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Aretruthandreconciliationcommissionsaneffectivemeansofdealingwithstateorganisedcriminality?DanielPascoe*

Whenanationpassesoutofaperiodoftyrannyoroppressionthereis often a sense that those responsible for past persecution andinjusticesshouldbepunished.Whilemanyformerdictatorsorhighgovernmentofficialsseektoprotectthemselvesthroughselfgrantedamnestiesorimmunitiesthesearenowatriskduetodevelopmentsinthe internationalcommunity,whichcastdoubtonthe legalityofsuchprotections.Betweenamnestyandpunishment,however,liesathirdoptionthetruthandreconciliationcommission.Designedtogive a voice to victims and perpetrators alike, these commissionshave become an increasingly popular tool in postconflictreconstruction. There is growing concern, however, thatcommissionshavebecomeanewvehiclethroughwhichwrongdoerscanescapeprosecution.Thisworkexaminesthehistoryofthetruthand reconciliation commission, in its various forms, from postapartheidSouthAfricatothenewSouthAmericandemocraciesandthrough to the latest commission, set up in the new state of EastTimor.

IntroductionSocieties emerging from conflict, in which a democratic governmentreplacesarepressiveone,facethedifficultquestionofhowtodealwithhuman rights abuses perpetrated under the previous regime. Theprocesses that hope to effectively account for such abuses, and toachieve a lasting peace, are debated within the field of transitionaljustice. One of the foremost options for states seeking transitionaljusticeisthetruthandreconciliationcommission.

*DanielPascoehasjustcompletedaBachelorofAsianStudies(Honours)/BachelorofLaws(Honours)degreeattheAustralianNationalUniversity.HeisaformerresidentofBruceHall.

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Although the first truth commissions,broadly conceived,appeared inthe early 20th century,1 there have been two notable surges in theirpopularity during the last 20 years. The first increase in popularitycoincided with the democratic transitions in many Latin Americannationsinthe1980s,whereasthesecondperiodaroseinresponsetotheworkoftheSouthAfricanTruthandReconciliationCommission(TRC),themostcomprehensiveexerciseintruthtellingeverseen.2 Alongtheway,variousclaimshavebeenmaderegardingthebenefitsoftruthandreconciliation commissions in promoting effective and lasting nationbuildingafterperiodsofsocietalconflict,withnearlyallpositiveclaimsmetbyscepticalresponses.3

Thisarticlesetsout theperceivedadvantagesof truthcommissions indealing with state crime, as put forward by scholars, governmentofficials, victims, and other parties. Criticism of those perceivedadvantages will also be considered in an attempt to address theshortcomingsofsome truthcommissionmodelsand to furtherensuretheireffectivenessinthefuture.

TheMultiplicityofTruthCommissionsIt is important tokeep inmindwhendiscussing the relativevalueoftruth commissions as instruments of peacebuilding that the powers,aims and composition of such bodies have varied greatly betweendifferentnations,andaccordingtodifferenthistoricaltrends.AsStanleyobserves,theprincipalfunctionofalltruthcommissionsistorecordtheextent and scale of serious violence through the use of testimony,4however,thisiswherethesimilarityends.

1ThefirstinvestigativecommissionsintoatrocitieswerethethosearisingfromtheBalkanWarsof191213,andTurkishandGermanactionsduringtheFirstWorldWar:M.A.Weiner,DefeatingHatredwithTruth:anArgumentinSupportofaTruthCommissionasPartoftheSolutiontotheIsraeliPalestinianConflict(2005)38ConnecticutLawReview129.2J.Sarkin&E.Daly,TooManyQuestions,TooFewAnswers:ReconciliationinTransitionalSocieties(2004)35ColumbiaHumanRightsLawReview661,723;J.Laakso,InPursuitofTruth,JusticeandReconciliation:TheTruthCommissionsofEastTimorandSouthAfrica(2003)22(2)SocialAlternatives44.3T.G.Phelps,ShatteredVoices:Language,ViolenceandtheWorkofTruthCommissions(2004)124.4E.Stanley,TruthCommissionsandtheRecognitionofStateCrime(2005)45BritishJournalofCriminology582.Hence,modelssuchasGermanysresearchbasedcommission

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Looking at the different types of truth commissions that have beenemployedinpostconflictsocietiesoverthelastfewdecades,mostwerestatutorygovernmentbodies (eg.SouthAfricasTRC),although somehave been inaugurated by executive decree (Chile),5 under a UnitedNations mandate (El Salvador and TimorLeste), and others byinternational(Rwanda)ordomesticNGOs(Brazil).6Mostcommissionsworktoalimitedtimeframe,althoughthoseofChadandUgandaaretorunforanindefiniteperiod.7Thecommissionstermsofreferencemayallowittolookatapatternofabusesoveranumberofdecades(ChileandSouthAfrica),orinsteadfocusonspecificcrimesorspecificgroupsofperpetrators.8Somemayrevealtheidentitiesofperpetrators(TimorLeste)andsomemaynot(Chile,Guatemala). Someattemptamassiveexercise in public participation andmobilisation (SouthAfrica, SierraLeone), whereas other commissions are smaller and more secretive(Guatemala,SriLanka,Haiti).9 Finally,somecommissionshavebroadpowersofsubpoena,searchandseizure,ortomakerecommendations,whilstothersdonot.10Asisevident,thetruthcommissionisaflexibleinstitution,capableofbeingadaptedtodifferentnationalcircumstances.

Whether or not a truth commission report is accompanied by arecommendation foramnesty forsomeorallperpetrators isespeciallycontroversial,asthisisthebasisformuchofthedebateoverrestorativeversus retributive justice processes in peacebuilding. The truthcommissions of Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, Chile and SouthAfricaincludedvariousconditionalandunconditionalamnestiesaspart

intothepracticesoftheGermanDemocraticRepublicbetween1949and1989willnotbediscussedhere:seeR.Daye,PoliticalForgiveness:LessonsfromSouthAfrica(2004)44.5R.I.Rotberg,TruthCommissionsandtheProvisionofTruth,JusticeandReconciliationinR.I.Rotberg&D.Thompson(eds.),Truthv.Justice:theMoralityofTruthCommissions(2000)13.6Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,723.7Ibid.8Ibid.9Ibid;Rotberg,aboven5,4.10Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,723;C.Stahn,AccommodatingIndividualCriminalResponsibilityandNationalReconciliation:TheUNTruthCommissionforEastTimor(2001)95AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw952,955;seealsoUnitedNationsTransitionalAdministrationforEastTimor,RegulationNo.2001/10:OntheEstablishmentofaCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliationinEastTimor,13July2001,s21(2).


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of theirwork,whereas thoseofRwanda,YugoslaviaandTimorLeste(forseriouscrimes)didnot.11

Despite thefact that internationalhumanrightsandhumanitarian lawplaceslimitsontheprovisionofamnestiesforgenocide,warcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity,12thisarticlewillnotprecludetheuseofsuchamnesties merely on the basis of their legality or otherwise withininternational law. In lookingat themethodsbywhichapostconflictsociety can heal itself and prevent further bloodshed, a full range ofinstitutionalmodelsmustbeconsidered.13AsSarkinandDalynote:

Crimes of state are both legal and political. Reconstruction ofcommunitylikewisehasbothlegalandpoliticaldimensions.14

ClaimsabouttheEffectsofTruthCommissions:AdvocatesandDetractorsThere is increasing agreement amongst theorists and practitioners oftransitional justice that some form of accounting for the past is anecessaryprerequisite to achieve lastingpeace in societiespreviouslyafflictedbyconflict.15 A failure todeal sufficientlywith thepastmaycreatemistrustbetweengroups insocietyand towards the institutionsof state.16 Importantly,proponentsof suchavieware foundonbothsidesof the restorativeversus retributive justicedebate. However, istheformalmechanismofanationaltruthandreconciliationcommissiontheappropriatemechanismtoaccountforstatecrime?Asnotedabove,

11D.Mendeloff,TruthSeeking,TruthTelling,andPostconflictPeacebuilding:CurbtheEnthusiasm?(2004)6InternationalStudiesReview355,367;Laakso,aboven2,49;Stahn,aboven10,958.12I.Simunovic,DealingwiththeLegacyofPastWarCrimesandHumanRightsAbuses:ExperiencesandTrends.(2004)2JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice701,702703.13TheUruguayancaseisoneexamplewhereacomprehensiveamnestyprograminitiallywentaheadwithpopularsupport:SarkinandDaly,aboven2,702.14Ibid,688,emphasisadded.15Ibid,669670;G.Gentilucci,TruthTellingandAccountabilityinDemocratizingNations:TheCasesAgainstChilesAgustoPinochetandSouthKoreasChunDooHwanandRohTaeWoo(2005)5ConnecticutPublicInterestLawJournal79;peaceheremaybedefinedastheabsenceofwar,inadditiontosocialequalityanddemocracy:Mendeloff,aboven11,363.16A.Fleschenberg,etal.,StatementoftheReflectionGroup(paperproducedasaresultoftheDealingwithaBurdenedPastTransitionalJusticeandDemocratizationConference,Berlin,Germany,2021April2006).


themanytypesoftruthcommissionsallshareonecommonfeature,thatofatruthseekingmandate,andhenceitisthiscommonfeaturethatwillbethemainfocusofthisarticleinattemptingtoanswerthisquestion.

The paragraphs below look at the various (sometimes overlapping)justifications advanced for the use of truth and reconciliationcommissions, as opposed to predominantly retributive justiceprocedures,particularly formalcriminalprosecutions. Significantly, itis throughaperception thatrestorative justiceprocesses,suchastruthand reconciliation commissions, can serve a number of purposesbeyond the reachof thedomestic and international court system thattheirpopularityhasdeveloped.17 Aswillbenoted,someoftheclaimsin support of truth commissions are meritorious, whereas some aremisguided. Heeding lessons from the past will enable the truthcommissions of the future to follow a model that increases theireffectiveness.

SocialHealingandReconciliationThe firstclaim that ismadeabout thevalueof truthtelling is that theexposureofthetruthregardinghumanrightsabusesperpetratedbytheprevious regimemayhelp topsychologicallyheal thevictimsof suchabusesandtheirfamilies,andtoassistwithreconciliation.18Proponentsclaim that it is only after psychological healing takes place that twopreviously warring parties can come together in a spirit ofreconciliation.19 Reconciliation, meaning the bringing together ofpreviouslyopposingparties, isa recognisedmeansof reckoningwithstatesponsoredatrocity,20 thesuccessofwhichmightbemeasuredbyanoverallfeelingofpeaceamongstanationscitizens.21

Truth and reconciliation commissions, unlike trials and historicalcommissions, are the institutional models best equipped to promotereconciliationinafracturedsociety,iffornootherreasonthanthefactthat they are usually set up for this express purpose.22 Although

17Stahn,aboven10,954.18Laakso,aboven2,50.19Mendeloff,aboven11,359.20Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,670.21Gentilucci,aboven15,86.22SarkinandDaly,aboven2,724.


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criminaltrialsmayofferasignificantsenseofhealingandsatisfactiontovictims,23theirutilityforreconciliationisdoubtful.Infact,reconciliationmay in factbe the antithesisofprosecution.24 Daly and Sarkin claimthat:

[T]he relevance to reconciliationof trials,generally, isquestionable,but the impact on reconciliation of international trials is surelyminimal. The primary reason for this is that trials that take placeoutsidethecountryarelikelytohavelittleeffectonrelationsamongpeoplewithinthecountry. Evenwheninternationaltrialstakeplacewithin the country, as in Sierra Leone, they are, by definition,conductedbyforeignerspeoplewhowerenotinvolvedintheactualevents.25

Moreover,truthcommissionsarefarsuperiortoprivateenvironsfortheexchangeofconfessionandforgiveness,assuchanexchangetakesplaceinanonconfrontationalandnondangerousenvironment.26

On the other hand, opponents argue that truthtelling, rather thanhaving a healing effect, may reopen old wounds and divisions insociety.27Certainly,incircumstanceswhereastateisnotyetfullystable,wherepeacehasbeenmiraculouslyachievedbymeansofasettlementorotherwise,28thentruthtellingwouldappeartopresentmoredangersthan benefits (e.g.with thepromotion of collective amnesia inpostFranco Spain and Mozambique).29 Yet, the examples of the SouthAfricanTRC,ChileanCommission andTimorLestesCommission onReception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR30) point to the opposite

23R.J.Goldstone,JusticeasaToolforPeacemaking:TruthCommissionsandInternationalCriminalTribunals(1996)28NewYorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLawandPolitics485,491inMendeloff,aboven11,359.24Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,691.25Ibid,690691,emphasisadded.26D.Schalkwyk,Truth,Reconciliation,andEvilinSouthAfricainM.S.Breen(ed),Truth,Reconciliation,andEvil(2004)32.27Mendeloff,aboven11,365.28Ibid,376.29Ibid,367.30CAVRisthePortugueseacronymthatiscommonlyusedfortheTimorLesteCommission:T.Jrvinen,HumanRightsandPostConflictTransitionalJusticeinEastTimor(WorkingPaperNo.47,UPI,2004)56,fn.183.


conclusion.31 Individedsocietieswhere formeradversariesare forcedto livesidebyside, it isprecisely in thosecircumstances thatpoliticalleaders are likely to engage in stereotyping and scapegoating alongethnic, cultural, religious or other lines.32 The findings of a truthcommissioncanpreclude this typeofbehaviour,exposing itas fallacybefore it becomes widely accepted.33 In deeply divided nations, asPhelpsnotes,thesharingofpersonalnarrativesmaybetheonlymeansbywhichsuchdiversepeoplecanbegin to recognize thehumanityofeachother.34

One other criticism that has been levelled at the perceived societalhealingbenefitof truthcommissions is thatalthoughstorytellingandacknowledgementof the factsmayhavesignificant therapeuticbenefitfor individuals, this personal psychological response cannot beextrapolated in its application to the psyche of an entire nation oroppressedsocialgroup.35Addressingthisconcern,itwouldappearthatthelargerthetruthseekingoperation,themoreacatharticeffectonanentire society would ensue, individual by individual.36 Thus, SouthAfricasTRC should serve as amodel to future commissionswith itsambitious mandate (documenting human rights violations between1960 and 199437) and mobilisation of mass participation (over 22,000statementsfromallsidesoftheconflictweretaken).38Althoughitisofcourse impossible to include every single surviving victims story ofsuffering and every single perpetrators confession within the oneprocess,atruthcommissionreportshouldbecomprehensiveenoughtoestablishnotabletrendsandpatternsofviolencethatmanymoreofthenontestifyingpubliccanrelateto.

31Laakso,aboven2,52.32Mendeloff,aboven11,375.33Ibid,3756.34Phelps,aboven3,69.35Mendeloff,aboven11,364.36Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,692;Fleschenberg,etal.,aboven16.37Laakso,aboven2,49.38Rotberg,aboven5,20,fn.1.


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JusticeforVictimsandPerpetrators:RetributionRetribution,orthepunishmentofcriminalsfortheiractions,isusuallyavital ingredient in transitional justice processes, in order to giveperpetrators what they deserve and to preclude vigilantestylerevenge.39Advocatesclaim that truthseeking inandof itselfprovidesjustice for victims of state crime, and acts as an effective form ofretributionagainst theperpetratorsofsuchactions. Theirargument isthat thepublicexposureof truthand theassignmentofblame for thecrimes committed are a form of punishment through shame,40 quiteapart from the more traditional forms of retribution (which includefines,trials,imprisonment,andsometimesexecution).41Rotbergargues,inrelationtotheSouthAfricanTruthandReconciliationCommission:

Thepublic shaming that came through theopennatureof theTRCproceduressubstitutedreasonablywellforpenaljustice.Exposureispunishment.Itisapowerfulcomponentofaccountability.42

Of course, a prerequisite for the effectiveness of such a retributivemeasure is the power andwillingness of the commission to publiclyidentify the perpetrators and their superiors by name, a requirementthathasnotbeenheededbysomecommissions.43

Ifthisretributiveaspectofthetruthseekingprocessissought,anotherdilemmawillarise. Thereleaseof information implicating theallegedperpetratorinstatecrimeislikelytoviolatetherighttodueprocessthatwould ordinarily be available to them during a criminal trial.44Althoughtheallegedperpetratorwillofcoursehavetherighttoremainsilent(orevennotparticipateincommissionproceedingsatall),thefactthatnoburdenofproofexists increasesthechanceoffalseaccusationsbeing made.45 This problem has no easy solution, other than to

39Phelps,aboven3,39,52.40Weiner,aboven1,130.41Phelps,aboven3,53.42Rotberg,aboven5,16.43Forexample,seeRotbergontheGuatemalanCommissiononHistoricalClarification(19971999):Rotberg,aboven5,4.44Weiner,aboven1,132.45Ibid.


acknowledgethattheallegedperpetrator(usually)alsohastherighttotestifybeforethecommission,andtorespondtoanyallegations.46

DeterrenceandDefeatingImpunityDeterrence is a kind of preemption, a strong statement directed atpotential futureperpetratorsso that thecrimesdescribed in thereportarenevercommittedagain. No fewer than fourLatinAmerican truthcommissionreportshaveemployedthetitleNuncaMas(nomoreinSpanish),47whilst theCAVR,TimorLestesCommission forReception,Truth and Reconciliation, has adopted the title Chega (enough inPortuguese).48 Moreover, formerArgentineanPresidentRaulAlfonsinstatedthathisnationalcommissionsaimwastopreventratherthantopunish.49 Clearlythen,deterrenceisoneoftheprimarygoalsoftruthcommissions. How then does the public exposure of human rightsabusespreventmoreofthesameinthefuture?

Themainway thatdeterrence is achievedby truth commissions, it isclaimed, is through the removal of perpetrators of state crime frompublic life. The culprits cannot then engage in criminal behaviouragain, but more significantly, other wouldbe perpetrators arediscouraged from doing so.50 Although generally truth commissionreports are not accompanied by highlevel prosecutions, the merenamingand shamingofperpetratorsmay force them to retreat frompublicview,giventheextenttowhichtheyarelikelytobeostracisedbythegreaterpublic.51Truthcommissionadvocatesoftenpointtothefactthat ritual shaming carriesmore serious consequences for the subjectthancriminalprosecutioninanumberofdifferentcultures.52

Although truthseekingmay function as a dispensation of retributivejusticeandasamessageofdeterrenceinindividualcases,thechallengeforthearchitectsoftruthcommissionsishowtoensuresuchbodiesact 46Stahn,aboven10,955.AprominentexampleistheUgandanCommissionofEnquiryAct,whichallowedallegedperpetratorstocrossexaminewitnessesandrespondtotheallegationsmadeagainstthem.47Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,695.48S.Powell,UNVerdictonEastTimor,TheAustralian(Sydney),19January2006nopage.49SarkinandDaly,aboven2,695.50Mendeloff,aboven11,361.51Ibid.52Ibid.


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againsttheimpunitypreviouslyenjoyedbyperpetrators(betheypolice,military,orcivilians). Impunity isnotmerely theabsenceofcriminalpunishment,butthatfailuretopunishreflectinganofficialendorsementof the perpetrators actions.53 It is not disputable that criminalprosecutionabolishesimpunity,bybreakingthecycleofviolentreprisalandsendingacleardeterrentmessagetootherwouldbeperpetrators.54However, is there a way this can be achieved through restorativeprocesses alone? This is this area where the controversy over truthcommissionswith attached amnesty provisions reaches its crescendo.Although, as will be noted below, the provision of an amnesty toperpetrators may help to significantly improve the truthfulness oftestimony and create a more accurate historical record, on the otherhand, opponents of amnesties vigorously assert that such a measureperpetuates impunity through a lack of accountability andresponsibility, leading to prolonged hatred and the threat of violentrevengebyvictimsandtheirfamilies.55

It is at this pointwhere conditional amnesties, equivalent to a specialtype of pleabargain,56 become an important tool in the process.Although conditional amnesties that exonerate the perpetrators ofserioushumanrightsbreacheswillprobablybeunlawfulaccording tointernationallaw,57theycanstillfunctiontodefeatimpunity,dependingonhow theyare framedandmanaged.58 Inorder to conveya strongstatement to the public (and the international community) that theamnestydoesnotlegitimatethecrimescommitted,theamnestyshouldbe:

53Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,719.Foradetailedaccountofthedangersofimpunityforseriouscrimes,seeDaye,aboven4,107.54Mendeloff,aboven11,360.55Laakso,aboven2,51.56Rotberg,aboven5,17.57Simunovic,aboven12,702703;nationstateshaveanonderogabledutyunderinternationallawtoprosecuteandpunishindividualswhocommitviolationsofhumanrights:Daye,aboven4,113.Moreover,inOctober2000,UNSecretaryGeneralKofiAnnanreportedtotheSecurityCouncilthattheUNpositiononthematterwasthatamnestycannotbegrantedinrespectofinternationalcrimes,suchasgenocide,crimesagainsthumanityorotherseriousviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw:Stahn,aboven10,955.58Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,721.


1. Individual, so as to preclude blanket amnesties: each applicantmustsubmitthemselvesforconsideration;59and,

2. asmentioned,conditional,suchthattheamnestyisonlygrantedinexchangeforsomethingofvaluetosociety,ratherthanfortheperformance of a preexisting duty (i.e. to obey the law or todisarm).60

These requirements epitomise recent international legal practice, asdemonstrated in South Africa and TimorLeste.61 The individualamnestyrequirementensuresthateachperpetratortakesresponsibilityand acknowledges their own actions, whilst the requirement ofconditionalityguarantees that thenewadministration cannotbe heldhostage by the old regime until amnesty is awarded.62 Thus,involvement in thiskindof amnesty regime indicates that the formerpowerholdersarepreparedtoworkwithintheparametersandlawsofthenewgovernment.63

RehabilitationofPerpetratorsTheopportunity to rehabilitateperpetrators emerged in the early 20thcenturyasthethirdgeneraljustificationforcriminalpunishment,alongwith retribution anddeterrence.64 So can a perpetrators cooperationwith a truth commission contribute towards the reform of theirbehaviour,andreintegrationwithinapeacefulsociety?

59Ibid.60Ibid;thiselementcouldofcoursebemetbyarequirementtotellthetruthduringtestimony(intheTRC),oralternativelytopayrestitutionorengageincommunityservice(asinTimorLestesCommunityReconciliationProcedureforlessseriouscrimes):LaoHamutuk,ReviewingtheEastTimorCommissionforReception,TruthandReconciliation(CAVR)(2003)4(5)LaoHamutukBulletin.at25March2006.61Stahn,aboven10,954;TheconditionalamnestiesemployedinSouthAfricaandTimorLestecontrastwiththeolderblanketmodelusedinChile,ArgentinaandElSalvador:Daye,aboven4,95.62Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,721.63Ibid,722.64Phelps,aboven3,30.


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The key to the rehabilitation of perpetrators is their acceptance ofresponsibilityfortheiractions.65Whentheperpetratorstepsforwardata truth commission hearing and acknowledges their own culpability,this crucial first step towards reintegrationwithin society takesplace.Suchaprocesscontrastsgreatlywithcriminaltrials,whereadefendantwillseektomaintaintheirinnocence,66oftenevenafteraguiltyverdict,and the punishment then meted out has its aim in isolating thatindividualfromtheremainderofsociety,ratherthanincludingthem.67Truthseeking processes, on the other hand, aim to reconcile the twoparties so they may live together peacefully.68 Whilst honestparticipation in a truthseeking process is far from an automaticguaranteetoforgivenessandanormallifewithinthenewnation,thereareanumberofprecedentstothateffect.69

BuildingaHistoricalRecordThe findings presented in a truth commission report constitute animportant addition to the public historical record.70 Importantly, anaccurate historical record can function to resolve disputes about theoccurrenceandextentofhumanrightsabuses. Assuch,anyhistoricallies createdby thepropagandamachineof the former regimewillbepubliclyrebuked.71Acommonunderstandingofthetroublingpartsofanationshistorymayallowthetwoormoreformerwarringfactionstounite ingovernment, rather thanargueover thepast.72Although it issometimestruethattheotherwiselaudablegoalofpromotingnational

65Daye,aboven4,96.66Ibid.67Ibid,110.68Ibid.69Forexample,thecomparativesuccessoftheCommunityReconciliationProcedureaspartoftheCAVRprocessinEastTimor,whichallowedtherepatriationofformermilitiamembersbacktotheircommunities,largelywithoutincident:S.Zifcak,RestorativejusticeinTimorLeste:TheTruthandReconciliationCommission(2005)68DevelopmentBulletin51,53;reconciliationbetweensupportersofIanSmithandthoseofRobertMugabefollowingcivilwarinZimbabwe:Daye,aboven4,81;andinSouthAfrica,thenotoriousformerwetbagpoliceinterrogator,JeffBenzien,whocontinuedservinginthepoliceforceafterhistestimonybeforetheTRC,withanumberofhisformervictimsashisseniorofficers:Daye,aboven4,9394.70Laakso,aboven2,44;Weiner,aboven1,130.71Mendeloff,aboven11,360.72Ibid.


identity in infant nations is achieved through a great deal ofmythmaking,73 fora feelingof trustbetween formeradversariesandalasting peace to ensue, a spirit of transparency and objectivity withregardstonationalhistoryisanimportantstartingpoint.74

Ascomparedwithcivilorcriminal trials,whichcanundoubtedlyalsomakeapositivecontributiontothehistoricalrecord,75truthcommissionhearings and reports have been criticised as providing inaccurateaccountsof thepast. First, the testimonyobtained in truthhearings isnearly never subject to the crossexamination and burden of proofproceduralrequirementsthatcharacterisecriminalorciviltrials;assuchit ismoreunlikelythatanaccurateandcommonunderstandingofthetruthwillarise.76Further,ithasbeenarguedthatevenifalltestimonyistendered ingood faith, the finite termsofreferenceandresourcesofatruthcommissionwillmeananaccurateandcompletehistoricalrecordof past human rights violations can never be produced, without thebenefitofyearsofcomprehensiveresearchbyqualifiedhistorians.77

Thissecondcriticism ismoreeasilydealtwith, firstby thehostnationensuring thatprofessionalhistorians and researchers are amongst thestaffofthecommission,andsecondbyensuringthatthecommissionslifespanandpowers(e.g.powersofsubpoena,search,andseizure78)aresufficientinorderforsubstantialhistoricalresearchandcompilationtobe achieved. It is true that no history, no matter how exhaustivelyresearched, can ever constitute the complete, objective truth, and thissame principle applies to the reports of truth commissions: they arepartiallyconstructedhistorieslikeanyother.79Ideally,acommissions

73Ibid,371.74AswitnessedintheexampleofmoderndayGermany:Mendeloff,aboven11,371.Ofcourse,theabovepointregardingnations,suchasMozambique,mustbeheeded:inasmallnumberofpostconflictsocieties,exposureofthetruthcandomoreharmthangood.75M.A.Drumbl,CollectiveViolenceandIndividualPunishment:TheCriminalityofMassAtrocity(2005)99NorthwesternUniversityLawReview539,593.76Mendeloff,aboven11,374;SchalkwyknotesthatthiscriticismhasbeenlevelledattheTRC:Schalkwyk,aboven26,11.77Mendeloff,aboven11,374.78Forexample,seeStahn,aboven10,955ontheTRC.79Laakso,aboven2,50.


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reportmightbetterbeseenasproducingasetoftruthsratherthanthetruth.80

Thefirstcriticismdescribedabove,alackofchecksandbalancesontheaccuracy of testimony,might be rectified by the use of a conditionalamnesty provision, as employed by the TRC, such that perpetratorsmayonlybegrantedamnestyif,amongstotherfactors,theysatisfythecommissionersthattheyhavetoldthecompletetruth.81Additionally,itispreciselythisrelaxationofproceduralrulesregardingtestimonythatforms part of the attraction of the truth commission mechanism. Ascomparedwithformalcriminaltrialsthatprovideonlymicroscopicorlogicaltruthinrelationtoasinglecase,82truthcommissionsareabletobuildamuchmorecomprehensiveaccountofpastevents,duetotheirability tohearmanymorewitnessesand involvevarious segmentsofcivil society over the same time period that the trials of only a fewleadingperpetratorsmightbeprocessed.83

HumanRightsEducationA truthandreconciliationcommissions finalreport, togetherwith thepublicity that will usually accompany its hearing procedure, canconstituteanimportantsourceofpubliceducation.Thedidacticelementthatmightbetakenfromsuchnarrativescanensurethatthesamekindofviolenceneveroccursagain.Themessageideallyconveyedisthatina democratic society, the use of abusive means to achieve nationbuildingwillneveragainbetolerated.84 Moreover,apartfromafocuson specific historical events, a truth commission can help to create ahuman rights culture and elevate its associated vocabulary into thepublicdiscourse,where,under the repressive regime, such ideasmay 80Phelps,aboven3,124.81Schalkwyk,aboven26,4;incontrast,whentheSriLankanCommissionsonDisappearanceswereformed,thegovernmentandthefamiliesofvictimsrefusedtoacceptsimilaramnesties,andhence,significantlylessinformationwasobtainedfromallegedperpetrators:Rotberg,aboven5,15.82Drumbl,aboven75,593.83Simunovic,aboven12,703.Relevantly,astudybyRonaldSlyeontheTRCfoundthatdespitetheabsenceofthehighlydevelopedrulesofevidence,procedure,andproofthatgoverntrialsinaWesternsetting,thequalityandquantityofinformationcollectedbytheTRCwascomparableorsuperiortothatwhichmighthavebeenproducedinacourtroom:Rotberg,aboven5,15.84Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,697;Mendeloff,aboven11,360.


neverhavepreviously existed.85 Of course, thepublicationofa truthcommissions report by itself is not enough to rapidly spread humanrightsawareness. Attheveryleast,thereleaseofthereportshouldbeaccompanied,wherever possible, by a sustained and institutionalisedeffortineducatingthebroaderpublicofthecommissionsfindings,andthehumanrightsdoctrinewhichhasunderpinnedthem.86

Althoughadmittedlythehumanrightsrecordsofanumberofnationsthathavepreviouslyinstitutedtruthcommissionsremainsquestionable(e.g.SouthAfrica,Guatemala,ElSalvador,NicaraguaandRwanda87),theeducativeaspectsofthecommissionsreportmustbegiventimetomatureintocommonpractice.Educationremainsakeystepinensuringrespectforhumanrightsinanationslongtermfuture.

InstitutionalReformAlthoughmosttruthcommissionsprimarilyoperatebyassigningblameforthecommissionofhumanrightsabusestoindividualperpetrators,88it is not just individual responsibility for state crime that can beemphasisedthroughthecommissionprocess.Theaggregationofmanydifferent individual accounts will often reveal the scope of an entireinstitutionalcultureofabuseanddisregardforhumanrights,89be thatin the government, military, police force, legal system, educationsystem,orelsewhere.

Looking at institutional responsibility for crimes will enable a postconflict society to takepolitical steps to remedy those shortcomings,90whethertheindividualperpetratorsofthosecrimesremainwithinthatinstitutionornot.Thiscontrastswiththenatureofcriminaltrials,withtheirfocusonthefactsoftheindividualcaseathand,ratherthanabigpictureviewwhichrevealstherootcausesoftheviolence,andinformsrecommendations as to the future.91 Relevant examples include thejudicialreformsthattookplaceinElSalvador,asrecommendedbythe

85Daye,aboven4,99.86Laakso,aboven2,51.87Mendeloff,aboven11,374.88Ibid,359.89Simunovic,aboven12,703.90Laakso,aboven2,51.91Simunovic,aboven12,703.


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truthcommissionthere,92theArgentineanCommissionsuncoveringofits militarys culture of torture, leading to reforms,93 and the TRCsmajor role in exposing the cruelty of the apartheid system in SouthAfrica.94

Significantly, institutional reform does not have to be limited to theformal institutions of the state. The patterns revealed by victim andperpetrator testimony may reveal substantial social injustice.95 If forexample, gender, employment, or economicbased discrimination isextremely widespread it may represent an institutionalised practice.The role of a truth commission in identifying social injustice andmakingrecommendationstoovercomeit,ratherthanmerelycombatingstatesanctionedviolence,canbe the first step inanagendaof furthersocialchange.

Oneareawherethiscrucialfunctionoftruthcommissionsinpromotinginstitutionalreformhasfallendowninthepastisthroughgovernmentsfailures to follow the recommendations of their commissions report.Given it takespoliticalwill inorder to effect institutional change (forexampleinthearmedforces,labourmarket,oreconomy),theultimatesuccess of the commissions work in this area depends upon itsconstituent government following its recommendations. A truthcommissioncannotfixeveryailmentofapostconflictsocietybyitself.96TheChairofTimorLestesCAVR,AnicetoGuterres,agreed:

Sometimes when I respond to questions [about dealing withinequalities],Ikindoflaughandsay,Look,ifyourereallyputtingsomuchonto theCAVR thenyoudontneedaParliament,youdontneedaPrimeMinister,youdontneedaGovernment.YoudontneedaPresidentofTimor,youjustasktheCAVRtodoeverything!97

Asimple,yetcontroversial,methodofovercomingthisproblemwouldbetoagreeinadvancetomaketherecommendationsofthecommission

92Mendeloff,aboven11,368.93Phelps,aboven3,120.94Mendeloff,aboven11,368.95Stanley,aboven4,586.96Ibid,588;seealsoPhelps,aboven3,125126.97Stanley,aboven4,593.


obligatory.98 However, this will only be possible in certaincircumstances,suchaswhere thecommission isa legislativelycreatedbody,andassuch,hasapopulardemocraticmandate.

PromotionofDemocracyWhy is the promotion of democratic government a laudable goal oftruth commissions? It is indisputable that strongdemocracies are farlesslikelytolapseintocivilwarthanundemocraticnations.99Althoughit is true that democracy is not the only political route to a peacefulsociety,100 its broad acceptance as a form of government by theinternational community and its guarantees for individual freedomsmeans it is an attractivemodelofgovernance.101 Of course, formostnationsthathaveengagedinamajortruthseekingexercise,democraticvalueswerefarfromthenormupuntiltheirrecentpast.

While there are of course postconflict societies that have made asuccessful transition to democratic government without the aid of atruth and reconciliation commission,102 the work of such a bodyundoubtedlycontributestowardsthepropagationofdemocraticideals.Thisoccursthroughathreefoldprocess:first,throughthereconciliationofwarringgroups,as it isonlywhere conflicting segmentsof societyagreetobegovernedincommonthatdemocracymayresult.103Second,thepublicexposureofatruthcommissionsworkcanindirectlyinspireother democratic transformations, such as a more active judiciary, amore reformist parliament and a more politically aware populace.104Thirdandmostdirectly, theprocessof truthseekingpromotesseveraldemocraticvalues inandof itself.These includepopularparticipation,

98Laakso,aboven2,51.99Mendeloff,aboven11,372.100Ibid.101R.Pannikar,IstheNotionofHumanRightsaWesternConcept?(1982)120Diogenes75,[III];H.J.Steiner&P.Alston,InternationalHumanRightsinContext,(2nded,2000)903904.102Mendeloff,aboven11,367;forexample:Spain,Mozambique,Lebanon,NamibiaandCambodia.103Ibid,700.104Phelps,aboven3,123124.


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an accurate and transparent historical record, and the rule of law.105Thesedemocraticvalueswillnowbediscussedinturn.

First, popular participation is promoted through the truthseekingprocessby the empowermentofvictims as they step forward togivetheirtestimony.106Underthepreviousregime,theiropinionsmayhavebeenseriouslyrepressed,andtestifyingbeforeatruthcommissionwillserve as an encouragement (for the witness and others) to furthercontributetothepublicdiscourse.Assuch,truthcommissionsmobilisethe participation of the previouslypowerless, and encourage them tospeak criticallyof those inpower.Once the commissions final reporthas been completed, if its findings arewidelydisseminated, thiswillfurtherencouragepopularparticipation,togetherwiththetransparencyofpublicprocesses.107

Second, thedemocraticbenefitsofanaccurateand commonhistoricalrecord are manifest in the sense that the leaders of previouslyconflicting societal factions can focus their energies on forming aneffective government for their new nation, rather than debating thepast.108 Aspreviouslydiscussed, all effortsmaybe focussed towardsthedemocraticneedsof thepresentsociety,rather than trying toaffixblameforpastmisdeeds.

Third,theruleoflawisthecontentionthatnooneisabovethelaw.109Oneofitsconsequencesistheprinciplethatcrimesarepunishedbythestate,throughlegalmeans,ratherthanthroughpersonalreprisal.110Thefactthatstatecrimecanbedealtwithbynegotiationandtruthseekingbymeansofacommission,ratherthanreprisalkillings,isseenbytruthcommissionadvocatesasstrengtheningthatprinciple.111However,thisis one of the most controversial conceptual areas of the truthcommissionmodel.Ifanamnestyregimeaccompaniesthetablingofthecommissionsfinalreport,criticsoftruthcommissionswillclaimthata

105Mendeloff,aboven11,361;Weiner,aboven1,131;Gentilucci,aboven15,87.106Weiner,aboven1,131.107Rotberg,aboven5,9.108Mendeloff,aboven11,361.109A.V.Dicey,IntroductiontotheStudyoftheLawoftheConstitution(10thed,1959)202203.110Mendeloff,aboven11,361;W.I.Jennings,TheLawandtheConstitution(5thed,1959)51.111Rotberg,aboven5,11.


failuretoprosecutethoseresponsibleforpriorstatesponsoredcrimeisa direct affront to the rule of law in a democratic system. Thiscontention might be answered by natural law theory, where, unlikewithpositivisttheoriesespousinglegalcontinuity,abreakwiththeoldlegalregimemaybejustifiedbecausethepriorlawlackedmoralityandhence did not constitute a valid legal regime.112 Nonetheless thisremainsanimportantpointofcontention.

InternationalImageTheestablishmentofasuccessfultruthcommissionmayhaveapositiverole to play in the way that the outside world views the newlydemocratised nation.113 Although this argument obviously overlapswith a number of the others mentioned above, it is still worthconsidering separately. Whilst transitional justice processes generallyfocus on the grievances of victims and the incapacitation ofperpetrators, it is still a fact that civil conflict and statesanctionedhumanrightsabusescanoften(butnotalways)damagetheeconomyofthe newly democratised nation.114 The reconciliation of previouslywarring factions, the promotion of democratic principles, and theinstitutional reforms that truth commissions contribute substantiallytowards are likely tomake thenewnationmore attractive to foreigneconomicinvestment.115Therefore,inanindirectmanner,theworkofatruth commission can promote business, trade, reconstruction andtourism.116

Ontheotherhand,theuseofrestorative,ratherthanpurelyretributivetransitional justice mechanisms, may attract foreign criticism,particularly fromnationswithstronghumanrights traditions. This ismost often the case where the truth commission report recommendsblanket amnesties for perpetrators, which, as articulated above,breaches the international legalobligationonstates toprosecute thosewhohavecommittedwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanityontheir

112Gentilucci,aboven15,87.113Sarkin&Daly,aboven2,698.114Ibid,727.115Ibid,689690.116Ibid.


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territory.117 Yet, forall thenegative internationalattention thatmightarise, it would constitute a serious step in international relations tothreatenaneconomicrelationshipwithanewlydemocratisednationiftheyhaveviolatedthisobligation.Internationallawalsocallsforstatestorespecteachotherssovereignty,andrefrainfrominterveningineachothers internal affairs.118 In any case, depending on the newlydemocratised states level of development, much postconflictinvestment is likely to arrive from private, rather than governmentsources.

ConclusionThis article does not set out to claim that truth and reconciliationcommissionsareacure forallof theproblemscreatedbyahistoryofstatesponsored criminality in every single case. In certaincircumstances, such as where a miraculous but fragile peace existsfollowing civil war, exposure of the true extent of human rightsviolationscoulddomoreharmthangood.119Moreover,democratisationwithouttheaidofatruthandreconciliationcommissionhasnotledtoarelapseofwarinanumberofpostconflictstates,includingpostFrancoSpain,Namibia,MozambiqueandCambodia.120Thepopularityoftruthand reconciliation commissions is a comparatively newphenomenon:previously,numerousarmedconflictsarrivedatafinalclosurewithoutthebenefitoftruthtelling,orevenwithoutprosecution.121

However,thisisnottodenythemanybenefitsthattruthcommissionscanhaveonsocietieswithatroubledpast,inordertoaccountforpriorstateorganised criminality, and aid the transition to lasting peace.Truthcommissionsoffermanyof thebenefitsofcriminalprosecutions(for example: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation of offenders,

117Simunovic,aboven12,702.118CharteroftheUnitedNations,Article2(1);DeclarationontheInadmissibilityofInterventionintheDomesticAffairsofStatesandtheProtectionofTheirIndependenceandSovereignty,GARes2131,UNGAOR,20thsess,1408thplenmtg,UNDocA/Res/2131(1966);DeclarationonPrinciplesofInternationalLawconcerningFriendlyRelationsandCooperationamongStatesinaccordancewiththeCharteroftheUnitedNations,GARes2625,UNGAOR,26thsess,1883rdplenmtg,UNDocA/Res/2625(1970).119Daye,aboven4,43.120Mendeloff,aboven11,367,369.121Ibid,367.


building a common historical record), in addition to several uniquefeatures: societal healing and reconciliation, the promotion ofdemocratic values and human rights, improvement of a statesinternational image,and thepossibilityof initiatingbroad institutionalreform.Finally,whentheworkofatruthcommissioniscombinedwithpolitical steps by the new government, such as a comprehensiveprogramofpubliceducation,andprovisionofreparationstovictims,122togetherwiththemerepassingoftime,123a lastingandcomprehensivesenseof justiceandpeacecanresult,and the legacyofstateorganisedcriminalitywillnolongerhauntthenewnation.

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122Ibid,376.123Daye,aboven4,43.


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