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BURYINGTHECONSTITUTIONUNDERATARPGARYLAWSON*
AskingwhetherthemodernadministrativestateisunconstitutionalislikeaskingwhetherYaleLawSchoolhasatendencytoemphasizetheory.Yesdoesnotdojusticetothequestion.The modern administrative state is not merely unconstitutional; it is anticonstitutional.TheConstitutionwasdesignedspecifically to prevent the emergence of the kinds of institutions that characterize the modern administrative state. Thefoundinggenerationwouldhavebeendumbstruckbythegovernmental
edifice
that
has
arisen
from
its
handiwork.
Just
con
sider that, during the founding era, the grand constitutionaldisputes about administration involved such matters aswhetherCongresss enumeratedpower to establishPostOffices and post Roads1 allowed Congress to create new postroads or merely to designate existing statecreated roads aspostalroutes,2andwhetherCongresscouldletthePresidentorPostmasterdetermine the locationofpostal routes or insteadhaditselftodesignatetheroutestownbytown.3
*Professor
of
Law,
Boston
University
School
of
Law.
Iam
grateful
to
the
Abra
hamandLillianBentonFundforsupport.1.U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.7.2.See,e.g.,LetterfromThomasJefferson toJamesMadison(Mar.6,1796), in3
THEFOUNDERSCONSTITUTION28 (PhilipB.Kurland&RalphLernereds.,1987)(arguing that thepostal roadpower extends only to the ability to select fromthose [roads]alreadymade, thoseonwhich there shallbeapost).Thedebateover the scopeof thepostalpower extended throughout thenations firsthalfcentury,withThomasJeffersonandJamesMonroe,amongothers,arguing thatCongress had no power to create new roads, andJamesMadison andJosephStory,amongothers,takingtheotherside.TheissuedividedtheSupremeCourtaslateas1845.SeeSearightv.Stokes,44U.S.(3How.)151,181(1845)(Daniel,J.,dissenting). For abrief account of the debate, seeGary Lawson& Patricia B.Granger,The Proper Scope of FederalPower:AJurisdictional Interpretation of theSweepingClause,43DUKEL.J.267,29495(1993).
3.See
GARYLAWSON,FEDERALADMINISTRATIVELAW4950
(4th
ed.
2007).
The
SecondCongress,afterdebate,electedtodesignatetheroutestownbytown.SeeActofFeb.20,1792,1,1Stat.23233(repealed1794).
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56 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33
The architects of themodern administrative state fully understoodtheconstitutionalobstaclesintheirpath.AdministrativelawstudentsandscholarsarefamiliarwithJamesLandiss
dismissiveattitude
toward
the
Constitutions
separation
of
powers, as articulated in TheAdministrative Process.4 EquallyrevealingaretheearliercommentsofFrankGoodnowin1911,whenprogressiveswerestillstruggling togiveadministrativegovernanceafirmfootholdintheAmericansystem:
[S]pecialcarewastaken[intheConstitution]tosecuretherecognition of the fact that thenew governmentwas oneonlyofenumeratedpowers,and thatpowersnotgrantedto such governmentwere reserved to the states or to thepeople.
ForonereasonoranotherthepeopleoftheUnitedStatescamesoontoregardwithanalmostsuperstitiousreverence
thedocument
into
which
this
general
scheme
of
government
wasincorporated....
...The question naturally arisesbefore thosewho havenobeliefinastaticpoliticalsocietyorinpermanentpoliticalprinciplesofuniversalapplication[:] Is thekindofpoliticalsystemwhichwecommonlybelieveourfathersestablishedonewhichcanwithadvantageberetainedunchangedinthechangedconditionswhichareseentoexist?5
These thinkers understood that validating the administrativestate requiredeitheranewconstitution,whichmodernscholarsarewillingtosupplyinabundance,6oranewtheoryofcon
4.See,e.g.,JAMESM.LANDIS,THEADMINISTRATIVEPROCESS2,1014(1938).5.FRANKJ.GOODNOW,SOCIALREFORMANDTHECONSTITUTION911(1911).For
additionalexamplesofprogressiveawarenessofconstitutionalproblemswiththeformationofthemodernadministrativestate,seeRonaldJ.Pestritto,TheProgressiveOriginsoftheAdministrativeState:Wilson,Goodnow,andLandis,24SOC.PHIL.&POLY16,21(2007).6.Somearewillingtosupplyitdirectly.See1BRUCEACKERMAN,WETHEPEO
PLE:FOUNDATIONS34(1991).OthersdosoindirectlybysubstitutingfortheConstitutionprecedentsorpractices.See,e.g.,DavidA.Strauss,CommonLawConstitutionalInterpretation,63U.CHI.L.REV.877,877(1996)(arguingthatinterpretationsof theConstitutionrelynotjuston thefoundingdocumentbutalso thebodyoflawssincelaidout,largelybythecourts).StillotherssubstituteabstractphilosophicalconstructsfortheConstitution.See,e.g.,JAMESE.FLEMING,SECURINGCONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 36 (2006) (arguing for a
constructivistinterpretative
methodology
that
builds
from
the
principles
that
bestexplainandjustifyagivensetoffundamentallegalmaterials).Tobesure,iftheConstitutioncontemplateditsownreplacementbysuchnorms,thesethinkers
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No.1] BuryingtheConstitution 57stitutionalism,whichhasobliginglyemergedunderthenameoffunctionalisman interpretative theory that effectively takesthe constitutionality of the administrative state as its starting
pointand
goes
from
there.7
Whatever
method
of
validation
the
champions ofmodern governance choose, theConstitution of1788istheobstaclethatmustbeavoidedorobliterated.As a practical matter, of course, the New Deal firmly ce
mented the administrative state, and we remain in that cementJimmyHoffaliketothisday.MygoalinthisEssayisnottodissolvethatcementbutmerelytohighlightthefactualpropositionthattheadministrativestatehasburiedtheConstitutionbeneathit.To gaugejust how far modern administration has veered
from theConstitution,considerasa representativecasestudytheEmergencyEconomicStabilizationActof2008,8whichcre
atedthe
Troubled
Assets
Relief
Program
(TARP).
Stripping
awaytwohundredpagesofpork,taxpreferences,andvariousoversight,reporting,andfasttrackprovisions,thesubstanceoftheTARP legislation isquite simple.Section101(a)(1)authorizestheSecretaryoftheTreasurytopurchase...troubledassets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are determinedby the Secretary.9 The Secretary isfurther empowered to take such actions as the Secretary
wouldbecorrectasaninterpretativematter.Butitdoesnot.SeeU.S.CONST.art.VI,cl.2(declaring[t]hisConstitutiontobethethesupremeLawoftheLand(emphasisadded)).IhappilygrantthatanyoralloftheseConstitutionsubstitutes
maywell
be
excellent
descriptions
of
modern
practice
or
interesting
normative
politicaltheoriesorboth.IobjecttothemhereonlyasaccountsoftheactualConstitutionsactualmeaning.
7.For an account of functionalism as a rationalization for the administrativestate, seeGary Lawson, Prolegomenon toAny FutureAdministrative Law Course:SeparationofPowersandtheTranscendentalDeduction,49ST.LOUISU.L.J.885,88890(2005).8.EmergencyEconomicStabilizationActof2008,Pub.L.No.110343,122Stat.
3765(2008)(tobecodifiedinscatteredsectionsof12&26U.S.C.).
9.Id.101(a)(1),122Stat.at3767(tobecodifiedat12US.C.5211).Troubledassets are (A) residential or commercialmortgages and any securities, obligations,orother instruments thatarebasedonor related to suchmortgages, that[were]originatedorissuedonorbeforeMarch14,2008,thepurchaseofwhichtheSecretarydeterminespromotesfinancialmarketstability;and(B)anyotherfinancial instrument that the Secretary, after consultationwith theChairman of the
Boardof
Governors
of
the
Federal
Reserve
System,
determines
the
purchase
of
whichisnecessarytopromotefinancialmarketstability....Id.3(9),122Stat.at3767(tobecodifiedat12U.S.C.5202).
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No.1] BuryingtheConstitution 59queandreprisal,18aneedfulregulationoftheterritoryorotherpropertybelongingtotheUnitedStates,19oranythingelsethatremotelycomeswithinCongresssenumeratedpowers.Noris
italaw
necessary
and
proper
for
carrying
into
Execution20
anyof thesepowers. Whatgrantedpowerdoes itnecessarilyandproperlycarryintoexecution?
Thereis,infact,aseeminglyobviousmodernanswertothislast question. The TARP statute spends moneya startlinglyhugepileofmoneysosurelytheSpendingClauseauthorizesit. That mightbe a good answer if the Constitution actuallycontained a Spending Clause. I suspect that it will surprisemany people to learn, however, that the Constitution simplydoesnotcontainaSpendingClause,inthesenseofaprovision specifically dedicated to authorizing federal spending.ThereareseveralclausesintheConstitutionthatquitesensibly
andcorrectly
assume
that
Congress
somewhere
has
the
power
tospend,suchastheprovisionstipulatingthatnomoneymaybe withdrawn from the Treasury except pursuant to a validappropriation,21but none of these provisions itself authorizesfederalspending.
TheprovisionmostoftencitedinmodernlawasaSpendingClause22 is actually nothing of the sort. Article I, Section 8,Clause1providesthatCongressshallhavePower[t]olayandcollectTaxes,Duties,ImpostsandExcises,topaytheDebtsandprovide for the common Defence and general Welfare of theUnitedStates;butallDuties,ImpostsandExcisesshallbeuniformthroughouttheUnitedStates.23Notwithstandingtheex
istenceof
asubstantial
body
of
jurisprudence
and
scholarship
treating this provision as a Spending Clause, it is a TaxingClause and nothing more. The only power granted by thisclause is the power to lay and collect taxes. The clause thenspecifiesthepurposesforwhichCongressmaylayandcollecttaxes. That specification is important,because it makes clearthat Congress can use taxes for purposes other than raising
18.U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.11.19.U.S.CONST.art.IV,3,cl.2.
20.U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.18.
21.
U.S.
CONST.
art.
I,
9,
cl.
7.
22.See,e.g.,Sabriv.UnitedStates,541U.S.600,605(2004).23.U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.1.
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60 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33
revenue, such asprotectionism or regulatory objectives,24buttheclauseconfersnopowertospendthemoneyraisedthroughtaxes,muchlessafreestandingpowertopromotethegeneral
welfarethrough
spending
or
other
means.
In
the
case
of
TARP,
itisparticularlyproblematictoinferthepowertospendfromthepowertotax.Abigchunkofthebailoutmoneywillcomefromborrowing,25 and good luck inferring apower to spendborrowedmoneyfromtheTaxingClause.26ThepowertospendintheConstitutioncomesfromtheNec
essary and Proper Clause: appropriations of funds are lawsnecessaryandproper forcarrying intoExecutionother federalpowers.27Butthen,inthecontextofTARP,onehastofindsomeenumeratedpowerthatappropriationstobuymortgagescannecessarilyandproperlycarryintoexecution.Ifthewordsnecessary and proper require anything more than a delu
sionalconnection
between
the
appropriations
law
and
an
enu
merated federal power,28 this task is impossible. The entireTARPenterprisewasunconstitutionalfromthebeginning.
24.Thisspecificationaddressedacontentiousissueineighteenthcenturytheoriesoftaxation.ForafullaccountoftheTaxingClause,seethemagisterialJeffreyT.Renz,WhatSpendingClause?(orthePresidentsParamour):AnExaminationoftheViewsofHamilton,Madison,andStoryonArticle I,Section8,Clause1of theUnitedStatesConstitution,33J.MARSHALLL.REV.81,96136(1999).
25.See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343,118,122Stat.3765,378687(2008)(tobecodifiedat12U.S.C.5228)(authorizingtheTreasurySecretarytouse31U.S.C.chapter31,whichprovidesforpublicdebtfinancing).26.Iam indebted toDavidEngdahl for this simplebutprofound insight.See
DavidE.
Engdahl,
The
Basis
of
the
Spending
Power,
18
SEATTLEU.L.REV.
215,
222
(1995) ([T]he spending allusion in the TaxingClausedoes not even colorablyreachborrowedsums.);seealsoDavidE.Engdahl,TheSpendingPower,44DUKEL.J. 1, 49 (1994) ([N]othing in theTaxingClause even implicitly contemplatesspendingsuchfunds[fromsalesoflandorotherproperty].).
27.Professor Engdahl has tried to locate the federal spending power in thePropertyClause,whichempowersCongresstodisposeofandmakeallneedfulRulesandRegulationsrespectingtheTerritoryorotherPropertybelongingtotheUnited States....U.S.CONST. art. IV, 3, cl. 2. See Engdahl, The Basis of theSpendingPower,supranote26,at24351.ForastructuralcritiqueofthisargumentandadefenseoftheNecessaryandProperClauseasthemostplausiblesourceoffederalspendingpower,seeGARYLAWSON&GUYSEIDMAN,THECONSTITUTIONOFEMPIRE:TERRITORIALEXPANSIONANDAMERICANLEGALHISTORY2732(2004).
28.I have spentmuch ofmy professional life arguing thusly. See, e.g.,GaryLawson,Discretion asDelegation:The ProperUnderstanding of theNondelegation
Doctrine,73
GEO.WASH.L.REV.
235,
24248
(2005)
(arguing
that
anecessary
implementing lawmusthavesomeobviousandpreciseaffinitywith the implementedpower);id.at24960(arguingthataproperimplementinglawmust
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No.1] BuryingtheConstitution 61In the modern administrative state, the only thing excep
tionalaboutTARPisitssize.Theadministrativestateroutinelyspendsmoneyonmattersentirelyunconnectedtoanyenumer
atedfederal
power;
indeed,
by
almost
any
measure,
unconsti
tutionallyspendingmoney issurely theadministrativestatesmost common activity. Everything from the Social SecurityAdministrationtotheDepartmentofEducation totheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)isamonumenttotheadministrativestateswarontheConstitution.TheFEMAexamplecalls forthanother instructivecompari
sonwith the constitutionalworld of the 1790s.A firedevastated the city of Savannah on November 26, 1796, leadingsouthernrepresentativestoaskCongressfor$15,000to$20,000in government aid.29NathanielMacon ofNorthCarolina answered:[H]ewishedgentlementoputtheirfingerupon that
partof
the
Constitution
which
gave
that
House
power
to
afford
them relief....He felt for the sufferers,...buthe feltas tenderly for theConstitution;hehadexamined it,and itdidnotauthorizeanysuchgrant.30AndrewMooreofVirginiaaddedthateveryindividualcitizencould,ifhepleased,showhisindividualhumanitybysubscribingtotheirrelief;butitwasnotConstitutional for them to afford relief from the Treasury.31Theaidbillwasdefeated.32
II.
Even assuming that Congress somehow has the power to
turn
the
Treasury
Department
into
a
subsidiary
of
Country
wide,thestatutoryauthorizationtotheTreasuryinTARPviolatestheconstitutionalnondelegationprinciple.UnderstandingtheprinciplesoriginandwhatitentailsiscriticaltoappreciatingfullytheunconstitutionalityofTARP.33
conformtobackgroundunderstandingsoffederalism,separationofpowers,andindividualrights).
29.See6ANNALSOFCONG.171214(1796)(statementofWilliamSmith).30.Id.at1717(statementofNathanielMacon).31.Id.at1718(statementofAndrewMoore).
32.
See
id.
at
1727.
33.Foralongerformofthefollowingbriefargument,seeGaryLawson,DelegationandOriginalMeaning,88VA.L.REV.327,334(2002)andLawson,supranote28.
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62 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33
The Constitutions nondelegation principle flows from themorebasicprincipleofenumeratedpowers.Anyfederalactororinstitutioncanexerciseonlythosepowersgrantedtoitpur
suantto
the
Constitution.
The
President,
and
through
him
the
TreasurySecretary,isgiven[t]heexecutivePower,34whichisquintessentially thepower to execute laws,not the power tomakelaws.35Lawmakingisgenerallythepurviewofthelegislativepower,36asubsetofwhichisvestedinaCongressoftheUnitedStates.37TheexecutivedepartmentsonlysharesinthisgenerallawmakingpowerarethePresidentsvetopower,38andtheVicePresidentspower tobreak ties in theSenate.39 Ifexecutive actors are making laws, they are exercising powersotherthanthosetheConstitutiongrantsthem.Tobesure, it isdifficulttodrawprecisedistinctionsamong
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, especially at the
margins.As
James
Madison
put
it,
these
interpretive
problems
prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects,and...puzzlethegreatestadeptsinpoliticalscience.40Tothisthe Constitution responds: Get over it. The Constitutionseparately identifies legislative power, executive power, andjudicialpower,41anditisthereforeincumbentuponhonestinterpreters todo thebest that theycanwith thosedistinctions,howevertoughthatmightbe.42Itcanbevery tough.Someelementofdiscretion in imple
mentationand interpretation is inherent inexecutiveandju
34.
U.S.
CONST.
art.
II,
1
(The
executive
power
shall
be
vested
in
a
President.).
35.See,e.g.,Lawson,DelegationandOriginalMeaning,supranote33,at33843.
36.Onemust say generallybecause there are specific contexts inwhichtheexecutivepowerdoesincludewhatcanonlybedescribedasalawmakingcomponent:ThePresidentmay (and,asamatterof international law,must)governoccupied territoryduringwartime, exercisingwhat looks to theoutsideworld like legislativepower. SeeLAWSON&SEIDMAN, supranote27,at12223.37.U.S.CONST.art. I, 1 (vesting [a]ll legislativepowershereingranted in
Congress).
38.U.S.CONST.art.I,7,cls.23.39.U.S.CONST.art.I,3,cl.4.40.THEFEDERALISTNO.37,at228(JamesMadison)(ClintonRossitered.,1961).
41.SeeLawson,DelegationandOriginalMeaning,supranote33,at33741.
42.Madisonhimselflaternotedthepossibilityandnecessityofdiscriminating,
therefore,in
theory,
the
several
classes
of
power,
as
they
may
in
their
nature
be
legislative,executive,orjudiciary.THEFEDERALISTNO.48(JamesMadison),supranote40,at308.
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64 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33eralpowers,andastatutethattriestoturnanexecutive(orjudicial)agent intoa lawmaker isnotproper forcarrying intoExecution thosepowers.Or,put anotherway, the executive
poweris
not
apurely
formal
power
to
implement
statutes
but
rather a power to implement statutes that do not confer thekindandqualityofdiscretionthatwouldconverttheexecutiveactor into a lawmaker. Far from authorizing delegations, theNecessary and Proper Clause is a textual vehicle throughwhichthenondelegationdoctrineisconstitutionalized.The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act authorizes the
Treasury Secretary to purchase anymortgages ormortgagebackedsecuritiesoriginatedonorbeforeMarch14,2008,thepurchaseofwhichtheSecretarydeterminespromotesfinancialmarket stability.48On its face, this looks like an unconstitutionaldelegation to theSecretary.Onmorecarefulconsidera
tion,it
looks
even
more
like
an
unconstitutional
delegation
to
the Secretary. In exercising his authority, the Secretarymustprevent unjust enrichment of financial institutions.49 AndCongress instructs the Secretary to take into considerationninefactors,thoughtheSecretarydoesnotactuallyhavetodoanythingspecificwiththesefactorsotherthanconsiderthem.50
48.Pub.L.No.110343,3(9),122Stat.3765,3767 (2008) (tobecodifiedat12U.S.C.5202).49.Id.101(e),122Stat.at3768(tobecodifiedat12U.S.C.5211).50.Id.103,122Stat.at3770(tobecodifiedat12U.S.C.5213)(Theninefac
torstobeconsideredare:(1)protectingtheinterestsoftaxpayersbymaximizingoverall returns andminimizing the impact on the national debt; (2) providingstability
and
preventing
disruption
to
financial
markets
in
order
to
limit
the
im
pactontheeconomyandprotectAmericanjobs,savings,andretirementsecurity;(3)theneedtohelpfamilieskeeptheirhomesandtostabilizecommunities;(4)indeterminingwhethertoengageinadirectpurchasefromanindividualfinancialinstitution, the longterm viability of the financial institution in determiningwhetherthepurchaserepresentsthemostefficientuseoffundsunderthisAct;(5)ensuring thatall financial institutionsare eligible toparticipate in theprogram,without discriminationbased on size, geography, form of organization, or thesize,type,andnumberofassetseligibleforpurchaseunderthisAct;(6)providingfinancial assistance to financial institutions, including those serving low andmoderateincomepopulationsandotherunderservedcommunities,andthathaveassetslessthan$1,000,000,000, thatwerewelloradequatelycapitalizedasofJune30, 2008, and that as a result of the devaluation of the preferred governmentsponsoredenterprisesstockwilldroponeormorecapitallevels,inamannersufficient to restore the financial institutions to at least an adequately capitalized
level;(7)
the
need
to
ensure
stability
for
United
States
public
instrumentalities,
suchascountiesandcities,thatmayhavesufferedsignificant increasedcostsorlosses in the currentmarket turmoil; (8) protecting the retirement security of
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No.1] BuryingtheConstitution 65Fairlyread,theseprovisionsessentiallyinstructtheSecretary
topromotegoodness andnicenessand toavoidbadnessandmeannesswhichmeans, in theend,thatthestatutedoesnot
actuallydo
anything
other
than
authorize
the
Secretary
to
spendthreequartersofatrilliondollarsonmortgagesandrelatedsecurities.Therecertainlyseem tobeplentyof, inChiefJusticeMarshallswords, important subjects left entirely totheSecretary,andthatkindofdiscretioncertainlyseemstoexceed the executivePower that theConstitutionpermits thePresident,andthereforetheSecretary,toexercise.51But,alas,thingsareoftennot thatsimplewith thenondele
gationdoctrine.Suppose thatCongressappropriates $50milliontotheTreasuryDepartmentforofficeoperations.IsthatanunconstitutionaldelegationunlessCongress specifieshowmanypaperclips, staplers,and secretaries theTreasurymust
purchasewith
the
money?
Lump
sum
appropriations
have
beenaround foravery long time,and itwouldbequitestartling even to narrowminded originalists such as myself ifCongress had to specify every individualpurchase for everyagency.And if lump sumappropriationsof this sortarepermissible,isTARPallthatdifferent?Itisdifferent:Distributingfundstobailoutthefinancialin
dustry is an important subject, although figuring outwhether staplers or paper clips will run the office moresmoothly is a matter of less interest. Why? Because. Ultimately,analysisunderthenondelegationprinciple isamatter
Americansby
purchasing
troubled
assets
held
by
or
on
behalf
of
an
eligible
re
tirementplandescribedinclause(iii),(iv),(v),or(vi)ofsection402(c)(8)(B)oftheInternalRevenueCodeof1986,exceptthatsuchauthorityshallnotextendtoanycompensation arrangements subject to section 409A of suchCode; and (9) theutilityofpurchasingother real estateowned and instrumentsbackedbymortgagesonmultifamilyproperties.).51.Inan importantstudyof theevolutionof theTARPbailout,StephenDavi
doff andDavidZaring argue that, although SecretaryPaulsons original threepageproposal forbailoutauthoritymighthaveraisedconstitutionalnondelegationconcerns, thoseconcernsarepresentedlessobviouslyby thecongressionalstatutes thatelaboratedTreasurysresponsibilitiesand thatfollowed it. StevenM.Davidoff&DavidZaring,RegulationbyDeal:TheGovernmentsResponsetotheFinancialCrisis,61ADMIN.L.REV.463,516(2009). Buttheoperativelegalauthority in theoriginalproposal, see id.at514,wasnomorevagueorunconstrainedthanwas theoperative legalauthority in the final legislation. All thatchanged
fromPaulsons
three
pages
to
the
final
legislation
was
the
addition
of
enough
pork towinpassagefromreluctantHousemembersandsomeoversightmechanismsthatdonotlegallyconstrainthediscretionoftheSecretary.
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66 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33ofjudgment rather thandeduction, and there is nothing onecandoabout it. If someone trulybelieves that theSecretarysauthorityunderTARPdoesnotconcernimportantsubjects,I
reallydo
not
know
what
to
say
to
him.
Aswith thespendingofmoney, theonly thingnoteworthyaboutthescopeofdiscretiongrantedtotheTreasurySecretaryinthecontextofthemodernadministrativestateisthesizeofthe relevant budget. From a constitutional standpoint, thegrant of authority is routine. The authorization to buy upmortgages, the purchase ofwhich the Secretary determinespromotes financialmarket stability, is nomore open endedthan,forexample,theauthorizationtotheAdministratoroftheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency (EPA) toadoptambientairqualitystandardstheattainmentandmaintenanceofwhichinthejudgmentof theAdministrator,basedon [certain]criteria
andallowing
an
adequate
margin
of
safety,
are
requisite
to
protect thepublichealth.52That latterauthorizationwasupheld as constitutionalby a unanimous SupremeCourt in anopinionauthoredbyJusticeScalia.53Similarly, the factors thatCongress instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to considerunderTARParenotmateriallydifferentfromthepasseloffactors and considerations that the United States SentencingCommission was supposed to consider when adopting sentencingguidelinesundertheSentencingReformActof1984.54An effectively unanimous Court found the SentencingCommissionsauthorityconstitutional.55There are perfectly good reasonswhy onemightwant to
celebratethe
demise
of
the
nondelegation
doctrine.
56
But
con
sistencywiththeConstitutionisnotoneofthem.
52.42U.S.C.7409(b)(1)(2000).
53.SeeWhitmanv.Am.TruckingAssns,531U.S.457,474(2001).
54.See28U.S.C.994(a)(1)(2000).55.SeeMistrettav.UnitedStates,488U.S.361(1989).JusticeScaliadissentedbe
causeof thepeculiarfunctionof theSentencingCommission,butwithregardtowhethergrantsofdiscretiontoexecutiveorjudicialactorscouldeverbesovagueastoviolatethenondelegationdoctrine,JusticeScaliawas,ifanything,moreinsis
tent
than
was
the
majority
on
the
fruitlessness
of
the
inquiry.
Id.
at
41517,
20.
56.PeterM.Shane,LegislativeDelegation,theUnitaryExecutive,andtheLegitimacyoftheAdministrativeState,33HARV.J.L.&PUB.POLY103,108110(2009).
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No.1] BuryingtheConstitution 67
III.
Perhapsthemostintellectuallyintriguingconstitutionalques
tionsurrounding
TARPa
question
with
potentially
sweeping
consequences for the administrative stateis whether Secretaryof theTreasuryHenryPaulsonwas constitutionallyauthorizedtoadministertheprogramduringtheBushAdministration.HenryPaulsonwas sworn in asTreasury SecretaryonJuly10,2006afterbeingconfirmedby theSenateonJune28,2006.57PaulsonsappointmentwasinfullconformancewiththeConstitutionsAppointmentsClause,forhewasnominatedby the President and confirmedby the Senate.58But inwhatcapacitywashe confirmed?TheSenateconfirmedhimas theTreasurySecretary,notastheAdministratoroftheEPAortheSecretaryofDefense.Suppose thatonJuly11,2006,Secretary
of
the
Treasury
Paulson
was
put
in
charge
of
establishing
am
bientairqualitystandardsunder theCleanAirAct,runningtheIraqwareffort,andrepresenting theUnitedStates in theUnited Nations. Could Secretary Paulson lawfully performthosefunctionsbyvirtueofbeingconfirmedasafederalofficerundertheAppointmentsClause?OrdidhisappointmentandconfirmationasSecretaryof theTreasuryonlyauthorizehim to perform functions reasonablywithin the contemplation of the appointing authorities, including the Senate thatconfirmedhim?Thequestion isactuallyquiteprofound.Federalappointees
arealwaysconfirmedinthecontextofspecificsetsofstatutory
authorizations
that
accompany
their
offices.
But
Congress
often
changesthosestatutoryauthorizationsbyexpansion,contraction, ormodificationduring the tenure of the officers.59Dotheofficershavetobereappointedandreconfirmedeachtimethereisanychangeintheirduties?Noonehaseverthoughtso;theinitialappointmenthasalwaysbeenunderstood,quitesensibly,to includetheauthorityto implementnewandchanged
57.152CONG.REC.S6615,6624(dailyed.June28,2006).58.SeeU.S.CONST.art.II,2,cl.2(requiringPresidentialnominationandSen
ateapproval);UnitedStatesv.LeBaron,60U.S.(19How.)73,78(1856)(WhenapersonhasbeennominatedtoanofficebythePresident,confirmedbytheSenate,andhiscommissionhasbeensignedbythePresident,andthesealoftheUnited
States
affixed
thereto,
his
appointment
to
that
office
is
complete.).
59.DavidR.Stras&RyanW.Scott,AreSeniorJudgesUnconstitutional?,92CORNELLL.REV.453,496(2007).
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68 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33
statutoryauthorizations.60Butare thereany limits to thenewauthoritythatcanbegiventoanexistingofficer,eitherbythePresident through reassignment61 or by Congress through
statutoryamendments,
and
if
so,
what
are
those
limits?62
The Supreme Court and the community of separationofpowers scholars havemanaged largely toduck this questionformorethantwocenturies.DavidStrasandRyanScott,intheonlyextendedacademic treatmentof thisproblemofwhich Iamaware,63makeagoodtextualandfunctionalcasethattheremustbesomelimittotheextenttowhichCongresscanalterthedutiesofanofficer,64buttheydonotofferclearguidanceaboutthenatureofthat limit.TheSupremeCourtfaced the issue in1994,holdingthatmilitaryofficerscanserveasmilitaryjudgeswithoutreceivingspecialappointmentsforthatpurpose.65TheCourtwentoutofitsway,however,todecidethecasewithout
announcingany
broad
principles
for
the
future.
In
particular,
60.Id.61.Iamnotaddressinghere theverydifficultquestionwhether thePresident
hasunilateralauthority toreassigndutieswithin theexecutivedepartment.ThecaseforsuchapowerarguesthatallexecutivePowerisvestedpersonallyinthePresidentbyArticleII,sothatthePresidentcanpersonallyassumeandthendelegateanyexecutiveauthority locatedanywhere in theUnitedStatesgovernment.SeeStevenG.Calabresi&SaikrishnaB.Prakash,ThePresidentsPowerToExecutetheLaws,104YALEL.J.541,59395(1994).ThecaseagainstsuchapowerarguesthatCongress,byvirtueofitsNecessaryandProperClausepowertocreatefederaloffices, candesignatewhich subordinateswithin the executivedepartmentcanpermissiblyexercisecertainclassesofexecutivepower(thoughCongresscannot,underthetheoryoftheunitaryexecutive,forbidthePresidentfrompersonallyexercisingatleastavetopoweroveranyuseoffederalexecutivepower).See
GeoffreyP.
Miller,
The
Unitary
Executive
in
aUnified
Theory
of
Constitutional
Law:
TheProblemofInterpretation,15CARDOZOL.REV.201,205(1993).
62.Note thatadifferentquorumoftheSenate(nottomentionadifferentSenate)mightconfirmanappointeeandthenparticipateinchangingthatappointeesauthorityafterconfirmation.63.Stras&Scott,supranote59,at494506.64.Textually,theyarguethatonlythePresidentandSenatecanappointprinci
palofficersandonly thePresident, thecourtsof law,andheadsofdepartmentscanappoint inferiorofficers;Congress, including theHouseofRepresentatives,hasnoappointmentpower.Id.at49495.Butallowingunlimitedchangesinandreallocations of the authority of officers would effectively grant Congress appointmentpower.Id.at495.Functionally,theyarguethatunlimitedreallocationsof power can shift appointment authority from the President toCongress andunderminetheaccountabilityconcernsthatunderlietheAppointmentsClause.Id.at 49596. Iwouldonly add that thedistinctionbetweenprincipal and inferior
officers
written
into
the
Appointments
Clause
makes
no
sense
unless
each
ap
pointedofficerhasfunctionsdefinedinsomefashionbyhisorherappointment. 65.SeeWeissv.UnitedStates,510U.S.163,16364(1994).
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No.1] BuryingtheConstitution 69themajorityassumed,withoutdeciding,thatnewdutiesmustbegermanetothepreexistingfunctionsoftheofficerinordertoobviatetheneedforanewappointment.66JusticesScaliaand
Thomasconcurred
on
the
ground
that
germaneness
is
the
un
avoidablekeytosuchquestionsandthatthemajorityhadcorrectlydeterminedthatservingasamilitaryjudgeisgermanetobeingamilitaryofficer.67JusticesScaliaandThomasarecorrectthatgermanenessanalysis isunavoidable,asnoonehascomeup with a better way to articulate the limits of Congressspowertochangeanofficersauthority.Is administering TARP germane in this sense to the pre
October 2008duties of the Secretary of theTreasury?By thenature of the inquiry, there canbeno slamdunk answer,butnoisatleastplausible.Thesheerscopeoftheprogrammaybeenoughtorequireanewappointmentforanyonewho isgoing
toadminister
it.
Even
if
scope
alone
does
not
make
the
appoint
ment unconstitutional, the federal governments purchases ofownershipstakes inprivatefinancial institutionsmaybesufficientlynoveltogobeyondthefunctionsoftheTreasurySecretarycontemplatedbyareasonablePresidentorSenatein2006.IfoneacknowledgesthattheEmergencyEconomicStabiliza
tionActpresentsaseriousquestionabout theneed foranewappointment for Secretary Paulson, the consequences for theadministrative state are large.68 If one retroactively examinestheNewDeal,itisquitepossiblethatmanyofthestatutesfromthateragaveauthoritytoexistingofficersfarbeyondthedutiesforwhich theywereconfirmed,providingyetanother reason
whythe
New
Deal
was
unconstitutional.
69
And
if
we
are
about
66.TheCourtfoundthatservingasamilitaryjudgewasgermanetoservingasamilitaryofficerbecauseallmilitaryofficers,consistentwithalongtradition,playaroleintheoperationofthemilitaryjusticesystem.Id.at17475.67.Id.at196(Scalia,J.,concurringinpartandconcurringinthejudgment).68.Theconsequencesareobviouslylargerforthoseappointeeswhoreceivedor
requiredSenateconfirmation. In thecaseofan inferiorofficerappointedby thePresidentalone,anovelexpansionofdutiescouldbeaccommodatedsimplybyanewpresidentialappointment,whichisreallyjustpaperpushing.Thereisalwaysachance,however, that someonewho startsoutasan inferiorofficercouldbecomeaprincipalofficerthroughexpansionofdutiesaslongasthedefinitionofaprincipalofficerreliesatleastinpartonthescopeoftheofficersdutiesandnotjustontheformalchainofcommand.
69.As
an
aside,
that
would
also
mean
that
if
Bruce
Ackerman
wants
to
rescue
theNewDealasconstitutional,hisconstitutionalmomentmustalso involveanamendmenttotheAppointmentsClause.SeeACKERMAN,supranote6,at11920
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70 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33toembarkuponanewNewDeal,witheverincreasing formsofgovernmentcontrol, the limitsof theAppointmentsClausemaybestretched in theprocess.Ataminimum, itseems like
somethingfor
which
to
watch.
IV.
OnefurtherfeatureofTARPbearsmention.WhenCongressfailedtobailouttheBigThreeautomakersandtheirunionsinthefallof2008,theBushAdministrationonDecember19,2008unilaterally extended loans totaling $17.4 billion to GeneralMotorsandChrysleroutofthefundsavailableunderTARP.70IndulgeforthemomenttheassumptionthatobtaininganIOUfromanautomaker,thoughnotthepurchaseofamortgageormortgagebacked security, is the purchase of any [non
mortgage
related]
financial
instrument
that
the
Secre
tary...determines thepurchaseofwhich isnecessary topromote financialmarket stability.71Themorebasicproblem isthatTARPonlyauthorizespurchasesofassets fromafinancialinstitution,72whichthestatutedefinesas:
[A]ny institution, including,but not limited to, anybank,savingsassociation, creditunion, securitybrokerordealer,or insurancecompany,establishedandregulatedunderthelawsof theUnitedStatesoranyState, territory,orpossession of theUnited States...and having significant operationsintheUnitedStates,butexcludinganycentralbankof,orinstitutionownedby,aforeigngovernment.73
Are
automakers
really
financial
institution[s]?
Conceivably,acasualtextualistcouldstopatthewordsanyinstitution in thedefinitionoffinancial institutionandsaythatautomakersare institutions,soendofstory.Thatreasoning,ofcourse,wouldalsosweepinasfinancialinstitution[s]antique dealers,ballet troupes, and theAssociation ofCom
(stating that President Roosevelt and theNewDealCongress let the SupremeCourtJusticesbringabout theNewDeals constitutional legitimacy rather thancodifytheirprinciplesthroughamendments).70.SeeJimPuzzanghera&MartinZimmerman, Bush extends aid to carmakers,
L.A.TIMES,Dec.20,2008,atA1.
71.EmergencyEconomicStabilizationActof2008,Pub.L.No.110343,3(9),
122
Stat.
3765,
376667
(2008)
(to
be
codified
at
12
U.S.C.
5202).
72.Id.101(a)(1),122Stat.at3767(tobecodifiedat12U.S.C.5211).73.Id.3(5),122Stat.at376667(tobecodifiedat12U.S.C.5202).
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No.1] BuryingtheConstitution 71
munity Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). I am asmuchofatextualistasthenextpersonprobablymoresothanmanyofthenextpeoplebutifIamapproachingthistextasa
reasonablereader,
Iwill
interpolate
some
synonym
of
the
word
financial inbetween thewords any and institution inthedefinitionoffinancial institution.Thegrounds for thisfeat of (as a criticmight call it) interpretative legislation arethat thewordsany institutionappear inadefinitionoffinancialinstitution,the(nonexhaustive)examplesgiveninthestatute all have something towith finance, the two hundredpagesofstatutesurroundingthisdefinitiondealwithfinancialmatters,andthecontextinwhichthestatutewasenactedfairlyscreamsthatfinancial institutionmeans institutionsthatareinsomeimportantsensefinancial.Inalllikelihood,thefinancing arms of the automakerswhich have obtained loans of
their
own
apart
from
the
initial
$17.4
billion74
would
qualify
asfinancialinstitutions.Pawnshopsmightevenmakeitin.Butautomakers are no more financial institution[s] under thisstatutethanIam.HowdidPresidentBush explain the legality of thisuse of
funds? InhisstatementofDecember19,2008announcing theautobailout,hesaid:
Unfortunately,despiteextensivedebateandagreementthatweshouldpreventdisorderlybankruptciesintheAmericanautoindustry,Congresswasunabletogetabilltomydeskbeforeadjourningthisyear.
Thismeans theonlyway toavoida collapseof theU.S.auto
industry
is
for
the
executive
branch
to
step
in
....So
today Im announcing that the Federal Government willgrant loans to auto companiesunder conditions similar tothoseCongressconsideredlastweek.75
PerhapsImmissingsomething,butthisstatementseemstobeaclaimthatifthePresidentconsiderssomethingimportantforthe country, thePresident cando itwhetherornotCongressauthorizes itby statute.Presidentshavemade such claims in
74.See, e.g.,NeilKingJr.&DeborahSolomon,GMFinanceArm toGetaFreshBailout,WALLST.J.,May21,2009,atA1;MartinZimmerman,U.S.togiveGMACa
$5
billion
bailout,
L.A.
TIMES,
Dec.
30,
2008,
at
C2.
75.Remarks on theAmericanAuto Industry, 44WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.1568,1569(Dec.19,2008).
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72 HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy [Vol.33
the past, sometimes with success,76 and sometimes meetingstrong legalresistance,77butsuchclaimsarealwaystotally inappropriateunder aConstitution of enumeratedpowers that
merelygives
the
President
executive
Power.
The
executive
powersimplydoesnot includethepowertodoanythingthatthePresidentthinksisimportantforthecountry.78
****
The unconstitutionality of large chunks of themodern administrativestate isafact.But it isalsoafact thatNeptune isoccasionally farther from Earth than Pluto. Both facts haveaboutequal relevance in thecontemporary legalworld.Whatdoestheirrelevanceofsignificantunconstitutionalitysayaboutthe roleof theConstitution inmodern life?Thatquestion re
quires
another
conference
and
another
essay.
For
today,
I
am
justthemessenger,andthemessage isthattheadministrativestateandtheConstitutiondonotmix.
76.See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: GoverningWithoutAuthority,95NW.U.L.REV.581,61516(2001)(describingsuccessfulexecutiveclaimsofemergencypowertogovernCaliforniawithoutstatutoryauthority).
77.SeeYoungstown Sheet&TubeCo.v. Sawyer, 343U.S. 579, 58586 (1952)(holding that thePresident couldnot seizedomestic steelmillsduringwartimewithoutstatutoryauthorization).
78.Interestingly, for eight yearsmany people complained about an imperialpresidency,but Ihavenotheardonepeepoutofanyone in the legalacademy
decryingthis
simply
outlandish
assertion
of
presidential
authority.
Professor
ChristopherSchroederassuresmethathe,too,wasappalledbythisassertionofpresidentialauthorityandevendraftedanopedcolumnaboutit.
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