ERIC BETTINGERSTANFORD UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION10 MAY 2010
Choice in International Contexts
School Choice and Vouchers Abroad
School Choice Takes Many Forms Abroad Educational Vouchers Contract Schools Open Enrollment Privately Financed Initiatives
Vouchers are More Integral to Many Educational Systems Abroad Than to the US National Voucher Systems in Chile, Sweden Targeted Voucher Programs
Means-Tested: Puerto Rico, Colombia Women: Bangladesh
International Literature is still in its infancy in many ways
International Evidence and the US
Design of School SystemsLimits to Generalizeability
Political Circumstances Institutions Funding Schemes
Role of Private SectorMotivation for Voucher Systems
Market Forces Equality of Opportunity Overcrowding Decentralization
Why Look Internationally?
Most Voucher Literature is From the USInternational programs are much larger than in
the US Chile, Bangladesh, Colombia
Long-run Equilibrium? Chile’s voucher program is now almost 30 years old
Existing funding systems and institutions may make vouchers more feasible
Many previous reviews: Neal (2002), West (1996), Zimmer and Bettinger (2008), Wößmann (2007)
Plan of Talk
1. Discuss Major Research Questions in Int’l Voucher Literature
2. Major Voucher Programs Chile Colombia
3. Effects of Vouchers on Voucher Users4. Effects of Vouchers on Overall System
Key Research Questions
1. How do Vouchers Affect Students Who Use Them?
Academic Outcomes Non-Academic Outcomes Heterogeneous Outcomes Cost Effectiveness Mechanisms?
2. How do Vouchers Affect the System as a Whole? School Entry and Exit Overall Attainment and Outcomes School Staffing Competition and Resource Loss
Why Study Voucher Users?
Policy relevance Motivation for many policies
Part of knowing overall impact of system Depends on size of system
Sheds light on other educational questions Effect of private schools Peer groups School Organization Cost Effectiveness
Overall Impact of the Voucher
Efficiency of Overall System Friedman (1955) Tiebout Competition (1956)
Alternative Explanations Resource Loss Limits on Competition Sorting
International Voucher Programs
Bangladesh Belize Canada Chile Colombia Guatemala Japan Lesotho The Netherlands New Zealand Poland Puerto Rico Sweden United Kingdom
Chilean Voucher Program
Part of Larger Decentralization Effort by Pinochet Government in 1980
All students were eligible Starting in 2008, “bonus” subsidy for admitting low-
income studentIncrease in Private Schooling
15% in 1981 to 42 percent in 2005Public, Voucher, and Private Non-Voucher
“Topping Off” Allowed in 1993Selective Admission Policies in Voucher
Schools
Attendance Across Sectors in Chile
Source: Bravo, Mukhopadhyay, and Todd (2009)
Colombia Voucher Program
From 1992 to 1997, Decentralization Effort by Colombian Government Goal to Improve Secondary School Enrollment
Means-Tested Focus on Students Entering Secondary School (Grade 6) Students Coming From Public Sector Covered About 144,000 Students
Admissions Students had to be admitted at a voucher school prior to voucher
application Vouchers assigned by lottery if oversubscribed
Voucher Value Declined over time from 100 to 50 percent
13
Enrollment Rates in Colombia, 1993
Overall Rate
Rate for Poorest Quintile
Rate for Richest Quintile
Grade 1-5 enrollment/ Population aged 6-11
89 78 97
Grade 6-11 enrollment/Population aged 12-18
75 55 89
University enrollment/ Population aged 19-24
30 12 51
Source: Sanchez and Mendes, 1995
Effect on Users
Not clear what to expect Imagine that the voucher at least does no harm
Parents can always reverse decision However, “original” school may be altered by voucher
programRaw correlations
Colombia: voucher schools have similar outcomes to public schools (King et al 1997)
Chile: comparisons depend on types of covariates included (McEwan and Carnoy 2000)
Cleanest evidence to date is from Colombia Uses randomization to identify the voucher
15
Evidence from Colombia
Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, Kremer (AER 2002) Surveyed Voucher Applicants from Bogotá 1995
Lottery Compared Voucher Lottery Winners and Losers Effects after Three Years
Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (AER 2006) Administrative Data on All Applicants Compared College Entrance Exam Scores
16
Effects on Users: Colombia
Effects after 3 Years Increased Usage of Private Schools Higher Educational Attainment No Difference in Drop-out Rates Less Grade Repetition Higher Test Scores Less Incidence of Teen-age Employment
Long-Run Effects 30 percent of Voucher Applicants Take College Entrance Exam Increase of 7 percentage points for Voucher Winners 25 Percent Relative Effect Impact on Test Scores
Users: Evidence from Chile
Hard to Interpret Counterfactual hard to identify New private schools and rapid entry into the market Were “control” students affected
Conclusion depends on Covariates Some Evidence of Positive Effects on Users (e.g.
Sappelli and Vial 2002) Evidence is Largely Mixed as to Whether
Vouchers Improve Outcomes (McEwan and Carnoy 2000)
Evidence on Users: Mechanisms
Randomization facilitates identification of “intent to treat” parameter in Colombia Does not help identify specific mechanisms
Possible mechanisms Private schools are better
But school quality was the same (King et al 1997) Peers are better
Bettinger, Kremer, and Saavedra (2008) examine vocational school applicants Winners “stuck” in vocational schools – peers are worse Winners outcomes are better despite worse peers
Voucher included incentives Students lost voucher if they failed. Alternative was labor force participation
Effect on Overall System
Competing Hypotheses Competition Resource Loss
Loss of money from enrollment depends on average versus marginal cost
Marginal cost of leavers is likely lower than average cost Inability to close public schools in Chile
Raw Correlation Positive relationship between degree of private
competition and outcomes (Wößmann 2009)Lack of pre-program data for Chile
Evidence on System: Chile
Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) Difference-in-Differences approach
Compare areas with significant increase in private school to those without
Average test scores do not rise Vouchers resort peers. Best students move to private voucher
schools. Some outcomes (e.g. grade repetition) are worse
Gallego (2005, 2007) Instrumental Variable approach
Uses stock of Catholic priests in 1980 as instrument Immediate expansion of parochial schools led overall
outcomes of all schools to improve
Evidence on System: Chile
Bravo, Mukhopadyay, and Todd (2009) Life-cycle model of earnings and schooling decisions Use labor force data for individuals educated before
and after the voucher reform Estimate impact of choosing private school Simulate what educational attainment would have
been in absence of the program. Positive impacts on educational attainment, high school
graduation, college attendance and graduation, and wages
Evidence on Systemic Effects: Other Countries
Sweden Comparisons based on penetration of private sector
Sandstrom and Bergstrom (2005): Positive effects on overall system
Value-added comparisons Ahlin (2003): Positive effects on overall system
Israel Open enrollment => Positive Effects Lavy (2006)
UK Relationship between degree of choice and outcomes
(Gibbons, Machin, and Silva 2008) Small, positive effects.
Evidence on Systemic Effects: India Experiment
Kremer and Muralidharan experiment Sample of communities who “might be eligible for
voucher study” Gathered applications
Matched randomization on which communities received voucher Comparisons between non-applicants across voucher and
non-voucher cities Within communities with vouchers, lotteries
determine voucher assignment Differences across users
Preliminary results positive on both accounts
Future Directions
Other Outcomes Parents choose schools for non-academic reasons
How do these outcomes vary? Wage impacts
Bravo et al (2009) is first study to exploreCost Effectiveness
Few studies so far Public expenditure on vouchers generally smaller
MechanismsStaffing issues
Summary
International Voucher Literature in Infancy Significant contributions in last few years
Effects on Users Positive Effects from Colombia Not clear on the mechanisms and the importance of the
voucher for the effects Chilean evidence is hard to interpret
Growing consensus of positive effectsEffects on System
Positive Effects in Chile Comparisons of areas with and without voucher penetration More evidence arriving soon
Top Related