CHINESE GROCERY’S AGE OF EMPIRESTWO GIANT GROUPINGS ARE CARVING UP THE MARKET
CHINESE GROCERY’S AGE OF EMPIRES
Chinese retail is evolving into two rival empires, each dominated by competing e-commerce
giants. One realm is centered on Alibaba, which owns two of China’s largest e-commerce
platforms, Taobao and TMall, as well as an electronic payments system, AliPay. The other is an
alliance between JD, a leading online retailer, and Tencent, an internet and digital-technology
conglomerate that owns WeChat, China’s most popular social-media app. These two empires
already own the digital lives of Chinese consumers today, where the average Chinese spends
over 60% of their mobile app usage on either ecosystem.
Now Alibaba and Tencent/JD have set their sights on physical retail, including acquiring stakes
in six of China’s top 10 hypermarkets, the country’s biggest electronics retailer, one of the largest
department stores and the largest commercial property and entertainment conglomerate.
Exhibit 1: Empire of JD/Tencent and Alibaba
SocialPhysical retail
Offline influence
Online influence
Online retail
Experiece
JD/Tencent
Alibaba Group
Mobike, QQ University, Tencent Cloud, QQ Gaming, DiDi ChuXing
Ali Health, Taobao Education, Amap.com, Xiami, Eleme, DiDi ChuXing, Ali Cloud
Vip.com, Little Red Book, YHD.com, Zhuanzhuan
Walmart, Yonghui, Wanda, Carrefour
Tencent Video, Dianping, Sogou, QQ Music, WeChat Pay
WeChat Pay, JD logistics, Meituan
WeChat, QQ, LY.com, Qzone, Pengyou.com
Intime Retail, New Huadu, Bailian, Century Mart, Sanjiang, Sun Art, Hema
MGTV, Yicai.com, 36Kr, SCMP, Alipay
YTO express, Cainiao, Alipay, Ali LST, Koubei
Etao, Taobao, Hema, Tmall, Suning.com
Sina Weibo, Momo, Qyer.com, AcFun, Youku
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Underlying their growing dominance is Chinese consumers’ enthusiasm for online shopping:
In 2006, just 11 percent of the population enjoyed internet access; today, more than 460 million
Chinese – one-third of the population – regularly shop online.
Exhibit 2: Number of online shoppers in China from 2006 to 2016IN MM
2006
500
0
250
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
33.6 46.4 74.0 108.0160.5 194.0
242.0301.9
361.4413.3
466.7
Source: CNNIC, Statista 2017
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 3
Unlike in Europe and North America, food shopping – the largest retail segment – is moving
online too, encouraged by densely populated cities that favor rapid, efficient home delivery.
As a result, nearly 10 percent of the Chinese population shops for groceries online, compared
to just 3 percent in the United States and 6 percent in the United Kingdom, Europe’s highest
rate. And room for expansion remains: Already, an estimated 5 percent of Chinese shoppers
buy groceries exclusively online, indicating plenty of potential growth if more people stop
shopping for food in physical stores. To gain still more customers, the e-commerce giants are
introducing new shopping formats – dubbed O2O, or online-to-offline – that blend online
shopping’s convenience and wealth of information with the social experience and physical
contact with products that people enjoy in traditional, brick-and-mortar stores.
An important foundation of the tech giants’ retail innovations is their dominance in mobile
payments, of which 97 percent are processed by either Alibaba or Tencent. Mobile payments
are already used for 35 percent of grocery purchases, and even when customers shop outside
the big e-commerce platforms, they can still be a valuable source of data. Through the
payments systems, the empires learn where, when, and what customers are buying, and
complement it with the rest of their digital ecosystem to see which websites they like to
visit, the apps they use, and whom they follow on social media.
Exhibit 3: Development of mobile payment landscape in China
MARKET SHARE BY PLAYER2017H1
MARKET SIZE OF MOBILE PAYMENT IN CHINAIN TN RMB
20
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F
120
40
60
80
100
0 18
16
35
108
2%
65%
32%
AliPay WeChat Pay Others
202%
Source: Mobile payment association, Yiguan, Union Pay, Oliver Wyman analysis
China’s traditional supermarkets and convenience stores can’t compete with this onslaught,
and both their like-for-like sales and their margins are declining (see Exhibit 4).
But they may survive in some form with help from the online giants themselves. Both Alibaba
and JD have developed logistics systems based on centralized, large-scale networks of
warehouses, which can replace traditional distribution. For supermarkets, the online giants
can thus provide the means to deliver fresh food quick enough to satisfy demanding Chinese
home cooks. They have also developed software that helps old-fashioned corner shops more
easily access and tap into their logistics system to directly order goods.
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 4
Exhibit 4: Declining performance to traditional big box grocers
LFL REVENUE GROWTH RATE EVOLUTION BY PLAYER, 2010-2016IN %
OPERATING MARGIN BY PLAYER2012 VS. 2016IN %
San Jiang4
Yonghui
Wumart1
CRE1
2012 2016
-4.63
2.03
3.0
4.42
3.5
3.0
4.2 2.9
5
10
15
0
-5
-10
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
1. 2015 number for CRE and Wumart is as of H1 FY2015; CRE figures are based on retail segment result figure as reported in the annual report “Segment Result“, mainly consisting of CR Vanguard, Chinese Arts & Crafts, CRCare, VIVO, Pacific Coffee, etc. | 2. Based on retail segment result figure as reported in the annual report “Segment Result” representing earnings before interest income, finance costs and taxation, to which we’ve added back the annual net gain on disposal of non-core investments and valuation surplus on investment properties | 3. As of 2015 due to data availability | 4. 2011-2014 LFL not available; 2015-2016 comparison on same store revenue growth; includes convenience store etc
Source: Corporate annual reports, Investor presentations, Analyst reports, Oliver Wyman analysis
Both empires are building their O2O power through three plays, each of which blends their
online capabilities with offline stores in new ways.
Exhibit 5: Future of retail in China: Major plays by the empires
Experiments with new retail formats
1Start to open own O2O retail formats to showcase what “future” looks like
Strategic partnership with traditional big box retailers
2Strategically invest in offline giants to facilitate their transformation and realize synergy
Reinvention of traditional “mom and pop” shops
3Capture the B2B opportunity to have fewer layers, higher efficiency, and more transparency within RTM, and disrupt traditional distributors/wholesalers
Stay in the center of retail ecosystem and interact with
every stakeholder
Consumers (multiple layers of)Distributors/wholesalers
Retailers
Brands
1 2
3e-Commerce platform
Already became the largest players in China grocery market
Taobao.com, YHD.com, JD,
Tmall.com
Ali/JD’s retail
empire
Lianhua, Quik, Walmart,
Bailian, RT-Mart, Yonghui,
Carrefour
Ali LST, JD Xintonglu
Hema, 7 Fresh, JD
Convenience store, Tmall
Xiaodian
Alibaba Group, JD, Tencent
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 5
EXPERIMENTS WITH NEW RETAIL FORMATS
The first play is the development of new formats that blend digital and physical features to
create imaginative new solutions. Many large supermarkets worldwide now offer online
services, where customers can order via a website and have food delivered. But these mainly
work as parallel services to traditional shopping in physical supermarkets.
Exhibit 6: Overview of new retail format development
Fresh supermarket
Unmanned retail
Alibaba Group JD/Tencent Other players
On its own By affiliated retailers On its own By affiliated retailers
• Hema
• F2 Fast & Fresh (Hema)
• 7 Fresh (JD)
• Zhangyu (Meituan)
JD unmanned store
• Haiwuhui (New Huadu)
• RT-Fresh
• RISO
• Lianhua Jingxuan (Lianhua & Bailian)
• Bingo Box
• Super Species (Yonghui)
• Hyper-mart (Bubugao)
• Auchan Minute (Auchan)
• Suning Biu (Suning)
• Fresh Ideas (Bu Bu Gao)
• Sp@ce (Tian Hong)
• Bingo Box
• Xingbianli
Source: Analyst reports, Company annual report, Oliver Wyman analysis
At Alibaba’s Hema stores, customers don’t have to go to checkout counters; they can pay by
smartphone. Many don’t take their purchases with them; the store sends a delivery van. And
some don’t even want all their food at home; supermarket staff members cook some of it for
eating in the store.
Exhibit 7: Key features of new “O2O” stores – Hema example
ASSORTMENT AND PRODUCT DISPLAY
1. WELL PACKED HIGH QUALITY FRESH PRODUCTS
• Get assured that products are kept fresh and good quality even with packaging
• Gradually get used to it once customers build trust with Hema
2. BASKETS ON THE FLYING RAIL
• Items picked from the store and put on a flying rail to get it delivered to your home within 30 mins
• Feel comfortable and convinced that the future online order enjoy the same product quality as in o�ine stores
3. IN-STORE DINING
• Buy high quality sea food with low price
• Enjoy in-store dining together with grocery shopping
4. HEMA APP TO CHECK OUT AND ALIPAY TO PAY
• Get all purchase histories through App
• Facilitate next purchase online if customers want to buy same products
STORE SET-UP
IN-STORE EXPERIENCE
CHECK-OUT
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
1
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 6
Hema stores aim to give shoppers the best of both worlds: the chance to see food before
purchase combined with online shopping’s detailed product information, quick payment,
and home delivery: To ensure customers get their food fresh, it arrives at their homes within
30 minutes. JD is experimenting with unmanned stores, uses mirrors, cameras, and smart
shopping carts to see which products customers are looking at and taking from shelves.
Then the store can provide them with information – and check what they’re walking out with.
More generally, this kind of model will often feature in-house apps, digital price tags, self-
service checkouts, and automated shopping carts. In the background will be a double-duty
logistics hub that serves both the physical store and deliveries from O2O orders, whether
placed online in in-store.
Early signs indicate that O2O retail will go beyond an interesting experiment and significantly
change the retail landscape. Hema stores are already attracting young, wealthy, tech-savvy
shoppers, a coveted group. They increasingly trust the Hema brand and are more willing to buy
fresh food online.
Exhibit 8: Profile of Hema shoppers
AGE MIXWHICH AGE GROUP DO YOU BELONG TO?IN RMB
20%
Hemashoppers1
Othershoppers2
40%
60%
80%
100%
0%
INCOME MIXWHAT IS YOUR MONTHLY HOUSE-HOLD INCOME? AFTER-TAX IN RMB
Hemashoppers
Othershoppers2
ONLINE SHOPPING (FMCG ONLY)DO YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE SHOPPING ONLINE FOR FMCG PRODUCTS?IN RMB
Hemashoppers
Othershoppers2
5,000 and below
4%8%
34%
54%37%
45%
13%
5%
6%
19%
34%
41%
19%
11%
50%
19%
69%
31%38%
62%
10,000 - 19,999
5,000 - 9,999
20,000 - and above
30 and below
41-50
31-40
51 and above
NoYes
Hema Shoppers show more interest in online shopping for FMCG products
Hema shoppers have higher income level than other consumers
Hema shoppers are younger than other consumers
1. Incl. all shoppers w/different shopping frequency in Hema | 2. Refer to those consumers who are aware of these new concept stores in the catchment, but never visited it
Source: Consumer survey (N=656,Oct 26-Nov 1, 2017), Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 7
We estimate that O2O – that is, sales via the app for home delivery, rather than products
checked out in the traditional way – contributes as much as 60 percent of Hema revenues.
Though stores with O2O features have been expensive to set up and their initial running
costs are high, the O2O contribution has boosted productivity, thus keeping losses marginal.
With further maturity and greater scale, they should soon be able to break even. We believe
there is potential for at least 1,000 stores in prime locations in major cities with total revenues
of 200 billion yuan.
Exhibit 9: P&L estimate of a Hema store
A MATURE STANDARD HEMA STORE AT 4,000 SQMAS % OF STORE REVENUE
Gross margin
25
5
10
15
20
-5
23-24
Markdown Storerental
In-storeoverhead
Homedelivery
overhead
Logistics Other Operatingprofit
0
5
3-5
c.4
c.3
5-7
3-4c.-3%
(on avg.)
Source: Store visits, Primary research, Research reports, Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 8
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH TRADITIONAL BIG BOX RETAILERS
The second major strategic play consists of partnerships between online stores and large,
traditional supermarkets. Big-box retailers have tried their own O2O and online shopping
services in the past. Hypermarket chain RT-mart launched B2C online platform Feiniu.com
in 2014, while Carrefour China tried a similar system a year later in Shanghai. But these and
other initiatives have failed.
One reason for such failures is that traditional retailers lack distribution capabilities of their
own: Fresh food typically requires 30-minute delivery, which is only possible with a logistics
operation that is complex, sophisticated, and large-scale. Another is that they do not naturally
generate O2O traffic. This is something that internet and e-commerce companies do through
their contact at multiple touch points in customers’ daily lives, such as payment services, social
media, and e-commerce purchases. So, traditional retailers have little option but to join one
of the tech empires.
A number of alliances have been announced in the past few years. The most recent came in
January 2018, when Tencent and YongHui Superstores agreed to take a stake in Carrefour
China, as part of a plan to work on smart retail, mobile payments, and data analysis.
Exhibit 10: Key M&A/partnership deals in China grocery retail
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Today
March
Tencent invested 214 million USD to become 3rd largest shareholder of JD at that time
JD, Tencent
June – December
Walmart bought c.10% of JD public shares and became 3rd largest shareholder of JD at that time
Walmart, JD
January
Tencent and Yonghui agreed to take a stake in Carrefour China business
Tencent, YongHui, Carrefour
November
Ali acquired 32% shares of Sanjiang Group – the largest grocery chain in Zhejiang
Alibaba, SanJiang
August
JD acquired 10% stake in Yonghui and formed strategic partnership
JD, Yonghui
May
Ali acquired 18% public shares of Lianhua supermarket and became 2nd largest shareholder
Alibaba, LianHua
November
Ali invested 2.9 billion USD in Sun Art Retail Group and formed strategic partnership
Alibaba, Sun Art
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
2
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 9
These partnerships show early signs of success thanks to complementary strengths, as
technology from the online retailers helps the brick-and-mortar stores generate incremental
revenue. For example, Alibaba installed shelves from its Tmall Supermarket online grocery
service in RT-mart branches and started to offer one-hour home delivery for products on
these shelves. Next, Alibaba is likely to help RT-mart optimize its in-store O2O infrastructure
through an improved app, greater integration with backend, traffic help from Taobao and
TMall, and support for delivery. In turn, RT-mart could strengthen Alibaba’s grocery supplier
management and store operation capabilities. It could also provide valuable data to Alibaba
on customers’ buying habits.
Exhibit 11: O2O business contribution in major grocery retailers
% OF ORDERS/PURCHASES PER DAY1
Carrefour(before recent
acquisition)
100
20
40
60
80
Walmart Sanjiang1 RT-mart3
0
O2O
In-store
c.99 >95 90-95 85-90 c.85
c. 1<5 5-10 10-15 10-15
Super Species2
O2O order #per day
O2Oplatforms
EcommercePartner
Format
c.50 c.100 150-200 c.300 c.800
Hyper Hyper Super Super Hyper
None JD Alibaba JD Alibaba
Carrefour/Meituan
JD Daojiamainly
Meituanmainly
Yonghui/JD Daojia
RT-mart/Meituan
Level of change
W/o eCommerce partner
W/ eCommerce partner but no store upgrade
W/ eCommerce partner and store upgrade
1. Not all stores operate O2O | 2. The online order # only accounts for c.5% in Yonghui Bravo Luban Rd. Store in Shanghai | 3. A new format store located in Yangpu, Shanghai
Source: Primary research, Store visits, Desktop research, Oliver Wyman analysis
Walmart has a strategic partnership with JD which is using its O2O unit JD Daojia as the service
platform for more than 150 Walmart stores in order to attract online traffic. Walmart is currently
planning to upgrade its stores in China to support O2O services, for example by adding picking
areas in store warehouses.
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 10
REINVENTION OF TRADITIONAL “MOM AND POP” SHOPS
The third strategic play is to reinvent small, family stores. Traditional stores still account for
half the sales of fast-moving consumer goods in China, much of them going through the
more than 7 million family-run stores that dominate retail outside big cities. Since early
2017, JD and Alibaba have been converting these into franchises. These stores are rebranded
under the Tmall/JD umbrella and offer new services, such as bill-paying. In addition, each
store is unique in its product offerings, as store owners receive data-based curation advice
so that they stock the optimal product selection based on its neighborhood: infant milk in
a neighborhood with lots of babies and pet supplies if many residents keep dogs or cats.
Stores’ procurement processes also improve dramatically. Small stores have traditionally
been served by a network of multi-layered distributors and wholesalers, which often come
with troublesome requirements such as minimum purchase quantities. The two e-commerce
giants have developed ordering systems that store owners can operate on their martphones:
Alibaba’s Ling Shou Tong (LST) system and JD’s Xin Tong Lu (XTL). Goods arrive from centralized
warehouses in less than three days and often on the day the order is placed – in contrast to
delays of weeks with traditional wholesalers. The scale of the alliances gives them leverage over
the product brands, resulting in better margins both for the stores and for JD and Alibaba.
Exhibit 12: Disruption of traditional distribution model with B2B ordering tools
Brands
Tier 1 distributors
Wholesalers/low tier
distributors(gradually phase out)
Less in # and layer
B2B ordering tools (mainly
Ali and JD ecosystem)
Chained retailers Independent retailers
JD Xintonglu, Ali LST
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
3
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 11
Exhibit 13: JD Xin Tong Lu vs. Alibaba Ling Shou Tong
DIGITAL SELF-OPERATED RESELLER: JD XIN TONG LU DIGITAL PLATFORM: ALIBABA LING SHOU TONG
Alibaba’s warehouse
Deliver product via
Internet B2B players’
warehouse
3b
Alibaba
2Place order1
Small retailers
JD’s warehouse
Brands
Deliver products
Sell products and send
products to warehouse
03
JD
Arrange delivery2
Brands’ warehouse
Inform brands of the
order details
3a Deliver product via
brands own warehouse
Regardless where inventory is,
brands own the inventory
Very small proportion of the business for now
Information flow Product flow
MAJOR DIFFERENCE OF TWO MODELS
Stock ownership (working capital management)
Level of transaction visibility to brands
Decision power of assortment and pricing
JD
Small retailers
Place order1
Brands
Mid-depending on JD’ willingness to share information
JD to decide
High
Brands to decide
Brands/distributors
Source: Primary Research, Oliver Wyman analysis
Tmall was planning on 10,000 such franchises in 2017, while JD has said it is aiming for one
million by 2021. In addition to the customer data and insights they can capture from these
expansions, Alibaba and JD are likely to dominate the growing market for ordering systems,
which could be worth around 400 billion yuan over the next five years.
Exhibit 14: Number of registered shops
0.4
0.8
2016 2017
0
0.2
0.5
2016 2017
0.1
0.7
JD XIN TONG LUIN MM
ALIBABA LING SHOU TONG
Source: Oliver Wyman analysis
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 12
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As O2O becomes the new normal in retail, the two alliances will act as both players in and
facilitators of these new models. Traditional retailers may start to test dark stores in selected
regions, and even the smallest stores are using the giants’ ordering systems.
To facilitate these combinations of e-commerce and traditional retail, a wave of acquisitions and
partnerships has taken place over the past four years. Alibaba has made strategic investments
totaling $21 billion in retail alone in just the past two years. The two empires already account
for around a tenth of grocery retail, and these plays will attract more consumers through
different activities and channels. Their share of grocery shopping could increase to around
30 percent over the next five years, when it could be worth around 4,000 billion yuan in gross
merchandise value.
Exhibit 15: GMV projection in the long-term (FMCG)
IN BN RMB
e-Commerce platforms2 (FMCG)
“New concept” O2O retailers3+B2B initiatives+Total GMV=
Alibaba Group JD/Tencent
c.1,800 in GMVTaobao.com, Tmall.com
c.500 in GMVJD
c.1,000 in GMVHema, Sun Art, New Huadu, Bailian, Sanjiang
c.300 in GMVYonghui Superstores, 7 Fresh, Walmart, Carrefour
c.200 in GMVAli LST
c.200 in GMVJD Xintonglu
c.3,000 c.1,000
1. 5 years’ projection; for the GMV of Hema, Ali LST, JD XTL, “theoretical” full potential is used for this calculation | 2. Ali current FMCG GMV is c.410 bn, JD current FMCG GMV is c.100 bn; assume c.30% CAGR for both players in FMCG categories in the next five years; for JD, YHD GMV is excluded as it remains a very small proportion (<5%) of JD’s FMCG GMV and is likely to shrink over the years | 3. Grocery retail only; for Ali system, assume 40% stores will be turned into Hema stores; rest of the offline GMV may grow at the same rate of RT Mart (4%); in addition, all stores have c.50% sales uplift from O2O
Source: Analyst reports, Oliver Wyman analysis
Independent supermarkets and hypermarkets will find the new environment hard. They
typically operate under franchise models that are ineffective due to a lack of centralized control
over store operations and products. Survival will call for drastic change, but we believe this is
unlikely under their current setup. Most already operate with thin or negative margins and may
not have sufficient funds to invest.
Some leading convenience stores should be able to survive on their own in the short term.
7-11 and Lawson, for instance, will continue to benefit from impulse buying. Moreover, they
still have room for expansion to meet unfulfilled demand in lower-tier cities. But over the
long term, growth will stagnate even in these convenience stores, and they will come under
threat from the revival of family-run stores under the JD and Alibaba franchise networks.
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman 13
So, retailers need to plan for how to function in a world dominated by the two empires. The
first step is to build a clear plan for strategic alliances that leverage the empires’ tools and
strengths. These include online traffic resources, technology capabilities that make better
use of physical retailers’ customer transaction data to inform buying and merchandising
decisions, and the integration of online and offline aspects of their business. In the case of
sub-scale smaller stores and chains that are rapidly losing their ability to compete, the online
platforms may prove to be of help in areas where physical hypermarkets traditionally had
an advantage, such as product assortment, procurement, and supply chain management.
However, if a store is not be viable even after these potential improvements, its owners should
consider switching to another business model, reducing size, or simply shutting down.
Brands, too, need to figure out the best ways to engage the new tech empires. Just as anchor
tenants in malls get preferential treatment thanks to their role in attracting shoppers,
brands should establish themselves as part of store networks’ core propositions, so that
they benefit from prominent display and favorable financial terms. They should work with
the tech giants to make distribution more efficient, while also maintaining relationships
with other distributors – if these survive – to avoid being completely dependent on the
e-commerce giants.
It is inevitable that the shape and future of the supermarket and hypermarket industry will be
strongly influenced by the tech empires. To survive and thrive, incumbent retailers need to
find ways to partner or co-exist.
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman
All rights reserved. This report may not be reproduced or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the written permission of Oliver Wyman and Oliver Wyman accepts no liability whatsoever for the actions of third parties in this respect.
The information and opinions in this report were prepared by Oliver Wyman. This report is not investment advice and should not be relied on for such advice or as a substitute for consultation with professional accountants, tax, legal or financial advisors. Oliver Wyman has made every effort to use reliable, up-to-date and comprehensive information and analysis, but all information is provided without warranty of any kind, express or implied. Oliver Wyman disclaims any responsibility to update the information or conclusions in this report. Oliver Wyman accepts no liability for any loss arising from any action taken or refrained from as a result of information contained in this report or any reports or sources of information referred to herein, or for any consequential, special or similar damages even if advised of the possibility of such damages. The report is not an offer to buy or sell securities or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell securities. This report may not be sold without the written consent of Oliver Wyman. 14
Copyright © 2018 Oliver Wyman
AUTHORS WAI-CHAN CHAN Global Consumer Goods Practice Leader Oliver Wyman [email protected] +852 2201 1702 RICHARD MCKENZIE Partner, Oliver Wyman Retail & Consumer Goods [email protected] +852 2201 1703 JAMES YANG Principal, Oliver Wyman Retail & Consumer Goods [email protected] +852 2201 1715
JOHN HO Janchor [email protected] +852 3665 8823 SHEN LI Janchor [email protected] +852 3665 8823 YUBO GONG Janchor [email protected] +852 3665 8823
ABOUT OLIVER WYMAN Oliver Wyman is a global leader in management consulting that combines deep industry knowledge with specialized expertise in strategy, operations, risk management, and organization transformation. Oliver Wyman’s global Operations Practice specializes in end-to-end operations transformation capabilities to address costs, risks, efficiency and effectiveness. Our global team offers a comprehensive and expert set of functional capabilities and high-impact solutions to address the key issues faced by Chief Operating Officers and Chief Procurement Officers across industries. In the Distribution and Wholesale practice, we draw on unrivaled customer and strategic insight and state-of-the-art analytical techniques to deliver better results for our clients. We understand what it takes to win in distribution and wholesale: an obsession with attracting, serving, and growing customers, constant dedication to operational excellence, and a relentless drive to improve capabilities. We have a track record of helping clients win in this environment, creating real competitive advantage and driving significant growth. We believe our hands-on approach to making change happen is truly unique – and over the last 25 years, we’ve built our business by helping distributors and wholesalers build theirs. Oliver Wyman is a strategic advisor to the NAW and sponsors a number of NAW roundtable events for companies with revenues $1 BN+. www.oliverwyman.com
ABOUT JANCHOR Established in 2009, Janchor Partners takes a long-term industrialist mindset in investing in companies that have superior business models, favorable growth prospects and the potential to take advantage of long-term positive structural dynamics of Asia countries and economies. Janchor Partners’ ability to invest for the long-term is strengthened by its investment partners, comprising high quality global institutional investors including family offices, university endowments, foundations and pension funds, who commit their capital to Janchor Partners for multi-year periods. This in turn enables Janchor Partners to build strong and meaningful relationships with its investee companies. www.janchorpartners.com
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