisational communication. The top five
sources of pressures identified were (1) the Bangladesh Accord, (2) organisations
placing pressures on industry peers, (3) activist groups or other, (4) consumers, and
(5) garment unions and labour groups.
The demand of stakeholders was essentially for the fast fashion industry to
address the need for collective industry actions combined with independent
involvement of unions. A prime example of such an initiative became the development
of the Bangladesh Accord. This Accord was a five-year agreement that mandated
187130
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332
79
161
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18 54 27 85 44 49 45 15 00
50100150200250300350400450500
Cod
ing
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renc
es
Sources of stakeholder pressures
82 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
legally binding compliance for the purpose of improved supply chain among its
signatories. This agreement became the first of its kind that mandated collaboration
with unions and labour groups for legitimate factory compliance. Whilst similar
industry initiatives had previously been considered unsuccessful, the Bangladesh
Accord took shape as an immediate outcome of the Rana Plaza disaster, emerging as
a catalyst for change within the fashion industry.
Organisations rejecting or remaining silent about their intentions to commit to
the Bangladesh Accord became heavily scrutinised and pressured by stakeholders. In
response to such pressures, Wal-Mart initiated the implementation of The Alliance as
a measure to improve safety and ethical standards across industry. They also indirectly
contributed towards the compensation plan for Rana Plaza victims through Building
resources across communities (BRAC), USA, which outlines a rebuild strategy
accordingly to Coombs’ (2007b) SCCT.
Stakeholders, such as news media and NGOs, continued to target large-scale
organisations resisting the Bangladesh Accord such as Wal-Mart. Such resistance was
further identified overall among organisations in the North American region due to
fears of legal accountability. Wal-Mart responded to pressures by proposing The
Alliance, a five-year industry initiative similar to the Bangladesh Accord, however,
with no legally or financially binding arbitration. Resistance to the Bangladesh Accord
was predominantly identified within the North American region with many
organisations following Wal-Mart’s lead by becoming members of The Alliance.
Investors later formed a part of the pressures facing the fast fashion industry,
particularly within the North American region, where a majority of the industry
resisted the Bangladesh Accord. For example, an extract from a news article published
in May, 2013 stated that:
Chapter 4: Findings 83
A large coalition of religious groups and investors is pressing major North
American organisations to join a sweeping plan to improve safety in
Bangladesh apparel factories, calling on them to act together to force changes
in overseas workplaces. Also Thursday, a second group of investment and
pension funds controlling $1.35 trillion in assets, sent a letter to organisations,
calling on them to ensure compliance with safety standards in Bangladesh and
to disclose all of the factories they use -- a demand that most major
organisations have resisted. (Greenhouse, 2013, May 17)
4.2.3 Implicit and explicit CSR
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, influential industry watchdogs (e.g.,
labour unions, NGOs activists and the ILO) began the development of the Bangladesh
Accord. This accord was coded as implicit CSR in the present study because of the
collective nature to the agreement as a result of societal expectations for industry-wide
improvements in developing regions. Implicit CSR is undertaken by organisations as
a result of societal expectations and regulations, as opposed to explicit CSR that is a
business-driven strategy (Carson et al., 2015; Matten & Moon, 2008; Thorne et al.,
2017). For example, whilst it was the choice of individual organisations to join the
Bangladesh Accord due to societal expectations, once they became signatories, the
organisations were obliged to adhere to its legal requirements. In other words, the
organisations were no longer creating safer factory environments for garment workers
as a voluntary act once they became signatories of the Bangladesh Accord; it became
an act of implicit CSR (Carson et al., 2015). Based on this, stakeholders began to
aggressively approach organisations to become signatories of the collective industry
agreement to create change. A deadline to join the Bangladesh Accord was set for 15
May 2013. Organisations had the option of committing to the agreement at a later
84 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
stage, however, with no right to retrospectively appeal prior decisions. Organisations
deciding to conform to the Bangladesh Accord started to shift towards implicit CSR
practices.
4.2.3.1 Connected Organisations
The analysis explored corporate CSR/sustainability reports published in early-
mid 2013, which thereby helped identify CSR practises at the time of the factory
collapse in April 2013. A predominant pattern of explicit CSR practices was identified
through individual corporate programs; for example, CSR was a non-collective
initiative. A shift in CSR practices thereby started to emerge across the industry in
response to the stakeholder pressures arising from the crisis. Pertinent trends and
patterns were captured from the research data and collated within Table 4.2. Some
organisations are listed as explicit/implicit, which means that they were in operational
transition from explicit CSR practises only to the undertaking of both explicit and
implicit CSR practises.
Table 4.2
Implicit/Explicit CSR in Time Period 1
Organisation Prevalent CSR strategy during Time Period 1
Data relating to CSR
Con
nect
ed
Adler Explicit Observed trends/patterns of industry actions: voluntary and non-legally binding activities observed in the data, such as community outreach programs, self-arranged factory audits through third-parties, code of conducts etc. Primark was the first and only organisation to immediately respond with an SCCT rebuild strategy which also happened to be CSR. This was achieved through immediate food and financial relief to victims and their families.
Benetton Explicit/Implicit C&A Explicit/Implicit Mango Explicit/Implicit Primark Explicit/Implicit
Wal-Mart Explicit
Chapter 4: Findings 85
Unc
onne
cted
Abercrombie & Fitch Explicit Observed trends/patterns of industry
actions: norm across industry to engage in voluntary and non-legally binding activities through self-arranged factory audits through third parties, community outreach programs to empower garment workers, code of conducts etc. Similar to Connected Organisations, the level of individuality and the predominantly voluntary aspect represents a trend of explicit CSR.
American Eagle Outfitters Explicit
Bestseller Explicit/Implicit
Cotton On Explicit
Fruit of the Loom Explicit H&M Explicit/Implicit Kmart Australia Explicit
Helly Hansen Explicit
Lindex Explicit/Implicit
Target Australia Explicit
Wal-Mart initially withheld public responses in relation to the Bangladesh
Accord, and later declined to sign the Bangladesh Accord due to the cost and binding
arbitration associated with the agreement. A data extract from a newspaper in May,
2013 read:
Most U.S. companies, however, have balked at the language in the accord.
Some say it would expose them to excessive legal liability — particularly in
North America's litigious courts. Written by labor groups, the agreement
would require organisations who source clothing from Bangladesh to commit
to pay for inspections, building upgrades, and training — all enforced by
binding arbitration. (Plumer, 2013, May, 16)
This quote explores underlying factors in North American organisations’
resistance to sign the Bangladesh Accord.
4.3.2.2 Unconnected Organisations
The data were examined by geographical groupings for the Connected
Organisations to explore potential trends in post-crisis responses and CSR. As an
outcome of stakeholder pressures, an important change in CSR trends became
noticeable in the data for the North American region, an area that often adopted explicit
CSR such as voluntary corporate programs (Matten & Moon, 2008).
86 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
The European region was ahead of the sample group with their proactive CSR
agenda, partly through a push for continuously developing government policies and
the European Union. The Australian organisations started predominantly with explicit
practises as per the industry standards at the time of the crisis in 2013. Following the
industry-wide pressures that faced organisations, the sample quickly depicted a shift
towards collective implicit CSR practises that communicated a willingness to improve
industry standards towards more ethical supply chain practices.
H&M did not initially respond or agree to sign the agreement due to its legally
binding nature, which reflected a similar response by Wal-Mart. H&M were targeted
to sign the Bangladesh Accord and it was the first organisation to sign the agreement
in May, 2013, urging other organisations operating in Bangladesh to follow its lead.
H&M does not admit to having conformed to stakeholder pressures, suggesting that
the organisation sought to be portrayed with implicit CSR to genuinely create industry
change through collective actions. Other organisations to immediately follow H&M’s
strategy were Lindex, Helly Hansen, Bestseller, and Abercrombie & Fitch as the first
North American organisation to join. Kmart Australia and Target Australia (managed
by Wesfarmers) initially confirmed that they would not cease their business in
Bangladesh, and later committed to the Bangladesh Accord in mid-June 2013. These
organisations were closely followed by Cotton On. North American, Eagle Outfitters
and Fruit of the Loom, refrained from making a decision in relation to the Bangladesh
Accord within this Time Period 1.
4.2.4 Summary
As expected, Time Period 1 depicted crisis response strategies consisting of both
SCCT and CSR, and a combination of SCCT and CSR. An example of this was
Primark’s rebuild response through boots on the ground at the disaster site, including
Chapter 4: Findings 87
the arrangement of food and monetary solutions to victims and their families through
local NGO’s. Other high level responses showed the following:
Responses that were SCCT, for example, without actions of CSR involved,
were of the bolstering type. This was to remind stakeholders about the prior
good that had been done by the organisations.
Responses that were purely CSR were depicted through organisations that
chose to not issue any statements about the crisis but instead undertook explicit
CSR by compensating victims through non-collective schemes.
The different organisational crisis response strategies showed different
responsibility attributions over time, culminating in the Connected
Organisations accepting responsibility. In doing so, these organisations
demonstrated a legitimate intention to improve less ethical industry practises
to protect vulnerable garment workers in developing regions. Essentially this
aligned with the social demands of stakeholders and linking this with CSR.
Connected and Unconnected Organisations typically arrived at a rebuild
strategy in different ways. For many Connected Organisations, this was after
trying different SCCT strategies.
Connected Organisations also used a wider variety of strategies (i.e., most used
four strategies, as opposed to Unconnected Organisations that used only two).
The latter sample, for the most part, did not initially make any statement, but
may have also used a bolstering or denial strategy.
Primark had active business with Rana Plaza but stood out through their
immediate admission of guilt followed by rebuild strategies.
Explicit CSR was the overall industry norm during Time Period 1.
88 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Overall, the emergence of a crisis spillover was intensified occurred through
stakeholder pressures. Such pressures demanded fashion organisations undertake
collective action in response to Rana Plaza, and irrespective of prior business ties with
the collapsed garment factory.
4.3 TIME PERIOD 2: THE SHORT-TERM POST-CRISIS RESPONSE
This section presents the crisis response data and stakeholder pressures identified
for Time Period 2 between 1 July 2103 and June 2014.
Time Period 2 was a critical period for the post-crisis events with regards to the
industry implementations of the Bangladesh Accord, The Alliance as well as The
Arrangement. The recurring theme in the data was the continuous stakeholder
pressures that demanded that organisations undertook collective actions to improve
supply chain practices, for example, through implicit CSR rather than individual
actions through explicit CSR. This was further signalled in the data through the two
different industry allies placing competitive pressures on one another to appear better
from a reputational perspective, for example, the Bangladesh Accord and The
Alliance.
The next sections outline relevant outcomes from the data further.
4.3.1 Crisis response
The analysis of Time Period 2 first investigated the crisis responses undertaken
by the organisations. The data was strongly dominated by the implementation of the
Bangladesh Accord and the effects of the crisis spillover phenomenon within this
context.
Chapter 4: Findings 89
As expected, the data depicted more established SCCT responses by
organisations as additional crisis-related information had been identified at this point
in time. Table 4.3 provides a numerical order of how crisis responses were undertaken
by organisations. For example, Mango immediately released statements of denial,
followed by diminished responsibility as to why order forms from their company were
found at Rana Plaza and finally a rebuild strategy.
For Connected Organisations, one additional organisation, namely, Adler
Modemärkte, became linked with production at Rana Plaza in July 2013 in result of
continued investigations and exploration of the disaster site. As such, Adler
Modemärkte was not included in the data until Time Period 2 as this is when evidence
emerged of their linkage with the Rana Plaza factory.
90 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Table 4.3
Overview of Crisis Response Strategies in Time Period 29
Organisation Bolst Dec. acc.
Alli mem. Den. Dimin. Reb. No
statem. Spillov. C
onne
cted
O
rgan
isat
ions
Adler #3 #2 #1 Benetton #1 #2 C&A #1 #2 Mango #1 #2 #3 Primark #1 Wal-Mart #3 #5 #2 #1 #4
Unc
onne
cted
Org
anis
atio
ns
Abercrombie & Fitch
#1
American Eagle Outfitters
#1
Bestseller #1 Cotton On #1 Fruit of the Loom
#2 #1
H&M #1 Kmart Australia
#1
Lindex #1 Helly Hansen
#1
Target Australia
#1
Total responses
0 2 2 2 4 6 1 10
Note. Bolst. = bolstering; Dec. acc. = declined accord; Alli. mem. = alliance member; Den. = denial; Dimin. = diminish; Reb. = rebuild; No statem.= no statement; Spillov. = spillover; #[number] = the order in which an organisation undertook its response strategies.
4.3.1.1 Connected organisations
Whilst Time Period 1 presented fewer organisational statements, for example,
the immediate post-crisis period, it was found that all organisations arrived at a rebuild
strategy with the Bangladesh Accord that was implemented at the end of Time Period
9 SCCT responses are ranked by the progressive order of different crisis responses aimed at stakeholders. For example, Benetton sought to diminish crisis responsibility due to a supplier sub-contracting parts of an order to the Rana Plaza factory. After explaining this to stakeholders, the organisation became a signatory of the Bangladesh Accord as a rebuild response to the crisis.
Chapter 4: Findings 91
1. As a result, during Time Period 2, the agreement grew to become an established
force of the SCCT rebuild strategy as well as a form of implicit CSR.
Table 4.3 shows that Wal-Mart declined to commit to the Bangladesh Accord
due to its legally binding policies and regulations. Adler Modemärkte followed an
equivalent response for unknown reasons. Both organisations eventually undertook
rebuild strategies of a non-collective nature, that is, explicit CSR actions. Whilst Wal-
Mart announced their rebuild actions on their website, Adler Modemärkte remained
silent in the public sphere after they became linked to Rana Plaza in July 2013. This
means that there were no data available about communications statements released by
the organisation. The analysis, however, identified that they made a small donation to
a local charity in Bangladesh to assist the Rana Plaza victims. This information was
retrieved from the NGO, ‘Clean Clothes Campaign’, and not the organisation, as Adler
Modemärkte continued to distance itself from the crisis through a silent
communications approach. As such, the ‘no statement’ response continued to
complement SCCT within the crisis spillover context.
Despite facts and evidence linking organisations with prior garment production
at the Rana Plaza factory, such as order forms found in the factory rubble, the majority
of Connected Organisations continued to distance themselves from crisis
responsibility. From an SCCT perspective, the rebuild strategies undertaken by
Connected Organisations (excluding Primark) were likely to narrate that they went out
of their way to fix broader social issues, in order to be perceived positively by
stakeholders.
This showed that the organisations eventually combined their rebuild responses
from Time Period 1 with additional rebuild strategies in Time Period 2 to lessen their
blame attribution among stakeholders. For example, C&A committed to the
92 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1 but extended their response in Time Period 2 by
also donating to the collective victim compensation scheme for Rana Plaza victims
and families. Organisations also extended their SCCT responses with diminish,
bolstering and denial strategies to reduce blame attributions. It was assumed that a sole
commitment to the Bangladesh Accord could otherwise risk being perceived as an
admission of guilt.
Wal-Mart stated that a staff member had incorrectly authorized production at the
Rana Plaza factory and the organisation was therefore unaware of their crisis linkage.
This was coded as a diminished crisis responsibility statement during the data analysis.
4.3.1.2 Unconnected Organisations
As SCCT focuses on single organisations responding to a crisis event, the crisis
spillover response is applied to Table 4.3 as a non-SCCT response for Unconnected
Organisations as they were considered guilty by association. In response to the
industry facing the Rana Plaza crisis, the Unconnected Organisations assumed
responsibility for a crisis they had no immediate linkage to by responding to various
stakeholder demands. For Time Period 2, this referred to collective agreements to
improve industry-wide supply chain practises and to collectively compensate Rana
Plaza victims and their families.
As previously discussed, some organisations became signatories of the
Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1, and this trend continued in Time Period 2.
Eventually, all the Unconnected Organisations became confirmed signatories.
There were few North American signatories of the Bangladesh Accord during
Time Period 2 due to the financial and legal arbitration of the agreements. Among the
early North American signatories were American Eagle Outfitters and Abercrombie
and Fitch. Fruit of the Loom was the last organisation in the sample to join the
Chapter 4: Findings 93
Bangladesh Accord in December 2013. The organisation initially joined The Alliance
in September 2013 but extended their crisis spillover response with a concurrent
commitment to the Bangladesh Accord.
The data presented more established and intensified stakeholder pressures by
industry watchdogs and media that demanded organisations to commit to collective
industry reforms. Stakeholders perceived the Bangladesh Accord to be a ground-
breaking industry initiative due to its financially and legally binding and arbitrary
collaboration with union groups.
The Alliance, on the other hand, may have been perceived as a strategic tool and
a PR tactic by many stakeholders. An extract from the data states:
By contrast, the Alliance does not meet a high standard of transparency and
this has made it more difficult to objectively measure progress. While the
Alliance published corrective action plans (CAPs) for each factory following
initial inspections, it has, since those inspections were done, published no
detailed updates on factory-by-factory progress. Indeed, there is no way to
determine from the information the Alliance makes available whether there
has been progress. (International Labor Rights Forum, 2016)
Figure 4.2 identifies 2,189 coding references, and each refers to the number of
times that stakeholder pressures were identified in Time Period 2 in the data from news
articles, company websites and industry watchdogs through statements or quotes in
relation to Rana Plaza and the post-crisis scrutiny directed at industry.
The analysis identified Time Period 2 as a critical phase for the crisis spillover
development. This is because the crisis spillover was properly established during this
94 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
time period and scrutiny had provided a foundation to separate organisations that were
directly or indirectly linked to the Rana Plaza factory.
Figure 4.2. Coding reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources for Time Period 2, July 2013 – June 2014. Based on the above information, this research determined a crisis spillover response
by the sample of Unconnected Organisations apart from the sample of Connected
Organisations, and also identified an increase in coding frequencies.
4.3.2 Description of stakeholder pressures
Evidence from Time Period 2 showed that the steering committee of the
Bangladesh Accord, excluding its neutral chair (i.e., ILO), placed significant
stakeholder pressures on organisations to commit to the agreement. They held the
highest frequency of 302 coding references (see Figure 4.2).
The crisis spillover brought a sense of competitiveness among the organisations
through their self-portrayal of goodwill to stakeholders. Based on this, some
organisations directly or indirectly placed pressures on other organisations to appear
302
162 143
3
133
11
135
49 49 62
128173
268
7739
234
19 0
202
050
100150200250300350
Cod
ing
refe
renc
es
Sources of stakeholder pressures
Chapter 4: Findings 95
in a better light and such patterns were identified from 268 coding references. This
included the prior statements released by H&M urging industry peers to follow their
crisis spillover response by committing to the Bangladesh Accord and to “do the right
thing”. This signals to stakeholders that those not following H&M’ response was
lagging with their willingness to undertake legitimate industry reforms.
The Rana Plaza Coordination Committee became the third strongest
environmental pressure on organisations. The objective of this committee was to
oversee a collective, industry-wide victim compensation scheme, namely, The
Arrangement. This compensation scheme became a tool for stakeholders to place
pressure on organisations with production in Bangladesh to take partial responsibility,
irrespective of their prior linkage with the Rana Plaza factory (Anonymous, 2015).
Whilst The Rana Plaza Coordination Committee was chaired by the neutral
International Labor Organisation, it was steered by other stakeholders, such as NGOs,
unions and labour groups, and the Bangladeshi government.
Pressures from consumers emerged through survey outcomes and statements
presented through the channels of news media, NGOs and activist organisations. Such
types of data supported claims of consumers being willing to pay slightly higher prices
for ethically made clothing, claims continuously contested by organisations such as
H&M and Wal-Mart.
Similar to Time Period 1, the analysis of the data for Time Period 2 continued to
identify consumers becoming actively involved in placing pressures on the fashion
industry. Such trends were intensified through the emergence of Fashion Revolution
which commemorated Rana Plaza victims by encouraging consumers to tag
organisations on social media to ask #whomademyclothes. The purpose of this was to
generate a social movement demanding improved supply chain practices, not only in
96 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Bangladesh but on a global scale. This movement subsequently encouraged
organisations to publish photos of their factory workers with the responding hashtag,
#imadeyourclothes. Soon after, this movement developed the Fashion Revolution
Week which occurs annually to the memorial of the factory collapse and has provided
a dialogue for transparency between stakeholders, institutions and industry.
4.3.3 Implicit and explicit CSR
The Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance were critical, CSR-based industry
responses from the crisis spillover perspective of the Rana Plaza case. Despite the
Bangladesh Accord being perceived by stakeholders as more legitimate than The
Alliance, the data analysis suggested that both agreements held a common objective
to collectively improve building and safety standards in Bangladesh garment factories.
Table 4.4 provides an overview of how the organisations used implicit or explicit
CSR to respond to stakeholder pressures using an SCCT rebuild strategy. Explicit CSR
within this context refers to non-collective victim compensation such as through third-
party NGOs.
The Arrangement, which was the victim compensation scheme, became
pertinent in Time Period 2. Stakeholders demanded that any organisation with garment
production in Bangladesh should take partial responsibility by contributing to the
victim compensation scheme. Such actions would depict effects of the crisis spillover
phenomena for organisations with no prior affiliation with Rana Plaza, and a consistent
pattern of CSR actions for the recovery of legitimacy in both samples being studied.
Chapter 4: Findings 97
4.3.3.1 Connected Organisations
The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) undertook extensive lobbying for
organisations to collectively conform to the Rana Plaza victims’ compensation plan,
particularly the Connected Organisations.
Table 4.4
Rebuild Strategies: Victim Compensation by Implicit or Explicit CSR10
Organisation
Contribution to Rana Plaza donors trust fund (RPDTF) or other victim compensation initiative
Implicit or explicit CSR
Con
nect
ed O
rgan
isat
ions
Adler USD$20,000 to an undisclosed Bangladeshi charity.
Explicit (e.g., individual)
Benetton USD$1,100,000 to RPDTF Implicit (e.g., collective)
C&A USD$1,000,000 to RPDTF (paid through the C&A Foundation).
Implicit (e.g., collective)
Mango Undisclosed amount to RPDTF Implicit (collective) through an explicit approach (individual)
Primark USD$7,300,000 - broken down by USD$1,000,000 to RPDTF and USD$6,300,000 via BRAC Bangladesh1.
Implicit (collective) and explicit (individual)
Wal-Mart USD$1,000,000 to RPDTF (paid via BRAC USA). Additional USD$1,750,000 earmarked for victim rehabilitation and future relief (as required) through BRAC US.
Implicit (collective) through an explicit approach (individual)
Unc
onne
cted
O
rgan
isat
ions
Abercrombie & Fitch
Nil Nil
American Eagle Outfitters
Nil Nil
Bestseller Nil Nil Cotton On Nil Nil Fruit of the Loom
Nil Nil
10Collective/implicit payments to RPDTF by Bangladesh Accord signatories are made in addition to their mandatory expenses for factory improvements.
98 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
H&M USD$100,000 to RPDTF (paid via H&M Conscious Foundation).
Implicit (collective) through an explicit approach (individual)
Kmart Australia
Nil Nil
Helly Hansen
Nil Nil
Lindex Nil Nil Target Australia
Nil Nil
The progressive development to such efforts were continuously published on their
website as well as via global news and media channels.
Table 4.4 depicts organisational rebuild strategies through CSR; this was visible
in the evidence from the compensation payments to Rana Plaza victims. The process
to reach a conforming stage with the compensation demands varied for most
organisations and was, in many cases, drawn out. For example, some organisations
provided their compensation payments to third parties to remain detached from the
crisis responsibility, including possible legal repercussions where payments may have
been perceived as an acceptance of crisis responsibility.
It should be noted that the contribution by Wal-Mart shown in Table 4.4 above
was a unique response as the data suggested that similar payment amounts had not
been considered by Wal-Mart when linked to prior industrial accidents in Bangladesh.
In addition to Wal-Mart’s indirect contribution to the Rana Plaza victims, they also
earmarked an additional USD$1,750,000 for the NGO, BRAC USA. The purpose of
the earmarked funds was to continue to support BRAC USA’s work in Bangladesh
with counselling and rehabilitation for victims, as well as for a rapid response to any
future garment factory accidents. It was possible that Wal-Mart’s response was
influenced by accumulated pressures from prior accidents combined with the large
scale of industry scrutiny brought with the Rana Plaza collapse.
Chapter 4: Findings 99
Benetton’s approach of appointing Price Waterhouse Cooper (PwC) to establish
their exact level of crisis liability, for example, by factoring in the square meters and
number of factory workers linked with their supplier, was perceived with mixed
responses by stakeholders. From a theoretical perspective, Benetton’s approach would
indicate a CSR approach that predominantly sought to meet societal expectations in an
attempt to address reputational damage and legitimacy (Carroll, 1979; Carroll &
Shabana, 2010; Janssen et al., 2015) following the negative outcomes to their early
crisis responses.
C&A launched the not-for-profit C&A Foundation in late 2013 following the
Rana Plaza collapse (C&A Foundation, 2017). Although C&A persisted on their
‘diminished’ SCCT response by stating that their contract with Rana Plaza was
outdated at the time of the collapse, Table 4.4 above shows that they have made one
of the larger contributions to The Arrangement through the C&A Foundation.
Primark’s response stood out again in comparison to the other Connected
Organisations, and Table 4.4 depicts a significant victim compensation approach. A
news media extract from October 2013 reads:
The firm [Primark] pledged to pay long-term compensation in the new year
to the 550 people in its supply chain who had worked there [Rana Plaza]. The
company [Primark] has also said it will guarantee a further three months’
wages to all 3300 workers or their dependants, having paid six months so far.
(Neville 2013, Oct 24)
Primark was, however, also heavily criticized by some industry stakeholders for
going ahead with their own compensation strategies in collaboration with local NGOs
such as BRAC. In lieu of Primark’s substantial compensation funds, The Arrangement
had to delay its payments to Rana Plaza victims and families as it had not managed to
100 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
raise the required minimum of USD$40 million through collective industry
contributions. Primark, however, contested the criticism by stating that vulnerable
crisis victims and families would have been unable to wait months for fashion
organisations to gather such collective funds.
4.3.3.2 Unconnected Organisations
H&M launched the not-for-profit H&M Foundation in the months following the
Rana Plaza collapse. Subsequent to the set-up of the foundation, H&M was the only
organisation among the Unconnected Organisations to contribute to the The
Arrangement. All the other organisations refrained from such victim compensation
strategies. The analysis interpreted H&M’s contribution to victim compensation
scheme as an additional strategic response to lead the way for others to follow within
the fashion industry.
Chapter 4: Findings 101
Table 4.5 Prevalent Strategy and Visibility of CSR for Connected and Unconnected
Organisations in Time Period 2
Organisation Prevalent CSR
strategy for Time Period 2
Visibility of CSR
Con
nect
ed O
rgan
isat
ions
Adler Explicit Whilst explicit CSR continued
among all organisations (e.g., codes of conduct, non-collective compensation strategies for Rana Plaza victims, community outreach programs etc.), a slow shift towards collective CSR emerged through a commitment to the Bangladesh Accord or The Alliance.
Benetton Implicit C&A Implicit Mango Implicit Primark Implicit
Wal-Mart Explicit
Unc
onne
cted
Org
anis
atio
ns
Abercrombie & Fitch Implicit Whilst explicit CSR did not cease among organisations (visible through codes of conduct, community outreach programs etc.), a shift towards collective actions emerged in response to the changing institutional environment (Matten & Moon, 2008). Sample trends were captured in the data through a consistent social/financial commitment to the Bangladesh Accord and/or The Alliance among the sample.
American Eagle Outfitters Implicit
Bestseller Implicit
Cotton On Implicit
Fruit of the Loom Implicit H&M Implicit
Kmart Australia Implicit
Helly Hansen Implicit
Lindex Implicit
Target Australia Implicit
On the other hand, it should be noted that all of the Unconnected Organisations
became signatories of the Bangladesh Accord in response of the crisis spillover
phenomena. This entailed annual payments of up to USD$500,000 over a five-year
period towards the improvement of garment factories in Bangladesh.
In summary, Table 4.5 above depicts a shift in the reported CSR based industry
norms between Time Periods 1 and 2. Time Period 1 primarily indicated independent
and explicit CSR by the organisations. The severity of the scope and depth of the Rana
Plaza crisis showed patterns of collective and implicit CSR across the industry through
the Bangladesh Accord, The Alliance and The Arrangement. The commitment to these
two collective industry agreements represents implicit CSR in Table 4.5.
102 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
The evidence further indicated that stakeholder pressures demanded collective
industry action and that organisations took crisis responsibility irrespective of their
prior linkage with the Rana Plaza factory. This was a contributing factor to the crisis
spilling over across the global fast fashion industry.
4.3.4 Summary
The Connected Organisations eventually all reached a rebuild response through
collective and thereby implicit CSR action. However, some organisations undertook
individual, for example, explicit CSR action, by compensating Rana Plaza victims
through third parties. This was to avoid victim compensations being perceived as the
acceptance of guilt among stakeholders and to alleviate the chance of direct payments
becoming the basis for prospective lawsuits by victims.
An example of an explicit CSR action was identified parallel to C&A’s
predominant implicit work with the Bangladesh Accord. The organisation set up the
C&A Foundation in the months following the factory collapse and thereby contributed
to the victim compensation scheme through their not-for-profit organisational channel
that technically operated separately from the organisation, C&A.
Primark’s initiated, immediate financial assistance and food relief program were
set up for not just their own garment workers in Rana Plaza, but also for the workers
of other organisations. The positive stakeholder responses that were generated by this
response placed pressures on other organisations to follow Primark’s example; for
example, by not taking action, they would allow Primark to publicly clean up the mess
of other organisations. Primark’s CSR responses were deemed as implicit given that
their actions were conducted in direct response to the crisis in their corporate
environment.
Chapter 4: Findings 103
The Unconnected Organisations did not contribute funds to the victim
compensation scheme. This did not include H&M as it launched the H&M Foundation
shortly after the Rana Plaza collapse and donated a compensation amount through their
foundation channel. All organisations attributed some degree of responsibility by
becoming signatories of the legally binding Bangladesh Accord, and thereby
committed to contribute up to USD$500,000 per annum towards factory improvements
over a five-year period.
In summary, the data analysis identified the following key findings in Time
Period 2:
The crisis spillover became fully developed, and stakeholders pressured
the broader industry to improve ethical supply chain practises across the
board through media. As a result, the public perception of the crisis and
their attribution of crisis responsibility were steered towards the
organisations.
There was a shift towards implicit CSR practices through collective and
binding initiatives within the sample groups.
Crisis response strategies consisted of SCCT or CSR, but responses that
combined SCCT and CSR also emerged. An example of this was where
rebuild responses through commitment to the Bangladesh Accord were
also deemed implicit CSR. This was because the main purpose of the
Bangladesh Accord was for organisations to collectively make a social
impact through safety enhancements to garment factories.
The majority of Connected and Unconnected Organisations joined
collective initiatives, such as the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance.
104 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
This action was suggested to be a strategic move by organisations and
helped the crisis recovery process in the industry.
The subsequent section presents the findings based on the strategic, long-term
responses undertaken by the organisations. Consistent with the prior sections, the
findings for Time Period 3 also showed how possible shifts in stakeholder pressures
may have influenced the strategic actions of the organisations.
4.4 TIME PERIOD 3: LONG-TERM CRISIS RESPONSE
Data for Time Period 3 referred to the period of July 2014 to June 2017. A shift
in the stakeholder pressures facing the organisations was evident in this time period.
With the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance set to expire in 2018, media scrutiny
focused on the progress and outcomes of the organisations and their commitment to
the agreements.
As a long-term legacy of the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance, stakeholder
pressures shifted to demand improved supply chain practises with transparency across
the industry. This section discusses how such findings emerged in the data under a
similar structure to the previous time periods. An important trend to note here is that
many organisations moved away from SCCT responses and patterns of crisis spillover
responses continued to be evident.
4.4.1 Crisis response
4.4.1.1 Connected Organisations
With the exclusion of Adler Modemärkte, the Connected Organisations remained
actively involved with objectives mandated by the Bangladesh Accord and The
Alliance. Adler Modemärkte, instead, committed to a German government initiative
to improve supply chain practises in developing regions.
Chapter 4: Findings 105
Figure 4.3. Patterns of crisis response strategies undertaken by Connected and Unconnected Organisations.
Figure 4.3 depicts an overview to SCCT trends in the overall data observed by
the level of responsibility undertaken by the Connected Organisations. Primark stood
out with their crisis response as the only organisation to immediately undertake a
rebuild strategy following the crisis whilst also reminding stakeholders of their prior
efforts to conduct business in safe factories.
The Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance were well underway in Time Period 3
and were, therefore, identified as long-term SCCT and crisis spillover responses.
Given that both initiatives primarily sought to make a social impact for garment
workers in Bangladesh, they were also identified as CSR. The focus of stakeholder
pressures, however, started to shift in Time Period 3 towards demands for transparent
supply chains, including the release of physical factory addresses.
Rebuild combined with
bolstering
Primark (UK/Ireland)
Rebuild combined with
diminishBenetton
(Italy), C&A (Netherlands),
Wal-Mart (USA)
Denial combined with
collective rebuild
Mango (Spain)
No official statements
releasedAdler
Modemärkte(Germany)
High Level of crisis responsibility accepted Low
106 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
As a part of the newer, long-term pressures, a group of influential industry
watchdogs joined forces to create industry change under the name, The Coalition.
Fashion organisations were approached to take a transparency pledge to disclose their
supplier information, including physical factory addresses within a given timeframe.
The evidence presented in Table 4.6 outlines the long-term crisis responses by
the organisations. The data essentially showed that the Connected Organisations
predominantly declined long-term crisis responses in response to stakeholders’ social
demands due to concerns of inviting competition from peers by releasing supplier
information. Data extracted from The Coalition’s report in April 2017 stated the
following in relation to Mango:
Mango, in response to outreach about the transparency pledge, offered an
alternative: disclosing only to members of the coalition that spearheaded the
Pledge, or to parties that register with the company. These proposals fall short
of the level of supply chain transparency needed in the industry. Private
disclosure of this type is not sustainable and does little to improve human
rights due diligence in global apparel supply chains. (The Coalition, 2017)
Whilst Benetton responded with a partial conformity to stakeholder pressures by
publishing some of its supplier names and physical addresses, C&A exclusively agreed
to take the full transparency pledge by publishing all of their supplier information on
their website in December 2016. In this respect, organisations in the Connected
Organisations appeared to continue to take measures for crisis detachment however
eventually all arrived at a rebuild strategy.
Chapter 4: Findings 107
Table 4.6
Long-Term crisis responses through conformity to the supply chain transparency
pledge by Connected and Unconnected Organisations in Time Period 3
Organisation Commitment to supply chain transparency pledge
Crisis response
Con
nect
ed O
rgan
isat
ions
Adler Declined No
Statement/ Rebuild
Benetton Partial Rebuild/ Diminish
C&A Full Rebuild
Mango Declined Diminish
Primark Declined Diminish
Wal-Mart Declined Diminish
Unc
onne
cted
Org
anis
atio
ns Abercrombie & Fitch Partial Spillover
American Eagle Outfitters
Declined Diminish/ Spillover
Bestseller Partial Spillover Cotton On Full Spillover Fruit of the Loom Partial Spillover H&M Full Spillover Kmart Australia Full Spillover Helly Hansen Partial Spillover Lindex Full Spillover Target Australia Full Spillover
Whilst SCCT theory traditionally posits short- to intermediate post-crisis
timeframes, it is argued here that the rebuild and diminish strategies continued for the
Connected Organisations in the years following the Rana Plaza collapse. A reasoning
for this is the scope and severity of the Rana Plaza crisis which required more than
short-term actions to mitigate stakeholder pressures.
Similar to Time Period 2, SCCT did not offer a spillover response as it focuses
on single organisations experiencing a crisis event. A spillover response was,
therefore, added to complement SCCT to fit the context of the crisis phenomenon
being explored. The crisis spillover response was applicable to organisations that
became implicated in the Rana Plaza crisis through guilt by association, for example,
108 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
the Unconnected Organisations. In response to the Rana Plaza crisis and their
implication in the event, these organisations assumed responsibility for the industry
crisis by responding to various stakeholder demands in the short- and long-term. For
Time Period 3, this referred to the demand for transparent supply chain practises.
4.4.1.2 Unconnected organisations
It should be noted here that Coombs (2007b) did not develop SCCT for
application in crisis spillover settings. This means that this study found an opportunity
to complement how organisations sustain SCCT strategies into the crisis spillover
phenomenon and the longer term.
The majority of Unconnected Organisations took the full or partial transparency
pledge which became a long-term spillover response as they were never linked with
prior business at the Rana Plaza factory. Had these organisations been a part of the
Connected Organisations, this would have rather been considered to be a long-term
rebuild response. This development indicated a shift in industry norms for fast fashion
organisations as a result of the Rana Plaza crisis spillover. The Unconnected
Organisations, yet again, accepted a degree of responsibility for a crisis that they were
linked with through guilt by association.
Similar to C&A’s response (i.e., Connected Organisations), H&M also took the
full transparency pledge in December 2016 and full supplier information with physical
addresses were available on their website. Both organisations implemented similar
CSR-based responses through the establishment of not-for-profit foundations in 2013.
The long-term data indicated the importance of large-scale organisations such as
H&M leading the way for industry peers by “doing the right thing”. If industry leaders
had embraced transparent supply chain practises, the impact would have been greater
Chapter 4: Findings 109
as smaller organisations would have been encouraged to replicate H&M’s crisis
responses. A news media channel containing stakeholder pressure in April 2016 stated:
They [collective activist groups] argue that the Swedish firm [H&M] has a
duty to do more as a market leader and an early signatory to the accord. They
have influence in a number of different countries... with great power comes
great responsibility. (Hutchison, 2016, April 20)
It is also likely that organisations embraced the non-SCCT, long-term responses
to remain competitive and maintain stakeholder legitimacy as the industry
environment started shifting towards transparent and more ethical norms.
4.4.2 Description of stakeholder pressures
It has been established that the analysis of the data showed a shift in the demands
for stakeholder pressures for transparent supply chain practices. Multiple justifications
for such demands appeared in the data. Among those were ambiguity around
organisation-supplier factory relationships which were apparent in the immediate
aftermath of the Rana Plaza collapse; for example, some organisations would not
disclose their supplier factories.
The analysis identified a total of 4,051 coding references for Time Period 3.
These referred to the number of times stakeholders appeared in the research data
through news media, interviews and organisational communication.
A shift in the stakeholder pressures became visible with an inference across four
of the top five stakeholder pressures appearing: (1) the Bangladesh Accord; (2) NGO
or charity initiative; (3) the Fashion Revolution; (4) activist group or other; and (5)
Oxfam.
110 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Figure 4.4 provides an overview on the sources of pressures facing the fashion
industry during this period of time, for example, the number of times that the
Bangladesh Accord appeared in the data in Time Period 3. Figure 4.4 contains the most
coding frequencies for stakeholder pressures in comparison to Time Period 1 and Time
Period 2 because industry watchdogs and news media intensified pressures for
transparent organisational supply chain practises.
Figure 4.4. Reference frequencies of stakeholder pressure sources for Time Period 3, July 2014 - June 2017.
The frequency of coding references in Figure 4.4 means that the industry
pressures experienced by the organisations were far from eliminated and they had to
continue industry reforms to appear legitimate and avoid reputational threats.
Moreover, pressures included media and stakeholders who scrutinised the
performance of the organisations and their commitment to the Bangladesh Accord and
322257
60
525
200234
446
97 88
233
50
186
105148
514
273
59124 130
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Cod
ing
refe
renc
es
Chapter 4: Findings 111
The Alliance. This became a measure for stakeholders to ensure that the post-crisis
industry developments would not stagnate over the long-term.
An analysis of the data showed that the five-year duration of the Bangladesh
Accord brought expectations of signatories to be underway with improvements at their
Bangladesh factories. In Time Period 3, H&M continued to be the main target of
stakeholder pressures to ensure that they followed through with their commitments for
industry reforms. A large number of negative reports became associated with H&M
during this period as they were perceived to lag behind with their factory
improvements as per the requirements of the Bangladesh Accord. For example, the
evidence presented scrutiny of H&M’s legitimacy for lagging behind with the
implementation of their factory improvements.
An extract from the Clean Clothes Campaign (2015, p. 4) annual report stated:
As a witness signatory to the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety,
Clean Clothes Campaign is keeping a close watch on organisations that
signed this binding agreement: making sure they keep their promises. Our
research in 2015 showed that Bangladesh factories supplying H&M were still
far from safe.
Due to H&M’s large organisational size and influence in the Bangladeshi
garment industry, the analysis of the data indicated that they became one of the key
targets of stakeholders, as was also depicted in Time Period 1. The organisation
continued to receive negative reports in news media in cases of perceived non-conduct
of the Bangladesh Accord.
112 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
4.4.3 Supply chain transparency
Stakeholder pressures demanding supply chain transparency emerged in Time
Period 3 and were aimed at all organisations to disclose their factory locations,
including physical addresses in the host country.
Figure 4.5 provides an overview on the level of pressures experienced by the
fashion industry in Time Period 3 between July and June 2017, which represents the
long-term timeline of this study. The main sources of pressure were news media,
statements by organisational peers, industry watchdogs and their annual industry
progress reports.
Figure 4.5 below shows that although that stakeholder pressures intensified in
Time Period 3. The scale and scope of the Rana Plaza crisis motivated stakeholders to
monitor the five-year commitment undertaken by organisations, and legitimate
outcomes were expected rather than short-term PR strategies.
Additional stakeholders also continued to emerge here, which is suggested to be
rare, three years after a crisis event. The Fashion Revolution initiative became an
influential post-crisis movement that emerged in the long-term data as they grew to be
active across 80 countries here. In addition to consumers asking #whomademyclothes
during Fashion Revolution Week in April each year, more global organisations started
to respond with the hashtag, #imadeyourclothes. The Fashion Revolution movement
also began publishing the Fashion Transparency Index as of 2016. The index reports
on 100 globally established fashion organisations that are surveyed on ethical supply
chain matters and operational transparency and are graded accordingly.
Cha
pter
4: F
indi
ngs
11
3
Fi
gure
4.5
. Ann
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reak
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Gar
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ghts
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e
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am
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n
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une
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412
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125
050100
150
200
250
300
Amount of coding references in data
114 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Similarly, industry reports such as the Ethical Fashion Report and Behind the Barcode
has enabled consumers to make informed brand purchases in the long-term. As such
industry reports place pressure on organisations to be perceived positively by
stakeholders, the reports have been coded accordingly as a stakeholder pressure.
Moreover, on January 1st, 2016, the United Nations implemented the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s), a pragmatic reform to achieve
social and economic equality on a global scale. Whilst the SDG’s are not legally
binding, each UN member country is expected to establish national frameworks and
measures for the collective achievement of the SDG’s.
Applicable to this study is SDG #12 which directs member states to achieve
sustainable consumption and production patterns. This was an interesting finding as
SDG’s were considered a governmental/political stakeholder pressures, however
relevant CSR had already started as a part of organisational long-term crisis responses.
Moreover, in December 2016, a policy instrument was introduced to align the
UN development system with the 2030 SDG’s, namely the Quadrennial
Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) 2017-2020. Whilst this study did not analyse
the QCPR, at the time of writing this thesis, the implementation of the UN’s SDG’s
was expected to have had a long-term impact on how the organisations within this
study mandated their CSR, given that they all originated from UN member states.
4.4.4 Implicit and explicit CSR
4.4.4.1 Connected organisations
Table 4.7 shows that all organisations undertook a combination of implicit and
explicit CSR. Implicit activities were determined by collective actions undertaken by
115
organisations with one or more industry peers, as opposed to explicit CSR, which was
deemed by individual organisational actions (Matten & Moon, 2008).
Table 4.7
Trends for implicit and explicit CSR by Connected and Unconnected Organisations
in Time Period 311
Organisation Prevalent CSR
strategy for Time Period 3
Visibility of CSR
Con
nect
ed O
rgan
isat
ions
Adler Explicit/Implicit Explicit CSR continued in the form of voluntary and non-legally binding activities, such as vendor codes of conduct, additional factory visits in addition to ongoing requirements for the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance. Many organisations resisted full or partial supply chain transparency. A shift towards legally binding supply chain requirements emerged.
Benetton Explicit/Implicit
C&A Explicit/Implicit
Mango Explicit/Implicit
Primark Explicit/Implicit
Wal-Mart
Explicit/Implicit
Unc
onne
cted
Org
anis
atio
ns Abercrombie & Fitch Explicit/Implicit In a similar manner to Connected
Organisations, explicit CSR continued in addition to ongoing requirements for the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance. Many organisations conformed to full or partial supply chain transparency. A shift towards legally binding supply chain requirements emerged through UN’s 2030 SDG’s and modern anti-slavery legislation.
American Eagle Outfitters Explicit/Implicit
Bestseller Explicit/Implicit
Cotton On Explicit/Implicit
Fruit of the Loom Explicit/Implicit
H&M Explicit/Implicit
Kmart Australia Explicit/Implicit
Helly Hansen Explicit/Implicit
Lindex Explicit/Implicit
Target Australia Explicit/Implicit
The newer pressures for transparent supply chain practises discussed in the
previous section influenced the type of activities undertaken here by the organisations.
Implicit CSR remained collective actions in response to the crisis in 2013 through the
legally binding Bangladesh Accord or The Accord.
16Collective transparency pledge/other obligatory schemes affecting industry = implicit CSR Internal policies, codes of conduct and vendor CoCs are explicit CSR (i.e., not collective actions but rather developed internally by the organisation).
116 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Some organisations, such as Primark, were now also legally required to declare
their annual CSR activities due to reforms by national governments, for example, the
UK Modern Slavery Act 2015. This required all public and private UK corporations
with a consolidated global turnover of GBP36 million or more to communicate the
measures taken to prevent modern slavery abuses in their supply chain in their annual
reports.
In 2015 Adler Modemärkte maintained its silent communications approach;
however, as the only German organisation in the sample, they joined the German
Partnership for Sustainable Textiles. This initiative was set up by the German Federal
Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development in 2014 as a response to the
Rana Plaza crisis and could be viewed as an implicit CSR response by the organisation.
Similar to the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance, the Partnership for Sustainable
Textiles sought to improve supply chain practices in developing regions of business in
collaboration with apparel organisations and industry bodies. At the conclusion of the
data collection for this dissertation, Adler Modemärkte had yet to publish a road map
for 2017 to disclose their individual action plans for supply chain improvements.
Given that it had been four years since the Rana Plaza factory collapse, at this point in
time, it was possible that Adler Modemärkte placed focus on other areas of priority for
PR purposes; however, no definitive statements were available from the organisation.
Wal-Mart expressed intentions of handing over the key responsibilities of The
Alliance to the Bangladesh government in 2018 when the official agreement expired.
As this study was conducted prior to 2018, the impacts of this could not be explored.
However, research data from 2013 suggested a conflict of interest by 60 % of 300
Bangladesh government members having direct or indirect ties to industry through
117
ownership interests. Such risks to future CSR outcomes could be linked to a data unit
dated October 2013 which reads:
Our political leaders [in Bangladesh] don't talk in terms of what workers
deserve. They talk in terms of trying to appease international pressure. They
do this because they have to, because they are afraid of losing orders, not
because they think it's the proper thing to do. (Westhead 2013, Oct 13)
At the point of writing this thesis, this presented concerns for the long-term
pragmatic outcomes of The Alliance beyond its expiry in 2018.
In summary, beyond the work being undertaken through the Bangladesh Accord
and The Alliance, explicit CSR again weighed strongly among the Connected
Organisations. This was evident through consistent introductions of the vendor codes
of conduct, which specifically applied to the suppliers. Other types of explicit CSR
undertaken by organisations within the region involved community engagement with
a focus on the health and empowerment of workers.
4.4.4.2 Unconnected Organisations
Table 4.7 overall presents similar responses across the Unconnected
Organisations through stronger, combined implicit and explicit CSR strategies. The
predominant pattern was that obligatory implicit CSR responses were concurrently
combined with voluntary corporate programs, such as community outreach or internal
corporate policies pertinent to ethical supply chain practices, that is, explicit CSR
(Matten & Moon, 2008). Observations of the overall data suggested that the
Unconnected Organisations proactively and collectively undertook measures based on
the lessons learned from the Rana Plaza crisis. A data extract from CCC state:
118 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Rana Plaza was described by everyone involved as a “wake-up call”.
Governments, employers, apparel organisations and civil society pledged
fundamental change to an industry grown out of control. Some innovative
programmes were developed to prevent new disasters and provide remedy to
those already affected. These victories now need to be defended and
developed, not eroded and reversed. However, the promises of fundamental
change have so far failed to come true: the systematic problems of cut-throat
competition, low pay, union repression, weak labour laws and legal impunity
remain. (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2015)
This quote depicts the long-term scrutiny that fashion organisations were faced
with as a long-term consequence of the Rana Plaza disaster.
Therefore, by conforming to stakeholder pressures through CSR, organisations
could continue to strategically maintain their social legitimacy when conducting
business in an environment reputed for its lack of compliance management. In fact,
this included American Eagle Outfitters who resisted the transparency pledge, but were
already obliged to follow the “California Transparency Supply Chains Act of 2010”.
As of 2015, organisations in the Nordic region started introducing corporate
policies and strategies aligned with the UN’s 2030 SDGs. Relevant data was identified
within annual reports and CSR/sustainability reports and referred to responsible
production goals as well as a contribution towards creating decent work and economic
growth in developing regions of business.
Bestseller were affected by the UK’s modern anti-slavery legislation due to a
UK-based subsidiary. A data extract showed that stakeholders could expect the
following statement within the organisation’s future annual reports:
119
BESTSELLER'S MODERN SLAVERY STATEMENT 2015/16 - This
statement is published in accordance with the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015.
It describes the steps taken by BESTSELLER A/S, which has a subsidiary in
the UK, within the financial year ending 31 July 2016 to prevent modern
slavery and human trafficking in our supply chain. (Bestseller, 2016)
This was to be followed by the organisation’s steps to ensure ethical and
sustainable supply chain practices.
Similar to the UK’s approach, Australia, as of 2018, was preparing to submit an
inquiry to parliament for a modern slavery act. As a long-term outcome of the Rana
Plaza crisis, this was likely to further impact on the organisations of Target Australia,
Kmart Australia and Cotton On Group to make stronger implicit CSR actions
involving supply chain practices. In addition, Target Australia and Kmart Australia
jointly implemented an Ethical Sourcing Guide (both operated under their holding
company, Wesfarmers). This sourcing guide applied to all of their suppliers and was
based on the UN’s “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.
In summary, the the analysis of the data suggested that industry was increasingly
affected by legislative requirements relating to CSR, for example, implicit CSR
through the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. The organisations combined
compulsory social engagements with individual and voluntary efforts, for example,
explicit CSR through community empowerment programs or disaster relief. By
combining explicit and implicit CSR, organisations were able to maximise the
outcomes of their image and reputation by building legitimacy among stakeholders.
120 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
4.4.5 Summary
Whilst work with the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance continued to be
carried out, the trend among the Connected Organisations shifted from being
responsive to becoming resistant towards transparent supply chain management. Only
one participant, C&A, accepted a full transparency pledge and consistently responded
in a similar way to H&M throughout the three time periods.
The evidence ultimately identified that the Connected Organisations group
continued to distance themselves from crisis responsibility and were reluctant to
conform to the causes of short- and long-term stakeholder pressures. This was an
interesting development and from a practical perspective it was likely that these
organisations acted this way to take protect themselves from long-term legal
repercussions by victims and their families.
The Unconnected Organisations, on the other hand, continued to respond to the
crisis spillover phenomenon by conforming (Allan & Caillouet, 1994) to stakeholder
pressures through a full or partial pledge for supply chain transparency. This was
deemed as a collective CSR action to meet social expectations for this point in time,
that is, implicit CSR.
Whilst one organisation, American Eagle Outfitters (AEO), declined to take the
transparency pledge, they were bound by compliance with the “California
Transparency in Supply Chain Act 2010” through implicit CSR. The Act required
AEO to disclose efforts for responsible supply chain management and to eradicate
human exploitation for consumers to make an informed purchase decision. Disclosures
were released annually on their website or other channels of written statements such
as annual reports.
121
In summary, the data analysis of Time Period 3 found the following:
Industry adapted to implicit CSR practices for the long-term due to
emerging governmental requirements, for example, the UN’s Sustainable
Development Goals and modern anti-slavery legislation.
Stakeholder pressures demanded transparent supply chains practices.
Industry scrutiny continued to create more transparency in supply chain
practises through annual reports released by industry watchdogs.
The next section presents the findings of trends and patterns within the two
groups being studied, as well as across the regions from which the organisations
originated.
4.5 ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE PATTERNS AND TRENDS
This section explores the objectives of Research Question 3, which asks:
What CSR strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ in
the short- and long-term?
To answer this research question, the analysis considered the trends and
variances in the crisis and CSR responses in both samples as well as the regional
CSR trends for the Unconnected Organisations.
4.5.1 Connected Organisations
The analysis identified inferences in the immediate crisis responses across the
sample. Whilst all organisations eventually arrived at a rebuild response within Time
Period 1, some organisations preferred to undertake individual crisis responses, for
example, explicitly rather than undertaking a collective industry approach, for
122 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
example, implicitly. By exploring individual organisations within each sample group,
broader industry-wide trends could be identified.
Adler Modemärkte persistently maintained a silent crisis response throughout
the study, with an undisclosed donation to a Bangladesh charity being the only
responsibility attributed to the crisis by this organisation. Others combined individual
rebuild strategies with collective industry responses, such as the Bangladesh Accord
or The Alliance.
Following the immediate crisis period, the data analysis identified that the
fashion industry shifted towards reformed collective industry practises that remained
unchanged throughout the study. This was evident through collective, implicit CSR,
such as the Bangladesh Accord, The Alliance, and even the German Partnership for
Sustainable Textiles. From 2016, the demand of stakeholders was for organisations to
pledge transparent supply chain practises. Surprisingly, a majority of the Connected
Organisations, excluding C&A, declined to take the pledge despite prior conformity
to pressures identified in the previous years, as explored by this study.
Among the CSR activities that stood out from the norm was the set-up of the
C&A Foundation following the Rana Plaza collapse. Whilst this was an individual
approach, a similar response was set up by H&M first and then this was imitated by
C&A. In summary, this suggests peer-to-peer imitation, however, on an individual
organisational basis.
4.5.2 Unconnected Organisations: Geographical CSR trends
4.5.2.1 Nordic region
Organisations assumed collective responsibility by agreeance with the
Bangladesh Accord and/or The Accord. H&M stood out from the norm within the
123
Nordic region. This organisation was the single, largest garment producer in
Bangladesh and, therefore, became a primary target by stakeholders despite non-
affiliations with the Rana Plaza factory.
Ultimately, organisations within the Nordic region depicted a unified CSR
movement, for example, implicit CSR. This was approached through the UN’s
Sustainable Development Goals for the long-term to empower the local communities
within less developed regions where business was being conducted, as well as
improved ethical standards. Organisations communicated relevant CSR goals widely
through various channels like CSR/sustainability agendas, annual reports and
company websites.
4.5.2.2 North America
Prior research has suggested that organisations within the North American
region commonly addressed CSR responses of an explicit nature (Matten & Moon,
2008) prior to the Rana Plaza crisis. This means that organisations primarily engaged
in their own strategic and voluntary CSR programs, such as through community
outreach programs after hurricanes or internal company policies. This trend remained
in the immediate period following the factory collapse as many North American
organisations declined the Bangladesh Accord by mimicking Wal-Mart’s non-
conformity to stakeholder pressures. The rationale for declining the Bangladesh
Accord was indicated by concerns for its legally binding arbitration. There was also
concerns for prospective law suits by victims and their families by indirectly accepting
a level of responsibility through commitment to collective industry reforms.
The North American region eventually responded to stakeholder pressures by
shifting to more implicit CSR practices through the implementation of The Alliance.
124 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Despite the lack of a legally binding arbitration and union collaboration, The Alliance
recognised that single organisations would not be able to improve industry practices
on their own, and that collaborative forces were necessary.
Analysis of the data for the long-term strategies indicated that there was a degree
of resistance in the North American region in the shift of industry norms towards
implicit CSR practices when compared to other regions; however, the market was
slowly transforming.
Although American Eagle Outfitters did not agree to the transparency pledge, it
was legally bound by the “California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010”,
which was of an implicit nature. American Eagle Outfitters was thereby strategically
aligned with the shifting industry norms for Unconnected Organisations.
4.5.2.3 Australia
Similar to other regions, Australia primarily undertook explicit CSR during
Time Period 1. Australian news media, NGOs, activists, and consumers were quick to
report on the Rana Plaza factory collapse, which likely prompted organisations to
respond tactically to minimise reputational damage.
Wesfarmers was the holding company of both Kmart Australia and Target
Australia, out of which Kmart Australia was the primary buyer in Bangladesh.
Following the Rana Plaza collapse, Kmart Australia immediately admitted that their
factory audits did not include structural building inspections, and thereby openly
brought awareness to an industry-wide issue at the time of the factory collapse. In
doing so, Kmart Australia accepted responsibility for the crisis spillover by
recognising their neglect of one of the broader underlying causes of the Rana Plaza
factory collapse that could apply collectively across the industry.
125
The shift towards implicit CSR in the Australian industry segment became
visible when Kmart Australia and Target Australia became the first organisations to
sign the Bangladesh Accord from the region in June 2013, again, closely followed by
Cotton On. The long-term analysis showed that all three Australian organisations now
led Australian fast fashion organisations by example through their ethical and
transparent supply chain practices. Such data emerged through industry reports, such
as Behind the Barcode which revealed a comparable scoring system of organisations
based on disclosure, or non-disclosure, of their ethical supply chain practises.
Target Australia and Kmart Australia further implemented a joint Ethical
Sourcing Guide which applied to all suppliers and was based on the UN’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. All three organisations achieved their top grades by
maintaining explicit CSR practices concurrent with implicit CSR through collective
industry initiatives, such as with the Bangladesh Accord and commitments to the
transparency pledge.
It should also be noted that whilst the pledge for supply chain transparency
became the objective of long-term pressures, the Australian region started releasing
physical factory addresses as early as in Time Period 2. The analysis of the data from
Australian news media outlets and NGOs indicated that Australia was increasingly
conscious of their ethical supply chain practices and how stakeholders perceived
relevant activities, as industry scrutiny had continued since Rana Plaza. The long-term
analysis showed that all three Australian organisations led by example with peers
within the region.
In addition, and similarly to what the UK had recently implemented, Australia
prepared to submit an inquiry to parliament for the implementation of a modern slavery
126 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
act. If successful, this would require organisations to declare ethical supply chain
practices in annual reports.
4.5.3 Summary
The section above discussed trends and variances in the crisis and CSR responses
between the two sample groups. It also compared patterns of geographical
characteristics between the organisations within Unconnected Organisations with
those linked with prior garment production at Rana Plaza.
In summary, the following key findings were identified within the data:
As the cause of stakeholder pressures shifted towards transparent supply chain
practices, the data showed patterns of resistance among the Connected
Organisations whilst Unconnected Organisations responded with agreement.
The Connected Organisations continued to distance themselves from the crisis
as opposed to those affected by the crisis spillover, and predominantly
conformed to pressures (Allen & Caillouet, 1994).
There was an industry shift towards obligatory and collective CSR of an
implicit nature, however, in combination with explicit CSR activities for
legitimacy.
127
Chapter 5: Discussion
5.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter contains a discussion, interpretation and evaluation of the research
findings with reference to the key constructs and theories explored in the literature
review in Chapter 2, namely, attribution theory and Coombs’ (2007b) SCCT
framework, implicit and explicit CSR responses (Matten & Moon, 2008), and
stakeholder pressures.
In providing succinct outcomes of the different short- and long-term strategies
undertaken by the organisations and their meaning in terms of the existing literature,
key constructs and theories are explored through the three RQs of this study:
(1) How does attribution theory explain organisational responses to a crisis
spillover?
(2) What SCCT strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations
employ in the short- and long-term?
(3) What CSR strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ
in the short- and long-term?
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations, implications for
theory and practise, and finally, recommendations for future research applicable to the
nexus or CSR and the crisis spillover context.
5.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 1
How does attribution theory explain organisational responses to a crisis
spillover?
128 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
5.2.1 Connected Organisations
Rana Plaza presented a complex case from the perspective of attribution theory
and crisis responsibility. Whilst neither of the sample groups were directly responsible
for the crisis, the Connected Organisations were more closely affected by the crisis
than the Unconnected Organisations due to their prior business links with the Rana
Plaza factory.
SCCT prescribes a rebuild strategy for preventable accidents leading to human
injury or fatality, as these situations bring a strong attribution of responsibility
(Coombs, 2007b). The evidence showed that this was not the preferred initial method
for the majority of the Connected Organisations, perhaps due to their indirect link to
the cause of the crisis. The data showed initial SCCT strategies that denied or
diminished crisis responsibility. Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) examined this
similarly through an inductive content analysis and found that defensive strategies,
including denial and justification, attracted negative attention from stakeholders.
Organisations that undertake defensive strategies in a collective setting may seek to
take advantage of the situation by “getting lost in the crowd” among other
organisations that assume responsibility (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016, p. 177).
Chapter 2 identified apologies, the expression of remorse and sympathy or the
gesture of offering compensation to victims, as the most effective way to mitigate
negative attributions among stakeholders (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016, p. 177).
Primark on the other hand immediately employed a rebuild response which indicates
that organisations assume crisis responsibility, in this instance however, the response
acted in the organisation’s favour (Coombs 2007b, 2015c; Comyns & Franklin-
Johnson, 2016). Primark quickly released crisis-related information, which partly
assisted them in ‘stealing thunder’ (Coombs, 2015c) from peers and other media
129
channels. This was related to crisis spillover as Primark was able to frame their own
crisis response to stakeholders immediately after the factory collapse (Coombs 2007b,
2015c; Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016), and thereby influence crisis attributions
from information infomediaries (Zavyalova et al., 2012).
Whilst most Connected Organisations conformed to the Bangladesh Accord in
Time Period 2, this rebuild response complemented other SCCT strategies, such as
bolstering and diminish for organisations to distance themselves from crisis
responsibility. A different type of crisis detachment was, however, observed with
Adler Modemärkte. This organisation became linked to the Rana Plaza factory in July
2013 and from then on maintained a no-statement response.
It is possible that stakeholders struggled to attribute crisis responsibility to Adler
Modemärkte as the organisation was able to avoid the immediate reporting of the
factory collapse. The organisation’s linkage with Rana Plaza was not frequently
reported by both global news media or in their media in their home country of
Germany. As Adler Modemärkte was not a globally established organisation and had
little global media presence, it would have been challenging for stakeholders outside
Germany to attribute responsibility to them. From Adler Modemärkte’s perspective,
their continued silence helped to detach them from blame attribution with Rana Plaza.
Overall, the Connected Organisations contributed with various levels of victim
compensation strategies, as all organisations moved to a rebuild crisis response
(Coombs, 2007b). Some, however, compensated victims through third parties to avoid
payments being perceived or cognitively attributed with guilt among stakeholders
(Coombs, 2007b; Weiner, 1985; Weiner et al., 1991), and thereby mitigate the risks
for possible legal repercussions. This was consistent with prior findings in the
literature, as organisations indirectly accepted responsibility through victim
130 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
compensation schemes, which in some instances, such as in the case for Wal-Mart,
could lead to class act law suits by victims.
The Connected Organisations continued long-term rebuild strategies through
CSR in Time Period 3, which were likely to encourage a positive perception of their
efforts among stakeholders, according to Zhou and Ki (2018b). Parallel with long-term
rebuild strategies, some Connected Organisations continued diminishing responses to
reiterate that factors causing Rana Plaza had been beyond their immediate control. The
purpose of such concurrent responses was to minimise blame attribution to their brand
names whilst responsibility was taken through rebuild responses to meet social
demands placed by stakeholders.
An example of this was C&A, which acknowledged prior business ties to Rana
Plaza but a diminish response to reduce responsibility was made stating that their
contract with the Rana Plaza factory had concluded well before the disaster. Whilst it
could normally be presumed that business contracts would have be active and in place
at the time of the crisis to enable the process of responsibility, this was not the case.
Poor record keeping management and, often, outdated websites of garment
manufacturers contributed to fashion organisations still being listed as business
partners at the time of the disaster.
However, journalist and stakeholders’ views of crisis responsibility (present in
media stories) were aimed at any organisation with prior business links with the unsafe
factory premises, as this was deemed unethical supply chain management.
This development is consistent with the literature in Chapter 2, for example the
organisations were still able to maintain a strong interplay by fulfilling the expectations
of their key stakeholders by undertaking the long-term rebuild strategies (Allen &
Caillouet 1994; Zhou & Ki, 2018a). For example, although C&A did not have an active
131
contract with the Rana Plaza factory at the time of the building collapse, they assumed
responsibility through rebuild responses in combination with statements to diminish
responsibility.
5.2.2 Unconnected Organisations
Unconnected Organisations became implicated by “externally induced
disruptions” in their industry environment (Desai, 2011, p. 263) and their SCCT
responses were, therefore, different to those of Connected Organisations. An important
pattern was that responsibility bypassed the traditional owner of the crisis to
organisations with similar corporate characteristics within the industry. As such,
affected organisations were faced with different circumstances under the three goals
for public excuse-giving (Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Weiner, 1985, 1991).
The causal locus fell explicitly on external circumstances, that is, the Rana Plaza
factory owners, which was expected to reduce stakeholders’ attribution of blame
(Weiner, 1985, 1991). The factors of controllability and stability should have thereby
become redundant but were, instead, transferred from the Rana Plaza owners to the
Connected Organisations and then to the Unconnected Organisations (Weiner, 1985,
1991) through social stakeholder expectations for ethical supply chain practises.
One other threat facing the Unconnected Organisations was reputational damage
through guilt by association (Desai, 2014; Yu et al., 2008) with the Connected
Organisations. Such cognitive attributions are particularly applicable to industry fields
with a prior history of disruptions (Desai, 2014) which had applied to the fashion
industry, for example, through prior sweatshop revelations and industrial accidents.
This may explain the initial crisis responses for the Unconnected Organisations in that
they either denied or remained silent in the immediate crisis aftermath.
132 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Chapter 2, however, explained that organisations are more likely to undertake
accommodative strategies when the industry environment is more interconnected
(Clemens & Douglas, 2005). This can generally lead organisations to participate in
industry associations or other collective equivalent initiatives, which can work as an
effective tool to influence industry reforms (Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Goodstein
1994). Based on this, H&M became susceptible to stakeholder pressures from the
Bangladesh Accord despite their non-linkage with the Rana Plaza factory.
Literature discussed in Chapter 2 suggested that this may happen to large-scale
organisations with a greater social presence to influence CSR trends (Arvidsson,
2010), which the analysis of the data supported. The findings thereby align with
Desai’s (2011) theory in that public relations responses provided from the
Unconnected Organisations sometimes carried a greater influence than that of the
Connected Organisations.
The Unconnected Organisations predominantly refrained from public statements
in Time Period 1. The sample strategically assumed responsibility through collective
CSR in Time Period 2, which presumably helped minimise anger among stakeholders
(Coombs & Holladay, 2004; Kim & Cameron, 2011). By meeting stakeholders’ post-
crisis expectations, for example, by collective measures to improve supply chain
practises through the Bangladesh Accord, the Unconnected Organisations created a
cognitive interruption in an attempt to diminish negative blame attributions.
This research has complemented Coombs’ (2007b) SCCT framework from the
crisis spillover perspective. The Unconnected Organisations became involved with the
crisis through the scrutiny of society’s “macrostructure” following a severe crisis event
(Allen & Caillouet, 1994, p. 46). By assuming responsibility through such responses,
the analysis of the data suggested that it was possible to collectively change or improve
133
industry norms as a result of the crisis spillover (Desai, 2011; Yu et al., 2008). By
accepting collective responsibility for the Rana Plaza crisis, the Unconnected
Organisations used public relations as a tool to amplify a perceived positive social
impact through short- and long-term industry reforms (Coombs, 2007a, 2007b; Huang,
2008).
5.2.3 Summary
In answering RQ1 that examined how attribution theory explains organisational
responses to a crisis spillover, the following could be unpacked at a theoretical level:
The Connected Organisations undertook a diverse range of SCCT responses to
address key stakeholder groups, often those bearing the greatest threat (Allan
& Caillouet, 1994), rather than addressing all stakeholders simultaneously with
moderate outcomes (Allan & Caillouet, 1994; Coombs, 2007b).
Whilst all Connected Organisations eventually arrived at a rebuild strategy,
their communication was complemented with statements of denial, diminish
and/or bolstering. The purpose of this was to mitigate stakeholders’ cognitive
attribution of blame, given that this process is often driven by unexpectedness
and negativity, often resulting in anger and/or sympathy (Coombs 2007b;
Weiner, 1985). The literature has suggested that the initial distancing from the
crisis responsibility through diminish and/or denial strategies amplified
stakeholders’ feelings of anger towards organisations and sympathy for the
victims (Coombs, 2015c; Coombs & Holladay, 2014).
Primark was the only organisation to explicitly address a rebuild strategy with
full responsibility for the crisis; this included monetary compensation plans to
aid Rana Plaza victims and their families. Whilst Primark paid a higher cost
134 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
financially, by assuming responsibility they lessened stakeholders’ anger and
negativity towards them.
As the crisis spilled over to affect the industry, the Unconnected Organisations
undertook crisis spillover strategies to their advantage by assuming partial
crisis responsibility. This supports emerging theory as the acceptance of guilt
would traditionally, generally bring reputational damage to organisations. In
this instance, however, the admission of collective guilt was used as a cognitive
interruption of stakeholders’ blame attributions (Weiner, 1985), as they likely
would have had opposite expectations.
The next section explores RQ2 based on the results from the data analysis.
5.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 2
The following research question was explored:
What SCCT strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ in
the short- and long-term?
To answer Research Question 2, short-term crisis responses were firstly explored
to determine broader findings in the data.
5.3.1 Connected Organisations
The analysis of the data showed that the organisations predominantly distanced
themselves from the crisis responsibility in the short-term due to the volatility brought
by the scale and scope of the crisis. Literature in Chapter 2 indicated that large-scale
organisations can be more susceptible to pressures due to the greater scope of their
public visibility (Arvidsson, 2010; Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Desai, 2014; Zhou &
Ki, 2018a), such as in the case of Wal-Mart. It could be assumed that non-conformity
to such pressures would bring reputational damage given that stakeholders often
135
specifically target large-scale organisations to lead peers by example. In this case, Wal-
Mart did not respond to the stakeholder demands that pressured them to become a
signatory of the Bangladesh Accord.
One explanation could be a high degree of internal bureaucracy and rigidity for
larger organisations such as Wal-Mart (Clemens et al., 2008), but also an
organisational structure seeking to adopt aggressive and cost-efficient responses to
pressures (Clemens et al., 2008). In this case, that became The Alliance which Wal-
Mart initiated as a counter-option to the Bangladesh Accord. The analysis of the data
showed that the legitimacy of The Alliance was often questioned by stakeholders as it
was not congruent with the expectations of the stakeholders (Coombs, 2007b; Weiner,
1985; Zavyalova et al., 2012).
Questions pertained as to whether Wal-Mart used The Alliance as a non-legal
counter-agreement to strategically rebuild their post-crisis image and to deter negative
publicity through a ceremonial action (Zavyalova et al., 2012). Crisis spillover
literature has addressed similar behaviour as a “free riding problem” (Comyns &
Franklin-Johnson, 2016, p. 178). This means that organisations that contribute nothing
or less than others to fix industry problems, can benefit from collective efforts
(Comyns, & Franklin-Johnson, 2016).
Other organisations, excluding Adler Modemärkte, more readily conformed to
the Bangladesh Accord and thereby responded with an active strategy to mitigate
reputational damage arising from the circumstances of a crisis with a high probability
of blame attribution (Coombs, 1995, 2007b, 2015c; Coombs & Holladay, 2004;
Weiner et al., 1991, p. 5). Once H&M became a signatory of the Bangladesh Accord,
smaller industry peers followed a similar strategy. Literature in Chapter 2 supported
this by suggesting that smaller organisations are better equipped to respond with active
136 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
strategies for stakeholder pressures and innovative solutions due to less dependability
on bureaucracy (Clemens et al., 2008). Similarly, Zhou and Ki’s (2018a) study found
that smaller organisations can have more flexibility due to their reduced public
visibility, as opposed to the case for large-scale organisations, which helps explain the
flexibility of smaller organisations to assume responsibility during a crisis spillover.
Stakeholder pressures eventually started to shift to demand collective industry
compensation for the Rana Plaza victims and their families. A pattern that emerged
here for the Connected Organisations was that they responded by agreeing with
stakeholder pressures. Monetary contributions were, however, made independently or
through third parties and could be linked with strategies to maintain diminished crisis
responsibility. Their acceptance of stakeholder pressures may, however, be explained
by literature based on the high level of dependence between the fashion industry and
its stakeholders (Clemens & Douglas 2005; Ingram & Simons, 1995). For example,
when societal demands are congruent with organisational objectives, such as to
maintain a positive brand perception for long-term viability, rational agreement about
the actions to take may occur (Clemens et al., 2008; Coombs, 2007b).
Benetton’s behaviour stood out in that they employed the accountancy firm Price
Waterhouse Cooper (PwC) to undertake an independent assessment to scale their crisis
liability, including their commercial association and the square meters used inside the
factory. PwC calculated retributions of USD$550,000 for which Benetton doubled the
compensation amount to victims and their families. Whilst Benetton was already a
signatory of the Bangladesh Accord, their journey towards this subsequent
compensation rebuild response does not align with Coombs’ (2007b, 2015c) SCCT.
Moreover, whilst SCCT does not traditionally posit a long-term lens, it is argued
here that the Connected Organisations undertook rebuild responses parallel with SCCT
137
strategies that denied, bolstered and/or diminished crisis responsibility in the short-
and long-term. The analysis of the data pertinent to stakeholders depicted emotions of
anger in response to the Connected Organisations’ reluctance to accept full
responsibility.
In Time Period 3, stakeholder pressures demanded transparent supply chain
practices and some Connected Organisations responded with resistance to conformity,
including Primark. Literature in Chapter 2 explained that when organisations feel the
need to conform to social and economic norms in their environment, they can be least
likely to make an active resistance (Clemens et al., 2008). Whilst the Connected
Organisations agreed with the need for industry reforms in the short-term, the long-
term pressures brought active resistance due to concerns about industry competition.
5.3.2 Unconnected Organisations
Similar to the Connected Organisation of Wal-Mart, H&M immediately became
susceptible to stakeholder pressures that demanded the two [large-scale] organisations
lead the way in industry reforms through the Bangladesh Accord. Literature in Chapter
2 acknowledged that the timing of the crisis response is imperative (Coombs, 2007b,
2015c; Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016), and H&M went with an accommodative
strategy as a first signatory of the Bangladesh Accord.
Whilst Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) looked at Connected Organisations,
they explained that organisations that respond with accommodative strategies in the
short-term put themselves in a vulnerable position reputationally and financially. For
the context of this study, this applied to the risks undertaken by H&M through their
accommodative spillover strategy. However, had they undertaken defensive strategies
instead, there is a probability that H&M could have experienced reputational damage
138 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
in the long-term (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016) with the rationale of not
fulfilling the social expectations held by stakeholders (Janssen et al., 2015).
Australian organisations, Target Australia, K-Mart Australia and Cotton On,
followed H&M’s lead by joining the Bangladesh Accord in June 2013. The subsequent
spillover response by K-Mart Australia and Target Australia stood out here as they
released the physical addresses of their suppliers on their websites. This was a
revolutionary development at the early stage of Time Period 2 given that demands for
transparent supply chains intensified in Time Period 3.
This early move by K-Mart Australian and Target Australia supports the
proposition made by Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) that organisations do not
share an equal burden during a crisis spillover. This means that some organisations,
such as K-Mart Australia and Target Australia, accepted the burden of responsibility
through accommodative strategies which could have caused reputational damage.
The evidence from the data analysis showed that all the Unconnected
Organisations eventually became signatories of the Bangladesh Accord, which
suggests that the crisis spillover influenced industry reforms. Whilst a difficult and
costly task to achieve, as suggested by crisis spillover literature (Desai, 2011; Yu et
al., 2008), it was likely that the scale and scope of the Rana Plaza crisis spillover
required pragmatic outcomes beyond statements of sympathy and/or bolstering from
the Unconnected Organisations. From a theoretical standpoint, the accommodative
responses from the Unconnected Organisations enabled them to build and rebuild their
“reservoir of goodwill” through CSR (Janssen et al., 2015, p. 184).
139
5.3.3 Summary
Immediately after the Rana Plaza factory collapse, heavy scrutiny of the fast
fashion industry practises began. The analysis indicated that as similarities in the
corporate characteristics among Connected and Unconnected Organisations may have
influenced competitiveness in the post-crisis organisational responses. Findings
further suggested that large-scale organisations, such as H&M and Wal-Mart, became
more susceptible to stakeholder pressures to lead peers towards industry reforms
(Desai 2011; Yu et al. 2008).
In answering RQ2, which examined the extent to which organisations assumed
responsibility for an industry-focused crisis in their communication in the short and
long-term, the below findings were established.
5.3.3.1 Connected Organisations – short-term
The two groups in the sample predominantly distanced themselves from the
crisis to reduce stakeholders’ attributions to crisis responsibility. Whilst they all
eventually arrived at a rebuild response, the majority complemented the response with
diminish, denial and/or bolstering responses to influence stakeholders’ crisis
perceptions. These findings depict a traditional approach of organisations acting in
such a manner as to protect negative reputational outcomes and the risks of long-term
threats. This could be explained in terms of Coombs’ (2015c) view of a response
strategy to reduce offensiveness to stakeholders by acknowledging that they bear some
responsibility, however, with claims of having had little control over the factors
causing the crisis. This approach is to reduce attributions of responsibility (Coombs &
Holladay, 2002).
140 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
5.3.3.2 Connected Organisations – long-term
Similar to the short-term crisis responses, the Connected Organisations
continued to undertake rebuild responses that were complemented with diminish,
denial and/or bolstering responses. As the crisis had well and truly spilled over to affect
the industry in the long-term responses, literature may explain the efforts of the
Connected Organisations as ‘free riding’ with the responses of Unconnected
Organisations (Comyns & Franklin-Johnson, 2016).
From a theoretical perspective, the long-term response of the Connected
Organisations again served strategies to reduce offensiveness among stakeholders.
This is an interesting development as Coombs (2015c) stated that in reality, this
strategy is rarely applied by organisations.
5.3.3.3 Unconnected Organisations – short term
The sample remained silent or undertook bolstering responses in the immediate
post-crisis phase during which linkages between organisations and the Rana Plaza
factory were determined by both stakeholders and industry. Some stepped forward to
release bolstering responses to remind stakeholders of existing measures and CSR
undertaken to keep factories and garment workers safe. The findings supported
existing literature in that large-scale organisations became susceptible to stakeholder
pressures to influence industry reforms of their peers. This was visible through H&M’s
commitment to the Bangladesh Accord in the short-term.
5.3.3.4 Unconnected Organisations – long-term
The full sample committed to industry reforms in the short- and long-term. In
doing so, the organisations could influence stakeholders to a positive attribution from
a micro perspective, whereby the conditions of the crisis spillover could influence
141
broader industry perceptions from the macro level. A competitive interplay between
the Unconnected Organisations with Connected Organisations was also observed,
likely in efforts to be viewed as Good Samaritans, given that the scale and scope of
Rana Plaza required responses by actions and not only organisational statements.
The following section theoretically discusses organisational CSR in response to
stakeholder pressures, including trends and patterns within each of the two samples.
5.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 3
What CSR strategies do Connected and Unconnected Organisations employ in
the short- and long-term?
The Rana Plaza crisis caused industry-wide reputational damage and loss of
organisational legitimacy for organisations; according to Janssen et al. (2015), this
could trigger all four roles played by CSR during a crisis by (1) increasing the level of
attention that stakeholders place on the crisis; (2) influencing the level of crisis blame
that stakeholders place on organisations, which highlights the importance of attribution
theory and SCCT within the crisis spillover context; (3) influencing stakeholder
expectations for the organisational crisis response; and (4) influencing the
organisations’ “insulation from the fallout of the crisis” (Janssen et al., 2015, p. 185).
As such, this part of the discussion of the findings addresses implicit and explicit
CSR from the perspective of RQ3, that is, what CSR strategies do Connected and
Unconnected Organisations employ in the short and long-term.
5.4.1 Connected Organisations – Short and long-term CSR
The analysis explored corporate CSR/sustainability reports published in early-
mid 2013, which thereby helped identify CSR practises at the time of the factory
collapse. The trend for the Connected Organisations was to engage in independent and
142 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
voluntary CSR, that is, explicit CSR. As the crisis started to spill over, implicit CSR
initiatives started to emerge based on stakeholder pressures. So, whilst the collective
industry approaches, such as the Bangladesh Accord, The Alliance, and the collective
Rana Plaza victim compensation scheme were considered rebuild and spillover
responses in the short-term, there was also CSR undertaken by the organisations to
meet stakeholders’ social expectations (Janssen et al., 2015). The legal and financially
binding aspects to the Bangladesh Accord reduced the likelihood of CSR efforts being
perceived as “greenwash” or manipulative public relations efforts (Bartlett, 2011; Du
et al., 2010; Morsing et al., 2008).
Linked with the findings for RQ2, stakeholders’ attributions of crisis
responsibility were influenced by the scale and scope (Coombs, 2007b) of the Rana
Plaza case and required legitimate reforms for crisis recovery. Environmental
ambiguity was amplified in the short-term phase as resources to identify client
relationships between the Rana Plaza and global fast fashion organisations were
limited within complex layers of supply chain practises. For example, it was more
tolerable for key suppliers to authorise the sub-contracting of orders at the time to
manage competitive turn-around times and deadlines.
With the exclusion of some organisations, the Connected Organisations
predominantly responded with moderate conformity to stakeholder pressures to
commit to collective and implicit CSR activities in the short-term. The industry norm
at the time of the crisis was explicit CSR (Matten & Moon, 2008) through voluntary
programs that, for example, enabled education and training for vulnerable
communities or contributions towards disaster relief programs (Matten & Moon,
2008).
143
Literature has assisted in examining the sample’s short-term response. Given
that implicit CSR that was related to supply chain practises fell outside the industry
norm at the time of the factory collapse, it was likely that organisations perceived a
low degree of common association. For example, there was an inconsistency between
implicit CSR strategies such as the Bangladesh Accord and industry norms at the time
(Du et al., 2010, Matten & Moon, 2008).
Among explicit CSR responses, Primark was criticized by industry watchdogs,
for example, stakeholders for proceeding with their own victim compensation schemes
collaboratively with BRAC Bangladesh, this is for example explicit CSR (Matten &
Moon, 2008). Primark later contested the criticism by stating that victims and families
would have been unable to wait months for fashion organisations to gather the
collective funds. Such patterns are explained in Chapter 2 as the ‘catch 22’ of CSR,
where organisations believe that they were damned if they did and damned if they did
not undertake relevant activities (Bartlett, 2011; Morsing et al., 2008, p. 97). On the
one hand, Primark attempted to act socially responsibly by immediately implementing
short- and long-term victim compensation schemes through explicit CSR. On the other
hand, the organisation was condemned for delaying implicit CSR efforts, which
seemed to have delayed collective victim compensation payments.
Other patterns in the data depicted organisations that indirectly contributed to
the collective victim compensation scheme, and to continue to “take actions to distance
themselves” from crisis responsibility (Yu, 2008, p. 463). As such, explicit CSR was
undertaken by a transfer of funds to a selected charity of NGO, and the latter party was
responsible for undertaking the implicit CSR by donating the funds to the collective
payment scheme.
144 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
The Connected Organisations eventually shifted towards implicit CSR through
collective industry engagement that was parallel with explicit CSR by individual
organisations. In doing so, the sample demonstrated a long-term commitment to
improving crisis-related, industry issues to reduce stakeholder scepticism (Zhou & Ki,
2018a). Literature suggested that successful CSR communication explores contextual
factors and societal expectations before utilising appropriate messages. Pertinent to
this, Wal-Mart expressed long-term intentions of handing over the key responsibilities
of The Alliance to the Bangladesh government upon its expiry in 2018. News media
reviewed as a part of the data analysis suggested a conflict of interest where 60% of
300 Bangladesh government members had direct or indirect ties to the industry through
ownership interests. Due to this, stakeholders expressed concerns about the
Bangladesh government holding a greater interest in generating profits from garment
orders than prioritising the protection of vulnerable garment workers.
Whilst this may again have been linked with the ‘catch 22’ of CSR (Morsing et
al., 2008), the legitimacy of The Alliance and Wal-Mart’s CSR in the Bangladesh
garment industry was consistently doubted among stakeholders and scholars (Comyns
& Franklin-Johnson, 2016; Zhou & Ki, 2018b). Despite the patterns of reluctance to
certain implicit CSR activities in the sample, long-term findings indicated emerging
government and legislative requirements to operate with ethical supply chain practices
in developing regions.
5.4.2 Unconnected Organisations – Short and long-term CSR
The findings suggested that high-profile industrial accidents, such as the Rana
Plaza case, can extend a reputational threat to organisations beyond those initially
viewed as guilty (Desai, 2011). This supports the literature discussed in Chapter 2 in
that stakeholder reactions to salient accidents can spill over through guilt by
145
association (Desai, 2011; Yu et al., 2008). This may explain why the Unconnected
Organisations remained silent in the immediate crisis aftermath, for example, to avoid
the Rana Plaza-related media attention. When an organisation is caught in a crisis,
silence about CSR could be beneficial to avoid threats to the legitimacy of the CSR
activities (Coombs & Holladay, 2015; Shim & Yang, 2016). Silence on the CSR matter
is also a form of communication from organisations (Ihlen et al., 2011) and was,
therefore, considered for the context of this study.
CSR research discussed in Chapter 2 suggested that NGOs are more likely to
report on a crisis that is related to organisations with a strong CSR record (Janssen et
al., 2015). A prime example of this is H&M, which became heavily scrutinised in the
immediate post-crisis period. This was likely due to H&M being the largest garment
exporter in Bangladesh and to existing activities of explicit CSR in developing regions
(Janssen et al., 2015). The remainder of the sample undertook imitative responses to
H&M, with European organisations signing the joint Bangladesh Accord more readily
than the North Americans. An underlying factor for this could be that Europe
accounted for 60% of Bangladesh apparel exports (Plumer, 2013) at the time of the
Rana Plaza crisis. The Bangladesh Accord, therefore, became an important tool for
European organisations to enhance social fitness after the factory collapse. The CSR-
based responses of the Unconnected Organisations are suggested to be a “ceremonial
action” to deter negative attention in order to maintain legitimacy and positive
stakeholder relationships (Peter et al., 1997; Zavyalova et al., 2012). By
communicating implicit CSR to stakeholders, the sample made efforts to simplify the
causal attribution process by influencing the “perceptions about the appropriateness of
firm actions” (Zavyalova et al., 2012, p. 1083).
146 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Collective industry responses following a disruptive event can be a costly and
challenging approach (Yu et al., 2008); this, however, became the industry trajectory
to meet stakeholders’ demands of improved supply chain standards. From a theoretical
perspective, an extreme crisis with a high fatality rate such as with the Rana Plaza
disaster extended the period of industry scrutiny and pressures (Coombs, 2007b,
2015c). The prevalence of mandatory policies and procedures were observed in the
data through corporate reports and organisational codes of conduct for suppliers, for
example, implicit CSR.
Similar to the long-term crisis responses of Connected Organisations, implicit
CSR communication became evident through emerging legislative requirements in
declaring ethical business practices (Carroll & Shabana, 2010; Matten & Moon, 2008).
In more recent developments, the implementation of the “UK Modern Slavery Act
2015” has been observed, which zoomed out from the Bangladeshi region to zoom in
on the improvement of ethical corporate practices in Western regions. It is expected
that the industry trajectory of implicit CSR practises will continue to be visible through
national government bodies as an outcome of the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development
Goals (SDG’s), which are applicable to the organisations in both samples groups. This
particularly applied to SDG #12 which directs member states to achieve sustainable
consumption and production patterns. The implementation of the UN’s SDG’s is
expected to have a long-term impact in how the organisations mandate their CSR,
given that all organisations from both samples originated from UN member states.
5.4.3 Summary
The final section of this chapter discussed key findings pertinent to RQ3. By
referring to the literature in Chapter 2, the following were established:
147
The scope and severity of the Rana Plaza crisis became a catalyst for
change in the fast fashion industry. Public relations could not be used for
organisational statements only, because the situation required actions in
the form of CSR for crisis recovery.
The industry-wide CSR trend at the time of the crisis was implicit CSR.
This trend started to shift towards implicit CSR through collective efforts
in the short-term. The long-term trend showed a clear representation of
implicit CSR combined with explicit CSR at the individual
organisational level (Matten & Moon, 2008).
The Connected Organisations eventually arrived at a rebuild strategy
through the Bangladesh Accord and/or The Alliance, which was also
considered implicit CSR. Literature could explain this as efforts to satisfy
select key stakeholders that posed the greatest reputational threat, such
as industry watchdogs, news media and NGOs (Bartlett, 2011; Dacin et
al., 2007; Desai, 2011; Suchman, 1995).
The Unconnected Organisations more readily assumed responsibility by
undertaking implicit CSR actions that addressed unsafe and unethical
environmental factors that enabled the Rana Plaza disaster to happen. In
doing so, organisations could strategically appear as Good Samaritans by
avoiding less favourable scapegoating strategies (Coombs, 2007b,
2015c) and engaging in damage control for a crisis with which they were
not immediately linked (Coombs, 2007b, 2015c; Desai, 2011; Yu, et al.,
2008).
148 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
Both sample groups carried a representation of a large-scale organisation
each with large market shares in the Bangladeshi garment export
industry, for example, Wal-Mart (Connected Organisation) and H&M
(Unconnected Organisation). Whilst both organisations were in different
sample groups within the context of this study, these large-scale
organisations became key targets of stakeholder pressures to influence
industry reforms (Clemens & Douglas, 2005; Yu et al., 2008).
The results of this study supported the proposition by Comyns &
Franklin-Johnson (2016) that the burden of responsibility is not equally
shared among organisations affected by a crisis spillover in the short-
term. These authors suggested that organisations that accept
accommodative strategies, such as through CSR, bear the burden of
reputational threats. The findings of the present study indicated positive
stakeholder attributions towards accommodative CSR-strategies and
worked in the favour of the organisations rather than acting as a crisis-
intensifying factor. The long-term shifts in CSR practices for the fashion industry were rooted in
increasing legal requirements. Such developments are expected to continue to increase,
particularly through the impacts of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, and
leaves opportunities for additional work within this sphere.
5.5 LIMITATIONS
Whilst the aim of this research was to make a theoretical contribution to the
existing conversation on the crisis spillover phenomenon, the research field recognised
a number of limitations in this study which presents opportunities for future research.
149
To date more, than five years has passed since the Rana Plaza factory collapse.
On the one hand, this facilitated the present study’s exploration of long-term crisis
spillover responses by organisations, but on the other hand, this may have presented
limitations for the collection of the qualitative data under some of the below possible
circumstances.
Accessibility concerns (Yin, 2009) may arise through content being deliberately
withheld by organisations; it is possible that some content was unavailable due to the
archiving of historical records. It is, however, also possible that some historical data
was made unavailable by organisations for privacy purposes.
Retrievability issues (Yin 2009) has been considered in that some content may
have been deliberately and retrospectively deleted by organisations for crisis
detachment. Such concerns could be applicable to the immediate crisis responses by
the Connected Organisations due to the high level of uncertainty that was pertinent to
the environment.
This research is further somewhat limited in its generalisability to crisis
spillovers within other industry settings (Desai, 2014). For example, crisis spillovers
affecting other industry setting could be influenced differently based on prior crisis
history linked with the relevant industry sector. A higher or lower fatality rate could
also determine the scope and duration to which the crisis spillover will carry, which
would impact how organisations are likely to respond to the crisis. These issues pose
challenges to the ability of replicating the methods and design of the present study to
the contextual conditions of other industries (Desai, 2014) and is therefore identified
as a limitation.
Specific characteristics pertinent to the sample frame further presents a
limitation as findings were representative of the organisations being examined as a part
150 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
of this study (Yin, 2009) This is identified as a limitation as specific characteristics to
organisations may have influenced how they have responded to the Rana Plaza crisis
and thereby the findings of this research.
Lastly, qualitative content analysis has proven to be extremely time consuming.
Whilst voluminous data was gathered for the purpose of this study, findings pose a
limitation in that they are restricted by the data that could be gathered for the analysis
based on the search parameters discussed in Chapter 3.
5.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
This study holds a range of implications for current discussions on the crisis
spillover phenomenon through the nexus of CSR and crisis communication. It has
contributed towards gaps in the literature by exploring a longitudinal timeline for a
crisis spillover that involved organisations that were directly and indirectly implicated
by an industry facing crisis. By exploring organisational CSR responses that were
motivated by stakeholder pressure, individual fast fashion organisations needed to
make a social impact to recover from reputational damage. Based on the literature
discussed in Chapter 2, the following theoretical implications could be established:
Connected Organisations: The scale, scope and evidence of prior business
links with the Rana Plaza factory motivated a high level of crisis attribution among
stakeholders, as suggested by Coombs (2007b, 2015c), but also a low level of
acceptance of responsibility. Whilst organisations eventually arrived at a rebuild
strategy, some faster than others, the broader sample remained cautious in fully
admitting responsibility to the public and may therefore have relied on other
organisations such as Primark to deflect responsibility. This pattern of assumed or
deflected responsibility supports Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) proposition of
151
‘free riders’ among the Connected Organisations that relied on other industry peers,
such as Primark and Unconnected Organisations, to recover from negative industry
scrutiny. The defensive strategies undertaken by such ‘free riders’ often led to led to
slower and sometimes poorer responses in the short- and long-term.
Unconnected Organisations: The crisis spillover provided an opportunity for
the Unconnected Organisations to acknowledge the lack of industry practices with the
opportunity to appear as Good Samaritans through their willingness to improve such
norms. The findings showed that large-scale organisations in particular were heavily
scrutinised by stakeholders and pressures for supply chain reform were used to
instigate competitive social efforts between industry peers. Organisations such as
H&M may therefore have been motivated to conform to stakeholder pressures for the
Bangladesh Accord to remain competitive in the outcome of the Rana Plaza crisis. As
a domino effect, H&M’s commitment to the Bangladesh Accord is likely to have
triggered similar behaviour among other Unconnected Organisations.
As a theoretical implication based on the behaviours of both sample groups, the
present study has found that responsibility was not shared equally among Connected
and Unconnected Organisations. However, given that anger and sympathy are the key
emotions of attribution theory (Coombs 2007b; Weiner 1985), Unconnected
Organisations were able to positively influence stakeholders blame attribution process
through strategies that sought to reduce anger. By acknowledging the need for industry
reforms that also supports a positive social impact, Unconnected Organisations
undertook accommodative responses through CSR and the Bangladesh Accord.
Comyns & Franklin-Johnson (2016) also found that responsibility was not
equally shared among the organisations examined in their study, however further
suggested that organisations that accept accommodative strategies often bear the
152 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
burden of reputational threats. Whilst the present study supports Comyn & Franklin-
Johnson’s (2016) argument for the short-term, the findings of the present study suggest
that the opposite applied for the long-term perspective. As industry scrutiny has
continued for the long-term, annual reports by industry watchdogs and NGO’s
outlining organisational efforts to abolish unethical practises are being released.
Organisations that have not continued to undertake accommodative strategies
have become subject to a higher degree of scrutiny and pressures to engage in CSR for
pragmatic social impact. Overall, these patterns an environmental interconnectedness
as crisis responses may have induced competitiveness among organisations however
the collective acceptance of responsibility through SCCT and CSR essentially acted in
favour of the organisations rather than as a crisis-intensifying factor.
5.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
The multifaceted context of crisis communication and CSR practices means that
the findings of this study contribute with a number of practical implications for public
relations practitioners and scholars:
(1) Organisations faced with a crisis spillover event should exert caution with
denial strategies in both the short- and long-term. The study has supported
Coombs (2015c) argument in that once a denial is communicated to
stakeholders and is later revoked, reputational threats and scrutiny is likely
to intensify for the organisation.
(2) For crisis events of the fatal scale and scope of Rana Plaza, especially
with the high fatality rate considered, it is suggested for both Connected or
an Unconnected Organisations to assume collective industry responsibility
in both the short- and long-term. By communicating action as opposed to
only media statements, organisations face the opportunity to depict a
153
legitimate intention to eliminate factors causing the crisis in first place. In
other words, organisations may be better off by riding into the storm.
(3) Larger organisations, such as H&M, may need to be prepared for high-level
scrutiny as a crisis starts to spill over to affect industry; this is irrespective of
them being perceived as a Connected or an Unconnected Organisation. The
motivation among stakeholders is likely to be directed at large-scale
organisations to influence industry reforms to their industry peers.
(4) Conversely, smaller organisations may strategically monitor the outcome of
the responses undertaken by large-scale organisations. If they are perceived
as successful by stakeholders, they could follow the lead to remain
competitive.
(5) Geographical CSR trends and patterns were examined for Unconnected
Organisations and as an important practical implication, organisations
should not only exert awareness of existing practises within their immediate
region, but also strategies among international peers in the environment. By
developing an understanding of what may or not work for industry peers,
especially in a climate with increasing legal requirements for organisational
CSR requirements, organisations are able to respond to crisis spillover events
with a better understanding of the environmental expectations.
5.8 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The present study was limited to the fashion industry to fully understand the
strategic short- and long-term development of organisational responses. It is possible
for future studies to expand beyond these parameters and explore the contextual
conditions of other industries faced by a crisis spillover.
154 Corporate social responsibility during times of crisis
It would be valuable to expand on the present study through a quantitative
experimental study that explores the long-term industry shift towards implicit CSR.
Given that governmental legislation and expectations have had an impact on such
industry reforms, particularly through UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, to
explore relevant progress and outcomes from a geographical lens.
Moreover, as the Bangladesh Accord and The Alliance expired in 2018,
opportunities have emerged to expand on the long-term focus of this study through the
exploration of industry responses from 2018 onwards. Questions could be asked of
whether five years has been sufficient time for the industry to recover reputational
damage through CSR, or whether the severity of the Rana Plaza crisis truly created a
wake-up call for industry, its stakeholders and consumers beyond 2018. This suggests
subsequent longitudinal research on the Rana Plaza case study and whether one crisis
spillover rolls over to the next and the attention of stakeholders and stakeholders.
Lastly, it remains important for crisis communications literature to continuously
explore how CSR engagement may influence crisis different outcomes. Crisis
communications remains an applied field that seeks solutions to evolving
environmental issues (Coombs, 2015c). This means that an approach that may have
been suitable two decades ago may no longer be suitable, as technology has drastically
changed how communication is used to reach stakeholders over this period. For
example, it could be valuable to expand of this study through the lens of Frandsen and
Johansen’s (2011) study by incorporating the background reputational
interdependence by applying this into the context of a crisis spillover situation.
Effectively, by continuously testing and examining key frameworks such as SCCT,
authors can review and improve relevant theories to suit evolving environments and
stakeholders’ social expectations.
155
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173
Appendices
Appendix A
Coombs’ (2007b) Original SCCT Primary and Secondary Crisis Response Strategies
Table A1
Coombs’ (2007b) Original SCCT Primary and Secondary Crisis Response Strategies
Primary crisis response strategies
Denial crisis response strategies o Attack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming
something is wrong with the organization. o Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis. o Scapegoat: Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the
organization for the crisis.
Diminish crisis response strategies o Excuse: Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying
intent to do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis.
o Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.
Rebuild crisis response strategies o Compensation: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims. o Apology: Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility
for the crisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness. Secondary crisis response strategies
Bolstering crisis response strategies o Reminder: Tell stakeholders about the past good works of the organization. o Ingratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of
past good works by the organization. o Victimage: Crisis managers remind stakeholders that the organization is a
victim of the crisis too.
Notes. Adapted from Coombs (2007b) SCCT framework.
174 Appendices
Appendix B
Coombs’ (2007b, p. 173) Original SCCT Crisis Response Strategy Guidelines
1. Informing and adjusting information alone can be enough when crises have minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises), no history of similar crises and a neutral or positive prior relationship reputation.
2. Victimage can be used as part of the response for workplace violence, product tampering, natural disasters and rumours.
3. Diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises) coupled with a history of similar crises and/or negative prior relationship reputation.
4. Diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility (accident crises), which have no history of similar crises, and a neutral or positive prior relationship reputation.
5. Rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility (accident crises), coupled with a history of similar crises and/or negative prior relationship reputation.
6. Rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with strong attributions of crisis responsibility (preventable crises) regardless of crisis history or prior relationship reputation.
7. The deny posture crisis response strategies should be used for rumour and challenge crises, when possible.
8. Maintain consistency in crisis response strategies. Mixing deny crisis response strategies with either diminish or rebuild strategies will erode the effectiveness of the overall response.
175
Appendix C
Organisational Profiles Pertinent to Sample Selection Criteria
Table C1
Organisational Profiles Pertinent to Sample Selection Criteria Organisations Accord
Signatory Alliance Member
Annual Sales
Fiscal Year Ending
Holding Company
Private or Listed Entity
Region
Abercrombie & Fitch
Yes No > 100 million
28 Jan 2017 Not Applicable
Public Parent USA
Adler Modemärkte AG
No No > 100 million
31 Dec 2016 Steilmann Holding Ag
Public Subsidiary
Linked to RP
American Eagle Outfitters
Yes No > 100 million
28 Jan 2017 Not Applicable
Public Parent USA
Benetton Yes No > 100 million
31 Dec 2015 Edizione Srl
Private Subsidiary
Linked to RP
Bestseller Yes No > 100 million
31 July 2016 Not Applicable
Private Subsidiary
Nordic Region
C&A Yes No > 100 million
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Private Parent
Linked to RP
Cotton On Yes No > 100 million
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Private Parent
Australia
Fruit of the Loom Yes Yes > 100 million
28 Jan 2016 Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
Private Subsidiary
USA
H&M Yes No > 100 million
30 Nov 2016 Not Applicable
Public Subsidiary
Nordic Region
Helly Hansen Yes No > 100 million
31 Dec 2015 Not Applicable
Private Parent
Nordic Region
Kmart Australia Yes No > 100 million
30 June 2016 Wesfarmers Ltd
Private Subsidiary
Australia
Lindex Yes No > 100 million
31 Dec 2016 Stockmann Group
Private Subsidiary
Nordic Region
Mango Yes No > 100 million
31 Dec 2015 Not Applicable
Private Parent
Linked to RP
Primark Yes No > 100 million
17 Sep 2016 Associated British Foods (ABF)
Private Subsidiary
Linked to RP
Target Australia Yes No > 100 million
30 June 2016 Wesfarmers Ltd
Private Subsidiary
Australia
Walmart No Yes > 100 million
31 Jan 2017 Not Applicable
Public Parent Linked to RP
176 Appendices
Appendix D
Data Extracts of Organisational SCCT Responses in Time Period 1
Table D1
Data Extracts of Organisational SCCT Responses in Time Period 1
Date Brand or Retailer Quote
24 Apr 13 H&M The factory does not produce for H&M. Please read more about our work in Bangladesh [in response to consumer comment on Facebook] [Facebook - H&M 2013].
24 Apr 13 Benetton "In reference to the tragic news on the collapse of the building in Bangladesh, Benetton Group wants to clarify that none of the companies involved are suppliers to Benetton Group or any of its brands" [Twitter].
24 Apr 13 Wal-Mart "We are investigating across our global supply chain to see if a factory in this building was currently producing for Wal-Mart."
26 Apr 13 Primark "The company is shocked and deeply saddened by this appalling Incident at Savar, near Dhaka, and expresses Its condolences to all al those involved. Primark confirms that one of its suppliers occupied the second floor al the eight storey building, which housed several suppliers to the garment industry making clothing for a number of brands. Primark has been engaged for several years with NGOs and other retailers to review the Bangladeshi industry's approach to factory standards. Primark will push for this review to also include building integrity. Meanwhile, Primark's ethical trade team is at this moment working to collect information, assess which communities the workers come from, and to provide support where possible".
30 Apr 13 Cotton On "We are deeply saddened by the recent tragedy at a Bangladesh factory end our thoughts are with the families of the victims and those Involved. Whilst we have suppliers in Bangladesh, we can assure our customers that the Rana Plaza factory was not a Cotton On Group vendor. The safety end welfare of our suppliers is paramount and we have an ethical auditing team (based In China and Bangladesh) who regularly assess and audit our factories and their employees. We are proud of our Cotton On Group Vendor Code of Conduct. which underpins our fundamental trading principles. We evaluate and choose our external partners within these guidelines end have a zero‐tolerance stance on forced labour, child labour and bribery and corruption. For anyone wanting further information, please contact our customer service team on 1800 420 178 or email [email protected]"
30 Apr 13 Target Australia
“Target extends its deepest condolences to all of those affected by the tragedy in Bangladesh last week. A small number of the products Target offers are made by suppliers in Bangladesh however none of our suppliers operated from the building involved in last week's devastating factory collapse. Target is committed to operating in a manner that reflects our high ethical and moral values and we require our suppliers to do the same, which is why we have a Target Ethical Sourcing Code that sets out strong, minimum standards for our suppliers.
177
Appendix E
Impact of H&M’s commitment to The Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1
Table E1
Impact of H&M Signing the Bangladesh Accord in Time Period 1 Date
Quote
May 13 “H&M's decision broke the dam. Following its lead, other major
European retailers, including Carrefour, Marks &Spencer and Inditex, parent of the huge Zara brand, said last week they would sign the accord, setting the stage for an industrywide collaboration to improve factory safety” (Alderman 2013, May 20).
May 13 "H&M's decision to sign the accord is crucial," said Scott Nova, executive director of the Worker Rights Consortium, a factory monitoring group based in Washington and backed by 175 American colleges and universities. "They are the single largest producer of apparel in Bangladesh, ahead even of Wal-Mart. This accord now has tremendous momentum" (Greenhouse & Yardley, 2013, May 15).
May 13 “If the organisers believe their online petitions had some impact, they are wrong, according to Anna Gedda, who heads H&M's programs to improve labour conditions. "Consumers and other groups were not the tipping point," she said. "The tipping point was that we reached an accord that we felt was really going to produce change" (Norman, 2013, June 8).
May 13 “But the Rana Plaza disaster, the deadliest in the garment industry's history, has created tremendous pressure for change. On Monday morning, the Swedish retail giant H&M and Inditex, owner of the popular Zara chain, endorsed the safety plan. Within hours, the large Dutch retailer C&A also joined the agreement, as did the lowcost British retailers Primark and Tesco. Benetton, the Italian clothing group, also agreed to sign, The Associated Press reported Tuesday” (Greenhouse & Yardley, 2013, May 15).
April 17 “ADVANCING THE BANGLADESH ACCORD - We were amongst the first companies to sign the Bangladesh Accord with the aim to help improve fire and building safety in the textile industry in Bangladesh. We are actively engaged with the Accord team, and have been on the steering committee since day one. We are also closely engaged with all of our suppliers? (H&M Sustainability Report, 2017).
178 Appendices
Appendix F
Data Extracts of SCCT Responses in Time Period 2
Table F1
Data Extracts of Organisational SCCT Responses in Time Period 2
Date Organisation Quote/Statement SCCT response
31 Jul 13 Adler
After being contacted by the CCC, Adler Modemarkte have offered a small charitable donation (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013).
Rebuild
31 Jul 13 Mango
Mango refuse to take any responsibility for the Rana Plaza victims despite having placed a trial order with one of the factories. Similarly, LPP refuse to take responsibility for paying compensation (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013).
Denial
31 Jul 13 Wal-Mart
Walmart (US) claims that they did not permit production at one of the factories housed in Rana Plaza, but do not deny evidence found on-site proving that one of their contractors had produced jeans in one of the factories less than one year before the collapse (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2013).
Diminish
13 Sep 13 Wal-Mart
Walmart did not attend the meeting [RP victim compensation summit in Geneva]. It has formed its own North American alliance for Bangladeshi worker safety, along with Sears, Hudson's Bay Co., The Gap, The Children's Place and J.C. Penney (Talaga, 2013, Sep 13).
Declined The Accord/Alliance member
24 Apr 14 C&A
C&A said it had given Pounds 410,000 to the Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund (Dean & Muktadi, 2014).
Rebuild
17
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3).
Spill
over
17 A
pr 1
5 B
enet
ton
Ben
etto
n G
roup
ann
ounc
es th
at it
has
con
tribu
ted
USD
1,1
00,0
00 to
the
Ran
a Pl
aza
Trus
t Fu
nd, d
oubl
ing
the
sum
reco
mm
ende
d in
an
inde
pend
ent a
sses
smen
t of i
ts c
ontri
butio
n by
Pw
C a
nd e
ndor
sed
by W
RA
P, a
n N
GO
focu
sed
on so
cial
com
plia
nce
thro
ugh
glob
al su
pply
ch
ains
. In
fact
Ben
etto
n's p
aym
ent o
f USD
1,1
00,0
00 fo
llow
s a p
revi
ous p
aym
ent o
f USD
50
0,00
0 m
ade
thro
ugh
BR
AC
, bef
ore
the
Ran
a Pl
aza
Trus
t Fun
d w
as e
stab
lishe
d (B
enet
ton
grou
p do
uble
s com
pens
atio
n fo
r ran
a pl
aza
trust
fund
reco
mm
ende
d by
inde
pend
ent
asse
ssor
s 201
5, A
pr 1
7).
Reb
uild
22 A
pr 1
6 C
&A
To m
eet t
his d
eman
d [s
uppl
y ch
ain
trans
pare
ncy]
, C&
A's
Sust
aina
ble
Supp
ly C
hain
stra
tegy
ha
s out
lined
cle
ar ta
rget
s whi
ch w
ill m
ean
grad
ually
dis
clos
ing
mor
e in
form
atio
n ab
out
C&
A's
supp
ly c
hain
and
eff
orts
unde
rtake
n to
mak
e it
mor
e su
stai
nabl
e. A
s suc
h w
e w
ill b
e pu
blis
hing
a d
etai
led
over
view
of a
ll of
our
PU
s on
our c
orpo
rate
web
site
by
the
end
of M
ay.
This
is ju
st th
e fir
st st
ep o
f a ro
bust
stra
tegy
that
aim
s to
incr
ease
the
degr
ee o
f tra
nspa
renc
y in
our
supp
ly c
hain
whi
ch w
ill e
nabl
e th
e cu
stom
er to
be
able
to tr
ace
back
thei
r gar
men
t to
the
prod
uctio
n un
it (C
&A
Sta
tem
ent o
n Fa
shio
n R
evol
utio
n D
ay A
pril
22, 2
016)
.
Long
-term
re
build
stra
tegy
180
App
endi
ces
Tab
le G
1 - c
ontin
ued
Dat
a Ex
trac
ts o
f Cri
sis R
espo
nses
in T
ime
Peri
od 3
Dat
e O
rgan
isat
ion
Q
uote
/Sta
tem
ent
SCC
T r
espo
nse
24 N
ov 1
6 M
ango
Emai
l com
mun
icat
ion
from
Man
go to
the
coal
ition
, Nov
embe
r 24,
201
6. M
ango
said
it
“was
dev
elop
ing
a sy
stem
to c
reat
e a
user
nam
e an
d pa
ssw
ord
upon
requ
est t
o its
CSR
de
partm
ent t
hrou
gh w
hich
supp
lier i
nfor
mat
ion
can
be a
cces
sed
by “
any
orga
nisa
tion
that
may
be
inte
rest
ed, a
s lon
g as
they
do
not h
ave
any
com
petit
ive
conf
lict"
(The
C
oalit
ion,
201
7).
Long
-term
re
build
stra
tegy
30 Ja
n 17
Fr
uit o
f the
Lo
om
Supp
liers
are
exp
ecte
d to
be
trans
pare
nt a
bout
thei
r ope
ratio
ns a
t all
times
. If r
eque
sted
, al
l sup
plie
rs su
ppor
ting
FOTL
pro
duct
s mus
t be
disc
lose
d, in
clud
ing
the
lega
l nam
e,
phys
ical
add
ress
, pro
duct
, and
per
cent
age
of p
rodu
ctio
n ca
paci
ty d
edic
ated
to F
OTL
pr
oduc
t (Fr
uit o
f the
Loo
m 2
016
Supp
lier G
uide
lines
, pub
lishe
d 20
15)
Long
-term
sp
illov
er
18 A
pr 1
7 W
al-M
art
Whi
le w
e di
d no
t hav
e pr
oduc
tion
at R
ana
Plaz
a at
the
time
of th
at tr
aged
y, o
ur
cont
ribut
ion
to B
RA
C's
fund
und
erlin
es o
ur fo
cus o
n po
sitiv
ely
impa
ctin
g gl
obal
supp
ly
chai
n pr
actic
es a
nd d
rivin
g sy
stem
ic im
prov
emen
t by
colla
bora
ting
with
oth
er
stak
ehol
ders
to im
prov
e co
nditi
ons f
or w
orke
rs a
cros
s the
indu
stry
(Wal
-Mar
t, 20
17).
Den
ial/L
ong-
term
rebu
ild
stra
tegy
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