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WorldWarI:AGreatWarUnderthe“ConditionofDemocracy”
AdamTooze
ColumbiaUniversity
April2015
RoughDraft
IntheEnglishlanguageattheopeningofthe20thcentury,theconcept(der
Begriff)ofdemocracywasnotyetalabelreservedforasettledconstitution.Itcould
alsobeusedtodesignatedapopularforceorbodyofopinion.1Inthelexiconofa
reformerlikeLloydGeorge,“Britishdemocracy”designatedthepoliticalsupporters
ofradicalliberalismandlabour.ThisstrikingfactofBegriffsgeschichtecanberead
intwoways.Clearlyitwastruethatdemocracyintheearlytwentiethcenturywas
farfrombeinganachievedreality,inBritainaselsewhere.Forthosehistorianswho
seektominimizetheextentofprogresstowards“Westerndemocracy”andargue
thatitemergedinfullyfledgedformonlyafter1945,theimportantthingto
emphasizearethelimitsontheprewarfranchise.Before1918lessthan60percent
ofBritishmencouldvote.2Butonecouldalsotakethisanotherway.Asthe20th
centuryandthe21stcenturyweretoamplydemonstrateademocraticconstitution
doesnotguaranteetheenergyofdemocraticpolitics.Ifthesubstanceofdemocracy
ispluralisticpoliticalcontestationbyengagedcitizens,thestatisticsof
enfranchisementareaverypartialmeasureofdemocratization.Liberaldemocratic
complacencycanfunctionasanantipoliticsmachine.In1914,bycontrast,thevery
term“democracy”stillhadanoppositionaledge.Democracywasnotanestablished
fact,itwastherallyingcryofthosearoundtheworldwhowantedtomakeitso.The
questionthatthisessayposesishowthisdynamicpoliticalforcefieldwasentwined
withtheGreatWarthatbrokeoutinAugust1914.
I1 A.Chadwick,Augmenting.Democracy:PoliticalMovementsand.ConstitutionalReformduringtheRiseofLabour,1900-1924,(Aldershot,Ashgate,19992 H.G.C.Matthews,R.I.McKibbninandJ.A.Kay,“ThefranchiseFactorintheRiseofthelabourParty”,EnglishHistoricalReviewXCI(1976),723-752.
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Intheearly20thcentury,democratizationwasacontestedtrendinwhichwe
canseebothintensifyinganddispersingtendencies.Feminismandsocialismwere
powerfulforcesdemandingextensionandintensification.GeoffEleycapturesthese
energiesinhishistoryofdemocracyinEuropewrittenfromtheleft.3The
quintessentialLib-LaballiancewasinBritain,wherebetween1905and1918the
convergentforcesofradicalliberalism,reformingwelfarism,organizedlabour,Irish
nationalismandsuffragismwouldtransformtheconstitution.Butitisimportantnot
tocastthenettoonarrowlyandtoidentifydemocratizationexclusivelywith“the
left”.Therewere“forcesofmovement”onallsides.Andtherelationshipbetween
theachievementof“progressive”constitutionalchangeandtheobjectivesofleft-
wingpoliticswasnotstraightforward.ThepopulistupsurgeintheUnitedStates
triggeredbythedepressionof1893andfigureheadedbyWilliamJenningsBryan
shookthepoliticalestablishment,butitalsocontainedwithinitpowerfulstrandsof
xenophobia.4ChristianDemocratsandwelfareactivistsofeverystripeall
contributedtowardsthepressuresforthepoliticalincorporationofthemasses.
Conservativespeculationthatgivingwomenthevotewouldhelptoneutralizethe
radicalismofworkingmenhelpedtouniversalizethefranchise.Eveninpreviously
conservativecatholiccountriessuchasAustria(1918),Poland(1919)andIreland
(1923)theaftermathofthewarsawthevoteextendedtowomen.Indeed,in1919
PopeBenedictXVabruptlyreversedtheVaticananti-suffragestanceandactively
supportedvotesforCatholicwomen.Likewiseitwasconservativeswhoextended
votestowomenintheaftermathofWorldWarIinBelgium(1919)andCanada
(1921)andtheNetherlands(1922).
Amongstthemostvociferousandobstreperouspopularactorsinmany
countriesintheearly20thcenturywerepopularnationalists.Eveniftheir
inclinationswereanti-leftandauthoritarian,the“objective”effectofmovements
likethepangermanswastomobilize,energizeandcontestauthority.5Thiswastrue
3 G.EleyForgingDemocracy:TheHistoryoftheLeftinEurope,1850-2000(OxfordOUP2002).4 JosephGerteisandAlyssaGoolsby,“NationalisminAmerica:TheCaseofthePopulist”,TheoryandSociety,Vol.34,No.2(Apr.,2005),pp.197-2255 GeoffEley,“ReshapingtheRight:RadicalNationalismandtheGermanNavyLeague,1898-1908”TheHistoricalJournalVol.21,No.2(Jun.,1978),pp.327-354.
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asmuchofImperialGermanyasitwasofJapan,wheretheunsatisfactoryTreatyof
Portsmouthproducedanoutburstofunprecedentednationalprotestagainstthe
establishment“sellout”.TheHibiyaParkincidentinSeptember1905usheredina
prolongedperiodofpopularriotingandprotestthatculminatedintheconvulsive
riceriotsof1918whichfelledthewartimegovernmentandusheredinthefirst
governmentledbyacommonerinJapanesehistory.6
ThecomplexambiguitiesofdemocraticenergyintheAnglo-Americansphere
arepowerfullycapturedbyaworksuchasLakeandReynoldsontheGlobalColour
Line.7TheyshowhowemphaticnotionsofdemocracycirculatedbetweentheUnited
StatesandtheCommonwealthoftheBritishEmpire,butalsohowthesewere
circumscribedbyapowerfulcommitmenttoracialexclusionandanemphatic
notionof“Whiteness”.ThisframedtheenfranchisementofwomeninNewZealand
onthesamebasisasmenin1893andinAustraliain1901.Itwasnolessmarkedin
the“newfreedom”proclaimedbyWilson’sprogressiveadministrationfrom1913.
Butthoughtheconstellationofpoliticalforceswasparticularandcomplexin
eachcase,theremarkablethinginthedecadesbefore1914wasthesheerscaleof
changeliterallyacrosstheworld.Indeed,soinescapabledidtheimperativeseemto
bethatonemightspeak,borrowingfromMichaelGeyerandCharlesBright’s
conceptofa“conditionofglobality”,ofa“democraticcondition”.8Asthemilitant
suffragistMillicentFawcettputittoatriumphantSuffragistandLabourrallyinthe
springof1917:"Theresultof”Britain’sfranchisereform“wasanillustrationofthe
deathlessenergyandvitalityofthesuffragemovement.”Thediscussionabout
electoralexpansion“hadbeeninitiatedbyananti-suffragist,presidedoverbyan
anti-suffragistandconsistedatfirstoffiftypercentanti-suffragists;thoughthebrew
6 AndrewGordon,“TheCrowdandPoliticsinImperialJapan:Tokyo1905-1918”Past&PresentNo.121(Nov.,1988),pp.141-170.7 MarilynLake,HenryReynolds.DrawingtheGlobalColourLine.WhiteMen’sCountriesandtheInternationalChallengeofRacialEquality(CambridgeCUP,2008).8 MichaelGeyerandCharlesBright,“WorldHistoryinaGlobalAge”TheAmericanHistoricalReviewVol.100,No.4(Oct.,1995),pp.1034-1060.
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seemeddistinctlyanti-suffrage,whenthetapwasturned-suffragecameout."9The
methodsandingredientswerevariedbuttheresultswereincreasinglythesame.
QualifiedmanhoodsuffragemultipliedthenumberofvotersinBelgium
tenfoldin1893afterawaveofmassstrikes.10Afterfouryearsofdisruptive
parliamentaryargumentaconservativegovernmentintheNetherlandsintroduced
adramaticallyexpandedfranchisein1896.11Womenwereenfranchisedalongwith
meninFinlandin1907andNorwayin1913.Thisfollowedaprocessofgeneral
democratizationinNorway,whichmovedtodirectelectionsonthebasisof
universalsuffragebetween1898and1905.Thoughfulluniversalsuffragedidnot
comeuntil1918,Sweden’sbicameralconstitutionwasdemocratizedin1909.Secret
ballotsandfullydemocraticelectionsforlocalgovernmentwereintroducedin
Denmarkin1901and1908.12
Bismarckwasoneofthefirstconservativestoattempttouseuniversal
manhoodsuffrageasaweaponagainstliberalismintheGermanEmpire.Asthe
forcesofpoliticalCatholicismandsocialdemocracyexpandeditwouldbackfire
seriously.Attheturnofthecenturytheconservativecomplexionofgovernmentin
Germanydependedaboveallonthequalifiedvotingsystemsthatwerestillthe
norminthememberstatesoftheEmpire.Butheretoothepressureforchangewas
relentless.ElectoralreformwascarriedoutinBaden,WuerttembergandBavaria
between1904and1906.Saxonyoscillatedbackandforthbetweenmoreorless
extensivefranchise,triggeringgiganticsuffragedemonstrationsin1910.13In1910
Prussiatoowitnessedhugedemonstrationsdemandingareformofitsnotorious
three-classfranchise.
9 S.S.HoltonFeminismandDemocracy.Women'sSuffrageandReformPoliticsinBritain1900-1918(Cambridge,1986),149.10 MauriceVauthier,“TheRevisionoftheBelgianConstitutionin1893”PoliticalScienceQuarterly,Vol.9,No.4(Dec.,1894),pp.704-729.11 JanVerhoef,“TheriseofnationalpoliticalpartiesintheNetherlands1888-1913”InternationalJournalofPolitics,Vol.4,No.1/2,AspectsofNation-BuildinginNorthwesternEurope(SPRING-SUMMER1974),pp.207-22112 AdamPrzeworski“ConqueredorGranted?AHistoryofSuffrageExtensions”BritishJournalofPoliticalScience,Vol.39,No.2(Apr.,2009),pp.291-321.13 JamesRetallack“"WhatIstoBeDone?"TheRedSpecter,FranchiseQuestions,andtheCrisisofConservativeHegemonyinSaxony,1896-1909”CentralEuropeanHistoryVol.23,No.4(Dec.,1990),pp.271-312.
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Between1896and1907theAustrianconstitutionwasdemocratizedwith
theabolitionofclassvotinganduniversalmanhoodsuffrage.Arathermore
ambiguousdemocratizationinHungarybetween1906and1908weightedvoting
rightssoastofavorspeakersofHungarian.14In1910electionsonthebasisof
separateconstituencieswereintroducedinBosniaHerzegovinathelatestaddition
totheHabsburgEmpire.
InItalyreformistshadlongdebatedtherelativemeritsofprogressing
towardsfullenfranchisementbywayoftheimmediateextensionofvotingrightsor
theslowreformingprogressofmasseducation.Inaremarkablevoltefaceon18
March1911LiberalPMGiolittideclaredtothechamber:“I believe that today an enlargement of the franchise cannot be postponed any longer. Twenty
years after the last electoral reform, a big revolution has happened in Italy, which has produced a vast
progress in the economic, intellectual and moral condition of the popular classes (...) I don’t think that an
exam on how easily a man can use the 24 letters of the alphabet should constitute the question to decide if
he has the attitude to evaluate the big issues that interest the popular classes”.15 Nor did Giolitti face serious
opposition from conservative opposition leader Sidney Sonnino. Sonnino professed himself in favor of
universal suffrage on Bismarckian grounds: “It is only from universal suffrage that the government can
achieve the strength to represent and protect the general interest, which is continuously endangered by the
particular interests of individuals, localities and small and egoistic groups.” Indeed, Sonnino would even
have been ready to support votes for women. The MP and sociologist Gaetano Mosca was in a minority in
his advocacy of an overtly elitist position that opposed the inclusion of millions of uneducated voters on
grounds of their incompetence.
For the advocates of democracy it was mobilization and inclusion that would raise the educational
level of the population at large. In Bulgaria from 1900onwardsthelockgripoftheelitewas
challengedbytheupsurgeofsocialistandagrarianparties,whichby1908were
regularlyscoringacombined20-30percentofthevote.16Romania’selitetoowere
underpressuretowidentheelitistbaseoftheirpoliticalsystem.In1914,following
theBalkanwar,theRomanianliberalgovernmentofBratianodraftedaconstitution
basedonmanhoodsuffragethatwouldformthebasisforcomprehensive
enfranchisementafterthewar.In1909,Greece’sstaidelitepoliticswereconvulsed
14 W.F.Dodd,“ConstitutionalDevelopmentsinForeignCountriesDuring1908and1909”TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.4,No.3(Aug.,1910),pp.325-349.15 Quotedinhttp://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/19600/enfranchisement_nyu.pdf16 R.J.Crampton,AShortHistoryofModernBulgaria(CambridgeCUP1987)
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bytheGoudicoup,whichopenedthedoortoVenizelos’sliberalreformmovement
anddramaticconstitutionalrevision.17
Noteveryoneofthesedevelopmentswasmarkedbyadramaticchangeof
thefranchise,butinDanielZiblatt’shelpfulterminologytheymarkedimportant
“democratizationepisodes”.18Norweresuch“episodes”confinedtotheNorth
AtlanticorEurope.BetweentheelectionofJoseBatlleyOrdonezasPresidentof
Uruguayin1903andtheConstituentAssemblyelectionof1916amodernpolity
wasshapedoutofatensestandoffbetweentheurbanworkingclassofMontevideo
andprovincialranchinginterests.Itprovidednotonlyaliberalfranchise,but
extensivewelfareprovision.InColombiain1910thehegemonicconservativeparty
undertookelectoralreformthatallowedtheliberaloppositiontogain
parliamentaryrepresentationforthefirsttime.19Theliteracyqualificationonvoting
wasabolishedinCostaRicain1912.InthesameyearinArgentina,therichestLatin
Americannation,aself-confidentconservativeelitedeterminedtooutflankan
anarchistminoritybyintroducingcomprehensiveelectoralreform.Asaresult
electoralparticipationsurgedfrom21to69percentofthoseeligibletovote,setting
thestageforashiftinpowerfromtheconservativepartytoYrigoyen’sUCR.20
Nordidpoliticalempowermentintheearlytwentiethcenturycomeonlyin
theformoffar-sightedeliteconcessions.In1908GeneralPorfirioDiaz,long-term
dictatorofMexico,sensingthe“spiritoftheage”announcedtoanAmerican
journalistthatheconsideredhiscountryripefordemocracyandpromised
contestedelectionsin1910.21Hehadnotreckonedwiththeforcesthatwouldbe
unleashed.Hisefforttorigthesubsequentpollresultedin1910inaconvulsive
periodofrevolutionandcivilwar.17 MarkMazower,“TheMessiahandtheBourgeoisie:VenizelosandPoliticsinGreece,1909-1912”,TheHistoricalJournalVol.35,No.4(Dec.,1992),pp.885-904.18 D.Ziblatt,“HowdidEuropedemocratize?”,WorldPolitics58(January2006),311-338.19 EduardoPosada-Carbó,“LimitsofPower:ElectionsUndertheConservativeHegemonyinColombia,1886-1930”TheHispanicAmericanHistoricalReview,Vol.77,No.2(May,1997),pp.245-279.20 JamesW.McGuire“Politicalpartiesanddemocracyinargentina”,206inS.MainwaringandT.Cully,Buildingdemocraticinstitutions:PartySystemsinLatinAmerica(Stanford,1995).21 EugeneMaurBraderman,“Mexico'sPoliticalEvolution”WorldAffairsVol.103,No.4(December,1940),pp.240-245
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TocontemporariestheMexicanrevolutionof1911didnotstandalone.22It
wasthesixthofaseriesofconstitutionalrevolutionsthatbeganinRussiain1905,
followedbyIran(1906/1909),theOttomanEmpire(1908)andPortugal(1910)and
climaxedwiththeoverthrewoftheQingdynastyinChinain1912andtheholdingof
electionstoChina’sfirstNationalAssemblyoverthewinterof1912-1913.China’s
firstnationalelectionswerearoughandreadyelectoralcontest.Buttheyremainto
thisdaythemostcompetitiveelectioninChinesehistoryandanimpressive
democraticdisplaybyanystandard.Twenty-fivepercentoftheadultmale
populationwerequalifiedtovote,amountingtoc.40millionelectors.Turnoutwas
between60and75percentanddespiteconsiderablecorruptiontheelectionswere
wondecisivelybythenationalistKuomintangparty.23
ThedecisionbyChinatooptforanexperimentinrepublicanismin1912was
ahugeshocktoEastAsia.Since1869Japan’sMeijirestorationhadbeenseenasa
symbolofreformacrossmuchofthenon-Westernworld.Butitsconstitutionof
1889wasanextremelyconservativedocumentinfluencedbyboththePrussian
modelandtheexampleoftheBritishhouseofLords.This,however,wasnot
uncontestedwithinJapanitself.Theconstitutionof1889wasadisappointing
conclusiontotheliberalmobilizationofthe1880sundertheflagofthePopular
RightsMovement.24Andfrom1900onwardssuccessivewavesofelectoralreformin
Japanexpandedtheelectoratefrom450,000to1millionin1902andthenin1908
tomorethan1.5million.Manhoodsuffragewouldbeachievedby1925.
NordidthepressureforthefranchisestopatthebordersofEmpire.In1906
DadabhaiNaorojiwhowasservingasPresidentofIndia’sNationalCongress,was
movedtocomment:“Surely”,IndiansasBritishsubjectswere“farmoreentitledto
self-government”anda“constitutionalrepresentativesystem,thanthepeasantsof
Russia.”25InwordsthatwouldbeechoedbyGiolittiinItalyfiveyearslaterNaionji
22 CharlesKurzman,DemocracyDenied1905-1915.IntelletualsandtheFateofDemocracy(CambridgeMassHarvard,2008).23 MaryClabaughWright,ChinainRevolution:TheFirstPhase,1900-1913.(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress.1968),209-218.24 JacksonH.Bailey,“PrinceSaionjiandthePopularRightsMovement”TheJournalofAsianStudiesVol.21,No.1(Nov.,1961),pp.49-6325 CitedinCharlesKurzman,DemocracyDenied1905-1915,4.
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commented“Itisfutiletotellmethatwemustwaittillallthepeopleready.The
BritishpeopledidnotsowaitfortheirParliament.…Wecanneverbefituntilwe
actuallyundertaketheworkandtheresponsibility.WhileChinaintheEastand
PersiaintheWestofAsiaareawakeningandJapanhasalreadyawakened,and
Russiaisstrugglingforemancipation…canthefreecitizensoftheBritishIndian
Empirecontinuetoremainsubjecttodespotism…unworthyofBritishinstincts,
principlesandcivilization?”26Naorojihadreasontoexpectaresponse.In1905a
newLiberalgovernmenthadtakenofficerinLondon.Between1892and1895
NaorojihadrepresentedtheLiberalPartyfortheparliamentaryseatofFinsburyin
NorthLondon.InresponsetotheriseofIndianNationalismtheSecretaryofState
forIndiaJohnMorley,himselfaveteranoftheGladstonianHomeRulepushfor
Ireland,imposednotjustthedeterminedrepressionofdissentinBengal,butalsoa
setofpoliticalreformsthatwouldculminateintheso-calledMorley-Mintocouncil
systemof1909.Forthefirsttimethisgaveanactive,thoughlimitedroletothe
Indianeliteinbothcentralandprovincialgovernment.
Asthetwentiethcenturybegantherewasnopartoftheworldnotcaughtup
inwhatSamuelHuntingtonwoulddubthefirst,“long”waveofdemocratization.27In
1914BlaiseDiagnewouldbecomethefirstAfricanelectedtotheFrenchchamber
fromtheSenegalesecapitalofDakar.FluentinbothFrenchandWolofDiagne’s
campaigndrovehomethecentralmessageoftheera:“Untiltodaythewhitesand
themetishavecampaignedfordeputy.Today,itisablackman,likeyouorme,thatI
giveyou!”.28Diagne’svictorypreparedthewayforthevirtuallycompletecaptureof
electiveofficesincolonialSenegalbyAfricancandidates.Theracialquestionwas
alsoverymuchtotheforeinSouthAfricawithitscombustiblecombinationofrival
whitesettlerpopulations,arapidlygrowingAsianminorityandmobileand
conflictedAfricanpopulations.WhenfiveyearsaftertheendoftheBoerwar,the
RepublicsofTransvaalandtheOrangeRiverweregrantedself-governmentin190726 TheLateDr.DadabhaiNaorojionSwaraj.PresidentialAddressattheCalcuttaCongress,1906(Bombay,1917).27 SamuelP.Huntington“HowCountriesDemocratize”,PoliticalScienceQuarterlyVol.106,No.4(Winter,1991-1992),pp.579-616.28 G.WesleyJohnson,“TheAscendancyofBlaiseDiagneandtheBeginningofAfricanPoliticsinSenegal”,Africa:JournaloftheInternationalAfricanInstitute,Vol.36,No.3(Jul.,1966),pp.235-253.
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allwhitemenwereenfranchisedandnopeopleofcolor.But,theUnionofSouth
AfricaActof1909preservedthestatusquobetweentheBoerrepublicsandthetwo
BritishcoloniesoftheCapeandNatal.Undertheso-called“entrenchedclauses”the
votingrightsofeliteblackandcoloredvotersintheCapewereprotected.29With
hindsightthis,ofcourse,lookslikeaminimaldefensivecompromise.Butasone
commentatorremarkedlookingbackfromthe1950sthevictoryofapartheidwas
notinevitable.Whenthe1909compromisewasagreed“manypeopleintheCape
believedthateventuallytheNorthernprovinceswouldadoptthemoreliberal
attitudeoftheCape.”ItwasnotuntilSouthAfrica’sindependencefromBritainin
the1930sthatthedoorwasopenedtoafullracialrollback.30
II
Onemaycriticizeeffortsatquantificationinthepoliticalsciencesbutthey
canbeusefulinconveyingatleastasenseofproportion.Anycomprehensive
summaryofconstitutionalchangefromthelate19thcenturyonwardswillpointtoa
generaltrendtowardsenfranchisement.
29 JoanRydon,“TheConstitutionalCrisisInSouthAfrica”TheAustralianQuarterlyVol.28,No.1(March,1956),pp.38-47.30 A.P.Walshe,“TheOriginsofAfricanPoliticalConsciousnessinSouthAfrica”TheJournalofModernAfricanStudiesVol.7,No.4(Dec.,1969),pp.583-610.
10
Thesamestoryemergesifweusesummarycompositeindexessuchasthat
derivedfromthestandardPolitydatabase.Thesedatashowatrendtowards
democracyrisinglinearlyfromthe1850sto1914.31
31 R.Doorenspleet“Reassessingthethreewavesofdemocratization”,Worldpolitics52(Apri2000),384-406.
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Norwerethesemerelyformalgains.Thedegreetowhichradicalsor
progressivescouldgovernor,indeed,wantedtogovernvarieddramatically.The
socialistmovementwassplitbetweenreformistsandabstentionistradicals.32But
theevidencesuggeststhatwhetherdirectlythroughinfluenceongovernment,or
indirectlyasalatentthreatthepressureofdemocratizationcontributedtowardsthe
riseofwelfarespendingandpublicspendingoneducationvisiblefromthelate
nineteenthcenturyonwards.AcemogluandRobinsongosofarastohypothesize
thattheKuznetcurveinflectionoffallinginequalityathigherlevelsofincomethatis
observableoverthecourseofthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturieswasdrivenin
largepartthroughthepoliticsofdemocratizationandwelfare.33
32 GaryMarks,HeatherA.D.MbayeandHyungMinKim“RadicalismorReformism?SocialistPartiesbeforeWorldWarI”AmericanSociologicalReviewVol.74,No.4(Aug.,2009),pp.615-63533 DaronAcemogluandJamesA.Robinson“WhyDidtheWestExtendtheFranchise?Democracy,Inequality,andGrowthinHistoricalPerspective”TheQuarterlyJournalofEconomicsVol.115,No.4(Nov.,2000),pp.1167-1199.
12
Norisoursenseofa“wave”ofdemocratizationmerelyaretrospective
imposition.Itwasamovementthathadaconsciousnessofitsownhistory.A
particularlystrongversionwasvoicedbyLiberation,aRussianprodemocracyorgan
in1902,whichstated:
“Freeformsofpoliticallifeareaslittlenationalasaretheuseofthealphabet
oroftheprintingpress,steamorelectricity.Thesearemerelyformsofhigher
culture…”theadoptionofwhich“becomesnecessarywhenpubliclifebecomesso
complicatedthatitcanonlongerbecontainedwithintheframeworkofamore
primitivepublicstructure.Whensuchatimearrives,whenaneweraofhistory
knocksatthedoor,itisuselesstoplacerestraintsanddelaysinitspath.Itwillcome
justthesame.”34
Thismonolithicandfunctionalistvisionmayhaveaddedstrengthtothe
democraticcause,butinretrospectwhatismorestrikingaboutthe“wave”of
democratizationarethemultifaceted,diverseandbraidedstrandsofpolitical
culturethatcontributedtoit.Comingtogetherinthepoliticsoftheearly20th
century,weretraditionsoforatoryinculcatedbywayofthecanonofclassicalGreek
andLatinexamplestaughtinschoolroomsandUniversityclassesacrossthe
Westernworld.35Theseweremeldedwithtraditionsofparliamentarypracticethat
datedbacktothelong18thcentury.Addedtowhichthereweremodelsofmodern
heroicpoliticalleadershipofferedbyfiguressuchasLincoln,Cavour,Gladstoneor
Bismarck.36AnewgenerationofpoliticaloratorssuchasLloydGeorgemastereda
modernmassmediamachinethatgavethemunprecedentedpopularreach.37
Additionalenergyorthreatwasprovidedbyaliverevolutionarytradition,which
includedfiguresasdiverseasClemenceauandRosaLuxembourg,aswellassocial
movementssuchasthesuffragettes,ornationalisminitsmanyvarieties,whether
Irish,Polishorinsurgentandanti-colonial.Meanwhile,beyondtheformalsphereof
34 CitedinKurzman,DemocracyDenied,34.35 G.Clemenceau,Demosthenes(London,1926)andaprimersuchasR.I.FultonandTCTrueblood,BritishAndAmericaneloquenceAnnArborMichigan1912.36 D.A.Hamer,“Gladstone:TheMakingofaPoliticalMyth”VictorianStudiesVol.22,No.1(Autumn,1978),pp.29-50.37 J.M.McEwen,“NorthcliffeandLloydGeorgeatWar,1914–1918”TheHistoricalJournalVolume24Issue03September1981,pp651-672
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parliament,politicallifewassustainedbythepullulatingnetworksofmassparty
organizationsandcivilsociety,includingthetradeunionmovement,women’s
associationsandCatholicpopulism.
Foralltheinstitutedandconsolidatedqualityofitsdemocraticinstitutions,
thepoliticalcultureoftheearly21stcenturycannotbutappearasapale,stripped
down,bureaucratizedandcommercializedshadowofthisdiverseandvibrant
democraticecology,whichwasnotonlyricherbutalsolessclearlywestern-
centeredthanitwouldbecome.Asthetwentiethcenturybeganthegeographic
directionandcenterofgravityofpoliticalprogressseemedopen.Fora
contemporaryasself-confidentasSunYat-sensurveyingthehistoryofthelast
hundredyears,threeprinciplesgovernedthe“naturalandinevitable…advanceof
civilization”:nationalism,democracyandthe“people’slivelihood”,bywhichhe
meantthe“socialquestion”.TheWesthadtakentheleadinaccomplishingthefirst
tworevolutions.Butthethirdwasunresolved.ForChinasimplytofollowinthe
footstepsoftheWesternstateswouldbetofollow“pathsthattheyhavealready
proventoleadnowhere.”Instead,China’srepublicanrevolutionwouldtacklethe
socialquestionbeforeitbecameascripplingasithadbecomeintheWest.“Then”,
Sunimagined,Chinacould“lookbackandfindEuropeandAmericalookingaheadto
us.”38
II
Againstthisbackdropwemayenquireastothe“impact”ofWorldWarIon
thisbroadlybasedandmulti-facetedprewardemocraticwave.Andtheshort
answeristhatthewarwouldnotjustshockandtraumatizebutalsoenergizeand
dynamizethissystemtoaremarkabledegree.Buttotalkintermsof“impact”begs
thequestionoftherelationshipbetweenthedemocratizationandthewar.Talkof
“impact”impliesthatthewarstruckthedemocraticwavelikeanexternalforce.
Whereas,infact,whetherweareconcernedwiththeTsar’scabinetinRussiaorthe
liberalgovernmentinLondon,itisclearthatthedecisiontounleashthewarcould
notbeseparatedfromcalculationsofpopularpoliticaladvantage.Beforewetalkof38 Yat-senSun,EditorialintroducingthefirstissueofMinPao26November1905inPrescriptionsforSavingChina(Stanford,Hoover,1994),40.
14
thewar’s“impact”weshould,considerthewaysinwhichdemocratizationmayin
facthavebeenentangledwiththecausationoftheconflict.
Fromtheleft,oneinterpretationhasbeentoarguethatthewarwaspartofa
desperateeffortbyreactionaryelitestoresistandescapedemocratization.39A
contraryconservativepointofviewwouldarguethatthewarisbestseennotasa
conservativeanti-democratictactic,butasthebanefulresultoftheunleashingofthe
violentpassionsofpopularnationalism,firstsetinmotionbyliberalism.A
distinctivelyliberalpointofviewinvolvesasynthesisofboththesepositions.It
wouldstartbyinterpretingtheoutbreakofconflictinEuropein1914intermsofa
hierarchyofpoliticaldevelopment.40ItwasawartriggeredinJuly-August1914by
thedefensivereactionsofthemostbackwardregimesinCentralEurope,whichfelt
thattheyhadnooptionbuttostandandfightiftheyweretosurvivemuchlonger
intothetwentiethcentury.Butwhatoriginallyunleashedtheviolenceinthe
Balkanswasnotpureconservatism,butthebirthpangsofunevenmodernization.
ChrisClark’sSleepwalkerswithitsemphasisonSerbianandRussianculpability
wouldbeastrikingrestatementofthisposition.41EdwardMansfieldandJack
Snyder’sidentificationofthetendencyofstatesundergoingdemocratizationtobe
becomemoreaggressiveprovidessystematicsupport.42
Tocomplicatemattersthesearenotmerelyarangeofcontending
historiographicalperspectives.Thesetypesofanalysiswerepowerfullyoperativein
theepochitself.ForBethmann-Hollweg’stacticsinthefinalstageoftheJulycrisisit
wascrucialtoensurethatRussianotGermanymobilizedfirst.Thiswasdoubly
conditionedbythe“democraticcondition”.FirstBethmannHollwegwasseriously
concernedtoensurethathecouldgainthebackingoftheSocialDemocrats,who
heldthelargestblockofseatsintheReichstag,forthewareffort.Andwhat
BethmannHollwegplayedonwasthedevelopmentalistconceptionofpolitical
developmentheldbytheSocialDemocrats,whowereconvincedthatawarof39 ArnoMayer,Thepersistenceoftheoldregime:EuropetotheGreatWar(NewYork,1981).40 Tooze“Capitalistpeaceorcapitalistwar.TheJulyCrisisRevisited”inA.Anievased.Cataclysm1914(Leiden,Brill2015).41 C.Clark,Sleepwalkers(London,2013).42 EdwardD.MansfieldandJackSnyder,“DemocratizationandtheDangerofWar”InternationalSecurity,Vol.20,No.1(Summer,1995),pp.5-38.
15
nationaldefenseagainsta“backward”and“autocratic”Russiawasnotjust
compatiblewith,butdictatedbytheirMarxistviewofhistory.Whenshipping
magnateBallinaskedBethmannHollweg:‚Your excellency, why are you in such a hurry to declare war on Russia?’ Bethmann … replied: “Otherwise I wont be able to take the Social Democrats along with me’“43
Asthewarprogressed,theentanglementbetweennarrativesof
democratization,self-government,emancipationandwar-fightingbecameever
moreclose.ThiswasmostoverwhelmingonthesideoftheEntenteandtheir
Americanassociates.Theconceptof“westernliberaldemocracy”thatwouldbeso
powerfulfortherestofthetwentiethcenturyinmarkingoutanormativecourseof
“proper”politicaldevelopmentwasaproductofthewar.Intheheatofthevast
militarystruggleincongruousandinconsistentideasofrepublicanism,liberalism,
democracy,constitutionalism,theruleoflawandnotionsof“selfgovernment”or
“responsiblegovernment”wereamalgamatedtogetherinawaythatwouldhave
beenunthinkableinthenineteenthcentury.44Anallianceofstatesrangingfrom
Romania,ItalyandJapantoBritainandFrancewithAmericaastheirassociatewere
arrayedinacommoncauseagainstImperialGermany,andthecrumblingEmpires
oftheHabsburgsandtheOttomans.Reifiedinthecategoriesandimagesof
sociologyandpoliticalsciencetheseunlikelyjuxtapositionswouldbecome
normalizedasamodelofpoliticalmodernity.
Thebewildermentthisinducedatthetimecanstillbefeltinanessaysuchas
MaxWeber’s“Politicsasavocation”.InthatessayWeberwasatpainstodescribein
unflatteringempiricaldetailhowthedemocraticsystemsofBritainandAmerica
hadactuallytakenshape,andtoremindhisreadersoftheempiricalandhistorical
factsthathadledtheirpartycaucusesandpoliticalmachinestoberegardedwith
considerableskepticismintheprewarperiod.NordidImperialGermanyacceptthe
roleassignedtoitasabackwardreactionaryautocracywithoutafight.Theeventual
outcomeofthewarinwhichacoalitionofself-proclaimeddemocraciesdefeated
43 Bülow,BernhardDenkwürdigkeiten.Bd.3.WeltkriegundZusammenbruch.(Berlin1931),S.167/168.44 DissectingthisweirdamalgamwasbreadandbutterforC.Schmitt,CrisisofParliamentaryDemocracy(MITCambridgeMass,1985).
16
bankruptandunpopularautocratswasnotpredetermined,itwasaresultofthe
swirlingpolitics,diplomacyandwar-fightingof1917-1918.45
TheKaiserwashardlyanaturaladvocateofdemocraticslogans,buthedid
proclaimanIslamicjihadagainsttheBritishEmpire.In1916theCentralPowers
establishedaPolishstatewithlimitedautonomy.InhisEastermessageof1917the
Kaiserandhisgovernmentpromisedfinallytosatisfythedemandforonemanone
voteinPrussia.Anditwasnotmerelyamatterofrhetoric.Inthesummerof1917
theReichstagmajorityfelledBethmannHollweg.Aftertheshort-livedand
disastrousexperimentwithMichaelis,fromthefallof1917Germanywasgoverned
byaChancellor,Hertling,whowaschosenexplicitlywithaviewtogainingthe
confidenceoftheReichstag.AndwhenitcametothemakingoftheBrest-Litovsk
peacetheReichstagmajorityarticulatedquiteexplicitlyapoliticsofself-
determinationandautonomyfortheBalticstatesandUkraine.
Thefailuretomakealegitimate“liberal”peaceatBrest-Litovskwasno
triumphfortheconservativeandmilitaryfactionsinGermany.Ithadtheeffectof
delegitimizingthepeace,splinteringtheKaiser’sgovernment,provokingthe
embarrassingdepartureofStateSecretaryKuehlmannandpersuadingmuchofthe
Reichstagmajoritythatthebusinessofpeace-makingcouldnotsafelybelefttothe
existingauthorities.Notfornothing,inMarch1918theKaiserwoulddeclarethat
whatwasatstakeinthelastGermanoffensive“wasavictoryofmonarchyover
democracy.”46“(W)henanEnglishparliamentariancomespleadingforpeace,hewill
firsthavetobowdownbeforetheImperialstandard...”.TheKaiserwasnotwrong.
WhenGermany’sarmiesweredrivenbackinthesummerof1918historyturned
onceandforallagainstmonarchy.InGermanyitselftheimpendingmilitarydefeat
thesetthestageforfull-scaleparlementarizationinOctober1918.TheReichstag
majoritytookpowernottosurrenderbutbecausetheywereconvincedthatonlya
democratizedGermanycouldmakeanadequatepeace,orinextremiscontinuethe
45 A.Tooze,TheDeluge.TheGreatWarandtheRemakingoftheGlobalOrder(London,AllenLane2014).46 W.Goerlitz(ed.),RegierteDerKaiser?Kriegstagebuecher,AufzeichnungenundBriefedesChefsdesMarinekabinettsAdmiralGeorgeAlexandervonMueller1914-1918(Goetingen,1959),366.
17
war.47InthecourseofthearmisticenegotiationswithWilsontheyconvinced
themselvesthattheyhadescapedthestigmaattachedtotheKaiserandhisregime.
ItcameasarudeshockinMay1919whenthetermsoftheVersaillesTreaty
reaffirmedthewartimenarrativeofGermany’suniqueresponsibilityforthewar.
III
Evenifweresisttheexternalistlanguageof“impacts”,itisclearthatina
worldalreadyarguingoverthetermofitsdemocratization,theexperienceofthe
massivemobilizationforWorldWarIhaddramaticeffects.In1914,the
nationalizationoftheworkingclassdisappointsradicalinternationalsocialistswho
expectandcallforworldwiderevolution.Butatanationallevelithadanirresistible
democratizingeffect.Thewarasamasswarcouldnotbefoughtwithoutworking-
classinvolvement.In1916HindenburgandLudendorffcouldonlymakethe
Hilfsdienstgesetzworkincollaborationwithtradeunions.48InItalyfollowingthe
CaporettodisasterinOctober1917thegovernmentmadeaconsciouseffortto
broadenthesocialbaseofthewareffort.49Thewar,theOrlandogovernment
declared“isforthesoldier:thepeasant,theworker,theclerk.Itisfoughtforall
thosewhosufferandwhoarehardup,inthecountrysideandinthecities,inItaly
andoutsideItaly.Thewarisfortheproletariat:thisisthewaroftheworkers.”50
ThecollapseoftheUnionSacreeinFrancein1917wouldseemtopointintheother
direction,likewisetheexitoftheLabourPartyfromtheBritishcoalition
government.Butinbothcasesthiswaspartofajockeyingforpoliticaladvantageon
theleft,initiatedbythesocialiststhemselves.Whilsttheyharassedtheirsocialist
opponents,bothLloydGeorgeandClemenceaucontinuedtoappealemphaticallyto
thepopulationatlarge.51Anystrategythatdidnotdosowascondemnedtofailure.
InGermany,theVaterlandsparteimobilizationin1917wasanimpressiveshowing
47 M.Geyer,"InsurrectionaryWarfare:TheGermanDebateaboutaLevéeenMasseinOctober1918."JournalofModernHistory73(September2001):459-527.48 G.Mai.,ArbeiterschaftinDeutschland,1914-1918:StudienzuArbeitskampfundArbeitsmarktimErstenWeltkrieg(Duesseldorf,1985).49 D.Rossini,WoodrowWilsonandtheAmericanMythinItaly(Cambridge,Mass2008).50 CharlesL.Bertrand,“WarandSubversioninItaly:1917-1918”,HistoricalReflections/RéflexionsHistoriquesVol.3,No.2(Winter/l'hiver1976),pp.120.51 Watson,Clemenceau,.APoliticalBiography(London,1974),275-292.
18
bythefarright.Butitwasadisappointmentpreciselybecauseitdidnotreachout
muchbeyondthefamiliarboundariesoftheright-wingbourgeoisconstituency.52It
didnotreachtheworking-class.Itwouldtaketheshockofdefeatandasocialistled
republictoforceapopulistmodernizationoftheGermanRight.TheNSDAPwasits
characteristicproduct.Itwasanti-leftist,anti-liberalandanti-parliamentary.Butit
was,forallthat,thoroughlydemotic.
InPrussiathereactionaryupperhousecontinuedtomakeastandagainst
universalone-man-onevotefranchise.Buttheydidsointhefaceoftheexplicit
requestbytheirmonarchtoadoptthecauseofreform.InAustria,itwasthenew
KaiserwhoreopenedtheAustrianparliamentinVienna.InBritainitwas
conservativepeersintheHouseofLordswhointroducedtheso-called“trench
voting”billin1916anditwastheconservativeswhoinenactingtheReformActof
1918pushed,unsuccessfully,forproportionalrepresentation.53Theydidsobecause
theyassumedthatundertheWestminsterfirst-passed-the-postsystem,theforceof
themasselectoratewouldsweepthemaway.AsLordBryce,theeminent
constitutionalist,commentedtohiscolleagueDiceyinSeptember1917,thecontrast
tothestrugglesoverthegreatReformActof1866wasstark.Then,bothsidesofthe
argumenthadassumed“thatfitness”forthefranchise“hadtobeproved.”Now,
"whenonetalkstotheyoungsentimentalwomansuffragisthe(sic)seesno
relevanceintheenquirywhetherthegreatmassofwomenknoworcareanything
aboutpolitics.Itisquiteenoughforhimthattheyarehumanbeings.Assuchthey
havearighttovote.”54AndthepressfellintolinewithLordNorthcliffeleadingthe
way.By1917,inthepagesoftheTimes,oppositiontothefranchisewaspaintedas
divisiveandipsofactounpatriotic.
Butthewarnotonlyintensifiedthedemandsfordemocratizationwithinthe
combatantstates,italsowidenedthem.IfFrance,BritainandtheUSdenounced
Germanautocracytheycouldnotsoeasilypracticerepressionwithintheirown
domain.ThispressurewasparticularlypowerfulontheBritishEmpire.Atthesame
52 Hagenluecke,DeutscheVaterlandspartei(Duesseldorf,1996).53 M.Pugh,Electoralreforminwarandpeace1906-1918(London,1978).54 Pugh,ElectoralReform,136.
19
timeasitcarriedoutthelargestexpansionoftheBritishfranchiseinhistory,the
LloydGeorgecoalitionbeganacomprehensivereconstructionofthelegitimacyof
Imperialrule.InIreland,despitetheopenmilitarychallengedmountedbySinnFein
inDublinin1916,BritainwasforcedtomakegoodonpromisesofHomeRule.
Emblematicallythemomentofdecisioncameinthespringof1918whenthe
emergencyontheWesternFrontdemandedanotherroundofconscription.Asthe
Labourcollaboratorsofthecoalitiongovernmentmadeclearthiscouldnotbe
imposedontheurbanworking-classofBritainwithoutanextensionofconscription
toIrelandaswell.Democracydemandedequalityofeffortbetweenallpartsofthe
UnitedKingdom.ButconscriptioninIrelandcouldnotbeattemptedwithoutsteps
finallytoimplementHomeRule,ifnecessaryagainsttheoppositionofUlster.55In
Indiatoo,by1917BritainwasforcedtospelloutanewjustificationforEmpirein
termsofthepromiseof“responsiblegovernment”.56InAustraliatheintroductionof
conscriptionwasmadedependentonpopularreferendaandtwicerejectedbythe
electorate.57
ThehostagesgiventohistoricalfortunebythepromisesofBritishimperial
liberalismmadeLondonparticularlysusceptibletothiskindoflogic.Andthe
pressurewascompoundedbythegrandstrategiclogicthatrequiredBritainto
cultivateitsrelationshipwiththeUnitedStates.Fromthemomentitenteredthe
war,theWhiteHousemadeclearthatitexpectedactiononIreland.Inthespringof
1918beforetakingthedecisivestepstowardsconscriptionandHomeRuleLondon
madesurethatithadtheapprovaloftheWhiteHouse.Butthoughthepressureon
Londonwasparticularlyintense,thesamelogiccouldbeseenatworkalsointhe
otherEntentepowers.InthecourseofthewarBlaiseDiagnewoncitizenshiprights
fortheinhabitantsofthefourCommunesofcolonialSenegalaswellastherightto
serveintheregularFrenchratherthanthecolonialarmy.In1918toraiseanother
roundofconscriptsinSenegalClemenceaupromotedBlaiseDiagnetotherankofa55 Hartley,IrishQuestion,175.56 R.Danzig“TheAnnouncementofAugust20th,1917”,TheJournalofAsianStudies,Vol.28,No.1(Nov.,1968),19-37.R.J.Moore“CurzonandIndianReform”ModernAsianStudies,Vol.27,No.4(Oct.,1993),719-74057 RobinArcher,“StoppingWarandStoppingConscription:AustralianLabour'sResponsetoWorldWarIinComparativePerspective”,LabourHistory,No.106(May2014),pp.43-67.
20
Governor-General.TogetherwithateamofAfricanofficershewasabletoraise
another60,000troopsfortheFrenchwareffort.58
IV
In1798ImmanuelKantintheContestoftheFacultiesremarkedthatthe
enthusiasticreactionaroundtheworldtotheFrenchrevolutionwasaharbingerof
apossibilityofprogress.Inthespringof1917somethingsimilarmightbesaid
abouttheglobalreactiontothefallofTsaristautocracyinRussia.Beforethewarthe
bottomofthescaleofpoliticaldevelopmentwasclearlyreservedforTsaristRussia.
Thebrutalsuppressionofthe1905revolutionandthewaveofpogromsagainstthe
JewishpopulationofWesternempirewererecognizedbyinternationalopinionas
hallmarksofRussia’sbackwardness.TheexcitementoftheoverthrowoftheTsar
waspreciselythatitpromisedtobringdemocracyandfreedomtotheleastfree
populationofEurope.Andtheextentoftheshockwavescastsintostarkreliefthe
significance,whichtheissueofdemocracyhadassumedintheconductofthewarby
1917.
ThespeedwithwhichthecollapseofTsarismundercuttheargumentfora
defensivewaronthepartoftheCentralPartsisnothingshortofremarkable.
Austriawasdesperateforapeace.InGermany,withinweeksoftherevolutionin
Russia,thelong-awaitedschismsplinteredtheSPDintoproandanti-warfactions.
TheKaiserwasreluctantlypersuadedbyBethmannHollwegtoissuehispromiseof
fundamentalelectoralreforminPrussia.Andinmilitarytermsthecentralpowers
ceasedoffensiveoperations.Ratherthanseekingtoforceadecisivebattlethe
Germanshopedforseparatepeacenegotiations.CourtesyoftheGermansLeninwas
sluicedbackintoRussiatotakeadvantageofthenewdemocraticfreedomsoffered
bytherevolution.
ButitwasnotjusttheGermanswhosoughttotakeadvantageoftheregime
changeinRussia.ForadvocatesofthecauseoftheEntenteasademocraticwar,
Russia’srevolutionwasagodsend.AsRobertLansing,WoodrowWilson’sSecretary
58 MyronJ.Echenberg“PayingtheBloodTax:MilitaryConscriptioninFrenchWestAfrica,1914-1929”CanadianJournalofAfricanStudies/RevueCanadiennedesÉtudesAfricaines,Vol.9,No.2(1975),pp.171-192.
21
ofStateputittohiscabinetcolleagues:“therevolutioninRussia...hadremovedthe
oneobjectiontoaffirmingthattheEuropeanwarwasawarbetweendemocracyand
absolutism.”59Andinhisdeclarationofwar,Wilsonhimselfwelcomedthe
“wonderfulandhearteningthingsthathavebeenhappeningwithinthelastfew
weeksinRussia”.TheTsaristautocracyhadbeen“shakenoffandthegreat,
generousRussianpeoplehavebeenaddedinalltheirnaivemajestyandmighttothe
forcesthatarefightingforfreedomintheworld....”60InParisClemenceau
welcomedthecoincidenceofAmerica’sdeclarationofwarandtheoverthrowofthe
Tsarintermsthatwerenothingshortofecstatic:“thesupremeinterestofthe
generalideaswithwhichPresidentWilsonsoughttojustifyhisactions”,indeclaring
war,“isthattheRussianRevolutionandtheAmericanrevolutioncomplementeach
otherinamicraculousway,indefiningonceandforallthemoralstakesinthe
conflict.Allthegreatpeoplesofdemocracy...havetakenthatplaceinthebattlethat
wasdestinedforthem.Theyworkforthetriumphnotofonealone,butofall.”61
ButfortheEntentepowersaswell,theoverthrowoftheTsarwasnotsimply
astrategicgain.Forthemtooitposedquestionsoflegitimacy,explicitlycouchedin
termsofthequestionofdemocracy.AsfollowingtheRussianrevolutionof1905the
questionwasputinIndia.IftheRussianautocracyhadbeenoverthrown,howlong
couldBritain’sself-confessedly“autocratic”ruleinIndiaprevail?AsSecretaryof
StateforIndia,theliberalconservativeAustenChamberlainexplainedtohiscabinet
colleagueson22May1917:“Theconstantharpingonthethemethatwearefighting
forlibertyandjusticeandtherightsofpeopletodirecttheirowndestinies,the
revolutioninRussiaandthewayinwhichithasbeenreceivedinthiscountryand
elsewhere,….-hasstrengthenedthedemandforreformandhascreatedaferment
ofideas…”,whichdemandedacleardeclarationofBritain’slong-termintentionto
59 PWW41,440andFRUSLansingPapersI,626-628,636.60 Wilson’sdeclarationofwar2April1917.61 QuotedinM.Winock,Clemenceau(Paris,2007),418-9.“LesupremeinteretdespenseesgeneralsparlesquelleslepresidentWilsonavoulujustifierl’actiondesonpays(hisdeclarationofwar)...c’estquelarevolutionrusseetlarevolutionamericainesecompletentamiracalepourfixeddefinitivementtoutelaporteeidealisteduconflit.Touslesgrandspeoplesdelademocratie...ontdesormaispris,danslalute,laplacequileuretaitdestine.Ilsvontautriomphe,nonpasd’unseul,maisdetous”.
22
grantIndiaself-government.Tofailtomeetthisdemandriskedthrowingthe
“moderateelement-suchasitis-intothehandsoftheextremists”.62
GiventheundeniablewaveofenthusiasmthatgreetedRussia’sexperiment
withdemocracyinearly1917,thediminutionithassufferedintherearviewmirror
ofhistoryisallthemorestriking.OvershadowedbytheBolshevikcoupthat
overthrewit,noregimehasbeensubjectedtogreaterhistoricalcondescensionthan
the“provisionalgovernment”thatstruggledtorealizethedemocraticpromiseof
revolutioninRussiain1917.It,infact,iscommonlyinvokedasanemblemofthe
indecisivenessofdemocracyortheweaknessofliberalsasopposedtotheirmore
hardnosedopponentsontheleftandright.Butwhatsurelyoughttoberecognized
isnotjustthehugeadversitythattheregimefacedandtheviolenceand
determinationofitsopponentsbutalsotheremarkablestridesthatitdidmanageto
maketowardsdemocratization.Aboveall,theConstituentAssemblyelectionof
November1917wasaremarkabledemonstrationofthepossibilityofextending
electoralmechanismsacrosstheworld.ExceedinginscaleeventheChinese
electionsof1912/1913theRussianConstituentAssemblyelectionwasthelargest
polleverheld.UnliketheChineseelectionsthefranchisewascomprehensive
includingwomenaswellasmen.Theturnoutwassubstantialandtheelections
weregenerallyagreedtohavebeen“freeandfair”.Theresults,furthermore,
reflectedacleardemocraticlogicwithamajorityofvotesinthecountrysidegoing
totheagrarianSocialRevolutionariesandinthecitiestotheBolsheviksand
Mensheviks.63
ThegreatestchallengeposedbytheRussianrevolution,however,wasthe
challengeofpeace.TheTsar’swaraimswerediscredited.Russia’sexhaustion
demandedpeace.ButtheRussia’sdemocraticrevolutionaries,asdemocratic
revolutionariesrefusedtocontemplatethepossibilityofhumiliatingand
treacheroustalksforaseparatepeacewithGermany’sreactionaryregime.Here
onceagainanotionofademocratichierarchyservedtosustainthewar.The
62 Rumbold,Watershed,71-2.63 O.Radkey,RussiaGoestothePolls.TheElectiontotheAll-RussianConstituentAssembly,1917(Ithaca,1989).
23
ProvisionalGovernmentwouldopenpeacetalksonlyinconjunctionwithits
Ententepartners.Buttheirgovernmentsrefused.Theresultwastoundercutany
prospectofsuccessthatRussiandemocracymighthavehadin1917.Whilstseeking
toopenupinformaldiplomaticchannelsbywayofthefraternityofEuropean
socialism,theprovisionalgovernmentbraceditselftolaunchademocraticoffensive.
Insodoingtheyexplicitlyinvokedanimageofrevolutionarywarhandeddown
fromthemythologyoftheFrenchrevolutionandtheleveeenmasseof1792.Itwas
thedemocraticrevolutionariesinRussiawhointhespringof1917introduced
politicalcommissarsintotheRussianarmytoenergizetheirsummeroffensive.The
militaryfailureoftheoffensivebrokethelegitimacyoftheProvisionalgovernment.
Intheautumnof1917theywereoverthrownbytheonepartywillingto
contemplateanimmediateseparatepeace.Thiswasundoubtedlyastaggeringblow
totheEntentewareffort.Butitseffectwasnottocallintoquestionthedemocratic
wareffort.IfanythingtheBrest-Litovskpeacetalksmadeevenclearerthe
associationbetweenautocracyandtheCentralPowers.TheGermanReichstagwith
itsvisionofalegitimatepeaceintheEastbasedontheprincipleofself-
determinationwasdrownedoutbytheclashingofswordsbetweentheBolsheviks
theGermanmilitaristsandAlliedpropaganda.ThoughLeninimaginedthatitwas
hiscommunismthatbroughtdownuponhisregimetheforceofEntente
intervention,hewasclearlywrong.Whatmadetheargumentforintervention
irresistibleevenforWoodrowWilsoninthesummerof1918wastheevidencethat
theCommunistregimewasslidingintodependenceonImperialGermany.When
skepticssuchasquestionedwhetheranythingwouldbegainedbyattackingRussia,
LloydGeorgerespondedinindignantterms:
"Iaminterventionist”,heinsisted“justasmuchbecauseIamademocratas
becauseIwanttowinthewar.”The"lastthing”he“wouldstandfor,wouldbethe
encouragementofanykindofrepressiveregime”inRussia“underwhatever
guise."64OnlyademocraticRussiawouldprovidearealbufferagainsttheGerman
threat.Russia’spoliticalcomplexionwoulddefinethepost-warorder."Unlessbythe
64 Ullman,Anglo-Soviet,222.
24
endofthewarRussiaissettledonliberal,progressiveanddemocraticlines",neither
the“peaceoftheworld”normorespecifically“thepeaceandsecurityoftheIndian
frontier"couldbeassured.65
Theinterventionwouldby1919becomeacausecelebreoftheEuropeanleft.
ButthisdidnotimplyanydeepsympathyforLenin’sregime.Forthevastmajority
oftheEuropeansocialists,theimpactoftheBolshevikseizureofpowerandthe
coupagainsttheconstituentassemblyinJanuary1918wasclarifying.Theyfavored
peace,democratizationandsocialtransformation,buttheyhadlittleornosympathy
forthemethodsbeingusedinRussia.ThemigrationofKarlKautskyfromprewar
popeofMarxistorthodoxytovigorouscriticofBolshevikterroranddefenderof
parliamentarydemocracyisemblematicoftheshift.66Twenty-firstcentury
gauchistssuchasSlavojZizekarenotwrongwhentheyidentifythismomentof
1917-1918aspivotaltotheemergenceofourera’sdemocraticpenseeunique.67
Whatattractstheirireisthekindofself-evisceratinglogicarticulatedby
practitionersofreformistlabourpoliticssuchasJ.McGurkthechairmanofthe
LabourParty.In1919helecturedhiscomradesonthechoicetheyfaced:“Weare
eitherconstitutionalistsorwearenotconstitutionalists.Ifweareconstitutionalists,
ifwebelieveintheefficacyofthepoliticalweapon(andweare,orwhydowehavea
LabourParty?)thenitisbothunwiseandundemocraticbecausewefailtogeta
majorityatthepollstoturnaroundanddemandthatweshouldsubstitute
industrialaction.”68AsfarasMcGurkwasconcerned,afullcommitmentto
parliamentarymethodswasnotsupplementarytoextraparliamentaryaction,buta
mutuallyexclusivealternative.Againstthisself-disarmingoftheleft,Zizekisclearly
righttoseeTrotskyandLeninasformulatingatrulyradicalcritiqueof
parliamentarydemocraticnorms.Thequestionforthedemocraticleftfromthis
momenton,waswhetherthiswasreallyaninescapablechoice:Lenin’srelentless
contemptforallmodesofparliamentarypolitics,ortheLabourParty’s
65 Ullman,Anglo-Soviet,305.66 K.Kautsky,TerrorismusundKommunismus(Berlin,1919).67 S.ZizekPresentsTrotsky:TerrorismandCommunism:AreplytoKautsky(1920).68 CitedbyRalphMiliband,ParliamentarySocialism.Astudyinthepoliticsoflabour2nded.(LondonMerlinPress1975),p.69.
25
uncompromisingacceptanceoftherulesofthegame,howeverone-sidedthose
mightbe.Fortherestofthecentury,atleastdowntothe1990s,thewagerofradical
democrats,whethertheybesocialdemocratsoradvocatesofcivilliberties,would
betorejectthisfalsealternative.
V
Ifonewantedafinaltestamenttotheforceofthedemocratizingprocessin
theearly20thcenturyitsurelyliesinitscapacity,notonlytoposethequestionof
constitutionalchangeasanecessaryconcomitantofwar-fighting,buteventocall
intoquestiontherationaleoftheGreatWaritself.Notonlydidtheeffortofthewar
intensifythedemocraticquestionevenonthevictoriousside.Butdemocraticvoices
daredtoposethequestionofwhethertocontinuethewar,eveninthefaceofthe
hugecasualtiesandtheimmensepressurethoseexercisedonthecombatantsto
pressthestruggletoavictoriousconclusion.
Thisradicalcapacityofdemocraticpoliticstoposethequestionofpeace
eveninasituationoftotalwarbetween1914-1918raisesquestionsabouthowwe
shouldwritethismomentintobroadernarrativesofdemocratization.Itcallsinto
questionconventionalnarratives,suchasthosesketchedbyquantitativemeasures
ofdemocracy,thatviewtheearlytwentiethcenturymerelyasapreludetogreater
democratizationtocome.Withregardtothefranchise,withregardtotheinclusion
ofwomen,withregardtocivilrightsforminoritiesandpostcolonialfreedoma
narrativeofprogressivedemocratizationclearlyisindispensable.Butitisfarless
obviousthatthesamestoryofprogressionappliestothesubstanceofthe
democraticargument.Ifweaskwhatitisthatdemocracywasabout,thestoryof
upwardprogressiontogreaterdemocracyislesscertain.Whereastheconstitutional
solidificationofthefranchisemovesupwardinaratchet-likefashion,thebreadth
anddepthofthedemocraticpoliticalfieldwaxesandwanesinfarlesslinearor
progressiveways.
Toaddforcetothispointitisperhapsusefultoinvokeacontrastthatis
closerintimethanWorldWarI,onethatisstillverymuchwithinthelivingmemory
ofWesterndemocracies,thatbetweenthepoliticsoftheVietnamwarinthe1960s
andearly1970sandthepoliticsoftheIraqwarafter2003.Thoughtheanti-Iraq
26
mobilizationinFebruary2003wasdramatic–theGuinnessBookofRecordscredits
thedemonstrationsof15February2003asthelargestinworldhistory-themedia
andpoliticalapparatusintheUnitedStatesandtheothercombatantnations,
notablytheUK,managedtostreamlinethepresentationofthewarandbuilda
remarkableconsensusaroundit.Giventheillegitimacyofthewar,giventhatitwas
aquintessential“warofchoice”thelackofrealpoliticalchoiceactuallyexercisedby
thepublic,wasremarkable.Bycontrast,Vietnamwasnotjustchallengedbyananti-
warmovement.Thatanti-warmovement,asadramaticexerciseindemocracyin
action,convergedwithothermovementsoftheday,includingfeminismandcivil
rights,toenergizeabroadbasedtransformationofasignificantpartofAmerican
politicalculture.Thiswasnotwelcomed,ofcourse,byAmericanconservatives,who
engagedacounterculturalmobilizationoftheirown,orbythemilitaryandsecurity
establishment.Learningtheirlessons,theircontrolofthemedia,alreadybythetime
ofthefirstIraqwarin1991,wasspectacularlymoreeffective.Thesmotheringof
dissentunderacloakofpatrioticsolidaritywiththetroopswasastonishingly
comprehensive.Similarfluctuationsintherangeofdemocraticargumentcanbe
seeninmanycrucialareasofpower,mostnotablythefundamentalissueof
economicpolicyandnotjustintheUnitedStatesbutacrossmuchoftheWestern
world.Notfornothing,AngelaMerkel,oneofthemostsuccessfulexponentsof
twenty-firstcenturydemocraticpolitics,respondedtotheEurozonecrisisby
declaringthistobeamomentof“Alternativlosigkeit”.69
AcomparisonofthepoliticsofwarinWorldWarIandWorldWarIIsuggests
analogousfluctuationsinthebandwidthofdemocraticargument.UnlikeWorldWar
I,WorldWarIIwasfoughttothedeathwithlittleornopossibilityofpolitical
negotiationeitherinternallyorwithregardtotheantagonist.Moreorless
immediatelyitusheredindecadesofColdWarstand-offalongsimilarlyhardened
lines.Thehardenedpolitico-military-industrialmachinesthatstruggledto
annihilateeachotherinWorldWarIIweredesignedonthebasisoflessonsinthe
69 http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7703633/Merkel-ruft-wieder-die-Alternativlosigkeit-aus.html.
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politicsofmobilizationlearnedinWorldWarIanditsaftermath.70TheItalianand
Sovietregimesactuallygreworganicallyoutofwartimepolitics.Forthemasforthe
Nazisthecentralproblemwasthatoftheconjunctionofwar,mobilizationand
democracy:howtoreconciletheneedforatrulypopularandencompassing
mobilization,withoutconcedingthedemocraticopen-endednessthatposedthe
questionofrevolutionandpeace.Norwerethesequestionsconfinedtothesideof
thedictatorships.Giventhenatureoftheirantagonists,andtheviolentpropaganda
directedbythemattheWest,itishardlysurprisingthattheideologicalbattlelines
weredrawnevenmoresharplythantheywereinWorldWarI.Asaresulttherewas
lessroomfordissentinWorldWarIIthaninanypreviouswar.InBritainand
AmericawhereithadposedaconsiderablechallengeinWorldWarI,political
pacificismwasvirtuallynon-existent.Thelabourmovementwasmoreeffectively
integratedandjoinedmorewillinglyincorporatistframeworksofaccommodation.
Themanagementofthehomefrontwasmoreeffective,fromthebureaucracyof
rationinguptothemacroeconomicsofinflationcontrol.Meanwhile,thealliance
withtheSovietUnionsealedofftheleftflankofanypossibleopposition.71
ThedifferencecanbefeltdowntothisdayinthewaythatWorldWarIand
WorldWarIIareremembered.TheimageofWorldWarIIasthe“good”warisone
ofthefewmonolithstosurvivethe20thcenturymoreorlessintact.FortheWestern
victorsitwasandremainsawarfordemocracywagedwithmassivepopular
consent.FortheSovietstooitwasaheroicpopulareffort,the“greatpatrioticwar”
anditwasadmiredassuch,evenbylaterColdWarantagonists.Strikinglyeventhe
defeatedGermans,whentheymoreorlessfurtivelyrememberedthe“goodsides”of
Hitler’sregime,tendedtorecallitsunifying,solidaristicaspects.Itishardtodeny
thatthislegacyoftheThirdReichshapedthesocialstructuresandpoliticalculture
ofthedemocraticFederalRepublic.Bycontrast,ahundredyearson,WorldWarI
stillremainsatroublesometopic.Itslegitimacyisquestionedandthisquestioning70 McgregorKnox,CommonDestiny:Dictatorship,ForeignPolicy,andWarinFascistItalyandNaziGermany(CambridgeCUP,2009)71 K.Middlemas,ThePoliticsofIndustrialSociety(London,1979)andJ.T.Sparrow,WarfareState:WorldWarIIAmericansandtheAgeofBigGovernment(Oxford,2011).Onlyinthecolonies,wasthislockgripsubjecttosignificantchallenge,mostnotablyintheQuitIndiacampaign.
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goes“allthewaydown”.Despiteeffortstodeclarethequestionpassé,thequestion
of“warguilt”andresponsibilityrefusetodie.Oneonlyneedstosaythewords-
“Verdun”,“Somme”and“Passchendaele”–totriggerapacifistreflex.Thethemeof
“Lionsledbydonkeys”continuestoresonateasanemblemofclassdivisionand
upperclassincompetence.“Versailles”completesthecatalogueofdisaster.Itis
temptingofcoursetopressallofthisintoadevelopmentalschema,inwhichthe
waranditsaftermatharesymptomaticoftheslowpainfuldeathofan“oldworld”.
BywayoflearninglessonsfromSarajevo,VerdunandVersailles,bydoingthings
betterinWorldWarII,“we”progressedtoabrighter,betterfuture.Andincertain
keyrespects,withregardforexampletothedemocraticwelfarestate,thisis
evidentlythecase.Butwasthisaprogresstowardsgreaterdemocracy?Perhapsthe
oppositeisthecase.PerhapsunlikeWorldWarII,itispreciselytheundecided,
contestedqualityofWorldWarIthatoughttomarksitastheprimeexampleofa
greatwarfoughtunderdemocraticconditions.