Candidate Number: 71817HY300 2008/2009
BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE
NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970
HY300 BA DISSERTATION
2008/2009
CANDIDATE NUMBER: 71817
Word Count – 9,969 words
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CONTENTS
Introduction p. 3
Map of the Secessionist State of the Republic of Biafra (1967 –
1970)
p. 6
July 1968 – April 1969
France’s Nigerian Policy under Charles de Gaulle
p. 7
April 1969 – September 1970
After General de Gaulle: ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’
p. 19
October 1969 – January 1970
The Failure of France’s Nigerian Policy
p. 27
Conclusions p. 36
Bibliography p. 39
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BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967-1970
On 30 May 1967, after months of tensions in Nigeria, a separatist group dominated
by members of the Ibo tribe (one of the country’s three major tribes based primarily in the
eastern region), declared its secession from the state of Nigeria and established the
independent Republic of Biafra. The refusal of the Nigerian government to recognise
Biafra’s independence marked the beginning of a civil war that would last until January
1970. Despite global criticism of the suffering endured by the Biafran people, only a
handful of states in the developing world, including Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast,
Zambia and Haiti, offered formal recognition to Biafra. Most Western states chose to adopt
a neutral stance, believing that resolution of the conflict was the responsibility of Nigeria’s
former colonial ruler, Britain.1
France stood apart, declaring its support for Biafran self-determination in a
communiqué given by Joel Le Theule, the French Secretary of State for Information, on 31
July 1968.2 Paris’ position towards Biafra was confirmed a little over a month later when,
on 9 September, French President Charles de Gaulle, announced publically that France was
assisting Biafra and was not discounting future diplomatic recognition of the breakaway
state.3 From this point on France gave the Biafrans moral and diplomatic support and was
accused of aiding them with the supply of arms, flown in via Libreville (Gabon) and
Abidjan (Ivory Coast).4 The British government was frustrated by France’s involvement in
one of its former colonies. The conflict thus created tension in Anglo-French relations
1 J. De St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (London, 1972), pp. 179-201.2 [T]he [N]ational [A]rchives/FCO/25/234_60, Everson to FO, 31/07/1968.3 S. Cronjé, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran Civil War, 1967-1970 (London, 1972), pp. 194-195.4 J. J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Princeton, 1977), pp. 230-231.
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already troubled by Charles de Gaulle’s rejection of Britain’s application for membership
of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963 and 1967, as well as by
disagreements over transatlantic relations, Cold War alliances, Rhodesia and the Concorde
Project.5 In this context, British politicians questioned the French government’s motives for
supporting Biafra in an attempt to understand and decide how to respond to French policy
in Nigeria during the civil strife.
Historians of post-Independence Africa have often neglected analysis of French
involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. Interpretations of France’s support for Biafra are
mostly found in contemporary journalistic narratives of the war, by authors including
Suzanne Cronjé, Auberon Waugh and John De St. Jorre,6 or historical accounts such as
John Stremlau’s ‘The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War’. 7 French policy in
Nigeria is otherwise also briefly referenced in general historical accounts of French policy
in Sub-Saharan Africa. However these studies (for example by Anton Andereggen, Robert
Bourgi, Francis McNamara and Claude Wauthier)8 tend to concentrate on France’s
relations with its former African colonial dependencies, a preoccupation that has meant
French involvement in non-Francophone Africa, in this case in Nigeria, has been neglected.
This is with the exception of two contemporary articles published in 1979 and 1980
that do concentrate on French policy during the Nigerian Civil War. Daniel Bach’s ‘Le
Général de Gaulle et la Guerre Civile au Nigeria’ analyses the nature and motivations
5 J. W. Young, ‘Franco-British Relations during the Wilson Years’, A. Capet (ed.), Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale Since 1904 (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 165-168.6 Cronjé, The World. De St. Jorre, Nigerian Civil War. A. Waugh & S. Cronjé, Biafra: Britain’s Shame (London, 1969).7 Stremlau, International Politics. 8 A. Andereggen, France’s Relationship with Subsaharan Africa (Westport, 1994).R. Bourgi, Le General de Gaulle et l’Afrique Noire, 1940-1969 (Paris, 1980).F. T. McNamara, France in Black Africa (Washington DC, 1989).C. Wauthier, Quatre Présidents et l’Afrique: De Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterand - Quarante Ans de Politique Africaine, (Paris, 1995).
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behind Charles de Gaulle’s decision to support Biafra in the Nigerian Civil War, and is the
most comprehensive analysis of France’s support for the Biafran separatists currently
available.9 Kirsty Melville’s ‘The Involvement of France and Francophone Africa in the
Nigerian Civil War’ in turn is based primarily on the contemporary journalistic accounts of
the war discussed above, and consequently offers few new high-political insights on
France’s role in the Nigerian Civil War.10
Apart from the occasional reference to British discontent with French policy, none
of the historiography on the Nigerian Civil War discussed above has examined in detail
British reactions to France’s involvement in the war, a perspective that is particularly
illuminating given Britain’s imperial history in Nigeria. On the basis of British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) documents, as well as records of British Parliamentary
Debates and memoirs of British politicians involved in Nigerian and French affairs, the aim
of this dissertation is therefore to examine British perceptions of French policy during the
Nigerian Civil War, following the French declaration of support for Biafra (July 1968), and
determine what Britain considered France’s aims in Nigeria to be. It will also explore
British attempts to alter French Nigerian policy and assess the success of these efforts.
Finally, by considering the extent to which French policy during the Nigerian Civil War
was an obstacle to good relations between Britain and France in this period, this
dissertation attempts to draw some wider conclusions on the impact of the Biafran affair on
Anglo-French relations more generally in the late 1960s.
9 D. Bach, ‘Le Général de Gaulle et la Guerre Civile au Nigeria’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 14, 2 (1980).10 K. Melville. The Involvement of France and Francophone West Africa in the Nigerian Civil War (Perth, 1979).
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MAP OF THE SECESSIONIST STATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA (1967 –
1970) AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (MAY 1967)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian-Biafran_war)
BIAFRA
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July 1968 – April 1969
France’s Nigerian Policy under Charles de Gaulle
During its first year (May 1967 – June 1968) the French government gave minimal
attention to the Nigerian Civil War, except for declaring an embargo on arms sales to both
Nigeria and Biafra on 12 June 1968 and making plans to send aid to Biafra.11 However,
over the summer of 1968, the French position changed as increased media attention and
statements by politicians regarding the conflict mobilised French public opinion in favour
of the Biafran cause. This set France apart from Britain in what was to become ‘a war
between Great Powers in their own material and economic interests.’12 Official statements
of French intent, particularly the declaration made by President Charles de Gaulle on 9
September 1968, as well as reports of arms being flown into Biafra from the Ivory Coast
and Gabon in French aircraft (which according to British FCO sources amounted to
between 100 and 150 tons per week) increased British suspicion of French involvement in
the conflict.13 France repeatedly denied its role in this arms traffic, claiming their only
involvement in the conflict was as part of humanitarian relief operations including those
organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as plans to collaborate
the OCAM (Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache).14 However, the close relations
France maintained with the Ivory Coast and Gabon, as well as much circumstantial
evidence, such as reports of French officers overseeing the loading of military supplies onto
planes at airstrips in Libreville and Abidjan,15 led many British politicians to believe that
France was more involved than it claimed. 11 Bach, ‘Le Général’, p. 260.12 [H]ouse of [L]ords Debate, vol.304, c.742, 21/07/1969.13 TNA/FCO/65/266_18, Stewart to Paris, 28/10/1968.14 TNA/FCO/65/268_100a, Stewart to Paris, 29/01/1969.15 TNA/FCO/65/266_23a, Wilson to Tebbit, 30/10/1968.
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During late 1968 and early 1969 British journalists and politicians speculated about
France’s motivations for this seemingly bizarre policy that allowed the conflict in Nigeria
to continue. The Guardian hypothesised that oil was the primary determinant in French
policy,16 while a report in the Daily Mirror suggested that France’s decision to support
Biafra was rooted in de Gaulle’s ‘obsessive’ hatred of the British.17 France maintained
throughout the course of the war that its principal concern was the well-being of the Ibo
people. This profession of humanitarian concern was however incomprehensible to British
FCO officials who interpreted increased French moral and military support for the
separatists as a significant factor contributing to the Biafran will and ability to fight, and the
consequent prolongation of the conflict. French policy therefore ran contrary to their
humanitarian rationale as it maintained a civil war that prolonged the ‘appalling suffering
of the Ibo people’.18
Paris’ humanitarian position was further distorted by the apparent divergence
between the concerns of the French population and those of certain members of the French
government, particularly Charles de Gaulle’s entourage. This internal division of opinion
was particularly apparent in March 1969, when the French national “Aid Biafra Week”
sparked controversy within circles sympathetic to the Biafran cause. During the week
fundraising was carried out in aid of Biafra with the support of the French government, the
Biafra Action Committee, formed by Raymond Offroy (French ambassador to Nigeria until
his expulsion from Nigeria in 1961), and publicised across the media, particularly in the
Gaullist newspaper, La Nation. However, various religious groups and trade unions that
supported the Biafran cause were opposed to the French government’s involvement in these
16 TNA/FCO/65/266_47, ‘Oil Bait’, The Guardian, 03/12/1968.17 TNA/FCO/65/269_121, W. Wilson, ‘Blood Oil and Hate’ Daily Mirror, 07/03/1969.18 TNA/FCO/65/267_66a, Brief for Anglo-French talks, 31/10/1968.
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fundraising efforts and what they perceived as the consequent debasement of the pro-
Biafran campaign.19 This opposition to French governmental policy in Biafra from within
France itself led the British government to question further French motives and their claim
to be acting solely on humanitarian grounds.
A commonly held assumption was that French policy was shaped by commercial
concerns, particularly the desire to exploit Biafra’s oil and mineral resources. The close
relationship between the Elysée (the office of the French President) and the Société
Anonyme Française de Recherches et d’Exploration Pétrolières (SAFRAP), as well as
France’s need to secure new oil reserves due to the reduction of supplies from Algeria,20 led
the Oil Department of the British government to assert that there was ‘an important “oily”
element’ to French policy in Nigeria.21 Moreover, the fact that at the outset of the war the
majority of SAFRAP’s Nigerian oil reserves lay in Ibo-dominated territory suggests that oil
was a determining factor in France’s decision to support Biafra.22 Nevertheless, the
commercial explanation for French policy was largely discounted. France had greater
investment and trading links in Federal Nigeria than in Biafra,23 and French support for the
Biafrans continued even after Biafra’s oil fields fell into Federal hands.24 Furthermore, the
amount of oil France obtained from Nigeria was minimal, with only 3% of French oil
purchases in 1966 coming from Nigeria.25 In any case, Charles de Gaulle’s foreign policy
was rarely shaped by economic considerations and it was left to the more commercially
minded to worry about the possible damage to France’s business interests in Nigeria.26 For
19 TNA/FCO /65/269_130, Simpson-Orlebar to Moberly, 01/04/1969.20 TNA/FCO/65/267_47, Wilson to Campbell, 04/12/1969.21 TNA/FCO 65/269_126, Wilson to Monson, 17/03/1969. 22 ‘Nigeria: France’s Biafra Bombshell’, Africa Confidential, 16 (9/08/1968), cited in C. Uche, ‘Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War’, Journal of African History, 49 (2008), p. 129.23 [H]ouse of [C]ommons Debate, vol.769, c.1462, 27/08/1968.24 Stremlau, International Politics, p. 225. 25 Z. Cervenka, A History of the Nigerian Civil War (Ibadan, 1972), p. 103. 26 TNA/FCO/65/267_78, Anderson to Wilson, 02/01/1969.
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de Gaulle commercial factors came into play only when potential economic gain was linked
with geopolitical concerns.27 In the context of the Nigerian Civil War, France was keen to
take control of British oil concessions in Nigeria. This desire to obtain oil was, however,
less to do with the oil itself and more to do with gaining the upper hand over Britain in
West Africa.
For France, Nigeria was a large and successful Anglophone federation that posed a
threat to France’s position in West Africa and the stability of Francophone Africa. The
friendly and liberal relations enjoyed by Nigeria with its former colonial ruler contrasted
sharply with the relations between France and its former African dependencies. Nigeria was
thus ‘un pôle d’attraction’ to its weaker Francophone neighbours, and its existence posed a
grave danger to Francophonie.28 These worries were, according to British politicians,
shaped by the ‘absurd historical analogies’29 of Charles de Gaulle and France’s memory of
Anglo-French rivalry in Africa in the late nineteenth century, as well as recent upheavals in
French Africa, particularly in Algeria.30 French policy in Nigeria during the civil war was a
remnant of ‘the old days – of Fashoda and the rival parties of French and British officers
going round Borgu planting the Tricoleur [sic] and the Union Jack at each village they
came to’ and dictated largely by the desire to frustrate Britain in Africa.31 Cynicism about
France’s ‘specifically anti-British operation’32 shaped by de Gaulle’s obsessive desire ‘to
give a knock to the Anglo-Saxons’33 permeated the British media and political world.
27 Bach, ‘Le Général’, p. 272.28 TNA/FCO/65/266_26, P. Decraene, ‘Les grandes puissances interviennent de plus en plus ouvertement dans la guerre civile du Nigeria’, Le Monde, 01/11/1968. 29 HC Debate, vol.775, c.664, 12/12/1968.30 TNA/FCO/65/267_48, Campbell to W. Wilson, 28/11/1968.31 TNA/FCO/65/266_23, Wilson to Tebbit, 31/10/1968. 32 HC Debate, vol.779, c.1668, 13/03/1969.33 D. Hunt, On the Spot: An Ambassador Remembers (London, 1975), p. 196.
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Interpretations such as these suggest deep-rooted tensions underpinning Anglo-French
contacts in Nigeria in this period.
The centrality of Charles de Gaulle to French policy was acknowledged by British
journalists and politicians alike, who emphasised the shift in the French position towards
the Biafran separatists following de Gaulle’s increased involvement in the Nigerian affair.34
France’s African policy was becoming ever more the domaine réservé of the Elysée, with
Jacques Foccart, Charles de Gaulle’s chief advisor on Africa from 1960 until de Gaulle’s
resignation in 1969, ‘master-minding the operation’ in Nigeria, with the Quai d’Orsay
allegedly uninvolved.35 British politicians did acknowledge that certain members of the
Quai were more closely associated with Biafra than others, such as Michel Debré (Foreign
Minister, 30 May 1968 - 22 June 1969) who took the Gaullist line, adopting a ‘mystic’
attitude towards the Ibos.36 However, despite the presence Biafran sympathisers at the Quai,
as well as apparent awareness of the extent and nature of French involvement in Biafra, the
French foreign ministry did not appear to be in a position to influence French policy in
Nigeria.
The Quai’s apparent lack of weight in France’s African policy-making created
many problems for the British government as they attempted to contend with France’s
involvement in the Nigerian Civil War. In late 1968 the British Embassy in Paris proposed
taking advantage of the Quai d’Orsay’s anxieties about French policy in the hope that they
might influence the Elysée to alter its position and use its influence in Biafra to help bring
about a settlement.37 However as the months passed it became increasingly apparent that,
despite some positive contacts between the Quai and British diplomats in Paris, Quai
34 TNA/FCO/65/267_48, Campbell to W. Wilson, 28/11/1968.35 H. Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London, 1971), p. 560.36 TNA/FCO/65/267_58, Fielding to West African Department, 10/12/1968. 37 TNA/FCO/33/536_11, Soames to FCO, 04/10/1968.
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statements on the Nigerian conflict were little more than an ‘echo’ of Jacques Foccart
himself.38 De Gaulle and Foccart’s control over France’s African policy was paramount,
and there was not a single British politician or diplomat, in London or Paris, who could
break this Elysée monopoly over French involvement in the Nigerian Civil War.
Whilst the FCO did not hold out much hope that they themselves could influence de
Gaulle or Foccart, they did believe that African states might be able to have an impact on
French policy in Nigeria. French support for the Biafran separatists contributed to anti-
French sentiment in Nigeria created by French nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert in 1960.
The FCO hoped that this discontent might be translated into a coherent Nigerian attack on
French policy. The Nigerians however were far from enthusiastic about confronting France
and made few public declarations against the French. They were fearful of provoking
France, and particularly de Gaulle, into increasing support for Biafra and thus prolonging
the war. They also, perceptively perhaps, believed that de Gaulle was backing the Biafrans
in an attempt to reduce Anglo-Saxon influence in West Africa, and that the civil conflict
was a result of great power rivalries being acted out in Africa. Thus Britain had to approach
Nigeria with caution to avoid confirming fears that the Nigerian Civil War was developing
into an Anglo-French conflict.39
British politicians also discussed working through other African leaders, particularly
those from Francophone Africa such as the President of the Ivory Coast, Félix Houphouët-
Boigny (1960-1993) and Léopold Sédar Senghor, the Senegalese President (1960-1980),
both of whom maintained close relations with de Gaulle and Foccart. It was hoped that an
African approach would be more successful than a direct British approach as it would play
on de Gaulle’s sensitivities about Africa and possibly act to counterbalance the influence of
38 TNA/FCO/65/266_36, Soames to FCO, 14/11/1968. 39 TNA/FCO/65/266_7, Willan to Wilson, 19/10/1968.
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Houphouët-Boigny on the Elysée.40 Nigeria’s reluctance to discuss matters directly with the
French prompted a further suggestion that the Federal government could raise the issue
with the Consultative Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and persuade
them in turn to approach de Gaulle. The OAU however failed to make an impact on the
situation.41 And while the Emperor of Ethiopia, President Kenyatta of Kenya and several
other African leaders were also considered as possible intermediaries, none of these plans
made it further than the drawing board.42
One African approach discussed at length was the suggestion that President Senghor
could be induced to encourage the French to reduce their support for Biafra. Senghor
supported the concept of “One Nigeria”, but was within the Francophone sphere and thus
believed to be in a position to influence Paris’ policy. However, relations between de
Gaulle and Senghor were plagued with difficulties which reduced the Senegalese weight in
French policy. Matters were further complicated by the French political and economic
support that was keeping the Senghor regime afloat. Moreover, Senghor’s desire to avoid
criticism left him unwilling to approach France on Britain’s behalf. Although Senghor did
make some statements indicating his opposition to French policy, his allegiance remained
firmly rooted in Francophonie.43
The problem that faced the British government was that, although an African
approach was a good idea in theory, in reality there were few Africans leaders who would
not only agree to act on behalf of the UK government, but were also in a position to
influence French politicians. The potentially influential leaders of France’s former African
colonies were, according to one FCO official, like schoolboys who hero-worshipped their
40 TNA/FCO/65/300_2, Soames to FCO, 08/10/1969.41 TNA/FCO/65/347_2, Wilson to Tebbit, 06/11/1968.42 TNA/FCO/65/300_3, Correspondence on France and Nigeria, 09/10/1969.43 TNA/FCO/65/300.
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‘Head-Boy’ de Gaulle and were thus unlikely to make a stand against France.44 Despite
various tactics being adopted, British attempts at working through African leaders yielded
few positive results. The issue here is not perhaps the success or failure of these efforts but
the fact that the British government were resorting to indirect means of dealing with
France. That British politicians felt they needed to make use of such oblique methods is
indicative of the height and depth of the barriers that existed between France and Britain,
effectively blocking direct Anglo-French discussion of the Nigerian problem. Anglo-French
disagreement over the civil war in Nigeria was part of a broader and more fundamental
Anglo-French divide rooted in a century of rivalry on the African continent.
This is not to say that the British government did not make some attempts to
establish a dialogue with French politicians on Nigeria. But such approaches were
extremely cautious, particularly in the light of Anglo-French disagreements over Europe,
exacerbated further in the wake of the ‘Soames Affair’ (February 1969) when the British
Foreign Office leaked details of a private conversation between de Gaulle and Christopher
Soames (British Ambassador to France, 1968-1972) about the EEC 45 Moreover, the
absence of any tangible evidence of French military involvement also created obstacles to
discussion with the French.46 ‘The joy of it all’, according to one journalist, ‘is that France
is not directly involved – or at least no one so far can prove that Paris is.’47
To overcome this predicament the FCO initially avoided ministerial approaches,
favouring high-level bilateral discussions. The first opportunity for such a dialogue was at
the annual Anglo-French talks on Africa which began on 17 December 1968. The main
objective at these talks with regard to the Nigerian situation was to persuade the French
44 TNA/FCO/65/300_3, Correspondence on France and Nigeria, 09/10/1969.45 TNA/FCO/65/266_38a, Brief for meeting with Soames, 19/11/1968. 46 TNA/FCO/65/347_11, Moberly to Fielding, 22/11/1968. 47 TNA/FCO/65/267_55, J. Wilde, ‘Keeping Biafra Alive’, Time, 06/12/1968.
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government to alter its position and stop encouraging the Biafrans to continue fighting. It
was hoped that France would agree to the necessity of an early ceasefire and negotiations,
and that they convince Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu (leader of Biafra, 1967-1970) of the
same thing. In order to achieve these objectives the FCO planned to emphasise the potential
dangers of France’s policy, particularly the possibility of Communist infiltration of Nigeria
that could pose a threat to Francophone West Africa. They also proposed to highlight the
potential tensions between Francophone and Anglophone Africa as a result of France’s
support for Biafra, underlining the possibility of Anglo-French conflict over the Nigerian
issue. British emphasis on the shared concerns of Britain and France, particularly their
common interest in preventing USSR penetration and maintaining African stability, reveals
the British hope that France could be induced to share their point of view, thus averting
serious Anglo-French disagreement over Nigeria.48 In the event these talks were
unsuccessful and the British government was unable to convince France to alter its policy.
Attention therefore shifted towards lower-level approaches, in the hope that discussion with
French ministers at the Quai would spread upward though the French foreign office and
produce more positive results.49
A “prise de contacte” between British diplomats and Claude Lebel and Jean Gueury
(Director and Deputy Director respectively for African Affairs at the Quai) on 20
December 1968 was interpreted as a positive development in Anglo-French discussions on
Nigeria. The British politicians sensed a ‘germ of a possible compromise’ on the French
side due to Quai unease about French support for Biafra. However, Debré’s loyalty to the
Biafran cause, as well as tight Elysée control over Nigerian affairs, limited the scope within
which Britain could work. A shift in high level opinion was necessary if the British
48 TNA/FCO/65/267_66a, Brief for Anglo-French Talks, 17/12/1968.49 TNA/FCO/65/267_68a, Tebbit to Monson, 23/12/1968.
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government could have any hope of altering French policy in Nigeria.50 The possibility of
approaching Jacques Foccart was briefly discussed, but the West Africa Department of
FCO had reservations from the outset and the proposed meeting failed to materialise.51
As the months passed Britain failed to make any sort of impact on France’s policy
and French support for the Biafrans continued unabated. Attempts to bridge the divide
between Britain and France over Nigeria were brought to a standstill as French politicians
became distracted by internal affairs, particularly the Constitutional Referendum that took
place on 27 April 1969. Because of the repeated failure of direct communication with the
French government, Britain was left to pursue other methods to alter France’s policy. It was
hoped the division in French public opinion on Biafra might be exploited, particularly
following the problems of the French national “Aid Biafra week” in March 1969. However
British politicians remained unconvinced about how deep this rift actually was, reducing
the potential impact such an approach might have.52 The suggestion to use unattributable
propaganda to sway French public opinion was treated with reserve due to concern that the
information might be traced back to the British government, leading to further difficulties
in Anglo-French relations.
The British government seemed to have run out of ideas on how to deal with France
and their policy in Nigeria. The minimal possibility of direct high level approaches shows
how far apart the British FCO was from its French counterpart and prompted the adoption
of alternative lower level approaches as well as indirect methods. These efforts however
had little effect on French policy. The cul-de-sac in which Britain found itself was the result
of a divergence in Anglo-French aims and interpretations of the Nigerian situation as a
50 TNA/FCO/65/267_68a, Tebbit to Monson, 23/12/1968.51 TNA/FCO/65/268_93, Wilson to Campbell, 22/01/1960. 52 TNA/FCO/65/269_130, Simpson-Orlebar to Moberly, 01/04/1969.
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whole. French assessments of the Biafran military position and the role of guerrilla warfare
were markedly different to Britain’s, as was their interpretation of the psychology of the
Ibos and the flexibility of the Federal government.53 Nigerian students who arrived in
France in November 1968 on French government scholarships were described by the
British government as ‘hostages’, whilst the French government saw them as part of a
friendly Franco-Nigerian cultural exchange. The British government made the distinction
between funds raised for humanitarian causes and military causes. France did not.54
Furthermore, Britain and France had different definitions of certain key terms
relating to the conflict including “federation”, “confederation” and “self-determination”.
France favoured a confederal solution to a federal solution (de Gaulle was notoriously
opposed to federations, particularly those of Anglo-Saxon origin). Britain however did not
believe it was possible to differentiate between a federation and a confederation as both
terms could be applied equally to several different situations. Similarly, France claimed that
its belief in the right of the Ibo people to disposer d’eux-mêmes did not necessarily imply
support for Biafran independence, a similar stance to that adopted by de Gaulle towards the
Québécois separatists in his infamous ‘Vive Québec Libre’ speech of July 1967. Britain
however associated self-determination with independence, and thus made no distinction
between the two terms. Disagreement also arose over whether or not the killings of the Ibo
people should be classified as genocide.55 France and Britain were on a different page when
it came to Nigeria. They repeatedly misinterpreted and misunderstood each other’s actions
and intentions, revealing deeply rooted differences which placed severe limitations on the
extent to which Britain and France could enjoy positive relations. As such, the Nigerian
53 TNA/FCO/33/536_36, Fielding to Wilson, 03/02/1969.54 TNA/FCO/65/266_34, Anderson to Minister, 08/11/1968.55 TNA/FCO/65/266_12, Moberly to Fielding, 24/10/1968
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affair was to affect other areas of Anglo-French contact and undermine potential
cooperation between the two nations in Africa, Europe and elsewhere.
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April 1969 – September 1970
After General de Gaulle: ‘ plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’
On 27 April 1969 France went to the polls to vote in a Constitutional Referendum
that would decide whether de Gaulle’s proposals to increase regional powers and reform
the Senate would be brought into legislation. De Gaulle had declared his intention to resign
if he was defeated. Despite early suggestions that de Gaulle would win, only 47% of the
population voted in favour of the reforms. The remaining 53% voted ‘non’ and
consequently, on 28 April 1969, after more than ten years as the President of the French
Republic, Charles de Gaulle resigned.56 The British government hoped his resignation
would lead to a shift in French Nigerian policy and mark the beginning of a new era in
Anglo-French relations.
In the second half of April reports that the quantity of French military supplies
reaching Biafra was diminishing began to appear, suggesting a possible modification in the
French attitude towards the Nigerian situation. Distracted by internal affairs and influenced
by French industrialists and businessmen fearful for future French investments in Nigeria,
France appeared to be experiencing ‘a distinct cooling off’ in their enthusiasm for the
Biafran cause.57 Although scepticism remained about the extent to which French interest
and involvement was actually decreasing, some, including Christopher Soames, were
hopeful of a French policy review following the referendum.58 There was further cause for
optimism when, on 2 May, the interim President, Alain Poher, replaced Jacques Foccart
with Daniel Pepy.
56 R. Kedward, La Vie en Bleu: France and the French since 1900 (London, 2006), p. 430-431.57 TNA/FCO/65/269_139a, BBC World Service Broadcast, 24/04/1969.58 TNA/FCO/65/269_141, Soames to FCO, 25/04/1969.
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The French media offered additional evidence of a possible shift in France’s
position towards Biafra. French commentators’ interpretations of the conflict were
increasingly rational and subjective, with some alluding to the need for Biafra to
surrender.59 One French journalist discussed the inevitability of a modification of French
policy if de Gaulle were to resign. He also acknowledged the cynical, anti-British nature of
France’s role in the Nigerian Civil War, a movement away from the media’s former
justification of French action on moral grounds.60 This perceived movement in French
intellectual thinking increased British hope that the French government would alter its
position on Biafra. The appointment of Georges Pompidou as the new President of the
French Republic on 15 June further buoyed British optimism. Even before his election
British diplomats based in Paris reported that, if elected, Pompidou would not continue de
Gaulle’s ‘emmerdements africains’.61 The removal of the dedicated Gaullist and supporter
of the Biafran people, Michel Debré, as foreign minister, and his replacement with Maurice
Schumann on 22 June was seen as further evidence of a possible departure from de
Gaulle’s Nigerian policy.
Whilst British government officials in Paris were heralding the end of Gaullism,
British diplomats and politicians outside of France interpreted events differently. The West
Africa Department of the FCO responded to de Gaulle’s resignation with reserve, uncertain
if the ‘new situation in relation to the French attitude to Biafra’ would actually lead to a
policy review by the French.62 Maurice Foley (Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the FCO)
predicted that Gaullist policies would survive the demise of de Gaulle himself.63 Moreover,
59 TNA/FCO/65/269_162, Moberly to Collins, 22/05/1969.60 TNA/FCO/65/269_158, Conversation with Decraene, 16/05/1969.61 TNA/FCO/65/269_164, Simpson-Orlebar to Millington, 04/06/1969.62 TNA/FCO/65/269_142, Wilson to Tebbit, 29/04/1969.63 TNA/FCO/65/269_151, Wilson to Hunt, 05/05/1969.
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contrary to the assumption of the British Embassy in Paris that Foccart would never
return,64 those based in Whitehall were not surprised by Foccart’s reappointment on 26
June.65 His return was seen as proof of the new regime’s intention to continue de Gaulle’s
African policies, dashing hopes for a modification of France’s Nigerian policy. The British
Embassy in Paris continued to put a positive spin on ‘Foccart’s reincarnation’, emphasising
Pompidou’s attempts to disassociate himself from Foccart.66 Christopher Soames made
much of the relocation of Foccart’s office away from the Elysée, as well as the change in
Foccart’s title, which no longer made reference to responsibility to the President.67 That
France’s African policy no longer seemed to be the domaine réservé of the Elysée was
interpreted as an early indication of the French government’s intention to change its
position on the Nigerian Civil War.
Yet ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la meme chose’.68 The replacement of Debré with
Schumann and Pompidou’s election as de Gaulle’s successor produced continuity more
than change. Although considered better disposed to Britain than his predecessor,69 it did
not take long for comparisons between Schumann and Debré to be drawn.70 Furthermore,
Schumann’s reference to “Biafra” on 9 July71 contrasted with efforts immediately after de
Gaulle’s resignation to speak of “the Ibos”, rather than “the Biafrans”,72 suggesting
renewed French commitment to the Biafran cause. Similarly, the expectation that
Pompidou would make a decisive break with Gaullism quickly disappeared when
64 TNA/FCO/65/269_164, Simpson-Orlebar to Millington, 04/06/1969.65 TNA/FCO/65/270_177, McEntee to Simpson-Orlebar, 04/07/1969.66 TNA/FCO/65/270_174, Simpson-Orlebar to Moberly, 27/06/1969.67 TNA/FCO/65/270_172, Soames to FCO, 26/06/1969.68 Alphonse Karr, Les Guêpes, January 1849, cited in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (Oxford, 1964), p. 119. The English translation of this quotation is ‘the more things change, the more they are the same.’69 TNA/FCO/65/271_240, Wilson to Tebbit, 08/10/1969.70 TNA/FCO/65/270_210, Simpson-Orlebar to Watts, 22/08/1969.71 TNA/FCO/65/270_179, Soames to FCO, 09/07/1969.72 TNA/FCO/65/269_154, Soames to FCO, 08/05/1969.
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Pompidou met one of Biafra’s most loyal supporters, Omar Bongo (President of Gabon,
1967-present day) to discuss the conflict, indicating the new French President’s intention to
continue supporting Biafra.73
As France stubbornly remained champions of the Biafran cause, the British
government began to question their refusal, despite mounting pressure, to alter their
position. Many of the familiar explanations of French action were repeated. The
geopolitical, commercial and humanitarian concerns that continued to shape French policy
were cited, as was the anti-British element of French policy-making. The absence of any
fresh insight indicates the British government’s struggle to comprehend French actions and
motives. Correspondence from all departments of the FCO was increasingly concentrated
on the paradoxical nature of France’s support for Biafra. The incompatibility of France’s
sponsorship of the Biafran cause with the maintenance of normal diplomatic relations with
Nigeria was highlighted,74 as was the contradiction between French support for Biafra and
France’s general policy objectives in West Africa.75 An inconsistency was also noted in the
continued vigour of Franco-Nigerian trade, which contributed more to the Federal Nigerian
economy than France gave to Biafra in the form of military support.76 That France was
prolonging the conflict, whilst at the same time being a position to help end the war, was
also difficult for British diplomats and politicians to comprehend.77
United in their incomprehension of French policy, the British government
increasingly denounced French motives. France’s intentions for support Biafra were viewed
as dishonourable, particularly their desire to exploit Nigerian oil and frustrate Britain in
73 TNA/FCO/65/270_181, BBC Report, 21/07/196974 TNA/FCO/65/270_182, Wilson to Glass, 29/07/1969.TNA/FCO/65/270_184, Stewart to Lagos, 30/07/1969.75 TNA/FCO/65/270_196, Soames to FCO, 07/08/1969.76 Stremlau, International Politics, p. 233.77 TNA/FCO/65/271_221, Brief for meeting with Schumann, 17/09/1969.
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West Africa. Paris was condemned for allowing the conflict to continue and, as a result,
damaging British interests in Nigeria. Such criticism shows how France’s Nigerian policy
was no longer seen as a minor irritant, but part of a direct attack on Britain. Sir Leslie Glass
(British High Commissioner to Nigeria, 1969-1971) was particularly open in his criticism,
stressing the ‘malice and greed which originally inspired’ the French support for Biafra. He
advocated publicising France’s role in the war in an attempt to turn opinion against the
French government both inside and outside France. The British Embassy in Paris however
had reservations about Glass’ plan due to fears that exposing French activities could
‘stiffen Gaullist determination’78 and prompt an upsurge in approval of France’s support for
‘“gallant little Biafra” against the threat of… Federal Nigerians armed to the teeth by the
wicked British and the Russians!’79 Fears for their reputation, which was particularly at risk
if they became associated with the USSR, deterred British politicians from being too overt
in their attacks on France. The British Embassy in Paris was more reluctant than British
government officials elsewhere, perhaps due to its close proximity to the French
government and its Cold War policies of non-alignment.
The British Embassy in Paris also opposed suggestions made by John Wilson (Head
of the West African Department of the FCO, 1968-1973) and others that Britain should try
to persuade Nigeria to take firm action against France, particularly targeting French
commercial concessions in Federal territory.80 This previously discarded idea for a Nigerian
approach was resurrected in the hope that Nigeria might be more willing to tackle Paris
now de Gaulle was no longer in power.81 Nigeria however remained unwilling to criticise
France due to its persistent worries about provoking France to intensify its support for
78 TNA/FCO/65/270_204, Johnston to Palliser, 14/08/1969.79 TNA/FCO/65/270_202, Palliser to Johnston, 8/08/1969.80 TNA/FCO/65/270_182, Wilson to Glass, 29/07/1969.81 TNA/FCO/65/269_145, Stewart to Paris, 29/04/1969.
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Biafra, which could in turn lead to Biafran victory. This was a scenario which British
politicians were also anxious to avoid.82 The possibility of working through Senegal was
once again explored due to the close relationship between Senghor and Pompidou.
Although critical of the France’s support for Biafra and its nurturing of a ‘cold war in
Nigeria’,83 Senghor preferred to maintain a more neutral stance.84 In any case, Senghor’s
influence over the French President was counterbalanced by the ardent Biafran supporter,
Houphouët-Boigny, and his connections to Pompidou.85
Whilst the different departments of the British FCO debated the merits of these
indirect attacks, British politicians and diplomats discussed possible direct approaches to
the French. The renewed interest in direct contacts shows the increased anxiety amongst
British politicians and diplomats about the Nigerian situation and the resulting negative
consequences for Anglo-French relations. However, once again the British FCO struggled
to agree on the exact line to take with the French. Whilst those in Whitehall favoured
dealing with low level Quai officials, the British Embassy in Paris believed that only a top
level directive would allow ‘a “real wind of change” to blow ‘through the corridors of the
Quai’.86 France’s repeated denial of involvement in the arms traffic to Biafra continued to
act as a barrier to any high or low level contacts,87 as did Britain’s desire to avoid being
accused of reviving old colonial rivalries.88 Fears of making the situation worse on the
ground in Nigeria, and, above all else, concerns about risking Britain’s EEC membership
82 TNA/FCO/65/270_183, Johnston to Foley, 30/04/1969.83 TNA/FCO/65/300_26, Report of Senghor interview with Figaro, 05/08/1969.84 TNA/FCO/65/300_23, Davidson to Moberly, 10/06/1969.85 TNA/FCO/65/270_200, Talks between Simpson-Orlebar and Ogunsulire, 06/08/1969.86 TNA/FCO/65/270_211, Palliser to Johnston, 20/08/1969.87 TNA/FCO/65/270_206, Freeman to FCO, 15/08/1969.88 TNA/FCO/65/271_217a, Glass to Johnston, 03/09/1969.
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and permanently damaging Anglo-French relations, led the British government to be
extremely cautious in their approaches to Paris.89
It did appear however that, given the failure of indirect methods and the escalation
of the problems in Nigeria, discussion with Paris was necessary if Britain was ever to
bridge the widening channel that separated British and French interpretations of the
Nigerian Civil War. This incongruity was patent in the different views Britain and France
held about Biafra’s secession. France believed Biafra’s declaration of independence from
Nigeria was a legitimate attempt to gain self-determination. Britain on the other hand,
characterised it as a rebellion. The British government attributed this different reading of
events to the contrasting styles of colonial and post-colonial policy the two countries
adopted,90 differences that meant France failed to understand Britain’s African policy as
well as the history and ambitions of the Ibo people.91 Here it is apparent that the Anglo-
French divide over Nigeria stemmed, not from the situation in Nigeria itself, but from a
century of disagreement and dispute over African and imperial policy.
Yet, although British politicians did not agree with France’s assessments of the war,
such as their description of the Nigerian Civil War as a religious war and their
concentration on the ‘Islamic bogey’ over the threat of Communist infiltration, they did
hope that, by presenting an accurate picture of the hostile influences in Nigeria, at least
some elements of French policy might be brought into line with that of Britain. As such the
possibility of Anglo-French cooperation in Nigeria became an item on the agenda in this
period.92 The ‘somewhat easier atmosphere of the post-de Gaulle period’ contributed to
rising British expectation that Britain and France might be able to collaborate on peace
89 TNA/FCO/65/271_232, Soames to FCO, 30/09/1969.90 TNA/FCO/65/270_205, Johnston to Wilson, 14/08/1969.91 TNA/FCO/65/270_204, Johnston to Palliser, 14/08/1969.92 TNA/FCO/65/270_205, Johnston to Wilson, 14/08/1969.
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efforts.93 Furthermore, the French pro-Biafran campaign was now seen as part of an internal
feud between the moderate majority and a hard-line Gaullist minority, with Jacques Foccart
and the Union des jeunes pour le progrès (UJP) mobilising public opinion about Biafra to
attack Pompidou and the new regime. The FCO questioned whether Britain was really the
main target of France’s Nigerian policy, raising hopes that the Anglo-French breach could
be repaired.94
As optimism grew among British politicians and diplomats, Anglo-French
differences were increasingly regarded as insignificant in comparison with the shared
threats that were created by the Nigerian Civil War, particularly the risk of Soviet
expansion in Africa.95 In discussions with the French, British politicians placed emphasis
on the shared desire for African stability, in the hope that France might be persuaded to
cooperate in a peace plan where both Britain and France would use their respective
influences to help bring about a settlement.96 It appears therefore that British politicians and
diplomats believed the only way to bring the conflict to a close was to overlook the impasse
that divided Britain and France. The need to stabilise Anglo-French relations was not only
essential for ending the Nigerian Civil War, but also for resolving tensions between Britain
and France in Africa and elsewhere.
93 TNA/FCO/65/271_221, Brief for meeting with Schumann, 17/09/1969.94 TNA/FCO/65/270_210, Simpson-Orlebar to Watts, 22/08/1969.95 TNA/FCO/65/271_220, Soames to FCO, 11/09/1969.96 TNA/FCO/65/271_231, Conversation between Stewart and Schumann, 20/09/1969.
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October 1969 – January 1970
The Failure of France’s Nigerian Policy
In October 1969 the Nigerian government began preparing for a final assault against
Biafra which was intended to defeat the breakaway state and bring it back under the Federal
rule.97 Alongside hopes that the war might end soon, a modification of France’s Nigerian
policy was also anticipated. The British media reported a transformation of the French
attitude towards the war. According to one British journalist reporting from Paris
‘unofficial French support for Biafra’ was to be ‘discouraged’, with a guarantee from
Pompidou himself ‘that there should be no further French involvement, official or
otherwise, in internal Nigerian affairs.’98 The British government however largely
discounted such reports as speculative and based upon tenuous evidence, recognising that a
major shift in France’s position, as predicted by the British press, was extremely
improbable.99 The best anyone could hope for was a minor modification that might bring
the war to a speedier conclusion, thus reducing the threats posed by the continuance of the
conflict and removing the obstacle that stood in the way of constructive Anglo-French
relations.
Those within the British government most hopeful of a small change on the French
side could be found at the British Embassy in Paris. They believed discussions between the
French and British foreign ministers in New York in late September had prompted top level
Quai officials to reconsider France’s Nigerian policy and, as a result, propose talks on the
issue with the British government. Although Nigeria was to be discussed under the veil of
97 De St. Jorre, Nigerian Civil War, p. 368.98 TNA/FCO/65/272_259, J. Smalldon, ‘French support for Biafra relief ‘will be discouraged’’, The Daily Telegraph, 30/10/1969.99 TNA/FCO/65/272_264, Simpson-Orlebar to Wilson, 07/11/1969.
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talks on the Middle East, the fact that the French government had proposed the meeting at
all was interpreted as an indication of a possible change in their policy and an alignment of
Anglo-French objectives in Nigeria.100 Optimism about a shift in France’s position was
heightened further when Claude Lebel (Director for African Affairs at the Quai) contacted
the British Embassy in Paris to arrange talks with London sooner than expected.101
Schumann’s speech to the French National Assembly on 4 November, in which he repeated
many elements of de Gaulle’s speech of 9 September 1968, but omitted the passage in
which de Gaulle had acknowledged the possibility of future diplomatic recognition of the
breakaway state, was also perceived as a signal that France would soon give up the idea of
Biafran self-determination.102 The replacement, in December 1969, of Lebel with Bruno de
Leusse de Syon, who lacked an ‘emotional or irrational commitment to “Biafra”’, was seen
as another positive development in France’s Nigerian policy.103
British government officials in London and Lagos did not share however the
British Embassy’s optimism that a change would take place in France’s position towards
the Nigerian Civil War, proof perhaps that a little more perspective was needed to obtain an
accurate interpretation of events. Assessments of French policy from outside of the
Embassy were increasingly cynical, focusing on the dishonourable and irrational
motivations that shaped France’s continued support for Biafra, revealing the growing
British disillusion with French policy. British diplomats disregarded the French
government’s declaration of commitment to the right of the Ibos to disposer d’eux-mêmes,
citing as evidence France’s opposition to self-determination in Indochina and Algeria, as
well as the support they had given to the governments of Cameroon and Chad respectively
100 TNA/FCO/65/271_235, Palliser to Tebbit, 03/10/1969.101 TNA/FCO/65/271_237, Palliser to Arthur, 06/10/1969.102 TNA/FCO/65/272_266, Simpson-Orlebar to Watts, 14/11/1969.103 TNA/FCO/65/751_1, Palliser to Tebbit, 31/12/1969.
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against movements striving for increased autonomy.104 Yet, as has previously been
discussed, British and French conceptions of “self-determination” (and other important
terms relating to the conflict) were quite dissimilar, posing serious problems for Anglo-
French contacts in Nigeria. This difference in interpretation was symptomatic of the
fundamental misunderstandings that existed between Britain and France which created
insurmountable obstacles to improving Anglo-French relations.
Avowed champions of the Biafran cause continued to dictate France’s Nigerian
policy, a dominance that British politicians remained unable to destroy. Charles de Gaulle
continued to exercise a significant influence over the French political scene in the months
since his resignation, making a reduction in France’s support for Biafra seem unlikely.
Foccart also maintained his near absolute control over French African policy, with Nigerian
policy remaining the domaine réservé of the Elysée, despite earlier hopes that the Quai
control was increasing.105 Moreover, Houphouët-Boigny, a dedicated Biafran supporter,
continued to act as a valued advisor on African affairs to high-ranking French decision-
makers, including President Pompidou himself.106 His ability to influence French actions in
Nigeria stemmed from the great significance that French politicians attached to their
relations with Francophone African leaders in their pursuit of West African hegemony.107
The desire to avoid falling out with their African friends, a legacy of France’s imperial
policy in Africa, created an obstacle to any real change in France’s attitude towards the
Nigerian conflict. As long as Houphouët-Boigny continued to support Biafra, so too would
France.
104 TNA/FCO/65/272_256, Edden to Barder, 01/10/1969.105 TNA/FCO/65/271_240, Wilson to Tebbit, 08/10/1969.106 TNA/FCO/65/271_235, Palliser to Tebbit, 03/10/1969.107 Bach, ‘Le Général’, p. 271.
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Other legacies of colonialism were perceived to have an impact on France’s
Nigerian policy, acting as a barrier to any possible alteration of France’s position. The
British High Commissioner in Lagos, Sir Leslie Glass, expressed serious doubts that there
would be a modification in French policy, emphasising the role of Foccart in running what
he described as ‘an autonomous empire which seems to have inherited some of the
frustrated mystique of Frenchmen embittered by events in Indo-China and Algeria’.108 This
association between France’s imperial failures and their support for Biafra shows the deep-
rooted forces that British politicians and diplomats believed to be at work in France’s
African policy-making. France’s determination to support Biafra was rooted in its imperial
past, undermining any British hopes that France might alter its Nigerian policy in any
significant way.
Alongside these analyses of French motives ran pessimistic British assessments of
France’s role in the war which concentrated on the negative consequences of France’s
involvement. France was identified as being at the heart of the problem in Nigeria, and was
accused by the FCO of pursuing a policy in direct opposition to Britain, as well as being
‘mainly responsible for keeping Biafra alive and for keeping the war going.’ As a result the
British government was more and more convinced that it was necessary to take a firm
stance with France, rejecting ‘the fiction’ that France was a neutral bystander in the
conflict. It was vital that Britain ‘do everything possible to try to induce the French to
change their policy.’109
It was not only France’s perceived responsibility in maintaining the conflict in
Nigeria that determined the decision by British politicians and diplomats to adopt a firmer
line with France. The recognition that France’s role in the conflict was having a detrimental
108 TNA/FCO/65/272_262, Glass to Johnston, 06/12/1969.109 TNA/FCO/65/271_240, Wilson to Tebbit, 08/10/1969.
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impact on Britain’s interests in Nigeria contributed to a hardening British attitude towards
France over the Nigerian problem. In the earlier months of the conflict the British
government had been willing to disregard the fact that France were pursuing a policy which
endangered British material interests in the region to avoid upsetting Anglo-French
relations or damaging Britain’s position in Europe. However, as evidence mounted of the
damage to British commerce in Nigeria as a result of France’s support for Biafra, the need
for a frank approach to the French to persuade them to alter their policy was advocated as
essential.110
In mid-November 1969 arguably the most damning reports of French involvement
in the war hitherto available were brought to the British government’s attention. There was
now concrete evidence that the Biafran Air Force was using weapons of French
manufacture against British oil installations in Nigeria. Moreover, British businessmen
working in Nigeria began to raise concerns about the potential threat posed to British
property and citizens as a result of French involvement in the war. Although some of the
reports were subsequently deemed false, the British government was becoming increasingly
anxious about the adverse publicity it would receive if it was seen to be neglecting the
safety of British nationals, emphasising its concern to preserve its own reputation.111 This,
combined with the threat to British commerce and the persistence of fighting in Nigeria,
prompted British politicians to discuss plans to approach Paris immediately and insist that
they ‘put matters right.’112 The French government needed to be aware that in supporting
Biafra they were not only fuelling serious problems in Nigeria, but also creating a ‘major
irritant’ in Anglo-French relations.113 The urgency of this rhetoric illustrates the intensifying
110 TNA/FCO/65/272_246, Tebbit from Bendall, 14/10/1969.111 TNA/FCO/65/272_270, Soames to FCO, 27/11/1969.112 TNA/FCO/65/272_268, Stewart to Paris, 26/11/1969.113 TNA/FCO/65/272_277, Brief on France’s attitude to Nigeria and Biafra, 09/12/1969.
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need to resolve Anglo-French tensions for the sake of Nigeria, but also for Britain itself.
Despite being quick to criticise France for acting in its own self-interest, British politicians
and diplomats were slow to recognise that they were in fact doing the same.
In order to persuade France to change its position, British politicians once again
underlined again the threat of instability in Francophone Africa if the Soviet Union was
allowed to penetrate Nigeria and religious and ethnic tensions in the region were left to
multiply as a result of the continuance of the conflict.114 Alongside these arguments, the
potential irreversible damage to Franco-Nigerian relations was emphasised, as was the risk
that Nigerian antagonism towards France might be extended to Francophone West
Africa.115 Both of these outcomes would create serious problems for France if it wished to
maintain its treasured position in the region and, as such, it was hoped that by highlighting
these threats, France might be persuaded to alter its position. The fact that Britain was able
to identify correctly the connection France felt to Africa demonstrates Britain’s own
attachment to the continent, and a shared Anglo-French bond that could perhaps act as a
foundation for compromise in Nigeria.
Tactics for approaching France continued to be a matter of contention within British
diplomatic circles. Whilst in agreement about the necessity of ‘a personal approach’, exact
tactical details continued to be debated, with tensions once again arising between Whitehall
and the British Embassy in Paris. Christopher Soames suggested that Michael Stewart
(Foreign Secretary, 1968-1970) should tackle Schumann about Nigeria at the NATO
Summit (4-5 December) which both British and French foreign ministers would be
attending. Stewart was however far from enamoured with such a plan, proposing instead
that Soames should discuss Nigeria with Schumann in more private surroundings. Soames
114 TNA/FCO/65/272_256, Edden to Barder, 01/10/1969.115 TNA/FCO/65/272_283, Letter from Wilson to Palliser, 19/12/1969.
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planned to warn Schumann’s officials of the British intention to raise the issue with them.
Stewart, on the hand, did not want to allow the Quai time to prepare for the discussion and
thus favoured a more surprise approach to ‘shock’ Schumann ‘to call M. Foccart to
order.’116 Division amongst the British about the precise line to take with the French is
symptomatic perhaps of how much depended on Anglo-French discussions on Nigeria. The
fact that neither Soames nor Stewart were personally willing to take responsibility for
approaching France emphasises the difficulties involved in tackling France about their
support for Biafra and the way in which the disagreement over Nigeria troubled Anglo-
French communications overall.
The establishment of a dialogue on Nigeria was further frustrated by the continued
clash between British and French interpretations of the war. France believed an Ibo victory
was possible and that a united Nigeria would collapse. This contrasted with the British view
that the Biafrans could not win and that a “One Nigeria” could survive.117 France and
Britain also interpreted the USSR’s role in the conflict differently, with the French
maintaining that the USSR might reconsider its policy despite the fact Britain thought such
an occurrence would be unlikely. France continued to differentiate between “self-
determination” and “independence”, a distinction that British politicians had never
understood.118 Another contentious issue was whether genocide was taking place in Nigeria.
Britain insisted that the Federal government had no genocidal intentions.119 The French
government, on the other hand, reiterated the belief it had expressed throughout the
conflict, that genocide against the Ibo people was imminent.120
116 TNA/FCO/65/272_268-171, Correspondence between Stewart and Soames, 26-28/11/1969.117 TNA/FCO/65/272_256, Edden to Barder, 01/10/1969.118 TNA/FCO/65/272_258, Minutes of Anglo-French Talks, 21/10/1969.119 TNA/FCO/65/272_258, Minutes of Anglo-French Talks, 21/10/1969.120 TNA/FCO/65/751_8, Glass to FCO, 10/01/1970.
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Pessimism also surrounded France’s humanitarian initiatives in the final weeks of
the war. French criticism of the Federal government and their attempts to mobilise
international opinion about the suffering of the Biafran people was seen as a desperate final
attempt by France to reverse the poor military situation in Biafra and save their Nigerian
policy. As a result the British government sought to disassociate itself from France to avoid
upsetting Nigeria, demonstrating how it was not only the French who felt an attachment to
their former colonial territories.121 Despite the British government’s desire to distance itself
from France’s Nigerian policy, Britain’s own commitment to its former imperial
dependencies mirrors France’s attachment to its ex-African empire. It is possible to suggest
therefore that, despite the appearance of hostility, underneath the surface Britain and France
understood each other better than has hitherto been suggested.
The fall of Biafra on 14 January 1970 signalled the collapse of France’s Nigerian
policy. Throughout the conflict Britain and France had consistently stood on different sides,
disagreeing over numerous issues and repeatedly failing to understand each other’s aims.
This Anglo-French mésentente in Nigeria was, according to John Wilson, the result of the
different styles of diplomacy that Britain and France adopted. France’s foreign policy-
making was ‘devoid of any moral content’ and based ‘on ruthless self-interest pursued with
determination and entire lack of scruple’. Such a ‘fundamental’ difference in outlooks,
which had endured despite the ‘passing of de Gaulle’, posed grave problems for the future
of Anglo-French relations.122
However France’s recognition that its Nigerian policy was ‘in ruins’ following the
fall of Biafra reignited hopes amongst British politicians and diplomats that past
disagreements could be put behind them and Anglo-French cooperation in Nigeria could be
121 TNA/FCO/65/751_12, Stewart to Lagos, 11/01/1970.122 TNA/FCO/65/751_2, Wilson to Burroughs, 07/01/1970.
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achieved.123 Despite the differences between Britain and France during the Nigerian Civil
War, a flicker of hope about a future Anglo-French entente cordiale still glimmered
brightly on the British side of the channel.
123 TNA/FCO/65/751_25, Palliser to Wilson, 14/01/1970.
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Conclusions
France’s support for the Biafran separatists during the Nigerian Civil War was a
major source of contention for Anglo-French relations in the late 1960s, particularly in the
final eighteen months of the Biafran war when French involvement directly opposed British
policy in the region. British politicians, diplomats and journalists offered various
interpretations of French participation, oscillating between optimism and pessimism
according to the location of the commentator. Those based in Paris, and thus closest to the
French government, generally adopted a positive perspective on French action, expressing
their hope throughout the conflict that France would modify its policy. In stark contrast
were the reports that came from on the ground in Nigeria. Here the experience of fighting
and a close association with the Federal government led journalists and diplomats alike to
respond negatively to French policy. A more balanced position was maintained by London-
based politicians, perhaps due to more ready access to both sides of the story.
Amongst these varying interpretations there was a degree of consensus. The British
government and media shared the view that France’s policy in Nigeria was shaped by
Charles de Gaulle himself, whose lasting influence on French African policy survived the
course of the conflict, despite his resignation in April 1969. The Gaullist conception of
France’s world role which stated that French grandeur was reliant on status in Africa was
significant. This notion was born in part from France’s colonial experience, the legacy of
which was entrenched in much of France’s Nigerian policy. The British government was to
discover to its cost this immovable rock on which French support for Biafra was founded.
As the conflict progressed, and French involvement persisted, British responses
became progressively pessimistic, focusing on the dishonourable motives for French policy
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in Nigeria. According to this negative interpretation, France was supporting Biafra to
preserve its own standing in West Africa, an aim that they hoped to achieve by challenging
Britain’s position in the region. Cynicism about French intent grew as British material
interests in Nigeria, particularly the highly valuable oil concessions, fell under attack. Thus,
many questioned if it was Britain, and not Nigeria, which was the real target of French
policy, increasing British resentment towards France.
From July 1968, when France issued its first statement in support of Biafra, the
FCO repeatedly discussed ways and means of convincing the Quai to alter its position
towards the Nigerian Civil War, and thus influence those in Elysée to do the same. In spite
of this, the British government was reluctant to make a firm stand, preferring indirect
methods of communicating their concern to the French government. However, as the threat
to British interests in Nigeria grew ever more acute, British politicians and diplomats
increased their commitment to induce a change in France’s position. This suggests that
perhaps the British government’s concern for its own interests was greater than its distress
about the unravelling situation in Nigeria.
All attempts to alter French policy nevertheless resulted in disappointment, as can
be seen by the support France gave to Biafra until its collapse in January 1970. The failure
of these efforts can be attributed to numerous factors including the difficult personal
relations that existed between British and French politicians and Britain’s concern for its
position in Europe. The principal reason however for the FCO’s inability to persuade
France to alter its stance, as well as the main cause of the Anglo-French disagreement over
Nigeria, was the fundamental disparity between Paris and London’s attitudes. These
differences stemmed from centuries of rivalry across the globe which had created discord
between British and French conceptions of diplomatic conduct, foreign policy and
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colonialism. The clash in Nigeria was just one manifestation of this inherent Anglo-French
divide which, in turn, created a significant obstacle to improving relations between Britain
and France. In the years since the end of the Nigerian Civil War this division has persisted
in Anglo-French interaction on the African continent. An examination of these contacts,
particularly in areas of Anglophone Africa such as South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)
where, as in Nigeria, France intervened outside of its traditional sphere of influence, is
necessary for a fuller understanding of the depth of this Anglo-French divide.
And yet, despite the deep gulf that existed between Britain and France, and their
failure to come to an agreement over the Nigerian issue, the collapse of France’s Biafran
policy in 1970 fostered a new hope of a future realignment of Anglo-French African policy.
Furthermore, beneath the surface, and perhaps unseen by British politicians and diplomats,
the shared Anglo-French concern for their former colonies created a foundation upon which
future cooperation could be built.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL
The National Archives - Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
predecessors
[T]he [N]ational [A]rchives/FCO/25/234 - France and Nigeria (1967-68)
TNA/FCO/33/46 – Overseas visits by General de Gaulle (1967-8)
TNA/FCO/33/62 - Reports of UK Ambassador's interviews with General de Gaulle
(1967-8)
TNA/FCO/33/536 - Relations between France and Nigeria (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/33/534 - Visit to London by M. Schumann, French Foreign Minister (1969)
TNA/FCO/38/249 – Recognition of Biafra by countries outside the UK (1967-68)
TNA/FCO/38/250 – Recognition of Biafra by countries outside the UK (1968)
TNA/FCO/65/266 - France: military support of Biafra and effect on Anglo-French
relations (1968)
TNA/FCO/65/267 - France: military support of Biafra and effect on Anglo-French
relations (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/268 - France: military support of Biafra and effect on Anglo-French
relations (1969)
TNA/FCO/65/269 - France: military support of Biafra and effect on Anglo-French
relations (1969)
TNA/FCO/65/270 - France: military support of Biafra and effect on Anglo-French
relations (1969)
TNA/FCO/65/271 - France: military support of Biafra and effect on Anglo-French
relations (1969)
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TNA/FCO/65/272 - France: military support of Biafra and effect on Anglo-French
relations (1969)
TNA/FCO/65/273 – French relief operations to Biafra (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/286 – Kenya: Bilateral Relations with Nigeria (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/299 – Ivory Coast: Bilateral Relations with Nigeria (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/306 – Gabon: Bilateral Relations with Nigeria (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/307 – Gabon: Bilateral Relations with Nigeria (1969)
TNA/FCO/65/300 - Senegal: suggestion that African leaders could be asked to
pressurise France not to support Biafra (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/347 – French arms supplies to Biafra (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/446 - Comments by journalists covering Biafra war (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/452 - Auberon Waugh's comments on Nigerian civil war (1969)
TNA/FCO/65/467 – French Deputies (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/ 544 – Ivory Coast: Bilateral Relations with France (1968-9)
TNA/FCO/65/751 - Attitude of France towards Civil War in Nigeria (1970)
TNA/FCO/65/752 - Attitude of France towards Civil War in Nigeria (1970)
TNA/FCO/95/617 – Gabon: support for Biafra (1969)
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British Parliamentary Debates (Available online at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/)
[H]ouse of [L]ords Deb 13 February 1968 vol. 289
HL Deb 11 March 1968 vol. 290
[H]ouse of [C]ommons Deb 27 August 1968 vol. 769
HC Deb 31 October 1968 vol. 772
HL Deb 05 November 1968 vol. 297
HC Deb 12 December 1968 vol. 775
HL Deb 25 February 1969 vol. 299
HL Deb 04 March 1969 vol. 300
HC Deb 13 March 1969 vol. 779
HC Deb 27 March 1969 vol. 780
HC Deb 12 June 1969 vol. 784
HL Deb 21 July 1969 vol. 304
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42
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