British Arm Sales in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970

Candidate Number: P14521

Word Count: 9117

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Table of Contents

Introduction...................................................................................................................3

Section I.........................................................................................................................6

Section II..........................................................................................................................12

Section III.........................................................................................................................24

Conclusion.......................................................................................................................31

Bibliography.....................................................................................................................31

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Introduction

On May 21 1968, Mr. David Winnick stood up in the House of Commons and asked Mr.

George Thomson, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, ‘Is my right hon. Friend

aware that many people in Britain would like to see all foreign arms supplies to Nigeria cut

off, including arms from this country?1’ Over a year later on June 23 1969, Mr. Barnes asked

Mr Foley, the new Foreign Secretary, ‘if he will set a time limit to the continued supply of

British arms to Nigeria in view of the protraction of the war with Biafra?2’ Nigeria, as

described by Lord Brockway, ‘was regarded almost as a showpiece of British

decolonisation.3’ It is not surprising then that the civil war which lasted from July 1967 to

January 1970 and which saw Britain play the role of arms dealer to Federal Nigeria, attracted

much comment, both inside and outside Parliament.

Eastern Nigeria seceded on May 26 1967 under the leadership of General Chukwuemeka

Ojukwu who declared the republic of Biafra in reaction to the massacres of Easterners earlier

that year. In his words, the act of secession was in order to ‘[ensure] the survival of our

people.4’ Federal Nigeria responded by declaring war on the breakaway republic in July

1967. Early on, the United States refused to sell arms to either side. As the war progressed,

the media images of Biafrans starving and dying led European countries such as Holland,

Belgium and Italy to also refuse to sell arms in the conflict.5 Britain never followed suit

despite the barrage of criticism that rained down on the government from the Archbishop of

Canterbury, who called for a British arms embargo in the House of Lords on February 13

1968,6 to the youths of London, Glasgow, Leeds, Bristol, Cardiff and Birmingham who

released 1,000 black balloons in their cities on December 19 1969 to symbolise the one

1 Hansard, House of Commons Debate [hereafter HC Deb], May 21 1968, Vol. 765, cc. 263-268, p 264.2 Hansard, HC Deb, 10 July 1968, Vol. 785, cc 983-985, p 9833 Hansard, House of Lords Debate [hereafter HL Deb], 13 February 1968, Vol. 289, cc 69-92, p70.4 John de St Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, Hodder and Stoughton (1972) p120. 5 Ibid. p 181, p 208.6 The Times, Wednesday February 14 1968, p 14.

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thousand Biafrans that were reportedly dying every day from the conflict.7 Even the

newspaper reports from this time were deliberately phrased to rile the public against the

government’s arms policy. On April 24 1968 one correspondent asked in The Times, ‘What

can one say to a man whose child has just been killed by a British bomb...8?’ Another

revelled in the unpopularity of Harold Wilson’s Labour Government, writing, ‘...the

Government are acutely embarrassed by their present public image as the main supplier of

arms which keep the war going. They would like to get off the hook.9’

For Britain to have refused arms to Nigeria would have gone against their historical

relationship. Prior to the civil war, Britain had been the traditional supplier of arms to the

former colony. In January 1961, a few months after independence, the two countries signed

the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact in which it was agreed that Britain would control Nigerian

military bases and air staging facilities and Nigeria would purchase her hardware and military

training from the former mother country. Although this weapons entente was ended in 1962

because of Nigerian opposition to its restrictive clauses,10 Britain still continued to supply a

sizeable portion of the arms and ammunition that the Nigerian military used. For example, in

1966, she supplied 32.8% of Nigeria’s total stock.11These traditional arrangements would

come into consideration whenever the subject of an arms embargo was discussed in the secret

papers circulated in Whitehall at the time but they would not be the main reason why Britain

refused to cut off arms to Federal Nigeria.

The major reason for Whitehall backing Nigeria was the threat to British influence posed by

certain foreign countries that were willing to supply arms to the conflict - countries that in

7 The Times, Saturday December 20, 1969, p 5.8 The Times, Thursday April 25 1968, p 8. 9 The Times, Tuesday May 28 1968, p 5.10 J.F Ade Ajayi and A.E Ekoko, ‘Transfer of Power in Nigeria: It’s Origins and Consequences,’ in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis eds. Decolonization and African Independence: the transfer or Power 1960-1980, Yale University Press (1988) pp 245-270, p 263. 11Olatunde JB Ojo, ‘Nigerian-Soviet Relations; Retrospect and Prospect,’ African Studies Review, Vol. 19 (Dec 1976) pp 43-63, p 55.

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some cases publicly purported a policy of neutrality. Chief amongst Britain’s competitors

was Soviet Russia. The documents show an acute paranoia of Soviet involvement in the

conflict which is only understandable in the context of the Cold War. By the 1960s, this war

was well underway and the tussle for influence in the Nigerian Civil War mirrors the wider

international struggle between East and West. Although Russia would be viewed as the chief

threat, there would also be other foreign powers attempting to use arm sales to stake a claim

in Nigeria and adding worry to the politicians in Whitehall who found themselves jostling for

influence in their former colonial ‘showpiece.’

The government papers used in this study are held at the National Archives in Kew Gardens

and have only recently been declassified. They add considerably to the debate on British

involvement in the Nigerian Civil War because the historians writing prior to their release

have relied on conjecture to deduce British motivation for selling arms to Nigeria. These

papers are by no means an exhaustive body of material. Some of the documents dealing with

this period have still been deemed too sensitive to be released. Yet from what has been made

public, a view of British motivation during this war begins to emerge which differs from what

earlier commentators and historians, overly concerned with the economic and neo-imperial

dimensions of arms sales, have said. Supporting the Federal side with arms was at its heart a

pragmatic attempt by the British to retain influence in a region that seemed to be drifting

away from the former mother country.

I

5

Much has been written about Britain’s decision to sell arms to Nigeria but less attention has

been focused on the months during which very few British arms reached the shores of her

former colony. The reaction in Whitehall to the idea of civil war in Nigeria was almost

uniformly condemnatory. An example of this strong opposition is displayed in a telegram

from the Commonwealth Office dated June 16 1967 which stated, ‘Whatever the rights and

wrongs of the dispute may be, there is no doubt that there would be strong revulsion of

feeling in this country against attempt to settle it by civil war.12’ And it seemed that the

British were prepared to go to some length to ensure that if the dispute between Eastern

Nigeria and the rest of the country did result in civil war, their involvement in the outcome

would be negligible. In a meeting between a British Minister of State and Gowon, the former

was alleged to have asked the General, ‘Would it really help Gowon if it became clear that he

had only vanquished the East through British help?’ In the same discussion the Minister also

mentioned that in their policy towards hostilities in Nigeria, Britain had ‘leant over

backwards to stick the principle of non-intervention in Nigerian affairs.13’ Though arms were

still supplied in this period, they were of a quantity that one telegram noted would ‘not

significantly or immediately add to [Nigeria’s] offensive capabilities against the East.14’ In

the first few months of hostilities, by pursuing this policy of minimum intervention where

arm sales were concerned, Britain, as Oye Ogunbadejo briefly summarised, ‘seemed to

be...anxious to limit the scale of the conflict.15’

While it does seem high-handed to attempt to control the scale of a war in a sovereign

country by limiting arms supplies, this policy seems to have rested on genuine humanitarian

feeling in Whitehall. In a report to the Prime Minister in November 1967, George Thomas

12 The National Archives, Kew Gardens [hereafter TNA], FCO 38/265, Telegram from Commonwealth Office to Lagos, 16 June 1967. 13 Ibid. Letter from O.G Forster to A.M Pallister at 10 Downing Street, 7 July 1967.14Ibid. Telegram from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 14 June 1967.15 Oye Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria and the Great Powers: The impact of the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Relations’, African Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 298 (Jan 1976) pp. 14-32, p 15.

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explained the rationale behind providing the Federal Government with only ‘reasonable

quantities of ammunition for weapons supplied by us with small quantities of weapons of

which we have been traditional suppliers.’ Thomas’s first explanation for this policy was ‘to

reduce loss of human life.16’ Certainly, the more cynical may argue that what the politicians

in Whitehall feared more than casualties in Biafra was public opinion in Britain. For example,

on agreeing to deliver some military supplies which had been ordered before the war began,

the Commonwealth Office instructed its official in Lagos that ‘it was important that there

should be no publicity whatever. Even an announcement that we were fulfilling orders now in

the pipeline might cause difficulty with opinion here.17’ Whether for humanitarian reasons or

public relations, the government in Britain was during the first months of the war, intent on

controlling the scale of the war by limiting their arms supplies.

Eventually though, the British did drastically increase their arm sales and historians and

commentators have given various reasons why. Historian Mark Phythian has identified a

wider move to commercialise British arms sales during the 1960s – a drive begun by Dennis

Healey, Defence Secretary in Harold Wilson’s government. In 1966, Healey made a speech

saying,

While the Government attach the highest importance to making progress in the field of

arms control and disarmament, we must also take what practical steps we can to ensure

that this country does not fail to secure its rightful share of this valuable commercial

market.18

Yet Healey’s ideas are not apparent in the government arms policy towards Nigeria. A

telling example of the government’s indifference to the financial benefits of arms sales during

this war is seen in the case of the nine Vampire jets. In May 1967, Hawker Siddeley Aviation

16 TNA, FCO 25/251, Report from George Thomas to Prime Minister titled Nigeria, 8 November 1967.17 TNA, FCO 38/265, Commonwealth Office to Lagos, 16 June 1967. 18 Mark Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964, Manchester University Press (2000), p1.

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was asked to give a quote for nine Vampire trainer aircraft. Each one cost £60,000 and in

total, the order would have been worth over half a million pounds. In a letter from the

Ministry of Technology to the Foreign Office, L.A Savigar informed L.S Price of this

proposal for ‘consideration at the appropriate time.19’ The response from the Foreign Office

on June 7 1967 was unequivocal:

The Commonwealth Office would not be able to approve the supply of Vampire

aircraft to Nigeria in the foreseeable future and do not consider it would be appropriate

even to make an offer...The advice is that no attempt should be made to follow up the

enquiry.20

This exchange not only shows the government’s indifference to the economic gains to be

made from arm sales in this war, it also shows the precedence the Foreign Office took over

the Ministry of Defence where arm sales were concerned. As Andrew Pierre wrote in his

general treatise on the subject of arms, if the Foreign Office is ‘opposed to a sale on foreign

policy grounds, the Ministry of Defence is unlikely to persevere.21’

A contemporary and key player during the war, General Ojukwu, posited a different theory to

explain British arm sales to Federal Nigeria. In a letter to Lord Brockway on March 27 1968,

Ojukwu wrote that the British Government had ‘for some time...tried rather hard not to get

too involved’ but had eventually thrown its support behind Nigeria because ‘the attachment

of the artist to his creation, no matter how faulty, must have become irresistible, especially

for the advisers in London.22’ This idea that arms sales to Nigeria reflected a sentimental wish

to preserve the colonial borders carved out by Lord Lugard in 1914, holds little water. The

government files of the early months of the war clearly show a Britain that was prepared to

support a secessionist Biafra at the expense of ‘one Nigeria.’ As the West and General Africa

19TNA, FCO 38/265, Letter from L.A Savigar to L.S Price, 31 May 1967.20 Ibid. Letter from L.S Price to L.A Savigar, 07 June 1967.21 Andrew Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Princeton University Press (1982) p105.22 TNA, PREM 13/2830, Letter from General Ojukwu to Lord Brockway, 27 March 1968.

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Department summarised in the report on the situation in Nigeria on June 15 1967, ‘a decision

of arms policy depends largely on a judgement as to which side “will come out on top” in the

confrontation between the Federal Government and the Eastern Region.’ The report goes on

to advise that ‘our policy should be one that can be defended to both Gowon and Ojukwu’

and ‘should do as little damage as possible to our relations with both sides.23’ The politicians

in Whitehall were not overly concerned with what the map of West Africa looked like after a

Nigerian civil war, so long as British influence remained intact in the Anglophone entities

that emerged.

Another hypothesis less easily dismissed than that of arms sales as a revenue earner or

territorial preserver, is Chibuike’s Uche’s emphatic assertion that British arms sales to

Nigeria were motivated by their oil interests. The statistics Obi evinces in support of his

argument are convincing. Prior to the Civil War, Shell-BP Petroleum accounted for 84% of

the 580,000 barrels of crude oil produced daily in Nigeria and 40% of Shell-BP’s output was

shipped to Britain. Although Nigeria was not the only African country that supplied large

quantities of oil to Britain, the 1967 ban on Arab oil to U.K destinations meant that Libya and

Algeria cut off their supply and the next closest supplier after Nigeria was the Persian Gulf.

While it was a ten day round trip from Nigeria to the U.K, it was a sixty-eight day round trip

journey from the Persian Gulf. Thus when on May 30 1967, Gowon placed a shipping

embargo on Nigerian oil, Britain was left in a difficult position. As Uche summarises, ‘Once

the oil flow stopped, sitting on the fence ceased to be an option for the British.24’ Thus, the

turning point in Uche’s arm sales narrative is Gowon’s oil embargo. Its imposition jolted the

British out of indecision and into a decided support of Nigeria with arms.

23TNA, FCO 38/265, West and General Africa Department Report, 15 June 1967.24 Chibuike Uche, ‘Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War,’ Journal of African History, Volume 49 (2008) pp 111-135, pp 123-125.

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Yet, when looking at the secret documents of the time, Whitehall’s reaction to the oil

embargo was not to grant the Nigerians carte blanche access to British arms but rather to give

a more calculated response. On July 13 1967, almost two months after oil had been

embargoed, in a telegram from the Commonwealth Office to Lagos, the British considered

using the delivery of some sea defence boats ordered before the war began, as a form of

leverage. One option considered was to ‘withhold SDBs while oil embargo is in operation.

Only Gowon can tell when embargo is likely to be lifted and thereafter SDBs would of course

be available.25’ This policy of trying to force Gowon’s hand was reconsidered. Three days

later another telegram was sent to Lagos to be passed on to Gowon in which the

Commonwealth Office wrote:

I need not explain to you the difficulties with which I shall be faced if these vessels are

supplied to you at a time when the oil embargo is still being maintained and we in this

country face the possibility of petrol rationing. But my colleagues and I have decided

that we should keep our word to you, despite these difficulties, and these vessels come

to you as planned.26

Thus while the British permitted the delivery of the sea defence boats in the hope that Gowon

would rethink his embargo on oil, they were not prepared to drastically alter their overall

arms sales to Nigeria to achieve this goal. In the same telegram, the Commonwealth Office

refused the order for fast patrol boats and added that Britain did ‘not intend to put any

obstacle in the way of orders placed in this country for reasonable quantities of military

material of types similar to those you have obtained in the past.’ In other words, even though

Nigeria was now at war, Britain did not intend to drastically increase its weapon supplies

from peace time quantities. The arms sales from the period certainly reflect this. In 1966,

Britain supplied N153,690 worth of arms and ammunition to Nigeria. In 1967, this quantity

25 TNA, FCO 38/265, Telegram from Commonwealth Office to Lagos, 13 July 1967.26 FCO 38/265, Telegram from Commonwealth Office to Lagos, 16 July 1967.

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was increased to N343, 336 worth of arms and ammunitions but was nothing compared to the

N5, 639,120 worth of weaponry supplied to Federal Nigeria in 1968 when for a reason other

than oil, Britain finally decided to throw her support behind the fledgling country.27

27 Ojo, Nigerian-Soviet Relations, p 55.

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II

It was the introduction of Russia into the equation, not oil embargos or the prospect of

commercial gain, which made the British rethink their arms policy. Prior to the civil war,

Soviet influence in Nigeria while present was comparably negligible to that of Britain, the

former mother country. In 1965, Nigerian exports to the U.S.S.R were worth a meagre £2.4

million.28 On the other hand, exports to the Commonwealth in the same year were worth

£39.9 million.29 Although links between Nigeria and the U.S.S.R were pursued by both

countries, such as the Federal Minister of Health, Dr. M.A Majekodunmi’s visit to the

U.S.R.R in October 1963 and the Director of Soviet Academy of Medical Science’s visit to

Nigeria in March 1965, there was still a preference for the British stamp. Many of the

applicants who applied for Soviet scholarships did so because, according to Olatunde Ojo,

‘their low qualifications made them ineligible for Western Schools.’ Even policies which on

their surface seemed pro-Soviet proved not to be so ardently supportive on closer inspection.

For example in 1961, a year after independence, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa lifted the ban

on communist literature which the British had imposed but did so on the grounds that

Nigerians had ‘the maturity and self-confidence not to be misled by literature of this sort.30’ It

did not help the Soviet cause that their advances were often viewed with suspicion. For

example, before the Nigerian government could receive Soviet financial aid, lengthy

documentation and cost estimates for a specific project needed to be provided and even in the

event they were provided, there was no guarantee that Nigeria would receive her full loan

request. This policy proved unpopular with Nigerian bureaucrats who were suspicious of the

level of detail required to request for a loan which might not even be granted.31

28 Ibid. p 4629 Olasupo Ojedokun, The Changing Pattern of Nigeria’s International Economic Relations: The Decline of the Colonial Nexus, 1960-1966, The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 6, No. 4, (1972), pp. 535-554, p 548.30 Ojo. Nigerian Soviet Relations, pp. 52-54. 31 Ibid. p 50.

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Soviet approaches to Nigeria were part of a wider attempt to extend their influence in Africa.

In 1959, the Soviet Union committed to providing aid to Ethiopia; in 1963, a similar

commitment was made to Algeria and between 1959 and 1973, the Soviet Union had given

400 million worth of equipment, materials and technical services towards developmental

projects in Africa.32 It was not only through financial aid that the Soviets wished to extend

influence but also through military assistance. In 1962, Somalia and Ethiopia had a territorial

dispute which resulted in border fighting. Somalia appealed to Western powers, including

Britain, for military aid to build up her small army. The request was refused in order not to

escalate an already volatile situation. Somalia then turned to the Soviet Union which in 1962

signed an agreement with Somalia, committing to provide military aid worth 35 million

dollars. Modern artillery, T 54 tanks and MIG15 and MIG 17 aircraft were delivered to

Somalia thereafter.33

Like in Somalia, another ex-colony, Britain was trying to control the scale of the conflict but

in Nigeria’s case by limiting arm supplies. Not surprisingly, the Nigerians were displeased by

this policy. That the British who had been their customary suppliers should refuse them in

their time of need was particularly disheartening. In the vaults of the National Archive at

Kew is the record of a meeting which took place on the afternoon of July 17 1967 between

Chief Enahoro the Federal Commissioner for Labour and Information and the Prime

Minister, Harold Wilson. Enahoro speaking on behalf of his Commander-in-Chief said that

‘General Gowon had been greatly distressed to feel that he no longer enjoyed the full support

of the British government; and that Britain was unwilling to provide him with the arms

needed to put down the Eastern rebellion.34’ As Enahoro explained, Britain was Nigeria’s

32 Ian Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet Chinese and Cuban Policies, Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd. (1977) p76.33 Ibid. p86.34 TNA, FCO 25/251, Record of a Meeting at No. 10 Downing Street, Present: Prime Minister, Mr. A.M Pallister, Chief Enahoro, July 17 1967.

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‘traditional supplier’ and ‘there was no question of ‘aid’ being sought. Nigeria was willing to

buy what she wanted.’ Ironically, the spectre of Soviet influence was first used in regards to

the Soviets supplying arms to Biafra. Enahoro said that ‘the Federal Government had reliable

reports that Ojukwu was planning to fly in arms from Eastern Europe and was also

negotiating for the supply of six fighter bombers.’ Adding that the Communist countries were

‘probably calculating that if “Biafra” became an accomplished fact they would have at least

one friend in a part of Africa where they had none at present.’ Yet the British were not yet

willing to budge from their position of a ‘reasonable quantity’ of arms sales and the meeting

ended on a non-committal note from the Prime Minister.

The British soon found that the Nigerians were willing to seek arms elsewhere. In November

1968, a list of Soviet Arms deliveries to Nigeria was sent to Mr. A.J Collins in the West

African Department from J.H Reiss. The list showed that in August 1967, 15 Antonov

transport aircraft were delivered, sixteen MIG-17s and two MIG-15s.35 That the British had

wind of this in August 1967 is almost certain. On August 31 1967, C.L Booth from the

Foreign Office telegraphed J.E Killick at the British Embassy in Washington detailing a

meeting about the war in Nigeria: a meeting at which Sir David Hunt, British High

Commissioner in Lagos, was recalled to London to give his report on hostilities so far. Booth

wrote,

The talks were based on a Commonwealth Office paper which tentatively concluded

that the time had come for HMG to make an appeal to both parties in the dispute to

negotiate and simultaneously announce a decision to cut off all arms supplies to the

Federal Military Government.

However, it was concluded that

35TNA FCO 65/ 349, J.H Reiss to Mr. A.J Collins, West African Department, 25 November 1968.

14

a sudden denial of arms in the middle of a war would have been regarded by Gowon as

a deliberately hostile act...The resentment thus generated would have prevented us

from playing a useful role at a later stage when the prospects for peace talks might

otherwise be better.

Yet, at the end of this letter, Booth gives the underlying reason for this reconsideration of

policy.

Moreover it was not desirable to leave the FMG entirely in the hands of the Russians.

As long as the FMG retained confidence in us the Russians might well find it uphill

work to establish a position of real influence among the British trained officers who

lead the FMG.36

Just a month before, the thought of Soviet Russia supplying any side in the conflict had been

confined to Biafra and the idea had been dismissed by the Prime Minister as ‘politically

unwise.37’ A month later, the first major consignment of Soviet arms had reached Federal

Nigeria and the British were suddenly confronted with a threat to their influence, a threat that

had not even been imagined four weeks earlier. It is no surprise then that after August 1967,

the British began to shift from a policy of seeking to keep arms sales at a minimum to seeking

to keep arms sales at a level where their influence in Federal Nigeria would remain secure.

As mentioned earlier, arms sales to Nigeria in 1967 were worth N343, 336 but had increased

fifteen times over by 1968.

Crucial to jolting the politicians out of their indecision were the reports of Sir David Hunt,

the British High Commissioner in Nigeria and quintessential ‘man on the spot.’ His reports

on the Nigerian ability to win the war were important to the politicians at Whitehall who

wished to support the side most likely to come out on top. On June 13 1967, in a letter from

36 TNA, FCO 25/251, Telegram from C.L Booth to J.E Killick, 31 August 1967.37 Ibid. Record of a Meeting at No. 10 Downing Street, July 17 1967.

15

F.S Miles to Mr. Norris, Miles wrote that Hunt felt that Federal Government ‘now look as

though they are likely to win a trial a strength.’ The letter concluded,

Unless the balance of the argument seems to be pretty clearly against the high

commissioner’s view, it is generally better to take the advice of the man on the spot.38

Yet, when thinking about a trial of strength and which side would come out on top, it is an

inescapable fact that British weapons greatly augmented Nigeria’s offensive capabilities and

proved to be an irreplaceable factor in grinding Biafra to surrender. In a report given by the

Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on June 23 1967, the report stated,

It now looks clear that the Federal forces seem reasonably assured of winning in the end and

since it is in our interest that their victory should be quick, we should not modify our policy

on the sale of arms to the Federal Government to allow them to purchase items which would

increase their ability to achieve a quicker victory.39

Yet even when quick victory did not materialise and it was proven that the two combatants

were more evenly matched than had originally been assumed, the British did not alter their

arms policy. More important than which side would emerge the winner, an outcome that

could be swayed by British support, was which side would prove more amenable to British

influence.

The reports from Biafra were not favourable. According to George Thomas in a report

delivered to the Prime Minister on November 8 1967, before James Parker the Deputy High

Commissioner stationed in Biafran territory was recalled, ‘it was clear that relations with

Ojukwu were so strained that he could do little good by staying.40’ Relations with Biafra were

fraught and the bird in the hand Nigeria, according to Hunt, was also slipping away. On June

38 TNA, FCO 38/265, F.S Miles to Mr. Norris, 13 June 1967. 39 TNA, FCO 25/251, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee report titled Nigeria: Arms Supplies to the Federal Government, 23 November 1967.40 TNA, FCO 25/251, George Thomas’ report to Prime Minister, 8 November 1967.

16

14 1967 in trying to persuade the politicians at Whitehall to grant Federal Nigeria their

existing orders, Hunt telegraphed to London, ‘whether or not we supply the items they

require, I feel sure that they will acquire them and that the French, whatever they may have

said to the Embassy, will supply them.41’ After the order, which included the sea defence

boats amongst other items, had been granted, he telegraphed London on June 19 saying,

Gowon and Wey informed accordingly. They both declared that news could not have

come at a better time as Britain was losing influence above all with some permanent

secretaries and in particular Atta who is very anti-British and anxious to switch

suppliers.42

Even though Hunt had incorrectly guessed the country, he had accurately gauged the mood

that wished to see another foreign supplier supplant Britain. His reports would continue to

prove important when shaping Whitehall’s policy. Ojukwu, the Biafran leader, recognised

this in his above mentioned letter to Lord Brockway in March 1968, writing, ‘the British

Government due, perhaps to the influence of Sir David Hunt...was goaded into a partisan

support for the regime in Lagos.43’

In order to understand why it was so important to Whitehall that British influence be

preserved in Nigeria, one must understand what having influence in a former colony meant

for the British. The economic benefits of retaining influence in a former colony were obvious

and clear. In 1966, 38% of Nigeria’s exports went to Britain, over a third of her total.44 It was

also no coincidence that eighty four percent of the oil produced in Nigeria was drilled by the

British company BP-Shell. Yet, this is not to agree with Uche’s earlier point that it was oil

that precipitated a drastic increase in British arm sales. What would cause the British to lose

their access to Nigerian oil irrevocably would not be a temporary embargo that could be

41TNA, FCO 25/251, Telegram from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 14 June 1967.42 Ibid. Telegram from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 19 June 1967. 43 TNA, PREM 13/2830, Ojukwu to Brockway, 27 March 1968.44Olasupo Ojedokun, The Changing Pattern of Nigeria’s International Economic Relations..., p 552.

17

easily reversed but a permanent displacement of Britain as the country to which the leaders in

the territory looked to. On 6 February 1968, George Thomson, Commonwealth Secretary,

wrote in a letter to the Prime Minister,

In the unlikely event of Biafra succeeding in obtaining international recognition as an

independent state, Shell/BP might well find their concession revoked altogether by the

Biafrans and offered to some non-British company instead.45

Influence also came with the less tangible but equally vital benefit of preference. This idea

that ‘British was best’ was apparent in the purchasing patterns of Federal Nigeria during the

war. Reflecting on his choices decades later in an interview with historian Michael Gould,

General Gowon pointed out that his decision to buy Russian jets had little to do with

ideology. Instead it was a pragmatic decision based on the fact that the British refused the

Nigerian request for jets and he needed an air fleet to counter Biafra’s B-26 bombers.46 In

instances where both Russian and British arms were available for purchase, the latter were

generally chosen. In a letter from Sir Leslie Monson to D.C Tebbit on 17 January 1969,

Monson recounted a discussion between Mr. Makarov of the Soviet Embassy and Mr.

Moberly in which Makarov had said,

it was still Soviet policy to supply arms to Nigeria and that they would go on with

it...He added that the British were the traditional suppliers of arms to Nigeria but the

Soviet Government were prepared to supply whatever the Nigerians could not obtain

from us.47

The Nigerians chose to keep the relationship that way. As one commentator noted, ‘The

Nigerians receive considerable quantities of arms from the Russians and if they wish to they

45TNA, PREM 13/2830, George Thomson (Commonwealth Office) to Prime Minister, Report titled: Nigerian Oil, 6 February 1968.46 Michael Gould, The Struggle for Modern Nigeria: The Biafran War 1967-1970, I.B Tauris and Co. Ltd. (2011) p 71.47 TNA, FCO 65/352, Letter from Sir Leslie Monson to D.C Tebbit, 17 January 1969.

18

could easily expand their orders for them.48’ Yet, Federal Nigeria continued to buy British

where possible. By 1969, Britain was supplying Federal Nigeria with over ninety percent of

her ammunition stock while Soviet Russia’s share was negligible in comparison.49 In

December 1967, Nigeria’s Minister of Finance, Adamu Atta, on a trip to England to procure

arms

made it clear that the F.M.G had realised the waste and folly of their arms procurement

policy, which in effect has consisted of buying up around Europe anything that was

going almost regardless of price and quality. They now wished, if possible, to get all

their requirements from a single reliable source.50

The politicians in Whitehall never lost sight of the human cost of the war and the opprobrium

it attracted to their Government, yet the threat of increased Soviet influence in Nigeria

dissuaded them from changing their course of action. As late into the war as 13 December

1968, Harold Wilson wrote to L. Monson, ‘the Secretary of State would like some further

considerations given to the problems involved in establishing a general arms embargo in

Nigeria.51’ From this request grew a report made by the West Africa Department titled

‘Nigeria: Considerations Affecting an International Arms Embargo.’ In this report dated 13

January 1969, the logistics of an international arms embargo were considered. Firstly, an

embargo would be ineffective without a ‘ceasefire agreement accepted by both sides.’ Next it

would be impossible to control because ‘existing embargos on the supply of arms to

Nigeria...are got around by dealers obtaining arms import licences from third countries...and

then diverting consignments to Nigeria.’ However, most important and mentioned three

separate times in the report was the threat of Soviet Russia. Firstly, Russia was unlikely to

48 Ibid. Incomplete document, 19 May 1969.49 Ojo, Nigerian-Soviet Relations, p55.50TNA, FCO 25/251, Report titled Nigeria, 4 December 1967.51 TNA, FCO 65/352, Letter from Sir Leslie Monson to D.C Tebitt, 17 January 1969.

19

observe an international arms embargo as she was more than willing to take Britain’s place of

supplying arms in order ‘to secure political influence.’ Secondly it was,

quite possible that if we were to approach them [the Russians] and suggest a general

arms embargo they would at once tell the Nigerians that we had suggested this thereby

doing us great damage in Nigeria and ensuring that they benefitted at our expense.

Lastly, even if Nigeria accepted a British decision to end arm sales, if news of Britain

approaching Nigeria’s main arms suppliers to join this embargo ever reached Federal Nigeria,

‘they [the Nigerians] would again draw invidious comparisons between the Soviet Union’s

unqualified and unquestioning support and our – as they see it – half-hearted support.52’ Thus,

the idea of Britain spearheading an international arms embargo was mooted for fear that

Russia would take their place as the European power Nigeria looked to. As Oye Ogunbadejo

accurately conjectured in 1975 when these secret documents were as yet declassified,

‘Russian involvement helped to assure continued British support for the Federal cause.53’

Periodically a lone voice would accurately summarise the government’s thinking. On August

27 1968, Lord Shepherd said in the House of Lords,

The Russians have already secured a political foothold in Nigeria by supplying military

aircraft and bombs which we ourselves refused to supply. If we cut off arms supplies, I

am sure that Russia would be only too willing to fill the gap and gain the influence

which we would lose.54

Over a year later, on December 9 1969, Mr. Nigel Fisher a Conservative backbencher

defended the Labour Prime Minister’s stance on Nigeria, saying,

52 Ibid. West Africa Department Report, Nigeria: Considerations Affecting an International Arms Embargo, 13 January 1969.53 Ogunbadejo, ‘Nigeria and the Great Powers...’, p 24.54 Hansard, HL Deb, 27 August 1968, Vol. 296, cc 676-774, p 690.

20

The only outcome of a British embargo on arms to Nigeria would be an increase in

Russian supplies. Russia would give her eyes to acquire a position of real influence in

Commonwealth Africa...It would be an act of folly almost unparalleled in international

politics to present her with this opportunity on a plate.55

While these pragmatic views were undoubtedly what the government wished most

commentators would adopt, more common was a political idealism that arose from the sheer

human cost of the war. Baroness Asquith of Yarnbury said on August 27 1968, ‘Every

civilized Government has now ceased to practise this hideous trade, with only two

exceptions, ourselves and Soviet Russia.56’ Lord Brockway continued in this idealistic vein,

on November 5 1968, although reaching vastly different conclusions. On that day, he is

recorded to have said,

Yes, my Lords, we can influence Russia...I have had repeated conversation with

representatives of Soviet Russia urging them to stop the supply of their arms; and

different from what Her Majesty’s Government have said through their Front-Bench

spokesmen, I think it is possible that Soviet Russia would be prepared to stop her

supply of arms if Britain would stop her supply of arms.57

This was of course in direct contradiction to what British intelligence had received. The

meeting with Soviet First Secretary Makarov in January 1969 proved that the Soviets were

more than willing to step in should Britain stop supplying arms to Nigeria. Public opinion of

the war did matter to Harold Wilson’s Government. As John Wilson wrote on January 28

1969 in a letter to Mr. Lambert of the U.N political department, it was possible that Britain

would ‘reach the position when a change in our own policy was regarded by Ministers as

inescapable because of public feeling in this country.58’ Yet, public opinion could never quite

55 Hansard, HC Deb, 9 December 1969, Vol. 793, cc 249-372, p 309.56 Hansard, HL Deb, 27 August 1968, Vol. 296, cc 676-774, p 699.57 Hansard, HL Deb, 05 November 1968, Vol. 297, cc125-218, p 190.58 TNA, FCO 65/352, Letter from John Wilson to Mr. Lambert (U.N Political Department), 28 January 1969.

21

tip the Government into declaring an arms embargo because the Russian threat to their

influence was deemed too dangerous.

The Nigerians in a display of great tactical skill, never revealed to what extent they relied on

Soviet Russia or any other European power. This ensured that the British were unlikely to

take for granted any influence they retained and return to an arms policy which attempted to

limit the war. At a stage in the conflict, Sir L. Glass and Gowon met. Though the archival

record of this meeting is incomplete, in what remains, Glass’ recount shows the deftness of

the Nigerians.

I asked him [Gowon] if he were willing to tell me how his relations were with the

Russians over supplying weapons and whether they were meeting his demands or being

difficult over any aspect of them...He replied that a large quantity of weapons was

bought otherwise than from us or the Russians.59

There is of course little to substantiate Gowon’s claim. In 1968, when the other documents in

this file are dated, Britain supplied almost three quarters of Nigeria’s arms and ammunition60

and thus, there was no supplier who could come close to matching Britain’s arms supply. Yet

Gowon used Whitehall’s inability to confirm this to Nigeria’s advantage.

It is a testament to the skill of Gowon and his advisers that throughout the war, Federal

Nigeria never fell too much under the sway of either Soviet Russia or Britain. After Britain’s

initial refusal to supply fighter jets or drastically increase arms sales, Gowon and his

government tried hard to not be overly beholden to any European power. To avoid any

restrictive obligations after the war, Nigeria paid for Russia’s arms, first with foreign

exchange and, when the county’s reserves ran low, by barter.61 While they continued to buy

ammunition from Britain as a mark of preference, the politicians in Whitehall were aware

59 TNA, FCO 65/349, Incomplete Documents, c. 1968. 60 Ojo, Nigeria-Soviet Relations, p 55.61Ibid.

22

that any refusal to meet demand would meet with Nigeria switching their suppliers. As Chief

Enahoro made clear in a statement published in The Times on 7 June 1968,

It is important for us to get British arms because it is a traditional source. But let’s not

deceive ourselves that the war would grind to a halt if the British stopped supplying us,

because it would not.62

62 The Times, Friday June 07 1968, p 6.

23

III

Yet, if as postulated above, the British were more concerned with retaining influence within

the geographical area known as Nigeria than in seeing their former colony remain one, then

one must ask why less effort was made to cultivate influence with General Ojukwu. Perhaps

as Ojukuwu opined, some residual colonial feeling did cause Whitehall to view Federal

Nigeria’s cause more favourably. However, more important than colonial sentiment was the

fact that by the early months of the war, the Republic of Biafra already seemed to be under

the influence of other European countries. In the period where Britain was relatively neutral,

Biafra was courting and being courted by other European powers, a state of affairs the

politicians in Whitehall were aware of. Ojukwu, in an act of defiance, did not turn first to the

former mother country but deliberately looked elsewhere. In October 1966 he received his

first shipment of arms from Poland before the state of Biafra had been formally declared.63

While such displays of independence may have been admirable, they did nothing to endear

the Biafran cause to Whitehall.

As early as June 1967, the British already seemed to be falling out of favour with Ojukwu

despite their policy of limiting their Nigerian arm sales to pre-war quantities. On June 15

1967, a report from the West and General Africa Department stated that,

He [Ojukwu] has every interest in presenting continued British arms supplies to the

Federal Government as a deliberate rebuff to the East. Already, before secession, anti-

British feeling had broken out as a result of rumours that British Forces were going to

intervene on the Federal side. It would not be difficult for Ojukwu to play up British

arms supplies to the Federal Government in the present circumstances as an anti-British

campaign.64

63 Gould, The Struggle for Modern Nigeria, p 61.64 TNA, FCO 38/265, West and General Africa Department Report, 15 June 1967.

24

Even before the British had decided on which side of the conflict they would fall, Ojukwu, it

seemed, was deliberately misinterpreting their cautious arms policy towards Nigeria as

openly hostile to Biafra. Later on, Ojukwu’s Foreign Secretary, Godwin Onyegbula, would

describe this period of minimum arms sales as a period when Britain was ‘neutral’ but at the

start of the war, Britain’s arms policy, limited though it was, was enough justification for

Ojukwu to seek arms elsewhere.

At the same time Soviet arms and thus influence seemed to be on the rise in Federal Nigeria,

Biafra also seemed to be falling under the sway of other European powers. On November 15

1967, Mr. Welbor Ker in a letter to the Foreign Office reported the details of a conversation

he had with Dr. Themido Political Director of Portugal. By this time, Portugal was supplying

arms to Biafra and in an attempt to dissuade Themido and his superiors from this course of

action, Ker stated that Biafra was certain to lose the war. Themido replied,

as for our appreciation that Biafra must lose the war we were no doubt better informed

than they but their own appreciation was that a full military victory by either side was

improbable.

Ker pressed, asking if the Portuguese intended to recognise Biafra. To which Themido

replied, ‘There was no question of their recognising Biafra in any way...’ but ‘these were

commercial facilities and Portugal could not deny them to Biafra because it was the losing

side.’ In a last attempt, Ker wrote,

I made it clear that we could not accept the notion that the facilities the Biafrians were

using were no more than ordinary commercial ones, and that in our view they

amounted to assistance by the Portuguese.

25

Themido remained impervious to this veiled threat and at some point in their meeting, much

to Ker’s chagrin, he ‘commented with obvious satisfaction that the Portuguese were indeed in

a large number of important places in Africa.65’

At first the only European country that was willing to supply arms to Biafra was Portugal, a

relatively minor power. However, as the war progressed, France, a larger power began to

show interest in the rebel state. In August 1967, the Nigerian government took a document to

the foreign press which purported that Ojukwu planned to sell Biafran oil rights to France’s

Rothschild bank.66 As the war dragged on, Nigeria continued to stoke British fears that

France was getting a foothold in Biafra. On April 24 1968 in a meeting between the Prime

Minister and Dr. Arikpo the Nigerian External Affairs Commissioner, Arikpo hinted of

Ojukwu’s ‘expectation of help and support from elsewhere.’ When asked to clarify,

Dr. Arikpo said that he was referring to French support for Biafra. France had secretly

supported the rebel regime for some time but was now intervening more actively.

As an example of this increased French support, Dr. Arikpo mentioned ten fighter planes

allegedly supplied by France which had been destroyed by the Federal air force while still on

ground.67

Although Nigerian reports of French dealings with Biafra may have been exaggerated or in

some instances fabricated, these reports combined with intelligence from less biased sources

shaped Whitehall’s attitude towards the rebel state. When George Thomson in February 1968

warned the Prime Minister that Shell/BP might have their concessions revoked in the event of

a Biafran victory, the source of this fear was most likely the Nigerian report of six months

earlier. By October 1968, Whitehall had access to American intelligence which corroborated

65 TNA, FCO 25/251, Telegram from Lisbon to Foreign Office, 15 November 1967.66Ndubisi Obiaga, The Politics of Humanitarian Organisations Interventions, University Press of America (2004) p 19.67TNA, PREM 12/2830, Record of a Conversations Between the P.M and the Federal Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, 24 April 1968.

26

with Nigerian reports that the French were supplying arms to Biafra. On October 11 1968, the

Commonwealth Office was forwarded a telegram which the U.S Embassy in Abidjan had

sent to the Commission in Lagos on October 9 1968. The original telegram stated, ‘There has

been heavy transhipment by air of military material through the airport at Abidjan destined

for Biafra. This military material is of French origin.’ The US embassy went on to conclude

that that the ‘amount of military material shipped, if delivered to Biafran forces would give

significant support to Biafra.68’ France’s support of Biafra with arms was particularly trying

for Whitehall because in public, de Gaulle did little more than express sympathy for the

Biafran cause, refusing to formally recognise the rebel state. However, evidence of his

clandestine support was reported by both Nigerian and American intelligence. When

discussing an international arms embargo, one of the stumbling blocks was France’s covert

backing. As the report stated,

To agree to join us in an international ban would cost them nothing, their public

position being that this would mean no change from existing French policy. Against

our ace they would be playing the lowest card in the pack but being allowed to score

equal.69

This knowledge that Britain would be displaced by other European powers should Biafra

succeed, lent continued vigour to Whitehall’s support of Nigeria. Neither Ojukwu nor his

delegates did much to disabuse the impression that they were ‘implacably hostile to us,’ as

George Thomas put it in a report to the Prime Minister on November 8 1967. In 1967, when

the Commonwealth Secretary General, Arnold Smith, suggested a peace talks, ‘Ojukwu

instructed his team...to insist on a venue outside the UK.70’ As the war progressed and

Britain’s arms supply to Nigeria increased, the Biafrans grew even more embittered against

their former mother country. When Biafran delegates visited London in January 1969, it was 68 TNA, FCO 38/283 Telegram from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 11 October 1968.69 TNA, FCO 65/352, West Africa Department Report, 13 January 1969.70 TNA, FCO 25/251, George Thomas’ report to Prime Minister, 8 November 1967.

27

reported to the Prime Minister that ‘the Ojukwu representative was offensive to Mr. Foley in

asking him how he could shake hands with Mr. Foley since his hand was stained with the

blood of the Ibos.71’ On 11 January 1969, in a recounted private conversation between Mr.

Godwin Onyegbula Permanent Secretary of the Biafran Foreign Ministry and the Prime

Minister’s Private Secretary, Onyegbula described the state of British influence in his

country.

If the British government had maintained a neutral attitude towards the civil war and

“had left it to us to sort out amongst ourselves” they might now be in a better posture to

offer their services as mediators and more likely to preserve something of their

interests throughout Nigeria. In Biafra, their influence now was of course nil.72

This desire, expressed by both Ojukwu and Onyegbula, that Britain should have remained

neutral during the conflict, was particularly galling for the British. In Whitehall’s estimation,

the Biafrans wished for Britain to stand by, as an area formerly under their influence fell

under the sway of other European powers.

Thus by the end of the war, there was a certain smug feeling in Whitehall that the horse that

would preserve British influence had been backed. At the end of his meeting with the Private

Secretary, Onyegbula spoke of the state of British influence in Federal Nigeria saying, ‘it was

wrong for us to think that by pursuing these policies, we had retained influence in Lagos. Our

influence there was in fact waning.’ To which the Private Secretary confidently replied, ‘I

rejected his view of the influence we had and could exert in Lagos.73’ By being quick to

assert his independence at the start of the war, Ojukwu left Whitehall in doubt over the sway

they had over him and his country. Whereas Federal Nigeria had shown themselves more

71 TNA, FCO 65/191, Minute of meeting at Lancaster House, 15 January 1969.72 TNA, FCO 65/191, Record of Conversation with Mr. Godwin Onyegbula at the Kensington Close Hotel, 11 January 1969. 73 Ibid.

28

amenable to British influence, approaching Britain first for arms and continuing to buy

British where they could, regardless of the option to purchase elsewhere.

Despite evidence to the contrary, some historians have chosen to situate this conflict in rigid

colonial terms, arguing that European involvement in the war was dictated by past imperial

connections. Ndubisi Obiaga in summary of this theory writes, ‘interventions in the ex-

colonial nations are regarded as a continuation of European political rivalries.’ Thus France’s

decision to aid Biafra, albeit secretly, was part of a wider plan to destabilise Anglophone

Nigeria and place the smaller Francophone countries that surrounded her in a stronger

position.74 As Roy Lewis succinctly wrote in The Times, ‘General de Gaulle is apprehensive

that Nigeria’s French-speaking neighbours will be drawn into the orbit of Lagos should

Nigeria remain one country.75’ Some rhetorical homage was paid to this idea in the secret

documents. In the January 13 1969 report produced by the West Africa Department on the

issue of the feasibility of an international arms embargo, the report stated that it was not,

at all likely that an embargo would be observed by the French. General de Gaulle’s

aim, we believe is to encourage the disintegration of Nigeria rather than to facilitate an

early end of fighting.76

The report thus placed the conflict in the perennial struggle between imperial France and

imperial Britain. Yet it was little more than a rhetorical flourish. At the start of the war

Britain had not been particularly hostile to the idea of Nigeria breaking up, seeking instead

for retention of influence on both sides. As Whitehall was quick to grasp, this was not an old

world conflict in which former colonial ties automatically guaranteed influence. This was a

new world order where European countries without any prior relationships with Britain’s ex-

colonies could jostle with Britain for influence. Russia could threaten Britain’s position in

74 Obiaga, Politics of Humanitarian..., p 4, p20.75 The Times, Tuesday October 22 1968, p 6. 76 TNA, FCO 65/352, West Africa Department Report, 13 January 1969.

29

Nigeria despite decades of Anglophone presence in the region. Biafra could bypass Britain

and seek weapons from Poland despite an officer corps that was made up almost entirely of

Sandhurst trained men.77

77 Michael Gould, The Struggle for Modern Nigeria, p 94.

30

Conclusion

It is not for the historian to moralise on British arms policy during this war. Enough has been

said by Bishops, newspapermen and novelists. In such a study as this, more pertinent than

morality is motivation. The British did not sell arms to preserve an imperial construct or to

swell their treasury. Instead by supplying arms to Federal Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil

War, they sought to secure that most nebulous and most invaluable of commodities:

influence. At first, Britain would attempt to take the path of least resistance, selling a limited

amount of arms in the hope that this caution would be deemed favourable by both sides.

Their approach failed. This was not the season for caution and half measures. Soviet Russia

was steadily seeking to increase its stake in Africa by financial, technical and military

assistance. Whatever, the British felt too scrupulous to supply, they were willing and

equipped to provide to Nigeria. At the same time, Biafra was receiving arms and attention

from Portugal and later on and more disconcertingly, France. In the end, Britain chose to

support Federal Nigeria, deeming her to be the more likely candidate to preserve their

influence in the region after the war was over and the guns were silent. Once the decision was

made, they supported her to the bitter end. By January 1970, when Biafra surrendered, the

short lived republic had been turned into ‘a vast smouldering rubble,’ as Chinua Achebe so

evocatively described.78 It is for others, not historians, to judge if the influence so doggedly

pursued was worth the cost.

78 Chinua Achebe, ‘What is Nigeria to Me?’, in The Education of a British-Protected Child: Essays, Penguin (2009), p 44.

31

Bibliography

Archival Documents

The National Archives, Kew Gardens [hereafter TNA] File, FCO 38/265,

Letter from L.A Savigar to L.S Price, 31 May 1967.

Letter from L.S Price to L.A Savigar, 07 June 1967.

Telegram from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 14 June 1967.

West and General Africa Department Report, 15 June 1967.

Telegram from Commonwealth Office to Lagos, 16 June 1967.

Letter from O.G Forster to A.M Pallister at 10 Downing Street, 7 July 1967.

Telegram from Commonwealth Office to Lagos, 13 July 1967.

Telegram from Commonwealth Office to Lagos, 16 July 1967.

TNA File, FCO 38/283

Telegram from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 11 October 1968.

TNA File, FCO 65/191

Record of Conversation with Mr. Godwin Onyegbula at the Kensington Close Hotel, 11 January 1969.

Minute of meeting at Lancaster House, 15 January 1969.

TNA File, FCO 65/349

Incomplete and undated documents, Conversation between Sir L. Glass and General Gowon c. 1968.

TNA File, FCO 65/352

West Africa Department Report, Nigeria: Considerations Affecting an International Arms Embargo, 13 January 1969.

Letter from Sir Leslie Monson to D.C Tebbit, 17 January 1969.

Letter from John Wilson to Mr. Lambert (U.N Political Department), 28 January 1969.

Incomplete document, 19 May 1969.

TNA File, FCO 25/251

Telegram from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 14 June 1967.

Telegram from Lagos to Commonwealth Office, 19 June 1967.

32

Record of a Meeting at No. 10 Downing Street, Present: Prime Minister, Mr. A.M Pallister, Chief Enahoro, July 17 1967.

Telegram from C.L Booth to J.E Killick, 31 August 1967.

Report from George Thomas to Prime Minister titled Nigeria, 8 November 1967.

Defence and Overseas Policy Committee report titled Nigeria: Arms Supplies to the Federal Government, 23 November 1967.

Report titled Nigeria, 4 December 1967.

Telegram from Lisbon to Foreign Office, 15 November 1967.

TNA File, PREM 13/2830

George Thomson (Commonwealth Office) to Prime Minister, Report titled: Nigerian Oil, 6 February 1968.

Letter from General Ojukwu to Lord Brockway, 27 March 1968.

Record of a Conversations Between the P.M and the Federal Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, 24 April 1968.

Newspapers

The Times, Wednesday February 14 1968, p 14.

The Times, Thursday April 25 1968, p 8.

The Times, Tuesday May 28 1968, p 5.

The Times, Friday June 07 1968, p 6.

The Times, Tuesday October 22 1968, p 6.

The Times, Saturday December20 1969, p 5.

Hansard

House of Commons

House of Commons Debate [hereafter HC Deb], May 21 1968, Vol. 765, cc. 263-268.

HC Deb, 10 July 1968, Vol. 785, cc 983-985.

HC Deb, 9 December 1969, Vol. 793, cc 249-372.

33

House of Lords

House of Lords Debate [hereafter HL Deb], 13 February 1968, Vol. 289, cc 69-92.

HL Deb, 27 August 1968, Vol. 296, cc 676-774.

HL Deb, 27 August 1968, Vol. 296, cc 676-774.

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J.F Ade Ajayi and A.E Ekoko, ‘Transfer of Power in Nigeria: It’s Origins and Consequences,’ in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis eds. Decolonization and African Independence: the Transfer or Power 1960-1980, Yale University Press (1988), pp 245-270.

Gould, Michael, The Struggle for Modern Nigeria: The Biafran War 1967-1970, I.B Tauris and Co. Ltd. (2011).

Greig, Ian, The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet Chinese and Cuban Policies, Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd. (1977).

Obiaga, Ndubisi, The Politics of Humanitarian Organisations Interventions, University Press of America (2004).

Ogunbadejo, Oye, ‘Nigeria and the Great Powers: The impact of the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Relations’, African Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 298 (Jan 1976) pp. 14-32.

Ojedokun, Olasupo, The Changing Pattern of Nigeria’s International Economic Relations: The Decline of the Colonial Nexus, 1960-1966, The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 6, No. 4, (1972), pp. 535-554.

Ojo, Olatunde JB, ‘Nigerian-Soviet Relations; Retrospect and Prospect,’ African Studies Review, Vol. 19 (Dec 1976) pp 43-63.

Phythian, Mark, The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964, Manchester University Press (2000).

St. Jorre, John de, The Nigerian Civil War, Hodder and Stoughton (1972).

Uche, Chibuike, ‘Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War,’ Journal of African History, Volume 49 (2008) pp 111-135.

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Crowder, Michael ed.,The Cambridge History of Africa c.1940-1975, Cambridge University Press (2008).

Nugent, Paul, Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History, Palmgrave Macmillan (2004).

34

Orobator, S.E, ‘The Nigerian Civil War and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia,’ African Affairs, Vol. 82 (1983) pp. 201-214.

Schabowska, Henryka and Himmelstrand, Ulf, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis,Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (1978).

Somerville, Keith, Foreign Military Intervention in Africa, Palgrave Macmillan (1990).

Waugh, Auberon and Cronje, Suzanne, Biafra: Britain’s Shame, Michael Joseph (1969).

35