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Security: Old Dilemmas and New Challenges in the Post-Cold War EnvironmentAuthor(s): Joseph A. CamilleriSource: GeoJournal, Vol. 34, No. 2, Military Geography: The Changing Role of the Military (
October 1994), pp. 135-145Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41146279Accessed: 11-11-2015 22:43 UTC
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2/12
GeoJournal 4.2
1
35-1 45
135
1994
(Oct)
by
Kluwer Academie Publishers
Security:
ld Dilemmas nd
New
Challenges
in
the Post-Cold
War Environment
Camilleri,
Joseph
A.,
Professor,
a
Trobe
University,
chool
of
Politics,
Bundoora,
Victoria
083,
Australia
ABSTRACT: ecurity,idely egardeds the entrepiecefgeopoliticaliscourse,as
been
raditionally
nderstood
n
ermsfnational
ilitary
efence. ore
ecently,
heorists
and
ractitioners
like ave
rgued
or
more
ncompassing,
ess tate-centricefinition
f
the
oncept,
hichakesnto ccount
on-military
hreats
o
ecurity
s well s
non-military
responses
o
both
military
nd
non-military
hreats.he nd f heCold
War
rovides
n
opportune
ime o reconsiderhese
rguments,
o establish hetherr not herelated
concepts
f commonnd
comprehensiveecurity
ave
ontemporatry
elevance,
ndto
identify
heir
ar-reachingolicy
nd nstitutional
mplications.
The
post-
945
political
nd
strategic
rder evolved
or
thebest
art
ffour ecades rroundwo
ompeting
lliance
systems
hich
argely upplanted
he UnitedNations
UN)
as
symbols
f collective
efence,
t least so far as their
members ere concerned.
et,
the
reassurancesxtended
by
both
uperpowers
o
their
espective
llies erved nother
purpose,namely
o entrench merican nd
Soviet
power
and
nfluence. s Kratochwil
1989)
points
ut,
heAtlantic
alliancecannot
be understood s a
security rrangement
operating
ithin he
"well-establishedonventions"
f
the
classical
alance
f
power.
The
argumentpplies
with ven
greater orce o the Warsaw act. In each case, powerful
integrative
endencies,
n
their arious
deological,
conomic
and
military
anifestations,
ere at odds with
raditional
notions of
statecraft,
lexible
diplomacy
nd
shifting
alliances.
espite
he outward
ppearances
f
stability
nd
quasi-permanence,
he
solution o
the
security
ilemma
offered
y
Cold War
alliances
only
partially
bscured
unresolved
mbiguities
nd
was
prone
o
periodic
rises.
he
end of
theCold
War
and,
more
pecifically,
hedissolution
of
the WarsawPact and
the
on-going
eorganization
f
North
Atlantic
Treaty
Organization
NATO)
provide
unique
opportunity
o
rethink
he
theory
nd
practice
f
security
n
a
post-hegemonic
orld.
Though
fficialnd
academic
ronouncements
bout he
end of theCold
War
nd
thebirth f a newworld rder re
proving
omewhat
premature,
he last ten
years
have
nevertheless
roduced
evidence
of
new attitudes nd
policies,
which
have resultedn a
number
f
disarmament
and
arms control
greements,
he
partial
resolution
f
several
egional
onflicts,
nd
the creationn
Europe
ofan
embryonic
ecurity
ramework
utting
cross
ong-standing
ideological
nd
geopolitical
ivisions.
ther
ositive
rends
include he riseofnewcentres f
economic nd
diplomatic
influence,
he
mprovement
n
Sino-Soviet
elationsndthe
tentative irst teps towardmore effectiveegional o-
operation
n
Asia-Pacific
enerally
nd
SoutheastAsia in
particular.
ncouraging
hough
hese
trends
may
be,
a
number f
obstacles tand nthe
way
f a
more
undamental
reassessmentf
ecurity
elationships,otably
he
ontinuing
reluctancef
policy-makers
nd
their
dvisers o
explore,
et
alone
mplement,
ew
approaches
o
security,
he
tendency
of
military
nd
political
lites to
cling
o
existing olicy-
making
processes,
he
lack of effective
mechanismsor
subjectingecurity olicy
o
probing ublic
crutiny,
he
relatively
nderdeveloped
haracterf
regional
o-operative
institutions,
nd
the
ontinuingmphasis
n
growth-oriented
economic
ompetitiveness
ithin
n
increasingly
ntegrated
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world
market,
with all that this
implies
for
military
technology
nd defence
pending.
Conceptual
Ambiguities
nd
Complexities
The destructivenessfthe Gulf
War,
not to mention
the more recent violence that has
afflicted
omalia,
Angola,
Haiti and
much
of
the former
ugoslavia
and
Soviet
Union,
are an
apt
reminder hat
ecurity
emains
for
many
t best distant
ossibility.
he
insecurity
hich
continues o describe the lives of countlessmillions
suggests
hat he
key
question
s not
merely
he
dequacy
of
existing
nstitutional
rrangements
ut the
very
meaning
f
security.
For
many
heoristsnd
practitioners
ational
ecurity
remains he
key
to
describing, xplaining
r
justifying
particular olicies,yetthe concept endsto obscure as
much s to
clarify.
oes the
word
national,
or
xample,
refer o the tate
nd ts
eading
nstitutions
ie
executive,
legislature,
rmed
ervices,
ntelligencerganizations),
r
to the nation s a whole? f thefirst
meaning
s
intended,
thennational
ecurity
ecomes
virtuallyynonymous
ith
thedefence
f
sectional
nterests,
r at eastwith
nterests
as
defined
nd articulated
y
those n
positions
f
power
and
authority.
f the second
meaning
is
preferred,
difficult
uestions
rise as
who or what he nation
s and
what
kind f
security
s
envisaged
or hose
who are
part
of t. Nations
differ
reatly
ot
only
n
terms
f size and
cohesion
but also
in
terms
f
organizingrinciples
nd
institutions
Wiberg
987).
In
some
cases
the boundaries
of state and nationmayvirtuallyoincide eg Japan,
Denmark),
but
n
others
he state
may
comprise
wo
or
more
nations
eg
Canada,
Yugoslavia),
nd
n others till
the nation
may
be
divided
nto two or
more states
eg
Kurdish
nation),
or the
nation
may
have no state that
recognizes
ts existence
eg
East
Timor).
Equally
problematic
s
security
tself.
s it
a condition
to be
understood
primarily
n terms
of
objective
conditions,
ften
quated
with
protection
rom
hysical
threat,
r in terms
f
subjective
erceptions
which
we
may
oosely
refer
o as the
nation's tate
of mind?
t is
not
possible
to entertain
ecurity
s
a
policy
objective
without
at least
implicitly
ddressing
number
of
complex uestions:
Who or
what s to
be defended?
rom
what?Bywhom?How? At whatprice?Thosewhofind
national
ecurity
convenient
hort-hand
nswer
o these
questions
end
to
equate
security
withthe
defence
of
national
erritory,
resumably
n the
assumption
hat
he
preservation
fterritorial
ntegrity,
hat
s
the exclusion
of others
rom he
physical
pace
delineated
s one's
own
(national)
erritory,
oldsthe
key
to
the
defence
f the
nation's
well-being.
But
the
link between
defence
of
territory
nd
preservation
f
national
well-being
s
often
assumed
rather
han
demonstrated.
Precisely
because
it has
acquired
such
widespread
currency,
he
notion
f national
ecurity,
r to
be
more
exact,
national
military efence,
merits
areful
nalysis.
We
propose
to
begin by considering
ach of
the three
components
f
this formulation:
national",
defence",
"military".
We have
already
bserved hatnational oes
notnecessarily efer o a clearly dentifiable, onolithic
or
even cohesive
entity
whose interests re
capable
of
objective
efinition.
ndeed,
the nterestsf thenation r
state nd the means
by
which
hey
re to be
pursued
re
often he
subject
of intense ntellectual ontestationnd
political
division.
ven
if
we should
focus
our attention
on the
conceptual,
more
manageable,
less elusive
category
f the
state,
there s no
escaping
he
fact,
s
Buzan is at
pains
to
show,
that "states re
exceedingly
dissimilars
objects
of
security"Buzan 1983). They
are
vulnerable o different inds
of
threat,
s
a
result
of
vastly
different xternal and domestic environments.
States
differ ith
espect
o
size,
strength,
tructurend
political
radition. he
security
ilemma
acing ny
state
can be given concreteshape only in the contextof
particular
circumstances.
or some the main threat
originates
rom
utside
whileforothers nternal
ecurity
is the
primary
ocus,
given
fundamental
isagreement
between
sectional nterests bout the
norms,
ules and
procedures
which hould
govern olitical
nstitutionsnd
processes.
nternaldivisions
may
become
so acute
(eg
former
ugoslavia
or even
Bosnia)
as to
deprive
the
notion of the national
of
any
theoretical,
et alone
operational
utility. eyond
a certain
point
there s
no
recognizable
ntity
hich s either he
ubject
r
object
of
defence.
In
any
case,
the
security
f the state
or the
nation,
assuming
hese remain
elative
oherent
ntities,
annot
be equated with ndividual ecurity. hough t can be
argued
hat he
preservation
f the state
s conducive
o
the
maintenance
f social
and
political
rder,
hence to
the
security
f
the
citizen,
t is
just
as
plausible
hat he
actions
of the
state,
whether
n
waging
r
preparing
or
war,
will
prejudice
the
security
f the
individual. he
same
outcome
may
flow
from ctions aken
to
preserve
or restore
nternal
ecurity.
efending
he
state
against
external
or internal
enemies
may
have
profoundly
negative
consequenses,
indluding
conomic
hardship,
social
dislocation
or even
injury
nd
death
for
large
numbers
f
people.
National
security,
hen,
sheds
but
little
ight
n twodistinct
ut
closely
related
questions:
whose
security?
What
kind
of
security?
y
making
he
state centralto the definitionf security nd
to
the
identification
f
that
which
s to
be
secured,
t obscures
the
nature
f the
ultimate
bjective
nd the
identity
f
the
ubjects
who
are at
the
heart
f the
ecurity
ilemma.
We
can
now examine
littlemore
losely
he
concept
of defence
mplicit
n
national
ecurity
iscourse
which,
notwithstanding
he
tensions
nd
ambiguities
nherent
n
the
concept, ostulates
he
feasibilityand
desirability)
f
defence
nderstood
s the
protection
f state
boundaries
from
military
ncursion
y
other
tates.
This formulation
is defective
n
several
respects.
irst,
t
wrongly
ssumes
that
state
boundaries
re vulnerable
nly
to external
attack,
whereas
omestic
pheaval
f various
kinds,
ven
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137
when
it falls short of
outright
ivil
war,
may
also
endanger
he territorial
ntegrity
f states. The recent
disintegration
f the
Soviet,
Yugoslav
and
Somali
states
are a case in point. Secondly, t is deficientn that t
concentrates
n the
use
of force
s the
only
erious
hreat
to
existing
oundaries,
hereas
ny
number f
economic,
political
nd
ideological
isturbances,
e
they
nternal
r
external
n
origin,may
have
precisely
he same effect.
Thirdly,
t
assumes,
again mistakenly,
hat
security
s
synonymous
ith he
protection
f
boundaries,
whereas
boundaries
may
remain
intact even as the
society
undergoes
traumatic
isruption rising
from racial or
religious
onflict
eg
Northern
reland,
outh
Africa)
r
revolutionary olitical change
(eg post-revolutionary
Russiaor
China).
Fourthly,
ven f t
could be established
that
protection
f
boundaries s a
necessary
ndsufficient
conditionfor
the achievement f national
security,
t
would not followthat such "security" an be readily
translatednto
ecurity
ither
or
he ndividual r for he
many
nd
diverse
roups
hat
omprise
he nation r
the
state.
Finally,
he
reference o
defence, efence orces,
and
defence epartments
lursthe
elusivebut
important
distinctionetween
efence ndoffencendobscures he
fact
that decisions on
military
ppropriations
nd
weapons ystems
made
n
the name of
defence
may
have
offensivententions r
consequences.
The third
distinguishing
haracteristic f national
security
iscourse s
the
closely
related
mphasis
n
the
military
imension,
hat is on
military
hreats s
the
primary
ource
of
insecurity
nd on
military
trategies
and
capabilities
s
the most
appropriate
nstrumentf
security. afetys associated lmost xclusively ith he
capacity
f
one state to
balance
the
military
ower
of
another.
Military
apabilities
re deemedusefulnot
only
for
purposes
f
actual
defence
n
the
event f
attack,
ut
for
purposes
f
deterrence
by
confrontingny
would-be
aggressor
ith
uperior
military
orce),
nd
perhaps
most
importantly
or
purposes
f
diplomacy, y
which
s meant
the
ability
o turn
military
ower
nto
political
nfluence
in
times
f
peace.
It is
doubtful,
owever,
whether he
contribution
f
military
orce o
security
s as
uniformly
beneficial s this
utilitarian
alculus
would
suggest.
Quite
apart
from
he
unprecedented
isks
posed
by
nuclear
deterrence,
et
alone
nuclear
defence,
military
force,
despite
the
refinements
made
possible
by
increasingechnical ophistication,emains remarkably
blunt
nstrument
orthe
attainment f
any
number f
social of
political
objectives.
As
Barry
Buzan
notes,
modern
military
ardware
s
particularly
ell
suitedto
destructive
urposes
but
"much ess
usefulfor
the fine-
tuning
f
voluntaristic
xchange
relations
where
neither
conquest
nor
destruction s
desired"
(Buzan
1981).
During
the
height
f
the
Cold
War,
the
availability
f
military
eans
tempted
oththe
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union to
seek
military
olutions to
regional
conflicts
whether in
Eastern
Europe,
Afghanistan,
Vietnam,
Lebanon or
Panama.
However,
more
often
than
not
these
attempts
ither
failed
to
produce
the
desired
result,
or else led
to unintended
onsequences
more troublesome
han the
problem hey
were
initially
meant o resolve rameliorate. he
"Vietnam
yndrome"
becamea potent ymbol, speciallynAmerican olitical
culture,
of
the
counter-productive
ffects
f
military
power.
The more recent
pplication
f force
n
the Gulf
War
may
have revived
onfidencen certain
uarters
n
the
utility
f
militaryapabilities,
ut even hereone must
be careful
to
distinguish
etween the achievement
f
specific
militarybjectives eg
the removal
f
raqi
forces
from
Kuwait)
and
a
durable
solution to the
complex
challenge posed by
Saddam Hussein's domestic and
external
olicies.
The
preceding
iscussion f national
military
efence
has,
at least
implicitly, ointed
to a
number of
methodological
nd substantive ifficulties hich the
national
ecurity
iscourse ends to
overlook,
utwhich
mustbe recognizedf we are to developa moresolidly
grounded heory and praxis)
of
security.
hese
may
be
more
concretely ncapsulated
n a
number
f
seemingly
disparateyet closely
connected
propositions.
he first
refers
o
the
diminishingapacity
f small nd
arge
tates
alike to
defend heir
borders,
ttributablen
part
o the
increasing
destructivenessf
military
echnology.
he
decline
n
militaryrotective
apability
s itself function
of
the
increasing
scendancy
f
offensive ver defensive
weapons
systems,
but also
of
the
complex
web of
technological,
conomic nd social
processes
which
have
cumulatively
made state boundariesboth
more
porous
and more
contested
Herz 1962).
The
fortress-type
hells
of
defence
haracteristicf the
European
state
ystem
f
the sixteenth o the eighteenth enturyhave been
overtaken
y
numerous
vents,
not
least the adventof
total
war and
the
conscription
f
national
rmies,
he
potential
or
deological-political
enetration,
he
potency
of
economic nstrumentsf
warfare,
nd
the
increasing
incidence of
urban
terrorism nd aerial
piracy,
ll of
which
reflectsthe
increasing
vulnerability
f
highly
complex,
ndustrial
ystems.
o
put
t
differently,
n
the
atomic
ge
the
power
tohurthas
vastly
utdistanced
he
power
to
defend
Schelling 966).
Nowhere s
this ast
observation
more
pposite
han n
the case
of
modern
weapons
of
mass
destruction
ie
chemical,
biological
and
especially
nuclear
weapons).
This
brings
s to
the
second
proposition
hich
highlights
the fundamental nsecurity nderpinninghe nuclear
edifice.
The
balance of
terror
may
be
described
s the
ultimate xercise n
competitive
isk
aken.
The
resulting
nuclear
policies
of
brinkmanship
nd
bluff
were an
integral
art
of
the
climate of
hostility,
uspicion
nd
tension
which
governed
Soviet-American
elations
for
more than
forty ears.
Some
have
sought
o
qualify
his
assessment
yarguing
hat
the fear of
nuclear
war,
and
the
consequent
elegitimization
f
war
as an
instrument
of
policy,
s a
welcome
development
n that
t
compels
great
powers
to
make
sure
that
tensions
among
themselves
do
not
degenerate
nto
armed
hostilities
(Osgood
and
Tucker
1967);
Hinsley
1982).
There
is,
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however,
no
guarantee
that the
management
f the
strategic elationship
will
always produce
the
desired
result
if for no other reason
than
that successful
managementdepends on the permanentthreat of
wholesale
destruction,
hich must
somehow neverbe
carried out
(Camilleri 1976).
Nuclear
deterrence
s
credible
nly
o
long
as all-outwar remains
easible.
To
this must be
added the
possibility
f the
inadvertent,
unauthorized
r
accidentaluse
of nuclear
weapons.
In
any
case,
the
dynamic
f deterrence
annotbe confined
to a few
greatpowers.
To the extent
hat the nuclear
weapon
remains
symbol
f
power
nd
prestige,
uclear
capabilities
re
likely
to
spread
to
more and
more
countries,
ith
ar-reachingmplications
or he
reliability
of
strategic
alculations
nd the
predictability
f state
behaviour.
The sustainedbut
only partially
uccessful
efforts
n the
part
of successiveUS
administrations
nd
a rangeof nternationalnstitutionso construct viable
non-proliferation
egime
are
striking
estimony
f the
proliferation
endencies
inherent
n the deterrence
strategy.
Concerned
o
contain,
t not
eliminate,
he
obvious
dangers
rising
rom he
unilateral
se
of
force,
tates
have
continued
o
experiment
ith
number
f collective
security
rrangements.
n the
post-1945
eriod
these
fell
intotwo
main
categories:
hose
which
were embodied
n
a universal
rganization
ie
the
UN)
and
those
ssociated
withthe creation
of Cold
War alliances
(eg
NATO,
Warsaw
Pact).
Central
to both
projects
were
two
propositions:
firstly,
hat
all
members
of a
given
collective
ecurity
ystem
be
it
regional
or
universal)
wouldmakethepreventionfaggressionheir verriding
security
bjective;
nd
secondly,
hat
hese
states
would
be
ready
ndable
to
oppose
aggression
ith hemeasures
needed
to
preserve
he
peace.
However
elegant,
this abstract
formulation
was
surrounded
y
theoretical
nd
practical
ifficulties
hich
soon
exposed
the
limits
f collective
ecurity
Camilleri
1976).
Quite
apart
from the
problem
of
defining
aggression
and
identifying
ggressors
in
particular
conflicts,
one
of the
ollective
ecurity
rrangements
ad
the
power
to enforce
he
peace
if
the
aggressor
was
a
greatpower,
et
alone
a
superpower.
ad
NATO,
the
Warsaw
Pact
or the UN
taken
military
ction
o
oppose
the
nterventionist
olicies
f the Soviet
Union
n
(East)-
Germany,Hungary, zechoslovakia r Afghanistan,r
of theUnited
tates
n
Korea,
Vietnam
r
the
Dominican
Republic,
a
global
confrontation
ould
have
been
the
most
ikely
utcome.
n
any
case,
the
theory
f
collective
security
s
premissed
on
the
dubious
principle
that
military
onflicts
re
reducible
to the
designs
and
capabilities
f
"aggressive"
tates
nd
that he
resolution
of such
conflicts
epends
on
the actions
f
peace-loving
states.
Not
only
s this
neat
division
eldom
replicated
n
the
complex
world f
nternational
olitics,
ut the
very
attempt
o establish
t
may
do
no morethan
mpede
he
chances
f mediation
nd
conciliation,
nd
may
ven
ead
to the escalation
of hostilities
by
transforming
n
otherwise ocalized
dispute
nto a
major
international
conflict.
The calculation
f
the
costs nd benefits
f collective
security whether f the universal r regionalvariety)
remains
sharply
ontested xercise.
What s much ess
in
question
is the
profound mpact
which collective
security greements
nd initiatives
ave
had on
the
theory
nd
practice
f
sovereignty.
he
complex
web
of
alliance
arrangements
n the one
hand and UN
peace-
keeping
nd
peace
enforcement
nitiatives
n the
other
have
"given
ise o
an elaborate
et of
expectations,
ights
and
obligations
which have
greatly
modified the
fragmented
ystem
f
sovereign
tates"
Camilleri
992).
The
establishment
f
military
ases and
stationing
f
troops
n
foreign
oil,
the
adoption
f
oint
conventional
and nuclear
strategies,
nd
participation
n combined
military
xercises
have
substantially
roded
or at least
obscured the territorialdemarcation of national
sovereignties.
he
expanding
ntrusion
f
UN
military
and civilian
personnel
n a
range
of local and
regional
conflicts
a trend which
has
gained
considerable
momentumince
the end
of the
Cold
War
-
points
n
exactly
he
same direction.
None
of this is
to
suggest
that the
cumulative
influence
f collective
ecurity
rrangements
as been
entirely
or even
largely
beneficial,
but
rather to
emphasize
hatthe
quest
for
ecurity uring
he
greater
part
of this
entury
and
increasingly
ver
the ast
fifty
years
has
given
ise o
multiple
nd
diverse
nstitutional
responses,
ll
of which
have
to a
greater
r lesser xtent
contributed
o
the nternationalization
f
security,
hich
maybe attributedt least npartto theglobalizaiton f
the
military
rder.
Reference
as
already
been made
to
the corrosive
mpact
f
advanced
military
echnologies
n
the exercise
f
sovereignty.
qually
significant
as
been
the
mounting
inancial
urden
f
military udgets
which
have
obliged
arge
and small
tates
liketo
develop
oint
military roduction
nd
procurement
olicies
and
"to
share
each
other's
markets,
financial
resources
and
technical
knowledge"
(Taylor
1990).
Licensed
production,
o-production
nd
offsets,
oint
research
nd
development
nd
various
orms
f
subcontracting
re
ust
a
few
of
the
collaboration
rrangements
hich
have
resulted
in the
tmnsnationalization
f
defence.
The
intricate
network
of
interlocking
public-private
arrangements eans that the development
f
military
technology,
rms
transfers
nd even
strategic
octrines
are
increasingly
haped
by
industrial,
inancial
and
political
nstitutions
nd
processes
whose
ocus
of
action
and
modus
operandi
are
essentially
ransnational.
or
some
the
motivation
s
simply
hatof
"keeping
p",
for
others
it is
the
desire
to
maintain
a
sophisticated
technological
base,
and
for
others
still
increasing
dependence
on
revenues
derived
from
military
ales.
Regardless
of
motivation,
he
net
effect
f
increased
militarypending
s
the
development
f a
global
military
order
Kaldor
and Eide
1979;
Vyrynen
987;
Johnson
and
Thompson
1985)
which
puts
an
entirely
new
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1 9
complexion
n
the traditional
ecurity
ilemma:new
in
that t
compels
s to connect ational
ecurity
ith
ocal,
regional, upranational,
nternationalnd transnational
agencies ndprocesses;new also in that thighlightshe
complex inkages
which
ie
military olicy
o
economic,
cultural nd
political
nstitutionsnd
relationships.
A Multi-Dimensional
ramework f
Security
nalysis
Barry
Buzan's
People,
States
nd
Fear has made
a
useful
contribution
o
our
understanding
f
security
because
it identifies
three
levels
of
analysis
(ie
individuals,
tates
and the
international
ystem),
but
more
mportantly
ecause
it seeks
to
integrate
hethree
levels,
viewing
ach
not as
a
distinct,
eparable
ategory
but as one vantage pointfromwhichto observethe
sources,
ffects
nd
dynamics
f the
"systemic
ecurity
problem"
Buzan
1983).
Buzan
makes
t clear
that
the
security
f the
individual
annot
be
reduced to the
security
f the
state,
and
that the
pursuit
f
security
t
one level
may
be
prejudicial
to the
achievement
f
security
t the
other evel.
Similarly,
e
interprets
he
underlying
narchy
of the
international
ystem
as
constituting
n arena
of conflict
nd
rivalry
ut also
as
providing
field
f
opportunity
hich
an
help
to sustain
diversity
ith
ecurity,
r whathe
calls
"the
promulgation
and observance
f
mature narchic
norms ased
on the
mutual
respect
of units".
He
takes the
analysis
even
further
y positing
omplex inkages
etween
ecurity
nd
the internationalconomicenvironment. e contrasts,
for
example,
the
mercantilist
ystem
with a liberal
international
conomy,
but cautions
against
facile
interpretations
hich
associate
mercantilism
ith
zero-
sum
competition
nd
war,
and economic
iberalism
ith
harmonious
nterdependence.
ach economic
ramework,
he
argues,
offers
oth
advantages
nd
disadvantages
n
security
erms.
They
need
not in
any
case
be seen as
opposed
extremes
ut as
points
n a
spectrum,
uggestive
of a middle
ground
which enhances
the
security
advantages
of both
doctrines,
while
minimizing
heir
costs.
Buzan's
systemic pproach
o
security
ffers
richer
analysis
which ends
tself o morebalanced
policies
ikely
to restrain, f not eliminate,"the pendulumswings
between
excessive
vulnerability
and excessive
provocation",
whichhe associates
with he idealist
nd
realist
ositions espectively.
systemicpproach
has the
added
advantage
of
placing
the
military
imension
f
security
ithin wider
ramework,
hereby ncouraging
long-term
utlookwhich s concernedmore with the
causes
than
the
symptoms
f conflict.t offers emedies
that re not confined o the use of
military ower,
and
envisages ecurity esponses
hat llow for
he nitiatives
not
only
of
states but
of
larger
formal
nd
informal
security
ommunities. t alludes
to
the role
which
regional
and international
nstitutionsan
perform
n
generating
nternational
aw and
promoting
mechanisms
for
negotiation,
onciliation
nd the
peaceful
ettlement
of
disputes.
Helpfulthough t is, Buzan's analytical ramework
must nevertheless
e extended
nd
qualified
n
several
respects
f we are to
develop
a holistic
onception
f
security,
hich
s sensitive
o current
rends
nd future
possibilities.
While
giving
ue
regard
o his
three evels
f
analysis (individual,
state,
international),
such
a
conception
must lso
embrace
he
nteractingrocesses
f
regionalization
nd
globalization
nd the
ever
widening
network
f
dentities,
elationships
nd institutions
hich
cut
across
national boundaries.
As
Dalby points
out,
Buzan's
analysis
s deficient
n its lack
of historical
contextualization
Dalby
1992).
The
modern
state is
treated
as a
given,
as
if it had
no
origins,
was not
susceptible
o
change,
nd
was the exclusive
rovider
f
security. n what is still essentially state-centric
formulation
nsufficientttention
s
given
to the
role
of
international
nstitutions,
ongovernmental
rganizations,
social
movements,
nd
cultural
dentitiesnd traditions.
Though
conomic
nd,
to a lesser
extent,
nvironmental
factors re
considered,
hey
re
not
rigorously
ntegrated
into the
analysis
n
ways
which
lluminate
ither the
quality
or
pace
of historical
change.
A radical
reformulation
f the
security
ilemma would
need
to
reconsider
he
nature nd function
f the
state,
place
it
within he context
of
global
integration
nd
national
fragmentation
nd distance
ecurity
rom he zero-sum
preceptions
hich
ccompany
he exercise
f
sovereignty
and
project
states and
nations as
symbols
f
exclusive
loyalty.
Two
clearly
iscernible
rendswould
seem
especially
relevant
o our
analysis;
he
growing
nterconnectedness
of the international
ystem
nd the
emergence
of
a
macropolitical agenda (Camilleri
and
Falk
1992).
Internationalonflict
an no
longer
e understood
imply
as the collision of rival nationalisms.
ven the First
World War is best
characterizeds
the culmination
f a
protracted
nd multifaceted
ompetition
or
markets,
resources nd
power
which had
long
since
overspilled
national boundaries. The contest
between
competing
ideologies
in
the Second
World War and the
equally
polarized
conflict
etween
capitalism
nd communsim
after
1945
provide
further evidence of the
internationalizationf conflict.The Cold War period
witnessed a
global
contestfor
spheres
of
influence,
marked
by
a
succession
f
military
nterventions
nd the
forward
rojection
f
power,
which
ransformed
egional
rivalries nd
domestic
upheavals
into
"surrogates
f
systemic
war"
(Bloomfield
989).
Even when
separated
by
long
distances,
regional
conflicts
became
closely
interconnected
y
virtue
f
their lose
relationship
o
the
central alance.
Far from
eversing
he
trend,
he end of theCold War
provided
n added
stimulus o the
nternationalizationf
conflict.The
Gulf War
provided
the most
striking
illustrationf
this trend.Saddam Hussein's
nvasion
f
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Kuwait
provoked
concertednternational
esponse,
nd
a
punishing
erial
onslaughtby
the US-led coalition
against
raq,
whichwas all the more
remarkable
n that
it was legitimized ya number fUN Security ouncil
resolutions.
complex
web
of
economic,
political
nd
strategic
nterests,
not least the
West's continued
dependence
n
access to
cheap
and abundant
upplies
f
Middle East
oil,
helped
to sustain the otherwise
precarious
nti-Saddam
oalition. A
simiarly
ntricate
pattern
f
global nterdependence
nterpinned
he
uneasy
but
co-operative
Soviet-American
elationship
both
during
nd after he war.
The end
of
the Cold
War had a
second
but
closely
related effect. he
UN,
and in
particular
he
Security
Council,
which ad been
virtuallyaralyzed y
the East-
West confrontationas
now
given
new ease
of ife.
n
a
dramatic
xpansion
f ts
ecurity
unction,
t
embarked
on numerouspeacekeeping and peace enforcement
operations (eg Iraq-Kuwait,
Somalia,
Bosnia,
Cambodia), justifying
ts intervention
n humanitarian
grounds
or
citing
he
potential
hreat
o international
peace
and
security.Perhaps
the most succinctand
authoritativessessment
f thistrendwas
given
by
UN
Secretary-General,
outros-Ghali,
ho
argued
hat
the
time f absolute nd exclusive
overeignty
had) passed".
Conscious
of the
fluidity
nd
permeability
f national
boundaries
he advocated
a new balance "between
the
needsof
good
internal
overnance
nd the
requirements
of an ever more
nterdependent
orld"
Boutros-Ghali
1992).
The interconnectedness
f the international
ystem
wasnot,however, urely functionftechnologicalnd
geopolitical
hange.
t was also
linked o
otherfacets
f
international
ife,
not least the
globalization
of the
market
rising
fromthe
transnationalization
f
trade,
production
nd
finance.
he
phenomenon
was reflected
in
the
mounting ressure
orthe iberalization
f
trade,
the
increasingnterdependence
f most
economies,
he
growing
vulnerability
f
national
financial
policy
to
overseas
money
markets,
he
consequent
ecline
n the
ability
f national
governments
o
regulate
their
own
economies,
and the
rapidly
expanding
role of
international
nstitutions.
he diminished
alience
of
territorial
nd
policy
boundaries
was
compounded
y
a
multi-faceted
rocess
f environmental
egradation
hich
included hanging limate atterns, zone depletion nd
loss of
species
diversity,
ot to
mention
the
more
localizedbut
still
dispersed
ffects
f soil
erosion,
cid
precipitation
nd
radioactive
ontamination.
Numerous
roblems,
otably
nternational
ebt,
rade
rivalries,
destabilizing
financial
flows,
transborder
pollution,
human
rights
buses,
nuclear
proliferation,
drug
trafficking,
nd
massive
migrations
f
people,
are
now bothsources
and
consequences
of conflict.
hese
constitute
"macropolitical
genda"
Camilleri
nd
Falk
1992)
not
merely
because
they
have
assumed
global
proportions,
ut
in the
more
profound
ense
that
they
represent losely
nterwoven
hreads
f
global
disorder
which
exceed the
problem-solvingapacity
of
existing
institutions.he internationalizationf informationnd
communicationnd the increasedconsciousness f
the
scale and multi-facetedharacter f globaldisorder re
important
factors
shaping
and
sustaining
the new
macropoliticalgenda.
ts functions to call nto
uestion
the theoretical and
practical utility
of
territorial
demarcation as the
overriding rinciple
of
political
organization,
nd to draw attention o the
requirements
of
"global
governance" Senghaas 1993).
Implications
or
Security
The
interacting
nd often
ontradictoryrocesses
f
integration
nd
fragmentation,
hich ave become
one of
the distinguishingeatures f globalizationn the late
twentieth
entury,
ave
far-reaching
onsequences
or
he
way
we understandnd
handle he
ecurity
ilemma.
or
purposes
f
analytical
onvenience e
may
onsider hese
consequences
nder hree
main
headings:
he
conceptual
framework
which
ndows
ecurity
ith ts
meaning
nd
content);
he
strategic
esponse
which
governs
he
way
resources
are mobilized
and
deployed);
and the
institutional
rrangementswhich
structure
elations
among
tates).
Over the last
fifteen o
twenty ears
a substantial
transformation
as occurred
in
both
popular
and
academic
perceptions
f the
security bjective,
which s
not to
say
that uch
change
has
been uniform
r universal
or that t has manifestedtselfwith qual force rclarity
within hecivilian
r
military ings
f national
ecurity
establishments.
here
has nevertheless
een
a modest ut
discernible
rift
way
from
highly
militarized,
ero-sum,
deterrence-oriented
efinitions
f
security
owards
more
inclusivist
onceptions
which
privilege
r at least
give
added
emphasis
o
notions f
reassurance,
o-operation
and
nterdependenceMack
1991).
The destructiveness
f
nuclear
apabilities
oupled
with he
ntensity
f nuclear
brinkmanship
uring
he Second
Cold War
generated
heightened
ense
of
danger,
which n turn
provided
he
impetus
or
a "new
dtente"
Kaldor,
Holden
and
Falk
1989).
The decline
f Cold
War
tensions,
nd,
especially,
the
attempts
o overcome
he division f
Europe
were
premissed n notions f commondestiny nd
common
security,
which Gorbachev's
appealing
slogan
of a
"European
home"
sought
o
harness
nd
institutionalize
(Bialer
1988;
Yazov
1988;
Camilleri
992).
In
sharp
contrast
o the idea
of collective
defence
which seeks
to
establish
a
sharp
divide
between
aggressive
and
law-abiding
tates,
common
security
(Independent
ommission
n
Defence
nd
Security
982;
SIPRI
1985;
Wiseman
1989;
Boserup
and
Nield
1990)
rests
on
the
proposition
hat
any
durable
peace
must
incorporate
he
egitimate
nterests
f all
parties.
t seeks
to
manage
the
problem
of
aggression
ot so
much
by
punishing
r
coercing
he
aggressor
s
by nfluencing
is
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moviatation,
by offering
mix of incentives and
disincentives hich
predispose
him to act within he
constraints et
by agreed
norms and
procedures.
The
minimalist pproach to common security sometimes
referred o as
"cooperative ecurity")
eeks to reconcile
the
competing
nterests
f states
by nstitutionalizing
o-
operative
behaviour whether
hrough
onfidence- nd
security-building
easures
CSBMs)
or more ambitious
arms control and disarmament
greements.
n
its
maximalist ersion t
provides olitical pace congenial
o
the resolution f
conflicts
nd
ensures hat the
security
interests f
weaker,
ess
privileged
r
revisionistocieties
are not
marginalized y
the
priorities
f
stronger,
more
privileged,
tatus
uo
societies.
Equally important
n the
changing onception
of
security
as been
the
attempt
o move
beyond
ts
purely
military
anifestations,
o
ncludenot
only
he defence f
territoryut the preservation f social, political and
ecological
values which
are critical to material and
psychological
ell-being.
et
in
this wider
context,
he
defence of
territorymay
still
prove
crucial to the
preservation
of the
society's
values,
liberties and
traditions. n
many
instances,
however,
territorial
defence,
itherbecause of
the
particular
errain r
the
means
by
which t s defended
e g
use of
nuclear r other
weapons
of
mass
destruction),
may
do little o
advance
the
nation's
ecurity
nd
may
ven
seriouslyeopardize
t.
As noted
earlier,
the use of
force
may
be even less
relevant o
theachievementf
security
hen t s
applied
a
long way
from
home
territory
n
pursuit
f
economic,
diplomatic
r
strategic
nterests,
hich
have more to
do
with heenhancement f thestate'spowerand prestige
than
with a
society's
territorial
ntegrity
r
social
cohesion.
As an
antidote o the
emphasis
n
military
orms
f
defence and
deterrence
has
emerged
the
notion of
comprehensive
ecurity^
which
has
come to
encompass
such
notions s cultural
urvival
e
g
of
ethnic
minorities
and
indigenous
eoples),
environmental
rotection,
nd
defence f
human
ights.
hese
concerns ave
also been
subsumed
nderother
abels,
ncluding
unconventional
security"Bedeski
1992)
"human
ecurity"
Dewitt
and
Evans
1993),
"democratic
ecurity"
Johansen
991),
or
"alternative
ecurity"
Galtung 1984).
For
some the
use
of
such
labels
is an
expression
f
scepticism
bout
the
analytic alue oftheconcept.These labels, t is argued,
point
o
various
orms f
insecurity,
hich
re
grounded
primarily
in
the
experience
of
individuals
and
communities,
re
necessarily
lastic n
their
definitional
content
nd,
as a
consequence,
ack
the
empirical igour
and
analytical
sharpness
associated
whith
the more
conventional
notion
of
national
security.
The
fact
remains,
however,
that
economic
and
environmental
threats to
societal
stability
and
well-being
loom
increasingly
arge
on
the
domestic
and
international
political
genda.
Damage
to
the
local or
global
ecology
(eg
desertificationr
global
warming)
or
the
harsh
consequences
of
risingforeign
ebt
can
have a direct
bearing
n the
quality
f life and even
physical ntegrity
of small states. These conditions
an
in
turn
provoke
social and
political
nstability
f a
kindwhich an unleash
the use of force itherwithin r between tates.
The
notion of
"comprehensive
security"
is
theoretically
seful f for no other reasonthan that t
suggests
onnections etween different
ypes
of threat
and
calls into
question
the
sharp dividing
ine between
domestic nd international
olitics.
The economic and
political rrangements
ithin
countryeg
the
pattern
and
intensity
f social
conflict)
re
closely
onnected o
regional
and
global decision-making rocesses
and
institutions
eg
distribution
f
resources,
nvironmental
regimes, efugee lows).Comprehensiveecurity,acking
the
analytical
ocusof national
ecurity,
oes,
it is
true,
have to
grapple
with much
arger
ield f
nvestigation
and
a far more
complex
set
of
variables. The distinct
advantage is that it subjects to criticala range of
boundaries
(between
states,
between insiders and
outsiders,
etween
governmental
nd
non-governmental
institutions,
etween
the state and civil
society,
and
between
internal
and
external
security),
and
as a
consequence
ffersmuch
richer
nsights
ot
only
nto
he
causes
of
insecurity
ut ntothe
structures,
elationships
and
agencies
needed to sustain
viable
security ystem
(Camilleri
1992).
The shift n
conceptual
orientation,
hichwe
have
briefly
escribed,
has
prompted good
deal
of
policy
innovation oth in
terms f
academic
prescription
nd
governmental
ction.
Referencehas
already
been
made
to
the
numerousnitiatives hich
brought
o an end
the
Cold War division n Europe and set in trainthe far-
reaching
oviet-
merican
ialogue
forboth
conventional
and
nuclear
disarmament.Within
he
span
of ten
years
we
have seen
theconclusion f
the
ntermediate
uclear
Forces
(INF)
Treaty,
a
unilateral ffer
by
the
US
to
eliminate
ts
land-based tactial
nuclear
weapons
and
withdrawts
sea-based
ones,
followed
by
a
comparable
Soviet
offer.
Other unilateral
steps
have
included
Moscow's
force
reductions,
ts
withdrawal f
offensive
forces rom
Germany,
ts
advocacy
f a
strictly
efensive
posture
and
its
renunciation f
the
use of
force,
culminating
n
the
dismantling
fthe
Warsaw
Pact. All of
this,
coupled
with
the
Conventional
orces in
Europe
agreement
and
Soviet
acceptance
of
a
reunified
Germany, as radically ransformedhepsychologicals
much
s the
geopolitical
map
of
Europe
Morgan
1993).
Behing
these
striking
and
largely
unforeseen
developments
nd
the
new
security
escourse
was a
combination
f
factors,
many
f
which
were
nextricably
linked
to
powerful
political,
economic
and
cultural
undercurrents
perating
with
the
American
nd
Soviet
societies,
as
well
as
those of
Eastern
and
Western
Europe.
Though
hese
security
nitiatives ad
their
most
conspicuous
mpact
n
the
European
theatre,
hey
were
not
altogether
bsentfrom
Africa r
Asia,
where
imilar
but
more
modest
attempts
t
military
isengagement
coincided
with
renewed
efforts or
the
resolution
f
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regional
conflicts
eg Angola,
Nambia,
Afghanistan,
Cambodia).
None
of
this s to
suggest
hat lder
security
doctrines nd
practices
ad
been
discarded,
hat
he use
offorcehad beenabandoned s a primarynstrumentf
policy,
r that llstateswere
uniformly
ommittedo new
notions
of
common and
comprehensiveecurity.
t is
nevertheless
pparent
hat
greatmany
tates,
arge
nd
small
alike,
the
United
Nations
tself
nd a
number
f
regional rganizations
ere
prepared
o
explore range
of
security
measures nd mechanismswhich had been
previously
ismissed r
simply ut
n
thetoo-hard asket.
Since the ate
1980s
a
good
deal
of
energy
as been
invested
n
endowing
he
UN
with n enhanced
ecurity
function,
ost
graphically
llustrated
y
the
quantitative
and
qualitativeexpansion
of its
peacekeeping
role.
ThirteenUN
peacekeeping perations
were established
between 945
nd
1987;
thirteenthers etween
987
nd
1992 Evans 1993). he aggregateostof theseoperations
till 1992 was estimated
at
$
8.2
billion,
but the
peacekeeping
illfor
1992 lone
came close to
$
3
billion.
Over the last few
years
these
operations
have been
designed
not
simply
o monitor easefires
nd
place
a
bufferbetween
warringparties
but to facilitate
he
withdrawal
of
forces,
restore
order,
mediate
and
conciliate between
opposing
factions,
wind
up
a
protracted
omestic
onflict nd oversee the
temporary
administration
f a
country.
Indicative f the new
thinking
as Bourtros-Ghali's
An
Agenda or
Peace
(Boutros-Ghali
992)
which et out
a
series
of
far-reaching
ecommendations
nd
proposals
for
peacemaking
(eg
more extensive
use
of the
arbitration nd other dispute-settlement echanisms
available
to the International
ourt
of Justice
ICJ);
a
more
equitable
framework
for the
imposition
of
sanctions;
nd
in extremeircumstances
he actual
use
of
force,
ncluding
he
establishment
f
peace
enforcement
units)
and
preventive
iplomacy
eg
confidence-building
measures,
ormal
act-finding
issionsmandated
by
the
Security
ouncilor the General
Assembly;
stablishment
of
early warning
systems
with
respect
to nuclear
accidents,
natural
disasters,
famines,
environmental
threats,
nd
mass movements
f
populations;
reventive
deployment
f
UN
forces;
nd creation
f demilitarized
zones).
These
deas,
which ad hitherto
irculated
ithin
primarily
cademic
ircles,
now became
respectable
nd
the subject of considerabledebate at the UN and
elsewhere.
With
henotable
xception
f
the
proposal
or
UN
peace-enforcement
nits,
where
reactions
were
ess
than
nthusiastic,
n
Agenda
or
Peace
provoked
great
many
responses
nd
refinements,
ost
of whichhave
emphasized
he
relevance
of
non-military
olutions
o
miltary
hreats
nd
especially
he
part
which
diplomatic
processes
an
play
n the
prevention
s wellas
resolution
of conflict.
ne
important
ntitiative
n this ontext
was
the
study
released
by
Australian
Foreign
Minsiter,
Gareth
vans,
which onstructed
typology
f threats
o
peace
and
a
corresponding
ix
of
military
nd
non-
military esponses,
withthe
emphasis
firmly laced
on
preventive
iplomacy
nd
early
nterventionn
conflicts
(Evans
1993).
Beyond
concepts
of
international
ecurity,
which
almost nevitably evolvearoundexisting r enhanced
UN functionsnd
activities,
umerous ther
proposals
have
since
gained
wide
currency
n official
lmost as
much s in
academic
discourse. o far s
military
ecurity
is
concerned,
considerable ttentionhas
been
given,
especially
n the
European
context,
o
the
concept
of
non-provocative
efence
Canby
1980;
Mack
1984).
Put
simply,
dvocacy
of this
trategy
as
premissed
n two
distinct ut
closely
related
propositions:
he need to
devise
a
system
f
defence that was
as inoffensives
possible
and whose success
depended largely
on
conditions
f
relative elf-reliancend
invulnerability.
t
stressed he need for
mobile,
small units with
imited
range,
but well
dispersed
over the national
territory.
Over time, deas of non-provocativeefence assumed
increasing importance
in
Soviet
doctrinal
pronouncements,
articularly
fterGorbachev ssumed
office,
and
percolated through
to NATO's defence
planning
nd its
deployment
f conventional orces
n
Europe. Although
tailored
specifically
o
European
geostrategic
onditions,
onprovocative
efencewas seen
to have muchwider
application,
ven to countries ike
Australia
with a
predominantly
aritime nvironment
(Dibb
1986;
Camilleri
987).
Even notionsof civilian r social defence ttracted
renewed
interest,
although
these were
still
largely
confined,
t least at the official
evel,
to
Scandinavia
nd
a
handful
f other ountries
Wiberg
1987). Perhaps
he
most significant evelopment n policy-makingerms
since he
early
980s
has been the
greater
tress
laced
on
notions of
economic,
environmental
nd
political
security, artly
because of the
perceived
connections
between
conomy,
nvironment
nd
political
tability
n
the one hand
and
military
apabilities
n theother.Yet
this is
far from hewhole
story,
or "unconventional"
security
oncerns
ave
steadily
cquired
n
importance
f
their
own,
reflecting
n
part
the diminished
tility
f
military
orce
n the achievement
f otherthan
strictly
military
bjectives. qually
salient
has been
the
corollary
of this
proposition,
amely
he
expectation
hat
greater
national eliance
n the
acquisition,
eployment
nd use
of
military
apabilities
will o taxthe
society's
conomic,
ecologicaland political esources s to compromisehe
realization
f
key
security
alues.
The Institutional
ontext
That
scholarly
deas
and even
policy
ormulation
ay
be
in a stateof
flux
s
one
thing,
hat nstitutions
re
evolving
n
ways
which
re
conducive
o the
application
of these
deas
or
policies
quite
another.
he end
of the
Cold
War
and,
n
particular,
he
resultant
ransformation
of the
European political
andscape
have
once
again
focusedattention
n the
feasibility
nd
desirability
f
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143
institutional
hange.
Two
keyquestions
re at issue here.
First,
to what extent does the state
or,
to be more
precise,
the
system
of states remain
the
defining
frameworkfor analysing and constructingecurity
rgimes?
econdly,
o what extentdoes theshift
n
the
global
distributionf
power,
f which heend
of
the Cold
War is but one
manifestation,
oint
to new
security
options
nd
arrangements?
As
regards
the first
question,
we have
already
observed hatthe state remains central ctor and
that
the
interstate
ystem
onfers n the
security
ilemma
many
of its
distinguishing
haracteristics.et the
state
must contend more and more witha
multiplicity
f
agencies
nd structures hich t can influence ut does
not
control,
nd which to
varying egrees shape
the
definitionf its own
objectives
nd the means
by
which
theymay
be
pursued.
t is not
only
hat he state an no
longerbe conceptualizeds a self-contained,erritorially
bound
decisional
unit,
but that
security
ecisions are
increasingly
he
by-product
f
an intricate etwork f
subnational,
upranational
nd transnational nterests
(Camilleri 992).
Ethnonationalist
entiment,
hether
n
Bosnia,
the
Ukraine,
or Northern
reland,
may
at first
sight ppear
as the
engine
f
conflict,
ut the
origins
nd
consequences
f
suchnationalist ervourave as much o
do with
he
process
f
globalization
nd the
disintegration
of
the state as with
the assertionof the
sovereignty
principle.
ike so
many
ther acets f nternational
ife,
the searchfor
ecurity
eflects ot
ust
national
dentity
and
state
interests ut a mosaic of
local,
regional,
national,
upranational
nd
transnational
paces, oyalties
and institutions.
The
complexity
f
this
rapidly
volving
multi-centric
world
provides
s with n
important
lue for
answering
the second
question.
f the Cold War and
the
collective
defence
arrangements
o
which it
gave
rise did not
provide
durable olution
o the
ecurity
ilemma,
t was
in
large
measurebecause of
the diffusion f
power
-
within,
etween nd
across
tates. n
the
post-Cold
War
period,
contradictory
pressures
and
powerful
disintegrative
endencieshave
continued o
erode
the
stability
f
the
major
alliance
systems.
he decline of
these
security
tructures,
hough
most
dramatic
n
the
case of
the former
ovietbloc
e g
dissolution f
Warsaw
Pact,
almost
omplete
disrepair
f
Russia's
security
ies
withNorthKorea, Vietnamand Cuba), is also at an
advanced
tage
n
the
case of
theWestern
lliance
ystem
(eg
steady
transformation
f
NATO's
objectives,
functionsnd
even
memberphip;
ithdrawalf
US bases
from
he
Philippines;
ncertainty
egarding
he
egal
and
political
status of
the
Australian,
New
Zealand and
UnitedStates
Treaty
ANZUS).
To
make
sense of
the
changing
onfiguration
f
interests,
ower,
norms nd
institutions,
ost
analysts
have
sought
o
identify
he
organizational
rinciple
r
principles
nderlying
he
emerging
ecurity ystem
by
reference o
one of four
models:
unipolar
security,
balance
of
power,
concert
of
powers,
collective
or
universal
security Camilleri 1993).
It
is
doubtful,
however,
whether
ny
one model does
justice
to
the
intricate
but
rapidly changing
framework f
security
policiesand institutions.he end of the Cold Warmay
have leftthe
United States
as the
pre-eminent ilitary
power
in the world and
the
only
one
capable
of
projecting
orce
n a
global
cale,
but t s
no
longer
ble
to
perform
he
coordinating
r
policing
ole it assumed
after 1945. The rise
of
new centres f
power, notably
Western
Europe
and
Japan,
coupled
with Russia's
continuingspirations
or
greatpower
tatus,
oints
o a
more
traditional
multipolar ystem
characterized
y
multiple,
iverse nd
shifting
lliances r
coalitions,
nd
perhaps
ompeting egional
locs.
Yet such divisions re
in
part
offset
by
America's residual
primacy,
new
patterns
of
global
economic and
technological
integration,
nd
increasing sensitivity
o notions of
common and comprehensiveecurity.The growth f
consultativend
co-operative
mechanism
n
international
diplomacy, specially
but not
exclusively
n
Europe,
in
both
the economic nd
security
ields,
may
enhance he
opportunities
or
adjusting
and
reconciling ompeting
geopolitical
interests and
priorities.
There exists
nevertheless no
single
forum
which
effectively
institutionalizes
concert
f
powers.
Nor
is
there an
agreed
et of
norms nd
expectations
hich
an
guide
ts
future
genda.
As
already
ndicated,
heUN has since
the ast
1980s
cquired
enewed
mpetus,
ntervening
n a
great
many regional
conflicts,
aising xpectations
nd
setting
ormative
tandardscross
wide
range
f
policy
issues.
But
any system
f
collective
ecurity
as still o
contendwith hemistrustnd jealousies of states,with
inadequate
resources nd
the
absence of a
greatpower
consensus.
All
of
this s not
argue
that
hesemodels re without
theoretical
or
practical
validity,
but that
they
each
capture
only
one slice of
contemporary
eopolitical
reality,
which
we
have
elsewhere escribed
s "a
mosaic
of
relatively
fluid
arrangements,
a
transitional
architecture
f
competingyet
overlapping
lobal
and
regional
esigns".2)
t
istnevertheless
ossible
o
discern
several
rendswhichwill
have a
considerable
earing
n
the
prospects
or
common
nd
comprehensive
ecurity.
Despite
the
primacy
f
US
military
apabilities,
ll the
indications
re that
we
are
moving
owards
multipolar
internationalystem Buzan 1991), in whichEurope,
Japan,
China,
Russia,
and
in due
course
India
and
perhaps
n
Islamic
coalition
will
play
a
part
n
defining
and
executing
referred
ecurity
utcomes,
nd in
which
co-operative
nd
competitive
endencies
co-exist
and
interact.
Without he
restraining
nfluence
f
the Cold-
War
greatpower
conflicts,
articularly
n
the
economic
arena,
may
become
particularly
cute,
not
least
among
former
llies. To
this
mustbe
added
the
unresolved
North-South
onflict,
which,
hough
dormant n
recent
years
partly
ecause ofthe
South's
reduced
everage,
will
sooner or later
re-emerge
with
the aid of
a
new or
revamped
anti-Western
deology.
The
resurgence
f
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94
Islamic
undamentalism
s bestunderstoodnthis ontext.
A third etof conflicts illrevolve round he renewed
tensionsbetween states
and
people,
as violations of
human rights nd a varietyof repressive trategies
provokeresponses
which ut across nationalboundaries
(Hoffmann 990-1991).
There
is
more, however,
o the
emerging ecurity
architecture
han the rise
of
a
polycentric ower
structure. lso
in evidence is an unmistakable
rend
towardsmultilateralism
urtured
y
the
intractability
f
theconflicts e have
ust
described
nd more
mportantly
by
the
growing
ealization
n the
part
of states that
"complex
nterdependence"
s here
to
stay Cox
1992).
The
argument
s most
succinctly xpressedby Stanley
Hoffmann:
The
very ynamism
f theworld
conomy
nd ts reckless
reallocation
f wealth nd
power equire
he ame
kind f
politicalontrolt theglobalevel hat he politicalealm"
of
authority,
he
state,
rovides
t the
country
evel;
and
that
ontrol,
oo,
can
come,
o
far,
nly
rom
pooling
f
state
fforts.3)
The result
s the
expansion
f
global
nstitutionalization,
that is the creation
of
co-operative
rameworks
nd
mechanisms
esigned
to enhance
policy
coordination
across a wide
range
of
policy
reas,
from ealth are to
environmental
protection
and from
agricultural
production
o
human
ights.
he
steady
nhancement
f
the UN's
peacekeeping
nd
peace
enforcement
ctivities
suggests
hat
the same
trend
s at work
n
the
security
field where
the state
has
traditionallyrided
tself
n
being
he
only
alient
ctor
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