ARUBA, A RICH COUNTRY IN THE CARIBBEANCOUNTRY GDP/PERSON

Puerto Rico US$ 37.900

Aruba (Therefore no fin. help!) 25.300

Bahama’s 25.100

Barbados 17.500

Sto. Domingo 17.000

Curaçao 15.000

Surinam 13.900

Dominica 12.000

Cuba 11.900

Jamaica 9.200

Haïti 1.800CIA Indexmundi Worldbook 2018

Yet, every year again, there is a lackof money for important tasks.

For example:

• Fighting criminality

(preventive measures and adecent prison)

• Maintenance of the infrastructure

(roads,buildings)

• Effective social care

• Good quality Education for thebenefit of the future of Aruba

THE STATE OF OUR EDUCATIONINFRASTRUCTURE CONTENTS

- Antique methods- Outdated didactics

RESULTS ‘UNDER PAR’Only 8% of the populace (inclusivestrangers who are in the island becauseof their expertise) has higherprofessional education or university.

CAUSE???

A SIMPLE EXPLANATION!NOT FOR NOTHING

GOOD GOVERNANCE &

INTEGRITY

ARE SPEARHEADS OF THE

CURRENT GOVERNMENT

BECAUSE…LACK OF THAT

DURING 30 YEARS

OF GOVERNANCE

AFTER ‘STATUS APARTE’

HAS CAUSED

SERIOUS PROBLEMS

IN ARUBA

THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE

• IDEAL → THE SOCIETY IS THE PRIORITY

• Equal treatment of citizens• legitimate and effective use of the

recources under control of independant organizations

• Integer treatment of projects• Transparant• Trustworthy• Clear and coherent policy

COHERENT POLICY ON THE LONG TERM

• REALITY → THE PARTY/SELF-INTERESTARE PRIORITY

• Political patronage• Deficient financial administration• Suspicious handling of projects• Lack of transparancy• Unreliable• Lack of long term, coherent policy

THE PARTY DETERMINES THE SHORT TERM AND AD HOC GOVERNMENT POLICY!

PARTY/MINISTER DETERMINES ‘ALLOCATION OF MEANS’

1 - POLITICAL PATRONAGE

Political patronage

• Personnel

• Properties

• Projects

CONSEQUENCE

ENORMOUS UNNECESSARY EXPENDITURES

OR

INSUFFICIENT INCOME

FINANCIAL CONSECUENCES OF POLITICAL PATRONAGE: A COMPARISON OF PUBLIC PERSONNEL ARUBA-CURACAO

COUNTRY

2014

INHABITANTS TOTAL PUBLIC

EMPLOYEES

MINISTER’S

OFFICEARUBA 106.795 5.757 374CURACAO 154.843 4.617 278OBSERVATIONS • Although Curacao counts almost 50% more inhabitants, Aruba

counts over 1.100 public employees more

• In case Aruba would have the same ratio of public

employee/inhabitants like in Curacao (1/33,5), then Aruba

(1/18,5) would have 3.200 public employees → 2.500 less…

• That would save Aruba Afl. 200 million/year,

that is more than Afl. 2 billion/10 years, or half

of our national debt!

2- DEFICIENT FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION

Deficient financial administration• Administrative caos

- No standards

- Fraud, robbery

- Tax-evasion → new tax.system

(CAft → result: Afl. 40-100 million/yearextra )

• Great lack of control

- ‘Mortuarium-construction’ of CAD/ARA

- No view of financial situation

• No accountability

- Dysfunctional Parliament

CONSEQUENCE ENORMOUS WASTE OF PUBLIC MONEY

FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A DEFICIENT FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION

• Audit office → enormous inefficiencies & lack of control → waste!

- Scholarships, Arubus, Airport, etc.

• Audit office → lots of irregularities, fraud: significant loss of money

- Laboratory: Afl. 10 million

- Dep. of education: at least Afl. 1 million

• HR department → 20 persons average/year with ‘integrity- problems’

• ALL advising & controlling institutions since ‘90: change tax-system

- Old, complicated, inefficient, lots of loopholes fortax-evasion → significant loss of money

• CAft → new tax-system generates Afl. 100 million EXTRA/year

3 - SUSPICIOUS PROJECTS

Suspicious projects- Violations of

Comptability law- No transparancy- Considerable cost-

overruns- No control

(FDNSN - Bo Aruba)CONSEQUENCE

ENORMOUS LOSSESAND

UNNECESSARY OBLIGATIONS

FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILED AND/OR SUSPICIOUS PROJECTS : OVER AFL. 1 BILLION/31 YEARS?

- Aruven - Ates project - Interbank/FCCA

- Dutchco - Race-track - FDNSN

- Sace - Interbank/CSS - Bushiri hotel

- Radar - ‘Air- & Sea-letters’ - Trias resort

- Airport - Aruba Bunita NV - PPP-projects

- Air Aruba - Bushiri Hotel - Bo Aruba

- Port - Ostrich project - Lotto pa Deporte

- Postoffice - Dump - Hedge-deal

- Setar/Fabela - Dividend special - CITGO → ???

- + Countless other projects characterized by suspicious procedures & heavy cost overruns

ONLY Sace (Afl. 200 million) + Hedge-deal (over Afl. 250 million) + Dump (Afl. 28 million) costed Aruba allready ± Afl. 0,5 billion

MIN. AFL. 1 BILLION IN 31 YEARS = AVERAGE ± AFL. 30 MILLION/YEAR

THE MINIMAL COST OF BAD GOVERNANCE IN ARUBA -2017# DESCRIPTION Afl. Million

1 Unnecessary direct cost of excess government personnel 200

2 Deficient financial administration, especially tax evasion: 100

3 Failed and/or suspicious government projects 30

TOTAL DIRECT MINIMAL AVERAGE COSTS OF BAD GOVERNANCE 330

4 Intrest payments (total Afl. 230 million/year) because of debts, for an important part as a result of bad governance

120

TOTAL MINIMAL COSTS OF BAD GOVERNANCE IN 2017 → UNSUSTAINABLE! 450

TOTAL ARUBAN BUDGET 1.350

Conclusion → Transition to Good Governance → REVERSAL of money flow

FINANCING BAD GOVERNANCE BEFORE (A) AND AFTER (B) CAFT

• Political patronage- Personnel- Properties- Projects

• Deficient financial administration- Administrative caos- Great lack of control- No accountability

• Suspicious and/or failed projects- Violations of law- Suspicious procedures- Big cost overruns

A- BIG BUDGET DEFICITS

CONTINUOUS RISE OF DEBTS AND INTEREST

B – REDUCTION BUDGET DEPARTMENTS

• Education

• Social affairs

• Health

• Justice

• Infrastructure

• +… Tax increase

Afl.450

A – INCREASE OF OUR NATIONAL DEBT AND INTEREST

B- DECREASING FUNDING FOR SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS

YEAR 2014 2015 2016

Subsidies (no salary!) 122.234.600 82.825.600 52.878.000

Source: Budget Aruba 2014, 2015, 2016

FINANCING GOOD GOVERNANCE

• Political patronage- Personnel- Properties- Projects

• Deficient financial administration- Administrative caos- Great lack of control- No accountability

• Suspicious and/or failed projects- Violations of law- Suspicious procedures- Big cost overruns

A- BUDGET SURPLUSES

REDUCTION OF DEBTS AND INTEREST

B – INCREASE OF BUDGET DEPARTMENTS

• Education

• Social affairs

• Health

• Justice

• Infrastructure

• +… Tax reduction

Afl 450

HOW?

THE BIG QUESTION!• A lot of attention for the 3 elements of bad governance:

- Political patronage

- Systematic deficient financial administration

- Suspicious and/or failed projects

• Enormous costs of bad governance

• HOW COULD THIS HAPPEN DURING 30 YEARS WITHOUT ANY PROBLEM IN OUR DEMOCRATIC STATE OF LAW?

Trias Politica Legislative

power

Judicairypower

executive power

Balance

Checks & Balances

Checks & Balances-Ideal

Budget

• Advisory Counsel

• Comptability law

Execution

• CAD

• Comptability law

control

• Audit office

• Comptability law

ParliamentControl

Executive power

FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Government

Policy

PoliticalParties

CONSTITUTION

GOOD GOVERNANCEGUARANTEED BY KINGDOM CHARTER

SER, IMF, CBA, CF, NCPF,

COM. V. LENNEP

Checks & Balances-Reality

Budget

• Advisory Counsil

• Comptability law

Execution

• CAD

• Comptability law

control

• Audit Office

• Comptability law

ParliamentControl

Executive power

FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Government

Policy

PoliticalParties

CONSTITUTION

GOOD GOVERNANCEGUARANTEED BY KINGDOM CHARTER

SER, IMF, CBA, CF, NCPF,

COM. V. LENNEP

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ARUBAN GOVERNANCE - 11. Structural violation of laws (e.g. Constitution & Comptability law)

by government.

2. Structural set-up of unrealistic budgets misleading

3. Structural legalizing of violations of laws and unrealistic budgets by Parliament.

4. Structural disregard for serious warnings from official institutionswith regard to financial administration and financial, economicand social policies.

5. Structural disregard for financial consequences of applied policies(e.g. SVB/AZV)

6. Structural neglect for important recommendations to improvequality of governance (e.g. Rapport Calidad) which might meanthat intentionally the choice was made for bad governanceF

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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ARUBAN GOVERNANCE - 27. Structural lack of transparancy (e.g. law for party financing)

8. Structural lack of accountability (never an approved financial statement by accounting office)

9. Systematic culture of manipulation of information and intimidation(culture of fear)

10. As a result: structural disregard for the well-being of the Arubancommunity with enormous financial and socio-economicconsequences against oath at commencement of term

11. Main focus on personal and political party interests NMAIN PROBLEM! LACK OF INTEGRITY

A- Failed and suspicious projects (Audit Office/CdB)

B- Rapport Koerten, Tom Blickman

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THE COMPLETE PICTURE

• Important focus on 3 areas of bad governance:- Political patronage- Deficient financial administration SYSTEMATIC- Failing & suspicious projects

• Huge cost of bad governance• Structural sidelining of advisory & controling institutions• Suspicious characteristics of government policy

UNINTERRUPTED SYSTEM DURING 30 YEARS

Apparent similarity with the workings of criminal organisations!?

CRIMINAL ORGANISATION OR ORGANISATIONAL CRIMINALITY?!

A MORE ACCURATE TYPOLGYWHITEBOARDCRIMINALITY/ ORGANISATIONAL CRIMINALITY \NETWORKCRIMINALITY

GOVERNMENTAL/STATE CRIMINALITY

CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNMENTAL CRIMINALITY: 1. Violations of laws and/or criteria of good governance; 2. By governmental dignitaries/representatives/personnel; 3. In the sphere of their function; 4. With disregard of the damage done to the community/citizens; 5. With reinforcement or expansion of their own position of power or prestige.

BUT…IT IS NOT ONLY POLITICIANS/POL. PARTIES!!!

Frequently politicians/political parties are under heavy pressure

Of voters and/or businesses

Who demand privileges from the politicians/political parties

In exchange for their support

Whether it be their vote or (a lot of!) campaign money

(‘sale’ of vote/financial contributions for privileges)

POLITICAL CRIMINALITY

Because…this ‘exchange’ is financed with public money and properties!

If Aruba wants to ‘survive’, it has to change this ‘culture’ urgently

CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENTAL CRIMINALITY

GOVERNMENTAL/STATE/ POLITICAL CRIMINALITY

STATE-UNDERMINING• SYSTEMATIC UNDERMINING OF OUR DEMOCRATIC STATE OF LAW

- Sistematic violation of law

- Sistematic violation of criteria of good governance

- Sidelining all kinds of important advising and controlling institutions and neglecting their warnings & recommendations

• LEGALIZING WRONG-DOINGS OF POLITICAL LEADERS ( OF GOVERNMENT BY PARLIAMENT)

• LARGE COMMUNAL (FINANCIAL-ECONOMIC-SOCIAL) DAMAGE (BILLIONS OF FLORINS!)

• COLLUSION ‘UNDER- & UPPERWORLD’, MONEY-LAUNDERING, ETC. (PARTY-FINANCING)

• CONSEQUENCE 1- POSSIBILITY OF BECOMING A CRIMINALIZED STATE (SURINAM-VEN.)2- UNDERMINING THE AUTONOMY OF ARUBA

UNDERMINING THE AUTONOMY BECAUSE OFPOLITICAL INCOMPETENCE & IRRESPONSABILITY

1. LOSS OF FINANCIAL AUTONOMY

• The systematic application of political patronage Gigantic debts• The maintenance of a deficient financial administration

• The practice of ‘suspicious projects’ - External fin. supervision - Dependant of ‘help’

1. LOSS OF JUDICIAL AUTONOMY

• Suspicious acts with permits (stay, etc.) ‘Royal order’

• Apparent collusion between officials and underworld

- Autonomous RST

- Org. undermining

THE EASY WAY OUT…

CONSEQUENCES FOR CITIZENS/EMPLOYEES

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR…

A- THE COMMUNITY

Large government apparatus with often incompetent staff, inadequate financial management end dubious ‘projects-policy’ → Inefficient use of tax revenues!

• Decline in quality of government services → e.g. social care

• Poor development in education, infrastructure

• Danger: pension funds (SVB-APFA)

Decline of society → prosperity↓

B- MOST CITIZENS (with exception of F & F)

Constant lack of money for government due to incorrect prioritization: Friends & instead of general interest.

• Regular increase in prices for government services (e.g. waste)

• Continual tax increases (needed because the causes of high government spending are not being addressed)

• High interest on loans → expensive mortgage loans, cars, etc.

Decline in purchasing power → prosperity↓

CHANGE ONLY TAKES PLACE IF WE ALL ACCEPT THE CHALLENGE

A CHALLENGE FOR THE WHOLE COMMUNITY

• Analise the quality of governance

• Analise the consecuences of good and bad governance

• Analise the need for change

• Change of mentality → focus on ones ownresponsability as citizen instead of beingdependant of the government

• Find out what it means to be a goodcitizen zijn (integer - righteous)

• Promote the need and the way for change

POTENTIALLY ALL PEOPLE HAVE

THE CAPACITY TO (HELP) CHANGE

FOR A BETTER FUTURE

CHANGE OF PARADIGM

A- PAST:Good governance = Bad politics → Good politics = Bad governance

NOT SUSTAINABLE!

B- FUTURE:Good governance = the best politics SUSTAINABLE!

In order to realize good governance, it is inevitable to recognize the workings of bad governance and to repair/eliminate all the shortcomings

CHANGE OF CITIZEN’S MENTALITY

SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE FALL OF CORRUPT POLITICIANS

• BRAZIL

• ECUADOR

• PERU

• VENEZUELA

• SOUTH COREA

• CHINA

• ISRAEL/GAZA

• AFRICA

• SPAIN

• ITALY

• GERMANY

• NETHERLANDS

• SURINAM

• ST.MAARTEN

• CURAÇAO

• ARUBA

• 2 Ex-Presidents and dozens of politicians envolved in and sentenced because of corruption (Petrobras)

• President envolved in corruption via Odebrecht

• President envolved in corruption via Odebrecht

• A criminalised state

• Ex-president envolved in corruptiion with e.g. Samsung

• More than 100.000 sentenced because of corruption

• Ex-president/Prime minister envolved in corruption

• Endemic corruption → extreme poverty –wars–health problems, etc.

• Prime minister (?) and partyleader envolved in corruption (55 years in prison)

• Collusion between underworld and ‘upperworld’

• Ex-president (Kohl, c.s.) envolved in corruption

• Regularly cases of corruption in counties (Limburg, etc.)

• A criminalised state (according to investigative report!)

• More than half of parlementarians under suspision of fraud (Ronald van Raak)

• Ex-prime-minister sentenced because of corruption and a ex-deputy (Fabela-case)

• Ex-minister sentenced because of corruption

IT TAKES A COMMUNITY…

1- THE FIRST STEP ON THE WAYTO GOOD GOVERNANCE

Don’t ask what Aruba

can do for YOU,

But what YOU

can do for your country!

2- THE SECOND STEPON THE WAYTO GOOD GOVERNANCE

What does those, who caused

all the problems, should do??• Recognize their fault

• Accept responsibility for the damage they inflicted to Aruba

• Recognize the negative effects of polarisation

• Recognize the need for a new way of practicing politics

• Accept the criteria of good governance as guiding principles

• Determine the short and longterm goals for the well-being of Aruba

• Involve the social partners in a structural way in this new direction

• Determine fixed and responsible criteria for the financial and economic policy

• Work for the unification of the Aruban people for one goal: the general well-being of all

FROM POLARISATION

TO COOPERATION,TO REPAIR

WHAT WE RUINED

PRESENTATION

SOURCES• Info from: Reports of Raad van Advies, SER, Algemene Rekenkamer, CBA, IMF, Commissie

van Lennep, Rapport de Ruiter, Een kwestie van mentaliteit (CdB), enz.

• Those have been elaborated in reports of Stichting Ddeugdelijk Bestuur Aruba:

- Naar een rationeel personeelsbeleid in Aruba

- Naar deugdelijk openbaar financieel beheer in Aruba

- Naar transparant openbaar bestuur in Aruba

- Naar een deugdelijk functionerende volks-vertegenwoordiging in Aruba

- Naar een duurzaam socio-economisch beleid in Aruba

• Suriname: The New Paradigm of a Criminalized State

Issue 3 • March 2017

by Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau

• Venezuela: A Mafia State?

Venezuela has become a hub of organized crime in the region

Written by Insight Crime – Investigation and Analysis of Organized Crime (May 2018)

ALGEMENE ONDERZOEKSTHEMA’S

• Hoe bouw je een 'bestendige bestuurslaag' voor Aruba? In Aruba is er veel verkwisting van bestuurservaring bij de wisseling van bestuurders na verkiezingen. Hoe bereikt Aruba een duurzame vorm van 'institutioneel geheugen' binnen de overheid?

• Hoe versterkt Aruba haar bestuurskracht en wat is daarbij nodig voor de Staten, de Regering, Rechterlijke macht, overheids N.V.'s en NGO's.

• Hoe versterken we de 'checks and balances' in Aruba?

• Wat is idealiter de grootte van het ambtenaren korps voor Aruba?

• Wat gebeurt er in Aruba indien we inhet ambtenarenrecht zouden afschaffen?

• Hoe geven we meer 'stem' aan de burgers van Aruba zodat er meer rekening wordt gehouden met hun belangen dan nu?

MOGELIJKE SCRIPTIE-THEMA’S OGM• Hoe kunnen benoemingen van ambtenaren zo onafhankelijk mogelijk

gedaan worden?

• Hoe kunnen organisatorische risico's van het steeds veranderen van de Landsverordering Instelling Ministeries worden verminderd/voorkomen?

• Waarom komt ‘het kerntaken onderzoek’ nooit van de grond en/of wordt het nooit uitgevoerd?

• Moeten adviseurs van Ministers aan een bepaalde profiel voldoen en aan een maximaal aantal gebonden zijn?

• Hoe doet Aruba het op het gebied van deugdelijk bestuur in vergelijking met andere kleine/vergelijkbare landen (bijv. transparantie)

MOGELIJKE SCRIPTIE-THEMA’S FEV• Is het ambtenarenapparaat van Aruba TE omvangrijk en zo ja, in welke mate?

(Vergelijk hiervoor o.m. met vergelijkbare landen die eenzelfdedefinitie/verwachting hebben omtrent de taak van de overheid).

• Hoe kan het ‘verkrijgingsbeleid’ van Aruba zodanig verbeterd worden dat dubieuzeprojecten worden vermeden?

• Heeft de Arubaanse regering haar middelen effectief/efficient besteed sinds 1986? Ook hier kan een vergelijking met andere landen helpen, bijv. v.w.b. de verhoudingtussen de onderwijsresultaten en de onderwijsbegroting. Op basis hiervan zoukunnen worden nagegaan of er sprake was van verspilling van publieke middelen.

• Leningen door landen worden normaal gesloten voor investeringen die rendementterugleveren waarmee de lening kan worden terugbetaald. Maar als leningenworden gebruikt voor consumptieve bestedingen is er geen sprake van terugverdienen. Bovendien gaan er zo mogelijkheden voor positieve investeringenverloren. Kan worden nagegaan wat voor economische schade Aruba heeftgeleden door het aangaan van leningen voor consumptieve bestedingen?

MOGELIJKE SCRIPTIE-THEMA’S STAATS- EN BESTUURSRECHT-1• Strafrechtelijke ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid

• Financiële ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid (Comptabiliteitsverordening)

• Beperking van politieke grondrechten

• De vrijheid van vereniging en de regulering van politieke partijen

• Regulering van politieke campagnes: een noodzaak?

• De rol van Hoge Colleges van Staat (ARA, Raad van Advies …) voor de bescherming van goed en integer bestuur

• Naar een nieuw grondrecht op toegang tot overheidsinformatie?

• De grondrechten van ambtenaren: beschermingswaardig?

• Rechten en plichten van de journalist vanuit het perspectief van de democratische rechtsstaat en grondrechten

MOGELIJKE SCRIPTIE-THEMA’S STAATS- EN BESTUURSRECHT-2

• Bestaat er behoefte aan de codificatie van het ‘verdedigingsbeginsel’ in Aruba?

• Toezicht en handhaving ten aanzien van de ambtelijke dienst

• Public governance van publiek private samenwerking in Aruba

• Terugvordering van onrechtmatig verkregen staatssteun (subsidies, financiering etc.)

• Overheidsaansprakelijkheid voor foute of ontoereikende voorlichtingen

• Overheidsaansprakelijkheid voor schade als gevolg van gedogen en ontoereikend toezicht (problematiek Volendam/Enschede)

• Private handhaving van publiekrechtelijke normen

• Implementatie van verdragen in de Caribische Landen van het Koninkrijk.

MOGELIJKE SCRIPTIE-THEMA’S STRAFRECHT

• Onderzoeken naar Ambtelijke- en Netwerkcorruptie: aan de hand van de zaken Schotte en van der Dijs, Croes en Paesch en Heyliger, naast die van de Veiligheidsdienstbaas van Sint Maarten...

• In welke mate zijn de praktijken van politieke partijen en politici om hun populariteit, imago en verkiezingssucces te financieren vergelijkbaar met de praktijken die strafbaar zijn gesteld wegens participatie aan georganiseerde misdaad en criminele organisaties

WEBSITE SDBA

WWW.DEUGDELIJKBESTUURARUBA.ORG

http://www.deugdelijkbestuuraruba.org/